Consti 1 Trans

Constitutional Law 1
Based on the Lectures of Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as
Transcribed by Wigmore 2013-14

Headed, Compiled, and Edited by Eng Delicana
Constitutional Law 1 2
Atty. Jumao-as Lectures
Editors Notes:
This is a compilation of the transcriptions of the lectures of Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as. It
has long been settled that the best way to pass this class is to record and transcribe the lectures of
Atty. Jumao-as since everything that will be coming out of the exam simply comes from her
lectures and her notes.
This piece is a product of the teamwork, patience, and perseverance of the the 1-Wigmore
batch of 2013-14. Simply put, this piece could not have been made into fruition had we not
worked together for this project. Similar to the whole law school experience, teamwork and
helping one another is the best way to achieve the goals each one of us set.
.
By the way, you might notice na may mga kulang-kulang na parts. And some parts may
not be as easily understood as the other parts. But put in mind na libre ra ang paghatag ani na
transcript. So wala kay right mureklamo. Kung mureklamo ka, pag transcribe ug inyuha. Simple
as that. ^_^
Lastly, whoever receives a copy of this is blessed to have friends in the right places. But
it is still recommended that your class transcribes her lectures. There might be new pieces in her
lectures this year which are not included in our edition. And some of the information here may
not be 100 percent correct. Better to transcribe as a class and use this piece to cross-reference. In
short, ayawg tinamad! Hehehe.
Transcribed by 1-Wigmore 13-14

So, in particular well be discussing the Philippine Constitution. What is therefore a Constitution? It is a body of rules
and maxims in which the powers of the sovereignty are habitually exercised. It therefore dictates on how, when, or what powers
the sovereignty can exercise. That definition would cover both written and unwritten constitution. The Philippine Constitution in
particular is defined as an instrument by which the powers of the government are established, limited, and defined and by which
these powers are distributed. With that definition, we can see that the Constitution is both a source of power, grant of power, and
an alienation of power. Its the instrument which establishes, defines, and limites government powers. It is, in the case of the
Philippines, the fundamental law of the land by which all other laws, acts, enactments of the government must conform with.
Otherwise, these acts or laws are null and void. What then is the purpose of enacting a Constitution? Do we need to have a
Constitution? If we are to be an organized society, the answer is YES. The Constitution would be the agreed precepts or body of
maxims. We would agree on what basic rules and principles we will obey. What would then be the purpose of the Constitution?
To establish the structure of the government or form of government.
To define, establish, or distribute the powers of the government. Do we give it to an individual person? Do we divide
it? That is in the Constitution.
To establish the basic principles of which the sovereignty would be governed. In our case, we believe in the principle of
separation of Church and State. We believe that the civilian is supreme over the military. Otherwise, if we dont put
that there, military rule will be allowed.
Now, as the basic fundamentally law, it is supposed to be the basis of all other enactments. In the Philippines, we have this
hierarchy of laws and enactments. Above in the hierarchy is, of course, the Constitution. We also have laws, international or
executive agreements or treaties. Being under the hierarchy, they must also comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
Example of those laws are Republic Acts, Commonwealth Acts, Batas Pambansa, Presidential Decrees. Who enacts the
Presidential Decrees? It is, by the term itself, enacted by the President. When we say laws, they are supposed to be enacted by the
legislative authority. Meaning, under our framework, only the department which we give the authority to enact laws will be able
to enact laws. In our case, it is the Congress. But how come I wrote here Presidential Decrees? Because in the time of Marcos, he
was given legislative powers. During the Martial Law, Marcos also exercised legislative authority. So this should be qualified
(Presidential Decrees enacted by Marcos). Another one, Executive Orders. Who issues Executive Orders? The President. Why is
it here? Was there a time in our history that an EO was considered a law? When President Corazon Aquino was acting under
pursuant to the powers granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution. During that time, the Freedom Constitution granted her
legislative authority. So this should also be qualified (the Executive Orders issued by President Aquino). Otherwise, this would
not be considered as laws. These would be administrative issuances. These are now the hierarchy of laws. What else? Presidential
Proclamations, Memorandum Circulars, Administrative Orders. These are issuances by the Executive Department. Because of
this hierarchy, administrative issuances must conform with the law which it implements. And that law must conform with the
Constitution.
Another issuance? Ordinance by LGUs (Local Government Units). LGUs under our structure also has the authority to
legislate local laws which we call ordinances. So it is in the bottom of the hierarchy.
The principle is that all these, being at the bottom of the Constitution, must conform with the SUPREME AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE LAND which is THE CONSTITUTION.
Now, may I ask you, are you familiar with the Constitution? Have you seen the Philippine Constitution? It is mandatory in our
high school curriculum and college curriculum. But the question is: has it been taught to you? Have you opened the Philippine
Constitution? Thats our problem. As Filipinos, we lack that particular patriotism. We dont even know the basic Bill of Rights.
These are all in the Constitution. All we know that there is the President, the Vice President, Congress, Senate, and judges. But
do we know how they are related to one another? That is all in the Constitution.
So that is our Constitution. Basically, it is what all laws must conform to. Otherwise, they are null and void. But there are no
penal provisions in the Constitution. It does not provide for punishment. Thats the function of criminal laws.
Now, who is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution? In our structure, it is the Congress which enacts laws, the
President which implements laws, and the Judiciary which says that certain acts or laws conform with the Constitution. So that is
our basic separation of powers.
So when we study the Constitution during the entire first semester, we will not only be reading the provisions but also
the Supreme Court decisions because these are the body of decisions or interpretations by the Supreme Court. Therefore, there is
some truth in the saying that the Constitution is what the judge says it is. Example, Puno was about to resign. His resignation was
supposed to be a few days before the next Presidential Election. So the Constitutional question there is who is supposed to
appoint the next Chief Justice because our Constitution says that the president is the one who says who the next Supreme Court
Chief Justice is. Who is supposed to appoint the next Chief Justice when the vacancy occurred a few days before election? Is it
the incumbent but outgoing president? Or is it the incoming president? Now who will answer the question? The answer will be
the interpretation of the Constitution. And since we say it is the Judiciary, then the Constitution is what the Judiciary says it is. So
we just have to trust in the wisdom of the Judiciary. But later, you will discover that they will get it wrong sometimes, but not all
the time.
So a constitution could be classified according to its form, according to how it came about, and according to how it can change or
amended. According to form, it can either be written or unwritten. On how it came about, it can be enacted, conventional, or
cumulative or evolved. According to how it can be changed, it can be rigid or flexible. So how do we classify or Constitution? It
is written, conventional, and rigid as we will all know why later.
Qualities of a good written constitution:
Broad-it should be comprehensive enough to cover all possible contingencies. Would our 1987 Constitution be still applicable
in 2050, in the year 3000? If it is still applicable, then our Constitution is broad.
Brief-it is the basic and fundamental, all must conform with it. It should not provide for the dealings of legislation. The
dealings of legislation is the function of Congress. It is the Congress which decides laws depending on the needs of the
contemporary times, what should be amended, some problems which were not thought of prior to the enactment of law. But if
they should change a law, it should still conform with the Constitution.
Definite-it should be clear, it should not be vague. Otherwise, it should lead to chaotic situations. So far, there are still no
provisions in the Constitution which is declared vague. Because, so far, the Supreme Court has interpreted it in such a way that it
is acceptable.
Those should also be the characteristics of your ESSAY ANSWERS. Broad, comprehensive enough. Brief, not 3 pages
long. And definite, you have a definite point, you have a definite stand.
Essential parts or basic parts of a good written constitution:
Constitution of liberty-There should be provisions or acknowledgement on civic or political rights of the citizens.
Constitution of government-there should be parts which provide for the structure and function of the government.
Constitution of sovereignty-there should be provisions on amendment or revision.
Our Constitution, therefore, is basically a good written constitution. Only that there are parts which violate the broad,
brief, and definite rule. Its not so brief. If you read it, there are very wrong parts as if the writer is making a speech. If not, there
are those that are like poems or literary works. These should not have a place in a constitution.
How do you understand Constitutional Construction? How do you understand the word construction?
INTERPRETATION. Since you are now law school students, you should now use the word CONSTRUE. Construction means
interpretation. So what is the proper Constitutional Construction? The Construction should be to give effect to the intent of the
framers. How do we know the intent of the framers? You look at the history, why they enact this provision. If you cannot tell in
with the history, then you go to extrinsic aids. What are extrinsic aids? They could refer to records of the constitutional
convention.
Now, is it self-executing? The provisions are self-executing. It is prospective in application, not retroactive. It is
mandatory, not directory.
As far as we can recall in our history, we were conquered by Spain in 1521 to 1898. We were under the Spanish rule
for 300+ years of Spanish rule. When did the American rule begin? 1899 by virtue of the Treaty of Paris up to 1946. Thats 47
years. Thats 300+ years of Spanish rule against only 47 years under American regime. It was only within those 47 years that we
were introduced to constitutionalism. Because before that, there was no constitution to speak of. In the Spanish rule, we were just
ruled without granting us any right under any constitution. Now, from 1899 to the current year, thats 114 years versus 300+
years under the Spanish rule. So imagine how influential the Spanish era was with regards to our culture and our system of
government. We had to change it. In fact, drastically from the Spanish rule up to the American regime and up to our
independence where we were given the authority or the right to decide for ourselves.
We had our constitution, first constitution written by ourselves in 1935. We had a Malolos constitution in 1899 but it
never saw the light of day. So it was really in 1935 that we drafted and ratified our own constitution. So in 1935 to 2013, we can
see how young our idea and our experience of a constitution is. Our idea of constitutionalism started with the entry of the
Americans. So we had that Schurman Commission who were a group of officers sent by the American president to study
constitutional condition of the Philippines. Their objective was to make a recommendation to America. They discovered that the
Filipinos were aspiring for independence but were not yet ready. But the good recommendation is that they recommended that
there should be a change on civil government because, before that, we were under military government. Thats why we had the
Sooner amendment. Based on the recommendation, it was now the American president which exercised administrative
supervision over the Philippines. Still, there was still a military government. It was only until the second Philippine Commission
(aka Taft Commission) wherein we were now working under a civil government. The Taft Commission headed by Howard Taft
is now the legislative authority of the Philippines. So imagine in that time that the ones making laws for us were congressmen of
America. It was included there that there will be an enactment of municipal and provincial orders and codes. We were now
slowly established as municipalities and governments. By virtue of the Taft Commission, we were given our own Judicial
system.
After the Taft Commission, came the Philippine Bill of 1902. So it was a relevant enactment of the Taft Commission. It
was also known as the Cooper Act. The Philippine Bill of 1902 is actually the first organic act or organic law in the Philippines.
The salient features of that bill are as follows:
-Term Filipino was defined.
-Bill of rights for Filipino.
-Appointment of Filipinos to represent the Philippines in the US congress.
-Establishment of a Philippine assembly. But it never came to be.
-Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916. Also known as the Jones Law. It was the first official commitment of the US to grant us our
independence. It provided for the framework for the creation of an autonomous government in preparation for our independence.
The Americans made good of this promise because, by 1934, the Philippine independent act was enacted or the TydingsMcDuffie law. It was an act which granted the Philippines independence subject to a transitional period. By 1934, we were
allowed to have our own government and to draft our own constitution. But we were still under a transitional period of 10 years.
So the Philippines drafted the constitution quickly and had our own constitution by 1935. But since we were still under a
transitional period, we were called a Commonwealth Government. If you observe, the laws enacted during that time were called
Commonwealth Acts. Supposed to be, the transitional period was for 10 years. But it never came to be because the Japanese
occupation happened. We were granted independence only in 1946.
Thereafter, we were already independent and the Americans left. We were governed by our constitution. But the
constitution was drafted on volatile ground, to please the Americans. If they were happy with our constitution, they would grant
us our independence. So, there was unease. There was a feeling that it was only drafted to comply with the US bids. There was a
clamor for an amendment of the Constitution. So, the amendment happened in Javellana vs Executive Secretary. Now, as a
background, Javellana vs Executive Secretary has two parts: the plebiscite cases and the validity of the 1973 Constitution.
*Recitation*
*Insert Javellana Digest*
The bottomline is, they were still in the stage of determining of whether or not to give due course to the petition.
Majority voted to dismiss the petition. The ultimate decision was to not give due course to the petition. In other words, they
turned a blind eye to the validity of the petition. Since there was no majority to say whether or not it was acquiesced in by the
people or to say whether or not it is already in effect, and since they voted to dismiss it, there is no more legal obstacle to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. If you read Bernas, he said History will be the judge of Javellana vs. Executive Secretary.
But, we must accept it that it was decided under difficult times, under threat of life, risk for safety and security. It might
not have been the best time to be patriotic. But you can see how it was done. Thats why under our 1987 Constitution, we were
very cautious. And there was also no legislature that time. All of them were in hiding. But, it was immaterial because we were
still in Martial Law. It was what Marcos said it was. Thats why I want you to appreciate our 1987 Constitution.
So we had our People Power Revolution in 1986. By virtue of it, Proclamation No. 3 was authorized, which was the
transitional provisional constitution aka the Freedom Constitution. Under Proclamation No. 3, Aquino had both executive and
legislative authority because there was a deadline on the submission of the 1987 Constitution. So when did the 1987 Constitution
take effect?
*Recitation*
De Leon vs Esguerra involves the question of which constitution to follow for certain provisions. Would they follow
the old constitution or will they follow the 1987 Constitution. So they had to determine when the constitution took effect. The
issue was between Feb. 2, the date of the plebiscite, or Feb. 11, the date of results. So, is it during the date of the plebiscite or the
date of the result? The argument of the latter is that you cannot know if it was ratified unless you know the result. So that should
be the day of ratification. But the transitional provision provides that the Constitution will take effect only upon ratification of
the people pursuant to the votes casted during the day of the plebiscite. The votes were casted on Feb. 2, so that should be
the day of ratification. The proclamation of the results on Feb. 7 was only the official announcement of the results.
Elements of the State:

1. People
2. Territory
3. Government
4. Sovereignty
People. It must be of such a number sufficient for the continued existence of the State. The State would usually define
who will be its citizens because its citizens will be entitled foremost to the States protection. On the flip side of the coin, the
citizen, while entitle to the States protection, is bound to the laws of the State. There are some that are specific to the citizens of
the State. Wherever they may be found, even outside of the territory of the Philippines, there are laws which will follow them.
Territory. Pertains not only to the physical aspect of the State. It includes the land, the water, and the airspace. These
are the physical attributes of a State. Now territory may sometimes be not yet settled as to boundaries. Sometimes, there are
disputes when it comes to boundaries. Sometimes, a portion of the territory is being occupied by another sovereign. But in these
cases, it doesnt necessarily mean that the entity failed to comply with the idea of a State. It still remains to be a State
notwithstanding that there are temporary problems when it comes to territory. Even if the entire territory is being occupied by
another sovereign provided that the occupation is merely temporary, it retains its characteristic as a State.
Reagan vs. CIR
There was a claim that the transaction which happened within the US military base no longer form parts of the territory
of the Philippines. That was the argument and therefore he can no longer be taxed by the Philippines. Now, the Philippines is an
independent and sovereign country. Thus, its laws are applicable in all corners of its territory. All are bound by it. If there are
some instances that some people are not bound by its laws, its because the Philippines consents to that. So that there is such a
concept as autolimitation precisely because we have the legal capacity of self-determination. It also includes the legal capacity of
self-limitation or restriction. The general premise is that our control in power is inlimitable within our jurisdiction. If a portion of
our territory is granted to allow their sovereign, it does not mean that portion becomes alien, of alien nature in that when you go
to the military bases, you will now present your visa. It retains its characteristic as native soil. It is still part of our territory but
precisely theyre allowed there because we have the sovereign capacity to allow them to stay there but it is still within our
territory.
With regards to foreign embassies, there is already international acceptance that they do not form part of the territory of the other
sovereign but is regarded as the territory of the host State. For example, an attach commits a crime within the embassy premises,
he still has committed a crime but he is not liable or prosecuted because the State consented to that and because it is the will of
the State that these certain kinds of persons will not be prosecuted. But it does not mean that they did not commit a violation of
our laws. If its not an attach committing a crime within that embassy premises, can the State, the host State prosecute him for
violation of its laws? Yes, precisely because thats still within our territory. So thats territory for you.
Government. It is the instrumentality by which the will of the State and its functions are expressed. Or the State
functions through the government. When we talk about government, the Republic of the Philippines is the entity by which the
functions of the Philippine government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands and it includes various arms through
which the political authorities made effective in the Philippines whether pertaining to the central government, the provincial
municipal branches, or other forms of government (Section 2 Revised Administrative Code).
When we talk about government, national government, it refers to those three great departments established by the
Constitution which are the executive, legislative, and judiciary. When hear about municipal corporations or local governments, it
only talks about organized local governments such as provinces, cities, or municipalities including baranggays. When we related
as a State with other countries, the government referred to is only the national government.
Now the government is the entity by which the powers and functions of the State are exercised. Now what are these
functions?
Government classifications:
1. Constituent
Mandatory functions of the government which forms the very bonds of society. In other words, these are the bonds by
which precisely the government is established. Basic mandatory functions and compulsory functions of the government.
Examples are: regulating property relations, property rights, maintenance of peace, prevention of crimes, foreign relationship and
affairs, determination of the political right of the citizens, administration of justice. These are the functions that cannot be
relegated to private entities. Can you imagine a State wherein the police force is a private entity? No because maintenance of
peace is a main function of the State. There are States which allow private police force but it doesnt mean that it can do away
with its own police force.
2. Ministrant
Are those that are optional functions of the government. These are the functions that the government may or may not
exercise to promote the general welfare of the society, for advancement of the society.
Those were the classifications in the case of Bacani vs NACOCO. Now the case happened in 1956. So that is an old
classification. Those were the distinctions in Bacani vs. NACOCO.
But in ACCFA vs. CUGCO, the Supreme Court said that the distinction becomes obsolete, if not practical because
there were some ministrant functions that were considered mandatory because of the increasing complexity and the demands of
modern times. For example, in Bacani vs NACOCO, you would say that public education, public works, public health which are
for the general welfare of the people are not governmental functions but rather ministrant functions. Thats in the definition under
Bacani vs. NACOC. But in the latter case ACCFA vs. CUGCO, these functions promoting the general welfare are now
considered mandatory because times have changed, the needs and the demands of the modern times are more complex, we are
now tending towards social justice. In fact, it is now provided in our Constitution, say, the right to education. Its mandated to
provide free education at least in the elementary level. So it is now mandated by the Constitution that these functions are no
longer considered ministrant but are now considered constituent. The better term therefore is governmental functions as against
proprietary functions. We will see this when we study State immunity. In other words, constituent or ministrant is no longer
applicable.
Another classification of government is on the basis of its legal existence:
1. De jure
Established pursuant to the legitimate sovereign or authority of the legitimate sovereign. For example, under the 1987
Constitution, a government, the officers can only be placed in power pursuant to an election.
2. De facto
Established in defiance to the legitimate sovereign. The Constitution does not prescribe occupation as a legitimate form
of change of government. So, in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez, when Japan occupied the Philippines and formed a
government for the Philippines, that is not pursuant to the authority of the legitimate sovereign, therefore it is considered as a de
facto government. In the case, the Supreme Court enumerated kinds of a de facto government:
1. Usurps by force or voice of the majority. If the people will revolt against the government and change the leaders.
2. Established and maintained by invading military force. Example is the Japanese military occupation in the case of Co Kim
Cham.
3. Established as an independent government by the inhabitance of the country. A government is formed in defiance of the
general order.
As in the case of Co Kim Cham, all acts not pertaining to political acts or not pursuant or in violation to political laws
are considered as valid.
The next question for our discussion is the characteristic of Aquinos government. Is it a de facto or a de jure
government? We said last night that it is a de jure government because it was established by the people, the authority of the
legitimate sovereign and the legitimate sovereign is the people. But we knew that because the revolution became successful. If
the revolution failed and we werent able to establish a constitution, that government would be a de facto of the first kind.
So, in Lawyers League, the Supreme Court dictated that the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
question but its a political one. It is within the realm of the people to decide. Sovereignty is the will of the people and legitimate
authority emanates from them. Thus, if the people say it is a government, then the Supreme Court cannot say otherwise. The
Supreme Court is merely a delegate of the people. That is also in In Re: Bermudez.
*Recitation In Re: Puno*
A revolution is a complete overthrow of a government by those who were previously subject to it. It is also defined as a
sudden and radical change in the government or political system. Usually, it is accompanied by violence or some act of violence.
Is that which occurs when the legal order is defied and is replaced with a new order. Now the government of Aquino is achieved
in violation of the 1973 Constitution. There is a drastic change in government not pursuant to the 1973 Constitution but in
defiance to it. Is revolution a right? Yes because the people have the inherent capacity to change its government, to change the
policy of the government to effect radical reforms to its system. But theres a qualification for that. The people can only do that if
the legal constitutional methods of making those changes have proved to be inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.
The general premise is that we have a legal procedure for effecting change. But when this legal procedure are no longer adequate
as in the case of Martial Law, then we have the right to assemble. Im emphasizing this because, ordinarily, the people should not
revolt because we have a system. Had the people power failed, the people would have been prosecuted for insurrection and for
inciting rebellion. Lawmaking power actually lies in the people. The original legislative authority is within the people. The legal
maxim is salus populi est suprema lex the voice of the people is the supreme law. In fact, in our Constitution, it says that
sovereignty lies in the people and all authority emanates from them. So Aquinos government is revolutionary, an entire new
entity, but de jure.
What about the government of Arroyo? The legitimacy of Arroyos government was questioned in Estrada vs. Desierto.
*Recitation Estrada vs. Desierto*
The question in this case revolves around the legitimacy of Arroyos government. The government of Aquino came
into power through a revolution in defiance to the 1973 Constitution. The case is a political question because they cannot refer it
to any law and in the constitution. Therefore, it was the people who decided it for themselves. In Arroyos government, it was
pursuant the revolutionary power of the people that is actually cited in the 1987 Constitution. So the Supreme Court, in the case
of Estrada vs. Desierto can refer it to an existing law and therefore it is a justciable case. In other words, Aquinos is
extraconstitutional. In the words of the Supreme Court, it orbits outside the loop of the Constitution. On the other hand,
Arroyos government is intraconstitutional.
Aquinos government is an overthrow of the entire government or change of the government. In fact, the case of In Re:
Puno, the Supreme Court said that it is a completely new entity. But in Arroyos government, it was only a change of one
department of the government. In fact, only one person. So thats the difference between the two governments. Is Arroyos
government de facto or de jure? In fact, it is de jure.
Sovereignty. Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in the State by which that State is
governed. Inherent power of the State to control its affairs and even relate with other nations.
-if it pertains to the part of the State to controls its domestic affairs.
-refers to the relations with other States.
In relation to sovereignty under Article 16 particularly Section 3, it is provided that the State may not be sued without
its consent. This basic postulate, whether or not it is enshrined in the Constitution, refers to the recognition of the sovereign
power of the State. It is an express affirmation that the State is insulated from the jurisdiction of the courts. You cannot file a
claim against the State. The juridical practical norm is that the State can do no wrong. The practical right is that there can be no
longer rights that can be claimed against the authority that which grants the right. How can you claim the right from the entity
which grants the right? It is sometimes a ground for dishonesty because the State can always claim that it cannot be sued even if
it is a legitimate claim. Should we consider this principle as abhorable? No because it is out of necessity that he principle is born.
Why? If the State is allowed to be sued, it will be faced with multiple suits as many as there are persons, juridical or natural, with
a right to sue whether or not it has a legitimate claim against the State. Then it will defeat the functions of the government. The
idea is that the effects of suing the State will be far greater than the inconvenience brought by its unsuability.
*Recitation China National*
As discussed in this case, there are two doctrines on sovereign immunity.
1. Classical/Absolute-the sovereign, without its consent, cannot be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. But it
has changed because of changes in the acts of States. Some states have now engaged in activities and affairs which are not purely
governmental but pertains something of an enterprise, commercial, or what we call proprietary.
2. Restrictive-provides that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only when the acts are public or when the acts are jure
imperia of the State but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
In order to determine the immunity of the State, the first to determine is if it is engaged in a governmental function or a
proprietary function. The Philippines adheres to the restrictive doctrine. The first question is that when will you consider an act a
suit against the State. The general rule is that the suit is a suit against the State when ultimately the enforcement of the decision in
the case will require an affirmative act by the State such as the appropriation of money or funds in payment of that judgment. In
other words, the suit is not a suit against the State if there is no money judgment or financial requirement for the State to
appropriate funds for the payment of the judgment.
DOH vs. Philpharmawealth
In that case, Philpharmawealth engaged in the distribution and selling of drugs. It regularly participates in biddings of the DOH.
It requested the DOH to accredit a certain drug. But DOH did not act on that request until such a time that there was a bidding on
that drug. They still participated in the bidding and, in fact, it was the lowest bidder. However, because it was not accredited to
supply the drug, DOH granted the bid to another corporation (YSS). Thus, they filed a case.
There were asking for three kinds of relief:
1. Injunction for the court to annul the bidding.
2. Mandamus is to mandate. For the court to direct DOH to award the bid to Pharmawealth
3. Damages for failure to act for its request
But we will focus on the first two. So is it a suit against the State? The Supreme Court said it is not. The relief being
asked did not require the State to perform an affirmative act such as appropriating funds in payment of the judgment.
Pharmawealth was not seeking relief to require DOH to pay them some money. So it is not a suit against the State.
The next question is, who is then the State? If it is impleading against the Republic of the Philippines, then it is a suit
against the State. But rarely do lawyers implead the Republic of the Philippines as the respondent. Because the Philippines would
just exercise its immunity. So what do you do as the lawyer? You implead the government official. If you file a suit against a
department of the State, you determine if it is incorporated or unincorporated.
-Does it charter on its own? Then it has a juridical personality separate and distinct from the State. It is its own
person. Usually, charters grant government entities the capacity to sue and be sued.
-it has no juridical personality separate and distinct from the State. It is attached to the State. For example,
DOH, DePEd, DOJ. They have no personality separate and distinct. So in that case, usually it will be a suit against the State.
So in the case, DOH is unincorporated but the Supreme Court said that it can be sued. Why? Because the character of
the suit is not something that can be considered against the State.
So the next action is to implead government officials. If you cannot file a case against DOH, then you just file a case
against the Secretary of Health. Can you do that? It depends. There will also be a criteria to determine if, ultimately, it is a suit
against the State.
State Immmunity
So we said that the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory. The immunity from suit is only restricted to jure
imperii or governmental acts. But it does not extend to jure gestionis or proprietary acts. And well know if it is a suit against the
State if the ultimate liability falls upon the State to perform certain positive acts such as appropriating funds to satisfy judgement.
But if you say government office or instrumentality, it is relevant to know if it is incorporated or unincorporated government
agency because the latter has a personality separate and distinct from the State itself. So it has its own charter. And, usually,
charters would provide that they can sue and be sued. And it may not be a suit against the State.
Now going to public officials, the general rule is that, when it comes to public officials, the suit against him will
prosper or will be allowed because even the Constitution allows for judicial review of the acts of government officials because
the Constitution provides that public office is public trust. So they are liable for suits. But what we should determine is if the suit
against the public official is a suit against the State. Then the immunity will apply. So a suit against a public official is a suit
against the State if the ultimate liability falls upon the State. For example is a money judgement. The other way of saying is that it
will not be a suit against the State if the defendant or respondent is a public official if:
1. The relief demanded by the Supreme Court is no affirmative discharge to any obligation which belongs to the State in
its political capacity.
Examples: if the suit is one for ejectment of a public official in a money judgement where theres already an
appropriation and then the public official is not releasing the money; an official discharges, in his official capacity, acts which are
not authorized or will cause injury to the rights of others (see DOH vs Philpharmawealth).
2. When the person is not sued in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, then the suit will be allowed.
DENR vs CA
A motor vehicle was apprehended by the DENR carrying illegally sourced timber. The owner brought an action for
replevin for the recovery of the motor vehicle and the timber. Now, is it a suit against the State? The Supreme Court said that
even if the suit is against a public officer, they were sued in their official capacity because when they apprehended the motor
vehicle, they did so in their authority and by the authority of the State. So, in that case, it was a suit against the State and the State
cannot be sued without its consent.
PASI vs Trinidad
PASI has been assigned an orbital slot for its satellite. Then the undersecretary of DOTC awarded it to another, an
unknown bidder, the same orbital slot. So PASI filed a case not against DOTC but against the undersecretary. In this case, is it a
suit against the State? No because the act of the public officer was an act beyond her authority. And the plaintiff in this case did
not ask for liability or indemnity from the State but merely for injunction and nullity of the award. Had it been that there had been
damages sought, then it may have been considered as a suit against the State.
Now, lets say if it is a suit against the State, since we adhere to the restrictive theory, it is important to know whether
the public official is performing a governmental act or a proprietary act.
PROVI vs TESDA
TESDA is a body attached to the Department of Labor. They train and accredit skills. Part of that is they issue ID cards.
The provider is PROVI. TESDA failed to pay for the ID cards. PROVI filed a suit to claim for payment. Does the immunity
apply? Yes because TESDA is an incorporated government agency attached to the Department of Labor. And then it is
performing a governmental function. The fact that it contracted with PROVI does not mean that it engaged in business. The
contract they entered into with PROVI was in relation to its governmental functions.
When a suit is against the State, the immunity is not absolute because Article 16, Section 3 provides that the State may
not be sued without its consent. Therefore, if the State consents, then it may be sued. Types of consent:
Express Consent -- given pursuant to a law, an enactment because it is only the congress which can allow suits to be
filed against the State. Consent given by the lawyer of the State is not recognizable. (See Act 3083)
The law says that the State consents to be sued provided that the money claim is first filed in the Commission on Audit.
Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
There is a certain security agency which contracted with the DA. The security agency fails to pay the statutory benefits
of the security guards. NLRC decided in favor of the guards because the labor code mandates these statutory benefits. NLRC
decided to make the security agency solidarily liable with DA. DA refused to pay on the ground of State immunity. Are they
immune? Yes because it is a government agency performing a governmental function and incorporated. It did not consent to be
sued. The Supreme Court discussed in that case that money claims should first be filed with the COA.
There are also special cases when the law grants a person the right to be sued in behalf of the State. You have to be a
special agent to be granted such a right.
Merritt vs Government
Merrit met an accident by an ambulance owned by a government hospital. A law was enacted to authorize him to file a
suit against the State. The Supreme Court said that the fact that the State consented to be sued doesnt mean that there is
acknowledgement of liability. In that case, the ambulance driver did not act as a special agent of the government therefore the
State is not liable for his acts.
Implied Consent when the State enters into a contract or initiates an action. In these two instances, it can be said that
the State descends to the level of an ordinary individual or an ordinary person therefore opening itself to counterclaims and
defenses of the other party. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability. Only
contracts which refer to commercial and proprietary acts serve as a waiver to non-suability. Contracts which are in accordance
with governmental functions do not operate as a waiver to non-suability.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
Republic initiated a complaint against Negros Oriental Golf and Country Club for the reconveyance of some shares in
the country club owned by Benedicto. They actually sequestered the shares of Benadicto alleging that these shares were illgotten. A reconveyance was filed but it turned out that the membership fees required for owning those shares were not paid. They
failed to return the shares or pay for the amount. They claimed non-suability. The Supreme Court said that it was Republic who
first initiated the action. Therefore, the State opened itself up to possible defenses and counterclaims. It has impliedly consented
to be sued in relation to those shares of stocks.
So a government agency performing governmental function may not be sued without its consent. But are there
instances when all these are present but still cannot claim immunity? Based on jurisprudence, the doctrine of State immunity
cannot be used to perpetrate injustice against a citizen.
EPG Construction vs Vigilar
DPWH is an agency of the State, incorporated, and performing governmental functions. But, in this case, the Supreme
Court said that it is not immune from suit based on the doctrine that State immunity cannot be used to perpetrate injustice against
a citizen. In this case, DPWH entered in contracts with several contractors and construction companies for a housing project. The
contract was only up to a certain stage. It so happened that, after that, there is no appropriation for the completion of the contract.
By virtue of a verbal assurance by DPWH that appropriation is forthcoming, they continued with the completion of the project.
Here, the Supreme Court said that the State cannot hide under the invisibility cloak of immunity. It must be pierced because, in
this case, it will cause injustice to the builders. How come they allowed it in this case unlike in PROVI? Because there was verbal
assurance, there were demand letters under a recommendation from the undersecretary. And the money was actually allowed to
be released by the secretary of DPWH. More importantly, the State has already enjoyed the fruits of the houses built.
Furthermore, the structures were already there. They didnt start from scratch. They only needed to finish what was stipulated in
the contract.
Another instance where the immunity cannot be invoked by the State even when all the elements are present is when
the government takes property for public use which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation. The taking of
property for just compensation is an exercise of the States power of eminent domain. Under the Bill of Rights, the State cannot
claim property without payment of just compensation. In this case, the State takes a private property for public use. The owner
has the right to sue for payment because it is mandated by the Constitution.
ATO vs Sps. Ramos
Spouses Ramos found out that a portion of a runway actually belonged to them. The negotiated with ATO which is the
one administrating the airport in Baguio. They came to an agreement to enter into a legal sale. Later on, ATO failed to pay. So
Ramos filed for them to pay. ATO was now claiming immunity. ATO cannot invoke non-suability because it is not performing a
governmental function although it is a government agency. The management of airports is not an exclusive prerogative of the
State. So in this case, the State was running a business. The more important reason is that this is an example of taking private
property for public use which should not have been done if there is no expropriation proceeding. Since the State took it before
any expropriation, the State should pay the amount to Spouses Ramos.
Lets say the State has consented to be sued and theres an existing claim and theres judgement against the State. If the
Court finds against the State, is the State ultimately liable? The answer is that suability is different from liability. The principle is
that, if the State consents to be sued, it agrees for the complainant to prove his claim. But it ends there. The duty of the Court
ends with the rendering of judgement. No court can order the State to appropriate or pay the complainant because it is in the
Constitution that public funds may only be released for appropriation and appropriation may only be had through a law. You
cannot misappropriate public funds other than which the law provides for. So if you have that judgement in your favor, what is is
your recourse? You file your claim with the Commission on Audit. The COA will determine and may recommend for
appropriation. Thats why in the case of Department of Agriculture vs NLRC, they had a judgement in favor but they had to
recourse with COA pursuant to Act. 3083. They cannot right away ask for execution and garnishment. Neither can the judge and
the courts do that.
NHA vs Heirs of Guivelondo
The Supreme Court said that the funds of the government to pay the expropriation proceedings by the NHA can be
garnished because the NHA is unincorporated government agency. It has a personality separate and distinct from the government,
it has its own funds. It is a public corporation actually. So, execution can be had in this case.
Municipal corporations have their own charters. Under the Local Government Code, there is a provision that it is a
public corporation which has the capacity to sue and be sued. So the rule is that it is unincorporated, it has a personality separate
and distinct, it can sue and be sued. So is it correct to say the local government units cannot enjoy immunity? No. It is still a
government agency performing governmental function but only in the local level.
Jaime vs Apostol
A driver employed by the Municipality of Koronadal was driving the mayor. They met an accident which led to the
death of a minor. A suit was filed by the parents against the driver, the mayor, the owner of the vehicle, and the municipality.
Who is the employer of the driver? It is the municipality. Only that the driver was assigned to the mayor. Is the municipality
liable? No. In this case, local government units are not liable for the torts, negligent acts of its agents. It has to consent to be sued.
Municipality vs Dumdum
A business woman entered into a contract with the Municipality of Hagonoy to provide certain vehicles or heavy
equipment. The municipality failed to pay. So is the municipality liable in this case? Pending trial, the business woman was
actually asking the court for a writ of attachment. So is that order proper? No because even if theres a valid judgement, in favor
of the businesswoman, ultimately a judgement against the municipality is not automatically executionary. It cannot be executed.
Suability is different from liability.
Municipality of Makati vs CA
This is an expropriation case and the Supreme Court already already rendered a judgement in favor the private owners
of the property. The municipality refused to pay. In this case, the Supreme Court said that theres recourse for the private owner.
The private owner can file a case for mandamus for the court to mandate to order the Sanggunian to enact an ordinance to order
the payment of the judgement. But take note that this is only an order against a local legislature. There is yet to be a case where
the Court ordered mandamus against the national legislature.
Art. 1 National Territory
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
The constitution is a municipal law. It applies only within our territorial jurisdiction. In other words, whatever claims of
territory written in our constitution would have no effect whatsoever regarding a position of our laws in territory as far as the
international community is concerned. Territory of a particular state must be based on some legally and internationally acceptable
evidence such as some legal instruments.
The scope of our territory has been defined in various separate documents. Such as the Treaty of Paris, Treaty of
Washington in 1900s which included some island like Cagayan and Sibutu, the Treaty between treaty in 1930s which included
Turtle and Mangsee Islands. Since these are treaties, it means that our claims to these territories are internationally acceptable and
recognized. So whatever we write in our constitution is actually immaterial. Its just for the purpose of our guidance. Bernas
would say that if we define the national territory in the 1987 constitution it would serve only one purpose, for educational
purpose. Thats just for the purpose of discussion because our rights over territories are defined in internationally acceptable
laws, agreements or treaties.
What comprises National Territory?
Under article 1 the National territory comprises of the Philippine Archipelago with all the waters and islands embraced
therein and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. Now with regards to these two
compositions of the national territory, these would include the terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains. Not only the land, water and
air but including the territorial sea, seabed, subsoil and other submarine areas. Thats the proper way of dividing the national
territory.
What is an archipelago?
In the 1982 Convention on the Law of Sea, it has defined archipelagos as:
A group of islands including parts of islands interconnecting waters and other national features form an intrinsic geographical,
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.
Why is there a need to define and archipelago?
Because if we compare the Philippines to the United States of America, the latter is a large mass of land whereas the
Philippines is an area with several and separate islands so when you say archipelago, its a group of islands surrounded with
water but you still consider it as one integral whole or a body of water studded with islands. The idea is that you call it an
archipelago because you consider it as one unit. So the Philippines is actually an archipelago.
Why do we have to put all other territories in our constitution in article 1?
Its because the Philippines have claims over other territories some of which has already been accepted, some not yet
and some are still under controversy. So, just to be safe that we are not surrendering our claims over these territories, authors
have found it necessary to put it here. Foremost is Batanes. Batanes is actually not included in the treaties that have been
previously mentioned but we have been exercising territorial jurisdiction over this island and it has been internationally accepted.
No one is contesting our claim over Batanes. But there are territories which are being contested by others; they are the Spratley
Islands or the Kalayaan group of islands. Several countries are claiming Kalayaan Islands; Vietnam, China, Brunei and many
others. Also under controversy are Sabah, Scarborough Shoals and Marianas Island. This will also include all other territories that
we may later on acquire through the form or mode that is internationally acceptable. It have been mentioned that this would
include territorial sea.
What is territorial sea?
Territorial sea would be that portion or part of the sea over which the coastal state would still exercise sovereignty. Its
still part of the territory. All rights can still be exercised over this area.
Who defines how far the territorial sea is?
The International Treaty or agreement does. Before, they defined it using the cannon-shot rule. The territorial sea is
measured based on the reach of a cannon ball if it is shot seawards. It will be the basis on the extent of protection that the state
can provide to its citizen. With this as basis, the international community has agreed that the territorial sea is 3 nautical miles
from the baseline.
Changes in modern time, we dont use cannon anymore on warfares. The international community has agreed that the territorial
sea will be 12 nautical miles from the baseline.
Is the baseline relevant?
Yes because it is the starting point from which we would measure our territorial sea.
How do we define baseline?
There are two methods of tracing the baseline, either Normal baseline method or straight baseline method.
Normal method is you follow the contour or the sinuosity of the outermost points of the archipelago.
Straight baseline method consists of drawing straight lines connecting the outermost points on the coast without
departing to any appreciable points from the general contour of the archipelago. This method is used in the Phillipines.
Remember territorial sea is just 12 nautical miles from the baseline. If they use the normal method, the Mindanao
island will be separated from Visayas since Mindanao sea is more than 12 nautical miles. So the Mindanao sea will not be
considered as our internal waters. Even Sibuyan Sea which separates Panay island (Visayas) from Luzon. If we dont use the
straight line method, these seas will be considered as high seas.
Is this method acceptable?
Any claims of territory should be internationally acceptable, so yes, it is acceptable. When it comes to the rights to the
seas the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea shall be followed which started in 1958 with the convention on
territorial sea. Thats where they defined the 12 nautical miles. And in 1982 it defined the maritime zones and other rights over
the maritime zone.
What are the maritime zones recognized by the UNCLOS?
1. Territorial sea which is the 12 nautical miles where we have the right to exercise sovereignty over it. Without this, know that
after territorial sea they are already considered as high seas but we agreed that we will identify some maritime zone over which
we could exercise our rights.
2. The contiguous zone which is 24 nautical miles from baseline. We have the right to implement immigration laws, custom
laws, fiscal laws and sanitation laws.
3. The Exclusive Economic Zone which is 200 nautical miles from the baseline. We have the right to explore and exploit living
and non-living resources.
What is archipelagic doctrine?
The archipelagic doctrine is espoused particularly by the Philippines along with the Bahamas, Indonesia, Papua New
Guinea and Fiji because all these are archipelagic states. We claimed that the straight baseline method is to be used. Those inside
the line should be considered as one integral whole. Another claim is that the waters around, between and connecting the islands
regardless of their dimensions are considered as internal waters. So, are all these claims internationally acceptable? The straight
line method is accepted, considering the islands as integral whole is accepted but as to our theory that these should be
considered as internal water is not accepted. In the UNCLOS, the claimed internal water is to be recognized as archipelagic
waters.
Whats the difference between archipelagic and internal waters?
It is internal water if it is in our position that we consider these to be similar to lakes and rivers between islands. They
are exclusively ours and there is no right to innocent passage. Whereas archipelagic water, the international customary laws
would require that there will be right to innocent passage by foreign vessels.
What is innocent passage?
Innocent passage means the unimpeded passage of foreign vessels provided that it is not prejudicial to the economic
interest and security of the coastal state both passage on the sea and on air. The state has the right to designate the routes.
Magallona Vs. Ermita
In 2009, the congress enacted RA 9522 which is an amendment to RA 3046. The purpose of this law is to demarcate
the points as basis for the baseline. In 1982, the UNCLOS was amended where there is now a prescribed water to land ratio. So to
comply with the prescribed contour, water to land ratio and length of baseline, congress enacted 9522 to amend 3046. As a result
of the amendment, they have maximized and stretched the territorial sea but Magallona, professors of UP and even law students
filed a case and questioned the constitutionality of 9522. In comparing 9522 and 3046, they said that 9522 diminished our
maritime territory. But Supreme Court said its not correct to say that it has reduced our territory because the mode of acquiring
or losing a territory are through internationally accepted modes which are: occupation, cession, accretion or prescription. You
cannot acquire or lose a territory by enacting alone. So the Supreme Court said it does not result to a diminution of territory.
UNCLOS have required us to identify where the baselines are so that we can identify up to where the 12, 24 and 200 nautical
miles would reach. So it is in fact, advantageous to our part because we have already identified our baselines.
Another objection was raised again by the petitioners stating that in 9522, the congress has classified the KIG and
Scarborough Shoals as Regime Islands. The point of the petitioner is that we are surrendering our claim to the said islands
because it is not included in the baseline rather they are considered as regime of islands having their own maritime zone. The
Supreme Court said that we cannot include this because we will be violating an international agreement which says that the
baseline should not depart from any appreciable point to the general contour. So its just practical that we consider KIG and
Scarborough as Regime of Islands having its own maritime zone. It does not in any way mean that we surrender our claim to
these islands. In fact 9522 specifically states that we are exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over these islands.
Another objection made again by the petitioner is that internal waters should not be available for the right to innocent
passage but the supreme court said whether you call it internal waters or archipelagic waters, we are bound by customary
international laws. Even without 9522, we are still mandated by international law to provide the right to innocent passage.
Otherwise, they would suffer retaliation from neighboring states. No state can claim the right to absolutely prohibit a vessel from
passing through its archipelagic waters. Being member of the international community, we are to follow its rules. The state
through the congress has the right to designate routes for the passage of foreign vessels.
Enacting the baseline law is actually beneficial for our territorial protection and the exercise of our right. If we do not
have these baselines, if we opt not to have this baseline law, there would be no starting point as far as the international
community is concerned from measuring the territorial zones and the exclusive economic zones. In other words, we would be
inviting foreign vessels and entity to explore our exclusive economic zones. And when we go to the international court, it would
weaken our position because we have no actual instrument that would demarcate from where the 12, 24 and 200 nautical miles
would be measured. Baseline law serves as to point and mark the starting point of our maritime zones. By marking the maritime
zone, it would give notice to other countries to where our right is. In conclusion of the case, 9522 is constitutional.
Article II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
The principles are merely guidelines for the operation of the Philippine government. These are the guidelines which the
government is ought to observe. Basically, these are ideological principles. These are simply useful in interpreting provisions of
the Constitution and the laws. In other words, if the Congress enacts a law, it should be pursuant to the principles and policies of
the Constitution. When we say principles, usually, the general rule is that these are binding rules which must be observed. While
policies are just guidelines. But, based on jurisprudence, the distinction is immaterial because the general rule is that these are
merely guidelines.
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
Basically, this is a quotation for government that we are democratic and republican. What do you mean by democratic
and republican? The definition is in the second sentencethat authority rests in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Republican means that we observe a representative-type of government. That is, we elect our officers and we have the
option to change them if they happen to be unsatisfactory. It is a government run by the people, for the people through a
representative. And the representative acts through the mandate of the people and he knows that he is accountable to the public at
all times because public office is of public trust.
Democratic means that the people has, in some instance, the option to directly in the government particularly in the
initiative and referendum kind.
Now, since sovereignty resides in the people, actions of government officials which are not sanction, provided that no
law supports it no matter how noble the action is, becomes invalid. No government official is above the law.
Villavicencio vs Lukban
The mayor of Manila shipped the women of ill-repute from the red light districts of Manila to Davao. The intention of
the mayor was somewhat noble. He wanted to rid the place of immorality. But there was no law that time authorizing him to ship
these women to Mindanao. The relatives of the women filed a case against the mayor. And in their decision, the Court said that
no official is above the law. The law is the only supreme power in the government. And any person in public office is only more
bound and subject to the law being representatives of the people.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
As regards to the renunciation of war, it is actually adopting an international acceptance because all members of the
international community have agreed to renounce war as an instrument of policy. In other words, in case of conflict between
other countries and other states, war will not be an option because these countries or states renounce war as an instrument of
national policy. But it does not mean that, in case there is aggression, we will not do the same. If war is brought to us, then
retaliation will not violate this principle because what we renounce is offensive war.
Adoption of international law is consistent with incorporation. As members of the international community, we have
already agreed to incorporate into our laws the internationally accepted principles. One example of an internationally accepted
principle is the principle of pacta sunt servanda which means that international agreements should be complied with faithfully. In
other words, when we enter into international treaties and agreements, we have the legal obligation to comply with the things in
the treaty. That is automatically incorporated in our laws. In case of conflict between the international law and the local law,
efforts should be made to reconcile them. But if there is no way to reconcile them, then, in the exercise of sovereignty, we will
follow the local law as oppose to the international law.
Taada vs Angara
The Philippines is a signatory in the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. Now there are provisions in
that international agreement which require that party State to make their laws in such a way that they will comply with what has
been agreed. This has been questioned as unconstitutional because it placed undue limitation on the power of the legislative
power of the Congress. The general principle is that the power of the Congress is plenary. In other words, the Congress has the
power to determine what laws will be proper.
But in this case, it seems that the international community was dictating the
Philippines to enact laws in order to conform to the agreements in this WTO. Is this tantamount to undue limitation on the
legislative powers of the Congress? This exemplifies pacta sunt servanda. Meaning that, as a signatory in an international
agreement, we are not only under moral obligation but also legal obligation to comply with the provisions in that agreement. And
besides, in the principle we have stated in the Constitution, we will adopt international laws. And this includes treaties and
agreements as part of the laws of the land. A state which was contracted by international agreements or obligations is bound to
make its legislations such modifications as deemed necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations under the agreement.
