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Spider Web: Al-Qaeda's Link to the

Intelligence Agencies of the Major
Powers
Sergio E. Sanchez
Published online: 15 May 2015.

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To cite this article: Sergio E. Sanchez (2015) Spider Web: Al-Qaeda's Link to the Intelligence Agencies
of the Major Powers, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28:3, 429-448,
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.992753
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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28: 429448, 2015

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ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.992753

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SERGIO E. SANCHEZ

Spider Web: Al-Qaedas Link to the

Intelligence Agencies of the Major
Powers

Some U.S. counterintelligence officials fear that terrorist groups such as

al-Qaeda may employ some of the same tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) of intelligence collection as its state adversaries.1 Indeed, according
to Justin R. Harber, al-Qaeda training media include lessons on how to
collect open source intelligence, conduct surveillance, interrogate detainees,
and recruit agents working in a foreign government.2 Moreover, others
argue that al-Qaeda. . . the most backward, barbaric, bloodthirsty, and
oppressive terrorist group on earthis under-resourced, given the United
Statess . . . massive, sprawling, multi-billion-dollar intelligence gathering
bureaucracy.3
Yet, many, perhaps most, are unaware that al-Qaedas intelligence and
counterintelligence TTPs originated with the intelligence agencies of the
major powers. And while the intelligence agencies of the United States,
Britain, France, and Russia have adapted their TTPs to deal with the
global threats of the day, al-Qaeda and similar groups have also evolved
the fundamental intelligence TTPs they acquired from the major powers to
survive in hostile operating environments.
Sergio E. Sanchez is a member of the adjunct faculty in the Political Science
Department at the California State University at Chico, where he teaches
courses in American government. A former intelligence officer in Germany
with the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, he was previously an
intelligence analyst and strategic debriefer for the Air Force. Mr. Sanchez
received his B.A. from the University of Marylands Maryland College and
an M.A. from CalState Chico.

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Al-Qaedas intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities originated with

the major powers of the 20th and 21st centuries, which have disseminated,
indirectly and for the most part unintentionally through a spider web of
relationships, these capabilities to al-Qaeda. By understanding, and
acknowledging, the culpability of the best intelligence agencies in the
world, intelligence and counterintelligence officials will be better able to
more accurately assess al-Qaedas capabilities and develop appropriate
countermeasures.

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EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON

Understanding the dissemination of intelligence TTPs, directly and indirectly
through a spider web of relationships, from the intelligence agencies of the
major powers to al-Qaeda, can best be done through an analysis of open
source and publicly available, primary sources such as autobiographies,
memoirs, and government documents, and secondary sources such as case
studies and literature reviews, to uncover the web of links involving
intelligence training from the early 1900s to 2001 between the major
powers and Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and ultimately
al-Qaeda. According to Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin, the strength
of [a] case study is that it can take an example of an activityan instance
in actionand use multiple methods and data sources to explore it and
interrogate it. Thus it can achieve a think description of a phenomenon in
order to represent it from the participants perspective.4
Moreover, the utilization of multiple cases can [bring] together more than
one method and perspective (triangulation) [that can lead] to added texture
and greater insight in analysis. This can enhance the validity of the research
results.5
The main goal is to definitively demonstrate that intelligence TTPs shared
by the major powers with various allies and proxies have been disseminated
to various countries=non-state actors, and have ultimately made their way
into al-Qaeda training camps and manuals. The U.S., USSR=Russian
Federation, UK, and France are selected as the major powers to be
analyzed due to their roles in the global arena in the past hundred years.
Al-Qaeda is used as an example because of the organizations resilience
since the Wests Global War on Terror (GWOT) was announced in 2001.
For example, Gaetano Joe Ilardi has highlighted the fact that
the worlds ongoing counterterrorism effort against al-Qaeda is
unparalleled in its magnitude, allocation of resources, and level of
international cooperation. [Moreover,] the hazards for al-Qaeda are
exacerbated by the nature of its operations, which have proven both
ambitious and complex. Extensive planning and logistical preparations

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have been required, along with the direct involvement of a large number
of operatives.6

