CASE DIGESTED NA

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5
MAR 1992]

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of

representatives of the mass media which are prevented
from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for
office (one for national and the other for provincial office)
in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and
voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being
curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section
11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of
expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition
imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because
it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political
propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's
role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of
public information and public opinion relevant to election
Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space
of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and

television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial

reduction in the quantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act

No. 6646 constitutional.

Held:

Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the

provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press
has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which
may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period i.e., "during the election period."
In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is
clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies
given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the assailed
legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and

information enterprises during an election period, or

whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11
(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability
and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX
(C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does
not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications,
political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs
and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions
and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular
candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not
to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by
candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to
cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free

speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly
repressive or unreasonable.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No.
119694; 22 May 1995]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent

Comelec promulgated Resolution No.

2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space
of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall
be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be
used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks
the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. On behalf of the
respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during
the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial
and
credible
election.

Issue:
Whether or not
unconstitutional.

Comelec

Resolution

No.

2772

Held:

is

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as

unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking
of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover,
the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized
by the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a
national emergency to take private property of newspaper
or magazine publishers.
10.
Comelec has no power to punish for contempt if the Commission is merely
discharging
ministerial duty
The controversy merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has
performed in its
administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by the
Constitution. In proceeding on
this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case,

it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for
such power is inherently
judicial in nature.
11.
Power to punish for contempt inherent in courts
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential
to the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons,
58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs.
Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The
exercise of this power
has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade
Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to
making effective the power
to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power
by an administrative body
in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.
Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re
Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810).