Does that reduce our sovereignty? The answer to that question is the concept of auto-limitation. Precisely we have that right to
determine which way to go that includes the right to limit or restrict the exercise of sovereignty. In this case, there is no violation
of any constitutional law. More importantly, there is observance of the provisions of this international agreement.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the
protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
The role of the military is to protect the people and the state. Civilian authority is at all times above and supreme over
the military. That authority is clearly manifested by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the military is the President. The
CIC is a civilian. He was placed in that position by the Constitution because we believe that at all times civilian authority is
supreme over the military. In other words, there is a distinction between the military and the police. When it comes to protection
of our state and security of our sovereignty, it is military work. When it comes to implementation or enforcement of civilian laws,
it is the function of the police. In other words, you cannot put the military to enforce traffic laws or to run after a theft
because these are civilian enforcement laws.
IBP vs. Zamora
President Erap called out the AFP invoking his powers under Section 18, Article 7 to help in the visibility patrols in
Metro Manila. They had a project which involved visibility patrols due to the alarming increase of criminality in Manila. In other
words, the marines were placed on the streets. The people in Manila got alarmed. Could this be a violation of this principle? Is
the military now being used to enforce civilian laws? The Court said no. In this case, we have to take note that the visibility patrol
is headed by the police. Now the police has the obligation to orient the military on visibility patrolling procedures by police
officers. It is the police who provided them with the necessary implements. It was also the police who process persons who get
arrested. In other words, the role of the military in this case was merely assistive. So there is no violation of this provision. Here,
civilian authority is still supreme over the military. The police, by the way, is civilian by nature. The Supreme Court also
recognized certain civilian enforcement activities wherein the military was used to assist like elections, enforcement of agrarian
laws, enforcement of departmental laws, and enforcement of customs laws. But they do it pursuant to civilian laws and not
through the laws of war or military laws.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfilment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.
Because it is the duty of the state or the government to protect the people, it has the power to mandate the people to
protect the people. Civilian military training may mandatory during this time. Do we have the ground to object if we are called to
render mandatory military service? No because the people was the one who drafted the Constitution in the first place. And it was
the people who gave the state or the government or the state this right to call us to render military service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
The General Welfare Law.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
There are several principles which support the separation of State and Church as being inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
When it comes to policies, the general rule is that these are merely guidelines. These are not enforceable rights. While
they are stated as policies, it doesnt mean that they can be claimed as right by the courts.
Lim vs. Executive Secretary
This is about the Balikatan exercise pursuant to the defense treaty in 1951 and the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1999,
both signed by the US and the Philippines. Generally, these treaties supply for the authority for the US military to come to the
Philippines and conduct military exercises. And the Visiting Forces Agreement is the rules and regulations that the military will
observe if they are in the Philippines. This was during when anti-terrorism was very active immediately after 9/11. Because of
this as an offshoot, US military came here. Some people feared that they were just placed here in case theres an anti-terrorism
activity or war that will happen. Now, will these treaties and agreements allow offensive war to be engaged by US military men
in the Philippines? To answer this question, the Court looked not only UN agreement or the charter of the UN which prohibits its
member states from threat and use of force against the integrity of another state but also the principles and policies stated in the
Constitution. So the first principle is the renunciation of war. This is bolstered by Section 7 which states that the state shall pursue
an independent foreign policy in its relations with other states the paramount consideration national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. This principle and policy dictates and points to the fact that these
US military men in the Philippines are not supposed to engage in offensive war. And the treaties and agreements we entered into
with them do not allow them to engage in offensive war. So in interpreting these agreements, the Court can use the principles and
policies stated in Article II.
Bar Matter 6325
This is a petition to use maiden name to take the 2006 Bar Examination by Josephine Uy-Timosa. She wanted to use
Uy instead of Timosa because she was undergoing separation or annulment with her husband during that time. Should the
petition be granted? The governing law in this case is Article 370 of the Civil Code. (Please refer to Article 370). The options in
Article 370 are the only options available. How will they be construed? The Court ruled that since the word may was used in
the said provision, then the wifes use of the husbands name is optional not obligatory. The Court looked into the policy as stated
in Section 14 which says that the state recognizes the role of women in nation building, , and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. The Court said that, if this Constitutional provision means anything at all, it signifies
that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights afforded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of
name upon marriage. In other words, it is not true that you shall always change your name. The Court said that marriage does not
change a womans name, and if I may add, identity as well. It merely changes the womans status from single to married. In
interpreting Art. 370, the Court used Section 14 as a guideline. It is not in itself an enforceable right. But there is a law which
now gives the parameters as to the role of women.
Since these are mere guidelines, the general rule is that the policies are not self-executing. In other words, these are not
judicially enforceable rights. They do not delegate rights that we can enforce or invoke before the courts. There is still a need for
legislation to determine the parameters on how these policies or principles will be exercised or implemented.
Tanada vs. Angara
In this case, one of the provisions to which the petitioners were reacting to is that provision which states that the
Philippines shall enact laws that these laws shall give equal treatment to the imported goods. Theres the commitment of the
parties to give equal treatment to imported products. Invoking Section 19, is this a judicially enforceable right? Does this mean
that only Filipinos can exercise trade within the Philippines? If this is not complied with, does this make the act of the state and
the Congress here null and void? The Court said no. This section, along with other sections, is not self-executing. They are
merely guidelines. Contrary to the belief of the petitioner, it does not necessarily out the entry of foreign investments and
services. It merely states that, as a policy, that the state shall develop self-reliance and national economy. Independence here
refers to the freedom from foreign control over national economy especially in such strategic industry as to the development of
natural resources and public utilities.
Kilosbayan vs. Morato
Petitioners argue that, if we introduce gambling in the Philippines, it will destroy the sanctity of family life pursuant to
Section 12. They also allege that it violates Sections 13 and 17. The Court said nullity cannot be invoked through these sections
because these do not, by themselves, grant judicially enforceable rights. In other words, a law must be enacted prohibiting
gambling absolutely.
Pamatong vs. COMELEC
The Court questioned is there a constitutional right to run for public office? Pamatong ran for presidency but was
declared as nuisance because, per the COMELEC, he had to capacity to run a national campaign. In questioning the resolution of
the COMELEC, he invoked Section 26. Does the first phrase of Section 26 mean that all of us have the constitutional right to run
for public office? The Court said that Section 26 is merely a guideline. It is not a judicially enforceable right. It does not create or
grant a right to run for public office. Public office is a privilege only to those who are qualified. The disregard of the provision
does not give rise to a cause of action because it is not self-executing.
Is there a section which the Court already declared as self-executing?
Oposa vs Factoran
In this case, the petitioners were minors representing themselves, and the next generation. Ordinarily, this will not pass
the Rules of Court. It will be automatically dismissed. The cause of action is that they are seeking for the cancellation of Timber
License Agreements. They invoke Section 16. How did they justify it to the point of convincing the Court that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is already in the status of a right that you can already invoke? They coined the term
intergenerational responsibility. They are saying that this generation has the obligation to preserve and protect the ecology for
the benefit of the next generation and the generations to come. This is often quoted in decisions of courts outside the Philippines.
The Court said that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology already transcends just being merely a guideline. It is now a
right equal to the right to life because it means the right to self-preservation. How can civilization continue if we do not exercise
this intergenerational responsibility? This right is in a different classification because it ultimately boils down to selfpreservation. So far, Section 16 has been declared as self-executing.
So what is citizenship? It is a membership in a political community that is more or less permanent. Why would you
want to become a citizen or a member of a political community? Because with citizenship comes rights. Basically, political
rights, the right to participate in the government, such as the right to vote, the right to be voted, the right to vote public office, the
right to engage in certain businesses that is reserved to Filipinos, the right to engage in a profession which are mostly reserved
only to Filipinos, the right to petition in the government. So with citizenship, theres a right to have rights. Thats why one
would want to become a citizen in a particular political community or we call it state.
Now what are the modes of acquiring citizenship? There are three different modes. First is what we call jus
sanguinis, sanguinis means blood. Thus there is transmission of citizenship by virtue of blood relations. Its blood relation,
therefore, adoption is not included.
Another mode is jus soli, that is citizenship on the basis of place of birth. I believe but Im not sure that the US also
observe jus soli because my nephew whose parents are natives, but he was born in US is a holder of an American passport. So I
think they also observe jus soli. Its not really observed in the Philippines.
Another mode of acquiring citizenship is by Naturalization. That is by law. Its the law that adopts an alien and grants
him the privilege of a citizen. Usually they have more or less the same price. A naturalized citizen and natural born citizen but
well go to that later on.
Now who are citizens of the Philippines? As Ive told you yesterday, we have to go back to 1902 by the Philippine Bill
of 1902, In fact in discussing the citizenship of FPJ in the case of Tecson versus COMELEC, the Supreme Court traced his
citizenship all the way back to his father and back to his grandfather. Now the Supreme Court said by virtue of Philippine Bill
1902 the grandfather who evidence would point is in the Philippine as of April 11, 1899 is considered as Filipino.
So what does Philippine Bill of 1902 provide? Who are citizens of the Philippines? In fact this is the first organic act,
wherein the term citizen of the Philippine Islands was first seen. So who are citizens of the Philippines? All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein or who are Spanish subjects on 11 th day of April 1899 and then resided in said
island and their children born subsequent there and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands. When Spain ceded the
Philippines to the Americans, the Americans or the US has to know who would be under its protection, therefore, it has defined
the citizens of the Philippines. And basically those who are found in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, whether you are a
native, or you are a Spaniard or Spanish.
The Spanish however has the option to retain his allegiance to the Spanish crown but the presumption is that if not, he
will be considered as a Filipino along with the children born subsequent there to and that was the law apply in determining the
citizenship of the grandfather of FPJ, by virtue of which, it was concluded that FPJ has a Filipino grandfather, therefore his father
is also a Filipino. Well go later to the complexities of this case.
Now after the Philippine Bill of 1902, it was only in 1935 that we had the Constitution. The Constitution provides the
1935 constitution provides who will be considered as Filipino citizens. Under the 1935 constitution, who are citizens of the
Philippines? Those who are citizens as of the adoption of the Constitution, his would refer to those who are already considered
citizens via the mass Filipinization of Philippine Bill of 1902. Its the mass Filipinization of all war found in the Philippines as of
that time. Another one is those who are born of foreign parents and who have elected or served.
So who says that we observe absolutely jus sanguinis? Who says that the Philippines absolutely observe jus sanguinis
and naturalization? Under the 1935 theres a portion in that constitution which observes jus soli born of foreign parents but
elected to public office, born in the Philippines. Is it born in the Philippines? Yes, born in the Philippines of foreign parents. So
far, I have no yet encountered a case applying this provision. Thats why if you read the books, it is just jus sanguinis that is
observed here in the Philippines.
Okay number 3, those whose fathers are Filipinos and theres a distinction of the father. Fathers are Filipinos
provided that they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity and those who have been naturalized. These are
considered as Filipino citizens as of that time.
Under the 1973 constitution, findings, discrimination against women in the 1935 constitution. They amended on who
will be considered as citizens of the Philippines. Of course, those who are citizens as of the adoption of the constitution.
Number 2, this time, either of father or mother would transmit Philippine citizenship. No need for election.
Number 3, those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to 1935 constitution.
And number 4, those who are naturalized.
1987, more or less same. Citizens as of adoption, father or mother, but they have to change their phrasing of paragraph
3, because there is confusion on who will be those that will have the right to elect Philippine citizenship. Because some are born
of Filipino mothers, married to aliens, would think that they have the option to elect Philippine citizenship even if they are
already born under the 1973 constitution. Thats why to clarify that confusion, it was just emphasized that those who were born
before, you memorize this, of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship as of upon reaching the age of maturity, and of
course, naturalization.
So discounting this one, the mode of acquisition of Philippine citizenship is jus sanguinis, by birth, or by naturalization.
So lets go first to the first _____ . Father or Mother. Appear duly under the 1973 constitution beginning 1973 so let me
literate under the 1935 constitution only fathers can transmit Philippine citizenship. What about mothers? The child is Filipino on
probationary status because the child has to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Now this presumes
that the Filipino mother is married to an alien. Why? Because upon reaching the age of majority, the child will have two
citizenships to choose. Either Filipino or alien. So presumption is there is marriage to an alien. Under the 1935 constitution,
Commonwealth act 63 was enacted. It is an act for providing ways in which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired.
Under that law one way of losing Philippine citizenship is in case of a woman upon her marriage to a foreigner if by virtue of the
laws enforced in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality. Therefore, by virtue of this CA the Filipino mother may lose
her Philippine citizenship upon marriage. Right? And it was not her choice because this is dependent on the law of the husband.
The woman may not even know that law says that she will lose her citizenship. So if that is the case, how would it give effect to
this one? So the principle is that as established by jurisprudence that the Filipino mother, should be a Filipina at the time of
marriage. Otherwise, this will not be given any effect at all, because the woman loses her citizenship upon marriage. So, the
theory is that the Filipino mother must be Filipina at the time of marriage. So, going beyond that, it would be safe to say that only
the first court will have the option to elect, why? When the woman, who is now an alien, later on would save his second child,
she will no longer be a Filipina. So she will not be covered by this provision
So in 1973, at least they have the sense to discover the discrimination and during that time, women are already
recognized as equals with men. So in this case, under the 1973, either parent can transmit, father or mother. Now in order to
correct the defect by this CA 63, I dont know if they find it proper to repeal the law or amend the law, they even provided it in
the constitution itself. So section 2 of Article 3 in the 1973 constitution also provides that a female citizen of the Philippines who
marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship unless by an act or commission she is lived under the law to have renounced
her citizenship. The same scenario here only that this time, she will lose her citizenship by choice. It will not be no longer
dependent on the law of the husband. So by her own act, or by her own omission. Electing of oath of allegiance of citizenship to
the state of the husband, so this time, by choice. Now, father or mother. In other words, this would no longer be applicable. That
the mothers Filipina by marriage because here, it would be practical because the woman would not know that she has no
citizenship, but here it would be by her choice. So this time the principle is that the mother is Filipina at the time of birth of the
child.
Lets have these two families. Family A and B similarly situated. Family A, the mother is Filipina, the father is Chinese
whose laws that the woman or the wife will become Chinese upon marriage and they have a son. Family B, the same. The mother
is Filipina, the father is Chinese whose laws provide the same and they have a son. Sino yung kanina? X and Y. The only
difference is that, X was born under the 1935 constitution and Y was born under the 1973 constitution. Lets say both mothers
loss their citizenship upon marriage. The same. Which child has the option to elect Philippine citizenship? X, Y, or both? As if
nag-iisip. Okay base on this ha, Y mother, Filipina, father Chinese. X mother Filipina, father Chinese. Both loss Philippine
citizenship by virtue of marriage. Same, right? Only that X was born in 1934, Y was born in 1978. Who between the two has the
option to elect Philippine citizenship? You see, theres a difference. Its only X. because he would fall under this and under this.
(Illustration sa board) All confusion should be clarified by this provision. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers
who elected Philippine citizenship, in other words, the option to elect is only as to those born prior to 1973 constitution. The
situation will change if the child is illegitimate. Alright?
Republic vs. Lim
Julia Lim was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father. In her birth certificate it is provided that she is of Chinese
citizenship. Now, she wanted that to change. She cannot do that because she was born under the 1935 constitution. She should
elect Philippine citizenship. But the facts that were established would include the fact that mother and father were never married,
therefore, Julia Lim is an illegitimate child. Whats the difference now if she is an illegitimate child of a Filipina mother? As
established by Jurisprudence, an illegitimate child is under the exclusive parental authority only of the mother; therefore upon
birth the child is already Filipino. So shes already Filipino and there is in fact no option to elect because there is no need to elect.
The mothers already transmitted her citizenship to the child, no need of any election. Again why would there be election upon
reaching age of majority, because the presumption is that you have 2 citizenship. It is only possible if there is a legal bind
between the mother and the father. But if there is none, then the citizenship of the alien father would not be considered in your
choice. So that is why, being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother will grant Philippine citizenship automatically to the child
without any need of election. There is nothing to elect.
Tecson vs. COMELEC
We said earlier by virtue of Philippine Bill of 1902, it was established that the father of Fernando Poe is the son of a
Spanish who was found in the Philippines and benefited from the _____ Filipinization of Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, he is
a Filipino. Problem is that the mother of FPJ is an American, and the complication goes further because he is was illegitimate
child. The Filipino mother and the American mother were not married when he was born. So, illegitimate son. The Supreme
Court this time, the theory is that an illegitimate child is under the parental authority of the mother, therefore, the theory of the
petitioner is that since FPJ was illegitimate, he should take only the citizenship of the mother, who was an American. So his
theory is FPJ is American. Now, what was established in this case is that, although they were never married, they got married
after, but the more important thing is that FPJ has been living with the mother and the father throughout his life. So he was
recognized as the son of Allan Poe. In this case, the Supreme Court takes a different position. In case of FPJ, notwithstanding that
he was an illegitimate son, he is Filipino. Why? The Supreme Court used this provision, those whose fathers are Filipino citizen.
The question is, is his father Filipino? Yes. And the Supreme Court said that the constitution did not make any distinction. So
therefore, since there is no distinction by the constitution, no law would also effect ____________ why should they also
distinguish. In other words, in case of illegitimate child of Filipino fathers, they will be considered as Filipinos. They will be
considered to have inherited the citizenship of the father provided that the paternity is clear. Relationship of the son to the father
is clear as the constitution did not distinguish.
Now, you may ask, may distinction ba dito? Now, what is relevant here is that paternity was established. Now even if
lets say paternity was established here, the Supreme Court _____ that the child will take the citizenship of the mother. Why? The
direction of their decision is going to which would be advantageous to the child. If you observe their decision. So in this case,
since paternity is clear, and the 1935 constitution did not distinguish of what kind of father it Is, mabaet ba siya na father or, then,
since it did not distinguish, the Supreme Court apply in his citizenship to the Father and to FPJ. So thats the distinction.
What do you mean by election? Election of Philippine citizenship. Election means you have to elect, to choose which
citizenship you prefer. As we have said, this election of Philippine citizenship is only an option to those born under the 1935
constitution or better yet or more specifically born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers. They have to elect Philippine
citizenship. Now, again, based on what we discussed earlier, this is only true if the mother is married to an alien because by
_____, does the child has two citizenship to choose from. Kung hindi sila married, there is only 1 citizenship that is that of the
mother. So again, this is only applicable born before January 17, 1973. So how is election done? We have Commonwealth 625.
CA 625 provides for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is
a Filipino citizen. Under that law, election is done expressly in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorize to administer. In other words there is a sworn statement expressly declaring the preferred citizenship
or the choice of citizenship. Number 2 it should be filed, the sworn statement must be filed to the nearest civil registry. And not
only the sworn statement required, It must be accompanied by an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, to the Republic of the
Philippines, government of the Philippines. In other words CA 625 requires a formal declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship.
In Re: Mallare
Now if you have read the case of In re Mallare: This involves the citizenship of Lorencio admitted to the bar but was
later on delisted because the question of one citizenship. It was alleged that he was born of Chinese Father and Chinese Mother.
But later on by motion of reconsideration he presented evidence to show that his father is not indeed in fact a Chinese, but a
Filipino. Why? According to him, the father was born of born of Filipina mother and Chinese father. One theory is that they were
not married. So if thats the case, illegitimate child si Esteban the father, then Esteban is Filipino. Therefore, Florencio is also
Filipino. Now another theory is that, the Filipino mother and the Chinese father are married. But Esteban, the father of Florencio,
upon reaching the age of majority, performs positive acts of citizenships. What are these positive acts of citizenships? Voting,
exercising right of suffrage, campaigning for a candidate, but yun lang naman ang namention doon. The Supreme Court said that
these positive acts of citizenships are tantamount to election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Question
maam, you said CA 625 requires the election must be formal, that is via sworn statement. But the Supreme Court said in this
case it would be impractical to require Esteban to comply with CA 625 when at the time he reached his age of majority, there was
no existing law yet. CA 625 became effective June 7, 1941. So in that case, In re Mallare allows for positive acts of citizenship as
a mode of electing Philippine citizenship.
Vicente Ching in Re: Application for Admission
He already took the bar examination. He passed the bar exam but he was not yet admitted to the bar. There was a
commission that he has to prove his citizenship. Si Florencio atleast na admit siya natanggal siya nabalik siya. In this case, hindi
pa siya na admit. He filed his petition to be admitted. Now, Vicente Ching is the son of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father.
Now, the presumption is that he became also Chinese. He was born under the 1935 constitution. He would have reached the age
of majority by 1985. Now he took the bar and the case happened some 14-13 years after. The Supreme Court said he was not able
to elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to CA 625. What is CA 625 again? Formal requirements, oath allegiance and filing it to
the Civil Registry. He was not able to do that. But according to Vicente Ching, but I preformed positive acts of citizenship. Not
only had he voted during the election, he exercised the privilege of suffrage, he was even voted for public office. He was also a
CPA a profession which is reserved for Filipinos. Other than that he was born in Philippines, lived his entire life in the
Philippines. So he said, these positive acts of citizenships should already be considered election of Philippine citizenship. But the
Supreme Court took a stricter stand. The CA 625 requirement is very simple, sworn statement, how come he was not able to do
that. So in that case the Supreme Court said, No, these positive acts do not tantamount to election of Philippine Citizenship.
Why? Only CA 625 is recognized. Okay, the ______ is suggesting that he be given an opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to 625. The Supreme Court said from the time he reached the age of majority, its already more than 14 years. So what is
the reason of all time from reaching the age of majority within which one can comply with CA 625. The Supreme Court said it
would be reasonable if he complied with it at least within 3 years upon reaching age of majority. There may be some justifiable
causes but in this case he did not even present any justifiable cause why he did not perform the requirements in CA 625. Now, the
jurisprudence they had the occasion to rule on compliance after 7 years and the Supreme Court even said that it is also not within
the reasonable period. So what can we deduce in the case of in re Admission? Number 1 CA 625 is mandatory. If formal acts
would not tantamount to election and the reasonable period to elect Philippine citizenship is at least within 3 years.
Co vs. HRET
Jose Ong was born of Filipino mother and Chinese father. 1935 constitution the same as Vicente Ching. Now, he also
failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority. But this time the
Supreme Court said that he doesnt need to elect. Informal acts or Positive acts of citizenship would suffice. Why? Whats the
difference in this case? He was born of Chinese father diba, the father just migrated from China. The mother is Filipina. But
when he was still a minor, the father was naturalized as Filipino. Now the theory since he was born of a Filipino mother, he was
already a Filipino. Only that upon reaching the age of majority, he has the option to elect Chinese because he has the Chinese
father. In other words, to understand it in context talaga, the option to elect is only there because you have another citizenship to
consider. So in this case, there is no need for him to elect Chinese or Filipino because both parents were already Filipino. In fact
the Supreme Court said to require him to comply with this would be useless. It was already the father who elected the Filipino
citizenship for him. At the time that he reaches the age of majority, there is only 1 citizenship to choose from. There is no longer
the Chinese option. So in the case Co v HRET, the Supreme Court said informal acts of citizenship would suffice because in fact
there is no need for him to elect Philippine citizenship.
Ma v. Commissioner
Ma, was born of Taiwanese father, Filipino mother. What is consistent in all of these cases? Mothers are all filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of majority, they elected Philippine citizenship pursuant to CA 625. They made their sworn statement
before an officer authorized to administer oath. So they have that number 1. They even took their oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Philippine Government. The problem is, they need to file these documents to the nearest civil registry. So
there was a question as to their status, because it seems that they have not completed the requirements under CA 625. Now when
the case was filed in fact, it was almost 3 decades after they performed these acts. Some 30 years have passed. Now what they are
seeking from the Supreme Court is that they be allowed to perform the last act, the filing to the civil registry of these 2
documents. What is relevant to this case is that the 2 documents were not questioned. They were already established. The only
lacking is the filing to the civil registry. And the Supreme Court this time that it would be proper to give them time to comply
with the third requirement. Why? They have complied with CA 625 substantially upon reaching the age of majority. The only
requirement lacking is the filing. Whats the purpose of the filing? To give notice or record purposes to the whole world that they
have already elected Philippine citizenship. The Supreme Court noted that from the time they elected Philippine citizenship by
the two acts, they have performed positive acts of citizenship. They have stayed in the Philippines, the performed acts which are
exclusive to citizens. So Supreme Court said this would suffice as notice to the whole world that they have in fact already elected
Philippine citizenship. So the Supreme Court said that it is proper to allow them to perform the last act of filing. So, thats
applying equity instead of being strict in law.
So, you have those cases under election of Philippine citizenship.
Yesterday we were talking about Section 1 of Art.4, modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship. Under the Constitution,
although the rule now that both the fathers' and mothers' contrasting citizenships [are passed] to children, we have to consider the
earlier constitutional provisions, particularly the 1935 Constitution. I told you that when it comes to the election of Philippine
citizenship you only have to remember that only those children born before January 17, 1973 of Filipina mothers have the option
to elect Philippine citizenship. Those who are born thereafter no longer have [that] option even if their mothers loss their
Philippine citizenship pursuant to marriage or by virtue of [the said] marriage.
In Section 2, we said that there are two modes of acquisition:
1. by birth
2. by naturalization
Naturalization is the legal act of a country to adopt a person and granting him with the privileges of a citizen. Now,
between a natural born citizen and a naturalized citizen there should be no distinction as to their rights, except when it is the
Constitution which provides a distinction. One distinction would be the right to hold certain public offices, but not all public
offices. So naturalized citizens are entitled to same treatment as native-born citizens, although there are exceptions that are
provided by the Constitution itself.
As of the present, we have two existing naturalization laws:
1. C.A. 473 as amended by Republic Act 530, The Revised Naturalization Law. It's actually and old law enacted in
1939 but it's still the law when it comes to Judicial Naturalization.
So there are two forms:
* Judicial naturalization -pursuant to Commonwealth Act 473 as amended by R.A. 530.
When we say judicial naturalization this applies to aliens who would want to become Filipino citizen but under the law
there are certain qualifications that they should comply with. Foremost is that they have been residents of the Philippines for at
least 10 years. This is shortened to 5 years if they are married to a Filipino or Filipina. So that's basically the requirement. You'll
just have to read the provision for the other requirements (*gibberish*). To be naturalized the applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
To show you how tedious it is for a person or alien to become naturalized if intended to become a Filipino, very tedious
ang Philippines when it comes to naturalizing aliens. Why? Under this Act you will have to wait ten years, before being allowed
to apply. Now before actually filing your petition, this is judicial naturalization, so you file it where? The Courts of course--the
Regional Trial Courts. Before you are allowed to file a petition, a year prior, you should already file your Declaration of Intent
with the Solicitor-General. That means, you cannot just directly file to the Courts prior the declaration of intent. That's one year.
That is because the Government or the State would want to take that one year span of time to investigate the person. So it starts
with the Declaration of Intent. After that you can now file the petition. Can it be heard immediately? No, not yet. There is a
required publication of three consecutive weeks. After that publication, you will have to wait for another six months before it is
actually calendared for hearing. In case your client is in a hurry of becoming a Filipino because he wanted to engage in a business
reserved for Filipinos then you cannot do that through this procedure because it takes time. When it is the right time for the
hearing, then there would be trial. Upon judgment, [it] only becomes final after 30 days. I'm telling you this because ordinarily,
judgments in ordinary civil actions would become final after 15 days. But when it comes to naturalization proceedings, it
becomes final only after 30days. But, after finality, is he already considered a Filipino? Not yet. As amended by the R.A. 530, he
has to wait for another 2 years before he can actually take his oath. Now, only when he has taken his oath can he perform acts can
he be clothed with rights of a citizen. So that's how long it would take for an alien to become a Filipino. You compare that with
the US, i know you have heard cases outside like nurses who have been there for only 5 years; they are among those exempted of
the 10year period. 5years of continuous residency, they can already apply for citizenship. In this application, i think they would
have to take some tests or interview, I don't know the procedure but after that they take their oath immediately. But in the
Philippines, even if the petition is already granted they have to wait for another 2 years. What's the 2 year period for? The State
would want to be sure that no. 1, the alien applicant who wants to become a citizen has not left the country for a considerable
number of time, or that means that he has not established residency outside the Philippines. No. 2 is that within that period he has
not committed any crime or violated any rules or laws of the Philippines. And no. 3, that within that period he has dedicated
himself continuously for a lawful calling or profession, in other words, he is not a burden to the Philippines. We only need
immigrants who can be assets to the country and no.4, that he has not committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government-announced policies. So that's how tedious it is when an alien would want to become naturalized as a
Filipino citizen.
Republic vs. De La Rosa
The point here is that the petitioner was not granted by the SC of citizenship even if he was a former Filipino citizen,
because he did not follow the proper procedure on naturalization.
Under our naturalization law there is what we call the derivative naturalization. That means an alien, whose petition for
naturalization was granted, can transmit his citizenship to his wife and minor children. So that's what we call derivative
naturalization as an effect of the naturalization of the alien. Regarding this derivative naturalization, what the law says is that any
woman who is married to a Filipino citizen who might be herself lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines. That phrase, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines, is not interpreted to mean automatic that upon
naturalization of the husband, she becomes a Filipino. That is interpreted to mean that she may now apply in an administrative
proceeding to change her status form alien to Filipino citizenship. There has to be an administrative proceeding where she will
prove that although she has none of the disqualifications. "Shall be deemed" does not mean an automatic grant, there has to be an
administrative proceeding also.
As to children, those who are still minors and born in the Philippines, they are also deemed to derive the citizenship of
the father. Now those who are not born in the Philippine, provided that they are in the Philippines,[also] get this privilege. But
those who are born outside the Philippines and are staying outside, they shall be considered as Filipinos, as far as our laws are
concerned only in so far as they are minors. But thereafter, since they are outside, they will not have this derivative citizenship.
But if they come to the Philippines and satay and reside continuously here during their minority years, they will get the benefit of
the derivative citizenship. Actually you should get a copy of Republic Act 473 and Republic Act 530.
So another kind of naturalization is administratively given. This has been enacted just recently in 2000...approved in
2001, Republic Act 9139: the Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000. This would be an easier path, because this will be not
be filed in the Court. There will be no hearing or trial. All you have to do is to qualify under the law and to pay the citizenship fee
of 100,000 pesos. But this is applicable only to those aliens who are born in the Philippines and lived their entire life in the
Philippines. In fact there are some aliens [who] have not seen their country, and some who cannot even speak the language of
their foreign line. Knowing this and acknowledging their contribution to our country, the Congress deemed it proper to enact this
law to grant them citizenship because anyway they have been here all their life. Granting them citizenship through an easier
route. So this is Republic Act 9139, all they have to do is to file a petition on the Special Committee on Naturalization. This is an
Administrative proceeding to reiterate; not with the Court but to special committee on naturalization. Where is that? The
committee is composed of the Solicitor General as Chairman, secretary: Foreign Affairs and National Security Adviser as
members.
So at least when the alien is already 18 years of age or older and he can prove that he was born in the Philippines,
resided in the country since birth, and who meets other qualifying requirements. And here, again, they only have to pay 100,000
pesos and they will be issued certificate of naturalization. Within sixty days after the issuance they can take their oath. In two
months time.
Is there any derivative citizenship here? Yes. It is provided also. The status of the alien wife and the minor children,
upon the approval of the petition, the applicant's lawful wife and minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their
ACR's. Again, it is not automatic. The wife and the minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their Alien Certificate of
Registration. So there is also a derivative citizenship. But there is a distinction in Section 12: status of alien husband and minor
children. When it comes to an alien husband, he will not benefit from the naturalization of the wife. But the minor children will
benefit from the derivative citizenship.
Co vs. Civil Registrar
There is another mode of naturalization via Letter of Instruction by President Marcos. During the time of Marcos he has
the authority to legislate. Also during his time there are several alien cronies and he wanted to grant them Philippine Citizenship.
That is the back story of the case, to grant the citizenship so that they can engage in business only reserved for Philippine
citizens. Okay, so that's the back story of the case but the idea is that these aliens have been staying in the Philippines and have
developed love and loyalty to the Philippines. That's in the whereas clause. To enable aliens, permanently residing in the
Philippines who having demonstrated love for and loyalty to the Philippines as well as affinity to the culture, traditions and ideals
of Filipino people. So during that time Marcos legislated Letter of Instruction 270. This is naturalization by Presidential Decree
and it was also ONLY applicable during that time. But the issue in this case was that, there was no provision regarding derivative
citizenship. So the petitioners are actually the children of those who had benefitted out of this Letter of Instruction. The
jurisprudence here is that these naturalization laws, however you call them are in pari materia. The have the same purposes,
subject matter and objective. In other words they should be considered as a one whole set of legislation. So here in this case
notwithstanding that there was no mention of derivative citizenship, since our existing naturalization law grants derivative
citizenship, so also must this right or privilege be granted even if the naturalization is pursuant to this Letter of Instruction. So
they should be considered as in pari materia, because enactment of the same legislature and the same subject matters are
supposed to form part of one uniform system.
Again, regardless of the mode, the objective is still the sameto grant aliens the status of a citizen for certain reasons.
SECTION 2
Section 2 provides that natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from BIRTH without having to
perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. So natural-born citizens are those Filipinos from birth without performing
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Let's go to the 1935 Constitution. Under paragraph 4 those who are born of mothers who elect Philippine citizenship at
the time of reaching the age of majority are Filipinos. But the question is are they considered natural-born Filipinos? As to the
1973 Constitution there was silence as to their status. So it was deemed that they are NOT natural-born. They're not natural-born.
Now to correct this discriminatory provision, the 1987 Constitution now provides for a second sentence. That those who elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3, section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born. So under the 1987
Constitution they are now considered as natural-born because there's inconsistency. Under the 1935Constitution if you are born
of a Filipino mother, you have to elect Philippine citizenship. Yu are not natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution if you are
born of a Filipino mother, not only that you don't need to elect Philippine citizenship, you are also considered natural-born. So
there is unfairness there. So in that case they corrected that unfair treatment and provided for the second sentence [that] they
should be considered as natural-born.
Do we need to distinguish between natural-born and naturalized? As I said, generally they should have the same rights
and privileges because they are both citizens of the Philippines. But there are SOME rights that are RESERVED for natural-born
citizens.
Kilosbayan vs. Ermita
Gregory Ong here has been practicing as lawyer. He was born of Chinese parents but during his minority, the father
applied for naturalization. So he benefitted out of naturalization of the father. He derived the citizenship of the father. So
allegedly he is not natural-born. Now, can he practice law? Can he engage in the profession of law? Yes or no? YES. As I said
there should be no distinction between a natural-born and naturalized Filipino. Since he is still a Filipino, he can practice law.
He's a lawyer actually. But later on he is to be appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Now, the Constitution
requires that an Associate justice must be natural-born. Here comes now the distinction because the Constitution itself provides
for the distinction. So is he natural-born or naturalized? The Supreme Court said that he was naturalized because you cannot trace
his lineage--his Filipino lineage from his father. His father is originally Chinese and then he was already a minor during that time.
Okay so the petition... derivative Citizenship therefore makes the child not natural-born but still naturalized.
Lim Kai Chong Case

This also pertains to the right to hold public office as a Congresswoman, which requires under the Constitution to be
natural-born citizen. Lim Kai Chong was born in 1959 November. But earlier before that in 1857, the father who was Chinese
filed for naturalization. 19857 he filed for naturalization and he was granted in 1957. Now when can the father take his oath? 2
years after. So in 1959 particularly in September 21, 1959 the father took his oath. Two months after Lim Kai Chong was born,
November 195. Now how would we consider her? Natural-born or naturalized? This time she is NATURAL BORN because she
was already born of a Filipino father. It is now immaterial how the father became a Filipino, whether natural-born or naturalized.
SECTION 3
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. By this mere statement you can already
deduce that a decision granting Philippine citizenship for example is not FINAL. It does not attain finality. THERE IS NO RES
JUDICATA. Meaning, every time that the person's citizenship is questioned it may be reopened because citizenship may be
LOST or REACQUIRED in a manner provided by law. Even for natural-born citizens it can be lost but then it may be reacquired.
* So the first principle is that there is no res judicata when it comes to citizenship. It does not attain finality. It can be
reexamined and reopened over and over again.
Okay, let's go to loss. How may a citizenship be lost? There are two laws [governing the loss] of citizenship.
1. C?A 63 (An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired)
A. By naturalization in a foreign country
B. Express renunciation
C. Oath of allegiance to another country
These are the general ways of losing citizenship but there are specific ways for specific persons like rendering services
to the armed forces of a foreign country and the cancellation of the certificates of naturalization is also provided in
Commonwealth Act 473. Having been declared by a competent authority as deserter. So if you are a deserter you are deemed to
have lost your Philippine citizenship.
2. C.A. 473 (An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Naturalization and to Repeal the Acts
numbered 2927 and 448)
There's another section which provides for the loss of Philippine citizenship in case of a woman. What's that? By
marriage to a foreign husband. So generally it's naturalization, express renunciation, and subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
another country. And then for C.A. 473 that's cancellation of naturalization which was also included in C.A. 63.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
He lost his citizenship when he was naturalized as American. By virtue of his naturalization he lost his Philippine
citizenship. Now let us go to express renunciation of citizenship.
How does one expressly renounce his or her Philippine citizenship?
Aznar vs Comelec
Lito Osmena. Lito Osmena was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and American mother. Now, since the
mother is American, he's a holder of an ACR stating that he's American. Sometime in 1970's, he even applied for permission to
reentry to reenter the Philippines, so a reentry. He was granted a Certificate of reentry and an Immigration Certificate of
Clearance in relation to that reentry. Now he ran for public office which requires him to be a Filipino. He is a holder of an ACR,
so allegedly is not a Filipino. And even if he's a Filipino, by holding an ACR he has EXPRESSLY renounced his Philippine
citizenship. It was there in the ACR that he is an American. So what is the ruling of the Supreme Court? An ACR is not an
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. The fact that you are holding an ACR does not mean that you are NOT a Filipino,
especially in this case where Lito Osmena, by birth, has dual citizenship. He's both a Filipino an American. In this case, holding
an ACR is merely an assertion that he is also an American. What we can deduce is that he is of dual citizenship but what we
cannot deduce is by virtue thereof he has RENOUNCED his Philippine citizenship or his status as a Filipino citizen. Did you get
it? What we have here is a person with dual citizenship. It is also his privilege or right to get an ACR to mean that he is a dual
citizen but it does not in any way mean that he one has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. Holding an ACR is not
tantamount to an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
Valles vs. COMELEC
It involved Mrs. Lopez who ran for Governor? In Mati, Davao Oriental? She was born of a Filipino father and
Australian mother. She was born outside the Philippines. She is not only a holder of an ACR, but of a ICR (immigration
Certificate of Residency) and an Australian passport. Her citizenship was questioned because she was running for public office.
Would holding an ACR and ICR expressly renounce her Philippine Citizenship? In the case of Aznar, it's not diba?! What about
holding a passport? It's also in the same case of an ACR. That it's not an express renunciation of one's Philippine citizenship. That
is an assertion that she is also an Australian because what we have here and you should not forget is a person with DUAL
CITIZENSHIP. Okay, so it's not express renunciation. So obtaining is not tantamount to repudiation of original citizenship. On
its face it only certifies that the applicant has submitted himself to registration. Therefore there is no presumption of alienage on
the part of the applicant for ACR.
Yu vs. Santiago
Here the holding of a foreign passport and the declaration by this person, the petitioner as of alien citizenship was taken
by the Supreme Court as tantamount to an express renunciation. Why? Yu here is not a natural-born Filipino. He is Portuguese.
He applied for naturalization to become Filipino. Now when you apply for naturalization and it is granted, what is required of
you? To take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and the Constitution and to renounce all other authority, so
by the fact that he was naturalized as a Filipino and he was required and he did renounce allegiance to some other State or
Sovereignty. But thereafter, after the naturalization was granted he obtained a Portuguese passport and in some commercial
documents, issued outside and he did it outside the country, he stated that he is Portuguese. In this case the Supreme Court said
that he has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. Why? Because it was after he supposedly renounce his allegiance to
other sovereignty or other State, only to find out later that he applied for a Portuguese passport. Compare this one with the case of
Aznar and the case of Valles. There is no renunciation; there is no taking of oath. In this case he has taken an oath of allegiance in
the Philippines. There they are already considered Filipinos and Americans/Australians by birth. The Supreme Court said that
citizenship is not a commodity or wear than can be used anytime when it is convenient and suppressed when required, displayed
when convenient.
We go back to how naturalization is granted. We grant it, niluluto natin, diba?! Kung sa pagsasaing pa, hugasan sa,
tapkisan, tapos ipabukal,.....before ihain. So it cannot be that thereafter magbalik sa pagka bugas.
Another way of losing citizenship is by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country.
The Case of Labo
In Labo's case he was married to an Australian. By virtue thereof he can already become an Australian citizen by
merely taking an oath of allegiance which he did. So in that case the natural effect would be that he loses his Philippine
citizenship.
Citizenship may be lost or acquired in any manner provided by law. Under our laws, there is CA 63 and
Commonwealth Act 473 which provides for ways in which citizenship may be lost. To recapitulate, may be lost by express
renunciation or by subscribing an oath of allegiance to another country, and, if you are naturalized, by cancellation of your
naturalization.
In case any of the above has happened, how do you reacquire your citizenship? Can it be reacquired? Of
course yes. Again, there is no res judicata when it comes to grant citizenship. Under CA 63, citizenship may be reacquired also
by naturalization. The more common is repatriation wherein, if you are lucky, you may be able to reacquire your citizenship by
direct act of Congress. It is the Congress which enacts a special law just for you. And, more fortunate for us, if we are to be
naturalized as Americans later on, there is already Republic Act 9225, the Philippine Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003.
So naturalization, therefore, would be both a mode of acquiring and reacquiring Philippine citizenship. What was
deemed lost may also be reacquired by naturalization. You just have to comply with the requirements in CA 473 and CA 63.
Repatriation
It is an easier way of reacquiring citizenship. This is available only to natural-born citizens. There are several laws
regarding this depending on how the citizenship was lost. For example, if you are a deserter in the AFP and you lost your
citizenship, you may be repatriated via CA 63. There is an appropriation there for repatriation. Example, if you served in the
Allied Forces during WWII, there is also RA 965. And if you served in the Armed Forces of the US, there is also RA 2630. The
more common law that is used when it comes to repatriation is RA 8171. That is a law on repatriation of Filipino women who
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. It is also the repatriation for natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship by political and economic necessity. The first foremost requirement being that you are a natural-born Filipino. If you
are a woman who lost your citizenship by virtue of marriage, you can apply for repatriation to reacquire your citizenship. How is
that done? Simply by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If you are a natural-born Filipino
who lost your citizenship by political and economic necessity, you can be repatriated via RA 8171 or simply by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Tabasa vs CA
Tabasa was a Filipino who became American in his minority by derivative citizenship since his father was naturalized
as an American. He came back to the Philippines allegedly evading US laws because he violated several of them. But his US
passport was revoked by violations of their laws. How do you consider him now? As far as the Philippines is concerned, he is an
undocumented alien. As far as the international community is concerned, he is a state-less person. What did he do in order to
evade being deported? He took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines via RA 8171. Is that repatriation valid?
Again, the subject of 8171 is only for those Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to an alien. Of course, he is
not qualified under that provision. But is he qualified as a Filipino who lost citizenship because of political or economic
necessity? The Court said that this is available only to the person who actually lost his citizenship by political and economic
necessity. In this case, he was not that kind of person, it was his father. He only derived that citizenship of the father. If he is to
avail of the privilege, he must remain a minor. He was no longer a minor. In other words, if it was the father who lost his
citizenship due to political or economic necessity, it would be the father who would apply for repatriation and the minor would
benefit from that repatriation. But that is not the case as to him. Even if, the Court said, that the right would be extended to him
who is now of legal age, he should prove that he was affected by that political and economic necessity. In this case, he did not
prove that he was affected by that political and economic necessity.
What are the examples of this? During the time of Marcos, there were several extra-judicial killings, extra-legal
maneuverings by the government particularly against the political opposition of Marcos. Some of them were summarily arrested
as political detainees. Some of them escaped by flying to another country to gain asylum and to gain protection of that country
and were forced to be naturalized citizens of such country. So these are those kinds of Filipinos who can benefit out of 8171. The
Court also noted that the precursor to 8171 is PD 725. Thats the repatriation enacted in 1975 particularly targeting women who
lost their citizenship by answer to CA 63 and the change in constitution. That was the repatriation for women who lost their
citizenship by marriage and for natural-born citizens. When it was amended, the phrase who lost their citizenship by virtue of
political and economic necessity was added. It was the intention of the Congress to limit the application of this repatriation law
to those kinds of citizens. So this is the reason why Tabasa cannot avail of RA 8171.
Where do you file repatriation proceedings? The jurisdiction is with the Special Committee on Naturalization. How is it
effected? Repatriation is effected by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
Civil Registry and with the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau will now cancel the ACR and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino.
What are the effects of repatriation?
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
Frivaldo was naturalized as an American. He came back to the Philippines. He wanted to run for public office. He was
not qualified because he was a naturalized American citizen. So, like in the case of Republic vs. De La Rosa, he filed of
naturalization so that he can run in the 1992 election. But the naturalization is invalid. Before the next election, he tried to run
again and asked the Congress itself. But there was no legislation enacted for him. For the third time, he tried to reacquire his
citizenship for the election. During that time, it was still PD 725 because 8171 became effective in 1995. It makes it easier for a
natural-born citizen to repatriate because there is no requirement that the person be a victim of political or economic oppression.
He filed the petition in 1994. The election was in May 1995. He ran for governor, but there were already petitions to deny due
course to his certificate of candidacy because he was allegedly an American. Since his motion was still pending when elections
came, his name was included in the ballot and he won. However, the losing party was proclaimed the winner on June 1995. Now,
Frivaldo, filed a petition to annul the proclamation because, earlier that day, he knew that his petition for repatriation was granted
and that he took his oath of allegiance earlier that day therefore removing any legal impediment as to his qualification. Who is
now the rightful governor? The Court discussed the effect of repatriation. First, as to citizenship requirement, the Court reviewed
the Local Government Code and said that unlike residency which under that law must be one year prior to the election, there is no
requirement for citizenship. Therefore, the Court concluded that the qualification for citizenship to hold public office is only
required upon proclamation and that on the date by which the law dictates that the term begins because it is only thereafter that a
citizen is required to serve the people. Even if you are still American when your petition is pending, you can still file your
certificate of candidacy as long as you are already a citizen on the day of proclamation and on the day that your term started. The
next one, to remove all doubts as to his qualification, the Court ruled that repatriation retroacts to the date of application. So he is
deemed to be Filipino when he filed his COC in 1994. The Court said that this is a just and equitable interpretation of the
repatriation laws because it is the intention of the State through the Congress to grant Filipino citizenship to as many Filipinos as
possible thereby allowing them to enjoy the Constitutional right of citizenship. The Court also noted that this would not be
prejudicial to any rights. Much more, it would prevent prejudice to the applicants because, sometimes, the committee would
delay on acting on your petition.
Altarejos vs COMELEC
Altarejos is a holder of a permanent US visa and he took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino in 1997. The
problem is, without his own fault, it was registered in the Civil Register some six years after. His candidacy was questioned.
Using the Frivaldo case, the Court reiterated that repatriation date backs to the date of application. Were it not for the Court
decision in Frivaldo, this would be a clear case of prejudice because it was not through his fault that the registration was belated.
Bengson vs. HRET
Cruz ran for Congress. Under the Constitution, a congressman must be a natural-born citizen. In 1985, Cruz enlisted
himself in the US Marine Corps and therefore took an allegiance to the United States. In 1990, he also became naturalized as a
US citizen. On 1994, he applied for repatriation under RA 2630, a law for those who lost their Philippine citizenship by serving
in the United States military. He was elected as representative in 1998. The question is, you have a natural-born Filipino, lost his
citizenship, and then repatriated. How will we consider him? Natural-born? Or naturalized? A natural-born Filipino is those
citizens who are Filipinos from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his citizenship. The theory of the
opposition is that he is not natural-born because he performed an act to perfect his citizenship. The Court said that that is the
wrong interpretation. Natural citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth. In other words, the main factor is birth. If
you are born a Filipino, then you are considered a natural-born Filipino. Under the 1973 Constitution, you have two kinds of
naturalized Filipinos:
-Those naturalized pursuant to naturalization laws; and
-Those children of Filipino mothers who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. There was no
provision granting them natural-born status. Under the 1973 Constitution, they are considered naturalized. Under the 1987
Constitution, they were now considered natural-born.