Yet the organization has survived the assassination of its leader, Osama bin
Laden in 2011 and the killing of many of his lieutenants, and continues to
pose a threat to U.S. national security.7
A better understanding of the genesis of al-Qaedas intelligence and
counterintelligence capabilities will assist analysts and pundits to more
accurately assess al-Qaedas skills by helping overcome any nave attitudes
stemming from the organizations provincial origins, or any biases of
Orientalism, the subtle and persistent prejudice against the Orient in
general, but specifically the Middle East, as described by the late Columbia
University professor Edward W. Said.8
This analysis highlights three clear instances where intelligence TTPs were
indirectly disseminated to al-Qaeda by the major powers. Unfortunately, the
shortage of quantitative information, as well as the limited qualitative data
from primary sources, due in large part to the sensitive nature of the topic,
makes an all-inclusive case study extremely difficult to compile.
IRAN, HEZBOLLAH, AND AL-QAEDA
At the beginning of the 20th century Irans military intelligence was
considered ineffective by the Iranian government, which resulted in the
introduction of French military intelligence officers to shore up the armys
skills. 9 According to General Hussein Fardust, it was only after
well-experienced French teachers were brought into the country that
Iranians learned the ABC [sic] of intelligence at the newly-established War
University. French officers taught Iranians how to collect information
about the enemys army, their positions and plans, and how to contain
[the] enemys penetration attempts . . . .10
Moreover, even after the departure of French personnel from the War
University prior to the outbreak of World War II, Iranian instructors
continued to teach French intelligence TTPs, thanks to French Intelligence
manuals that were translated into Persian.11
Presumably, French TTPs were employed until 1957, when the Iranian
State Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) was formed, after
considerable effort by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The
SAVAK was created, in part, to guard against the Soviet Committee for
State Security (KGB) and the Soviet Military Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU), which had penetrated the Shah Mohammed Reza
government after he came to power in 1941. 12 SAVAK, which was
structured similar to Western intelligence organizations at the time, sent
officers to receive intelligence and counterintelligence training in the U.S.,

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and later in Israel. 13 According to William H. Sullivan, the last U.S.

Ambassador to Iran, although we never [knew] exactly how many
full-time professionals the [SAVAK] embraced, [the U.S. governments]
best estimate put the total [number of Iranian intelligence officers]
somewhere in the vicinity of six thousand.14
Additionally, according to General Fardust, a former Deputy head of the
SAVAK, British intelligence assisted the Shah in creating the Special
Information Bureau (SIB), an Iranian intelligence organization designed to
serve as a clearing house for intelligence, similar to the British Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC).15 Fardust was assigned to set up the SIB,
having traveled to London to receive specialized training that familiarized
him with British intelligence operations and procedures.16 Included in the
training was intelligence and counterintelligence training, as conducted by
British intelligence.17 Also significant is the fact that British intelligence
selected several candidates for the new organization;18 presumably some of
the candidates were also working directly for British intelligence, perhaps
as penetration agents who would give MI-6 undue influence over SIB.
Consequently, any training that SIB members received from British
intelligence was likely absorbed by post-revolution Iranian intelligence, as
was the case with CIA-trained SAVAK agents.
Interestingly, Britain created its own secret network of intelligence
collectors, under the SAVAK, which MI-6 oversaw independently from the
CIA, utilizing traditional British intelligence TTPs. 19 MI-6s network
demonstrated that British intelligence knowhow, specifically human
intelligence (HUMINT), was directly disseminated to Iranian agents.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the new government abolished
SAVAK. According to Ali Tabatabai, who served as press counselor at the
Iranian Embassy in Washington, D.C., under the Shah, the SAVAK was
replaced by the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (SAVAMA)
shortly after the revolution. 20 The existence of SAVAMA was later
confirmed by Behzad Nabavi, an Iranian government spokesman, who
stated that Revolutionary Iran needed an intelligence agency, but one that
did not stray from religious precepts. 21 Moreover, Ali Tabatabai noted
that SAVAMAs organizational structure, which consisted of nine bureaus,
was almost identical to the organizational structure of SAVAK. 22 For
example, both organizations included bureaus to handle such matters as
. . . cover personnel, collection of foreign intelligence, collection of
domestic intelligence, surveillance of its own agents and security of its own
agents and security of government buildings, communications, finances,
analysis of collected intelligence, counterintelligence, and recruitment and
training.23 More important still was the fact that SAVAMA maintained
many of the SAVAKs rank-and-file members, replacing only some of the
organizations previous chiefs.24 By maintaining SAVAK personnel, the

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new Iranian government was able to maintain a continuity of CIA and MI-6
TTPs originally entrusted to the Shahs security service.
The post-revolutionary Iranian intelligence establishment incorporating
SAVAMA and other security organs was reorganized, and made to rest on
twin pillars: the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran,
the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, and the Revolutionary
Guard.25
The Onset of the Party of God
Meanwhile, post-revolutionary Iran began to support Hezbollah (the Party
of God) in the summer of 1982 after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli
forces.26 Iran supplied approximately 2,000 IRGC soldiers in 1982 to serve
as the nucleus of Hezbollah, a number that swelled to approximately 5,000
by the end of the 1980s.27 Moreover, according to Carl Anthony Wege,
Iran has been one of the most consistent sources of external support for
[Hezbollah] in terms of bureaucratic links, operational support, finance,
and political guidance.28 Of note is Irans operational support, which has
included using intelligence networks operating out of embassies to support
terrorist activities.29 Additionally, Iranian intelligence runs training camps
to support operations of Islamist-oriented terrorist organizations. 30
Interestingly, the security apparatus developed by Hezbollah, which
numbered in the hundreds of operatives, provided its leadership with
regular intelligence reports, 31 thereby emphasizing the intelligence
capabilities that in large part can be attributed to training by Iranian
intelligence.
In time, Hezbollahs capabilities came to the attention of al-Qaedas
leadership who sought to increase their own capabilities. And, while some
experts disagree over the relationship between al-Qaeda, a Sunni
organization, and Hezbollah, a Shia organization, others have noted that
both groups have in the past allied against common enemies.32 For example,
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, former U.S. National Security Council
staff members, noted that a small group of al-Qaeda members visited
Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon in the mid-1990s. 33 Furthermore,
according Ton Hays and Sharon Theimer, Ali Mohammed, a former
Egyptian intelligence officer, and later a U.S. Army sergeant, who in 2000
pleaded guilty for his role in providing counterintelligence training,
surveillance reports, and other support to al-Qaeda, Hezbollah agreed to
provide training to al-Qaeda in exchange for money and manpower.34
Indeed, direct relations between al-Qaeda and Iran were established while
Osama bin Laden, the organizations leader, was living in Sudan circa the
early 1990s.35 As part of the agreement, Iran agreed to provide al-Qaeda

