Interstate tensions led to greater unity between independent SEA states

in regional cooperation and security. HFDYA with this statement?

IST refers to latent hostility or opposition between sovereign states.
They arise when states are locked in a relationship of mutual distrust. The
statement in the question claims that interstate tensions brought SEA
states closer together in cooperative and security efforts. Newly
independent SEA governments were too fiercely nationalistic and thus
were more belligerent in managing bilateral relations, especially in dealing
with sensitive and contentious ethno-religious and territorial issues. In the
pre-1967 period, the statement in the question was not true, as interstate
tension typically led to conflict and breakdown of regional institutions,
such as MAPHILINDO and ASA. However, with the formation of ASEAN in
1967, member states shared a commitment to regionalism and thus, even
though tensions still existed, they were still able to cooperate on other
issues such as economic development. In the final analysis, interstate
tensions did not lead to greater unity. Rather, it was in spite of interstate
tensions that some progress towards regional unity was made. However,
interstate tensions still inhibited ASEANs ability to manage the regional
environment and ultimately produce a true regional community.
Before the formation of ASEAN in 1967, it was clear that interstate
tensions were leading to greater division among the SEA states, rather
than to greater unity. Prior to the formation of ASEAN, the SEA states had
no obligation to the concept of regionalism. The development bilateral ties
between these nations were frequently stalled by historical, racial,
religious and territorial disagreements that tended to fragment, rather
than provide common ground. For example, Malaysia-Indonesia relations
were put to the test when Indonesia organised the Konfrontasi, an
expression of Indonesias opposition to the formation of Malaysia in 1963.
Direct conflict was involved, with attempted infiltration, sabotage and
terrorist bombings taking place. The underlying reason was Sukarnos
belief that Indonesia should be leader of the Pan-Malayan world in SEA,
which was irreconcilable with the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.
It is evident, therefore, that SEA states pre-1967 did not have any notion,
much less commitment to the idea of regionalism. The result of such
interstate tensions and their manifestations was, in fact, a step back from
progress towards regionalism. In the case of the Konfrontasi, it led to the
failure of MAPHILINDO, the organisation formed by Malaya, Philippines and
Indonesia in 1963. Hence, it is apparent that prior to the formation of
ASEAN in 1967, interstate tensions had in fact provided the impetus for
greater division between SEA states, rather than fostering closer ties.

Post 1967, it can be observed that the SEA states carried more
commitment to the idea of regionalism, and consequently, to the broader
ideal of unity. This shift towards regional cooperation was due, in part, to a
perceived common threat the escalation of conflict in Indochina, and its
possible effects to the rest of Southeast Asia. Unlike overt usage of
military force as seen in the Konfrontasi, the post-1967 SEA saw no
outbreak of military confrontation, no great power involvement in any of
the interstate disputes and importantly, the persistence of ASEAN as a
regional organisation vis--vis previous failed attempts such as
MAPHILINDO. An example is the disagreement between Malaysia and
Thailand regarding their maritime borders. In December 1979, Malaysia
claimed a disputed continental shelf as its own Exclusive Economic Zone.
This overlapped a similar claim by Thailand, which was particular poignant
given the vast depositories of gas/oil and fisheries in the area. Escalation
of conflict was prevented by attempts at resolution from both sides,
culminating in the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, which was
established to coordinate oil exploration and divide the profits equally
between both nations. Evidently, the countries attempted to resolve the
conflict, preventing possible escalation into something far more severe.
Arguably, this was due to the commitment to regionalism which did not
exist prior to the ASEAN, and incidentally, the Bangkok Declaration of its
formation, which affirmed a commitment to the idea of common regional
identity and unity. Thus, post-1967, it could be said that interstate
tensions, and their subsequent resolutions or denouements, were
testament to the greater unity being forged among the nations of SEA.
Again, it was in spite of these tensions that progress in regional unity
persisted, not because of them.
At the same time, it is not to say that interstate tensions held no
significant threat to SEA unity post-1967. Whilst it is true that a
commitment to regionalism now existed as common agenda among the
governments of Southeast Asia, mutual suspicion and hostility did
continue between certain nations. On a less serious scale, these may
manifest themselves as public protests and critical editorials in national
newspapers. However, tensions may also escalate to a point of military
brinksmanship, suspension of diplomatic relations and military joint
exercises and an implicit arms race. An example of still persistent
tensions, albeit on a less serious scale, is the Herzog Crisis of 1986.
Singapore had issued an invitation to the then President Chiam Herzog of
Israel. This led to Malaysia and Indonesia protesting vehemently, given
the delicate situation between Islamic nations and the Jewish state.
Eventually, Malaysia recalled its High Commissioner from Singapore.
Malaysian public and political entities also began clamouring for a

severing of diplomatic ties, as well as expulsion of Singapore from ASEAN,

among other things. Fortunately, however, the leading statesmen from
either nation saw the need for a de-escalation of tensions before it
broached dangerous levels. Lee Kuan Yew stepped in to personally
mediate the situation, and PM Mahathir of Malaysia similarly expressed
desire for the incident to be forgotten. President Suharto of Indonesia also
stepped in. Whereas tensions in the Herzog Crisis did not approach a level
of severity that involved any military confrontation of sorts, it did show
that interstate tensions posed significant threat to the unity of ASEAN,
particularly due to the tripartite importance of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore as the geostrategic core of the organisation. On the other hand,
there was evidence that interstate tensions could, even after 1967,
degenerate very quickly into near military conflict. The Pedra Branca issue
in 1979 was, again, one that involved Singapore and Malaysia. In this
case, it involved claims by either side over a small island outcrop. The
formalisation of the claim became necessary when Malaysia had to define
its territory clearly ahead of the Law of the Sea Convention (1973-84). The
disagreement persisted to a point in August 1991, wherein a joint
Malaysian-Indonesian military exercise called Operation Total Wipeout was
conducted, which included a paratrooper landing in southern Johore, just
18km north of Singapore. Taking this as a provocation, the Singapore
military responded with Operation Trojan, a full out military exercise. Many
threats were thrown back and forth, until eventually, editorials in national
newspapers on either side warned against direct conflict. This in turn
progressed into a mutual agreement between Singapores Goh Chok Tong
and Malaysias Mahathir, to refer the disagreement to a third party the
International Court of Justice. Whilst the ICJ ultimately resolved the issue
by awarding the rights to Pedra Branca to Singapore, the interstate
tensions and their manifestations made it all to clear that they still posed
a very big threat to bilateral relations between SEA states and
consequently, to the unity of SEA as a whole. In particular, this was the
antithesis of the regional cooperation and security envisioned as the goal
for the formation of ASEAN. Even so, it must be noted that the idea of
regionalism, and more importantly, ASEAN, did persist in spite of the
instances of brinksmanship. Therefore, again, it was in spite of interstate
tensions that progress in regional unity persisted, not because of them.
In conclusion, it is clear that, prior or post the formation of ASEAN in
1967, interstate tensions in general did not provide the impetus for
greater unity among the Southeast Asian states. However, their successful
resolutions and in other instances, the choice between either nation to not
let the issue affect cooperation, could be said to be a testament to the
commitment to regionalism and unity. Yet it must be recalled that these

interstate tensions did not directly contribute to unity. It was in spite of

them that SEA unity progressed.