Under the 1987 Constitution is concerned, there is only one type of naturalized citizen. That is those who citizens who
became Filipinos pursuant to naturalization laws. So you have only two types of Filipino citizens: natural-born and those who
became Filipinos pursuant to naturalization proceedings. What about those who reacquired their citizenship? How do we regard
them? Theres nothing in the Constitution which says anything about those kind of citizens because it will depend on the original
citizenship that was lost. In other words, if you are natural-born Filipino, lost it, and were repatriated, you return to your original
citizenship. Also, if you are naturalized as Filipino, lost it, and reacquired it, you are restored to being naturalized Filipino. If you
are natural-born, you will reacquire your citizenship by virtue of repatriation which is an easier way. If you are a naturalized
citizen, lost it, can you reacquire it by repatriation? No. You have to apply for a new naturalization proceedings.
To recapitulate, what are the effects of repatriation? First is it retroacts to the date of application. And it restores the
applicant to his original citizenship.
Lets recap where there are 2 parts that show for 2 actions that provide for those will be considered as citizen of the
Philippines. In Sec. 1 we know that there are 2 modes of acquiring citizenship: by jus sanguinis and by naturalization. So we
repeat, by virtue of operation of the laws of naturalization, now there is a distinction between natural-born citizen and naturalized
citizen, although they have the same rights and privileges as citizens of the Philippines but there are also rights reserved only to
the natural-born citizens. So Section 2 therefore describes who is considered a natural-born citizen, under Section 3 our
constitution provides that citizenship maybe lost or reacquired, therefore the decision of citizenship does not attain finality
because anytime the decision however to raise question, the Supreme Court ruled that the citizenship may be lost or reacquired
pursuant to laws.
By laws, we said it may be lost under CA 63 by express renunciation or by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
another state. Now in relation to CA 63 it may be lost when it comes to naturalized citizen by virtue of cancellation on their
naturalization. In laws how may be it be reacquired? The common way of reacquiring is through repatriation and in repatriation,
its effect retroact to the time of filing, and the repatriation will restore the person to his original citizenshipthat is if you
natural-born citizen. If you retain by reacquiring it by virtue of repatriation then you will go back/ restore to being natural-born
or, if naturalized then you go back by being naturalized. Now we stop there, theres another way of reacquiring Filipino
citizenship by virtue of R.A. 9225, is a law enacted in 2003, by virtue of 9225, for those who are not natural-born citizen. Take
note of that it only for those who are not natural-born citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of naturalization in
another country. How? By taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, In other words if you are not a naturalborn citizen, you lost it by naturalization.
You are deemed to have reacquired it by merely an oath of allegiance. Whats the distinction by how you consider one
who has reacquired? It depends on when they were naturalized. If they were naturalized after the effectivity of 9225 then they are
deemed to have retained their citizenship. Now the only requirement of 9225 is taking an oath of allegiance but in Section 5
thereof that there are other conditions for specific situation like when you what to run for public office, you want to hold a public
office you want to vote, you want to exercise a profession.
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law
Benjamin Dacanay left the Philippines sometimes in 2004 for his medical needs. He was constrained to be naturalized
as Canadian in order to enjoy social security benefits of the Canadian citizen. Now he went in the Philippines by 2006.
Reacquired his citizenship by virtue of 9225 and he wanted to practice law can he do that? Just to give you a view about our topic
here. He has been authorized since 1960, so when he returned in the Philippines by 2006. It must have been some 46 years. He is
already a lawyer for 46 years. Say he became a lawyer at 35 and he returned at 71, 72, 73, 72, 75 years of age. He wanted to
practice or resume his practice of law in the Philippines. Would his retention of Philippine citizenship be sufficient to grant him
that privilege? (Read R.A. 9225 SEC. 5) Those who retain/ reacquire Philippine citizenship should enjoy full civil and political.
However, there are certain provisions as Ive said there are specific conditions in this case. The particular conditions in paragraph
4 (read paragraph 4 of Section 5 of R.A. 9225). So knowing that, can he automatically resume his practice of law? So he has to
comply with certain requirements with the proper authority, the Supreme Court, for license. Just to give you an idea that by
passing a bar would not only be a ticket to automatically practicing law, you have certain other requirements, you must be a
lawyer in good standing that means being a member of the IBP or mandatory membership. As a member you have to pay your
annual dues. If you want to practice in Davao City, you should pay your PTR, Professional Tax Receipt, you need to have a PTR.
Then every 3 years you need to have 36 units of MCLE (Mandatory Continuing Legal Education). So after you become a lawyer,
your studying will not stop. You are still a students of law until you decide not be a lawyer and in this case you need to have an
oath of office.
Although, 9225 grants that person, an individual, who has lost his citizenship by virtue of naturalization in another
country, the benefit of retaining or reacquiring citizenship to civil and political rights. As we said before, Section 4 states that the
citizen of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship nonetheless. When it comes to construction of the
constitution it should is to be prospectively applied. In other words, it does not cure the defect of the 1973 Constitution or the
1935 Constitution. That relief will be from the 1987 constitution. That will be her relief, CA 63 through repatriation particularly
RA 8171.
Now we will notice Section 4 is more or less worded in the same manner to this Section in 1987 Constitution pertaining
to females. Females who lost their Philippine citizenship. Meaning its not applicable for both males and females. Sec. 4 also
provides that marriage does not affect cross citizenship. Marriage to an alien does not make a Filipino an alien or may not have
an effect of losing his citizenship.
Labo vs. COMELEC
Labo was a natural-born Filipino, he married an Australian citizen. He took his oath of allegiance to the Queen of
Australia and thereafter he became an Australian citizen. When he ran for public office he was disqualified because he lost his
citizenship. He has not lost his Philippine citizenship by virtue of marriage because, in fact, the law provides that a citizen
marries an alien shall retain his citizenship. In other words, he seems to be a Filipino and that his marriage does not affect his
citizenship. But the Supreme Court said that no one is questioning his citizenship on the talk of his marriage. There is no
argument that does not marriage affects ones citizenship. It was his act of subscribing to an oath of allegiance in Australia which
made him lose his citizenship. This is what Section 4 says, citizens by an act or omission deemed under the law to have renounce
it. It was an act of subscribing or an oath of allegiance which has effect of losing his citizenship. It was actually a process of
naturalization in the laws of Australia simply because he was married to an Australian. Now he has another contention that his
naturalization as an Australian only made him a dual citizen. Is he correct? He is wrong if he considers CA 63 because CA 63
provides that a mode of citizenship still be via naturalization. Lets just say it was in naturalization. Now, what if immediately he
takes his naturalization, now would your answer be the same if he was naturalized now? We consider R.A. 9225, what does 9225
say? Natural-born citizens who lost his Philippine citizenship by naturalization will retain his Philippine citizenship. So the
answer would be different if we consider R.A. 9225. But this case was decided prior to the enactment of 9225. This was in 1989.
Now this marriage was actually discovered to be bigamous. Because the marriage was bigamous, the naturalization was annulled.
He now contends that since his naturalization was annulled, he is still a Filipino. Is he correct? NO! When he was annulled he
lost his Australian citizenship, so whats his status now? He is now a stateless person. The fact is whatever his status with
Australia is a matter between him and Australia. He already severed his relationship with the Philippines because of
naturalization. He freely rejected his Philippine citizenship and knowingly embraces his citizenship in a foreign country. We have
here a Supreme Court that is hurt, because he rejected Philippine citizenship now he just cannot claim to be a Filipino just
because he was rejected by Australian law. At best he was a stateless person.
Djumantan vs. Domingo
Now I consider this case as a classic MMK. By reason of economic necessity, the husband went to Indonesia an
overseas worker. There, he embraces the religion of Islam and found a woman whom he married. They had two children. Now
when he came back to Philippines embraced by her wife, the other woman came to the Philippines, met by her wife herself. They
were accepted as guests in the house of this couple. The wife in the Philippines believed that the husband was really returning a
favor to this woman from Indonesia. And they stayed for 2 years. It took the wife that long to discover that they were married.
She filed for concubinage it was dismissed why? Because they were married. It was the son who took the initiative, what was it
that he filed? Deportation proceedings. The woman was actually detained in the CIDG prison. In her defense, she said she cannot
be forced to leave because she was married a Filipino. In other words she should be entitled to the rights of a Filipina to stay in
the Philippines. Section 4 revised, the citizens of the Philippines shall retain their Philippine citizenship. An alien who marries a
citizen does not give a fact to become a citizen by virtue of marriage. Theres no law in the Philippines which grants automatic
citizenship to the wife or husband of a Filipino citizen. He/she has to undergo naturalization proceedings. So in this case, it is
incorrect for the Indonesian wife to claim rights of a citizenship to stay in the Philippines.
Section 5. Dual Allegiance of Citizens Is Inimical To The National Interest And Shall Be Dealt With By Law.
Take note: that Section 5 deals with Dual Allegiance.
Now, in the local government code, a person or a citizen who intends to run for public office must qualify under the
qualifications provided by the law and there are also disqualifications. Section 40 of R.A 7160, the local government code
provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running to any elective local position.
Mercado vs. Manzano
In this case, Edu Manzano was born of Filipino parents but he was born in America. During his minority, when he was
6 years old he was brought by his parents back to the Philippines. He was of course a holder of a foreign passport an American
passport, and he was registered as an alien. He is a holder of an ACR (Alien Certificate of Registration). Now, he wanted to run
for public office, and when he reached the age of majority he exercised his rights as a Filipino like voting. But his qualification
was questioned based on provision of the local government code. What does the local government code say? Persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any public position. Is he disqualified to run, because he has dual citizenship? The
Supreme Court looked into the claims under Section 5 what is found upon is Dual Allegiance and not Dual Citizenship. When
saying dual citizenship, it is a condition which arises because the Philippines has no control over the laws of another country,
such as the laws on citizenship. In this case by operation of the laws of both countries, a person is simultaneously both a citizen
of that country and a citizen of the Philippines. It is involuntary on the part of the individual. Example in the case of Manzano. It
was not in his own decision that he was both a Filipino and American. It was by accident of birth that he was American. He was
born in the United States of America. So dual citizenship happens, maybe because by accident of birth or by accident of
marriage. For example, that law stated that they become their citizen. The bottomline is that the individual has no control over
that, its by operation of their law and operation of our law. Dual Allegiance on the other hand, it is sure that person because of a
positive act on his part vows allegiance to both countries. So, in his case it was through his own voluntary act that he vows
allegiance to both countries. What is frowned upon by the Constitution is not dual citizenship but dual allegiance, because this
person voluntarily placed himself to the position where he vows dual allegiance allegiance to two countries. In other words,
what the Supreme Court is saying is that disqualification under the local government code although it says that any persons with
dual citizenships shall be disqualified should be construed to be dual allegiance. Any person with dual allegiance shall be
disqualified. Why? You cannot disqualify a person with dual citizenship because he is a Filipino. You cannot deny that fact that
he is a Filipino. So in other words, to interpret that provision it would mean persons with dual allegiance. Now, in the case of
Manzano, the Supreme Court noted that when Manzano filed his certificate of candidacy, theres a provision there in which the
prospective candidate declares under oath that he is a Filipino and he defend and support the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines. The Supreme Court is saying that it would suffice to prove that he has elected or chosen Philippine citizenship
over this other citizenship. Thus, other than he is not disqualified just because he is a dual citizenship, hes also qualified because
he has chosen or elected Philippine citizenship. Ruling of the Supreme Court: certificate of candidacy would suffice as proof of
election of Philippine citizenship. This is with regards to persons with dual citizenship. DO NOT mistake this in the case who are
born prior to January 17, 1973. *So, when the question is asked in the essay exam, be sure to distinguish. Now, thats the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano.
Valles vs. COMELEC
Lopez ran as governor in Mati. Her citizenship was questioned because she was born of a Filipino father and Australian
mother in Australia. So, what is her status? Dual citizen, she has dual citizenship. So, in this case the Supreme Court she is not
disqualified because what the Constitution frowns upon is dual allegiance. It is not her fault that she is also an Australian. But it
would suffice if the Supreme Court is satisfied that she has elected Philippine citizenship merely by filing her certificate of
candidate where she can have proof that she is a Filipino citizen. Since were talking about the validities, lets go back to R.A.
9225. What does R.A. 9225 require again? Natural loss, right? Loss that diminishes the citizenship by how? Naturalization.
When we say naturalization, you are required to take an oath of allegiance to another state, right? But R.A. 9225 suffice that
merely taking an oath, you retain your Philippine citizenship. You are like to not have lost your Philippine citizenship. Isnt this
unfair?
AASJS vs. Datumanong
The petitioners oddly say that R.A. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. You have here an individual renouncing his
Philippine citizenship and we have this law embracing him back as a Filipino, by taking just an oath. What happens to his other
citizenship? R.A. 9225 does not say. Meaning it does not concern itself to his citizenship. In other words, the Philippines doesnt
care if you retain or lose your citizenship to other country. So, we have here, lets say America, wala din silang pakialam. Now
the AASJS vs. Datumanong, petitioner contests that dual allegiance should be declared as unconstitutional. Is the petitioner
correct? R.A. 9225 on its base does not allow dual allegiance but only dual citizenship. Why? *Oath
I ____, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
If you read the oath, theres a portion there wherein the individual recognizes the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Although there is no express renunciation because it would seem that R.A.
9225 would allow that person to retrieve his other citizenship. The latter oath is an oath to the Philippines and that he recognizes
the supreme authority of the Philippines. In other words, as far as the Philippines is concerned it is satisfied that the later oath is
to the Philippines. As to the question of dual allegiance it has been clear out of the picture and passes this to the other candidate.
If the country will question the allegiance of its individual then that is the matter we leave to them. As far as the Philippines is
concern, this Filipino natural-born as the one that pledge his loyalty to the Philippines declared as the supreme authority. So as to
dual allegiance, as far as R.A. 9225 is concerned, thats the problem of the other state. In other words, R.A. 9225 does not
allowed dual allegiance but merely dual citizenship. So AASJS vs. Datumanong is the landmark case affirming the
constitutionality of R.A. 9225. Now going to the provisions of R.A. 9225, you have the case of:
Jacot vs. Dal
Now lets apply R.A. 9225. It was decided in 2009, Jacot was a natural-born Filipino and he was naturalized as an
American. He reacquired Philippine citizenship on the benefits of R.A. 9225. Whats the effect? He can enjoy the full civil and
political rights. Now, he wanted to run for public office. As said that R.A. 9225 provide for certain conditions for certain
situations. One which is whether an individual want to run for public office. *Section 5, Paragraph 2:
Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
So, R.A. 9225 in Section 3 requires a person to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. By virtue thereof he
faces the citizenship and he shall enjoy the full civil and political rights that Section 5 provides. If he intends to run for public
office, what are the conditions? He must qualify under the Constitution and other existing laws, and what else? He must make a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign allegiance. Now, Jacot is saying, because he was not able to make his personal and
sworn statement, is contending that although under Section 3 is sufficient as renunciation. Because here he declares that he
recognizes the supreme authority of the Philippines. And not also that, using the decision in Mercado vs. Manzano. He is saying
that the certificate of candidacy would suffice as his election of Philippine citizenship. Supreme Court said that the requirements
of R.A. 9225 are clear. You would take an oath of allegiance for that purpose, to maintain or reacquire Philippine citizenship and
thats it. Now, if you intend to run for public office, there are orderly requirements, when which is you must be qualified and the
other one is you must take a personal and sworn renunciation. If you read the oath, there is no express renunciation there. In fact,
it is deemed that R.A. 9225 allows for dual citizenship. But with intent to run, you must renounce your other citizenship. In other
words, the personal and sworn renunciation is a mandatory requirement if one wants to run for public office.
Cordora vs. COMELEC
The petitioner was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. He was born in the Philippines and he wanted to
go the US. His father petitioned him. So he applied for 45130, American visa. He then availed of 9225 and he took an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines. He was now running for public office. But he failed to comply with the third requirement which is
personal renunciation of the US citizenship. According to him, he did not need to take that personal renunciation because his oath
under 9225 would suffice. Other than that, the Manzano case would say that the Certificate of Candidacy would suffice as an
election of Philippine citizenship. The Court said that he is right. He does not need to make a personal renunciation. Because hes
a natural-born Filipino and an American upon birth. He did not lose his American citizenship by naturalization. He was both
Filipino and American by birth. He is a dual citizen. For me, he did not need to reacquire his Filipino citizenship by 9225 because
hes already a Filipino and he is also an American by accident of birth. So in this case, he was similarly situated with Manzano.
His COC would suffice as election of Filipino citizenship.
Take note, when you hear election of Philippine citizenship, it might be an election of a person with dual citizenship
because he wanted to run for public office. But it might also be an election of Philippine citizenship because he was born under
the 1935 Constitution. And if he wont elect, he wont be considered Filipino. In the former case, he would still be considered
Filipino even if he did not elect Philippine citizenship.
Article 5
SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to
vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.
Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
A. SUFFRAGE AS A RIGHT AND DUTY
Under Article 5 and 4 the reading of provision is therefore included thats the exercise of Suffrage is a constitutional right. We
should understand this in the context that the right to vote includes also the right not to vote. Distinguish this under the 1973
Constitution wherein it was made criminally punishable for a person to fail to register or to fail to vote. In otherwise under the
1973 constitution, suffrage is not only a right but also an obligation. Now under the 1987 Constitution wherein they
acknowledge, they recognize and they hold dear our democracy, it is recognized that, to that vote is a proper exercise or
expression of the dissent. In fact to boycott is a legally acceptable mode of expression of a persons will or desire under
democratic system. So the right to vote also includes the right not to vote.
There are two cases about Akbayan Youth vs COMELEC and Kabataan partylist vs COMELEC. These cases are similar in so far
as certain facts are concerned because in the conclusion of the Supreme Court they differ. In both cases the youth sector is asking
the COMELEC to extend the registration of voters. Now who administers the registration of voters? It is the COMELEC but the
COMELEC works under the mandate or its functions is also governed by National Laws. Congress enacted a law, which is R.A.
8189, for a system of a continuing registration.
Akbayan vs. COMELEC
The COMELEC provided for the deadline of the last day for registration of voters. It is supposed to be a system of a
continuing registration, but here there is a deadline for the last day of registration for the preparation of the 2001 Election. The
deadline is supposed to be December 2000 in preparation of May 2001 Election. After that deadline the youth sector is
contending that there are still around 4 million who were not able to register. The COMELEC denied their request, when they
went to the Supreme Court, the SC said that the COMELEC is right. Even if the youth were saying , even if we were denied our
right to exercise suffrage. Isnt it that suffrage is a constitutional right? And the SC said that, Yes, there is no argument that
suffrage is a constitutional right but that right must be exercised within the framework of certain statutory or procedural
requirements, in order to exercise that right. In our jurisdiction we have a system of continuing registration. What is the purpose
of registration? In order to determine who are qualified to vote, who will be allowed to vote, and who will be delisted from
voting. In other words this is a mechanism for determining that those who will vote will be only those that are qualified. That
under R.A. 8189 it is provided that there is a continuing system of registration only that 120 days before the next election there
will be no more registration. Why? Is the prohibitive period reasonable? The SC said YES, it is determined reasonable and it has
no issue whether it is or is not reasonable because the State through the COMELEC needs time to sort out those who are
registered if are they qualified ? or are they flying voters? If we didnt give the COMELEC this time we will be flooded with
shadows and ghost who are allowed to vote. In this case, when they filed the petition and they ask for certainty for extension of
registration, the date that they sought for is already well beyond the 120 days prohibitive period. Therefore, they were not denied
the right to register; it was their fault that they did not register during the time that they are supposed to register. They are not
without fault. So, the SC already discussed that the prohibitive period is reasonable. It is not tantamount to denying a person in
his right to exercise suffrage if this right must be exercised only within the framework of certain substantive and procedural
requirement. We need to have these requirements in order to put order in the exercise of this right; otherwise just anybody of us
can just vote invoking our constitutional right. So understanding this is to understand that the constitutional right to vote is not
really a right but a privilege, just like any other right.
Kabataan vs. COMELEC
Similar also COMELEC also established the last day of registration thats supposed to be December 2009, in the
preparation of the first automated election. It is supposed to be December 2009 but it is moved much earlier in October 2009, so
in both cases the youth sector is asking the COMELEC to extend the registration. But in this case the SC granted the petition of
the youth. Why? The reason for the COMELEC in advancing the date of registration is because it will be the first time that we
will have the automated election and they are not sure what will happen so they wanted enough time to prepare. The SC said NO,
that the law R.A. 8189 does not provide for time much longer than 120 days. The SC granted the petition of this case because the
petition was filed and the recommended date was still outside the 120 days prohibitive period. In fact, the original deadline of the
registration which is December 2009 is still outside the 120 days prohibitive period. In the computation of the SC, it should be
January 2009. Since they filed it on time and the recommended date is still outside the 120 days prohibitive period, that they shall
exercise that right to register.
Under Section 1, it provides for the qualifications in order for one to exercise the right for suffrage. What are these
qualifications?
There are just 3 basic qualifications:
1.
2.
3.
Citizenship- which means you have to be a Filipino, all aliens are excluded. This section require the citizenship
grants the person the right to exercise political rights, qualifications to the right to vote. This is exclusive only for
the citizen of the Philippines.
Age- the age requirement is 18 years of age. Under the 1973 Constitution used to be 21 years of age. Why did
they reduce it to 18 yrs old? Statistically shows that if it is 21 year old and above the direction of the State or the
State will be governed around by around 80% of the population. Theres also a data showing that 18-20 years old
are just as mature as 21 years old. In fact that argument was whether you are 18, you can enter the public, you can
already make your will and also you can get married. So if you are allowed to get married in law so why would
not it allow you in voting. Under the 1987 Constitution the age requirement was reduced to 18 years old.
Residency Requirement- resides in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to
vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Romualdez vs RTC
Sometime in 1980s, Cocoy Romualdez established his residence in Tolosa, Leyte. He has stayed there, dwelled in that
place and established his home, in fact he ran for Barangay Captain in that place. Sometime in 1986, when EDSA Revolution
happened, considering that they are close associates with the Marcoss, they feared for their lives, so he fled to US. After the
situation is already good in the Philippines, he went back to Tolosa, Leyte in December 1991. There is incoming election that will
happen in May 1992, he registered as a voter. He proposes to vote in Tolosa , Leyte. Does he satisfy the residency requirement?
The Supreme Court said YES. Why? Because, it has been established that Leyte has been his domicile since 1980s. Theres no
prove that he abandoned his domicile, in fact when he went to the US, there was always the intention to go back and he in fact
did go back to his domicile. In other words if you count his residency since residence as a requirement is synonymous with
domicile, you should count it from 1980. The SC said that he is qualified being a domiciliary of Tolosa, Leyte since 1980.
In elections laws and political laws, remember this principle, Residency is synonymous with Domicile. What is their
distinction? Domicile is considered as the legal residence, it is more permanent when you compare to Residency. Residence
connotes physical appearance or presence of a particular place and when one intends to leave the moment that his purpose there
ends, on the contrary, domicile devours a more permanent or legal abode wherein one intends to return the moment that his
purpose in other place ends. Example, you are in Davao because of your studies, the moment that it ends you have the intention
to return to your domicile. A person can only have 1 domicile. It is very difficult to lose your domicile. You have to have
physical presence in another place and intention to abandon your prior domicile and intention to remain in your new place. There
is animus manendi the intention to stay in the new domicile and animus non revertendi the intention to leave your domicile which
is difficult to establish. A person can have as many residences as he has many purposes in life. Example, if she studies in Davao
and has a business in Cebu, he also stays there on weekends and goes back to Davao, so he has 2 residences. A person can have 1
domicile and several residences. Domicile is a residence which is more permanent. Example, in Ms. Basirs situation that she has
a residence in Davao for 2 years and cant go home to her domicile in Iligan for elections, she can register as a voter here in
Davao because she satisfies the 6 months residency requirement. But if she changed her mind for the next election and went to
Iligan and even if it is 1 day after she set foot there and want to transfer her registration to Iligan, she can also do that since it is
her domicile. Residency is synonymous to domicile, so if you talk about domicile (since birth usually) automatic qualified. When
residency means ordinary connotation then we have to count if she reached the 6 months requirement.
Velasco vs. COMELEC
Velasco was born in Pampanga in 1952 and grew up there so that is his domicile. Sometime in 1983, he left the
Philippines to US. He was naturalized in US as an American. Sometime in July 2006 he availed of RA 9225, he was still in
America, so that means that he is now a dual citizen. He came back to the Philippines and stayed here beginning September 2006.
There is an upcoming election on May 2007. So he had stayed for 8 months. Did he satisfy the residency requirement? The
answer is NO. Why? It was similar with Romualdez but here it was different because he was naturalized as an American citizen.
The moment of naturalization he had severed his ties with the Philippines. Therefore, he is no longer considered a resident, much
less a domicile of the Philippines. In fact, when he visits his relatives in the Philippnes, he can only enter through an approved
visitors Visa because he is no longer considered as a resident of the Philippines. So in this case, he is NOT qualified. He did not
satisfy the residency requirement.
In the last sentence in section 1, No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage. In other words, the Congress did not enact the law making ability to read and write, financial capacity , sex or civil
status as a requirement when it comes to carry the vote but theres a provision in section 1 which states that citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law this means the Congress can enact a law to provide for certain disqualifications.
This is what we mean by the exercise of a right within the framework of substantive frameworks as long as you are not
disqualified by law. In other words, the Congress cannot add substantive requirements but can add disqualifications. This should
be understood in the form of forfeiture of a right. For example, under the Election Code, a person is convicted by final judgment
to render the sentence of not less than 1 year is disqualified to vote. Thats constitutional because when the legal impediment is
removed he can go back to voting. So the disqualification must be in the form of forfeiture of a right but not an additional
substantive requirement because the constitution only requires for one to be qualified: citizenship, age and residency requirement.
Now section 2 states that:
The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.
Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
There are several mandates of the constitution, mandates of the Congress. Our form of secrecy of ballot is the folder. ^_^. We
also have secrecy of voting of illiterates and disabled but not just yet the system of voting independently as of this time they need
to be assisted.
In the system of absentee voting, the Congress enacted R.A. 9189 or the Absentee Voters Act of 2003. It provides four ways
wherein a person who is not in the place to cast a vote can nonetheless vote trough the system of Absentee Voting. Example, you
are a military on in active service, and you want to vote in the election and you are not in the place where you are registered. Can
you vote? YES, pursuant to R.A. 9189. In section 5 paragraph 4 of RA 9189, which states that; An immigrant or a permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three years from the approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
the permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia. Physically immigrants in residence of another country are supposed to be disqualified. Why? Since they are resident
or in permanent residence in another country there is a presumption that they have abandoned their domicile. Thats why in the
succeeding provision unless he/she executes an affidavit that he/she is qualified. What was the affidavit for? Affidavit that she
will establish residence within 3 years from the approval of her registration.
Macalintal vs. COMELEC
The petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of this provision because, the constitution requires a person to be a
resident of the Philippines. How can you allow an immigrant or permanent resident of another country to vote or participate in
the election in the Philippines? The SC said that if you read Article 5 of the 1987 Constitution, theres Section 1 and Theres
section 2. Section 1 provides for the general requirements (citizenship, age, residency), Section 2 provides the constitutional act
assisting for the absentee voting. The frameworks of the constitution knows that they are not in the place where they should be
voting. Therefore, by the strategic notation of Section 1 and 2, it is statutory construction; it is presumed that Section 2 by
providing for a system of absentee voting is an exception to the residency requirement of Section 1. In other words, there no
requirement of residency in absentee voting system. The practical reason maybe, how can you have an absentee voting system if
you require a person to be present? So Absentee Voting System is an exception to the residency requirement. Another objection,
is about the affidavit. Isnt that a provisional registration which is prohibited by the Constitution? The SC said NO. What is the
purpose of the affidavit? More than expressing the intention to establish residence it is actually to express declaration that he has
not actually abandoned his domicile. In having under oath that you will establish your residence within 3 years it is an express
declaration that you have not actually abandoned your domicile, so its not a promise but actually compliance to this Act.
Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC
The spouses here are used to be Filipinos but naturalized as Americans. They availed of RA 9225 which bestows to
their being dual citizens. They wanted to register under RA9189. The Philippine Consulate in the US denied them the privilege to
register. According to the Consular Office they have not satisfied their residency requirement. Is the Consular office correct?
The answer is NO. Why? They are those considered as immigrants or permanent residents of another country because the availed
the RA9225 they are considered also Filipinos. The RA 9189 has no residency requirement but just the affidavit. In RA 9189 you
can only participate in voting for the National Positions.
The Three Great Departments:
Legislative
Executive
Judiciary
They have their own territories and is based on the principles of separation of powers. Each cannot be made to the
doing of the others. Each cannot decide all the matters and its decision, is respected by the other department because in its set
department in which would have supreme authority over their territory.
In this sense, the legislation should only belong to legislative department. Thats the only department who has the ability to
legislate.
Can legislation of laws belong to the executive department? Or can interpretation of laws be done by departments otherr than the
Judiciary
No. The main purpose is to prevent the concentration of powers to a department because it may be subjected to abuse
of authority. There would be a risk of abuse especially if the governship of power is like Marcos. So at the time of Martial law,
Marcos was the executive and legislative and because he owns the judiciary: he is also the judiciary. Under the 1987
Constitution, we would let to put a severe mark of delegation in between these powers to acquire this institution.
But who would determine whether or not these departments are already abusing the respective authorities? So apart
from the principles of separation of powers we would also serve the separation of checks and balance. So in reality its not
absolute separation of powers is not absolute independence of but interdependence. So now what department should be able to
check the work of the other departments or to provide some check and balances?
For example, the problem in enacting laws now after it enacts the law is it considered a law? There is already
independence?
No. Its not complete law yet. Why? Because it needs the approval of the president. So in enacting a law although it is
purely legislative, it needs the participation of the president for a law to be complete.
Now what if the President will abuse its authority? Is there another system of check and balance so that we will accept its
authority?
Yes, the Congress can authorize the veto of the president. So we have the system of check and balance. What about the
President? There are certain acts of the President that would not be complete without the participation of the Congress. For
example, when the president enters into international agreements or treaties, it needs the conference of the Senate otherwise, it
will not be valid.
What about the judiciary? Where is its participation?
Now prior to 1987 Constitution the judiciary will avoid questions that are a political question because that action or that
duty belongs exclusively to the president. However, in the 1987 Constitution, we now have the Expanded Judicial Power. The
Supreme Court can now determine whether or not the action of the other government is valid or whether they are guilty of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lets say they have the conflict of the election who would be the
Senate President (sample lang ha). Normally there is a political and the Supreme Court cannot come in and decide for the Senate.
Somehow, if you apply grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court can come in not to replace the decision of the Senate but to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion in coming up with the election. The Supreme Court is given under the
Constitution that expanded authority to determine whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the other departments.
So thats separation of powers and checks and balances.
Legislative Department
Article 6, Section 1
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision of initiative and referendum.
One Congress consisting of two houses:
Senate
House of Representatives
Now base on this section we can already deduce certain things. Lets go back to the principle on who drafted the
Constitution and approved the Constitution. Who are authors of the Constitution? It is the People. It is the people who are the
authors of the Constitution and under the definition of the principles, sovereignty resides in the people. Sovereignty includes the
power to legislate, so the people have the power to legislate. In other words, the original owner of legislation is the people.
If the original power to legislate is with the people, what kind of power or legislative power is in Congress?
Delegated legislative power. Legislative power could be the original or it could be delegated, and the power of the
Congress is actually merely delegated power. Why? You reconcile with the principle that we are the republican state, meaning
we are a state of representatives. Sovereignty resides in the people that the people need that representative to perform these
duties. We cannot expect the people enact the laws. So in our Constitution that we drafted we delegated the legislative authority
with the Congress.
There is also another classification of legislative power:
Ordinary legislative power - ordinary legislative power is that would lead to enactment of ordinary laws, or ordinary
subject matters.
Constituent legislative power - refers to the enactment, amendment or repeal of the Constitution. So when the subject
matter is the Constitution, it is already exercise of constituent power. Now constituent power may also be exercise by
the people.
What is legislative power?
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, to amend laws to repeal. Each of these act constitute legislative power.
Take one and we already have a limited or reduced legislative power, because under our Constitution the legislative power of our

Congress is plenary. It can enact all subject matters, it has no limitation as to what subjects it can enact on, it has no limitation as
to the exercise of that power except as to the limits provided by the Constitution.
What are the limits?
That would be substantive limits that we would find in the Constitution. Mostly, these limits are only found in the Bill
of Rights. For example, Congress cannot enact laws establishing religion or enact ex post facto laws, or giving titles to a certain
person. The Constitution itself limits Congress. Now there are also limitations in a procedural aspect, on how a bill becomes a
law. This limitation is also provided in the Constitution.
But can you see the Constitutions enumeration on what laws Congress should enact?
No. It leaves up to the discretion of the Congress on what subject matter to legislate law.
League of Cities vs. COMELEC
There are certain municipalities that were converted into cities only to find out thereon that the laws which converted
them into cities became invalid. 2008 was the original decision. It was changed in 2009. In 2010, the Supreme Court reverted to
the original decision. In 2011, the Supreme Court changed again and went back again to its second resolution. Whats the issue
there? We have 16 municipalities by virtue of 16 laws. Under the Constitution, Art. 10, local government, the creation of cities by
the local government must be pursuant to the Local Government Code. Article 10, Section 10:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
So its a Constitutional mandate. So the Constitution was enacted in 1987. By 1991, Congress enacted the Local
Government Code. And that Local Government Code would provide for the criteria in creating municipalities of the fulfillment
to cities. What is that criteria? It would depend on your land area, the population and your income. These are the 3 determinants
under the Local Government Code of 1991. The income requirement for the municipality to become a city is 20 million, income
generated from its own resources excluding that 20 million. In 2001, Congress amended that provision of the Local Government
Code changing it from 20 million and is now 100 million. It had to be a 100 million earning municipality in order to apply in
becoming a city. But these 16 municipality that were converted into cities. In other words, the laws converting them into cities
was enacted after the release. But, looking at the municipalities, they did not qualify under the requirement, they were below to
100 million. Now why they were converted into cities? Common in these 16 laws is the provision exempting them from the 100
million income requirement.
Can Congress just disregard the Constitutional provision? The original decision of the SC in 2008 said that the
Congress abused its discretion because it is the Constitution that provided that the criteria should be based on the Local
Government Code. In other words, if there should be any exemption from the criteria set by the Local Government Code, it
should be contained in the Local Government Code (LGC) itself. And the criteria should be applicable to future conditions. Not
only to these particular municipalities. So what the SC is saying is that, these are the criteria provided by the Local Government
Code and its amendment. And that Code provided for the exemptions. Again, because the criteria should be based on the criteria
set by the Local Government Code.
What is the reason behind that? So that we would have uniform determinant if we convert municipalities into cities.
Equal protection of laws.
So, if there would be those who will be exempted, it should be the exemptions provided by the Local Government Code
itself. Thats why the SC said that the 16 cityhood laws are all invalid for being violative of the Constitution and the Local
Government Code.
That was the first decision.
Now, in 2009, the SC changed its mind. Immediately thereafter, SC said were wrong. Isnt it that Congress power is
plenary? It can enact on all subject matters. It has no limit. So, if this is the LGC, and the Congress can enact an amendment to
the LGC, then it is valid because its plenary. So, the Congress can enact law amending the amendment to the LGC. In essence,
the cityhood laws, exempting them from the 100 million mark is essentially an amendment to the amendment of the LGC. And
the SC is saying that Congress can do that because its legislative power is plenary. There is no limit as to its legislative authority.
In 2010, the SC changed it mind again. The Congress gravely abused its discretion. Why? The Constitution says, the
criteria should be the criteria set by LGC for uniform application.
So, every year, the SC keeps changing its decision.
In 2011, the SC said that its valid. Going back to its originally decision, the SC said that its essentially an amendatory
law of its prior amendment to the LGC. Again, its legislative authority being plenary, it has no limit on what law it would enact.
(But Im not comfortable with that decision.) Why? We said that the legislative authority has no limits, except as to the limits
provided by the Constitution. And the SC disregarded Article X, sec. 10.
In other words, what would prevent Congress from later on enacting another cityhood law (making Davao City a
province), disregarding the criteria set by the LGC, by provided a provision that it is exempted from that criteria.
(So actually it would be history that would be the judge to this SC. But if you would look at all these cases, you would see that
there are also several changes of the composition of the SC. Beginning 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, look at the composition of the
persons in the SC. There were several changes. And the decisions here nagligas-ligas lang og one vote. So this a clear case of
flip-flopping of the SC. But mind you, in each of these decisions, the SC was able to justify its decisions/resolution.)
Corollary to that plenary power of Congress, we said that it is unlimited, unless it is provided by the Constitution.
Corollary to that, Congress cannot enact irrepealable laws. What do you mean by irrepealable laws? Laws that cannot be repealed
or amended. Why would that be prohibited? Because it will limit the power of the next Congress. But the Constitution does not
provide the limitations. We said that Congress power is plenary but it cannot touch on that matter. In other words, it is limiting
what is otherwise an unlimited power. So Congress cannot enact irrepealable laws.
City of Davao vs. RTC
GSIS, pursuant to the GSIS Act, has been enjoying tax exemptions. And there is a provision in the GSIS Act which
states, in gist, that tax exemptions cannot be amended, unless the law expressly amends that exemption. So what GSIS Act is
saying is that it is exempted from taxes. If that exemption is to be amended or removed, the amendment must be done by clearly
expressing the amendment of that section. So, it is envisioning is an act amending xxx. Comes the LGC, it removed the
exemptions of these public corporations, although stated in general, not stating GSIS. So GSIS is arguing that that amendment is
not applicable to it because it does not expressly and categorically amend section 33 of GSIS Act. Is GSIS correct?
You relate that with the plenary power of Congress and GSIS would be correct. That provision provided for a mode for
repeal or amendment is also essentially providing for a limit of the plenary power of Congress. It is limiting the plenary
legislative authority of Congress. So although it is in the guise of an irrepealable law, (hindi naman sinabing it can be repealed.)
But it is providing for a mode of repeal. That is essentially dictating upon the next Congress could be amended. Ultimately, it is
limiting or reducing the power of Congress.
Kida vs. COMELEC
Well zero in on plenary power. RA 9054 is an act governing ARMM. Now, in that law, there is a provision that states
that any amendment to that law would require a vote of 2/3 of the Congress. Is the provision valid?
Under the Constitution, Congress cannot amend a law, or repeal a law with only a vote of majority, provided that there
is a quorum. In fact, it is majority of the quorum. So it is the simple majority is required to amend a law. But what do we have
here? Now, RA 9054 is stating that in case of amendment, the voting required is 2/3. The SC called it the super-majority. Is this
provision valid, if you relate is the plenary power of Congress?
No. Why? It is limiting the plenary authority. It is providing for another requirement not provided in the Constitution.
Ordinarily, Congress can amend law with only a majority vote. So if you connect it with the Constitution, RA 9054 is amending
the Constitution. While the Constitution says 2/3, it is requiring 2/3 vote. So it is in a way amending the Constitution via ordinary
legislation. So, it is unConstitutional.
Another corollary to that principle of plenary. So the first principle is that Congress cannot make irrepealable laws. The second is
that the Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority. So the principle of non-delegabilty of legislative authority.
Why cant it be delegated?
Reasons: (1) separation of powers, (2) principle of delegata potestas non potes delegari (what has been delegated
cannot be further delegated).
However, legislative authority can be delegated to (1) president in emergency, (2) people through initiative and referendum, as
mandated by the Constitution.
Also, through time and immemorial practice the delegation to the Local Sangguanian has been considered as permissible
delegation. Now, who authorized the Local Sanggunian to enact ordinances? Congress through the LGC.
There is what we call the power of subordinate legislation. This is not the power of delegating legislation. But
delegating subordinate legislation.
What is the distinction to the power to make law and law-execution?
What is delegated to the administrative bodies or the executive department is merely to supplement it or to provide for
the details of its implementation. The power to subordinate legislation therefore, allows supplementary legislation, which is to fill
up the details of the law. Or contingent legislation, which is that brings the law into actual operation.
It is not the actual law-making authority that is being delegated but the authority to fill up the details and to determine
the assistance of tax, which are all rule-making authority and not law-making authority.
Review Center v. Ermita
There was massive and national leakage of board exam questions. Because of the leakage which was discovered, Pres.
Arroyo issued an executive order directing CHED to regulate the operation of review centers because the leakage came from the
review centers. Is this valid?
No. CHED has only authority over institutions on higher education. Review centers are not one of them. So what did
Arroyo do in this case, she expanded the authority of CHED. She is therefore exercising legislative power, which she does not
possess. What Arroyo did here is undue exercise of legislative authority. Congress didnt even give her the authority to do that.
So there is no issue of undue delegation. She just exercised it herself.
There must always be a law before one can issue undue delegation of legislative power.
Abakada vs. Executive
The issue on VAT was raised. The VAT law fixed rates to 10%. But by January 1, 2006, the President can raised that to
12%, if the following conditions in the provision are satisfied. Now the authority to fix rates is with Congress. So there is undue
delegation of legislative authority. It gave the president legislative discretion whether or not to increase rates. But here, the
Congress leaves to the president to determine the economic condition. It is contingent legislation. So it is permissible. In fact,
there is no delegation of legislative authority but merely subordinate legislation.
Subordinate Legislation
Subordinate legislation means what is being delegated to the administrative bodies is not lawmaking authority but rulemaking
authority that is limited to filling out the details or what you call supplementary legislation or determining the existence of certain
facts necessary to enable actual operation. It is what you call contingent legislation. So an example of contingent legislation is
what we discussed yesterday in Abakada vs. Executive wherein when the Congress granted the president and the secretary
authority to increase the VAT rate from 10 % to 12 % does not mean that full discretion was given to them. The discretion is only
to determine the existence of certain tasks or the existence of certain conditions set forth in the law. Other than that there is no
discretion whether or not to increase it to 12% effective January 1, 2006. So it is an example of contingent legislation.
KMU versus Garcia
In that case public service act is a law granting the LTFRB the authority to fix the fare or pamasahe. It is permissible
for Congress to delegate the authority to fix fare rates to the LTFRB? And we said that because of the complexity of the needs of
modern times, Congress would have no time nor the expertise to determine this. This is just about fare and you cannot expect the
Congress to every now and then call a session to determine whether or not to increase or decrease the piso fare. So in this case the
delegation is permissible. Anyway the problem came about when LTFRB, after fixing the rate of the fares, allowed bus operators
to fix their own rates, either decreasing by 15 % or increasing by 15 % the prescribed rate. Is this allowable? Or if not what
would be your objection?
This is a classic example of delegata potestas non potest delegari. What has been delegated cannot be further
delegated. In this case, the delegation is also invalid because the delegation is given to a private entity. It should have stopped
with the LTFRB.
Echegaray vs. Secretary
They voted on lethal injection act, lethal injection being the mode of extinguishing, the mode of death penalty. Pursuant
to law, Congress has determined that the death penalty be carried out through lethal injection. Anyway the details need to be
filled by the executive dept. You dont expect the Congress to provide the details. What would be the first step, what time would
we call the prisoner, when would he be given his last meal, would he be given his last meal? Would he be allowed to say his
prayers? Who would be invited to his execution? So these are the details that need not undergo the lawmaking authority of the
Congress. It can be delegated to the Executive Dept, to the administrative bodies. So we have the legal injection law delegating
the authority to promulgate the implementing rules to the department of secretary in coordination with the director of the bureau
of corrections. So the Secretary of Justice designated or assigned this Director of Bureau of Corrections to promulgate the method
or procedure for lethal injection. Anyway these are the details that the secretary asked this director of the corrections to do. Is this
valid? Under the natural course of things this would be valid because the Director of Prisons is under supervision of the Secretary
of Justice. In fact, his work would be the work of the Secretary of Justice. But the problem is in the manual that was prepared
there was no provision there which requires that the method identified by the director of the Bureau of Corrections would require
the approval or should pass the approval of the secretary of Justice. In other words whatever the Director of Corrections has
prepared is the final manual. If we look at it in the greater scheme of things the manual is prepared by the Director of Corrections
alone without the imprimatur or approval of the Secretary. So we have here a case of delegating further what has been delegated
by law to the Secretary of Justice and this is what is not allowed. How would you make it valid? The manual should have the
approval of the secretary of Justice so that it turns out to be the work of the Secretary of Justice as envisioned by the law that it
should be the Secretary of Justice which would supply the implementing rules and regulations because if you ask me if I were the
secretary Id ask my clerk to enumerate the procedure and that would be because the final approval would be mine, and that
would be my work. Its just the same scenario.
In every case of permissible delegation there must be showing that the delegation itself is valid. I have been
emphasizing to you that every time theres a delegation, it only starts with the law. There must be a law delegating and to be valid
the law delegating must be, (1) complete in itself and, (2) must provide for sufficient standards. The basic standard in delegating
must conform in the performance of this delegated authority. It must pass, therefore, two tests: (1) completeness test and (2)
sufficient standard test. It is complete when the law has its already set forth therein the policy to be executed. There is no more
discretion as to whether or not on how to implement it and whether or not that implementation would directly fall to the policy or
the law. So the inquiries as to whether the state is complete with its terms and provisions will be vested in the legislature. So that
nothing is left to the judgment of any other appointee or the delegate of the legislature. Sufficient standard test, here the limits of
the statute are sufficiently determined or at least determinable. When you say there is a standard, there are measures to determine
whether or not the delegate has already exceeded his authority in implementing the law. Without this standard there will be no
knowing whether or not there was already abuse of discretion where the delegate has already went beyond its authority under the
law. It marks its limit, most of its boundaries in the cases or circumstances in which the legislative command is to be effected.
People vs. Dacuycuy
In that case the teacher was indicted for a crime under a law which defines that crime and provides for its penalty. He is
convicted of the offense. For its penalty, the law provides for alternative penalties: either a fine of 100php or imprisonment at the
discretion of the court. What would be your objection to that provision? I am the judge, I am the victim. I have the option of
penalizing you for a crime for 100 or 1000 or imprisonment. As to the imprisonment something is wrong. For what period should
I imprison you? In the words of the judge, he said that from one day to a lifetime, and the offense is not that heinous, so from one
day to a lifetime.
There you can see that this is one example that there is no sufficient standard given in the law. The delegate, in this
case the judge, is given the required leeway on how to implement that law. So when there is no standard and the judge imposes
the imprisonment at his own discretion, he is almost like legislating himself. So what we have here is an invalid delegation of
legislative authority because there is no standard. In fact when Congressman Ansaldo penalizing the crime and the penalty is
imprisonment, it always provides with the minimum and the maximum depending on the gravity of the offense or the policy on
which that act was made criminal.
Beltran vs Secretary
The law is the National Blood Services Act of 1994. It provides for the phasing out of commercial blood banks. So, all
commercial blood banks shall be phased out for a period of two years, extendable for a maximum period of another two years. So
the phasing out of commercial blood banks was a policy by the Congress to protect public safety. It would seem that commercial
blood banks are mostly supplied by persons in need of money. The reason for giving blood is economics. In other words the
person is not concerned whether or not he is infected of some diseases which he may pass on through blood. So most commercial
blood banks were unsafe for public use. So that was the policy of the law. So, the secretary of health was given authority to
extend the phasing out for another two years. The petitioners were arguing that theres no sufficient standard when the secretary
will exercise his discretion to extend it or not. The Supreme Court said you can look for the standard elsewhere in the law. In this
case, in the law here, its in the statement of the policy. So in the law it was stated that it would be based on the result of a careful
study, the policy is the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood
donation. So the main standards would be public safety and the result of supply and demand of the blood within that period. If
they cannot yet cope with the supply, then the secretary has the authority to further extend prior to totally phasing out commercial
blood banks. What we can get from this case is that the standards can be taken from the statement of policy of the law.
Tatad vs. Secretary
You have here the full delegation of downstream oil industry. Generally, oil industries are fully delegated. They in fact
dictate the price of gasoline. If they want to increase it, they will increase it. If they want to decrease, they just do it.
But around 1990s, there was a great demand for oil deregulation in that students are even participating in the rallies
calling for the deregulation of the oil industry. Now, deregulated na. Ano na ang presyo ngaun? 55-56? This was in 1997. So,
because of the demand to deregulate the oil industry, Congress enacted a law providing for the deregulation. But not immediately
effective. So, Congress authorized the Department of Energy upon the approval of the president to fully deregulate it by the end
of March 1997 provided that, the law set standards for the Department upon delegation as far as practicable one that prices of oil
and petroleum products are declining and peso-dollar rate is more or less stable. Now, petitioners are arguing that these
standards: as far as practicable-how would you know that its already practicable to delegate? When the price of oil and
petroleum is declining-how would you know that it is declining? With respect that the rate is stable-how would you know that it
is stable? So the petitioners are arguing that there are standards, these standards are vague. And the Supreme Court said, short of
saying thats a stupid argument, the Supreme Court here says, even a man of ordinary intelligence could understand what these
standards mean. When you say as far as practicable, it means, in the dictionary, possible to perform and practice. When you say
declining, its going down. When you say stable, its established, firmly established. So, you have sufficient standards.