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with explosives, intelligence, and security training through what Matthew Levitt
and Michael Jacobson have referred to as Shiite entities, which presumably
meant Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.36
Troubling still, however, is the fact that circa 1995 Russias Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR), the successor to the KGB, provided the latest
methods of intelligence training to the Iranian MOIS, 37 training that
would be of immense value to Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.
Lastly, according to Eben Kaplan, U.S. and European intelligence reports
dated circa 11 September 2001 (9=11), noted that Hezbollah and al-Qaeda
were collaborating in money laundering, gun running, and various types of
training.38 While the current status of the relationship between al-Qaeda
and Hezbollah is unknown, given sectarian violence between Shia and
Sunni in Iraq and Syrianotice should be taken that a relationship existed
in the past between both organizations, a relationship that involved
intelligence training. Indeed, according to a U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) document released by Wikileaks, and subsequently published by the
New York Times, Assessment of Afghanistan Travels and Islamic Duties as
they Pertain to Interrogation, counterintelligence techniques were . . . at
least discussed even in the most basic training programs.39 Therefore, at
least some intelligence and counterintelligence training was arguably shared
between Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, intelligence knowhow that was originally
entrusted to Iran by the major powers.
In sum, the CIA and MI-6 helped establish the Iranian SAVAK under the
Shah and trained its personnel in intelligence and counterintelligence TTPs
prior to the revolution of 1979. The post-revolutionary Islamic government
retained SAVAK personnel as it established relations with Hezbollah,
which benefited from intelligence training and support. Hezbollah, in turn,
shared training and support with al-Qaeda in exchange for funds and
manpower. The United States has therefore indirectly and unintentionally,
through a spider web of relationships, provided intelligence and
counterintelligence skills to al-Qaeda via Iran and Hezbollah.
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND AL-QAEDA
Pakistans Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Directorates connection to the
British should come as no surprise, given that the Pakistani army emerged
out of the British Indian army after India gained its independence from the
British Empire in 1947.40 In fact, Major General R. Cawthome, a British
army officer, formed the Pakistani ISI Directorate in 1948, after the
unsatisfactory performance of Pakistani intelligence during the Indo-Pakistani
War over Kashmir in 19471948.41 Moreover, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
notes that the senior echelons [of the Pakistani army] were still British
officers who had opted to stay on [after independence], and importantly,

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they were in turn succeeded by their native clones, men who saw the army as
a unique institution, separate and apart from the rest of civil society and
authority.42 Thus, any intelligence training that British officers possessed
at the time of their transfer to the Pakistani military was more than likely
disseminated to their subordinates and successors. In other words,
Pakistans ISI has been infused with British Intelligence TTPs since its
inception.
In time, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and ISI developed a
working relationship, which began during the Nixon Administration, and
focused on the Khalistan movement in the Punjab 43 a campaign to
establish a separate and independent Sikh state of Khalistan in the Indian
state of Punjab.44 Perhaps the best-known relationship between the ISI and
the IC involved the CIA and the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s.
According to Gartenstein-Ross, the relationship between the CIA and ISI
developed on the ISIs terms, with Zia [the president of Pakistan from
1978 to 1988] minimizing contact between the Americans and the Afghan
mujahideen. This arrangement was mutually advantageous. It gave the
Americans plausible deniability, gave the Pakistanis access to a large
amount of American money, and allowed Pakistani officials to forge their
own relationships with the mujahideen.45
Additionally, the relationship between the ISI and the CIA resulted in the
enhancement of the ISIs covert intelligence capabilities.46 For example,
several ISI personnel received intelligence training in the U.S., and the CIA
also attached experts to the ISI as operational advisors.47
Likewise, the ISI established contacts with large numbers of mujahedeen
commanders, supplying them with weapons, 48 and presumably at least
some rudimentary intelligence training, given the nature of the Pakistani
organization as an intelligence agency. For example, agents would have to
be trained in surveillance and counter-surveillance of targets; maneuvering
undetected behind enemy lines; clandestine communications; and
conducting battle damage assessments, among other basic intelligence
practices. Additionally, more advanced intelligence tradecraft would have
had to be provided to some mujahedeen for the purposes of agent
handling and intelligence collection in Soviet-occupied areas denied to the
Pakistani ISI and the CIA. Moreover, during this time the ISI established
a relationship with Osama bin Laden, the future leader of al-Qaeda.49
In 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, and with
it the U.S.s covert support for the mujahedeen ended. However, the American
endeavor, as noted by former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, resulted
in short-term gain for longer-term pain,50 meaning that the immediate gain
achieved by the U.S. in supporting the mujahedeen would cause lasting
problems for the country. For example, in his memoir Musharraf laments
that

