RogelioC.

LascoaJr

June15,2015

1. USON v. DEL ROSARIO

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530
FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued
to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's
common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and
signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and
the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the
decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil
Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law
accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
ISSUE:
Are the contentions of the defendants correct?
HELD:
No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed
from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court
aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her
expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be
the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article
2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only
when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early
part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon
the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted
to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

2. Borja v. Borja
46 SCRA 577
GR. L-28040
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco,
with the CFI of Rizal. He wasappointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose
became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2 nd wife Tasiana before he died; she
instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed
special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana
opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid,
because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with
the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.
HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will
receive P800,000as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and
Josefa. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estateof Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was

merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no
stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a
decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

3. ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and

PONCIANO BONILLA(their father) who represents the minors,
petitioners, vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA,AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and
HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra,
Respondents.
(Bonilla vs Barcena)
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of
Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The herein defendants then
filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the said motion,
the plaintiffs counsel moved to amend the complaint which was granted. The defendants
again filed another motion to dismiss the complaint. The said motion to dismiss was then
heard. On August 19, 1975, plaintiffs counsel received a copy of the order dismissing the
complaint and on the 23rd of the same month; he moved to set aside the said order. The
court denied the MR filed by the plaintiffs counsel which the counsel later on filed a written
manifestation allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to substitute their deceased
mother. From the order, the plaintiffs counsel filed a second MR of the order dismissing the
complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON THE ACTION SURVIVES EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARTY DURING THEPENDENCY OF
THE CASE.
HELD:
Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted
by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under Section 16, Rule 3of the Rules
of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death, and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of
the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to
the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but
was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. In addition, Under
Section17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be
granted." The question asto whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to
quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and
property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the
duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to
appear and to be substituted for her. Thus, the action in the instant case survives.

4. JIMENEZ v FERNANDEZ
184 SCR 190
April 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS

- land in question is the Eastern portion of parcel of residential land with an area of 436 sqm
situated in Barrio Dulig, Labrador, Pangasinan in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez. The entire
parcel of land with area of 2,932 sqm, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin has 2
sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. Fortunato who predeceased his father has only
one child, the petitioner Sulpicia. After the death of Fermin, the entire parcel of land was
registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and
niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso with respective OCTs issued on February 28, 1933. Carlos
died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia
Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436sqm.
- January 20, 1944, Melecia sold said 436 sqm portion to Edilberto Cagampan. Defendant
Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the
Edilberto transferred said 436 sqm portion to the Teodora,who has been in occupation since.August 29, 1969, Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of
the property appertaining toCarlos, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her
deceased uncle. Consequently, TCT was issued on October 1, 1969 in Sulipicias name alone
over the entire 2,932 sqm property.
- April 1, 1970, Sulpicia, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the
recovery of the eastern portion consisting 436 sqm occupied by defendant Teodora and her
son.TRIAL COURT: dismissed the complaint and held defendant Teodora the absolute owner of
the land in questionCA:affirmed in toto, MFR deined
ISSUE
WON Melecia Cayabyab (aka Melecia Jimenez) has right to transfer (Melecia to Edilberto)
(and consequent transfer (Edilberto to Teodora)) over the said property given that she is
illegitimate child of Carlos Jimenez.
HELD
NO
Melecia is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property
in question. Teodora et alfailed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab
was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Assuming that Melecia was the illegitimate
daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia had no right to succeed to
the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to
Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.
-It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777 CC). Moreover, Article 2263 of Civil Code
says Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws,
and by the Rules of Court . . ." Since Carlos died on July 9, 1936, the successional rights
pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Cid v. Burnaman: To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889, a child must be
either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child for
illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)
- Even assuming that Melecia was born out of the common-law-relationship between her
mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an
acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana
Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently
MeleciaCayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional
rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
- Melecia could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto who accordingly,
could not also legally transfer the same to Teodora.
-Melecias possession or of her predecessors
-in-interest would be unavailing against Sulpicia who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos
Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion
now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the OCT was issued.
Benin v. Tuason:
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of
titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of
title.

5. QUISON VS. SALUD

6. ARSENIO DE VERA for himself and as guardian ad litem of the
minors

ARTURO, TEOGINISA, DEOGRACIAS,

VICTORIA surnamed DE VERA,
vs.
CLEOTILDE GALAURAN
67 Phil 273
April 10, 1939

SIMEON,

GUILLERMO

and

Topic/Doctrine: Article 777, Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:
Isabel Domingo Is survived by Arsenio de Vera and six minor heirs. During the lifetime of
deceased wife and herein petitioner, they mortgaged their property to secured a loan from
respondent CleotildeGaularan. According to petitioner, respondent illegally made them to
sign a deed which made them believed to be of mortgage and which later turnedout to be a
sale. Petitioner instituted an action against respondent before CFI of Rizal for the annulment
of the sale. Respondent interposed a demurrer alleging that plaintiffs has no cause of action
for they have not been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. Lower court sustained
demurrer and the action was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs may commence an action for the recovery of property without the
necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status.
HELD:
Yes they may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor.
If the deceased turned out to have debts, the creditors or the heirs themselves may initiate
a special proceeding. The lower court should have granted this petition instead of
sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.