But anyway, the Supreme Court said, there is really no discretion for the Department of Energy and the president,
whether or not to fully deregulate the oil industry because the law itself sets the deadline. That is by the end of March 1997, there
would be full deregulation. The discretion given to the administrative body and the president is to advance the deregulation
should these standards exist. So, there is no invalid delegation of legislative authority.
The Senate
Section 2.
The senate shall be composed of 24 senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines as may be
provided by law.
Section 3.
No person shall be a senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election is at least thirtyfive years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
So the first house in the Congress is the Senate. So there are just 24 of them, and they are elected at large or in the
national elections. The idea is that they would be more focused on national issues. So, to be a senator, the Constitution requires
that he must be natural born citizen, is at least 35 years of age on the day of election, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and resident of the Philippines for how long? The residency requirement is two years in the Philippines. Now, students get
confused during the examination. Usually, the question would say, he lived in Davao City for 6 months, and then in Cebu City
for another six months, and he kept on transferring from one town to another in the next 12 months. And then they would
answer that he is not qualified because he failed to comply with the 2-year requirement. Is it correct?
No. The requirement is 2-year residence in the Philippines. Now, 35 years of age on the day of election. So you have
citizenship, age, literacy, voter registration, and residency. These are the requirements in the Constitution. Now, sometime in
2004, Congress enacted a law and Comelec issued a resolution implementing this law, one provision of which says that all
candidates for public office, both in the national and local government should undergo a mandatory drug test. Pimentel was
questioning the validity of this provision. Pimentel that time was running for senator. Why? What is the basis of his objection?
The law is now requiring another qualification for a person running for public office, when under the Constitution, the only
requirement would be age, literacy, voter registration, citizenship, and residency. So, is it correct for Congress to provide for this
requirement? Mandatory drug test. If you cannot go mandatory drug test, you could not run for public office and your certificate
of candidacy will be invalid. Or even if you win the election, you cannot sit because you have not undergone the mandatory drug
test. The Supreme Court said this is unconstitutional. It enlarges the qualifications that are provided in the Constitution. So what
we can get from this decision is that these qualifications are exclusive. Congress cannot add to the qualifications or deduct or
remove one of the qualifications. So the qualifications are exclusive. This is good news for those who are interested to run for
public office because whether or not you are not drug-free, you can still run for public office.
Section 4 speaks about the term of office of office of the senators. The term of office shall be 6 years. It will start at
noon of the 30th of June next following the election day. If you observe: not only the senators, not only the Congressmen, not
only the president, but all government officers simultaneously start their term of office at the noon on the 30 th of June. The idea is
simultaneous commencement of the term of office, simultaneous ending of their office because in this Constitution, there is no
hold-over capacity. It ends when it ends. It starts when it starts. No senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. So
six years, maximum 2 terms. Now, under the last sentence, Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected. Meaning, if you are
elected for a term of 6 years, and then within this period you resign along the way, and then you won again in the next election,
that would be considered your second term. Now if you resign again, can you run again? The maximum allowable consecutive
terms are two terms. So you cannot run in the immediately succeeding senatorial election. But when can you run? In this
jurisdiction, under the transitory provision of the Constitution, the first set of senators who were elected in 1992-there were 24 of
them- the first half serve for six years, the 2nd half for only 3 years. And every 3 years we have elections. So every 3 years we
replace half of the composition of the senate. So we observe staggering terms in our senate. The idea is continuity of the senate.
So every 3 years is election.
Going back to my question, if you have served for two consecutive terms, in the next election, after 3 years we have another
elections, right? Can you run? Not yet. You have served for two terms, at the end May election pa rin dito, you cannot run right?
Because thats the maximum. You wait for 3 years. Can you run or do you have to wait for 6 years, the full term? So you can run
again, 3 years would be enough, at least there must be a gap of 3 years. So its not actually full term of 6 years. Talking about
staggering terms of senators, there is an interesting question of whether or not the senate is a continuing body. Why is this
question relevant?
Arnault vs. Nazareno
This decision was made in 1950s. So that was under the 1935 Constitution. You have to understand that under the
1935 Constitution, although we have the same number of senators- 24 in all, unlike our current system, they were divided into
three sets, for a term of 4 years, and every 2 years we have an election. So that every 2 years, one third of the entire set would be
replaced in the election. The two terms remain. Ok? Thats the set-up. Now in this, Arnault was cited for contempt because he
refused to divulge or disclose an information required by the senate during a legislative inquiry. We will discuss what is
legislative inquiry later on. Now, senate has the power to cite him for contempt. So he was sent to prison, just because he did not
like to disclose one information to the senate. He was sent to Bilibid Prison, until he would divulge the information. But May 18,
1950 there is a scheduled election for a new set of senators. As I have said, only one third will be replaced. The two thirds will
remain. So in other words, is the end of the term for the entire senate? Now, Arnault is now contending that by May 18, 1950,
when they would change composition, the term of that senate has ended. Correct? That has ended. Therefore, he contended that
that senate no longer has the authority to continue that contempt order against him. What he is saying is that by the end of the
term of that senate, the order of contempt also terminates. So what is the decision of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court said
that this senate is a continuing body. Why? When the term of the one third set ended, the two thirds remained. Thus, it is more or
less the same composition. In other words, it can still continually order his contempt penalty for violating the rules. So it is a
continuing body. And the Supreme Court said, had it been the House of Representatives which gave the contempt order, by the
end of the term when all of them would be replaced, whether or not they would be re-elected, then that contempt and the
authority to order his continued imprisonment will also terminate. Now that was in 1950s under the 1935 Constitution.
Garcillano vs. House of Representatives
This is about the Hello Garci tapes legislative inquiry conducted involving the Hello Garci tapes. The senate is about to
reopen, is about to conduct their own legislative inquiry. Anyway, we will go to that later, whether or not valid. But one
argument by Garcillano arguing for the invalidity of the proceeding is that, the senate now is not a continuing body. In other
words, it has no authority to continue the unfinished business of the prior senate because the inquiry was commenced when it was
yet the prior set of senators, and then election came and then theres a new set of second half of senators. So, theres a
requirement under the Constitution which we shall discuss later on that they have to publish their rules regarding legislative
inquiry. Which was the issue there. They were not able to publish their rules. But as to whether or not its a continuing body, the
senate argued that under Arnault, the senate is a continuing body. Right? Therefore there is no reason for the senate to republish
its rules. And the Supreme Court said, this time, and using also the explanation in Arnault case, the senate is no longer a
continuing body. Why? When the term of the half of the senate ends, how many will remain? One half. The senate under the
Constitution can conduct its business provided that there is a quorum. What is a quorum? One half plus one. In other words,
every time that there is a change of term, no quorum is left. The senate cannot therefore conduct business as that old set of senate.
It needs another set to complete its composition. Therefore, whatever it has done prior to the change of composition would be
considered as unfinished business and by the end of the term of its second half, it would imply the termination of that particular
senate.
Now, the Supreme Court clarifies citing the case of Neri vs. Senate that to be sure, the senate as an institution is a
continuing body. Right? What we have is a senate before, from under the 1935 Constitution, the first set of senators up to now
would be the same senate of the Republic of the Philippines. Its a continuing body as an institution. But as to its day-to-day
business, its not a continuing body, to such effect that whatever business it conducts, whatever the present senate conducts in its
day-to-day business would not bind the future senate. In fact, under its rules for unfinished business, all pending matters and
proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one Congress. One Congress would start every three years. But it may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as their present business for the first time. In other words, if now you are talking about
legalizing gay marriage, and then you were not able to finish deliberation, we were not able to bring that to a vote, and then
theres a new election, come the new set of Congress, it does not mean that that discussion is continued. They may or they may
not take up that discussion. Its an unfinished business ok? But as an institution, its still one Congress.

One of the arguments is that, during the first decision of the Supreme Court, it started in the 11 th Congress. During the
th
11 Congress, there were actually 50+ municipalities which have pending bills for conversion from municipalities to cities. And
during that 11th Congress, only 30+ were passed as laws. 20+ remained pending. During the 12 th Congress, the presumption is
that these are unfinished business, and the next Congress has the discretion on whether or not to continue with such. But during
the 12th Congress, there seemed to be a deliberation or so on whether or not to exempt these other municipalities whose pending
bills were not passed, exempt them from the 100 million income requirement. But it did not proceed up to its enactment. They
still remained pending.
Now, during the 13th Congress, that was the time when 16 of them were converted into cities and they were in fact
exempted from the 100 million income requirement. Now, in arguing for the validity of that exemption, the municipalitiesturned-into-cities were arguing that Congress is a continuing body, one institution. Thus, its deliberations prior to this Congressthe deliberations during the 11th Congress, the deliberations in the 12th Congress, can be used to interpret the reason for the
exemption. And the Supreme Court said no. we have established jurisprudence that this is not a continuing body with respect to
their day-to-day business. In other words, the deliberations during the 11th Congress which did not end in passing a law, cannot
bind the 13th Congress and it cannot be used to explain the exemption here. And I think, these remained to be deliberations not
carried by the majority of Congress. So therefore, they were just opinions of individual Congressmen. Even during the 12 th
Congress. So the original decision of the Supreme Court is that these deliberations cannot be used to explain or interpret the
exemption under the law passed by the 13th Congress because they are separate and distinct Congresses.
Now of course, in the motion for reconsideration, we know that the Supreme Court changed its mind. And the Supreme
Court said that the issue of whether or not Congress is a continuing body in this case is irrelevant because the Supreme Court has
already determined that it is the will of Congress to exempt them. Almost akin to amending the amendment to the Local
Government Code. So they are amending the amendment to the Local Government Code. And besides, isnt it that when the law
is vague, to interpret the law, we go back to the deliberations of Congress. But for me, I wont subscribe to it because I think that
the deliberations would refer to the deliberations leading up to the enactment or the passage of the law. Not that deliberations
report that were more or less pending or hanging, were not concluded. Para bang, if nadiscuss na yang gay marriage in the
1960s, Congress of the 1960s, we will use them to interpret for example if we pass this law now. Ang layo naman di ba? So, if
we stretch our imagination that way, I would subscribe to the decision of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is that-and this is
true examining the decision of the supreme Court- Congress is a continuing body as an institution. But as to its day-to-day
business, it is separate and distinct. It is not continuing, to the point that the pending business of the prior Congress cannot bind
the next Congress and they have the discretion of whether to continue or to start all over again with what has been started in the
previous Congress.
House of Representatives
Paragraph 1, Section 5.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Initial number of the House of Representatives is 250 members.
Can it be increased?
YES because of the phrase unless otherwise fixed by law.
Who makes up the HOR?
The two kinds of representatives in the HOR:
1. District representatives - those elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio.
2. Partylist representatives - those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
District Representatives
Who are these?
They are representatives who are elected in their respective districts. For example, Davao City has three districts. So in Davao
City alone, we have three congressmen.
How are legislative districts apportioned?
Under Paragraph 1, Section 5, it shall be apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. So there you can
see that legislative districts may be created from a province or a city.
Is it possible to have more than one legislative district in a single province?
As previously mentioned, Davao City has three legislative districts. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. When Congress makes a district or apportions a district, like in a province, it may
comprise of several municipalities. If there should be more than one legislative district, they should be adjacent to each other or
continuous or compact. In other words, there is no separation when it comes to physical location of these municipalities under a
particular district. The purpose of the law is to prevent the practice of gerrymandering. That is the practice of creating several
separate and not continuous districts out of separate territories in order to favor a candidate. Those areas adjacent to each other
have, more or less, the same problems and the same concerns.
The next rule, under Paragraph 3, is that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
Note: Each city is required to have 250,000 minimum population to be entitled to at least one legislative district and each
province shall have at least one representative. In other words, there is no population requirement for a province.
Under the last paragraph of Section 5, within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. This does not mean that every 3 years
the Congress will reapportion the legislative districts. It means 3 years following the return of every census. What it mandates is
that, regularly, the Congress will reorganize the legislative districts. The most probable thing that will happen is that it will
increase the number of legislative districts to determine whether there are portions of population which have no representatives
maybe because of changes in the population, growth in the population, or movement of population. To avoid this instance
wherein certain areas would have no district representatives, the Congress is mandated by the Constitution to make a general
reapportionment of legislative districts. Thats why 250 members in the HOR is only the initial number because, most probably,
there will be an increase in population. So a corresponding increase in the number of representatives is in order to ensure
representation in each area.
Mariano vs. COMELEC
Congress enacted a law converting Makati from municipality to city. Part of it is the creation of another legislative
district in Makati. It increases the legislative districts of Makati from 1 to 2. So there is a creation of another district. It was
objected because the increase of legislative district should only be done via general reapportionment of law and not pursuant to a
special law. In other words, it should be done once together with the other districts. The other contention is that Makati only has a
population of 450,000 and entitled to only one legislative district. The Court said, with regard to the first contention, is that
reapportionment of legislative district need not be via general reapportionment of law. There is no need to wait for the return of
survey for the Congress to reapportion the legislative districts. Here, reapportionment may be made through as special law such
as changing the charter of a city. In the words of the Constitution, the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. In other words, the Congress has the power to increase its
members via special laws. And to wait for the general reapportionment of law will deny representation in other areas of the
Philippines. As to the addition of another legislative district in Makati, granting the population is just 450,000, its legislative
district may be increased since it has met the minimum population of 250,000. In fact, under the Constitution, it said that a city
which reaches 250,000 population is entitled to at least one representative. The 250,000 requirement is only for the entitlement
of a legislative district. But as to the addition of another legislative district, the Constitution does not provide that it has to wait
for another 250,000.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC
Malolos Citys population in 2007 was around 223,069. Is it entitled to a legislative representative? By some means of
projection, it will reach a population of around 254,000 by 2010. By May 2010, theres going to be an election. So they want to
elect their own district representative. Can this be a basis for making a legislative district in Malolos? Are they entitled to a
legislative representative? Court held that a city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative representative
only in the immediately following election. In other words, a city must first attain the required population for such city to have a
legislative representative. In Malolos Citys case, the projection for the population was for the entire 2010. The election is earlier
in May 2010. Then it cannot conclude that by May 2010 it has already attained the population that they projected. The issue here
is factual rather than legal.
Aquino vs. COMELEC
Congress enacted a law increasing the legislative districts of CamSur. CamSur, as a province, has 4 legislative districts.
In time for the 2010 elections, they increased it to 5. While most of the districts have reached the 250,000 mark, the first district
turns out only to have a population of 176,000. So the validity of this was questioned. The Court discussed the distinctions
between the entitlement of a city to a district and the entitlement of province to a district. For while a province is entitled to a
representative without anything mentioned about its population, a city must first reach the requirement in order to be given a
representative. The 250,000 population is only required for a city and not for a province. But what were talking about here is the
creation of an additional district. In the case of Mariano, the Court is also consistent that in the addition of another legislative
district, the 250,000 requirement is no longer applicable. So is this district valid? Yes.
Partylist Representatives
Paragraph 1, Section 5
...those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Paragraph 2
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Congress is mandated to enact a law to include this provision of partylist system. Congress enacted RA 7941 Providing
for the Election of Partylist Representatives to the Partylist System and Appropriating Funds Therefor. The Constitution took
effect in 1987. The law for partylist system was made only in 1995. We are now in 2013. But the provision of this law is still
being interpreted by the Court. And, more often, the Court changes its interpretation now and then.
What is a partylist system?
It is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in district legislative elections a
chance to win seats in the HOR. Commission Monsod said it is to open the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multi-party system. But that cannot be done under the legislative district representative system. There are some parties that
consistently dominate the legislative district elections and there are some parties that consistently place 3 rd or 4th in the legislative
district elections. But they have a national constituency that will entitle to representation in the Congress.
Here in the partylist system, the voter elects two representatives in the house: one for his legislative district and one for
his partylist of choice. The problem that we have now is who is this group that can participate in the partylist system. As said,
Congress enacted RA 7941 and there it established this policy that a partylist system is a social justice tool designed not only to
give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence but also active participants in the
main scheme of partylist democracy. In connection to the intent of Commissioner Monsod in proposing the partylist system,
theres already a discrepancy. In Monsods case, it was his group which proposed for a partylist system to be written in the
Constitution. His idea was that it was an open system to allow other parties that cannot win in legislative elections a chance to
win seats in the HOR. But when Congress enacted the law that would implement that, the policy is to empower those who have
less in life for them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Who may participate in the partylist election?
Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC
The Court said that the intent of the Constitution is clear. It is to give genuine power to the people not only to those
who have less in life but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. It is to enable the marginalized
people, the underrepresented parties to become part of the HOR. In other words, only those that represent the economically
marginalized and underrepresented may participate in the partylist election. Section 5 of that law that the sectors shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. What can be deduced, although the list is not exclusive, is that not all sectors can be represented in
the partylist system.
May political parties participate in the partylist election?
In the same case above, the Court said yes. If you read Section 5 of Article 6 of the Constitution it provides that these
representatives shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
In other words, political parties may participate in a partylist election. The proponent even said intended to open up the partylist
election to those who consistently place 3rd or 4th in the legislative district elections.
Under RA 7941, it provides for a partylist of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes. In other words, parties may also participate. Section 3 of the law states that the party may
either be political or sectoral or coalition of parties. The law defines political party as an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means
of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
But, it doesnt mean that any political party may participate. It was qualified by the Court that the partylist system is for
the marginalized and underrepresented. If you are a political party, you can only participate if you represent such.
Banat vs. COMELEC
Whether or not major political parties may participate in the partylist elections. If you construe the law and the
Constitution together, major political parties are allowed to form coalitions with sectoral group for political purposes. For
example, the LP participates in the partylist election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas. In other words, major political
parties may participate but only through their sectoral wings. However, the Court continued their ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the partylist election directly or even indirectly because COMELEC really did not
accredit the sectoral wings to participate in the partylist elections. The reality is that they do not really represent the marginalized
and underrepresented. This was from 2001-2009.
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC

In 2013, the Court overturned its earlier decision in Bagong Bayani and Banat. They said that the clear intent of the
partylist structure as stated in Section 5, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 6 of the Constitution cannot be disputed. The partylist system
is not only for sectoral parties but also for non-sectoral parties. Under Section 5, Paragraph 1, there shall be a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Thus, the partylist system is composed of three different
groups: the national parties/organizations, the regional parties/organizations, and the sectoral parties/organizations. National
parties are different from sectoral parties. So are regional parties. In other words, national or regional parties need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector. Another reason is the law itself. The law does not
require the parties to represent the marginalized or the underrepresented. The law provides the different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Meaning that they are separate and distinct from each other. Section 3 defines a party as either political or
sectoral. That definition alone shows that the party need not be sectoral or need not represent the marginalized or
underrepresented. Further, Section 3(C) states that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
Sectoral party would now be another type of organization which refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. For
example, Greenforce, which is an environmentally oriented advocate group, does not represent a sector. But, under this ruling by
the Court, they can know participate under the partylist election.
Earlier we said its uncertain whether political parties may participate in the partylist elections. The reality is the
Supreme Court has allowed political parties to participate. In the case of Atung Paglaom, the SUPREME COURT is much
clearer. First major political parties are those that fill in candidates in the legislative district elections, major political parties
cannot participate in the party list elections since they have well defined political constituencies to represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. They cannot qualify under this requirement thus; the national or regional parties under the party list
system are necessarily those who do not belong to major political parties, this reserves the regional or national partylist under the
party list system to those lack well defined political constituencies to giving them a chance to have members in the house of
representatives.
If you are therefore a major political party and you are filling a candidate to the legislative district election, you cannot
now participate in the party list election. Why? The idea of the party list is to give chance to those seemingly marginalized parties
who consistently rank third or fifth in the legislative district elections but they have such no. of constituencies that they can get
such no. of votes if you total it to the national level. So to participate in party list elections, a major political party that fills a
candidate in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing- like fisher folk, urban poor, professional, youth wing
that can register under the party list system. Major political party should participate in the party list election only through their
sectoral wings. What the SUPREME COURT is saying is that major political party cannot directly participate in the party list
election because they already aided their candidates in the legislative district election. But they can still participate indirectly
through their sectoral wings. The participation of the major political parties in their sectoral wings, a majority of its members are
marginalized and underrepresented were lacking political constituencies will facilitate the entry of the marginalized and
underrepresented in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court is consistent with that policy with regards to the party list.
We have now therefore the new parameters in determining whether or not a party should be allowed to participate.
1. National partylist, regional partylist, sectoral partylist/organization not exclusive to sectoral parties only.
2. National party/regional- they will not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. If they qualify as a party as defined in RA 7941
3. Political parties- provided they register in the partylist system and do not have candidates in the legislative district
elections. If they have filled candidate in the legislative district election, they can still participate only through their
sectoral wings. The sectoral wing itself should have its own consti and bylaws and can register independently.
4. Other parties which give them candidates in legislative district elections. Whether major or not if they have been that
candidates in the legislative district elections they still can participate but only through their sectoral wings. That can
separately register on paty list system this sectoral wings will be treated as an independent party linked to a political
party like a coalition.
Political party can participate directly? Yes, provided it registers in party list system and does not fill any candidates in
the legislative district election but if ever it does still regardless of legislative district elections, they can still participate but only
through their sectoral wings and the sectoral wings itself must have its own constitutional and bylaws that it can register
independently. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and otherwise underrepresented or lacking in welldefined political constituencies. It is enough that they pertain to a special interest. If you say sectoral party, it does not mean that
you have to be marginalized and underrepresented because there are sectoral parties even those parties defined in the law such as
women, the eldery and the professionals who are not necessarily marginalized and underrepresented yet they are included in the
enumeration in the law of who will be considered as sectors. But how will they be qualified? They will considered as those
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. Professionals. for example, is a sector defined in the law but is not necessarily
marginalized and underrepresented. but is it disqualified? No, because now in the new interpretation you dont have to be that M
and U. but you can be the sector that lacks a well-defined political constituency.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized must belong to the
marginalized or the sector they represent. The Supreme Court only requires a majority of the membership that must belong to that
marginalized sector. For ex, if your sector represents the farmer, at least majority of you members should be farmers. The
nominees of these sectors whether you represent the FMU or LUDPC, either we are talking about the nominees. The nominees
must either belong to the sector or must have a track record for advocacy for the sector. Connect that to the first sentence it makes
that this is a fisher folk sector and I have a track record for advocating for the fishermen I can be a member of that sector. So that
is why that the Supreme Court emphasized that only majority of the sector is required to belong to that sector. There will be
members who are not fishermen themselves. This is now gold for the likes of Arroyo and Esperon because they do not need to
experience to be a security guarsds or fishermen to be able to represent the sector as long as they have a track record of advocacy.
National, regional and sectoral parties shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees is disqualified as long as there is at least
one nominee that remains qualified. This is the problem with court, because if the nominees are disqualified, the COMELEC
automatically will disqualify the party itself. If at least 1 nominee remains qualified then it should not be a ground for the partys
disqualification.
Ang LADLAD is an org of men and women who calls themselves LGBT (bisexuals and homo). The COMELEC
denied their application. On what grounds? Ground were cited either bible or Quran. Possible ground to justify the
disqualification by the COMELEC is a ground under a law that LGBT does not sector or not among the sectors included in
SECTION 5 of R.A. 7941.
RA 7941 is actually just an excuse for the Supreme Court because in the earlier case of Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC,
the Supreme Court said that this enumeration of sectors is not exclusive. Its iterated in Ladlad vs COMELEC that the
enumeration of the marginalized and other represented sectors is not exclusive, the crucial element is not whether the sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
In Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC
Par (2) Section 5
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
So the ratio is 80:20, 20% for party-list representative and 80% for district representatives. Number of district rep = 80%
Example: in Veterans vs. Akbayan, there were 208 district representatives, the 208 is just the 80%, if you try to get the 20%, it
would be 52.
Easier Solution to get the 20%:
In the case of Banat vs. COMELEC, there were 220 legislative district representatives, so the 20% would be 55.
Question: The total members of the house of representative are 300, how many would be reserved to the party list represtative?
Answer: 300x.20= 60.
In allocating seats, the constitution only provided the 20% allocation. If you do not have20% reserved for the party list, how will
you distribute that among the candidates or the parties who joined the election? Of course all of them will agree necessarily of
votes but will it entitle a seat? The constitution left it to the discretion of the congress. Under the Par 2 Sec 5 of RA 7941, it states
that the party list organizations will be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of the votes garnered during
the election. After the ranking, the parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
When we talk about allocation of seats, you just have to remember Veterans vs. Akbayan & Banat vs. COMELEC. In these cases,
there are four inviolable parameters in determining the allocation of seats:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Is the 20% mandatory?
No. It is merely a ceiling.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion
to their total number of votes.
In the 20% allocation, is it necessary that all the seats reserved for the party-list be filled or is it mandatory?
Supreme Court concluded in Veterans & Banat that its not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats
in Congress. If there are unfilled seats, it will not be a violation of the constitution because it would only depend on the result of
the computation. The congress was vested with powers to describe the mechanics of the 4 inviolable parameters: 20% allocation,
2% threshold, 3-seat limit and proportional representation. The party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.
In the case of Veterans, Supreme Court said: 2% Threshold is constitutional. Congress should make sure that only those
parties who have sufficient number of constituents deserving representation are actually represented in Congress. In line of the
fourth parameter which is the proportional representation: If we talk about district representatives, in a city there must be a
minimum population of 250,000. 3 seat limit is necessary. It would prevent some parties from dominating. If there is no limit,
only the dominant parties will only get the seats available. It will defeat the purpose of having a multi-party system. So, Supreme
Court says that the 3-seat limit is constitutional.
When we say 2% or the percentage the party gets(whether 3%,5%,8%), it should be based on the total votes cast for the
party list that is provided by the law. What do you mean by total votes cast by the party list? The confusion happened in Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC, in 2001 election there were 160+ parties who applied for accreditations and were listed in the ballots. But
it turned out, 100+ were disqualified and 40+ remained, so you have here 15 million votes for the entire list in the ballots.
So how to get the percentage? Will it be the 15 million votes of the entire party list or 6 million votes of those only
qualified?
The total votes cast means that the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in
determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present case, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the
canvass of the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a
new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as
compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. Otherwise if we base it on the 15 million, no one will get the 2% threshold.
So total votes cast will only be for qualified party-lists.
How do we allocate the seats?
The only guide given by the Constitution is the 20%. Other than that it led it to the Congress to determine or to provide
for the procedure. So, same law would be our reference, 7491. Under Sec 11 of 7491, the Congress provides that that parties,
organizations, coalitions receiving at least 2 % of the total votes cast of the party list system shall be entitled to 1 seat provided
that those garnering more than 2 % of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
provided finally that each party, organization or coalition shall be titled to not more than 3 seats. So how do we put this into
actual computation?
(four parameters reiterated)
So, in Veterans and Banat, 2 % entitled to one seat. But how about the additional seats? In Veterans for example, there
were 52 seats available and only 17 of all the parties that participated got more than 2%. So only 17 have one guaranteed seat
each.
Now, how about the additional seats? In Veterans which the earlier case, the SC said that in solving for the additional
seat, you consider proportional representation and the SC interpreted this to as the vote of the second party in proportion to the
vote of the first party. Meaning, that if the first party has 50% more of the votes of the second party, the seats for the second party
should not be equal to the number of seats of the first party. So the SC looked for a way to compute it so that the result would not
be in any way would not be equal for the seat of the first party would not equal of the seat of the 2 nd party. If there cant be equal
seat with the first party and the 2nd party. Another way of saying here is that the seats for the 2 nd party, 3rd, 4th and 5th in rank is
always lower than the seats of the first party because the SC then believed that proportional representation means the vote of your
party in proportion to the vote of the first party
So for example, I have 10% votes. Lets say I have 20% and Im the first party. So we have three seat limit right? I am entitled to
how many seats? Just three. Now, the 2nd party had votes, 50% lower than mine, lets say 8%. But because of the three seat limit,
how many seats would the 2nd party have? Three because of the 3-seat limit, the SC interpreted as if you have 2%, you have 1
seat. If you have 4% youll have 2 seats. If you have 6%, youll have 3 seats. If you have 8%, youll have just 3 seats because we
have maximum of three seats. So thats why if youre the first party 20%, Ill have three seats. If youre the 2nd party, 10% or
8%. The SC did not like that because its supposed to be your vote in proportion to the voters of the first party. If youll read
Veterans there are 2 computations. The first is computation for the first party and then a new formula for the seats of the rest of
the party. And that is the seat of the second ranking and up to the last in relation to the total number of votes of the first party.
So in that case, Veterans for example, Veterans had, 1st ranking is 6% so entitled to three seats. 2nd ranking say, 5%, but that
would be in relation to Veterans and then the SC provided for a formula. The result would always be lower than Veterans. So in
that case, only those with 2% and higher are considered for additional seats. If you do not reach the 2% mark, you do not have
any vote of getting a seat. So thats one thing clear about Veterans. Only the 2percenters and up are entitled to a seat. And
number 2 when it comes to additional seats, the additional seats are computed in relation to the total number of votes of the first
ranking. So, how many %s is your vote in relation to my vote?
Now something is wrong with that interpretation. Why? The law provides that it would be the % of a party list votes gathered in
relation to the total number of votes cast in the election. Now, what do you mean by total number of votes casts in the election?
We have that case of:
Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC
During that particular election, 152 parties participated. But, after the election was held, it was only then that the
COMELEC resolved that only 46 were qualified. So we have an election which included those that did not qualify. If you include
all of the votes including those that were disqualified, there were around 15M votes total for the party list system. Now if you
remove all those that were disqualified, there were only around 6M votes. Now if you solve your percentage, if youre among
those who qualified, total number of votes __14:40__ by how many? Theres a 15M or sa 6M? So what do you mean by total
number of votes casts in the party list election. The SC said it means only those votes for the qualified parties will be considered.
In other words, the percentage of your number of votes in relation to total votes cast of the qualified parties. So doon
lang sa 6M. The rest are invalid because their votes were disqualified.
Going back to the Veterans, if that was the formula for solving the number of seats for each party list depending on their number
of votes, it would be easy to deduce that only very few would qualify to have seats. Sino-sino sila? Number 1 only those win 2%
and up. And then for the first party, its 2,4,6 increments. If you have 6%, 3 seats, 4%, seats, 2 seats, 2%, 1 seat. How about the
2nd party and the rest? It depends to how much is your vote in relation to the 1 st party. So there is no way na nagkapareho kayo ng
number of seats kahit pa sabihin mo in the first computation parehas kayo 6%, because in the 2 nd formula, it is the total number of
votes of the first party. In fact in that case, I think only parties were qualified to have additional seats using the formula of
Veterans.
So in the case of Banat, the SC revisited their formula. Number 1 the formula is very complicated. And dami mong
imemorize. In fact the COMELEC would have to convene and then proclaim the winners, it would be wise to call a
mathematician first para lang ma-proclaim yung winner. So for me, my observation is that ginawa nilang complicated because of
the belief yung proportional representation should be my vote in proportion to your vote. Well in fact, my vote in proportion to
the total number of votes. Thats why you have a new formula in Banat.
So whats the difference in Veterans and Banat? In Banat, the SC simplified it. Number 1, you rank it from the highest
to the lowest. Number 2, the same, those who got 2% or more is entitled to 1 guaranteed seat. So all 2 percenters are entitled to 1
guaranteed seat. Rank them, 10%, 9%, 8, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Yung 2 and up may guaranteed 1 seat.
Now in solving for the additional seat the SC said that the 2 nd portion of the law, yung binasa ko kanina, provided that
those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to the total number of votes thise time
the SC that this portion is unconstitutional. What does this portion means? It means that only those 2% and up are entitled to
additional votes.
The SC said if we stick to the interpretation, that only 2% and up would get additional votes, then there is no way
wherein we could fill the entire 20% allocation. Although its not mandatory, but the computation, mathematical formula
provided will not in any way in the future provide for a whole compliment of the 20%.
The SC held it as an unconstitutional.
What does it mean? This time, in solving for additional seats, the SC considered everyone not only the 2 percenters.
The 2 percenters are entitled to 1 guaranteed seat. As to those 2 percenters and up, theyll still get their percentage in relation to
the total number of votes. If youre percentage is, the total number of both side is 5% and 2%, that will still be your percentage.
But you multiply it with the number of remaining seats.
Whats the difference between Veterans? Ilan ang percentage ko in relation sa boto ng first party at sa seats ng first
party? Yun ang sa Veterans.
In Banat, my percentage in relation to the number of remaining seats. So if I have 5%, and the remaining are 55 for
Banat and 17 filled. So there are 38 remaining seats. So if I have 5%, what is 5% of 38? That would be my additional seats. All 2
percenters and up have one guaranteed seat. As to the additional seat, everyone is a candidate. For 2 percenters and up, your
percentage in relation to the number of seats remaining. And you consider the 3-seat limit.
Now what happens if after providing them with the seats, there are still remaining seats available? The SC said that the
20% allocation is not mandatory but it is also not prohibited. Thats why the SC after giving the 2 percenters their guaranteed
seats and giving them their additional seats and solve for their rest of the ranking. Kung ilan ang seats na pwede sa kanila. So in
this case of Banat, the additional seat is no longer limited to the 2 percenters. Even if you have less than 2%, the total number of
votes, dont lose hope because you may still be given a seat in the additional seat.
Now, kung way below na talaga basta maka-apas ka lang sa ranking kahit hindi naka abot sa 1%, the SC said ibigay na
natin ang lahat ng upuan. So after solving the %%, SC said give them a seat until all the seats were filled-up.
Whats the conclusion with Banat? The 2% threshold is only true for the guaranteed seat. 2 % is no longer used for
solving for solving for additional seats.
In fact ganito lang, you rank them from highest to lowest and then get their percentage. Then rank them from highest to
lowest. When you say highest to lowest Im talking about percentage. All those 2% up give them 1 seat each. For the additional
seats, look at how many seats are left. If ilan ang percentage nila, multiply by how many seats are available. So give them at most
2 or 1. At most two because of the 3-seat limit. After that if there are still seats available, give the rest depending upon the
ranking.
So on the question, is the 2% threshold constitutional? Whats your answer? Yes as the guaranteed seats. No as to the additional
seats. Is the three-seat limit constitutional? SC only Veterans and Banat said yes, we need to have a limit otherwise it will defeat
the purpose of preventing a particular party for dominating the party list. Kahit 15% or 18% nakuha mo youre still just entitled
to three seats.
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
As to the later requirement, registered voter and residency these are not required of party list members. Theres another
requirement provided by law: natural born, 25 years of age, literacy requirement and registered voter.
When we talk about residency in the right of suffrage we said that residency is synonymous with domicile and it is also
the same when it comes to election or qualification of elective officials. When you say residency its synonymous with domicile.
What is the purpose of the law why is residency required for an elective office or for persons seeking an elective office?
Because the person is to be familiar with the case of the community, aspirations, its protection and the difficulty that
conquered by that particular place and how it happened. You cannot have a stranger rule a particular constituent. Now, on the
part of the voters, a person seeking an elective office must be a resident of that place for at least 1 year. Why? Because he still has
to assess whether or not he is qualified for that position. That is the rationale for requiring residency. Since residency is not the
same as domicile. How will we apply this in the case of Imelda Marcos?
Imelda Marcos was born somewhere else. She came to Leyte when she was around 8 years old but she established it as
her domicile 8 years up to college. She worked also in Tolosa Leyte, she taught in Tolosa Leyte but then later she just went to
Manila and in around 1960s she was with her husband Marcos who that time became the President of the Philippines. If you
count it she was just in Tolosa for around14 years and from the time or if we reckon it from the time she married Marcos mga
1960s she was already in Manila. Now, by the 1990s, ay.. yung nag EDSA Revolution, she left the country, she was in exile.
She came back around the 1990. She actually ran for president and there stated that she is a resident of San Juan, Manila. Prior
to that, she has some documents stating that she is a resident of another place in Manila. In August 1994, she came back to
Tolosa Leyte.. physical residency. The election would be May 1995 counting from August to May is just nine months. The
requirement is one year, diba? Because shes running for Congresswoman. Was she able to comply with the residency
requirement? Using the principle that when we talk of residency as a qualification, it is synonymous with domicile, the answer is
YES. She has established her domicile long ago in Tolosa Leyte. She has not exhibited any acts which in point to abandoning her
original domicile although she transferred in Manila , it is because she has to go with her husband. Although, she stated that she
had been a resident of Manila as a voter and later as a candidate. It does not even point to .. as an evidence that she has
abandoned her domicile. To abandon ones domicile, there should be actual abandonment. There should be acts that show that
you are really abandoning your old domicile or domicile of origin.
In her case, although she was in Manila, she has been regularly going back to Tolosa. Most of her projects benefit her
kababayan in Tolosa and the SC also observed that she has established her political machinery in Tolosa. Tinulungan niya yung
mga pulitiko, most of them were her relatives. Most of her milestones were also celebrated in Tolosa. So, these are acts which
show that she has not abandoned her domicile. So if you look at it, Tolosa is her domicile so she is not disqualified. But, when
she ran for presidency, Manila was her residence so she is not also disqualified. When she voted in Manila saying that she is a
resident of not San Juan, the other one in Manila, she is also qualified because thats her residency. But when we say she has not
been physically present in Tolosa would that be counted against her? No, because Tolosa is her domicile.
Aquino vs. COMELEC
Makati was converted into a city and there was another legislative district that was created. Butch Aquino is interested
to run. In fact, he filed his certificate of candidacy. The Aquinos are known to be domiciles of Tarlac. How did he intend to prove
that despite his domicile and hes a resident of Makati. He rented a condo unit. Now, you heard the technicalities. He was saying
that his rent is for adhere para makaabot siya sa one year residency. But the Supreme Court noted, although you have a lease
contract that is not exclusively proof that you intend to make Makati your residence much less prove that you abandon your
domicile of origin. So thats the ruling in Aquino. Aquino said, no one can possibly comply with the 1 year requirement because
the second legislative District of Makati has just been newly created and its just 4 months old.
The Supreme Court said that argument cannot hold water because although it is a newly created legislative district, the
physical territory has been in existence for more than a year. Another case, Domino vs. Comelec. Domino has won as a
representative in Saranggani, Province of Saranggani lone district in 1998 election. But it was shown that around June 22, 1997,
he registered himself as a voter in Quezon City. June- registered voter in Quezon City, May 1998, he ran in Saranggani. Lets go
to the issue of residency.
Whats his proof that he has complied with the 1 year residency requirement for congressman? Its also a lease
contract, lease, contract dated January 1997 but other than that the SC noted that there a re no other acts which accompany the
lease contract to show that he has abandoned his domicile in Quezon City. Or another way of saying it, a lease contract alone is
not sufficient to prove abandonment of domicile or to prove residency for 1 year period.
Fernandez vs. HRET
Fernandez, used to be an SP member and thereafter and vice governor of Laguna. In his prior service in the
government, he has declared that hes a resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna which belongs to the 4th District. He is now running for
the 1st District of Congress and his residency and certificate of candidacy is no longer Pagsanjan but Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Now, the
next problem is if he has transferred to Sta. Rosa he should be able to comply with the 1 year residency requirement. Theres no
problem that he has transferred from Pagsanjan to Sta. Rosa. The next problem is did you reach the one year requirement? He
showed among others his contract of lease of his house in Sta. Rosa. Citing the decisions of the SC in Aquino and Domino, he is
disqualified. He did not comply with the one year residency requirement because lease contract is not sufficient to show
abandonment of domicile or does not in general the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of the original domicile.
But the SC, this time ruled in favor of Fernandez. Why? Whats the problem with Aquino and Domino? They only showed the
lease contract but were not able to prove the acts showing physical presence and attachment to the place. In the case of
Fernandez, he was able to explain, why he only had a lease contract and not a purchase of property. Property requirement is not a
qualification because the question was raised whether or not kailangan ba talaga binili niya yung property kasi di mag suffice
yung lease contract? A candidate is not required to purchase a property in another place to be able to qualify the residency
requirement otherwise, you will be adding another qualification which is property based and that is unconstitutional. This lease
contract would suffice, why? He has established attachment to the place. He has business in the place. He has actually purchased
other residential properties. To explain why he has a lease contract, he said that he was still building his house in the purchased
lot. The children were already studying in that place. So the SC said that other acts also proved his residency.
The residency requirement for partylist representatives is not the same. We refer to 7941 Section 9:
No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
So the difference here is that there is residency in the Philippines and membership in the party in which he wishes to represent.
Banat vs. COMELEC
Must the nominee be also marginalized and underrepresented? The SC said that the nominee need not be one who is
impoverished as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee belongs to the M and UR sectors.
Now, you know that in Atong Paglaum, the SC qualified its decision with regards to who are qualified to participate in
the partylist election and who will be the nominees. In this case, the nominees of the partylist representing the M and UR either
must belong to the respective sector or must have a track record of advocacy for the respective sectors. They must be bona fide
members of such parties or organizations. Why did they change this decision? Because in the ruling of Atong Paglaum said that
anybody can participate in the partylist election even the political parties.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of
Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
So term is 3 years and is qualified for 3 consecutive terms. What is the difference between term and tenure?
When you say term, it is the period by which the official is entitled to hold office. Term is provided by law. Tenure is
the period in which the elective official actually holds office. This may be reduced by death or resignation.
Term may only be changed by amending the Constitution. Tenure can be shortened by any factor (death, resignation,
removal, etc.).
Under the Omnibus Election Code, there was this provision (already amended) which says that elective official running
for office other than that which he is holding is considered ipso facto resigned the moment that he files his COC.
Dimaporo vs. Mitra
Dimaporo is a congressman. At the time of the filing of the COC, he filed for governor. The moment that he filed his
COC, he is considered as ipso facto resigned. He challenged this provision saying that it is shortening the term of a
representative. The shortening of term may only be done through amending the Constitution. The SC said that what is shortened
here is not his term but his tenure through his voluntary act by filing his COC. But under the new law, the elective officials are no
longer considered as ipso facto resigned. Only appointive officials are considered.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Can Congress enact a law changing the date of the elections?
Yes. unless otherwise provided. It means the Constitution gives them the discretion to change the schedule but
unless provided, it shall be the 2nd Monday of May.
Sec.9
In case vacancy of a seat in the Senate or the house of the representatives, how it shall be filled. Will there be appointments?
Special elections.
Is the calling of special election mandatory in case of vacancy?
No. It may be called in the manner provided by law. So the next question is, do we now have a law governing special elections in
case of vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives? Yes, we have RA 6645 sec. 1 and 2, R.A. 7166 Section 4.
How shall a special election be called?
First, a vacancy of permanent nature must first occur in either the Senate or the House of Representatives. At least 1
year before the expiration of the term. That is important. Then the Senate or the HOR will issue a resolution if it is in session or
an official communication if it is not in session. Communication by the Senate president or the speaker of the house: (1)
certifying the existence of the vacancy, and (2) calling for the special election. It will then direct the COMELEC to hold and call
the special election. The COMELEC then will call the special election provided, in case of the HOR, it will be held within 60-90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy. But what about in case of vacancy in the Senate? The special election will be held
simultaneously with the next regular election. Why? Because we elect senators every 3 years, even if their terms will expire in 6
years. Now the COMELEC must a give a notice to the voters that they will be electing a replacement for the vacancy or electing
to fill the vacancy.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC
When Gloria arroyo, former vice president, succeeded to the office of the president, she vacated the office of the vicepresident. Its now vacant. Under the Constitution, the president will nominate a v-president from among the members of
congress. She now nominated Sen. Teofisto Guingona. As a result thereof, a vacancy in the Senate. The vacancy occurred
somewhere in February 2001 and in May 2001, were having a regular election. So in the resolution of the Senate, it certified the
existence of the vacancy and directed the COMELEC to hold the election to fill the vacancy there that 13th rank will be the
senator in place of Guingona. But in the surveys of resolutions and the issuances of COMELEC, there was no mention that they
ever notified the voters that they will be voting for 13 senators not 12. The question is, will that lack of notice, since we mention
that it was also a provision in law, nullify the election of the 13th senator?
The Supreme Court said no. The notice is already provided in the law itself. It is the law which states or mandates that
in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously to the next regular election. That puts the voters
on notice that since they already know that there is a vacancy in the Senate that they will be voting for not 12 senators but for 13
senators. COMELEC then was negligent to its duties. Of course, I will presume that there are some voters who only voted for 12.
Thats why in this case, they would want to nullify the election to the 13th senator but then the SC said no. There is already the
presumption of notice because of the law itself. Isnt it that ignorance of the law, excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Nakalusot ngayon ang COMELEC. But actually, it was negligent on the part of COMELEC to forget to inform the voters that
they will be voting for 13 senators. The notice, however, therefore, is relevant if we are voting to fill up the vacancy in the
congress. Because the election would be held on its own, its a special day. Not simultaneously the regular election. So people or
the voters might get anxious on why they are going to the polls. So when we talk about notice this would be more relevant if its
really a special election on a special day.
Section 10
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
Philconsa vs. Mathay
In case of the members in the HOR, a waiting period before the increase would take effect. If you would look into the
Constitution what it simply means is that the increase will not take effect during their term of office. They must be re-elected if
they want to avail or enjoy the increase. What does it mean during their term? Would it mean that as a member of the house of
the representatives, much earlier that the Senate can now enjoy if ever they are re-elected in case of increase of salary? SC said
that this provision means the congress in its entirety. So they have to wait for the expiration of the full term of all the members of
that congress which enacted that increase in salary. Actual application: we had our election last May 2013, that what they
approved is the increase in their salary and passed in on first session of congress, first week of August, first bill nila 2013. By
2016, the members of the HOR terms will expire and some members of the house of Senate. Will the increase take effect after the
noon of June 30, 2016. No, because there are still senators who belong to that congress which enacted the increase, whose terms
will expire in 2019. The bottom line is, if you pass it on the first month of your term, you have to wait for how many years? 6
years. Because its 2019. Why is that the scheme provided in the Constitution? It is to put a legal bar on the natural temptation to
increase their own salary. So that if you really want to increase, that would be out of necessity, not out of self-interest. Imagine if
you are a congressman, and this is your 2nd term, and then you won in your next term. Of course, we know that he will not
benefit form that law. So part of the argument is whether or not the increase is really necessary for those who will not benefit
with the increase. At least they will be objective enough to determine whether the increase is necessary.
Ligot vs. Mathay
In relation to Philconsa vs. Mathay, when was the effectivity of the increase? December 30, 1969. That is the
expiration of the full term of all those members of congress at that time. But hes also retiring on the same date. In its face value,
it seems that there are some legit to his argument. I will be retiring on December 30 but Im still working in the morning of
December 30, 1969! Im present! So his argument is that, since it was the set date for the effectivity of the increase, hes
retirement benefit would be based on that increase. Imagine that they were receiving how much? 7 thousand annual income. They
increase it to 32 thousand. There is a big disparity. So he would really like to get that benefit based on the increase rate. So the
SC said that it is a subtle way of circumventing what the Constitution expressly prohibits. So there is a Constitutional bar.
Therefore, what cannot be done directly cannot also be done indirectly.
What about allowances? When would an increase in allowance take effect? If you compare our present Constitution to
the prior Constitutions, this provision on prohibition of increase includes allowances and other embodiments. But it seems that
they have deleted it in the 1987 Constitution, meaning that, in case of allowances, they can be increased anytime. That is why, the
position of congressman and senator is very attractive to politicians. There is no prohibition as to allowances because they do not
form part of salary or compensation. It will take effect immediately. There is no legal bar or Constitutional bar as to when it
would take effect and as to the limit of the amount of the increase, sky is the limit. The limit only being moral.
How about reduction in salary? Can the congress enact a law reducing their salary? Congress power is plenary so they
can do that. It would take effect immediately, because the provision in the Constitution is only as to the increase.
Section 11
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Sec. 11 is a very powerful section for the congressmen and senators. Because this section gives congressmen and senators certain
privileges and immunities, not enjoyed by ordinary citizens like us.
First Immunity: Privilege from Arrest
Can be availed by the senators and HOR provided that the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of
imprisonment. This looks like it is for minor offenses. Then, it is also important that the law is availed and claimed only if the
congress is still in session. Why? The objective of this or the purpose of this privilege is to protect the legislator from harassment,
which would take him away from legislative sessions. So as much as possible, they should be free to go in and out of the session
hall without fear of being harassed, especially in criminal cases. It is easy to file a criminal case founded or unfounded against a
person because most of the crimes can be filed by just anyone, not only the aggrieved party except crimes against persons, such
as adultery or rape. Because of the nature of our criminal justice system, congressmen and senators who are themselves public
figures are easy targets for harassment through filing of cases. It is deemed necessary that they have this privilege from arrest.