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We helped create the mujahideen, fired them with religious zeal in

seminaries, armed them, paid them, fed them, and sent them to a jihad
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We did not stop to think how
we would divert them to productive life after the jihad was won. This
mistake cost Afghanistan and Pakistan more dearly than any other
country. Neither did the United States realize what a rich, educated
person like Osama bin Laden might later do with the organization that
we all had enabled him to establish.51

Later, in May 1996, bin Laden arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, along with
various Arabs who had left the country after the Soviets had withdrawn.52
And while Musharraf asserted in his 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, that
al-Qaeda and other radicals including Uzbeks, Bangladeshis, Chechens,
Chinese Uygurs, and Muslims from south India, Europe, America, and even
Australia started to arrive in Afghanistan to help the Taliban cause,53
Mark J. Roberts has suggested that Pakistans motives for supporting bin
Laden were to solidify the Talibans control over the country, and then
establish training camps for Kashmiri militants.54 In fact, the ISI allegedly
asked Saudi Arabian Intelligence for prior permission to sponsor bin Laden
since the ISI received Saudi funds to operate madrassas in Pakistan, and did
not want to sour its relationship with the Kingdom.55 And while Musharraf
suggests that bin Laden was in Afghanistan merely to assist the Taliban,
Robertss assertion that the relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan
was more complex seems accurate. For example, the ISI requested
permission from the Saudi Kingdom to sponsor bin Laden, an important
point because by this time the Saudi government disapproved of Osama and
may have attempted to assassinate him.56 But bin Laden had the ability to
establish training camps and attract large numbers of radical followers who
could assist the ISI in waging a covert war against India in Kashmir, which
was exactly what the ISI wanted, and therefore justified its requesting
permission from the Saudis who might have been offended if not
consulted.57 In fact, according to Roberts:
Pakistani support to Kashmiri jihadists fundamentally changed the
nature of the struggle. . . . Pakistani backing enabled the Kashmiris to
sustain and expand what other- wise might have been a limited and
short-lived struggle. This expanded the conflicts scope by helping
organize and insert large numbers of foreign militants into the
struggle. The foreign fighters were trained in the killing fields of
Afghanistan and paid and supplied by ISI. As late as 2002, 25 to 50
percent of the terrorists fighting in Kashmir were ISI-recruited foreign
fighters, not Kashmiris.58

Furthermore, Roberts notes that ISI personnel did not limit themselves to
funding al-Qaeda training camps, but also actively participated in training

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militants.59 In fact, in 1998, when then-U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered

missile strikes against al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in
retaliation for the organizations role in the bombings of U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, bin Laden escaped but several ISI officers were
killed in the attack.60 Given the fact that Pakistani intelligence officers
were actively training militants in al-Qaeda training camps, and based on
the fact that intelligence officers instructed courses, the training they
provided most probably included ISI and CIA TTPs because those
techniques were known to both the ISI and Hezbollah, and both
disseminated their intelligence knowledge to al-Qaeda. This conclusion is
further supported by author Lawrence Wrights claims that al-Qaeda ran
several camps focused on intelligence and counterintelligence training.
Wright also noted that intelligence training was part of al-Qaedas course
offerings at camps in Afghanistan prior to 9=11.61
The ISIs relationship with al-Qaeda persisted until 2001, when the U.S.
issued an ultimatum.62 According to former President Musharraf, U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated strongly that
. . . not only that we [the Pakistani government] had to decide whether we
were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the
terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone
Age. This was a shockingly barefaced threat, but it was obvious that
the United States had decided to hit back, and hit back hard.63

Despite that warning, according to Gartenstein-Ross, the ISIal-Qaeda links

continued as late as 2008, as noted by U.S. documents provided to the
Pakistani government linking at least one retired ISI intelligence officer
with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.64
In sum, as with Iran, Pakistans ISI Directorate was created and staffed by
British army officers whose intelligence knowledge formed the core of the
organization. Later, the ISIs intelligence TTPs were enhanced by CIA
training as both the ISI and CIA battled, by proxy, the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the ISI
established links with the mujahedeen, and to an eccentric millionaire by
the name of Osama bin Laden. After the withdrawal of the Soviet army
from Afghanistan, the ISI maintained its relationship with former
mujahedeen, including bin Laden, as it fought a covert battle with India in
Kashmir. The ISI had funded, supplied, and trained the Taliban, al-Qaeda,
and other groups of radical militants that made their way to Afghanistan
during the 1990s as part of their covert war against India in Kashmir.
Thus, intelligence TTPs were in all likelihood proliferated from ISI, which
itself originated with the British, and included TTPs from the CIA, as part
of the spider web of intelligence relationships among the major powers and
their allies, to al-Qaeda.

