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CASE DIGEST ON CRIMINAL LAW I

RIZOS, KRISTINE LARA E.


1ST YEAR L.L.B.

DEAN MANUEL BUSTAMANTE


GEMMA JACINTO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, G.R. NO. 162540 JULY 13, 2009
FACTS:
Jacinto worked as a collector for Mega Foam International Inc., she did not remit to her employer the check
issued by the latters customer and, instead, deposited it to the bank account of her brother-in-law. The check,
however, bounced. Jacinto was found guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacinto was guilty of qualified theft.

HELD:
No. What Jacinto committed was an impossible crime defined and penalized under Article $ paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides, Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred: 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual
means. All the requisites are present in this case: (1.) Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
qualified theft, which is crime against property; (2.) Jacintos evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for her employer showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched; and (3.) The
crime of qualified theft was not produced because of the extraneous circumstance that the check was unfunded and
was subsequently dishonored.

DATU EDUARDO AMPO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 169091 FEBRUARY 16, 2006
FACTS:
Ampo was found guilty of violation of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 2323 known as Gun Ban.
He insisted that the two receipts issued to him were conflicting and his weapon was covered by a memorandum
which he failed to prove.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners action constitutes a mala prohibita crime.

HELD:
Yes. Comelec Resolution No. 2323 is a special law and a violation of which is in the nature of a mala prohibita
crime. It is a hornbook doctrine that in mala prohibita crimes, the only inquiry is whether the law has been violated.
When the act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

SPO2 LOLITO NACNAC VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. NO. 191913, MARCH 21, 2012
FACTS:
On the fateful night of February 20, 2003 SPO2 Nacnac the accused-appellant, the victim and together with
other police officers were on duty. SPO2 Nacnac had a heated argument with SPO1 Espejo which led to a violent
scenario, killing SPO1 Espejo. SPO2 Nacnac was found guilty of homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstances of the petitioners acts constitutes a valid
self-defense.
HELD:
Yes. The refusal of the victim to follow a lawful order from petitioner , his superior , considering also the
negative words uttered by the victim in response to SPO2 Nacnac, his drunken situation, his profession as being a
police officer and the warning shot fired by the petitioner justifies the acts done as mere defending himself from an
inebriated and disobedient colleague.
The lone wound inflicted on the victim supports that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to
defend himself. It was a reasonable means chosen by the petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of
the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience on lawful order and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERONICO M. LOBINO ALIAS HAPON G.R. NO.
123071 OCTOBER 28, 1999
FACTS:
On April 28, 1994, Lobino alias Hapon stabbed his common-law wife Patricia Abajar. The victim was
brought to the provincial hospital where she died two days later. Lobino filed an appeal to the Supreme Court
contending the decision of the trial court by maintaining mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to
lower the crime from murder to homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Lobino acted with passion and obfuscation in killing his common-law wife.

HELD:
No. There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.
Appellant's insinuations regarding his common-law wife's late night trysts or her lack of concern for a sick
husband are not cogent enough to drive anyone to passion or obfuscation.
Moreover, the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by
a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his normal equanimity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALFONSO FONTANILLA


G.R. NO. 177743 JANUARY 25, 2012
FACTS:
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut
Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called
bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla
desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais,
shouted at him, causing him to run away. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival.
Fontanilla was found guilty of the crime of murder but pleaded for self-defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fontanilla acted upon self- defense.

HELD:
No. Review of the records, the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla and two,
Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone was not proportional to and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victims fistic attack and kicks.
Fontanilla failed to clearly prove the convincing evidence of self-defense, the elements of it. The absence of
the number one requisite of self-defense as to unlawful aggression negates his plea thus found him guilty of murder.

Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of
land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to
inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project
partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by
Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The
judge then approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in
1965.
On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge on
the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case
decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil
Code which provides:
"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either
in person or through the mediation of another:
"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon
an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession".
Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project
partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of
the parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.
HELD:
No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965
2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of
the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion.
There was no showing that Galapon acted as a dummy of Asuncion.
Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got
were insignificant portions of the land.
The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal
transactions.

G.R. No. 175784 August 25, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, vs.JAIME AYOCHOK y TAULI, Accused-Appellant.
F

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