Martinez vs. Morfe
However, under the 1935 consti, there is a different provision, the privilege is only for criminal arrest and not for civil
arrest. The SC is on the opinion that there should be no special treatment on the part of congressmen and senators. Just because
they are legislators, if they would commit a crime or there is a conviction pending, they should not be treated differently from
other citizens under the same circumstance.
People vs. Jalosjos
In this case of Jalosjos is already convicted of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was already
serving sentence in the national penitentiary. But he appealed his case. In our criminal justice system, as long as appeal is still
available, the case is not yet final. He was elected and he served as a congressman. He hold that he be allowed to attend sessions
to perform his functions as congressman, including going to and coming out the session. Will his motion be granted? Of course
not. The Supreme Court said that obviously he is not entitled to the privilege. He is convicted of an offense punishable by an
afflictive penalty. It was never the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to shield a member of the Congress from the
consequence of his wrongdoings. To allow the accused to attend could cause unjustified broadening of the privilege from arrest
provided in the Constitution. What was the difference of this circumstance from the circumstances of Trillanes? Why did
Trillanes think that his Motion would be granted this time?
Trillanes vs Pimentel Sr.
He was part of the Oakwood Mutiny Incident. What happens to the persons charged of coup dtat? Where was he
when he won the election? He was in jail. He won as Senator. Trillanes was charged with coup d etata crime against national
security. So he is our Representative but he cannot represent us because he cannot attend the sessions. He filed a motion to be
allowed to attend the sessions. Knowing the decision in Jalosos, whats his argument to say that he not similarly situated with
Jalosjos? At what stage is his case when he filed the Motion? There is already the decision of the Supreme Court that he cannot
avail of the privilege. Why did he still file the motion? In the case of Jalosjos, he was already convicted. In Trillanes case, he is
pending trial. Since here is no conviction yet, he still enjoys the presumption of innocence. Thats a right enjoyed by the accused
in the Philippines. Since he is presumably innocent, he should be allowed to go to sessions. What did the Supreme Court say?
The SC said that it would be impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for
maintaining security. Regardless of whether you are convicted or awaiting trial, all of you are to be treated similarly. You cannot
engage in an occupation or hold office, elective or appointive while in detention but you can get elected. In other words, what the
SC is saying both in Jalosjos and Trillanes is that the privilege of arrest maybe available both to detainees while undergoing trial
or convicted or his appeal pending. If one is to avail of the privilege under Section 11, one may ask, Maam the offense is
punishable by not more than 6 years but he was already convicted. Maybe you can apply the decision of Jalosjos and Trillanes
because the SC said that there is not point of drawing the line between the two but wala pa namang decision so maybe we can use
these cases as guides. If you are a Congressman, convicted with an offensepunishable of less than 6 yrs imprisonment, pag end ng
term mo magtago ka na; but I am not saying that is the ruling because there is no case yet.
Second Immunity Privilege of Speech and Debate
Under the 2nd sentence of section 11 no member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place or any speech
or debate in Congress or any committee thereof. The nature of this speech and debate refers to utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their official functions such as speeches delivered, or statements made while the same is in session; as well
as bills introduced whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressman either in Congress or outside
the premises of the House of Representatives or his office. The bottomline is that the privilege is available to anything that is
communicative and deliberative in nature. Utterances, speeches made. Any acts communicative in nature but which are
performed while in the discharge of his official functions.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang
While the Congressman published an article while the Congress is not in session; An Article imputing coup dtat plans
against the President and naming the masterminds in that coup dtat plan, and those mentioned filed a complaint, the SC said
that this Congressman is not immune and cannot enjoy the parliamentary privilege of speech and debate because the publication
is not among those that belong to the category of utterances, speech and debate protected by Sec. 11. Why? It was mentioned that
when the publication was made when the Congress was not in session.
Is being in session or not in session relevant to avail of this privilege.
No. This is the difference between the privilege from arrest and privilege of speech and debate. Why? For the former,
the idea is that for the Congressman to be allowed to go out and come in the session free from harassment while the latter is for
the Congress to continuously perform his function as a legislator. Regardless whether the Congress is in session or not, a
Congressman or Senator is a legislator all throughout his term of office. Even when not in Congress he may be performing

functions legislative in nature. It is essential to note that what is contended here are only those functions legislative in nature.
What do you mean by legislative action?
Refers to deliberative and communicative processes by which members participate in Committee and House
proceedings in the consideration of proposed legislation or of other matters in the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of
the legislature; anything that is within the function of the legislature. Again the privilege is only for those speech and debate
including acts which is considered deliberative and communicative in nature. It was performed while in the discharge of his
legislative function.
The privilege however is not absolute. There is one special place where they could be held liable. Where? In the
Congress itself. They could be disciplined by their peers for disorderly behavior if their internal rules would say that this
particular act constitutes disorderly behavior because each House can actually suspend or worse, expel, a member.
Notwithstanding that they could not be held liable in any other place be it an administrative case, criminal case, or civil case they
could still be held liable within the Congress and by their peers.
Osmea vs. Pendatun
Congressman Osmena made a privilege speech imputing bribery against the President. Of course the supporters of the
President reacted and demanded that Osmena should supply evidence to support his imputations. When he failed to present the
necessary evidence, they filed a complaint, a disciplinary action against him within the House of Representative causing his
suspension. There was no Constitutional violation of his suspension even if it was a privilege speech because he can still be held
liable in the Congress itself. This provision is understood to mean that although except from prosecution or civil action, the
members of the Congress may nevertheless be questioned in the Congress itself. The idea is that they should be guaranteed
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions.
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
How far can you claim this privilege? You know Miriam Defensor-Santiago; she can get away with whatever it is. So
in this case, she applied for the position of the Chief Justice of the SC to replace Justice Panganiban. The JDs and bar council
announced that for the purpose of nomination they will only consider the incumbent members of the SC kasi Chief Justice. She
reacted to that and made a privilege speech as a Senator. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court. I am no longer interested in the position as Chief Justice if it was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another Department but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
Actually there was a case in the 1990s against Ramon Tulfo in relation to the checkpoints. The issue there was that
whether or not these checkpoints are Constitutional. You know what happens in checkpoints? There are warrantless searches and
seizures being conducted and even warrantless arrests. So it was questioned. The SC said that the balance is bent towards its
Constitutionality. He published an article wherein he said, I call the Supreme Court as sangkatutak na bobo. He was cited for
contempt, but that was Tulfo. Lets change the face of Tulfo to that of Santiago. When she made the speech, she was not only a
Senator but also a lawyer. Lawyers are under the disciplinary administration of the SC. Okay, you are not liable, but as a lawyer
can she be disbarred?
No. The complaint was dismissed. The privilege speech is not actionable criminally or even in a disciplinary
proceeding. It was spelt however that this is not the last word on the matter. We would be remiss in our duty if we let the
Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our
part to re-instill in the Senator/Atty. Santiago, her duty to respect the courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her
anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions
for their own benefit, but to enable them as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members. So she can get away with it because of the privilege.
The position in the Congress is very attracting because of these privileges under Section 11. They enjoy this privilege
from arrest for offenses not punishable by more than 6 years. Take note, this can only be availed when the Congress is in session.
Session means from the time of the convening of the Congress up to adjournment in a given year. When it comes to the privilege
of speech and debate that is in relation to his function as legislator in general, so that session or not in session is irrelevant.
AGAIN, when a Senator or Congressman is detained, he cannot perform his function as a legislator if he is not covered by the
privilege, just like other professional, but he can be elected or re-elected.
Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure
of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise
from the filing of the proposed legislation of which they are authors.
Take note that what is required, it is the conflict of interest that leads us to disclosure of possible conflict of interest
does not necessarily mean that the legislators are prevented from filing the proposed legislation as long as he discloses the
potential or possible conflict of interest.
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither he shall be appointed to any office which may have been created
nor the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
The first sentence refers to what we call the un-incompatible office. This is any office in the Government which may
not be held by the legislators during his tenure in the Congress without forfeiting his seat. What if the Congressman or Senator
would really want to take that position? Whats the consequence? He can take that position in the Government but the
consequence is, he will forfeit his seat because these offices are incompatible. How come they are incompatible? One is within
the Legislative Department and the other is in the Executive Department. Therefore, it violates the separation of powers. So, what
is not allowed therefore is just the simultaneous holding of that office and the seating of the Congress. So to prevent him from
owing loyalty, since he is from the Legislative Department and owing loyalty to another department, the Constitution constrained
a barrier. This is just called the incompatible office. Now it can be shown however that the other office in the Government,
GOCC or public corporation is just an extension of the legislative position. Meaning that it takes a ex-officio capacity and it is
part of his legislative function then there is no incompatibility. For example, the Chairman of Education, the Committee on
Education for whom the Senate and the House of Representatives whose ex-officio office as Board Members of the University of
the Philippines(UP). Thats part of their legislative function there is no incompatibility there. They hold office as such member of
the legislative department.
The second sentence however, refers to in-forbidden office .<forbidden>. Any office in the Government that has been
created or emoluments thereof that been increased during his term. Whats the difference between an incompatible office and
forbidden office, other than its nature? Because for incompatible these are a very distinct offices but in forbidden offices, these
are offices created during the term of the Congress or the emoluments increased during the term. The difference is that for the
latter, the Congressman or Senator cannot hold office, regardless if he waives his right to hold office or regardless whether he
forfeit his seat to the Congress, so its really forbidden. If he insist of taking the office; he is forbidden by the constitution and
also he is removed as Member of the Legislative Department. So again, when you say forbidden, theres no way that a
Congressman or Senator can take hold of that office, he must wait until the end of his term for taking that office.
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Section 14 provides certain prohibitions on a Member of a Legislative Department, foremost is the prohibition in
particular to legislators who are also lawyers. Is there a prohibition to practice legal profession or practice as lawyer? There is no
prohibition, he can still practice his profession as lawyer BUT he CANNOT personally appear as counsel in any court or quasijudicial and other administrative bodies. The idea being that his mere presence would have the effect of influencing the Tribunal
or the Court but the prohibition is merely of his appearing personally as counsel. Can he therefore sign pleadings as counsel? It
seems that he can because as stated in the constitution, only the personal appearance is prohibited. So what is the difference
between the signature and the face? For us there is no difference at all but maybe there is a difference when he comes to the
tribunal itself or the court. The law firm of the lawyer of the Senator and Congressman may still appear as counsel for a party.
Again the only prohibition is personal appearance in tribunal or the court. The rest of section 14 refers to any conflict of interest,
so they cannot be members of courts or corporations with contract with the Government.
Puyat vs. De Guzman
Involved here is assembly man. Before they are called congressman they are called assemblyman. Now he appeared as
counsel for one of the Board of Directors in particular Corporation before the City Legist of Exchange Commission before the
SEC has jurisdiction over in the corporate matters. Absolutely and obviously he is prohibited to appear as counsel as stated in the
constitution. What they did thereafter is for him to purchase a very few shares of stocks. Ten (10) shares out of the available
200,000+ stocks. Now as a stockholder he is elected as a director because under corporation law you only need 1 stock to be
qualified as director. Now, as Director, he filed a motion to intervene the case, the issue there being he is the rightful Board of
Directors. This time, he is no longer a counsel but party litigant because he is already interested in the outcome of the case.
Would that be allowed?
The SC said that under usual circumstances any Board of Director may appear or intervene or participate in a trial
involving his interest in the corporation, under NORMAL circumstances, but the SC saw that the circumstances that they impair
would point to the fact that they just designed that this assemblyman would still appear without violating the constitutional
prohibition. The SC noted that; 1.) he bought very few shares of stocks only 200pesos worth, if his intention is to stockholder
bonafide he should have more than that.; 2.) he bought it after the fact that the was already prohibited by the court to appear as
counsel. So, in this case there seems to be a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The SC said that though in ordinary
circumstance it is allowed but it as seem that the circumvention of the constitutional prohibition it is the same as doing indirectly
what the constitution definitely prohibits. So he was not allowed to participate.
Liban vs Gordon
There is a question as to Gordons eligibility as to be is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross(PNRC) at
the same time a Senator. It was contended that he was holding an incompatible office so that he would not be Chairman unless he
would forfeits his seat as a Senator. So the SC reviewed the nature of the PNRC if is it a Government owned Corporation or a
Public Corporation. The PNRC was established pursuant to international agreement of nations. It is a neutral group. The SC said
that even if it was created pursuant to a law in compliance of an international agreement BUT it does not take any funds from the
Government and its officers are private although there are some representatives of the Government. The SC concluded that the
PNRC is a private Corporation it is not in any way, related to the Government or performing any Government function.
Therefore, there is no incompatibility in being a Senator and a Chairman of PNRC. There is no prohibition that a Senator can
hold any office or board of director in a private corporation.
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different
date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session
at any time.
Convening of the Congress is on the fourth Monday of July it also coincide the SONA of the President .
What is the duration of the regular session?
It depends upon the Congress but under the Constitution there is a mandatory recess or compulsory adjournment that is
thirty days before the opening of the next regular session,, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
There is also a special session. The president may call a special session at any time. So what we talked about
parliamentary immunity from arrest and it is said that is relevant to determine whether or not the Congress is in session, we are
talking about the regular session from fourth Monday of July up to its adjournment, whether compulsory or voluntary
adjournment.
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 16 refers to the internal workings in the Legislative Department. In paragraph 1, the constitution requires them
to reorganize, especially in the new set of membership or compliment. Take note that when they elect their Head the Senate
President and Speaker of the House the required vote is majority of all its members. Paragraph 2 provides that the majority of
each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, so in other words, it is not necessary that everybodys present in order for
each House to conduct its business. The constitution merely requires a quorum to do its business but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of the absent members in such manner, in other such penalties that the
House may provide.
Avelino vs Quenco
Quorum in relation to the election of its Senate President. In this case, one of the Senators is in abroad, one is in the
hospital. They were electing their Senate President, they have two factions, the Avelino and Quenco Factions. Quenco has 12
senators while Avelino has 11.there were maneuverings that they were complete at the beginning of the day and by noon when
they want to elect Senate President on motion and when the other faction realized that they are changing the Senate President,
they walk out and in the afternoon only the 12 came back. Quenco was elected. Election of the senate president is the absolute
discretion of the senate. They can change it anytime. It is within the exclusive realm jurisdiction of the senate to the point that the
court cannot interfere and dictate for the senate who will be its senate president. This is the separation of powers. So the question
for the election of senate president will be a political question. It is not justiciable because the court cannot rule on who is the
rightful Senate President.
However in this case, the SC in the main decision and the motion for reconsideration decided to take jurisdiction
because the issue of determination of the meaning of quorum. Is there a quorum? This is on the requirement of the constitution
and was Quenco validly elected? Quorum is majority plus 1. If we base it on 24 the quorum is 13 but the SC said that in this case
is that the quorum is 12. Why? The majority of the members is based not on the number fixed or provided by law but an actual
members or incumbents and it is limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
or absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other causes which make the attendance of the members concerned will be
impossible.
Take note that if there are some members who are absent and they cannot form the quorum, the House concerned has
the discretion to exercise compulsory processes, they can arrest the absent member just so they can have a quorum but if it is such
circumstance that regardless of compulsory processes they cannot compel a member to attend then that absent member will be
excluded from the total membership in the determination of a quorum. for example, if one died , then you will base the
computation of quorum in 23 not 24, because no matter what you do, he cannot attend the Session. One in abroad, the warrant of
arrest is not effective outside the Philippines. In other words he is beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate, so he is excluded. In the
hospital it is subject to debate he can be subjected to attend. Thus the quorum here is based on 23 then the majority is 12. A
quorum is based on actual members in incumbency.
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Ordinarily, which office or body has jurisdiction over election returns, and qualifications of elected public officials? Its
the COMELEC. So, under the 1987 Constitution however, with regards to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the HOR and the members of the Senate, each shall be under the sole jurisdiction of their respective Electoral Tribunals. Under
this system therefore, each House will have their own Electoral Tribunal. So you have heard of the term HRET which refer to
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and SET --- Senate Electoral Tribunal. So we have to specialize.
If you look at it, including its membership, its not solely and exclusively legislative members, right? There is also
judicial membership. Nine (9) will be from each House plus three (3) from the Supreme Court or the judiciary. So if you look at
it therefore, its ultimately a different body from the Legislative body. It does not function to enact laws. Its only a body created
by the Constitution in order to address questions regarding election, returns, and qualifications of members of each House.
Under this provision, emphasize the terms SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS, meaning, it is only and only the
HRET or the SET which has jurisdiction over the election, returns and qualifications of each respective members. So it is a body
independent from the Legislative Department itself. Its not part of the Legislative Department. Its ipso facto as its complement,
one third (1/3) from the Judiciary and two third (2/3) from the Legislative Department.
Now, this is the principle, when is it the jurisdiction will be in the COMELEC and when is it that the jurisdiction is with the
respective Tribunal? The defining line is the moment of proclamation. Once the candidate or the winning candidate has been
proclaimed, has taken his oath and has assumed office, what happens? Hes already a member of that House. So from that
moment on, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to any questions is already lost and the jurisdiction is
transferred to the respective Electoral Tribunal. Again, the defining and qualifying word one can only be member if he has been
proclaimed and has taken his oath or has assumed office.
Barbers vs. COMELEC
When Coco Pimentel initially attempted to restrain the proclamation of Barbers, he filed the petition before the SC to
restrain the COMELEC to further conduct the canvass and he also asks for the proceedings conducted by COMELEC. So the SC
however did not issue or grant the prayer for or petition for TRO or Temporary Restraining Order, and a result Barbers was
proclaimed. Can Pimentel now file a motion for reconsideration or proceed with the petition that he filed with the Supreme
Court?
This time, when Barbers was already proclaimed the Supreme Court already lost its jurisdiction with regards to the
question of validity of the proceedings in the Board of Canvassers (BOC) because once the candidate is proclaimed, jurisdiction
is already transferred in this case, in the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC (Pimentel vs. Zubiri)
In this case the action was initiated prior to the proclamation, and they were questioning the election returns. Now, like
in the case of Pimentel and Barbers, there was no restraining order. So the BOC proclaimed the winner. So the moment of
proclamation, COMELEC already loses jurisdiction over the questions on election returns. So the jurisdiction now is with the
HRET.
Guillermo vs. COMELEC
He was questioning the validity of Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Now in this system, you would understand later on,
that it would take a long time for the COMELEC to decide on questions of cancellation and denying due course of COC even if
the COMELEC can be able to resolve it on time before the election, there is still a motion of reconsideration available. Even if
the motion of reconsideration is acted upon by the COMELEC on time, there is still an available remedy of appeal or certiorari
proceedings. So sometimes, you cannot blame the COMELEC. Like in this case, he was questioning pa the COC but it was not
resolved on time up to the point that the candidate with the questionable COC was proclaimed. Now, can we continue with the
proceeding regarding the case? We cannot because the COMELEC will automatically lose jurisdiction, the jurisdiction now
being with the HRET. What do you do?
You file the case anew with the HRET. COC would still refer to qualifications of candidate. For example, the
COMELEC has already passed upon the issue of qualification of the candidate and the COMELEC said he is qualified. After
that, he was voted upon and then he became a member of the Congress. Such is the case of Fernandez vs. HRET. Can he still file
a case before the HRET this time still questioning the qualification? The answer is yes. Is it not res judicata because the Electoral
Tribunal is the body sole and exclusive judge of all contests relating to the election, return and qualifications of members of the
House. There is no forum shopping and the question can still be raised.
How about the question on the election, returns and qualifications of a nominee for the party-list representatives?
Palparan vs. HRET
Theyre questioning the nomination of Palparan to represent the victims, rebels, the CAFGUs, the security guards, their
main allegation being that it was Palparan who violated human rights of this people. In Abayon vs. HRET, they are also
questioning the qualifications of the nominee of Aangat Tayo because the nominee is the wife of an incumbent congressman.
Surely, she cant be one who is marginalized and be one of the underrepresented sectors. It was contended that they cannot
question the qualifications of Palparan and Abayon as they are not the one elected and written in the ballot. What was written in
the ballot? It was the party-list right? So when you question the validity of the nomination, it should be addressed before the party
which nominated them in pursuant to their own rules. Is it correct? Where can the question therefore the qualification of a partylist representative?
The HRET resolved that it has jurisdiction which the SC upheld. Take note that in the Constitutional point of view, it is
the party-list representative or nominee who is elected to office and not the party. But according to the Constitution, the election
is pursuant to a party-list system. If we voted for the party, in reality we are voting for a nominee. The party-list nominee is the
one who becomes the congressman and not the party. It is the party-list representative who performs the duties and functions of a
congressman, and receives the salaries and emoluments as any district representative, has rights and duties the same as the district
representatives, therefore he is no different from a district representative. So in other words, its not true that we are voting to a
party. We are only electing them through a system of party-list that we put this people in the House of Representatives.
Therefore, they being members of the Congress, who has jurisdiction over questions on election, returns and qualifications?
Sino? It is still the HRET.
Lo Kim vs. COMELEC
This involved the nominees of the same party. The party is CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption). Initially, it has
submitted to the COMELEC four (4) nominees. Thereafter, it has withdrawn the 2nd, 3rd and 4th nominees and replaced with
another. Lo Kim was the 2nd nominee who was replaced. It so happened that after the elections, CIBAC got 2 seats. So Lo Kim
is saying that he is supposed to be the one sitting as the 2nd nominee. It was shown to the COMELEC the resolution withdrawing
his nomination and the substitution with another nominee. It was alleged in this case the action was initiated prior to the
proclamation, and they were questioning the election returns. Now, like in the case of Pimentel and Barbers, there was no
restraining order. So the BOC proclaimed the winner. So the moment of proclamation, COMELEC already loses jurisdiction over
the questions on election returns. So the jurisdiction now is with the HRET.
Guillermo vs. COMELEC
He was questioning the validity of Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Now in this system, you would understand later on,
that it would take a long time for the COMELEC to decide on questions of cancellation and denying due course of COC even if
the COMELEC can be able to resolve it on time before the election, there is still a motion of reconsideration available. Even if
the motion of reconsideration is acted upon by the COMELEC on time, there is still an available remedy of appeal or certiorari
proceedings. So sometimes, you cannot blame the COMELEC. Like in this case, he was questioning pa the COC but it was not
resolved on time up to the point that the candidate with the questionable COC was proclaimed. Now, can we continue with the
proceeding regarding the case? We cannot because the COMELEC will automatically lose jurisdiction, the jurisdiction now
being with the HRET. What do you do?
You file the case anew with the HRET. COC would still refer to qualifications of candidate. For example, the
COMELEC has already passed upon the issue of qualification of the candidate and the COMELEC said he is qualified. After
that, he was voted upon and then he became a member of the Congress. Such is the case of Fernandez vs. HRET. Can he still file
a case before the HRET this time still questioning the qualification? The answer is yes. Is it not res judicata because the Electoral
Tribunal is the body sole and exclusive judge of all contests relating to the election, return and qualifications of members of the
House. There is no forum shopping and the question can still be raised.
How about the question on the election, returns and qualifications of a nominee for the party-list representatives?
Palparan vs. HRET
Theyre questioning the nomination of Palparan to represent the victims, rebels, the CAFGUs, the security guards, their
main allegation being that it was Palparan who violated human rights of this people. In Abayon vs. HRET, they are also
questioning the qualifications of the nominee of Aangat Tayo because the nominee is the wife of an incumbent congressman.
Surely, she cant be one who is marginalized and be one of the underrepresented sectors. It was contended that they cannot
question the qualifications of Palparan and Abayon as they are not the one elected and written in the ballot. What was written in
the ballot? It was the party-list right? So when you question the validity of the nomination, it should be addressed before the party
which nominated them in pursuant to their own rules. Is it correct? Where can the question therefore the qualification of a partylist representative?
The HRET resolved that it has jurisdiction which the SC upheld. Take note that in the Constitutional point of view, it is
the party-list representative or nominee who is elected to office and not the party. But according to the Constitution, the election
is pursuant to a party-list system. If we voted for the party, in reality we are voting for a nominee. The party-list nominee is the
one who becomes the congressman and not the party. It is the party-list representative who performs the duties and functions of a
congressman, and receives the salaries and emoluments as any district representative, has rights and duties the same as the district
representatives, therefore he is no different from a district representative. So in other words, its not true that we are voting to a
party. We are only electing them through a system of party-list that we put this people in the House of Representatives.
Therefore, they being members of the Congress, who has jurisdiction over questions on election, returns and qualifications?
Sino? It is still the HRET.
Lo Kim vs. COMELEC
This involved the nominees of the same party. The party is CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption). Initially, it has
submitted to the COMELEC four (4) nominees. Thereafter, it has withdrawn the 2nd, 3rd and 4th nominees and replaced with
another. Lo Kim was the 2nd nominee who was replaced. It so happened that after the elections, CIBAC got 2 seats. So Lo Kim
is saying that he is supposed to be the one sitting as the 2nd nominee. It was shown to the COMELEC the resolution withdrawing
his nomination and the substitution with another nominee. It was alleged that COMELEC no longer has jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction is now with the HRET. Is the contention correct? Take note in this case that this is not a contest between a party and
another party or a question on the qualification of the 2nd nominee. Ultimately, what you see is the contest between nominees in
the same party. So here, the question is who is the rightful nominee which can only be answered within the party and the
COMELEC. So this time, the jurisdiction is not with the HRET because it does not relate with election, returns and qualification
of a member. It relates with the nominees, who is the rightful nominee of a particular party.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC
This is about Arroyo rising to power through succession and nominating Guingona to the Vice Presidency.
Consequently, a Senate seat was vacated. So the 13th Senator shall fill up the vacated position. The object of the case is to annul
the special elections the allegation being there is no special conducted being there was no office. Ultimately, in relation to that,
since there was no election, the petition was praying that whoever that would be in the 13th place will not be proclaimed. The
13th slot was Honasan. So there was a contention that the issue is no longer within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court from the
moment that Honasan was proclaimed and is now with the SET. Is it correct? What is issue here? Is it the election, return and
qualifications of Honasan? If you look closely, the petition was more about the validity of the special election. It asked for the
annulment of the special election. This issue is not within the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal but with the Supreme Court.
Honasan is just collateral. It could be regardless who shall be the 13th placer. If it is declared that there is no special, of course,
the 13th placer shall be removed and not disqualified. His number of votes is not questioned; returns and qualifications are not
the issue. Therefore, who has jurisdiction? Shall it remain in the Supreme Court or be transferred to the Electoral Tribunal? It
remains with the Supreme Court.
Note:
Lazatin vs. HRET
The rules of procedure when it comes to election protests involving members of the House and the Senate shall be
based on the rules of each House and no longer in the Omnibus Election Code enacted during the time of Marcos. Under the
1973, the jurisdictions in questions on elections, return or qualifications fall under the COMELEC. But this is no longer true with
the 1987 Constitution as it already fall with the respective Electoral Tribunals.
Composition of the HRET:
bers of the HOR
Composition of the SET
Abas vs. SET

In that case, 22 Senators are respondents in a disqualification case filed before the SET. If you file a motion for
inhibition, you are a respondent. Even if you are replaced, the one who replaced is still subject to the same motion for inhibition.
Sino na ngayon ang uupo sa SET? It was proposed in this case that, since most of the Senators are party or respondents in the
electoral protest, the three justices will be considered as quorum and can decide on the electoral tribunal cases. Will that proposal
be constitutionally acceptable? The SC said no. The electoral tribunal is different and independent body. Its not even a
legislative body. Its composition is 1/3 Judiciary and 2/3 political. That is the complement. You cannot take away the entire
membership of the political aspect without running over the constitutional mandate of composition. So what is now the remedy?
The SC is saying that, without the legislative counterpart, it cannot function as electoral tribunal. Because, if only the
Judiciary is left, why didnt the Constitution give this function solely to the Judiciary? What the SC is saying is that it cannot
function without the legislative counterpart. The Constitution and the law have no remedy provided. So, the litigants can only
hope on the sense of justice and fairness on the members of the tribunal.
Bondoc vs. Pineda
Congressman Camasura, who is a member of Cojuangcos LDP and who is also member of the electoral tribunal,
admitted that he voted for Bondoc when it turned out that Bondoc really won. Bondoc is not an LDP member. Cojuangco and the
LDP got angry and removed Camasura from the membership of the LDP. Since he was no longer a member, he cannot be
representing LDP in the HRET. The HOR reorganized the HRET because of that. Can they do that?
The SC said, going back to the principle that the ETs are independent bodies, they are independent from the house itself. So those
who are members of the ET should enjoy security of tenure because they are expected to be non-partisan as judges. They can
only be removed with cause. Party disloyalty is not a valid cause. It was not shown that Camasura has resigned from the LDP and
has affiliated himself with another party.
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex-officio chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives, elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case
of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all its members.
If you compare ETs and the Commission on Appointments, there are two ETs while there is only one Commission the
membership being one part from the Senate and one part from the HOR. Whats the function of the CoA?
It will act on all appointments which are submitted for its approval.
What is the composition?
It will be proportional representation from the political parties and the partylists registered under the partylist system.
Since the composition is proportional to the size of political parties, the more members you have in the party, the more seats you
have in the CoA. Since the composition is proportional to the size of the political parties, it may be necessary to reorganize the
CoA. Why? Because, in the Philippines, tapok2 ang style. Kung sino sikat, kung sino madaming pera, doon ka. Right now, most
politicians would want to affiliate themselves with LP and some are planning to change to Binays party. Because of this, it is
necessary to regularly change the composition of the CoA.
Cunanan vs. Tan
72 were Nationalistas Party. 22 were LPs. One independent. Based on proportional representation, 8 would be the NP,
4 were LP. But because of the dissatisfaction with the administration of NP, several of them formed an alliance with LP to the
point that they called themselves Allied Majority and were already more than the NP. Is it proper to reorganize the CoA?
No. The AM is just a temporary alliance. It was not shown that those members of NP who formed AM have resigned from being
members of NP and are now members of LP. This is just a temporary alliance
.
Daza vs. Singson
The parties in the house who had winning candidates were Lakas ng Bansa, PDP Laban, NP Unido, LP, and KBL.
Based on their members, they appropriated the seats in the CoA. It happened that, within their term, the LDP was reorganized.
The heads of the LDP were the President and the Senate President. If you have these two big powers, where will you go? You
jump into the other boat. The membership of LDP now swelled to 159 members. Will it be proper now to reorganize the CoA?
Yes. It was contended it should not because LDP is just newly formed. However, the SC said that, since the heads were the
President and the Senate President, you cannot say that it is not yet established as a party. Besides, the ones who jumped boats
had formally resigned from their parties and formally affiliated themselves with LDP. So, if you have to reorganize the CoA, it
should be bona fide change in party representation.
Guingona vs. Gonzales
When they sought for party representations in the CoA, it yielded the following: for the LDP 7.5, NPC 2.5, Lakas 1.5,
PDP Laban .5. What do you do with the .5? LDP rounded it to 8. NPC rounded down to 2. Lakas rounded down to 1. PDP Laban
rounded up to 1. What happened? It violates the proportional representation. It adds more to some and deducts from some. So it
is now longer proportional. Whats the principle?
The decimal is not to be considered as a whole because it will violate the mandated proportional representation. So
what will happen now? 7 for LDP, 2 for NPC, 1 for Lakas, and none for PDP Laban. Then, it is now contended that the
membership of 12 is mandatory. The SC said no. It is not necessary to fill the entire membership of 12. Between the mandate of
proportional representation and the mandate of 12 members, the former will prevail and given more weight because it will violate
the entire provision if you insist on filling the 12 and only a majority is needed to fill the function of the CoA.
A motion for reconsideration was filed showing the history of the Legislative department.

It was shown that several members who had .5 representations would form a coalition in order to get a seat. The Court said that a
practice, no matter how long it is, does not validate what is unconstitutional. It just so happened that nobody complained about
those practices.
Pimentel vs. HRET
This was the first time we had partylist representatives and then it was questioned that the partylist representatives were
not considered. The SC said how will you be considered when you didnt even nominate? That was the rule. But I was
thinking, if we have 280 members in the HOR and a maximum number of seats of 3 for the partylists, is there a way for them to
get a seat in the CoA? It will be difficult because 3 members out of 280 is a very small proportion.
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate
and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission
on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its chairman or a majority of all its members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Legislative Inquiries: Limitations
In our discussion on whether or not the senate is a continuing body, right?
Arnault vs. Nazareno
There was investigation about one resource speaker. When that resource speaker, Arnault, was being asked a particular
question and the subject matter under inquiry is that in a particular relation to graft and corruption... acts in the case of the
purchase of properties by the government which seemed to be overpriced, so they conducted this investigation in aid of
legislation in the hope of coming up with a reasonable legislation to regulate misconduct. So, Arnault was asked a question,
although he attended investigation, but the question was asked on who received the money. He refused to disclose the
information. Remember the case. Ayaw niya sabihin kung sino yung tumanggap ng 440,000.
So, the senate that conducted the inquiry cited him for contempt and, in fact, have him imprisoned in the bilibid- the
bilibid prison. So, doon talaga siya sinama sa mga priso, piniriso...unlike in our case we just see them in the senate office, diba?
But, the question, therefore, was asked whether or not, other than the authority to cite him for contempt, does the senate have
that power or authority to conduct the investigation, to conduct the inquiry, no? Now, the question was asked because under the
1935 constitution, there was... or the constitution was silent on this power. There was no condition as the same as section 21 and
the Supreme Court in that case said that this power to conduct inquiry, in so far incidental to legislative power. There is no need
for express authorization of that office because it is so interrelated with the power to legislate.
This is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to legislative function. Legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions, which the legislation is intended to affect or to change. How
can you legislate if you are not familiar with the subject matter? And if you are not familiar with the subject matter, would you
not, would you just set it aside just because you are not familiar with it. Okay? What would you do, therefore, to be familiar with
[the subject matter]? You have to gather information. Now, usually or often than that, the information, as observed by the
supreme court, the information that are volunteered are not precise or not actually true, so you have to compel one to give out the
information regarding that required. That is why vis-a-vis to this power to investigate, which is part of the power to legislate, the
Congress is also empowered to compel attendance. Otherwise, it would be just like obstruction of the legislative power. They
cannot perform their duties. Attendance, therefore, to legislative inquiry is mandatory and the congress may exercise or is
authorized to exercise compulsory processes. Compulsory means to compel a person to tell. Example, they could issue a
subpoena. They could issue or will cite a person for contempt. They could go as far as arresting the person and as far as detaining
the person. Is this constitutional? And the Supreme Court said yes. This is, in essence, part of self-preservation. The right of the
Congress for self... towards to self-preservation. Otherwise, it will lose its identity as Congress. It can no longer legislate.
If this is mandatory, and this is in relation with the power of Congress, then what would be now about the power of
legislation? The constitution, therefore, place some limitations on the exercise of this power. Because once they... this is
inherent... this is an appropriate auxiliary... It means that without that power to inquire, there is no power to legislate. They take
one and you disable the Congress. Hindi lang paa or kamay yung tinanggal mo sa Congress. Its battery can no longer legislate.
So, what would therefore...? Can you imagine, therefore, that power to inquire is immense, no? It can affect anyone.
So the constitution placed some limitations. The first of the limitations are in section 21. The first being that the
investigation must be in aid of legislation. It cannot be just any kind of inquiry or investigation. The second limit is that it must be
in accordance with this rules of procedure. We will discuss that later. And then the last limit is that the rights and person affected
by section 26 shall be respected. So these are the three constitutional limits.
When you say in aid of legislation, the inquiry together with the jurisdiction of the legislative body must be material or
necessary to the exercise of the power that is vested to the Congress, which is the power to legislate. In other words, it should be
geared towards possible legislation. Why should we say possible legislation? It does not necessarily require that by the end of the
inquiry or investigation, there is the product legislation... because the inquiry would lead to, whether or not a legislation is
necessary, for or if an amendment of the law is necessary, repeal of the law is necessary, revocation of the law of necessary.
Therefore, they have lots of options after the inquiry and this authority or constitutional right to conduct inquiry does not require
that the Congress will, at the end of the inquiry, will have that legislation. So understand that. It is only part that is in aid of
legislation. So...but... brought as it is, plenary as it is, no, the limit would be that it will have a wider range of legislative field of
inquiry...
It should not be illegal to expose private affairs. You relate them with the last limit, no? Rights and persons upbringing
must be respected. It must not be a venue for exposing private affairs. Meaning, those affairs which the public is not interested in.
So, if that is the subject matter, then what can invoke that person to privacy?... But can the investigation still proceed? Yes, so far
as those private affairs would be excluded. Okay? So, it would not also be, should be, a venue for self-aggrandizement or grand
standing of a particular congressman, especially nowadays that legislative inquiries are televised, diba? So, at least, on that part,
its more of an ethical or moral consideration for the congress because if that is really the intended legislation and it is in aid of
legislation, there would be objection to that grand standing. But, take note, that the congress is not a law enforcement agency nor
is a trial agency. Who is, which is the law enforcement agency? It is the executive department and the trial being the courts in the
judiciary. So, we must also be sensitive of whether or not there is already encroachment on these areas. But as you will see later
on, this power is very... a wild latitude as to the extent of the inquiry as long as again it is in aid of legislation.
Now, in the case of Arnault v. Nazareno, so I was telling the court case, he refused to answer the question, who gave
or who received the money? Now, his justification for refusal is theres no relation. Regardless of who received the money,
theres no relation to an intended legislation. Okay? So, as no relation or material lead to any proposed legislation, then the
Supreme Court said, in this inquiries, these tons of inquiries, as long as its already admitted that the subject of inquiry is a proper
subject for legislation, like in this case, the subject is operations of the government... Since the general subject of inquiry is
already accepted or acknowledged as a proper subject for legislation, therefore, a proper subject for inquiry, there is no need to
scrutinize each question propounded to the resource speaker and to determine, or for the court to determine whether this question
is relevant, has relation to an intended legislation. No, as long as the question is relevant to the entire subject matter of inquiry.
So, in other words, its not for Arnault to say that I will refuse the question because it has no relation to the proposed legislation.
Okay? Kahit nga, even if he was asked, What was the color of your polo?, Where did you met this guy?, he cant say that
theres no relation to whatever the color of my polo would be to the intended legislation because as long as the question is
relevant to the subject...general subject matter under investigation.
Bengzon vs. Senate
Theres another question that you are supposed to be interested in. What if, maam, theres an inquiry ongoing in the
congress and that usually you will observe that this refer to graft and corruption, diba, sex videotapes, sex video, violation of law,
okay? What if theres already a pending case regarding these transactions, regarding these actions, will it prevent the congress
from further continuing with the investigation? Now, the first case to subtly answer this question is Bengzon v. Senate. In
Bengzon v. Senate, the inquiry was an offshoot to Enriles privilege speech. He was referring to the transaction between one
Romualdez and the sale of his interest to 39 corporations but there was an allegation of graft and corruption. Bottom line is the
relation to graft and corruption. Enrile urged the senate to conduct an inquiry to determine a possible violation of section 5 of RA
3019. So, if we rephrase that, it would be urging the senate to determine whether or not there was a violation of... there was...
the transaction was tainted with graft and corruption or whether or not there was a violation of law of the anti-graft and corrupt
practices act. So that was the intention of the inquiry as the supreme court found. Now, in this case, therefore, the Supreme Court
said that based on their intention, there was no intended legislation. They just want to see whether or not there was a violation of
law and perhaps determine who would be liable. So, it was not in aid of legislation, therefore, it is not a valid inquiry. But in the
case of Bengzon v. Senate, the Supreme Court has an obiter, may pahabol siya. Besides, the Supreme Court said the issues ought
to be investigated by the respondent committee, the senate committee, is one over which the jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan and it concluded that for the respondent committee to prowl any far into the same justiciable controversy already
[pending] with the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in conclusion. In this case, the Supreme Court said that if the inquiry is the same justiciable controversy and its
already pending with the courts, it would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of the judiciary-domain of judicial
jurisdiction. Nauna yun. So, the Supre court said, there is no valid reason for the Senate to proceed with the investigation. The
ruling is, however, not that much clear. Parang meron pa siyang mga loopholes...
Senate v. Majaducon
This is after the Bengzon case. In this case, the senate conducted an inquiry, this time in aid of legislation, the
transaction being, the subject matter of inquiry is the use of the funds of the AFP retirement and separation benefits system. So
the retirement funds of the AFP, the use, thereof, in the purchase of lot in General Santos city, which appear to be overpriced.
Again, almost like the case of Arnault vs. Nazareno, overpricing. Still, bottom line is graft and corruption. Now, the investigation
is supposed to determine any possible legislation that could protect the retirees. So theres no doubt that the investigation was in
aid of legislation. Now, the vendee is one Atty. Ilo Gabiano. He applied for a temporary restraining order, an injunction order
against the Senate. And whats funny here is that the RTC granted his application. So you have this clear situation wherein the
RTC ordered a Congress, the Senate, desist from the same conducting the legislative inquiry. You cannot immediately see the
floor. One department, sa lower court pa talaga, is preventing another from performing its functions. Clearly... Clearly, there is
violation of separation of powers. And its parang David v. Goliath. David ordering Goliath to stop using your hammer. So, of
course, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed a case against Judge who issued that order. Now, the Judge, in his defense, cited
Bengzon v. Senate. Ano yung ruling sa Bengzon v. Senate? That it would be an encroachment, right? Now, the Supreme Court
said, this case of Majaducon and the case of Bengzon, is not the same. Why? Whats the case of Bengzon v. Senate about? Whats
the ruling of the Supreme Court? Its really about determining or finding that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation. Ano ang
subject matter of inquiry? Determining violation of law. Its not the function of Congress. Now, besides, sabi ko, the Supreme
Court said... besides its already in the question mismo whether or not theres violation of law is already pending with the
Sandiganbayan. So, this is not the same. He cannot use that case (Bengzon) to justify his (Judges) action. And further, no? And
further, so there was no intended legislation. In this case, also, there were already pending investigations against Atty. Gabiano
and the Judge. They were pending before the office of the ombudsman, okay? Now, sabi ko dati, padaghanay na lang mo og case
ani. Bengzon said that it could be an encroachment if the judicial justiciable controversy is already in the Sandiganbayan. Then,
you have an encroachment into the exclusive domain of the judicial jurisdiction and the Supreme Court said here (Majaducon)
there is yet no judicial jurisdiction to speak of because the cases were still pending with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is not
under the judiciary. In this case, it investigates a possible criminal action. It finds for probable cause or it looks for probable
cause to file a criminal case. It is acting for the prosecutor and the prosecutor is not under the judiciary. It is under the executive
department in his function to implement the law. But did the Supreme Court squarely answer the question? Pwede ba? Can they
go together with the encroachment? We say that it is an encroachment, right? So far.
Standard Charter vs. Senate Committee
At least in this case, the Supreme Court finally settled the question with clarity at that. Now, in this case, the Senate
was conducting an investigation over the purchase of or the selling of unregistered foreign securities. Unregistered foreign
securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code. Now, in the explanation of the resolution calling for the investigation of
inquiry, there was an acknowledgment that the current securities code regulation code is inadequate to regulate these kinds of
transaction and even the regulatory intervention of the SEC-Securities and Exchange Commission-and the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas also seemed inadequate. So, they would conduct the inquiry, okay? And this time you could see that it is really intended
for possible legislation. Kasi parang kulang yung law natin. Why did this case... Why was this allowed to happen, no? So, it was
in aid of legislation.
Now the officers of the bank refused to attend the investigation, refused to, refused the investigation or investiation,
claiming that there [were] already civil and criminal cases pending before the courts. The issues in these civil and criminal
cases... the subject matters of these cases are all about these securities or unregistered foreign securities in this transaction. So,
this is, now, a direct question on the court or the Supreme Court. Whether or not the pendency of these cases would preclude or
would bar the congress or the senate from continuing with the investigation and the Supreme Court said, with definiteness, no.
In the first place, they also cited Bengzon vs. Senate. In the first place, the court said, lest we forget that the central legal
issue...that the central decision of the Supreme Court in Bengzon v. Senate is the finding that the investigation conducted was not
in aid of legislation. In this case, it was really in aid of legislation. Ano pala yung sa Bengzon v. Senate? Yun na nga. May
violation ba ng..ano ba? Nagviolate ba sila ng law? Are they liable? Thats not in aid of legislation. And that is, thats..the ruling
of the supreme court in Bengzon cannot be applicable in this case because this case is in aid of legislation.
Now, the Supreme Court also said, as to the question, that the mere filing of civil or administrative complaint before a
court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert the intended inquiry. Just...at the convenience of filing a case, you can already bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, no, thru the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of
sovereign authority of the Congress cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative complaint. So it is now that is
clear. Even if there are cases pending, invoking the same subject matter, Congress will still go on with the inquiry.
Romero vs. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada
Still in investagion of graft and corruption, this invoke the use of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
funds to invest them to the Smokey Mountain project. There are also looking for the possibility of filing a plunder case against
Fidel V. Ramos. In all instances the Supreme Court will first determine if the inquiry is in aid of legislation, and the Supreme
Court in this case said that it was in aid of legislation. Now, regarding of the pendency of cases. It was the contention of Romero
that the issue is Sub Judicism. What do you mean by Sub Judicism? Sub Judicism is an ethical rule or professional rule that when
use, party litigants and the lawyers in particular should not talk about it in public. Instigation is that, they were alleger contending
that there are cases pending, so you cannot proceed with the investigation. And the supreme court cited standard charter where
the supreme court already said that the pendency of criminal and administrative cases should not automatically bar the conduct of
inquiries. But, this time the supreme court further explains. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings
has different purposes. At one hand, the courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application
of law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. That is the purpose of
investigations conducted in courts, to settle actual controversies. What about investigations conducted by congress? It does not
interest itself of demandable rights or whether or not there are violation of rights. Why it should be granted to a party or why
should it be made liable? What is the function in a legislative investigation? To determine whether or not there should be
enactment of a law, repeal of a law, amendment of a law. In other words, it is in aid of legislation, although we said earlier that it
is not necessary that there is the product legislation. In other words, these two investigations are different. We are more familiar
with this court investigations. What is the ultimate result of court investigations?
If it is a criminal case, either the accused is acquitted or convicted and there is a penalty. If it is an administration case
theres also a penalty. If it is a civil case, awards of damages. Determination of rights. It has a different purpose than legislative
inquiries. So, if youre asked, can they proceed simultaneously? What about if I attend that and I will be compeled to answer a
question, they can use it against me as evidence against me in another proceedings that were pending. This time you cannot
refuse solely on that grounds. Diba we mentioned 3 limits? The third being, the rights of the persons attending or affected by it
should be respected. But, the bottomline is it should not be a ground to bar an investigation or to refuse to attend the
investigation. Now, I will jump to the next limit kasi medyo mahaba to. First and secondly that it must be in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedures. What do you mean by duly published rules of procedures?
Garcillano vs. House
What the Supreme Court decided in that case is that they cited Neri vs. Senate. In that case, the house is already done
with the investigation of the Garci tapes and the senate was about to start. They commenced with the investigation. But in June
30, 2007, there was a new set of half of the senators because of the election that transpire in May 2007. Now, Garci is contending
that the investigation cannot proceed because there was no duly published rules of procedure. So, when the supreme court asked
the Senate, it said that it published its rules of procedure regarding the conduct of inquiries in 1995 and in 2006. Take note, by
June 2007 the commencement of the new set of Senators. And the Supreme Court said, duly published rules of procedure; the
phrase requires that the Senate of every congress shall publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation.
Why? Meaning in every set of Senators will published its rules of procedure. How often is that therefore? Every 3 years, diba?
Relate that with the decision determining that the Senate is no longer a continuing body in a context of yung main basis nga nila
and in relations to the decision of Arnault, diba? It requires the senate to the congress to publish its rules for procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation because every senate is distinct from the law before it interact therein. Since senatorial elections
happens every 3 years its no longer a continuing body. The moment that it changes its membership, the remaining half is no
longer a quorum. Therefore, its no longer allowed to conduct a business. So, in this case each senate may enact a different set of
rules as it may deem in fit. The Supreme Court also noted that even in the internal rules in the senate they are provided that all
tending matter in proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one congress but maybe taken by the succeeding congress as
in present for the first time. Ibig sabihin if they want to continue with it, they cannot continue from where they left off. They will
start back to zero, because now there are members who are not around when they started the investigation. In other words, the
Supreme Court said since the last publication was in 2006. When the 2007 set, now that is the 14th congress, commence its term.