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EGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND AL-QAEDA

Around the year 1910, in order to maintain colonial rule amidst growing
nationalism in Egypt, the British government directed the creation of an
Egyptian secret police apparatus that would centralize police intelligence
and analysis under one organizationthe Central Special Office (CSO).65
Moreover, the British, French, tsarist Russias Okhrana (the predecessor of
the Soviet KGB),66 and other European powers established intelligence
relationships with the CSO in order to improve the organizations
intelligence capabilities and gain influence with the Egyptian leadership.67
In so doing, the great powers transmitted their intelligence TTPs to the
Egyptian mukhabarat (Arabic for intelligence), continuing the spider web
of intelligence partnerships.
Initially, the British administration selected and installed the CSOs
director.68 In this way, Britain helped direct the Egyptian governments
intelligence collection efforts until the late 1930s when British influence
began to decline, 69 paving the way for the American government to
increase its influence over the Egyptian monarchy.70
Shortly after the 1952 coup detat which ousted the Egyptian royal family,
the new regime created the General Investigations Directorate (GID) with
expanded security powers, capabilities, and more importantly, direct
control over the intelligence process. 71 The GID sought to maintain a
relationship with the newly-established CIA, benefiting from American
intelligence training and funding.72 Included were CIA training manuals
that were disseminated to Egyptian officers, a noteworthy aspect given that
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypts leader from 19561970, had been earlier
reprimanded for passing a training manual to the Muslim Brotherhood.73
While the type of manual Nasser had passed to the Brotherhood is unclear,
at least some military manuals were in fact making their way to the
organization.
In fact, by 1953, senior Egyptian officials had discussed intelligence
suggesting that the army and police had been infiltrated by the Muslim
Brotherhood. 74 The Brotherhood, which spread throughout much of
Egyptian society,75 had also penetrated Egyptian intelligence by this point.
For example, Egyptian nationalist intelligence officers supported the
Brotherhood because certain of its elements were working with them in
a covert war to oust British forces from the Suez Canal Zone between 1952
and 1953.76
Further, in 1954 the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) was
created, maintaining intelligence ties with the CIA.77 During this time the
U.S. funneled millions of dollars to Egypt and the mukhabarat, some of
which were used to battle elements within the Brotherhood which, by this
point, had fallen out of favor.78 However, by 1956 the CIAs relationship

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with the Egyptian government, specifically with President Nasser, had

deteriorated to the point where the Agency wanted to remove him from
power.79 By this time Egypts foreign policy was notably turning towards
the Soviet Union, 80 giving the USSR greater influence in the region by
virtue of its relationship with a large Muslim country.
In 1958, a formal intelligence relationship was established between Egypt
and the Soviet Union, a relationship that involved the KGB providing
intelligence training to the Egyptian mukhabarat.81 Moreover, by 1967, the
KGB was a major player in Egypt, at the cost of American influence,
a development which reflected Nassers sentiments about the CIA.82
Shortly after Nassers death of natural causes in 1970, Vice President
Anwar al-Sadat took the helm of government, which some claim was in
part due to his relationship with the CIA.83 That after becoming the new
leader of Egypt, Sadat began distancing his country from the Soviet Union
and aligning more with the West, which included mending ties with the
CIA, should therefore come as no surprise.84
While the mukhabarat was rekindling ties with American intelligence, the
Egyptian Brotherhood began to fragment, with some more radical members
splintering from the main organization into smaller cells.85 One group was
Munazzamat Al Jihad, also known variously as Tanzim al Jihad, Egyptian
Islamic Jihad (EIJ), or simply Jihad, an offshoot of al Tahrir al Islami
itself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhoodwhich in 1981 was
responsible for Sadats assassination.86 Notably, Sadats assassin was an
Egyptian military officer,87 highlighting how the military, and presumably
other organs of state, were penetrated by radical elements. Indeed, a
leading member of EIJ was Abud al-Zumur, a retired lieutenant colonel
from the Egyptian Military Intelligence Department (MID),88 who by virtue of
his position was trained on the intelligence TTPs by both the CIA and the
KGB, and thus strategically positioned to share his knowledge with his
compatriots.
Another key personality in EIJ was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,89 who later
traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet invaders, and while
there met the Saudi Osama bin Laden. 90 The two formed a personal
relationship in the mid-1980s, with Zawahiri serving as bin Ladens
personal physician, and later a professional activist relationship which
lasted throughout the 1990s, subsequently merging al-Qaeda and EIJ in
2001 under the banner of al-Qaeda.91
Bin Ladens nascent organization benefited from al-Jihads expertise in the
1980s and 1990s. For example, an Egyptian special forces colonel, Saif alAdel, arguably possessed knowledge of intelligence and counterintelligence
TTPs, based on both his military rank and the nature of his function as
a special forces officer, assisted bin Ladens group in their fight against the
Soviets and later in their jihad against the U.S.92 In 2001, Saif al-Adel was

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indicted in New York for providing intelligence and counterintelligence

training to al-Qaeda and al-Jihad in support of their war against
America.93 Likewise, a former Egyptian major, Ali Mohammed, assisted alJihad in the 1980s by passing U.S. Army training manuals he acquired while
stationed as a supply sergeant at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of the
U.S. Special Operations Command, and later trained bin Ladens men on
intelligence and counterintelligence TTPs.94
In sum, the Egyptian mukhabarat was initially trained in Western
intelligence practices by the British government, then enhanced by France,
Russia, and other European powers before the American government
became Egyptian intelligences main benefactor. Later, under Nasser, the
Soviet KGB replaced the CIA as the mukhabarats key ally before Sadat
once again reestablished ties between Egyptian intelligence and the CIA.
During this time the Muslim Brotherhood penetrated various organizations
and had supporters in others, including the military and the intelligence
services. As noted, the Brotherhood later splintered, leading one of its
offshoots, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, to join with Osama
bin Laden and al-Qaeda. This chronology illustrates how intelligence and
counterintelligence TTPs were disseminated by the major powers to
Egyptian intelligence, which then, indirectly or directly through a spider
web of relationships, passed them to the Muslim Brotherhood, which
ultimately shared its knowledge with its al-Qaeda partners.

UNWISE SPREAD OF WESTERN TTPs CONTINUES

The U.S., Russia, UK, and France have indirectly, and some times directly,
disseminated to al-Qaeda, and organizations like it, the intelligence TTPs
that have later been used to harm the West. While the U.S. and its allies
have attacked al-Qaeda central, killed bin Laden, and disrupted the
organizations ability to safely plan and execute attacks, much of
al-Qaedas institutional knowledge, with regards to intelligence and
counterintelligence TTPs, has been digitized and uploaded to the
Internet.95 For example, the 180-page al-Qaeda training manual, Military
Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, which includes chapters on
counterfeiting, weapons training, security and espionage, can readily be
downloaded.96 Prior to the widespread use of the Internet, the manual had
to be replicated manually, handwritten page-by-page, a time consuming
task, but that is no longer the case.97
Likewise, the widespread dissemination of al-Qaeda intelligence TTPs has
been noted in such places as Jordan, where in 1999 security officials
discovered a six-volume set of training manuals on CD-ROM. 98 This
discovery was disconcerting because it highlighted the ease and availability

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of intelligence training TTPs, allowing them to be made available to both

state and non-state actors, such as the Democratic People Republic of
Korea and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which
seek knowledge of the intelligence and operational TTPs of the major
powers.
More disconcerting still is the Wests continued dissemination of intelligence
and counterintelligence TTPs to unstable, and=or at a minimum, questionable,
allies whose motivations and loyalties can and will change, and which might
further disseminate Western intelligence methods to the detriment of the
U.S. and its allies. For example, President Bill Clinton signed an intelligence
finding authorizing the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
to train Palestinian Authority security personnel. 99 At the time, Yasser
Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and
President of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), feared inadvertently
strengthening adversaries within the PLO and therefore decentralized his
intelligence services into two competing organizations, one located and
operating out of the West Bank and the other in the Gaza Strip.100 After
Arafats death, the Gaza Strip fell under the control of Hamas, an offshoot
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,101 while the West Bank is controlled
by Fatah, under the PA. 102 Thus, Hamas now controls the Palestinian
intelligence organization in Gaza, with its CIA and FBI trained intelligence
officers. Yet, this is only the latest iteration of cooperation between the
major powers and Palestine, with the USSR supporting the PLO in the
1960s, and more recently Russias President Vladimir Putin offering to assist
Hamas in defiance of the West.103
Additionally, American intelligence organizations have trained and
equipped Iraqi intelligence, which has been penetrated by state (Iran) and
non-state actors, and further disseminates Western intelligence TTPs.104 In
fact, the Iranian government, through its IRGC and other intelligence
organizations, has been one of the U.S.s major antagonists in Iraq, both
training and funding insurgents, as well as meddling in Iraqi internal
affairs. 105 In so doing, Iran is utilizing its acquired TTPs, as well as
developing and enhancing its organic intelligence capabilities. Given
Iranian ties to Hezbollah, whatever intelligence TTPs Iran develops or
enhances to fight the Westor even collaborate with it in the muddled
Middle Eastwill make their way to Hezbollah.
Similarly, the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
members have trained and equipped the intelligence and security services
of Afghanistan, which like Iraq, have arguably been infiltrated by hostile
intelligence, specifically Iran and the Taliban. 106 Moreover, as U.S.
intelligence and NATO prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, their
departure is creating a security vacuum with former assets becoming free
agents for hire.107