Their failure to publish the rules of procedure regarding the legislative investigation made the investigation of Garcillano null and
void. Thus, nakalusot si Garcillano. What is the essence of publication pala? Why is it required? Constitutional requirement sya.
Why? The answer is Notice. Notice is about due process right. Right of due process is a constitutional right. So, the constitution
also faces this limit in constitution itself. Because this is the essence of due process. A person under inquiry should be accorded
due processing. Due process would require that he be notified of the proceedings under which he is being scrutinized or in this
case investigated. At least, when there is publication, there is constructive notice like all laws are. The Senate even said that he
was notified of the rules because you can check it up anywhere. Is that a valid argument? In light of the Constitutional mandate
that it be published, the SC applied the rule strictly because it is a Constitutional right under Section 21.
The next limit in the exercise of this authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation that the rights of the persons
appearing in such inquiries should be respected. Your rights as a citizen are mostly found in the Bill of Rights. You can invoke
these rights when you are called to appear before legislative inquiry.
In Re: Sabio
The Senate is investigating the anomalies in several government owned corporations. The Board of Directors of these
corporations refused to appear invoking right to privacy. Can you invoke right to privacy to refuse to attend the investigation or
inquiry?
The SC said that when one invokes the right of privacy, there should be a reasonable expectation of privacy. In this case, as BOD
of public corporations, they are called upon to talk about their public functions as BOD involved in a public corporation. Do they
have reasonable expectation of privacy? Can they keep the function of their public offices from public scrutiny? In the first place,
public office is public trust. In this case, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Now, they invoked the right against self-incrimination. The SC said you will never know whether or not the question is
incriminating unless the question is asked. So this is not a valid right to refuse to attend. You can only invoke this right when the
question is asked.
Legislative Inquiry (Sec. 21)

- It is an inherent to and is an appropriate auxiliary to the power to legislate. Take it away and you also take away the power to
legislate.
- Appearance before congress is mandatory
General rule: Nobody is exempted from appearing for a legislative inquiry provided that:
a.) The legislative inquiry is in aid of legislation;
b.) It is pursuant to the duly published rules of legislation; and
c.) the rights of the persons appearing and affected are respected.
Exemption to the general rule: The president and the members of the judiciary cannot be compelled to attend a legislative
inquiry.
- Justification: based on the separation of powers and the co-equality of the departments of the government, they cannot be
compelled.
Exemption to the exemption: Executive Privilege it is the power of the government to withhold information from the
courts, the congress and the public.
Three types of information that may be asserted in the context of either a judicial or legislative inquiry:
1.) State secrets privilege the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military and diplomatic
objectives.
2.) Informers privilege the government has the right to withhold the identity of a person furnishing information in violation of
laws to the government.
3.) Generic privilege for internal deliberations advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations forming part of
governmental decisions and formulation of policies
The mentioned typed of information that may be asserted are not considered privilege at all times. Prayer for the
privilege must be valid. It would depend if the information falls among the three types enumerated above and that there is a
justifiable reason to consider or grant the privilege. In addition, the privilege may be recognized only in relation ti certain typed
of information of sensitive character. Its validity will depend on the ground to justify it and in the context on which it is made.
Senate vs Ermita
Facts: The congress was conducting a legislative inquiry on several transactions alleged to be anomalous and are
marked with graft and corruption involving hhigh officials in the government including the president. It involved North Rail
Project, the alleged massive electoral fraud in the previous election and also the Fertilizer Fund Scam. The Senate has been
issuing several subpoenas to the different department heads under president Arroyo. A panic button was pressed and president
Arroyo issued Executive Order 434. Section 2 of the said order enumerates the officers and section 3 provides that those
enumerated in sec. 2 are covered by executive privilege and therefore cannot attend legislative investigations without the consent
of the president.
Issue: Is that provision of E.O. 464 valid?
Ruling of the court: in essence, what the provision is requiring is that no person under the executive department enumerated in
section 2 shall attend legislative inquiries in aid of legislation without the consent of the president. The president is stating a
general rule rather than the exemption. The exemption being they can attend only if the president consents. The justification is
that these officers are covered by executive privilege. Recall that executive privilege attaches to the type of information not the
type of person. In other words, just because an officer is under the executive department, it does not necessarily mean that he
enjoys executive privilege. What is important is the information
Executive Order 464 claims Executive Privilege for the persons without necessarily disclosing whether or not they are in custody
of certain types of information. The president must invoke Executive Privilege citing the type of information.
The flaw in the section is that it does not provide the type of information they are withholding. Let us say that section 3
provides for the type of information, would it be automatically covered by Executive Privilege?
An Executive Privilege being a mere exemption to the general rule of disclosure must therefore be claimed, asserted or
invoked by the president or the department upon which the information rests or it must be invoked by the president citing the type
of information and the grounds upon which the information is withheld. In order to be valid, a claim for executive privilege is a
case to case basis. Just because an information is among those types of information cited earlier, it does not automatically mean
that it is already covered by Executive Privilege. It must be claimed or asserted, There must be a formal claim of the privilege
and is launched by the head of the department who has control over the matter.
Neri vs Senate
Facts: The case involves the legislative inquiry on the National Broadband Network deal involving the ZTE
Corporation which is under the control of China. There were allegations of anomalies in the transaction involving high ranking
officials of the Philippines and China. The chairman of the COMELEC was accused of offering a bribe of 200 million pesos. The
public was appalled and the investigation by congress was conducted for no other purpose other than in aid of legislation. Neri
was invited as a resource person. He attended the legislative inquiry and answered al questions except three:
1.) Whether or not the President followed-up the NBN project;
2.) Whether or not he was directed to prioritize it; and
3.) Whether or not he was directed to approve it.
For Neri, the information sought would refer to private and confidential information or communication between him
and the president. He claimed Executive Privilege and refused to answer the questions. The claim was made through the letter of
Executive Secretary Ermita claiming that the president is invoking Executive Privilege and also stated that there were candid
discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions. These discussions belong to the impact of private scandals
involving high raking officials and accomplishment.
In the letter, Ermita said that the information might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China.
Issue: Are the information sought from Neri covered by Executive Privilege?
Ruling of the Court: The information is covered by presidential communications privilege. These would pertain to
communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision making and deliberations that the president
believes should remain confidential.
Elements of a presidential communications privilege
- The information must relate to a quintessential and on-delegable basic presidential power like his power as commander-in-chief,
powers relating to diplomatic relations, power to appoint and revoke and the power to grant pardon.
- The information is covered or solicited and received by a close adviser of the president or the president himself. An adviser
must be in operational
proximity with the president. These information must are those that would lead to policy formulation, presidential decision
making and deliberation.
- The Presidential Communication Privilege remains a qualified privilege. It can be overcome by an adequate need. The privilege
can be overcome by other proof requiring the need of disclosure of the information.
The Supreme Court said that the information sought from Neri is covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1.) The communication involves the power of the president to enter into international treaties, a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the president.
2.) The communication was received by a close adviser of the president.
3.) The congress has not showed that the information is required for congress to enact the intended law. The presidential
communication being a qualified privilege was not overcome by a pressing need of the congress to obtain the information.
Congress can enact the law with or without the information, In congressional proceedings on the enactment of laws, you only
need to foresee the future and determine what the effect of your legislation would be to the people. There is no need to recognize
what happened in the transaction to enable congress to enact legislation.
What is being sought from Neri is validly covered by the Presidential Communications Privilege.
In addition, the claim was made by Executive Secretary Ermita. He is considered o be the alter ego of the president. Thus, he can
invoke the Executive Privilege in behalf of the president. He was also able to properly justify the granting of the privilege. The
letter said that it the disclosure would impair our diplomatic and economic relations with China.
Should the congress further ask why or how?
- There is no need for congress to as these questions otherwise that would defeat the purpose of confidentiality of these
information.
Gudani Case
Facts: There was another legislative inquiry conducted by the senate regarding the massive electoral fraud. There were
allegations that military personnel were used in the electoral process in far flung areas for Arroyo to cheat in the election. The
senate invited military personnel but the president prohibited them from attending.
Issue: Can the president prohibit military personnel from attending legislative inquiries in aid of legislation?
Ruling of the court: Yes. Military personnel can be prohibited by the president in attending legislative inquiries on the ground
that the president can invoke his power as commander-in-chief. In case of clashes, the two departments can settle it in the
judiciary. The courts will determine whether the military personnel should attend the legislative inquiry or not.
Justification: It would be ill advised for congress to interfere with the power of the president as commander-in-chief but it would
also be detrimental if the president would prevent his soldiers from attending legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. In this
case, both departments are hampering the functions of the otier. There would be an impasse; a clash of powers. The remedy
would be judicial because it is the judiciary who is given the authority to determine rights. This determination of rights also
includes the rights of its co-equal departments in the government.The congress is not without relief if the president is really bent
on preventing the military personnel. The congress can go to the courts and ask for the determination of whether or not military
personnel should attend. If the Supreme Court should say that the military personnel should attend, how sure is it that the
president will allow it? The duty of the president is to ensure that all laws are properly executed. Judicial decisions form part of
the legal system, so the president is compelled to follow the decision of the Supreme Court by virtue of the principle of
separation of powers and the co-equality of the departments in the government.
In re: Sabio
A legislative inquiry involving anomalous transactions in the Philippine Holdings Corporation and other corporations
was initiated. Among the persons required to testify or to appear before the legislative inquiry was the chairman of the PCGG. He
refused to appear invoking section 4 of Executive Order 380 in the PCGG. It provides that no member or staff of the commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings concerning matters
within its official cognizance. The purpose is to prevent any hampering of the performance of PCGGs tasks and functions.
Essentially, the members of the PCGG are exempted from attending legislative inquiries. The Supreme Court said that no mere
provision of law can impose a limitation on the broad powers of congress in the absence of a constitutional basis. There is no
constitutional basis to exempt the staff and members of the PCGG unless when you exempt a claim based in Executive Privilege
because Executive Privilege is rooted in the constitutional power of the president. It is therefore an invalid provision.
Furthermore, this should be a contravention of the principle that public office is a public trust. Even if we do not go to that
legislative inquiry, it is still a contravention of that general principle of public office.
Question Hour (Section 22)
- The heads of the departments of the executive department can appear before congress in relation to any matter pertaining to
their department.
In Senate vs Ermita, where section 1 of E.O. 464 provides tat the department heads cannot be before the congress
without the consent of the president in relation to section 22 of article VI of the constitution. It refers solely and exclusively to
Question Hour.
Is it valid? Yes, precisely that is the provision of article 22.
If the department heads are called to appear in aid of legislation, it would be section 21 that is applicable. If they are
called to appear in relation to the oversight function of the congress, then they may be asked only in the matters pertaining to
their departments.
When congress seeks only to be informed on how the department heads are implementing their statutes then section 22
will apply. Consent of the president is therefore necessary. Section 22 works the other way around, It is not only the congress
who may invite the department heads. They may also seek audience with the congress. They can do so with the consent of the
president.
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In the Enactment of laws, where shall bills originate?
In the Congress.
Which house can enact a bill? Which house can propose a bill?
Either house can propose a bill because each house is co-equal in their powers. So what does section 24 say? It says
that the House of representatives has a jurisdiction in proposing bills that did not involve tax, tariff bills and any other money
bills such as appropriation bills, tax and revenue bills, bills authorizing public thefts and bills involving private matters, bills of
local application must originate in the house of representatives. This is an exception to the general rule that bills may originate
from either houses. Only in these specific bills did the constitution require that they originate from the house of representatives.
Why? Whats the theory? because the house of representatives, the congressmen are more closer to the public because they are
representing a legislative district, unlike in the senate, their jurisdiction is national.
So what do we mean by this provision that this kinds of bills must originate with the house of representatives? Again
what are these bills? Money bills, your money bills are your appropriation bills. Appropriation bills are those which are set aside
funds for some public purposes. These however exclude bills for some other purpose but in relation thereto, congress has to set
aside some funds which incidentally set aside money for that purpose. Revenue and tariff bills of course raise revenue bills
authorizing the increase of public debts etc., then bills of local application and private bills.
What do you mean by must originate?
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
It was about the VAT Law. Now, the House passed its own bill on the VAT Law and after that, the Senate also passed
its own version. In the end, when the after the conference committee resolve the differences between the version of the House
and the Senate, ultimately when the Law was passed, it was mostly the version of the Senate which became Law. Now Senator
Tolentino in that case questioned the validity of that Law and he is arguing that it did not originate with the House of
Representatives given the fact that the final Law was as admitted by the Chairman of the Senate panel, that it was mostly the
version of the Senate which was approved in the final Law.
So what do you mean therefore by must originate in the House of Representatives? Is Senator Tolentino correct in saying that
since it was the version of the Senate it did not originate with the House of Representatives? What was the ruling of the Supreme
Court in that case? Is Senator Tolentino correct? And the Law is invalid? In this case, this is what happened, the House filed its
version of the VAT Law. That is what it appears. Now after that, the Senate also filed its own version. Of course after that this
has to be reconciled. So they created a conference committee to reconcile the two differing proposals or versions and then, we
have the VAT Law. As it turned out, this is mostly the version of the Senate. So is it now correct to say that the bill did not
originate with the House of Representatives and this is now invalid? What do you mean by must originate? It refers to the
revenue bill not the revenue law. It means that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debts, private bills, and bills of local application must come on the House of Representatives. So what it means is that
what the constitution merely requires is the initiative must come from the House of Representatives. As in this case, it must be
that the first filing was from the House of Representatives. It would mean that initiative, It would be that at of filing or proposing
the bill which will initiate the legislative process. Meaning, if the House of Representative will not initiate the filing of such bill,
the Senate cannot on its own propose a VAT Law such as this one. It does not mean that the Law itself must be the version of the
House of Representatives just because it must originate from the House of representatives because under section 4, Senate has
that equal power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. In that Legislative process, it would be
such that after taking into consideration the proposals of each house, it may undergo extensive changes. In fact, there are
instances that it will not resemble either of the versions of either house. It may happen that way because of this extensive review
and changes that may be introduced along the way. So must originate in the house means such kinds of bills must be initiated
by the house. The theory is, the house of representatives is much more closer to the people and as Mr. Demrev said, they are
more familiar with needs and even the burden that the public can take. So if they think that its not yet the right time to pass bill
affecting taxation, then in it that case, the Senate cannot do anything about it. They have to wait for the house to initiate the
legislative process. It does not mean, as emphasized in this case, it is the bill that must originate not the law. If you are saying that
the law must originate, then it would be tantamount to saying that the version of the house will be that law. So it is not true in this
case.
Abakada vs. Executive Secretary
The House of Representatives in this case propose to amend only the VAT portion in the internal revenue code. The
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains several taxation provisions like income tax, etc. Now, in this instance, the House of
Representatives filed its house bill proposing to amend only the VAT portion of the IRC. The Senate receives the house bill they
filed also their proposed amendment but this time, they included not only the VAT provisions of the IRC, but also amendments
and certain other portions of the IRC. The question is, can they do that? Did it go beyond its authority under section 24 to concur
with amendments and to propose amendments? What is the extent of the concurrence of the Senate or of the proposal of the
Senate to amend? Under sec. 24, they may concur with amendments or propose amendments. So what is the extent? Can they
touch provisions which the House of Representatives did not include when it initiated the legislative process? What is the extent
of the power of the congress in proposing amendments? Whats the decision?
In this case, was it right for the Senate to touch other provisions which was not included in the house bill? Yes. Why?
Because they are entitled to provide provisions in the bill. The Senate can produce a version of the bill as long as the Senate does
not act on it as the body separate from the House of Representatives. In other words, in sec. 24, there is no prohibition or
limitation as to the extent of the amendments that the Senate may propose, for as long as under sec. 24, the bill originated in the
House of Representatives. In other words, what the Supreme Court is saying is, lets just look at the date of the passage of the
bill. If it was passed by the house before the Senate, then it was the house which initiated the passage of the bill. It is now
immaterial to what extent the Senate may propose amendments to that subject matter. There is not limit because equally, under
sec. 24, the Senate has that power to concur with the amendments or propose amendments. So there is no prohibition or limitation
on the extent of the amendments that maybe introduced by the Senate for as long as long as it is within that subject matter that
was introduced by the house. Now, lets look at the case of Alvarez vs Guingona. In this case, its about the conversion of a
certain municipality into a component city. Now this is an example of bill of local application. Under Sec. 24, it must originate in
the House of Rep. As to what happened in this case? The House filed its own house bill towards this end, converting this
municipality into a city. Whats the complication in this case? House filed its bill on April 18,1993. The Senate files its version
May 19, 1993. The problem is, the house forwarded its bill after the 3rd reading meaning, the Senate received the house version
only on Jan. 28, 1994. In other words, the Senate before receiving the version of the house, already made its own version of the
bill. Now, is it proper for the Senate to do that or must equate for the receipt of the verge of the houses proposal before it can file
its own version of the bill.
Thats the issue in the case of Alvarez v Guingona. So did the Senate violate the provision of sec. 24? In this case,
which house filed it first? It was undisputed that it was the house. What about the action of the Senate in which it filed its own
version without waiting for the receipt before receiving the house version. Is it proper? Is it unconstitutional? The constitution
states that it does not prohibit the filing of the Senate of a substitution in anticipation of its receipt of the bill of the House of
Representatives. In other words, we go back to the basic intent of the constitution in that originate means the initiative must come
from the House of Representatives. It does not preclude the Senate from filing its own version ahead as long as they initiated it
ahead of the receipt as long as it holds in abeyance further action until after its receipt. So standby yung kanilang version. In fact
in this case, upon receipt on Jan. 15, seven months after they filed their own version, upon receipt, ait was only after that the
Senate conducted its own public hearing. Although the Senate filed its own version, it cannot be disputed that the house filed it
first. Now, does this matter? The Supreme Court said that it does not as long a s Senate will hold in abeyance any further action
on that proposal until after its receipt of the version of the house. So they conducted their public hearing on Feb. 1994, a month
after. Nothing in the constitution was violated by the Senate. Its easier now to understand sec.24. The important factor to be
determined therefore is the date of filing of the proposal or the proposed bill. If you have that, then you can already determine
that there is no violation on the part of the Senate because the Senate has that immense power not only to concur amendments but
also to propose amendments. That means they can file its own version totally different from the house.
Section 26.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Section 26 mandates that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be express in the title itself. This is the
one subject, one tile rule. This is mandatory to the pint that this is essential to the validity of the legislation. Why? Because the
constitution does not in fact require congress to read during its deliberation the entire text of a bill. They are just required to read
at least the title. So by reading the title they already notify of what it contains. One subject per title is required to prevent, this
more on the notice is the overall consideration. Here, the subject must be express in the title that there must only be one subject to
prevent messy, disorganize or unruly legislation. The overall consideration is notice. Second purpose is to prevent surprise of
fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions deals to which the titles give no information and which might therefore be
overlook and unintentionally adopted. It must be express in the title and of course for the people to fairly apprise them of what
this law is about. Thats general notice. When you say that the subject must be express in the title, the constitution does not
require that the title must be an index of the provisions contained in the law, that each of the chapter you will place in the text.
What is important is the general subject matter is there, and all the provisions are germane to that general subject matter or has a
relation to that general subject matter. It is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people. As long as the title is expresses
the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject then this is a specific or at least already
a substantial compliance. There is no need that the title is an index of all the provisions of the law. In fact, if you are reading the
titles of laws, usually you will see at the last portion and for other purposes. That is now all inclusive but for me, it is not
necessary to put and for other purposes as long as the provisions in that law has a certain relation to the subject matter. So the
sufficiency of the title is whether or not it is misleading.
Guzman vs. COMELEC
Involve is the voters registration act of 1996. The explanatory note is an act providing for a general registration of
voters, adopting a system of continuing registration, prescribing the procedures thereof, and authorizing the appropriation of
funds therefore. Personally this is already an index of the provisions of that law. Voters registration act, an act providing for a
general registration of voters adopting a continuing registration, prescribing the procedures thereof, and authorizing the
appropriation of funds therefore. Complete na nga siya no. but here comes the provisions in that law. Sec. 44. It provides for the
reassignment of election officers, regular reassignment that every 4 years they must be reassigned to another congressional
district. It was argued that this sec. 24 is a rider. A rider means that this provision is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
So its not suppose to be there. The title therefore is violative of the one title, one subject rule. Is it a correct contention? The
main subject matter now is securing the integrity of registration, that provision of transferring election officers to secure the
integrity of registration is relevant to the subject of the law. Therefore not a violation of sec. 26.
Farinas vs. Exec. Sec
This is an act when has the holding of pre orderly honest, peaceful legal elections through fair elections practices or the
fair elections act. If you look that law, the provisions of the law relates to the revelations of media and the use of media during
election campaign. However, there is a provision there which provides for a repeal of sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. That
section provides for the in so facto resignation of elective officials when they filed their certificate of candidacy. Fair elections
act repealed that provision, meaning, when elective officials filed their certificate of candidacy, they are no longer considered as
in so facto resigned. Lets look at the title. An act to enhance the holding of pre orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections
through fair election practices. It this provision, the one I mentioned earlier, a rider or is it germane to the subject of the law? Did
this provision violate sec. 26? According to the Supreme Court, it is germane to the subject. A law may contain several
provisions no matter how diverse they may be for as long as they are not inconsistent with the general subject. Somehow there is
a relation. In the words of the Supreme Court, whats the relation of deleting that provision to the subject on fair elections? Isnt
it that the law is about the fair elections act? That the provisions that we are talking about is that elective officials are no longer
considered as in so facto resigned the moment that they file their certificate of candidacy. How is it related to fair elections act?
The SC said that the legislators considered sec. 67 a support of harassment or discrimination that has to be done a way with and
had to be repealed. Somehow the SC found a way to validate/make that provision valid.
PJA vs. Prado
This is about creating the Philippine Coastal Corp. There is a provision there which repeals certain other laws. Sec. 35
which is an express repeal of other existing laws. It was contended that the title itself must provide that this is an act creating the
he title
must itself express that that law is also repealing another law without that express provision in the title the law is invalid or that
repeals invalid. The SC said, again there is no need to put that in the title. The title need not be an index. Besides, repeal of a law
is not really the subject matter of that law but is the effects of that law. Whether or not the congress will provide that express
repeal, the effect would be the same because it would be inconsistent an existing law. So it would be an implied repeal. It would
be more of an effect rather than a subject matter that must be written in the title of that law.
Garcia vs. Mata
This is a general appropriation law. There is a provision in that law that provides for the status reserved officer of the
Military. In case where there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the AFP may be called to an active tour of duty for more than
3 years. It pertains to the status of reserved Military personnel. You can see that this is a law setting aside funds for the operations
of the government an d theres a provision on the status of military personnel. Clearly, that provision has no relation to the
general subject matter. It is not providing for the funds but it is providing for a status which should be legislated in another law
and not incorporated in the general appropriations bill. What you have here therefore is a rider. A provision that is not related to
the subject matter of the law.
Lidasan v COMELEC
The law is an act creating the municipality of Janaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. Thats the title. So at one
glance, what would be your impression? That it will affect only the Province of Lanao del Sur. Whats the complication of this
case? The title is misleading because it seems that the municipality will be created out of municipalities are barrios in the
province of Lanao del Sur because it only mentions the Province of Lanao del Sur, therefore any legislator for that matter or the
public would presume that it would only affect the Province of Lanao de Sur. The provisions however provide that this new
municipality will have members coming from barrios in certain municipalities not only in Lanao del Sur, but also in two
municipalities from Cotabato. It did not apprise public coming from Cotabato that their province will be affected. In this case,
this is one clear example that the title is misleading. Therefore, it violated the rule that the subject must be express in the title.
Thats the essence of Sec.26. So here, the title did not members of Congress as to full impact of the law. It did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang Cotabato and the province of Cotabato itself that part of its territory id being taken
away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent town with Lanao del Sur. It kept the public in the dark as to what
towns or provinces actually affected by the bill. We have an example of a violation of sec. 26.
Section 26. (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Section 26 provides the formal requirements of the Constitution. In other words, each bill passed by each House must
pass 3 readings on separate days and its final form be distributed 3 days before its passage. These are the formal requirements.
Tolentino vs. Secretary
It challenges the validity of the VAT Law. So the Supreme Court said it is valid and the petitioner moved for
reconsideration. He alleged that the bill which became the VAT Law did not undergo 3 readings on separate days. Now it appears
however that the President has made a certification as to the urgency of the bill.. Can the president do this? Yes, the president can
certify a bill as urgent to meet public calamity or emergency. The Supreme Court said that the certification would dispense with
the requirement of 3 readings on separate days. So it would dispense not only the printing but the readings on separate days. As
to the certification of the President, can the Supreme Court continue the actual validity of the certification? Can the Supreme
Court question if it is necessary for the President to certify a bill as urgent? The certification is sufficient according to the
Supreme Court. It does not have the power to encroach upon the discretion of the President to certify a bill us urgent. Besides, the
Senate did not object, it immediately acted as to the certification of that bill. What the Supreme Court took note is that the 2
departments has agreed that there is a need, an emergency need to be addressed.
The second sentence of paragraph 2, section 26 provides: Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter It simply means entered into journal.
Lets imagine the setup in the Congress. Theres a lower house and upper house right? Now either of the house could
propose a bill. After proposing a bill, it would forward once that proposed bill is approved by that house, it would forward the bill
to the other house. For what? For concurrence, for approval or proposal of further amendments. Ideally, after that it would be
forwarded to the President for approval. But by saying ideally, it rarely happens that after one house to another house, it already
goes to the approval of the president. More often than not, there would be differing versions by the lower house and upper house.
Now, how would they be able to reconcile the differences? If you look at the Constitution, nothing is provided right? So here
comes the conference committee. What is a conference committee? What is the extent or limit of its jurisdiction? How far can it
go when it comes to reconciling or harmonizing the versions of the House of Representatives and Senate? So when we talk about
conference committees, cases in point would be PJS vs. Prado, Tolentino vs. Secretary, and Abakada vs. Executive Secretary.
So what I will be discussing would be rulings of the Supreme Court in all these cases. As to the nature of the
conference committee, theyre created in response to a problem which is not addressed by any constitutional provision. Where
two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a
legislative bill. What is the basis for their creation of a conference committee that there is no remedy provided by the
Constitution.
What is the remedy therefore? The Constitution also provides that the Congress has the power to promulgate its own
rules of procedures. So therefore, pursuant to that power to promulgate rules, these conference committees were created. Pursuant
to that power which prescribes internal rules of procedure. Whats the practice of conference committees? Basically to settle,
reconcile and harmonize differences between THE provisions of the House and Senate Bill. So this is therefore a mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House; differences in their versions of a particular bill. So these are the
rulings from Abakada, PJA and Prado.
The next question is, what is the extent or limit of its jurisdiction? In PJA vs. PRADO, it was alleged, it was about the
Philippine Postal Corporation right? So Sec. 35 removes the franking privileges of certain offices. Now, Sec. 35 according to the
petitioners werea subject of disagreement between the House of Representatives and Senate, how come the conference committee
was able to insert it? So for the petitioners, it was an invalid insertion, so it was an invalid provision.
In Tolentino, what is the problem? The VAT Law. According to Tolentino, there were provisions inserted
surreptitiously by the conference committee which were not found either in the House Bill or Senate Bill. He also alleged that the
conference committee met in close doors, executive sessions. Hindi public. What else? And supposed to be the committee report
under the rules should have to detail put the specific or what provisions were in conflict. And what their proposal was. There was
no detailed statement. So according to Tolentino, the conference committee went beyond its jurisdiction and added insertions, the
meetings were in closed doors made the provisions invalid.
Abakada vs. Executive Secretary
Citing Farias vs. Executive Secretary, there were allegations, according to the petitioners, the Congress had two sets
of bicameral conference committees. 2 sets. And then, the committee lacked record of proceedings. The committees violated the
rules of both houses and the disappearance or omissions of what the commissions discussed in the compromised bill. Ibig
sabihin, nag-compromise na yung House and Senate, it turned out that it was deleted by the conference committee. So the
question now is what is the extent or limit of power of the conference committee?
In all these allegations, the Supreme Court said that the provisions were not invalid. First, the power of conference
committees are determined by who? The Congress itself. Rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make
any material change in the measure of the issue. Items or provisions, provides certain provisions. Thats the idea. But as of survey
of the Supreme Court, and to which theres really an implied of cases of Congress, this congressional rule is difficult to enforce.
Why? The mere fact that the lower house will propose a bill, forward it to the upper house, the upper house will propose
amendments by that fact of proposing amendments and the conference committees is called to reconcile the differences, what
will happen? An entirely different version will come out. So its very difficult to enforce the rule that do not add or maintain,
limit or change because sometimes, in order to reconcile a provision, you will propose another way of attacking that particular
subject matter. So, although this is a congressional rule that they may not give any material changes, this, s observed by the
Supreme Court, acquiesced by Congress, difficult to enforce. In other words, the result would be like a third version. It would be
considered as an amendment. The only requirement for it being that it should be germane to the subject matter of the House and
Senate Bill.
What can you say therefore as to the extent? In Tolentino, the Supreme Court said that to be sure, nothing in the rules
limits conference committees to a consideration of conflicting provisions. If you read the rules, it does not really say that theyre
prohibited or limited only to the conflicting provisions. It is in fact commonplace or it is usually practiced in Congress that
conference committee reports new matters though germane havent been committed to the Committee. The Court therefore has
recognized the long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House. So if youre asked, what is the extent or limit of its jurisdiction? How far can it propose provisions to
reconcile differences? The answer is that it has ample latitude. It can add new items, new provisions, delete provisions, even
provisions if theyre already agreed upon by both houses. What is the basis if the Supreme Court in saying this? First, after all,
the committee reports are still subject to the approval of both houses, right? So the allegation that the committee would now be a
3rd house has no basis. It could not hold water because its report would still be subject to approval of both houses. Its not as if
its report is already deemed as the Bill. Second reason, and this is for me the more credible reason, enrolled bill doctrine.
Remember that once a bill has been considered enrolled, meaning it bears the signature of the Senate President and Speaker of
the House, the signatures would mean a certification by these officers that this bill has duly been enacted and these are the
provisions. The enrolled bill is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also to its due enactment. So if theres question that it
did not undergo 3 readings, there were insertions, this would be defeated by the mere fact that the bill is enrolled. What are these
allegations as against the certification of the officers of each house? Diba? So enrolled bill doctrine.
Another reason by the Supreme Court is even if there are conference committees pursuant to the power of congress to
create their own rules of procedure. So as stated in the case of Tolentino, if a change us desired, it is subject to the practice of
bicameral committees in the congress. Since this question is not governed by any provision, it is only an internal rule of each
house. To date, the Supreme Court observed, it seems that Congress finds the practice of the bicameral conference committee to
be very useful for the purpose of prompt and efficient legislative action. So far, they have not changed that practice. They have
not changed that rule. And finally, the reason of the Supreme Court is when it comes to allegations of violations made by the
conference committee regarding the rules, it did not comply that they must state specifically what were the differences, what are
the proposals, they did not meet publicly or met in closed doors, it entailed therefore violations. The best judge for their
violations of their rules would be who? The Congress itself, each House. And the Supreme Court is not the proper forum for
determination of violations. Supreme Court said that is the sole concern of Congress to instil discipline among the members of its
conference committees that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Now, even regarding its jurisdiction, the Court
cannot apply questions regarding internal operations of Congress. As consistently ruled by the Supreme Court when it comes to
parliamentary rules, these are merely procedural and their observance, the Courts have no concern; their concern is with the
procedural part of the constitution on the enactment of law. So, these are the reasons why the Supreme Court validated the bill up
to the point where it became a law notwithstanding the allegations that allegedly the constitutional committee violated rules of
procedure. For me, the best justification, kahit ano pang sabihin ng isang senator or congressman, the fact is it has been certified
by the Senate President of Speaker of the House. Again, if we have this problem, if indeed it was the intention of Congress and
Senate, what would be the remedy? You move for the amendment of the law. It was already certified. The best remedy would be
to amend the law because there you can see for sure that its the bill of the majority. But heres a question regarding conference
committees. Isnt is that under the 2nd sentence of paragraph 2, section 26, provides that Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter Now the 1st question raised in Tolentino, after the conference committee submitted its report, it is supposed to be
submitted to the house where it originated for its approval right? And then forward it to the other house for concurrence right?
Ok. It was alleged that it should undergo 3 readings in the house where it originated and thereafter, 3 readings also in the other
house because section 26 provides that a bill undergoes 3 readings, is that contention correct? The Supreme Court said no.
Committee reports need not undergo 3 readings all over again. Why? There will be no end to negotiations towards cancellation of
differing provisions or questions of the House or Senate. By the nature of this bill, these must therefore be enacted by each house
on a take it or leave it basis. Approve it or disapprove it. Theres no need to further study because they already designated the
committee to study it. So take it or leave it. Because the other alternative would be, they may also create another bicameral
committee to further hone the bill for study and form proposal to make it perfect. But the Supreme Court observed this would be
an idea. But the result would still be far from perfection. So usually it would just be a take it or leave it basis. Approve or
disapprove.
Another question was raised, isnt it that there should be no amendment allowed? Does a referral to a conference
committee violate the no amendment rule? Im going back to the three readings, section 26, paragraph 2 must be construed to
refer only to the initial bill or the bills introduced for the 1st time by either Senate or House of Representatives and after the
committee report. What about the no amendment rule? Does this violate the no amendment rule?
The Supreme Court in Abakada citing the decision of Tolentino, section 26, paragraph 2 must be construed to refer
only to the bill introduced for the 1st time in either House of Congress and must not refer to the conference committee report.
Why? To say that after the last reading, no amendment would be allowed would mean to ___ absurd. Why? This is the House
which proposes the bill. 1st, 2nd, 3rd reading. No amendment. Right? Once this is referred to the other house, the other house can
no longer enforce amendments, right? So, this therefore should not be taken to refer even to the conference committee. In the
words of Abakada, the no amendment rule refers to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills
initiated in respective houses before said bill is submitted to other house for concurrence or amendment. To continue said
provision in a way to proscribe and any changes after houses acted on it, would lead to absurdity. As this would mean that the
other house would be deprived of its constitutional provision to amend or introduce changes in said bill. So this cannot be taken
to mean that the introduction of amendments and modifications by the bicameral conference committee is prohibited.
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
There are 3 ways in which a bill becomes a law. What are these 3 ways? Im sure you understood what I just read.
Were talking about an enrolled bill. Theres already an enrolled bill. How does it become a law? There are 3 ways:
1. If it is approved by the president, it becomes a law;
2. If after 30 days after the receipt of the president, the president failed to act on it, to approve or disapprove it ipso facto it
becomes a law. So we have here a case where a bill becomes a law because of the presidents inaction;
3. If the president vetoes the enrolled bill, the Congress was able to override the veto. Then it becomes a law.
Now for me, overriding a veto would be very difficult. It requires numbers. Why? Under section 27, paragraph 1,
requires two-thirds of votes. Absolute two-thirds. Now if it becomes successful in obtaining the votes, it will still be
forwarded to the other house and it will still have to obtain two-thirds of votes of all its members. Thereafter, its the end of the
process. The President can no longer question the effectivity/validity of the bill becoming a law.
Miller vs. Mardo
Here the Congress enacted the law and theres a section requiring the president to propose the reorganizational plan of
the government including the powers of some of the offices of government. The President will submit his plans to Congress and
Congress may approve or disapprove the plan. If approved, it is considered as a law, if it is disapproved, of course not. Theres a
provision wherein in case the congress failed to enact on it, that is also considered a law. Now the problem in here is that the
President in his reorganizational plan, granted certain judicial, quasi-judicial powers to some regional offices. No, according to
them, it was the contention that since the Congress failed to act on the proposal and when it adjourned, after adjournment it now
becomes a law. Now, lets look at what happened here. After our legislative process up to the enactment of a law, it starts where?
The proposal or the legislation must come from the Congress right? And the role of the President is merely to approve or
disapprove it. What happened in the case? It is now the President who proposes the reorganizational plan to be approved by
Congress.
And the Supreme Court said theres a reversal of the democratic process and if it is countenances by the Supreme
Court, it will create a very dangerous president. And the Congress may use this to abrogate its legislative power. So this provision
is therefore invalid for being unconstitutional.
Next, how do laws become effective? What is the basic requirement after it is approved by the President? Is it already
effective? What is the basic requirement? Publication. Basic recall in due process is that it must be published. Because, as we
keep mentioning, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. So at least, there should be a constructive
notice of the existence of the law. The constructive notice is achieved through publication.
Taada vs. Tuvera
What the Supreme Court describes as 15 days unless otherwise provided, the term unless otherwise provided refer to
the number of days of publication but not to the publication. Meaning, a law which provides it needs no publication, hindi yan
valid. Publication is necessary, indispensable to the efficiency of laws.
Ok, lets go the veto power. But lets go first to veto power of the President. Now to understand this, remember that
when the enrolled bill is submitted to the President, the legislative process is already over. The writing of the law is over. Whats
the role of the President? Only to approve or disapprove it. Now, the general rule therefore when it comes to veto power, the
President must veto the entire bill or approve it. In other words, veto all or none at all. The President cannot act like an editor,
inserting provisions he likes, deleting provisions he dislikes, inserting words he prefers Otherwise, what he is now doing if he
us doing veto by provision? What is he doing? He is already legislating. Diba? So the rule is, veto all or none at all. But we have
a problem. If you read section 27, paragraph 2, The President shall have the power to veto So we are meeting again Mr.
Appropriation, bill, Mr. Tariff bill and Mr. Revenue bill. What are the nature of these bills? These are money bills. Ok. Now if
we go by the general rule, veto all or none at all. And the President as the Chief Executive of the government, needs the money
for the daily operation of the government, he has no option but to approve the appropriation even if there are provisions there to
which are parts even if they are objectionable features of that bill. So the President will be compelled to just approve it. Thats
why the Constitution would provide that in case of appropriation, revenue, tariff bills which are money bills, the President can
veto what? Items. This is the item-veto rule. The President can veto items. Now if you ask me, what is an item Maam? An item
to distinguish it from a provision of law, an item in appropriation bill is by itself an appropriation. It is a sum of money set aside
for a particular purpose. So example, an appropriation bill is a budget of the government expressed in a law. Executive
Department- Department of Education, 10 billion Pesos. That is the item. That is an appropriation itself. Right? In a particular
item, the Congress usually provides the methods, mechanisms or systems for the use of this particular appropriations. Now, these
methods, mechanisms, systems or conditions will be considered as provisions. Based on the item-veto rule, the President can only
veto items and not provisions.
Bengzon vs. Drilon
Theres a provision in the General Appropriations Bill under the Supreme Court, general fund adjustments of 500,000
Pesos. General fund adjustment is set aside to enable the government to meet certain unavoidable obligations. So gist lang ng
provision, there are provisions there that would be used for the adjusted pension rates of retired Judges. Now, these adjusted
pension rates would still be determined by the decision of the Supreme Court. So there was an adjusted pension rates. Now the
President vetoed that portion. He vetoed the portion which provides for the condition of the use of funds. The President did not
veto the P500,000. What happened there? The President vetoed the provision for the use of funds but not the appropriation. Is it
valid or invalid? It is invalid. Because under the Constitution, he may veto items and not provisions. Why? If the President would
veto the provisions, he would then be allowed to legislate.
Bolinao vs. Valencia
There was an appropriation for the Philippine Broadcasting System for its operations, P300,000. Under that item, its
an item, its an appropriation itself. Its a sum of money set aside for PBS. Theres a condition for its use. Congress provided that
this money shall not be used in areas where there are already television stations.
The President vetoed that portion. Is that valid? The President vetoed the condition and not the item. So the President
vetoed a provision, condition which is not allowed by the Constitution but did not touch the item. Again, the Constitution
provides (sec. 27, par. 2). President may only veto what? Items. If he vetoes items, it covers the conditions. But you cannot veto
the provision without touching the item. He is already legislating. So what is the effect if the veto is invalid? In the case of
Bolinao, the veto was illegal, if it is unconstitutional, it has no effect whatsoever. So in this case, there was a question whether or
not it was proper for PBS to operate in an area in fact that it was shown that there were already TV Stations. Since the veto was
invalid, the condition remains.
Ok, general rule, veto all or none at all. Exception, in case of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, item-veto is allowed.
Now theres an exception to the exception, this is a judge-made rule provided in the case of:
PCA vs. Enriquez
What is that? If the provision in an appropriation bill is inappropriate for an appropriation bill. We are talking about an
appropriation bill. If the provision is inappropriate to be written in an appropriation bill, the President may veto that provision. So
this is the Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision. Meaning, this provision has no place in an appropriation bill. Diba? Appropriation
bill-setting aside money, how it is to be used. So what if it is inserted now, registration of nurses in an appropriation bill? It
would now be considered as an inappropriate provision so therefore the President may veto it.
Again, this is a judge-made rule cited or held in the case of PCA vs. Enriquez. Inappropriate provisions would therefore
be:
1. Provisions that does not relate to any particular item
2. Provisions which extend its operation beyond an item in appropriation.
3. Unconstitutional provisions of course has no place.
4. Provisions which are intended to amend laws. Why? Again, appropriation bill is only to set aside money and provide
conditions for its use. If the Congress intends to amend a law, it is proper in another legislation, another law not in an
appropriation bill.
In this case of PCA vs. Enriquez, this is the provision. The item is for debt service, 86 billion Pesos. There is a
provision, use of funds. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject of the approval
of the President with the concurrence of the Congress. Take note of the phrase, any payment in excess of the amount herein
appropriated. Meaning, that amount, the amount in excess is not appropriated. You cannot find it in the appropriation bill.
Payment in excess in the amount appropriated, therefore means that its not in that law. So, this is according to the Supreme
Court, an inappropriate provision. There is no item as to that amount. Number 1, sabi natin, provisions that does not relate to any
particular item. Walang item na-provide. Therefore it is an inappropriate provision. In PCA further, the Supreme Court observed
that there is a provision for the payment of compensation of CAFGUs, a very simple phrase that even the President did not notice
it. That these amount shall be paid to the CAFGUs including their separation benefit for the CAFGUs who will be deactivated in
1994. Now in this case, there was no law deactivating CAFGUs. It was only placed in the appropriation bill. Question, can the
appropriation bill provide for the deactivation of a particular office? No. What is the purpose of an appropriation bill? Only to set
aside funds. If it was the intention of the Congress to deactivate a particular office, amend certain laws, it is proper in another law
or legislation. So this is another example of inappropriate law. But in this case, it was the Supreme Court which noticed the
provision, the President did not notice it. It nevertheless invalidated the provision.
Ok, finally, is there such a thing as legislative veto? In Abakada vs. Purisima, it defined legislative veto as a statutory
provision requiring the President or administrative agency to present the implementing rules and regulations of a law to the
Congress by itself or a committee formed by it which retains rights and powers to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. Legislative veto is a form of a congressional oversight committee, allegedly the exercise of congress oversight
powers. What is a legislative veto then? Its a provision in a law, written by Congress which provides that the President after
formulating its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), must still submit it to Congress for approval or disapproval. Is this
constitutionally valid? Can the Congress provide in the law that the IRR promulgated by the President or his administrative
agencies would be subject to the approval of Congress? We have an inward turning of our legislative process again. The Supreme
Court said that this is invalid. Why? In our Constitutional setup, who enacts the laws? The Legislative-Congress. Who
implements the laws? The Executive. The Executive Department implements it through the promulgation of IRR. Jurisprudence
would say that IRRs have the effect of a law as if they are written in the law itself. The IRR is in the performance of the executive
function to implement rules. Now what happens if the Congress requires the President to submit his IRR for the approval of the
Congress? The Congress is now encroaching upon the authority of the President to implement laws. This is not the function of
Congress to implement its laws. Its the function of the President, so vis--vis invalid as an encroachment of executive power.
What else? To approve or disapprove the IRRs promulgated by the Executive Department is the function of whom in the setup?
To bind or invalidate? To declare as valid or invalid? Legal or illegal? It is the function of the Supreme Court. The Judiciary.
Now when the Congress provides in a law that it has the power to approve or disapprove, then its now giving itself a power that
is under the Constitution the power of the judiciary. So legislative veto is therefore unconstitutional.
Section 29 Par. 1, No money shall be paid out of the treasury, except in pursuance to an appropriation made by law
Its only the Congress that makes laws, so you can generally say that its the Congress that puts the power of the
purse. Its the department that has the power of the purse. When you say the power of the purse, it comprehends both the
power to generate money and the power to spend money. So, only Congress can authorize the expenditure of public funds and
how to authorize it through the enactment of laws. The Congress is the guardian of the public treasury, which is very ironic now
considering whats been going on with the case of Napoles and the congressmen and the senators. So I think along the way, it is
not the Constitution that is failing but its the implementation, in this case the spending of money.
Now, since Congress alone can authorize the expenditure of public funds, the power carries with it the power to specify
not only the amount, but also the purposes for which it may be spent. So this is a really immense power in regards to that
department because the government cannot operate without the congress that limits authority to spend public funds. The
Constitution however, provides certain limitations of this power of the congress, most of them are in Sec 25 Par 1. But the first
limitation can be found under Sec 24: When it comes to appropriation bills, what does the Constitution require? It requires that it
must come from the House of Representatives. That is the first limitation.
Second, lets go to Sec 25 Par 1: The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the president or
the operation of the government as specified in the budget. The form, content manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law. So its the President who proposes the budget, and it is the congress that may authorize the budget. But in
budget proposal, the Congress cannot increase the appropriations recommended by the president. This is to prevent budget
deficits.
Third, under Par. 2: No provision or enactment may be embraced in the general appropriations bill. If youve listened to
our previous discussions, youll know that weve had this in our previous discussion. No provision or enactment may be
embraced in the general appropriations bill Weve met this and recall that this is an inappropriate provision, as in inappropriate
for an appropriation bill, unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation. In fact, as weve discussed before, under
the Constitution, the president may only veto items when it comes to appropriation bills. But the Supreme Court said that, as a
judge to the law, that the president may also veto inappropriate provisions. So what will be these inappropriate provisions? Here,
Par. 2 of Sec 25: Those that do not relate particularly to some appropriation therein. We also call them as riders. And can the
president veto them notwithstanding that they are not items? Yes.
Next example of riders, weve discussed them in Garcia vs. Mata, wherein in the appropriations Act of 1986-1987,
there was a provision there regarding the reversion of certain officers into active duty. Since this provision does not relate to any
appropriation, it is considered as an inappropriate provision, therefore a rider, therefore an unconstitutional provision, and
therefore can be vetoed by the president.
Par. 3: The procedure in approving appropriations where the congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. This simply means that there should be no special treatment with
regards to the congress. What procedure the executive department and the judiciary should observe must also be observed by the
congress. So the congress may not adapt a procedure that is different from the procedure for other appropriations.
Par. 4: A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended. So Par. 4 refers to a special
appropriations bill, not a general appropriations bill. So it must specify the purpose for which it is intended and shall be supported
by funds up to the available as certified by the National Treasurer. So if there is a special appropriation but there are no funds
available, that appropriations bill must be supported by a way for revenue for that particular proposal.
Par. 5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations.
So this is a prohibition on the transferring of funds. However the president, the president of the senate, the speaker of the House
of Representatives, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions, may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law, for their respective officers from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The general rule is that the transferring of funds is prohibited. The exception is: when the law authorizes it. But there is
a specific limitation to that. The law can authorize the president, the senate president, the speaker of the house, the chief justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions. What have you noticed? These are the heads of the 3 great
departments and heads of the constitutional commissions. Only they may be authorized by law to transfer funds between their
departments. That is to give them at least a considerable leeway in the use of funds in the operation of their respective
departments. But there is a further limit to this authority to transfer. The transfer may only be for the purpose of augmenting an
attempt in his department and he must make it from savings from other items. In other words, he cannot just transfer funds from
one item to an inexistent item. The item must already be in existence. You will just use these funds from another item to augment
and not to spend it to a newly created item. And it is also important to remember that it can only use savings.
PCA v. Enriquez
There are 2 questionable provisions in that general appropriations law in 94. The first questionable provision:
Realignment of allocation of operational expenses. Realignment so it is the transfer of funds. A member of congress may
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category, provided that total of said allocation is not
exceeded. Whats questionable about that? It authorizes the member of congress to transfer funds, which is already
unconstitutional because we said earlier that the officers that may be authorized are exclusive.