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Lastly, U.S. intelligence is, as of this writing, training and equipping the
security services of Libya, 1 0 8 and training rebels in Syria. 1 0 9 The
disconcerting aspect about U.S. efforts is that the loyalties of those
involved cannot be guaranteed, and while the security interests of the U.S.
and those it trains may currently align, that alignment cannot be
guaranteed for the foreseeable future given the fluidity of events on the
ground in both Libya and Syria.
In sum, the U.S. and its allies perhaps unwisely continue to disseminate
intelligence TTPs to friendly, yet questionable, allies whose motivations to
work with the U.S. are dynamic and unstable. Americas allies today have
the potential to be its enemies tomorrow, or at minimum, passive-aggressive
states that sponsor, or facilitate, terrorism against the West. The U.S.
trained the security services of the PA, part of which are now under the
control of Hamas, an ardent opponent of U.S. allies in the region and
hostile to America. Likewise, the U.S. is currently training the security
services of Libya, an unstable country, Afghanistan, an unstable country,
and rebels in Syria, a war-torn country. Will Americas actions come back
to harm its citizens? In other words, will the U.S. reap what it sowed?
UNDERESTIMATING THE OPPOSITION
Al-Qaedas intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, as well as those
similar non-state actors, tend to be perceived as unsophisticated, given
their meager resources, when compared to those of the major powers. But,
many intelligence officers and government officials are either nave about
al-Qaedas ability to absorb and adapt intelligence TTPs indirectly
acquired from the major powers through a spider web of relationships and
other links, or tend to have a prejudice towards the region (Orientalism).
Intelligence and counterintelligence officers must now fully realize that
al-Qaedas capabilities are formidable, given their origin, and should adjust
their own TTPs to address the threat more effectively.
Future research should focus on other instances where intelligence TTPs
were disseminated to allies, or friendly regimes, only to be transferred to
entities that seek to harm the West. Moreover, policymakers should focus
more resources to better understand the long-term effects of training
unstable or capricious partners on intelligence, counterintelligence, and
other operational TTPs and then perform a cost-benefit analysis to
determine if the transfer of intelligence training is in the best interest of the
U.S. Additionally, for those instances where policymakers must act, steps
should be taken in order to reduce the possibility or impact of any
blowback. Long-term strategic analysis regarding the dissemination of
TTPs is necessary, given that the average time in office for a President
of the U.S. is five years, and the average length of service for Secretaries of

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Defense and State is less than that.110 This means that almost any important
decision made by one administration will have to be addressed by its
successor, a situation that highlights the need for long-term studies that
outline the pros and cons of sharing intelligence operations knowhow.
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2
Ibid., p. 223.
3
Robert Tracinski, Al-Qaedas Intelligence Service, RealClearPolitics.com, 2
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4
Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin, eds., Theory and Methods in Social Research,
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Lisa Harrison and Theresa Callan, eds., Key Research Concepts in Politics &
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Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Al Qaedas Operational IntelligenceA Key Prerequisite
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7
Brian Katulis, Understanding the Threat to the Homeland From Al Qaeda in
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8
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).
9
Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former
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10
Ibid., p. 196.
11
Ibid.
12
William H. Sullivan, Savak, in Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton,
1981), pp. 9499; Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 3,
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13
William H. Sullivan, Savak.
14
Ibid., p. 96.
15
Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former
General Hussian Farhust, p. 146; Michael S. Goodman, Learning to Walk: The
Origins of the UKs Joint Intelligence Committee, International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 4056.
16
Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former
General Hussein Fardust, pp. 149164.

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SERGIO E. SANCHEZ

17

Ibid., pp. 162164.

Ibid., p. 161.
19
Ibid., pp. 175178.
20
Michael Getler, Khomeini Is Reported to Have a SAVAK of His Own;
Khomeini Reported to Have Own SAVAK-Style Agency, The Washington
Post, 7 June 1980; Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.
21
Reuters, Around the World; Iranian Says Secret Agency Isnt Like Savak
Under Shah, The New York Times, 1 June 1981.
22
Michael Getler, Khomeini Is Reported to Have a SAVAK of His Own.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.
26
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
Vol. 17, 1994, pp. 151164; Graham E. Fuller, Iran, Lebanon, and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict, in The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991), pp. 119135.
27
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization; Sean Anderson and Stephen
Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow
Press, 2009).
28
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization, p. 157.
29
Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.
30
Ibid.
31
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization.
32
Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship, Council on Foreign
Relations, 14 August 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-andnetworks/al-qaeda-hezbollah-relationship/p11275.
33
Ibid.
34
Dina Temple-Raston, The Closer, in The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna
Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), pp.
8194; Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship; Ton Hays and
Sharon Theimer, Egyptian Agent Worked with Green Berets, Bin Laden,
Associated Press, 31 December 2001.
35
Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, The Iran-Al-Qaeda Conundrum,
Washingtoninstitute.org, 23 January 2009, available at http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum.
36
Ibid.
37
Bill Gertz, Russian Agents Teach Iranians How to Spy, The Washington
Times, 11 September 1995, available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/
409352119?accountid=10346.
38
Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship.
39
U. S. Department of Defense, The Governments Guide to Assessing Prisoners,
The New York Times, 24 April 2011, p. 2, available at http://www.nytimes.

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445

com/interactive/2011/04/24/world/guantanamo-guide-to-assessing-prisoners.
html.
40
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem, The Journal of
International Security Affairs, January 2009, pp. 112, available at http://
www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/gartenstein-ross.php.
41
B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers,
2002); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
42
Ibid.
43
B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 46.
44
Virginia Van Dyke, The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and the
Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions,
Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 6, November 2009, pp. 975997.
45
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
46
B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 46.
47
Ibid.
48
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?, Joint Force Quarterly, 16 March 2010, pp. 18, available at
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA517856; Pervez Musharraf, In the
Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 208.
49
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?
50
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 208.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid., p. 212.
53
Ibid.
54
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?
55
Ibid., p. 106.
56
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11
(New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 161162.
57
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
58
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State? p. 107.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11,
p. 303.
62
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?
63
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 201.
64
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.

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65

Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the

Mukhabarat, 19102009 (London: Routledge, 2010); Owen L. Sirrs,
Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects, Intelligence and
National Security, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2013, pp. 230251.
66
Benjamin B. Fischer, Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial
Police, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 19 March 2007,
available at http://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
csi-publications/books-and-monographs/okhrana-the-paris-operations-of-therussian-imperial-police/5474-1.html.
67
Owen L. Sirrs, Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects.
68
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009.
69
Ibid., p. 16; Owen L. Sirrs, Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and
Prospects.
70
Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: the CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the
Middle East, Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 5, November 2004, pp. 663701;
Owen L Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009.
71
Ibid., p. 29.
72
Ibid., p. 34.
73
Ibid., p. 24.
74
Ibid., p. 36.
75
Ibid.; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.
76
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, pp. 4243.
77
Ibid., p. 44.
78
Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in
the Middle East, p. 678.
79
Ibid., p. 680.
80
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, 51.
81
Ibid., p. 65.
82
Ibid., Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert
Action in the Middle East.
83
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, p. 117.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid., p. 142.
86
Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism,
pp. 456457.
87
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009; Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and

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the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East; Lawrence Wright, The Looming
Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.
88
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, p. 143.
89
Ibid., Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid., Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism.
92
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11, p. 129.
93
U. S. Department of Justice, United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden Et Al.
(New York, 18 October 2001).
94
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11, pp.
181182.
95
Abdul Hameed Bakier, Jihadis Adapt to Counter-Terror Measures and Create
New Intelligence Manuals, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 14, 13 July 2006,
available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]
=837&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1.
96
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11; Dina
Temple-Raston, The Closer.
97
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11,
pp. 302303.
98
Ibid., p. 297.
99
Shlomo Shpiro, Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in the
Middle East, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,
Vol. 17, No. 4, Winter 20042005, pp. 575600; Jim Hoagland, Friends of
the CIA, The Washington Post, 7 April 2002.
100
Shlomo Shpiro, Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in the
Middle East.
101
Central Intelligence Agency, The World FactbookWest Bank, 7 April 2014, p. 227,
available at https:==www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
we.html; Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism.
102
Central Intelligence Agency, The World FactbookWest Bank.
103
Talal Nizameddin, Squaring the Middle East Triangle in Lebanon: Russia and
the Nexus, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, July 2008,
pp. 457500.
104
Neil MacKay, Irans Spies, Sunday Herald, 24 December 2006, available at
http://search.proquest.com/docview/331301170?accountid=10346.
105
Richard Spencer, Wikileaks: How Iran Devised New Suicide Vest for Al-Qaeda
to Use in Iraq, The Telegraph (London), 23 October 2010; Sudarsan Raghavan
and Robin Wright, Iraq Expels 2 Iranians Detained by U.S., The Washington
Post, 29 December 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122901510.html.
106
Neil MacKay, Irans Spies; Shehzad H Qazi, The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency
& the American Endgame in Afghanistan, Institute for Social Policy and

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Understanding, 18 April 2011, available at http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/

586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.
107
Kimberly Dozier, Exclusive: CIA Falls Back in Afghanistan, The Daily Beast
(Kabul, Afghanistan), 4 May 2014, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/05/04/exclusive-cia-falls-back-in-afghanistan.html.
108
Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, and Michael S. Schmidt, Attack in Libya Was
Major Blow to C.I.A. Efforts, The New York Times, 12 September 2012.
109
Greg Miller, CIA Ramping Up Covert Training Program for Moderate Syrian
Rebels, The Washington Post, 2 October 2013, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-ramping-up-coverttraining-program-for-moderate-syrian-rebels/2013/10/02/a0bba084-2af6-11e38ade-a1f23cda135e_print.html.
110
Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Washington,
DC: CQ Press, 2011), p. 3.

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