The second questionable provision: the use of savings. The chief of staff of the AFP is authorized subject to the approval of the
secretary national of defense to use the savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment the pension fund being managed
by the AFP Retirement. What is the problem with that provision? The chief of staff was authorized. Who should be authorized in
lieu of the chief of staff? He is under the president.
Another provision: The president shall have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices, and agencies of the executive department which are included in the general appropriations act or
(cannot understand 32:10). So whats the problem with that? The president has the authority to transfer any fund appropriated to
his department. Whats wrong with that? The constitution requires that he can only transfer funds from savings, and only for the
purpose of augmenting items under his department. In this case, there is the general authority to jumble funds, which is now
unconstitutional. So this orders the president to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard to whether such funds to be
transferred are actually savings or that they are for the purpose of augmenting other items.
Next provision, under Sec. 25 Par 6, Discretionary funds appropriated for a particular officials shall be dispersed only
for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
Discretionary funds, so dito tayo nagkakatalo. Intelligence funds, allowance for congress, so as Ive said, its the implementation
of the law that is the problem.
Par. 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal
year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect
until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. So, the congress therefore cannot (cannot understand 34:29) the
operation of the government by its failure or refusal to pass the general appropriations bill because Sec. 25 Par 7 provides for an
automatic reenactment of the prior appropriations law. Automatic means there is no further need of any act to give effect to the
prior or to the appropriations bill of the preceding year.
Further limits are in Sec. 29. Ive mentioned this earlier in Par 1, No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Public funds can only be spent pursuant to appropriations embodied in a law.
Brillantes v COMELEC
COMELEC was given the authority to start the automation of the elections. So budget was appropriated for that
purpose, for the automated election system. Around 2004 or 2003, weve heard the several contracts entered into by the
COMELEC were declared invalid by the Supreme Court kaya nasayang lang ung pera natin the last time. The funds for that
purpose were almost defeated because they spent it on invalid contracts or contracts that were later held to be invalid by the
Supreme Court. So we have this remaining budget. They cannot pursue with the automation of the election for the coming
election, so what they did was to contract another service provided to provide for automation of an official P-tab. Why? The
appropriation provided by law is only for automated election system. Now they are spending it for an automated unofficial quick
count? That fact alone that it is called unofficial means that it is not sanctioned by the government. So whats the purpose of
contracting that? The question is: is this expense authorized by law by the appropriations bill? So the Supreme Court said: This is
an expenditure not supported by law. It is not authorized. Under the constitution No money shall be paid out of the treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. There was no appropriation for thaw law. They cannot use the remaining
money for the automated election system because that will be transferring of funds. And can the COMELEC transfer funds? The
first question is that was there a law authorizing the COMELEC chairman to transfer funds. There was none. Second question is,
is it for the purpose of augmenting an item? The fact is ung unofficial quick count is an inexistent item, so it cannot be
augmenting an item if ever it is allowed to transfer funds. It is creating a new item and getting a budget out of the savings. In fact
its not the savings. Un na lang ang natira sa winalgas ng COMELEC, it is not savings.
Par. 2 Sec 29: No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed directly or indirectly for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution.
This is one of the illustrations of separation of church and state. No funds from the public treasury shall be spent for
religious purposes. But theres an exception to everything. Take note, however, that not every governmental activity that involves
the expenditure of public funds and which has religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding the separation
of church and state, freedom of worship, and banning the use of public money and property. A very, very practical example of
that would be spending money from your office funds for Christmas decorations. Not every governmental activity which involves
the expenditure of public funds, which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provision regarding the separation
of church and state. But that was only a practical example from me.
Aglipay v Ruiz
Aglipay is the founder of Philippine Independent Church. Now sometime in the 1970s, the Philippines became the
venue for the Eucharistic congress or the International Eucharistic Congress of the Catholic Church. In other words, several
delegates or dignitaries coming from other countries will be coming over the Philippines. Now, in relation to that, thats an
activity of the Catholic religion. In relation to that however, the congress enacted a law mandating the printing of stamps in
relation to that occasion and activity. Now Aglipay questioned this act as violative of Sec. 25 Par2, violative of the principle of
separation of state and money, because according to him, the State is spending money to promote the catholic religion. But the
Supreme Court said, again using the principle that Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public
funds, which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provision regarding the separation of church and state.
Why? In this case, it is only collateral, that the printing of the postage stamps and the selling of thereof was occasion with the
activity of the Catholic Church. But the purpose is not to promote that religion, but to raise revenue. Para bang, in that case, nakiride on lang ang government sa activity. Since they have this international activity, the Philippines the venue thereof, the purpose
is dual. Raised revenue by selling stamps and to promote the Philippines because the Philippines will be heard of in the
international community. So its not the primary purpose of the enactment of that law, the printing of the stamps and the selling
of the stamps, citing the occasion, is not really to promote religion, but for some other governmental purpose like (cannot
understand word at 44:19) revenue and promoting the Philippines.
Garces v. Estenzo
The basic question here is Who will own the statue? Will it be the Parish priest or the layman? This is what
happened, a particular barangay will be celebrating its fiesta. So the barangay councilmen issued a resolution authorizing the
solicitation of funds so they can buy a statue of their patron saint. Of course, during the fiesta, they will lend it from one house to
another. Thats their practice. And ultimately it will end up in the church. The problem here is, when the fiesta was over, the
priest refused to give it back because for him it belongs to the church. Now when it reached the Supreme Court, and there was
raised an issue that it violates the religious freedom or separation of church and state and using of public funds for religious
purposes. And the Supreme Court said: in the first place, the funds that were used were from solicitations. So they were not
public funds. So what about the buying of the statue in relation to the Catholic church. The Supreme Court said, if there is
nothing unconstitutional upon celebration fiestas, and fiestas are usually in relation to in celebration of saints. If there is nothing
unconstitutional about that, there is nothing unconstitutional about buying the statue.
Now what I understand is that, in this instance, it is difficult to separate the church from the state. Why? Because we
are a culture of religious persons. So its already part of our culture. Its very difficult for the Supreme Court to say Do not
celebrate fiestas anymore. The issue here is not the separation of church and state, because in the first place, there was no use of
public funds. But as in this case, the Supreme Court also said that there is nothing unconstitutional about celebrating fiestas,
which is a sociocultural activity of a particular barangay, which has some religious tint. But there has to be the participation of
the local barangay government. So this also goes through with that principle that not every governmental activity which involves
the expenditure of public funds, which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provision regarding the separation
of church and state. The bottom line is, it was not public funds used in this case. And in fact, the Supreme Court said the problem
would have been averted if the parish priest just used the alms directed to the church to buy his own statue.
We go back to Section 23 Paragraph 1
The Congress by a vote 2/3 of both Houses in Joint Session assembled , voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
Now, under the Constitution it is only the Congress who has the power to declare a state of war. This is in pursuance also or
consistent with the Constitutional principle that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Much better to
give light to that than give the power to declare the existence of war to a declarative body consisting of more than 200 or 300
heads than to give the power to one head, to the President. Imagine if, since we are now talking with China, Taiwan and some
other Asian countries regarding the issues of Spratlys.Imagine if that power is granted to the President. So, the President can by
his will declare a state of war with China. So under the constitution in fact, the powers is granted to the Congress and there is a
written number of votes required. How many votes? 2/3 of both Houses, in joint session assembled, voting separately.
Now, what is, when you say declare a state of war? What if the war is an offensive war, is ongoing? Can the President do
something about it? Of course, the President can fight that, because he is authorized or in fact obligated by the Constitution to
secure and protect the country and the people. But this does not mean that it carries with it the power to declare the existence of
war.
Whats the relevance if the Congress has this power? If so declared, the resources of the government can be hoard into this war
weapons. So, you might say, its useless because if we are attack the President can still (affect) that. But the best sense of this the
hoarding of resources of the government.
Paragraph 2, In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by Law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
Now, Paragraph 2, provides, that in case of war, or national emergency or other national emergency, the Congress may delegate
upon the President, What? Emergency Powers. What is vested of Emergency Powers? Any Power that maybe necessary to carry
out or declare of national policy.
When you say ANY POWER what does it constitute? Any power, even the power to legislate. This would be one again of
those Valid the exception of delegation of legislative power. Wherein, in times of war, the President, maybe granted the power to
legislate pursuant to the grant of emergency powers by the Congress.
Since what is given to the President is a power that is so immense, to the point that the Congress in fact in times of
national emergency can just sit back and look at the President doing his magic. Pwede silang mag relax and give everything to
the President.
The Constitution has two sub limits to this authority to grant power to the President: First, is that the grant of emergency power is
pursuant to law. A Law must be enacted. Then under the Constitution it can only be given in a limited period, an indefinite period
is not constitutionally sanctioned. In fact, if the Congress does not provide, does not set a limit the constitution itself has provided
for its limit, that upon the next adjournment of the Congress, the power shall automatically cease. So, this is also preventing the
congress in abrogating his powers or the President from abusing such powers.
Now, in drawback, if the Congress sees it fit to withdraw the power, does it need to enact another law to withdraw the emergency
powers? NO. A MERE RESOLUTION will suffice. What is the relevance of that? A Resolution is not a law or not like a law
which would require the approval or signature of the President. So ONLY a Resolution is needed to withdraw that power.
Next limit is that, the emergency powers are subject to such restrictions as the Congress may provide. So it can be as narrow or as
broad as the Congress may like to give it to the President.
David vs. MacapagalArroyo
It was this time that the President Arroyo declared a state of Emergency. Does she have this power? Or is it Inherent in
the Executive Department to declare a state of emergency? Or is it constitutionally given to the Congress? Whats your answer?
Remember that in paragraph 1, the Constitution provides, the Congress has the authority to declare a state of war and it is only a
state of war, although it mentioned state of calamity in paragraph to it did not include the power to declare the state of war. The
Supreme Court interpreted this act of President Arroyo to be VALID. Why? What she is declaring is merely, stating an existing
condition. The current condition of the country. That it is experiencing some sort of National emergency. So when you say it is a
statement of fact that there is an emergency. So, she is not therefore precluded by the constitution or any law, from declaring a
state of emergency it is within her authority. Just like declaring a state of calamity and in another case she declared a state of
rebellion. These are merely descriptive of the current situation of the country and it has no legal or constitutional implication.
WHY? If she declared a state of emergency can she exercise emergency powers? NO, because under the constitution, its the
CONGRESS which grants her emergency powers. There is therefore no constitutional objection to her declaration because such
is only a declaration and does not come with it the power to exercise emergency powers. The power to declare is different from
the power to exercise emergency powers.
Section 28 Power of taxation.
(1) The Rule of taxation shall be uniform equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
So, the power of taxation or tax is therefore within the exclusive authority of the Congress and to some extent to the
local legislative bodies. The Local legislative bodies are granted, delegated with some legislative authority to some local
government code to raise their revenues through the taxation.
Paragaraph 2 The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the National Development Program of the Government.
The basic principle is that taxation is exclusively within the realm or power of Congress. But under paragraph 2 there
are certain types of impositions which the Congress may delegate to the President. These impositions under paragraph 2 refers to
impositions upon foreign importation of goods into the Philippines. So, you have that power to impose tariff dues, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties or imposts. This is therefore again, an exception to that
principle of exclusive legislative authority and the constitution has provided for one instance or another instance of a valid
delegation of legislative authority or legislative power. The basic principle therefore is that, although taxation is exclusive within
the Congress, as to impositions on Foreign importation, these can be delegated to the President.
Southern vs. Cement
The Supreme Court explained that these provision has some basic postulates integrated in it. Southern vs. Cement
tackles the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA). Remember the case of Tanada vs. Angara , youve have read of the World Trade
Organization and the GATT or General Agreement on Tarriff and Trade, what is the effect on that ? That is an agreement to
allow the coming in of goods from other countries, services and goods at that. And this foreign imported goods and services
would be treated equally as like the local goods. This is the opening up of trade and we agreed to that. In the same way that China
agreed to opening up their trade so we could sell our products there and our products will be treated equally as their local
products. The problem is with the influx of imported goods , which presumably have better quality than the local goods,
considering that , mahihilig tayo sa importedThe problem for the government is how to protect the local goods. So the
government through the Congress , promulgated the Safeguard Measures Act. Wherein the President through the DTI upon the
approval of the Tariff Commission can impose importation dues of resort. The Supreme Court in this case the basic postulates of
Paragraph 2 Section 28. Number 1, it is Congress that authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, other duties or impose.
The authority therefore cannot come from say, the Finance Department who would, presumably know better whether or
not we should band such importation or allow such importation. Impose some dues to some types of importation. It would not
come from say the National Economic Development Authority much less from the World Trade Organization. So the authority
cannot come from the World Trade Organization, under the constitution, it is the Congress which has the authority. Even if the
WTO even if we agree to the WTO that asking these stipulation it needs Congressional enactment. The second postulate is
that the authorization granted to the President must be ( a quality? ) a law or it must be pursuant to a law. It cannot be supplied
simply by saying that it is an inherent power of the Executive department, because this was their argument that it was the inherent
power of the President. Somehow this was related to foreign relations, but then again the constitution is specific it must be
pursuant to law and it is NOT inherent in the power of the President. So it cannot arise from an initiative or executive orders
promulgated by the Executive Department or from the wisdom or the will of the President.
The Third postulate is that the authorization to the President can be exercise ONLY if it specified and set in the law and
is further subject to limitations and restrictions which congress may impose. Therefore, the Congress specifies the tariff rates
should not exceed a given amount that the President is therefore is notified that whatever his imposition would be should has the
limit with regards to the amount. If the congress will stipulate that no duties may be impose in the importation of corn then even
if the President is pressured by the corn industry to help them because they are now failing in the war against importation of
cornnagtatalo na sila ng mga imported , the President cannot do anything about it if the congress says that there will be no
imposition in the importation of corn. So, the power therefore is limited by the grant of the Congress.
Now, it was also an issue here that necessarily , the President may exercise his many powers through his alter ego, d
iba? Who are his alter egos? The Department Secretaries. Now, in the exercise of his power usually in the current practice it is
usually the Secretary of Finance which act as the alter ego of the President in the exercise of his delegated powers of imposing of
import duties and imposts. These SMA ( Safeguard Measures Act ) however, has a provision , that it will be the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Tariff Commission that will determine whether or not to impose and how much will be the
imposition. Now, there is now a clash between who will be that alter ego who will act with the President and the answer is
simple, that we said on the outset that it is the Congress who sets the limits and restrictions of his power. Therefore , in saying
that it is the DTI and the Tariff Commission who will determine the impositions, it is now a form of restriction which must be
complied with by the President. In this case in fact, the Supreme Court said that the DTI and Tariff Commission acts like an
agent, like agents of the Congress in the exercise of his powers. In same way, as to look at the President, when he is delegated his
power, as an agent of the Congress. So, they cannot therefore, by mere will, say that, the President will say it , I will not
believe my DTI , I will ask the Secretary of finance because in this case , the restriction is already buried in the law.
Executive vs South Wing
Now again, in order for the President to exercise his power, there must be a law, statutory support or basis. So the
Supreme Court, surveyed the existing laws , the current laws , and concluded that there is not only one but there are actually three
laws granting the President. So its a general grant of the President to ban certain importation, importation of certain goods or
products. So , what are these laws? You have the Tariff and Customs code, which authorizes the President to prohibit importation
of any commodity. Executive Order 226 or the Omnibus Investment Code, which empowers the President to approve or reject the
prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finish products. And of course, the SMA or Safeguard
Measures Act the current of all the laws, of these laws, providing for the safeguard measures to be undertaken or response to the
increase imports and provide with penalties in violation thereof. The bottom line therefore is that, as we can see, there is already a
continuing authority to the President with regard to the banning of importation of certain goods and products. The conclusion is
that, as long as there is statutory authority, then it is maybe exercise by the President. Bakit sila nagka issue? That the general
premise , that the Congress , it is only the Congress which has the exclusive authority to impose taxation and other revenue
measures.

Paragraph 3 Charitable institutions , churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
How do you understand this provision? Is it true that, the business of religion is a good business? Or education or
charitable institution is a good business because exempt from taxation? It is not entirely true. Although it is true its good
business. Under the constitution, its not the Institution that is exempted but it is the lands, buildings, or other improvements of
this institutions which are this is mandatory , directly used for educational, religious or charitable purposes. In other words, only
real estate taxation is exempted under the constitution. Sinong na lulugi? It is the Local Government and not the National
Government. What is the reason for granting them these exemption? Hoaning or promoting the morality, spiritual needs of the
country and special needs are basically governmental functions. Now, these institutions are in a way helping out the government.
So, to some extent lifts the burden of giving these services by the government. So, as a return, at least Consuelo de bobo , they
are granted certain tax exemptions, but then again only real estate taxation is exempted. And beside its the father(?)of the people
which benefits from their services and these would have been a function or obligation of the government.
Lung Center vs. Quezon City
Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock , non-profit entityIts a health service entity, primarily focus on
pulmonary health. When this was established during the time when tuberculosis was prevalent in the country, pneumonia , etc.So,
this was established for that purpose. Now, it stands, the Hospital stands on a 12 hectares lot, its a very big lot, 12 hectares. The
hospital was in the middle , there was a vacant lot on one side and another lot rented out to a private business owner. The
building itself was devoted for patients and hospital services except for the ground floor. The ground floor has a canteen, has
several doctors clinics, which are rented out by the doctors. The lung center earns income out of the rents from the doctors , from
the business owner. They were assessed real estate tax by the local assessors of Quezon City. They questioned the assessment,
saying that the entire land is exempted from taxation. Now, it argued, that its character as charitable institution remains because
it the income derived from the rents are used for charitable purposes. It said that, its character as charitable institution is not lost
notwithstanding the it rents out certain portions of its property. Meaning on the sideline it is also engage in some business.
The Supreme Court said, that there is no argument as to that matter. The characteristics of an institution is define by its
articles and objectives of incorporation and the methods by which they render out their services. So, notwithstanding that on the
sideline they are also engage in some business, it does not matter, thats not an issue here. It remains to be a charitable institution.
The issue is the land and the building exempt from taxation? The Supreme Court said that what the Constitution exempts are only
those portions directly used for, in this case charitable purposes. So in this case, only those portions of the building devoted for its
actual rendering of charitable services would be exempted. The lands rented out, the rooms and clinics rented out to doctors and a
canteen are not exempted.
Therefore, the conclusion is that , this provision must be specifically applied. The Supreme Court strictly applied this
provision only those areas which are directly used. An argument that it directly helps the institution will not be given merit,
therefore. Only those generally used for religious, charitable and educational purposes are exempted from taxation.
Paragraph 4 No Law granting any tax exemption shall be passed with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
congress.
Chavez vs. PCGG
The PCGG is task to investigate, look for , determine, the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos. How many are around,
where can they be found? where were they hidden? This authority granted to PCGG is very taxing so that the authority includes
the authority to enter into a compromise agreement with the Marcos. To make things easier for the PCGG we may enter into a
compromise agreement with the Marcos which they did. Why is that? You help us Marcos family and we will grant you this
certain privileges. First is, you surrender all the ill-gotten wealth and you will be considered as state witnesses , not the primary
accused in the grounds of graft and corruption or plunder. Of course , in your study , meron man kayo nito, they cannot qualify as
state witnesses because they are the main accused or primary accused. That is beyond our concern right now. Our concern is
another stipulation wherein the PCGG commits that if they surrender all the ill-gotten wealth they will share it equally between
the Marcos and the Philippines. And whatever the Marcos shared with me will be exempt from tax. Is this stipulation Valid? If
not what would be your constitutional contention?
PCGG was granted to enter into a compromise agreements with the Marcos. In pursuance to that power, it stipulated
this, in this compromise agreement is that valid? It is constitutionally inferred. WHY? Because only Congress can grant tax
exemption. If so granted, it must be pursuant to a law not a compromise agreement. In pursuant to law, it can become a law only
after the concurrence of WHAT? Majority of all its members. So, this stipulation therefore, is constitutionally VERY
constitutionally inferred. The PCGG has no authority to grant , to commit much less tax exemption of the Marcos.
That was Section 28.
Weve been talking about prohibited measures. At the outset, we said that the legislative power or the Congress
exercises plenary legislative powers. That it can enact on any subject matter under the sun and then Ive said that if you observe
under the constitution there is no enumeration of what would be the extent of its subject matter for its legislation because ika nga,
its plenary. There is no enumeration that these are subject matters for legislation but instead what the constitution provides are
limits to these powers. Among these limits are found in Section 30 and 31.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the Appelleate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
Question: can the Congress increasing the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
YES, if the Supreme Court will give its advice and concurrence. Its not the a definite No and not a definite Yes.
Because the Constitution allows it only if the Supreme Court will concur. Now, the purpose for this provision is to avoid
unnecessary burdening of the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, it will be hindered in performing its basic
function under the Constitution. Under Article 8 of the Constitution, The Powers, functions and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
are already elevated. These can be expanded by Congress but only that there is advice and concurrence by the Supreme Court.
Lepanto vs. ?
The issue there is the validity of the appellate jurisdiction from the decisions of the Board of Investments. Because the
Board of Investments Code or the Omnibus Investment Code, I mean, provides that decisions of the Board of Investments are
final but they can be raised to the Supreme Court by certiorari, I think. Now, the omnibus investment code was promulgated on
July 17,1987 but by then the 1987 Constitution was already effective. Now, under Section 30 of Article 6 No Law shall be passed
increasing the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court unless there is advice and concurrence by the supreme court. So, in
this case the Supreme Court said , unfortunately did not obey the Supreme Courts advice much less its concurrence when it
added up the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Therefore, where do you appeal decisions of the Board of Investments? Under
the Philippine Judiciary Act , from that body the next step is with the Court of Appeals.
Fabian vs. Desierto
Question in the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided by the Ombudsman Act. The Ombudsman Act
provides , that the decision of the Ombudsman in Administrative cases, because the Ombudsman has different restrictions, one of
which is deciding Administrative cases. Its decisions are final but can be raised with the Supreme Court via certiorari. So, you
have this a form of an appeal directed to the Supreme Court. You have to take note of this because you might have this under
your Administrative Law. That this provision is already invalidated by the Supreme Court in violation of Section 30. So,
Decisions of the Ombudsman in Administrative Cases are appealable (?) with the Court of Appeals, so it is not the Supreme
Court.
Section 31. No Law granting a title of Royalty or Nobility shall be enacted.
I dont know if it is written here. Im sorry mga Prince William, mga princess, wala na tayong hope dyan.
Thats another prohibited measure under Article 12 Section 16. Read : Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
Article 12 Section 16, this prohibits the Congress from creating private corporations pursuant to law. It prescribes that private
corporations shall be created pursuant to the Philippine Corporation Code and not a special law for its creation. The Congress
may create government controlled or owned corporations pursuant to a special charter or a special to law because they are
government owned and controlled corporations. But when it comes to private corporations, the Congress is prohibited from
enacting a special law just for the creation of that private corporation. Imagine, if the Congress will create pursuant to law , say
the Philippine Cellphone Corporation or the Philippineanong gusto nyo? Philippine WatersPrivate Corporation engaged in
private business, it cannot be created. The reason is to avoid giving special treatment to these private corporations not in any way
related to the government, ha. Private Corporations giving them special treatments. Giving the owners special treatments.
Imagine the Congress will create a law for Manny Pangilinan for his businesses, then it will be a special treatment a violation of
equal protection under the constitution.
Remember the Case of Liban vs Gordon . In that case Gordon was then a senator, di ba? He also simultaneously
holding the Chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross. The issue there is , is he prohibited from holding the seat of the
Chairman or was he proclaimed of said seat? The Supreme Court there is no complication, there is no violation of the
Constitution because the Philippine National Red Cross is a Private Corporation. Now, theres a portion in the decision wherein
the Supreme Court, compelled that, the Philippine National Red Cross was created pursuant to a Presidential Decree. So, the
PNRC was indeed pala created pursuant to a law. So, instead this is a violation of the constitution. The Constitutional
complication upon the congress. So, the existence of PNRC is therefore declared as INVALID and it has now to incorporate
pursuant to the Philippine Corporation Code as a private corporation. Now, the Supreme Court made that decision even if the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a party of the case. It made a decision that drastically affected PNRC. Imagine That. PNRC
has been in existence for more than 60 years, helping out Filipinos, helping out whoeverthe wounded in the warmga
refugees and all of a sudden its valid existence is denied by the Government, without it participating in the case, ha. So PNRC
filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration Supreme Court please reconsider your decision, we are not
even a party to that case, why should you make that decision all of a sudden our existence is invalidated. It also argued that its
creation was not a violation of the prohibition of the constitution. And the Supreme Court reconsidered its decision.
Among its other decisions resurface later on, a survey of the history in the creation of PNRC, the Supreme Court
recognized that it was created by law. Its a private corporation. Its a privates corporation created by law , but its creation did
not violate the constitution why? It was created by the Philippine Government in compliance with the Geneva Commission. Its
our adherence to our obligations under the Geneva Convention. Historically states why we are putting up Red Crosses and Red
Crescents. These institutions render public service, charitable services voluntary at that and not funded by the Government. Funds
come from Donors and they are Internationally acknowledged as neutral independent institutions. What do you mean by neutral ?
In times of war, the International Committee through the Geneva Convention has agreed , that in times of war, its personnel
should be protected at all costs. Regardless whether you are the enemy or the territory being attacked. In fact, the occupant, kung
natalo yung country, the occupant is prohibited from touching the personnel of the Red Cross. That is a neutral ground , it will
cater the wounded of either side. In other words it has been a partner of the government for so long a time. Its a private
corporation rendering public service. There is none like its kind. No other institution is like it.
So the Supreme Court said, the Philippine Red Cross and Red Crescent is sui generis, a class of its own. It therefore, Its
creation pursuant to law is therefore not a violation of the constitution. Because it cannot be considered as among the private
corporations prohibited to be created pursuant to law. Take note that the prohibition is to avoid, giving or granting special
treatments to private entities and in this case there is no special treatment. That special treatment is already granted and govern by
the International Committee through the international agreement in the Geneva Convention.
Therefore in the case of Liban vs Gordon decided in 2011, the Supreme Court reconsidered its position acknowledged
that it made a mistake in making a decision affecting the Philippine National Red Cross and Red Crescent even if the Philippine
Red Cross is not a party to the case. A big mistake. A very big mistake at that on the part of the Supreme Court. Because the first
element in tackling constitutional issue is that it must be a party to the case. It must have a legal standing.The supreme court
made a decision on a non party.
Article 7. Executive department. Section 1. Executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Executive power shall be vested in THE President of the Republic of the Philippines. Executive power is described as
the power to enforce and administer laws but if you look at the entire Article 7, examining the provisions of the constitution, the
power of the president or the executive department is really or actually not just limited to the enforcement or implementation of
laws. It involves other immense powers not involving the full implementation and operation of the laws enacted by congress.
For one, the powers of the president under Article 7 are couched in general piece. Meaning, the extent will depend on
how the incumbent president will exercise his powers. And another one, if you observe and compare him with the other two
great, supposedly co-equal departments, there's only one person composing the executive department, and that is, according to
Article 7, the President of the Philippines. As against the congress, consisting of two houses, each house consisting also of
members. As against the judiciary consisting of 15 Supreme Court Justices. And we have this one person.
As a single-man department, he can act on his own. He makes decisions on his own with or without consulting with a
peer, because he has no peer. So therefore, it is an understatement to say that the executive power is just the enforcement or the
administration of laws. If you look at the constitution, there are still other functions given him that do not involve the
implementation of of laws. Example: he is the representative of the state in all foreign relations activities, or he has powers in
foreign relations. He has powers to grant clemency, pardon. It is discretionary, fully discretionary on his part. He has the powers
as commander-in-chief of the military. This does not involve really the application, or just merely the enforcement of laws. He
has the power to appoint. The power to contract foreign troops.
Now, this gives you the idea of the greatness or vastness of the power of the president. In fact, in one comment, it was
said that the president can in fact test the limits of the constitution. Limits of the power of the Chief Executive. Because the
constitution merely provides for the limits and not the extent, to the point that he may even overwhelm the two other theoretically
co-equal departments. Because he can decide immediately, unlike the others, they need to consult with each other. Now, if you
look at the list of decisions, you will observe that there are a lot of cases involving President Arroyo. Because, just my
observation, the administration of Arroyo is about testing the limits of the constitution. It was during her time when the President
declared a state of emergency. It was during her time when the president declared a state of rebellion. Because she cannot just
declare martial law, she declares these kinds of states. Can she do this? Can she do that? Normally, a president, had it not been
Arroyo, the presidents maybe will not do that. But that's just the idea.
In a comment, one great American constitutionalist said, what the presidency is, at any particular moment, depends the
important measure on who is the president. so we have this single person, occupying one department, co-equal with congress,
co-equal with the judiciary. He or she is, indubitably, the most influential person in the country. That is why, since the U.S. Is the
most influential country in the world, whoever is the president of the US will be considered as the most influential person, most
powerful person at that, in the world. Because the idea is that, he has these immense powers that may be exercised as long as not
prohibited or limited by laws.
Going to the power to enforce and administer laws.
Ople vs. Torres
In that case, the president issued Executive Order 308 entitled Adoption of the National Computerized Identification
Reference System. It's a national ID system wherein the idea is like in the US that there is one ID and you can use it in any
transaction with any government agency. The problem is that this ID system saw the light of day in the Philippines for the first
time, when the president issued an Administrative Order. Meaning, there was no law authorizing the issuance of that, or the
implementation of an ID system. Why is it problematic? Because it requires a balance between certain policies of the state. Like
security of the state and privacy of persons. The president is not the proper authority to determine that. The policy-making body
is the congress. So this is what you mean by limits provided by the constitution. When he enforces a law, implements a law, puts
the law into actual operation, the presumption is there must be a law. So he failed in this particular instance. Just like in the case
of Review Center, which we have thoroughly studied before. The president issued an executive order expanding the jurisdiction
of the CHED, to include review centers. Now, that power was supposed to be included in the Act creating the CHED. A law. But
that law did not provide for the power to regulate the conduct of review centers. Can she do that? She cannnot. She usurped.
What she did was, according to the Supreme Court, a usurpation of the legislative powers. There was in fact no delegation of the
legislative power.
Ok. going to the question, What is the extent of the executive power of the president? As early as 1989, the Supreme
Court made this landmark ruling, that the president has residual powers in addition to the specific powers granted to him by the
constitution. How did this ruling come about?
Marcos vs Manglapuz
Fresh from our experience and memory of the Marcoses who were then exiled to Hawaii, and then just a few years after
that they wanted to come back to the Philippines. Ordinarily, if you go abroad, because you have the right to travel, ordinarily any
citizen has the right to come back. Now Corazon Aquino, issued an order banning the entry of the Marcoses. So the question is,
can she do that? Or, did she exercise grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? Has she exceeded in her
jurisdiction or authority? Does she have the power? So it was in this case when the Supreme Court said that the president has
residual powers in addition to specific powers granted to him by the constitution. Meaning, that although the constitution outlines
the facts of the president, this list is not defined nor exclusive. She has residual and discretionary powers not stated in the
constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. At that time, the president exercised her
discretion and said that the return of the Marcoses would not be beneficial to the general welfare of the people, because allegedly
there were still some very active supporters of the Marcoses and their return would cause chaos in the country. So for her, it was
not yet time for them to come back. So, meron tayong constitutional issue dito regarding the bill of rights which you will discuss
when you get promoted to the 2nd semester. Anyway, the landmark ruling here is that the president has residual powers, even
powers not defined or enumerated in the constitution. The Supreme Court in this case said, Any power not vested in the judicial
and legislative bodies, belong to the executive. Very wide leeway for the president. The powers of the president cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
the specific powers so enumerated. Whatever power of the government that is neither legislative or judiciary, has to be executive.
He could exercise power from sources not enumerated so long as it is not forbidden by the constitution. That is why it is not an
understatement to say that the president is in fact, indeed the most influential person, the most powerful person at that, in the
country.
Now, Father Bernas, who was a member of the Constitutional Convention, has this comment: the doctrine enunciated
by the constitution in this case, will be regretted when another Ferdinand Marcos will sit as the president. And somehow, we have
that another experience with Arroyo. And because of this residual powers, some of her issuances, actions, were made invalid or
validated??? by the Supreme Court. Because what is not legislative, what is not judiciary, does not mean in every case to be
executive, although not enumerated in the constitution.
Province of Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel
So the president, through the GRP peace panel, was negotiating with this group, and in this Memorandum of
Agreement, this group is called the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. Surveying the stipulations in the MOA, it seem that the
President of the Philippines through the GRP Peace Panel is granting this group a status that is more of an independent state. It
has powers, privileges, authorities greater than the autonomous region. So if you compare it with the 46:52 of the international
committee, their status in the MOA is almost like that they are considered as independent state. Because there are some
agreements between mother countries and independent states of the mother country, and they are considered as independent on
their own. So naturally, under our constitution, there is no such thing as an independent state apart from the Philippines. The
Philippines is only one state, but we recognize certain political subdivisions, such as the barangay, municipality, city, province,
even region, autonomous regions. So far, we have granted autonomy into some regions. But then this provision has limits in the
constitution. Now in this case, the president has accorded the BJE certain rights and privileges that are equivalent to that of an
independent state. Now the issue is regarding the powers of the president. Can the president enter into peace negotiations with
rebels? You read it in the constitution. Is it among the enumerated powers of the president? It's not there.
But the Supreme Court said that it isn't not allowed. The president has residual powers to enter into peace negotiations
with rebels, or to find for viable resolutions to such kinds of problems, based on the power of the president to promote the general
welfare, to promote peace and security. But the next question is, what is the extent of the power of the president to find peaceful
resolutions to the problem. As stated in the case, what is the extent of the power of the president to conduct peace negotiations?
The answer is simple. She is limited to the provisions of law and the provisions of the constitution. But since she has residual
powers, she is not barred from exploring other solutions even if they are intra-constitutional, extra-constitutional, or not provided
in the constitution. The idea is exploration of viable solutions. We've mentioned last time that the president has no constituent
powers. If you look at the MOA, the stipulations therein, it is apparent that the president has guaranteed the amendment to the
constitution, the enactment of laws, amending of laws, to comply with the MOA. This she cannot do. This is the constitutional
limit of her otherwise EXTENSIVE RESIDUAL POWERS. So the bottom line is that since the president has residual powers,
she has in fact the power to conduct peace negotiations and to explore viable solutions, even if these solutions may be beyond
constitutional provisions. But regarding that part, the most that she can do is to recommend these solutions, perhaps the amending
of the constitution, to whom, to the congress. The most that she can do is to recommend and not to guarantee. Because to
guarantee means there is already that assurance that these changes will be effected, which cannot be because she has no
constituent powers. The president may only propose constitutional amendments and not unilaterally approve them.
Let's go to immunity from suits. Unlike in Article 6 which provides for parliamentary immunities, Article 7 does not
have a provision giving the president the privilege of immunity from suits. But it is common knowledge that the president is
immune from suits. Why? This is based on long-time persistent, consistent judicial decisions. This principle has been in
application since a long time ago, applied in the US where we pattern most of our decisions, and where we pattern most of our
provisions in the constitution. So, as to the question, is the president immune from suit? Notwithstanding that there is no
provision in the constitution, the answer is yes. There is no need to provide that in the constitution as it is already inherent. It
comes with the office. And this is supported by judicial decisions.
In Re: Bermudez
The Supreme Court has already expressly held that incumbent presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. Now note of the term incumbent president, and then for during the
period of their incumbency and tenure. Note that it is not term that is used but tenure. As we will appreciate later on.
Soliven vs. Makasiar
The Supreme Court also stated that the rationale for the grant to the president of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of the presidential duties and functions, free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the chief
executive of the government is a job that aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
We are all guilty of this. We demand that the president will be a 24/7 president. There is no time to sleep, there is no
time to eat. You are eating, you are thinking for the welfare of the government. You are sleeping, you are supposed to be
dreaming for the future of the country. That is why, note that some sectors angrily reacted when they heard of PNoy playing PSP
with Josh. Our idea is that the president should be president 24/7. Now, place in the equation the suits. Necessarily, he has to be
immune from suits, otherwise it could affect governmental functions. The operation of the government is entirely dependent upon
him.
David vs Macapagal-Arroyo
Take note of the title. Randy David vs Macapagal-Arroyo, who are the parties in this case. Obviously, the president was
impleaded. Because this was the case where the president issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of emergency.
The basic question is does she have the power to declare a state of emergency, or is it with the congress? But the problem in this
case is, the president was impleaded. Is this proper? And the Supreme Court said: since the president is immune from suit, she
should not be impleaded from suits or cases. This is not proper. But the case was not dismissed immediately, because there were
other respondents. If it were that the title is only Jumao-as vs Arroyo and no one else, then im sorry for me that the case would be
dismissed outright. Because the 1st rule is that, the president is immune from suits. Now in this case, the Supreme Court added a
reason for the immunity. It will degrade the high office of the president. Because he is the head of the state. How will it appear in
the international community if the president is bombarded with suits? He cant be dragged into court litigations while serving as
the president. Unlike the legislative and the judicial branches, only one constitutes the executive branch. And anything which
impairs his usefulness to the discharge of the great and important duties imposed upon him necessarily impairs the operation of
the government. Ok lng yung congress. You implead one, congress can still function. But when it comes to the president, he is the
only executive department. So he must necessarily be immune from suits.
In Soliven, President Aquino filed a libel case against the editors of a publication. So the president filed a libel case
against the editor, the writer, and the publisher. Now, in defense, the petitioner, Soliven, argued that because the president is
immune from suits, she cannot be dragged into court litigations, then there is that __________ disability to file a case. She is not
supposed to to be, not a tribute?? to file suits. He contended that if criminal proceedings would ensue because the president filed
the suit, the president may have to be called as witness for the prosecution. So you have a president sitting on the witness stand,
and as a witness she exposes herself to possible contempt or perjury. So the theory is that she is immune from suit, she is also
prohibited from filing suits. And the Supreme Court said that the theory is wrong. The contention is ??? (34:11). why? This is a
privilege, and the privilege can only be waived by the person having that right or privilege. And who is that person? Only the
president can waive his or her immunity from suit. When she filed the suit, she had no intention to waive the privilege. Thus,
immunity from suit cannot be used as a defense of the accused. Otherwise, the accused will be waived from having criminal
liability just by alleging that the president cannot file suits because he or she is immune from suits.
So what is the scope of immunity? As far as the Philippines is concerned, immunity from any case. So far, there is yet
no decision of the Supreme Court saying that some case are exempted. Im mentioning this to you because in the US, there was
already this decision against Clinton. Clinton vs Jones, involving Starr, Jones, and I think eto ung Monica Lewinsky thing. There
was already this decision by the US Supreme Court that their constitution does not protect a sitting president from a lawsuit that
is predicated at private, pre-presidential conduct. It was supposed to be a pre-presidential conduct. But this was during his
incumbency. If that happened here, that would still be part of the immunity. Because what is the rationale for our immunity? To
prevent any hindrance to the performance of his action. So in this case, if the suit is with regards the private affairs, private
activity of the president, or conduct that is not in anyway related to the performance of his function that is excluded from the
immunity. But again, that is a US decision. We will wait for the time of day, for the day that the Supreme Court will say that there
are certain exemptions to this immunity. But as of now, it would seem that the immunity of the president is absolute.
What about after the term?
Estrada vs. Desierto
Remember Estrada? He used to be our president. But he was not able to finish his term because in 2001, the Supreme
Court decided that he already resigned. His term should have ended in 2004. But in 2001 he already resigned. Immediately after
his resignation, cases upon cases were filed against him by the ombudsman. The ombudsman did not lose any time in filing the
cases. So Estrada's defense is immunity from suit. Of course he was contending that he did not resign. So he was the incumbent
president. Arroyo was only the acting president. Now, do we need to wait for his term to end before the cases will be filed? The
first question is, can the cases nonetheless be filed before the end of the term of the president, or tenure, whichever it may be?
The Supreme Court in this case said that there is no such thing as post-tenure immunity from liability. There is no decision like
that in the case of a president who commits criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. So I said
no, you link that with the 1st principle that that the sitting or incumbent president is immune from suit brought during the period
of his incumbency or tenure. This is how we will appreciate this. There is a need to wait for the end of the term. This is only
applicable for as long as he is the incumbent, he is the sitting president. Thereafter the immunity ends. What is the moral lesson
of the story? It is not totally true to say that the president can just commit any criminal activity, because any criminal act is not an
official act. After his tenure, he can still be held liable. That is why there is no constitutional objection when after the term of
there were several cases filed against her. This is obviously understood, that there is no post-tenure immunity from suit.
Rubrico vs. Arroyo
Notice that impleaded as party respondent is Macapagal-Arroyo as president. This is the more recent case, 2010, when
the Supreme Court reiterated the principle of immunity that there is no need to provide that in the constitution. That has already
been recognized. This is the case for writ of amparo filed by 27:40, and she impleaded the president along with the generals. So
here, the president was dropped as party respondent. Going back to my question. How then can we make the president
accountable or liable for his or her decisions while she is still the sitting president? Isn't it that under the constitution, the
Supreme Court has expanded power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the other departments? Under the 1987 constitution, pwede nyang hindi yun political question. The Supreme Court
can already look into the propriety of the action of the other department based on possible abuse of discretion. Sumobra na yun.
Abuse of authority. Then only the Supreme Court can do that against the executive department, when we say that the president is
immune from suit.
If we are not amenable to the action of the president, if we disagree with the decision of the president, how can we
question the act? Pwede ba?
Gloria vs. CA
Gloria was the Secretary of Education. Now there was here a schools division superintendent questioning her reassignment. The re-assignment was upon the recommendation of the secretary, but the approving authority was the president. So
when that action, the re-assignment was questioned, the validity of that reassignment was questioned, is it questioning the action
of the president? Yes, because ultimately, the approval of the president was being questioned. But, should the petition be
dismissed on the ground that since the president is immune from suit, Gloria cannot also be impleaded as party? Gloria is the
Secretary of Education. In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the petition. Why? When he filed that action against the alteregos of the president, the question ///25:00???. The principle therefore is that one cannot directly question the president, but will
file the action against the alter-egos.
Senate vs. Ermita
Who is Ermita? The executive secretary. So to question the action of the president, usually, who are impleaded are the
alter-egos. So it is not also true that the president cannot be held liable for her actions. Some of her actions may also be nullified
but not to the point that she is also held administratively liable, criminally liable, civilly liable. The most in excess of jurisdiction
amounting to abuse of discretion cases, the most that the Supreme Court can do is to nullify the action. But not to whom liable
that department to the point that the congress will pay, the president will pay, the congress will be imprisoned, the president will
be imprisoned. This is a check-and-balance scheme insofar as nullifying the action of the other department. But we will go to that
later.
Qualifications
Section 2. No person may be elected president unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least 40 yrs of age on the day of election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 yrs immediately
preceding such elections. Natural born. Registered voter. Able to read and write. 40 yrs old on the day of the election. A resident
of the Philippines for at least 10 yrs.
Your father could already qualify to run for president. In a few years' time I will also be qualified to run for president. A
taxi driver 40 yrs old and above, is already qualified to run for president under the qualifications required by the constitution.
Compare that with the qualifications required by companies for a clerk: college graduate, 3 yrs experience, pleasing personality.
So this is the maximum requirement of the constitution. And we are talking about the most influential, the most powerful person
in the country.
Section 3. There shall be a vice president who shall have the same qualifications and term of office, and be elected with and in
the same manner as the president. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the president.
So we have a vice president who is almost like a president, as to qualification, term of office, and manner of removal.
Why? In the words of Roxas, the vice president must be himself presidentiable. So he must have the same qualification, the same
vision as the president. What is the function of the vice president? Reserve officer. Stand-by officer. Prayerful officer. The entire
duration of 6 yrs, he keeps on praying. What are is duties and functions? The 2 nd paragraph says, the president may appoint him
as a member of the cabinet and it requires no confirmation by the CA. He may be appointed, he may be given another job. But
what if the president will not give him any other function? He is kapwa. For me, this is one of the most coveted positions. Vice
president. You get paid, you get the prestige, and you do not do anytrhing. You are just merely the reserve officer. Kaso, you just
learn to pray.
Section 4. The president and the vice president shall be elected by a direct vote of the people for a term of 6 yrs.
Take note. House of representatives, ano ang term? 3 yrs. Senators? 6 yrs. President and vice president? 6 yrs. If you
observe, the commencement of their offices coincide. Noon of the 30th day of June next following the day of election and shall
end noon of the same day. This specific provision of time start time end, this merely says, confirms the principle of no hold-over
capacity when it comes to the president, vice president, even the congress. Meaning when the time comes, in the time sharp, it is
June 30, get out. What if, by that time there is no president yet who was elected, who has qualified. The mode of succession
provided in the constitution will set in. because there is no hold-over capacity. Ok. Next sentence. The president shall not be
eligible for any re-election. This is the general rule. If you are the president, you are no longer eligible for any 2nd term, for any
re-election. It does not matter if you run immediately or after some interval. Any re-election. That is the general rule. The 2 nd
sentence says, no person who has succeeded as president and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time. It is as an exception to the general rule. This is applicable not to the elected president but
to the president who came into office through the mode of succession. In this case, if he has served for more than 4 yrs, the
general rule will apply. He will not be eligible for any re-election. But if he has served for less than 4 yrs, he or she can still run.
That was the case of Macapagal- Arroyo. She became president not because she was elected, but she became president
because she succeeded in office. When was that? 2001.When is the end of the term of that particular office? 2004. And if you
count the number of years, just 3 yrs. She did not complete the 4 yrs reckoning point in consideration. Therefore, can she or can
she not file? Is she eligible? Yes. Now, why was Erap able to run? For me, this provision is clear. If you are the president, you are
not eligible for any re-election. The 2nd sentence is only an exception for some circumstances. Is he a succeeding president? no.
actually, there were several cases filed against Erap. When it was rumored that he was running for president, someone already
filed a case. Of course, it will be dismissed. When he filed his COC, someone also filed. I dont know what happened or it's
politics or whatever. This cases were dismissed because he filed it with the Comelec. So the Comelec dismissed these cases for
lack of ??14:57?? That case may be true. Why? Because after dismissal by the Comelec, he filed his appeal with the Supreme
Court.
Pormento vs. Estrada
In the Comelec, the Comelec supported the position of Estrada. Ano ang position ni Estrada? I did not reach four years.
That is why im still eligible to run. Im still eligible for a full term. And the Comelec believed that position. If you ask me, that is a
very wrong contention. Again this provision is very clear. The president is not eligible for any re-election. I dont know why that
happened. So the petitioner pursued the case all the way to the Supreme Court. Eto ang background. The Chief Justice at that
time was Corona. The ponente of the decision (it's not even called a decision, they called it a resolution, which is wrong. It's a
case, it's supposed to be a decision. Resolution is, you have a decision, nagfile ka ng motion, then they will resolve your motion.
That is a resolution.) The resolution was penned by who? No other than Corona. I dont know the connection. Im not giving you
any impression. Im just stating a fact. Anyway, what happened in the case? Is President Estrada eligible or ineligible for any reelection? Something happened. The case was already overtaken by the election. P-Noy was proclaimed winner. Erap was the 2nd
placer. But the Supreme Court took advantage of this supervening event. The Supreme Court said, the issue is moot and
academic. There is no point in confusing ourselves, because there is no point in deciding the case. Erap did not win, it's P-Noy.
It's a case of judicial inhibition. Was it proper for the Supreme Court, was it constitutional for the Supreme Court to do that? The
answer is yes. As we will discuss later on under the judiciary. But was it really moot and academic? Actually, although the
Supreme Court has, time and again, evaded answering constitutional questions because of the reason that they are moot and
academic, there is an exception to that mootness principle. If the question is capable of being revived, being repeated. In this case
it can be revived because what if Erap will run again? In 2016. it's not really moot. And besides, there was already this decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Salonga vs Pano where the Supreme Court said that it has the symbolic function of guiding
the bench and the bar. It should have exercised that symbolic function. It's not symbolic because it's not in the constitution, but it
is the symbolic function of the Supreme Court to to guide the bench and the bar. And it could have done it, what is this? A ruse.
Ano ang reason ng Supreme Court? Eto ang worse. The Supreme Court said: our constitution said, the president shall not be
eligible for any re-election. Erap was not re-elected. Are they saying that he has to be re-elected first before they will decide the
case? What if Erap won? That was the decision of the Supreme Court in ??9;23?? vs Estrada. One word shared by most
commentaries: Sayang. This would have been a proper opportunity for the Supreme Court to decide the case, where for me, the
provision is not even ambivalent. It's clear. Unequivocal ang pagkakasulat nyan. It should not even be a question that she is still
allowed. So that's the beauty of practicing. That's the beauty of law. That's the beauty of legal practice.
Section 4. (1) The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which
shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six
years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served
as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
(2) No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
(3) Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday
of May.
(4) The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
(5) The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.
(6) The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
(7) The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Second paragraph provides that No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the
full term for which he was elected
If you have this voluntary renunciation is not present in the first paragraph, it bolsters the argument that there is no need
to determine that the renunciation of the office of the president is voluntary or involuntary. The fact is he is still prohibited from
any re-election. That is why, that is not the argument because that is not present in the first paragraph. You talk about
renunciation of office for any length of time meaning if he is still allowed to be re-elected for another term.
Paragraph 3,4,5 and 6 refers to the congress as the national board of canvassers for presidential election as always
provided by law the election of the president and vice president should be held on the second Monday of May where returns of
every election shall be transmitted to the Congress directed to the President of the Senate. So its the Congress who will canvass,
done in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes. When it comes to ordinary or regular elections meanings elections other than the president
and the vice president its the COMELEC is the authority of the over-all canvass of the votes. Now when it comes to the
president and the vice president the Constitution put that away from the COMELEC and gave the authority to canvass to the
CONGRESS. So the board of canvassers will be the Congress, now take note of that because the multiple choice may ask who
acts as the board of canvassers of the president or vice president. Now you may say that maam we now have the automation of
the election, so there is no point of counting because before they will actually canvass/count the votes in a joint session. What
they would receive right now is EACH OF THE RETURNS of each Province. So, there is still subject for canvassing only that
they are assisted by the computer. But, its not just the counting of the votes that is the function of national canvasser. Under the
second paragraph, it is also their function to proclaim the winner and if there is a tie. It is still the national board of canvasser who
will break the tie. In the case, there are two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. So as national board of canvassers they will canvass the vote and
proclaim the winner. And in case of a tie, it has the authority to break the tie. All its functions are ministerial. It does not require
any discretion.
Last paragraph, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. We call this as the
PET or the presidential electoral tribunal. Their function is more or less same on the SET [senate] or HRET [house or
representatives] only the subject.
Tecson vs. COMELEC
Actually this case was originally filed w/ the COMELEC questioning the qualifications of FPJ, but it was appealed
certiorari w/ the Supreme Court, on certiorari Tecson questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine the qualification
of FPJ citing this last paragraph of Sec. 4 that according to the Constitution it is the SC w/c is the sole judge of qualifications.
Now is it correct? The same principle that we have learned with the SET or HRET meaning that its jurisdiction will begin only
when the candidate is proclaim to be a winner, has taken his oath & has assume the duties and functions of his office. In other
words, when who is involve is still a candidate the jurisdiction is not in the electoral tribunal. When you say electoral tribunal and
electoral protest this would not ordinarily refer to post election contest. So the same principle, the contention of Tecson is
incorrect.
Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos
There was a time that Ramos ran for president among several others including Defensor. It was a hot contested election.
Allegedly Ramos cheated so that Miriam Santiago will not win but the records allegedly showed that it was Santiago who won.
Muntik na tayo nagka president na Miriam Santiago. [lol!] Ramos was called tobacco, Salonga was called super lolo & Miriam
Santiago was called Brenda. Anyway, until now she is still saying that she won that election. After that election, Ramos won.
Santiago filed an election protest before the PET (Presidential Electoral Tribunal). Three years after that there is again an election
for Senators. She ran for senator. The question is does it affect her electoral protest w/ the PET? The SC said, the fact that she ran
for senator will be tantamount to abandonment of her electoral protest because she has effectively abandon/withdrawn her protest
or at least abandon the determination to protect & pursue public interest in voting matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. Also, consistently held even in the case of Legarda vs De Castro. Legarda also questioned the vice presidential race
against Noli De Castro. But in the next succeeding election she ran for senator. So citing this ruling she also abandoned her
interest. Now for me, thats the proper ruling because they won and the they took their oath of office w/ regards to the senate
office.
My question is what is what if they lost in the election, would that still be tantamount to abandonment? The decision did not say
that & I dont think that the decision covers that. Anyway, there is still no case where there is someone who ran as president
placed second questioned the decision and ran as senator then lost.
Poe Jr. vs. Macapagal
Fernando Poe ran against Macapagal Arroyo & there is still a contention that Arroyo cheated & it was Fernando Poe
actually won the election which was later confirmed w/ no less than the COMELEC in a unofficial recount. Anyway, after the
election filed an electoral protest against Arroyo. They have several evidence w/ regards to cheating & massive fraud in the
election. But we know that what happened next, FPJ died. The next question is what happens to the electoral protest, will it be
vacated? Will the SC lose jurisdiction because the complainant died. The answer would be NO. Although it is personal in the
case claimed that he won, it is also a matter of public interest. The public would be interested would know who actually won in
the presidential race. But the next question is that, who may substitute FPJ? Because in this case, it was Susan Roces, the wife so
that the case will continue. Sc said the wife as a widow has no personal interest on the winner/ who will win because she will not
take the seat in case FPJ will be declared as a winner or in case it is declared that the actual votes for GMA does not really
belongs to her. So, she is not the real party interest so substitute FPJ it would have been more correct if it is the second or third
placer died. The second placer died, the third placer would have that interest to pursue the case. So in this case since public office
cannot be transmitted by inheritance, Susan Roces cannot substitute FPJ. Ultimately, the case was vacated.
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take
the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other source.
This is more in testing w/ section 7 & 8. These are the rules on succession in case there is a vacancy in the office of the
president or in the office of the vice president. Sec. 7 will cover the instances where the vacancy occurred at the beginning of the
term.
Section 7. (1) The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
(2) If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
(3) If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
(4) If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled,
the Vice President-elect shall become President.
(5) Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
(6) The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President
or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.
There is a precise time & date for the assumption/ commencement of office = 12 noon of June 30 next following date
of election. They must assume their office. Now there are instances, wherein the president cannot assume office. So thats in
paragraph 2, If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall
have qualified. Paragraph 3, If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified. Paragraph 4, If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect
shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
So we have3 instances that may happen at the beginning at the term, the first instance maybe that the president elect to
qualify. Example, he has not yet taken his oath of office saying that there is a restraining order for his taking of oath, so that is a
temporary incapacity. So until, he can take his oath of office since the beginning of the term is already effective the function of
the office has already commenced at the precise time and date. And, who will be the president? The vice president in what
capacity? Will the vice president becomes the president? ONLY ACTING PRESIDENT. Why? The vacancy is only temporary.
Another instance, the president shall not have been chosen. Example, there has still no proclamation. No one has been
proclaimed as the president and it is already June 30. What will happen then? The Vice president will be the president in what
capacity? ACTING CAPACITY because again the vacancy is only temporary.
The third instance, at the beginning of the term the president shall have died or permanently becomes disabled. So this
is an instance where the vacancy is no longer temporary. It is a permanent vacancy. What will happen? Who will succeed as
president? The vice president as president so this is one instance where it is called an answered prayer. (lol!)
Problem, what if we have no president and there is also no vice president? Or the three instances happening to both the
president and the vice president? So there is no vice president to act as a president. The question is who is next in line? IT IS
THE SENATE PRESIDENT OR IN HIS ABSENCE THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE.
In what capacity? Acting president. If the president dies and the vice president also dies, what will happen? The senate
president will become the president or will only act as president? The last phrase provides until a President or a Vice-President
shall have been chosen and qualified. The senate president or in his absence the speaker of the house will never be a president
because in this instance we will choose another president, so there is a special election. Unless they will run in the special
election, they will become the president.
Another problem, what if maam they all boarded in the same flight the president, the vice president, the speaker of the
house, the senate president and the plane crashed. Who will act as the president? This time the Constitution left it in the discretion
of the congress. Saying or mandating the congress to enact a law to provide for this kind of situation. Question, is there already a
law? NOT YET. NO LAW. Because they cannot yet imagine that situation. Again, that is about vacancy at the beginning of the
term.
Section 8. (1) In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
(2) The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the
Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to
the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Now, section 8 would found a vacancy w/c occurs midterm. Congress only refers to permanent vacancy. In case of
death or permanent disability removal from office or resignation of that president, what will happen? RULE ON SUCCESSION.
The vice president will become the president. (answered prayer again.haha) Now second question, what if they boarded the same
plane, they died under the Constitution the senate president or the speaker of the house will act as president. Again, there is no
way that the senate president of house of representative on rule on succession become the president. Only the vice president will
be given w/ that privilege. Another problem they boarded the same plane again, di na sila natuto. There is no president, vice
president, speaker of the house, senate president, who will act as president? The congress will enact a law to provide for this kind
of situation.
If you observe, we have touch on the specific areas in relation to this topic because we have already discussed before regarding
de facto & de jure government then the constitution comparing with the Aquino & arroyo government, political questions,
immunity from suits. This time we are talking about RESIGNATION. There were several scandals involving Estrada including is
the Jueteng scandal where he allegedly resigned. He submitted a resignation letter immediately at the same day, Gloria Arroyo
immediately took her oath of office. Now, Estrada contended that he never resigned, that he only left his position temporarily &
that Arroyo would only be in acting capacity as president. The SC rule instead in a factual manner, whether or not Erap resigned.
SC said lets us look at the prior contemporaneous and posterior facts & circumstances. Pinalalim pa noh? Before, during & after.
Facts & circumstances surrounding his resignation, among these that was credited by the SC is the diary of Angara, which for the
SC serve as a window to the mind of Estrada. Yun pala yun? If someone is writing about you, his diary to the mind of Estrada.
Yun pala yun? If someone is writing about you, his diary will be a window to my mind. [class laughs.] You have this person
claiming that he has not resigned and you have this diary the you have resigned. Between these two facts, in ordinary setting it
would be the person because he talks about the intention of the mind. For me this case would be the worst nightmare of Erap, if
they will say may all odds be in your favor. In this case, all the odds were against his favor. Because the SC said that he did
resigned. If we apply this ruling in a labor case, it would be a different ruling diba? The SC said the validity of resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement in labor case the resignation has to be accepted right? It can be oral, written. There is no
implied resignation. You can call it abandonment. In fact an ordinary worker submits a resignation & thereafter comes back to
office & claims his salary & claims his statutory benefits under the labor standards. In this contrary setting, the SC will give
weight to the act of the labourer claiming its salary. Meaning it was no really his intention to really resign. I can understand the
reasoning of that because labor is your source of income, your source of living. But if you will apply it here, you have the
president elected at large by the general voting population. To SC, they are now contradicting the general population in just one
finding or holding that he resigned amidst his claim that he did not resigned. Ganon lang ba kadali? Its just that I sent a letter
but i did not intend to resign. Its just as simple as that. And he made a claim, immediately after sending the resignation letter. SC
said that he is resigned because of the diary of Angara.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in theOffice of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
In other words, anyone from the Congress may it be a senator or a member of the house of representative may become
a vice president by President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
It happened in the case of Arroyo assuming the office of the president so the vice president/c she left is vacant. Since
there is vacancy, she nominated Guingona, a senator, and his nomination was confirmed & supported by his peers in the
Congress. ANYONE as long as he is nominated by the president concurred by the congress.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from
the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of
this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article
V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
Question, when shall we have a special election of the president or the vice president? We will only hold therefore
mandatory special election when there is vacancy in both the offices of the president and the vice president. Why? If there is a
vacancy of the president what will happen? The rule on succession will apply so there is no need to hold a special election.
When there is a vacancy in the office of the vice president only? What will happen? The president will nominate on who will
become the vice president. In other words, a special election is only applicable when there is a vacancy in BOTH offices. Calling
a special election is in fact mandatory right? It states that The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed. Is there an exception? if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election. Now this is an urgent matter w/c must be acted upon by the congress. Now we know how laws are created from the time
that they become bills. Must they undergo separate or separate days? There is a provion that states The bill calling such special
election shall be deemed certified. You can dispense the reading on 3 separate days w/ the printing of the copies. Another
exception, it becomes a law immediately upon approval of the third reading. Another exception, Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section
25, Article V1 of this Constitution. They can take the funds anywhere w/o violating the transfer of funds. So this is how crucial&
important the calling of special election is.
Section 11. (1) Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
(2) Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
(3) Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
(4) If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising
the powers and duties of his office.
That is a very long section. When you read the provisions, it like a pingpong. When you read the first paragraph
would be the president would declare itself to be temporarily incapacitated, unable to discharge the powers of his office. So he
will declare this to the senate president & the speaker of the house, what will happen after that? The Vice-President as acts as the
president. Sec. 11 therefore covers situations of temporary incapacity or disability midterm. Hindi siya kasama sa sec. 8 na
permanent vacancy. So paragraph 1 is the president declaring the he is temporarily incapacitated unable to discharge the powers
& duties of his office. What if he will not admit it? There was a time in the history that it was rumoured that when Marcos got
sick & we did not know how critical his sickness was, it was another person who is running the country. So it seems that there
was at the time temporary disability on the part of Marcos to discharge the powers of his office & he did not admit to it so hindi
a-apply yung praragraph 1.
What will apply is paragraph 2. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President. What will happen if they make that declaration? Mga traydor kayo!lol The vice president shall act as president but
because the president is given the benefit of the doubt by the Constitution, he can contradict or counter the declaration of his
cabinet members. So automatically upon saying NO there is no disability echapwera si vice president. Now is that the end of it?
The cabinet members may pursue that declaration. What will happen? The congress will side. Take note that controversy is w/
the congress & not the courts. The congress will decide the ability or disability of the president only after the pingpong not
immediately. Because in the first instance pwede pa i counter ng president. Now last paragraph says that the desired vote is twothirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President.
The vice president shall act as a president only when the congress has already decided that the president is already
unable to discharge his office. Otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. Bakit mataas
ang required vote? 2/3. Because you are declaring a person incapacitated. The presumption remains that he is capacitated to
perform its functions. Lets relate that to Estradas nightmare.
Continuing the Estrada vs. Desierto case. On the same day, Estrada submitted his resignation letter. He left
Malacaang, Arroyo took her oath & on the same day Estrada sent a letter to the Senate president that he is temporarily
incapacitated to temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties & functions in his office. So for him, Arroyo would be just an
acting president. What is the ruling of the SC? I think the question is wrong was he temporarily incapacitated? Because who has
the power to determine that he is temporarily incapacitated is not the SC. Anyway the SC said that is the president unable to act
as president? NO. The house issued resolution supporting the assumption of Arroyo as president. So it was not denied that they
receive the letter. Likewise in Feb. 7 it confirmed the nomination of president Arroyo of senator Guingona as vice president on
the same day the senate also confirmed the nomination xx. So the SC recognized the domino effect after Erap left. Arroyo
became president, Guingona became vice president, the senate has vacancy. All of these where w/ the support of the congress.
When Erap made his declaration & there was no dispute that it was received. What did the Congress do? Make a resolution
supporting Arroyo as president. Ask the COMELEC to call for a special election supported Guingona as vice president, the
question would have been is this within it authority of the congress? Because the SC in holding against Erap said in the phase
of this determination of a co-equal branch the court is w/o authority to review. It is a political question xx. Sabi ng court sabi ng
Congeress eh na tama yun, president na si Arroyo. Then we cannot review that. After the declaration of the incapacity congress
said Arroyo is already the president. Is this within their authority?
Now you tell me, you read again paragraph 1 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the VicePresident as Acting President. The congress has no discretion or participation. What did the congress do in this case? Declared
Arroyo to be the president. What did the SC do in this case? It said that it is the determination of the Congress that it cannot
review for it to be a political question. All the odd are against Estrada. It is supported by the Constitution but co-equal branches
in a way that it will fit the situation however they will rule that Arroyo will be the president & Estrada will be ousted. But my
question is, black & white, is this constitutionally correct? Or was there a violation of the Constituion? By both departments, di
naman tayo naririnig diba. Accprding to Atty. Jumao-as: For me there is a violation, clear naman provision ng constitution, It is
not the congress who will determine the capacity of the president at the first instance that the president himself will declare that
he is temporarily incapacitated. The congress has no authority to declare him incapacitated nor declare the correctness of the
assumption of the vice president as the president & not the acting president. So ika nga naisahan si Erap. Personally I dont agree
w/ the decision of the SC. Lets call him a victim of politics. Only to find out that the next president is far worst.
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall
not be denied access to the President during such illness.
It was added in the 1987 Constitution to address the situation we had w/ Marcos at the time we do not know what
happen to him whether buhay pa ba siya or etc. The mandatory disclosure is with regards to serious illness. There was a buzz
about Arroyos implants, anong paki-alam namin kung nag pasexy siya, that is not covered in this section.
Section 13. (1) The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
(2) The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
The president or the vice president shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession.
Compare this with the congress, they can still practice their profession like being accountants, lawyers xx. And, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members xx.
Bitonio vs. COA
NAC vs. COA
More or less in situations where the secretaries of the president are ruling ex officio functions. Sometimes they are
called to be a member of this committee or etc. As long as they are holding positions in their ex officio capacity there is no
violation in the Constitutional provision in holding other office. But still, they are prevented in receiving emoluments in whatever
they made thereof. In both this cases, they have delegated the attendance in meetings etc. to their representatives. The law said
that their representatives because secretaries cannot receive honorarium he representatives are given honorarium. SC said since
the principal is prohibited in the constitution so also are their representatives. So they cannot also receive honorariums.
Public Interest vs. Elma
The ruling of interest here is that the chairman of the PCGG is also a lawyer, cannot also be appointed as chief
presidential legal counsel. Why? Because this chief legal counsel has the function to reviewing all the acts, all the consumptions
of the cabinet secretaries & all offices including the PCGG. In other words, he will be reviewing his own work. So there is here a
conflict of function. So one person cannot hold this two offices even if he waived any remuneration as he may receive as chief
presidential legal counsel.
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Can the acting president make appointments? Of course, the acting president can exercise all the powers of the
president but when it comes to appointments made by him, Sec 14 provides that it shall be made effective unless revoked by the
elected president within 90 days, within reassumption of office. In other words, the appointments made by an acting president are
considered valid but the elected president, or resuming president, has the prerogative of revoking the same within a certain period
of 90 days.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Section 15 talks about midnight appointments. What is a midnight appointment? Section 15 provides that 2 months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, the president or an acting president, shall not
make any appointments. This kind of appointment is what we refer to as the midnight appointment.
Now, true or false. The period of the prohibition is 2 months. How long is the period of the prohibition? It depends. The
reckoning point is the presidential election, 2 months earlier and up to the end of the term of the president. Now when is the end
of the term? June 30. So lets say the election is May 10. What if it is 2 months earlier, like March. So it could rank up to 3 to 4
months. So its not true that midnight appointments are only within a period of 2 months. But is there an exception to such kind
of an appointment? The Constitution also provides that temporary appointments to executive positions may be made within this
prohibited period, provided that the continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. So the
president may make temporary appointments only to executive positions, in the expediency of service.
De Rama vs. CA
Involved here are appointments made within this same period that is prohibited in Section 15, but the appointments
were made by the outgoing mayor. This is usually practiced in the local scene. If the outgoing mayor is not reelected, he will
make his political woos by making appointments that are solely based on political considerations. Is this constitutionally
prohibited? Meaning, is there such sort of midnight appointment in the local scenario? In the case of De Rama v. CA, midnight
appointments refer only to the prohibitions to the president under Section 15. So what about appointments made mayors when
they are outgoing? Are these considered midnight appointments? No. Are these prohibited? It depends. The appointments in the
local government are subject to the civil service rules, laws and regulations. The current revelation is that generally it is not
advisable, especially if the sole reason is for political reasons. But appointments may be made under a certain criteria. So for
example, it is really necessary, they must prove that, and then subject to qualifications of the appointee. So long as it is not shown
that the appointments were politically motivated. Then there is no prohibition. But there is a general regulation: that there should
be no appointments during this time, including the election period. The appointments are already prohibited. But again, what we
are trying to say is that these are not midnight appointments.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
Reading Sec 16, you will see that there are 4 categories of appointees. They are classified into 4 groups.
The first group is the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. Because the general rule is that, when it comes to appointments, it is an exclusive executive power. When you say
exclusive executive power, the intention of the framers of the Constitution is really to vest it only with the President, without the
participation of the Congress through the Commission on Appointments. In other words, the general rule is appointment is solely
within the power of the President. The exception is that, only this first sentence, which requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. The first sentence therefore is only an exemption to the general rule. The general rule again is that
appointment is within the power of the President.
Now which appointments are vested in the President? So the first sentence: secretaries (this would refer to the heads of
the executive departments), ambassadors, other public ministers of consuls, or officers of the armed officers from the ranked
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. OK so separate natin sila.
All other officers of the government whose appointments are not provided by law. Who are these officers? Sometimes the
Congress may enact a law creating an office but forgets to provide on who will appoint the officers in that new office. If the law
is silent therefore, the appointment is vested in the President. Those who may be authorized by law to appoint is bound by law
which specifically vests the power of appointment to the President. As to the last sentence, the Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank. In this case, if the officers are lower in rank, they may be vested, other than with the
president, in the courts, with the heads of the departments, or boards. So there is no prohibition if a law will say that the
appointment of this person is vested with the secretary as long as their officers are considered as officers lower in rank.
Sarmiento vs. Mison
This is the first test case of Section 16. The issue in this case is the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs. The basic question is: does his appointment need to be confirmed by the CoA? How do you answer that question? You
look at Section 16. Obviously the confirmation is no longer needed but what is to relevant to know is that other than the 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitution, this provision on appointment, it included the heads of bureaus. Now under the 1987
Constitution that provision, that group, was deleted. Now obviously the intention of the framers now is to really exclude the
heads of bureaus. Now if I say the Commissioner of the BIR. Must her appointment be submitted to the Commission of
Appointments for confirmation? No.
Bautista v. Salonga
The Chairman of the Commission of Human Rights. Does it need the confirmation of the CoA? Now take note that the
Commission of Human Rights office was created under the 1987 Constitution. So ano ung mga sabi sa Section 16? Those
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Only the chairman and the commissioners of the
Commission of Audit, COMELEC, and the Commission of Civil Service. These are the Constitutional Constitutions. What else?
The regular members of the judicial and bar council. Thats it. Weve learned earlier about sectoral representatives who are
appointed by the President at the beginning of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and up to a certain period. But now it is no
longer applicable. We are now electing partylist representatives. But what about the Commission of Human Rights? Obviously it
was not mentioned in this list. Why? Although the office was created by the 1987 Constitution, it left to the Congress the vesting
of the power to appoint. A law was enacted for the creation of the Commission of Human Rights and in that law, the appointment
of the chairman is vested in the President. So which is more applicable? Does it belong to those officers whose appointments are
vested in the Constitution, or does it belong to the group those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint? So san sya nabelong? In to the latter group diba? Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. It is the law creating the Commission
of Human Rights, which vested upon the authority to appoint the chairman. Therefore, does it need the confirmation of the
Commission of Appointments? Obviously no. It is not an officer whose appointment is vested in the President in the
Constitution. Is an officer whose appointment is vested in the President by law (Wigmore, eto talaga sabi nya. Dunno if she was
asking a question or what.) Therefore, we go to the general rule. There is no need for the participation of the Commission on
Appointments or the Congress.
In the same case of Bautista v. Salonga, the ruling is theres no need for the confirmation. In that case, the president
nonetheless submitted the appointment for the confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. Now the CoA disapproved the
appointment. What is the effect of that disapproval? Is it valid? Does the appointee have the right to assume office? Yes. He has
the right to assume office because his appointment does not require the confirmation of the COA. What we learned therefore in
this case is that the list in the first sentence of Sec 16 is exclusive. The president cannot decide which appointees would be
submitted for approval by the CoA. If he does that, he is exercising the power without jurisdiction. It is beyond her authority to
do that. Now that principle goes the other way around also on the part of the Congress.
Calderon vs. Carale
Congress enacted a law amending the Labor Code. That law created certain offices and provided that the chairman, the
division presiding the commissioners and other commissioners shall be appointed by the president subject to the confirmation by
the CoA. So what will appear is a law enacted by Congress creating an office and then vesting the appointment of the officers
upon the president but further requiring that these appointments will be subjected to the affirmation of the CoA.
Manalo vs. Sistoza
In this case, Congress also enacted a law: the DILG Act or the Department of Interior Local Government Act of 1990,
creating also certain offices and therein provided that the appointment of the chief superintended, the deputee director of the PNP
and the general director of the PNP are vested upon the president to appoint. But further provides that their appointments will be
subjected to the confirmation of the CoA. The same, diba? A law creating office, vesting the power of appointment to the
president but providing that these appointments will be subjected for confirmation with the CoA.
Question: are these provisions of law valid? No. Because we go back to the general rule: the list is exclusive. The list in
the first sentence of Sec 16 is exclusive, meaning that the Congress has no authority to expand that list by enacting a law vesting
appointment upon the president and expanding the jurisdiction and the power of the CoA by requiring certain other officers to be
approved by the CoA. So we when we say that the list is exclusive, it means that: 1. The president just cannot decide for himself
which appointments will be submitted for the approval of the CoA. And 2. The congress cannot expand the jurisdiction of the
CoA.
Soriano vs. Lista
The respondents here were appointed to various positions in the Philippine coastguard. Their positions were from naval
captain, commodore, real admiral, and vice admiral. Their appointments were submitted to the CoA but their appointments were
not confirmed. Question: can they assume office without violating the Constitution? The Supreme Court said that they can. Why?
In our exclusive list, it only mentions members of the armed forces of the Philippines, of positions reigning from colonel, or
when it comes to the Philippine Navy, naval captain. The Philippine Coastguard is not a military unit, is not part of the Philippine
Navy nor is it a part of the AFP. Its not even under the Secretary of Defense. Its under whom? The Secretary of Transportation
and Communication. Therefore there is no need for the confirmation of the CoA. Can you recall what comprises the CoA? Sino
members nyan? 12 from the Lower House, 12 from the Senate and 1 Senate President.
Lets go to ad-interim appointments. The second paragraph of Sec 16 provides that the president shall have the power
to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The 2 nd paragraph of Sec 16 refers to
ad-interim appointments. Take note that it is in relation to the session or recess of the Congress. When an appointment is made
during the time when the Congress is in recess, whether voluntary or compulsory, its called an ad-interim appointment.
Question: If the president will appoint the commissioner of the Bureau of Customs while the Congress is in recess, is it an adinterim appointment? No. The general rule is that the power to appoint is exclusive to the president without the need of the
participation of the Congress. So when you talk about recess, it means that these are appointments which require the participation
of the Congress, otherwise it is irrelevant whether the Congress is in recess or in session. So when we talk about ad-interim
appointments, what kinds of appointments are we talking about? We are referring to only those appointments which require the
confirmation of the CoA. Meaning, only those appointments in the first sentence. Otherwise, whether the Congress is in session
or not, it is immaterial to the power of the President to appoint.
Matipag v. Benipayo
In this case President Arroyo appointed ad-interim the Chairman of the COMELEC Benipayo and his commissioners.
They took their oaths and started discharging their functions. While in the discharge of their functions, Benipayo reassigned
Matipag. Matipag questioned the reassignment. Now it is good to know that their ad-interim appointment was later on bypassed.
Meaning the CoA did not act on that appointment. One of the questions of Matipag is that the appointment of Benipayo and the
rest are invalid because under the Constitution, it is prohibited to appoint the Chairman and the commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions in a temporary capacity. So it is his contention that an ad-interim appointment is an appointment that
is temporary. So the appointee is holding the office in a temporary capacity, which is prohibited by the Constitution when it
comes to Constitutional commissioners. Is his contention correct? The Supreme Court said that an appointment ad-interim is a
regular appointment. It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. What do you mean by regular appointment? It
means that the appointee enjoys security of tenure and can only be removed by cause provided by the Constitution. What are the
causes for the termination or the removal of that appointee? Under Sec 16 Par 2, the appointment may be terminated only for 2
causes: 1. The CoA disapproves the appointment upon its next session. 2. It is terminated when the CoA fails to act on that
appointment and adjourns without acting on the appointment. It is what we call as a bypass. So in other words there is no
violation of the Constitutional prohibition on appointing constitutional commissioners in a temporary or acting capacity because
the nature of his appointments are regular appointments.
The next issue in Matipag v. Benipayo is the propriety of the act of the President in appointing and reappointing adinterim the same officers. What happened here? Arroyo appointed Benipayo et al ad interim. Walang Congress, mag-appoint
ako. When the Congress was in session, the CoA did not act on the appointment. It was bypassed. Upon adjournment, what
happens to the appointment? It is terminated. So ad interim again. Nag-adjourn sila. The president again appointed the same
people. Question: Can a person whose appointment has been bypassed by the CoA be reappointed? Yes. Bypassing is different
from being rejected or disapproved. When the CoA disapproves an appointment, it is a final decision on such an appointment. So
it has decided that he will be rejected. Meaning that thereafter, he is a reject and he can no longer be reappointed to the same
position. When it becomes bypassed however, there is no final determination yet of his final appointment. What happens is that
merely the CoA failed to act on it for some reason or another, saying that hindi sila nag-meeting, hindi sila nag constitute. There
will be several reasons but the bottom line is that it has not acted on the appointment. Therefore there is no final determination on
the appointment and reappointed can be done.
Another tactic na ginawa ni Arroyo. There are appointees that sometimes the President believes will be rejected by the
CoA. But she needs to fill the vacancy. There is an urgency to fill that vacancy especially if the Congress is in session. She
cannot do the prior tactic of appointing only during recess. In the case of Pimentel v. Ermita, the Congress was in session. So
whoever she appoints as secretary will need to be approved by the CoA. But she has this feeling that they will be disapproved. So
what did she do? She appointed 8 persons to fill the office of the department secretaries, but in an acting capacity. Officer-incharge.
Question: Is it necessary for these appointments to be subjected to the confirmation of the CoA? Answer: No. So this is
what I mean when I said that what the presidency is depends largely on who is the president. And the power of the president is so
vast that the president can test the limits of the Constitution, which is what Arroyo did in this case. Sometimes this is done for
political compromises. Sometimes the President will appoint, the CoA will hesitate to disapprove for some reason or another, so
as not to disappoint the President, they will just bypass the appointment. But bottom line, if it is ad-interim or bypass, there is no
prohibition on reappointment. If the appointment is in an acting capacity, there is no need for the confirmation of the CoA.
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all Executive Department, Bureaus and Offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
The mere fact that it is provided in section 17 in the Constitution means that the POWER OF CONTROL is a power that can in
fact specifically granted or provided by the Constitution to the President , its source is constitutional.
THE POWER OF CONTROL
The President therefore given by the Constitution the Power to Control all Executive Department Bureaus and Offices
under him. The control is not just over the Department Head but also over the subordinates of his department heads. What do you
mean by the power of control ?? The Power of Control is the Power of the President to ALTER, to MODIFY or to ANNUL the
acts of his subordinate officers and the power to substitute his judgment or decision of the latter for that of the former. So the
President therefore extend his power to modify an act and even to substitute his own judgment. The Presidents power of control
is directly exercised by him over the Members of the Cabinet. His Members of the Cabinet in turn also have the power of control
over the bureaus and offices under their respective jurisdiction. Now, this constitutional grant of the power of control is now
executing , meaning there is no need for a statutory enactment for the President to exercise this power nor can the legislative
department limit this power or withdraw this power of the President. The President obviously is just a single person in the
Executive Department so he cannot be expected to perform all this multi-various functions of that Central government.
Therefore, he has authority to have assistance or agents who we call his alter-egos, these are specifically his secretaries or the
department heads.
Corollary to the power of control therefore is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency , agency meaning that these
secretaries are not only his assistants but are in fact his agents. Under the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which
recognizes the establishment of a single Executive, because we only have one executive, and not executive organizations are
adjuncts of the executive department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the chief
executive. And in certain cases where the chief executive is required by the Constitution or by law to act in person or the situation
demand that he act personally the multi-various executive and administrative functions of the chief executive are performed by
and through the executive departments and the acts of the secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President , presumptively the acts of the President
himself. Its called agency because they are acting in behalf the President. Alter-egos because they are themselves supposed to
be the Presidents. The President can disapprove or reprobate their act precisely because of the power of control, so they go
together.
Lacson vs Pao
Here the law provides that the decision of the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or an appeal
from the director of lands is already FINAL. Can his decision be still appealed to the Office of the President and can this decision
be modified by the President through his Executive Secretary. Take note that it is in fact that the Executive Secretary modifies the
decision. The executive secretary is the auxiliary unit which assists the President. Can the President through his Executive
Secretary still modify the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources where the law says that the decision is
already FINAL, the answer is YES because of the Power of Control and relate it with the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.
Under the Law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is just the alter-ego of the President and his acts are valid only
if the President will not disapprove or reprobate them but still these are the acts of the President himself. Bottom-line therefore,
notwithstanding the Statutory Provision making the decision of the Department Secretary Final, it is still within the authority of
the President to on these decisions whether to disapprove, modify or annul them, so this is the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency and the Power of Control.
De Leon vs. Carpio
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) determines the termination of these officers under the NBI to have been made by
the former Secretary of Justice, without jurisdiction or in violation to Constitution. In short the Civil Service ordered the
reinstatement of these terminated officials of the NBI, the problem is the NBI Director(Director Carpio) refused to act on this
decision of the CSC, because for him the CSC has no jurisdiction and the decision of the prior Secretary is already valid and
cannot be altered by the CSC. Now, he returned the order of the CSC without acting in it. The CSC, later sent another letter to the
NBI Director stating that the decision of the CSC is final, therefore he is ordered by the CSC to reinstate the NBI agents. He still
refused to reinstate them still contending that the CSC has no jurisdiction. This time the Department of Justice Secretary ordered
him to reinstate the employees pursuant to CSC order. He directly defy the order of the DOJ Secretary which he says that the
DOJ Secretary has no jurisdiction over this case, that it has no authority to declare the prior act of the DOJ Secretary as invalid
or unconstitutional. The NBI under the structural composition of the Government is under the DOJ, the NBI Director therefore is
a subordinate of the DOJ Secretary. When the DOJ Secretary gave that directive to comply with the CSC order, he does that in
the regular course of his duties and functions, thus he is doing that as alter-ego of the President, and so the NBI Director has no
freedom to violate or defy that directive because of his own beliefs of facts or conclusions of law. In this case, it illustrates that
even Secretaries in turn have Power of Control over their subordinates.
Bermudez vs. Torres
Bermudez here was recommended by the Secretary of Justice for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. The President,
however, appointed another person as the Provincial Prosecutor. Now, under the Administrative code of the Philippines, the
appointment of the Provincial or City Prosecutors is vested in the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
When the President appointed the person who is not recommended by the Secretary of Justice is his act invalid? We relate that in
the Power of Control, that it includes the Power to disregard the acts of his subordinate. In fact, based on that power, he will
personally do the acts which are vested with his Secretaries or subordinates. When you say upon the recommendation by the
Secretary of Justice therefore, it should be taken to him only upon the advice of the Secretary and it has only persuasive value
rather than a necessary requirement for the appointment. Besides, when the law grants the President the Power to appoint it
necessarily carries with it the power or freedom to select who to appoint, he should not be limited to the recommendations. So,
the term recommendation should have persuasive value rather than making it as a strict limitation to the power of the President to
appoint.
Constantino vs. Quisha
This is the authority in saying that the power of the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans does not fall
within the exceptional task of cases which may not be dedicated. Therefore, the President may dedicate the power to guarantee
and contract foreign loans in behalf of the Philippines to another officer like his Secretary of Finance. The Power to Contract and
Guarantee Loans is not a power that should be personally performed by the President, this may be dedicated. Besides, there is a
limitation that the Secretary is bound to secure the Presidents prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts.
The Power of the President to Control must be exercised under the prescriptions of existing laws. Where the law
providing for some limitations that is not unconstitutional or invalid, the President is still bound to comply with this law.
MMDA vs. Dion
The President Arroyo issued an executive order providing for the establishment of the Greater Manila Mass Transport
System. The project involved the Mass Transport Terminal facilities. She dedicated the MMDA to implement this project, in turn
MMDA issued a resolution for the closure of private bus terminals along EDSA, and so the resolution was questioned.
Ultimately, the question is, does the President have the Power to dedicate this, the function relating to transportation, with
MMDA? What is the nature of the authority of MMDA? Under the Administrative Code of the Philippines, when it comes to
performance of programs and projects of transportation, it is the DOTC which is specifically created by the Congress for this
purpose. So the question is, can she dedicate it other than DOTC which is the MMDA? For me I think there will be no problem
if the MMDA has the authority and power over these programs and projects for transportation. But here it was already been
lodged with the DOTC. Whats the power of MMDA? So in deciding this case the Supreme Court has to analyze the extent of the
power of MMDA. The MMDA is an administrative office, merely a development authority. Basic to its function, is only limited
to formulation of monitoring policies. It has no police power nor does it have any delegated legislative authority to enact
resolutions just like local Sangguniangs. it has no powers and functions that are covered by the powers and functions of the
DOTC. In other words, when the President exercise her power of control and Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, in this case
she can only do so when she delegates it to the proper office which is the DOTC.
POWER TO REMOVE
Now, lets go to the Power to Remove. Is the power to remove source from the Power of Control? Does it mean that
when the person has the power of control, he has the power to remove the subordinate?
The ultimate question is, does the power of control include the power to remove? The power of control is more focused
on the acts of the subordinate and not on the actor. The power of control simply means that the President may set aside the
judgment or actions of that person but not set aside the person. The power to remove does not come from the power of control.
The power to remove is sourced from the power to appoint.
Angco vs. Castillo
The petitioner here is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee. Under the
law, his appointment was vested upon and he was appointed by the Secretary of Finance. So, can he be removed from service by
the President based on the power of control or is he protected by the laws, rules and regulations of the CSC? His investigation,
termination, suspension is covered by CSCs laws, rules and regulations. The SC acknowledged that there is some point in the
argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers or
employees who belong to the executive department but, this is only if they are presidential appointees. If he is the appointing
authority then he is also the removing authority. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) has no authority or jurisdiction over the
actions like suspension, disciplinary action or removal of Presidential appointees.
POWER TO RE-ORGANIZE
Does the President have the power to re-organize the Executive Department? The Supreme Court has been consistent in
ruling that the power to re-organize is an adjunct in the power of control. What do we mean by re-organization? It involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, and abolition thereof by reason of economy redundancy of functions. The idea is
that, when you organize, you alter an existing structure, government offices or units. Under the Philippine Structure, within the 3
departments, who has the authority to create offices? It is the Legislative Department or the Congress. The power to create carries
with it the power to abolish, but with this power to re-organize, the President can also abolish offices because he has the power to
re-organize to the point of consolidating offices. Is this a usurpation of Legislative authority? NO, because in fact, the President is
granted by law a continuing authority to re-organize the executive department of re-organize his office. What is that law? The
Administrative Code of the Philippines Section 31:The President subject to the policy of the executive office and in order to
achieve simplicity and economy efficiency has the continuing authority to re-organize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. The goal is simplicity, economy and efficiency, because sometimes some offices are already not effective or
cannot respond immediately the current needs of the society. In the words of the SC, the law grants the President this power
because the office of the president is the nerve center of the executive branch. To remain effective and efficient the office of the
president should be capable of being shaped and re-shaped by the President in the manner that is fit to carry on his directive and
policies. The president should have leeway to use the offices under the office of the President and then remove those offices
which are already obsolete, not functioning or ineffective.
ANAK Mindanao vs. Executive
The SC validated the act of the President of transferring the PCUP and NCIP from the office of the president to DAR.
These offices questioned the authority of the President because according to them, these offices are created pursuant to law
therefore only the law or Congress has the power to transfer these offices to other department. The SC said that the President has
the continuing authority to re-organize when it comes to the offices under the office of the President proper.
DENR vs. DENR Employees
The DENR Secretary transferred the Regional office of DENR from Cotabato City to Coronadal City. The employees
of course are affected by the transfer mostly because they are dislocated because the transfer is affected during the middle of
school year. They said that the Secretary of DENR has no authority to transfer. Is it a correct contention? No, since the Secretary
is the alter-ego of the President then he can also perform as which can be performed by the President directly the power to reorganize unless the President will disapprove or reprobate his actions, then his acts are valid, so he acts within his jurisdiction.
Buklod vs. Zamora
President Aquino established the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau. Estrada issued another executive
order when its his term deactivating that Bureau and in its lieu he created the Presidential Advice Task Force. Those employees
who are affected some of them were no longer absorbed of the new office. The SC ruled that the President has the authority to reorganize.
Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Its function particularly the Investigative and Adjudicatory Commission, is to investigate allegations of graft and
corruption against the administrative officers of the President. In this case, Pichay was made a respondent in an administrative
case for grave abuse of authority. He questions the authority of ODESLA because ODESLA is the new office taking on the
function of the defunct PAGCI of President Arroyo. He questions the abolition of PAGCI and the creations of this Investigative
and Adjudicatory Commission: The president usurp the legislative authority to create offices. The SC ruled that the President has
the continuing authority to re-organize. This power to re-organize includes the power to create and abolish, the power to
consolidate or merge, he has virtually free hand when it comes to the offices under the office of the President proper. Another
contention of Pichay is that section 31 only mentions, abolition, consolidation or merge but nothing of creation of a office. Can
the President create? The SC said that there is no creation; the ODESLA is already an existing office in the existing structure of
the office of the President. It is merely given another function to investigate alleged graft and corruption. Theres no creation of
office but in order to perform its functions it made a new division. When you say re-organization it only an already existing
structure of the government, but if it is entirely new then that is usurpation of authority.
Biraugo vs. Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)
The SC found out that the PTC is an entirely new office, it is a public office, and therefore the Congress can only create
the public office. It cannot be justified under the continuing authority of the President because as we mention earlier it does not
include the power to create. But is the creation invalid? The SC said that NO, although it cannot be justified under the reorganization power or power of control, its creation is justified in the second sentence of section 17: He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. In the exercise of its authority to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed the President may create
or authorize investigations to aid him in making his decisions regarding the acts of his officers. It is in our history to have these
truth commissions or whatever you call it is already practiced by our Presidents under temporary capacity. Does it usurp the
function of the ombudsman and the DOJ? It does not because it does not exercise quasi-judicial function nor it does have the
authority to find probable cause for the filing of cases. It is merely an investigatory body, at most it can assist the DOJ or the
ombudsman. But why does the PTC defunct? Yes, the President can create it but the SC invalidated it based on the functions that
it has been given. Why? It is because the investigation is limited only to the officials of the previous administration. It
discriminates officers of Arroyos administration and only these officers. It is invalidated because of the violation of equal
protection laws.
Section 18. The president shall be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call on such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion.
That is the ordinary power of the president as commander-in-chief that whenever it is necessary, he may call on such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, while the public
safety require it, he may or may be given 60 days to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. So you read the rest of the provision.
The president, as we know, is not a member of the military. He is a civilian. But as a principle, the civilian is at all times
supreme over the military. Thus, the head of the military, whether it be the ceremonial leader or administrative is the president or
is placed in the presidency.
Now, what are the commander-in-chief powers of the president under the constitution? Take note, this is not the
executive power as it is. Only that the constitution places upon the president to be the commander-in-chief of the military. Under
section 18, what are the commander-in-chief powers under the constitution?
First, as I have mentioned earlier, it is part of his ordinary commander-in-chief power to call out the armed forces
anytime to suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion whenever it becomes necessary. The calling out of the military is
really in the full discretion of the President. It is not subject to judicial review because it is part of the ordinary power of the
president as commander-in-chief. Under section 18, however, he may go beyond that power of calling out the armed forces in
case of suppression of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion because in some instances under the constitution, provided in the
constitution, he may exercise extra-ordinary powers. What are these extra-ordinary powers?
First is to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the other one is the power to impose martial law. Why did I emphasize
that these are extra-ordinary powers? Its because these powers are not exercised every time at the discretion of the president. The
grounds are specific. Again, with regards to the calling out of the armed forces, the authority to decide whether a necessity has
risen belongs exclusively to the president and his decision is, in fact, conclusive upon all persons.
Going to the extra-ordinary powers of the president, first, what do you understand by a writ of habeas corpus? A writ is
an order. Corpus is a body, so habeas corpus is an order to bring the body. This essential object therefore is required in all matters
of involuntary restraint and to relieve the person therefrom from such restraint which is illegal. How can you put this in actual
operation or application? For example, during the time of Marcos, there were several anti-Marcos movements or anti-Marcos
activists. Now, they disappeared and it turned out that they became political detainees. They were arrested without charges and,
in fact, imprisoned without charges. What was their intention not to question said illegal restraint? It would not be possible
because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus then was also suspended. In other words, the court cannot issue the writ when
the privilege is suspended. So when the court cannot issue the writ, no one can question illegal arrest. No one can require the
military, for example, to bring the body of the person or to explain why he is detained. That is why this is crucial.
What is, on the other hand, martial law? Martial law is also called military rule. So this is the exercise of the power
vested in the executive department. The object is to preserve order and ensure the public safety in times of emergency when other
branches of the government are unable to function or if their functioning will itself threaten the public safety. It is the law of
necessity to be prescribed and administered by the executive power.
What is the scope of what the president can do or what the chief executive can do at times of martial law or declaration
of martial law? Anything that would be for the preservation of the public safety and public order. So, in fact when the martial law
is declared, some rights that are protected by the Bill of Rights may be curtailed. For example, the right to peaceful assembly and
the freedom of speech. These may be curtailed during this time if it is necessary to preserve public safety and order. That is why
it is very dangerous to grant the chief executive the power to declare martial law but it is also necessary in times of emergency. It
comes as a matter of necessity. Thus, under the 1987 constitution, we have somehow limited the powers of the chief executive
when he exercises these extraordinary powers of either suspending the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law.
Lets go back to what martial law is under the Marcos rule. In Philippine history, we have that experience of martial
law under Marcos. So based on jurisprudence, it has validated martial law and what happened then at the time of Marcos. First,
according to jurisprudence, it was valid. The martial law proclamation was validly deemed on the basis of an existing rebellion
which turned out later in an administrative hearing that his kidnapping which was the catalyst of the martial law may be staged.
Second now, the imposition of martial law carried with it (around that time under the 1935 and 1973 constitutions) the
suspension of the privileged writ of habeas corpus. They go together. Third, the martial law administrator could legislate under
Marcos rule. The martial law administrator could legislate at any matter related to the welfare of the nation. That is why during
that time, he executed several presidential decrees. Fourth, he could create military tribunals and these military tribunals will
have jurisdiction over civilians even for civil offenses, not military offenses. Fifth, even in the absence of acts of
constitutionality, he could even proposed amendments to the constitution which was what happened and which was the reason
why we have the 1973 constitution. He proposed amendments and because it was martial law during that time, he made it
possible for the amendments to be ratified by the people. There are other several amendments also in the 1973 constitution.
Based on this experience, we have put several limitations on the power of the chief executive to exercise his
commander-in-chief powers, particularly in the exercise of his extra-ordinary powers. So under section 18, we have narrowed
now the grounds for the imposition of the martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Whereas
before, under the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, the grounds would include invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or even imminent
danger thereof. Meaning, if it is still about to happen, then the president when the public safety requires it, may declare martial
law.
Under the 1987 constitution, what is required is actual invasion or actual rebellion. Not only that, it must be qualified
by a threat to public safety. So first, there must be actual invasion or rebellion when public safety requires it. Second, under the
1987 constitution, we have also limited the discretion of the President and put it under review-the review powers of the Congress
and the Supreme Court. Whereas in the 1973 constitution, the Supreme Court cannot review the power of the president to declare
martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ, under section 18, when the president declares martial law or suspends the
privilege of the writ, several domino effects as to obligations or mandatory duties of the president, congress, and supreme court
will vacate (11:37).
So when the president declares martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ, he is required by section 18 to submit
in person or in writing to the congress within 48 hours within the proclamation or suspension of the writ. He has to make a report.
After that, the congress has to vote. Voting jointly by a vote of at least a majority of all its members in a regular or special
session, what can the congress do? The Congress may either revoke the proclamation or suspension or extend the proclamation or
suspension upon the initiative of the president. If the congress does not revoke it and just let it be, the constitution also provides
for the duration. It is only up to 60 days. So 60 days or earlier if revoked and in 60 days or longer if extended. The initial
formation of martial law therefore is with the President subject to revocation by the congress or extension by the congress.
Now, what is the role of the Supreme Court? This is in case of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ. When the President exercises his extra-ordinary powers, the supreme court may review in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizens the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof and is required to promulgate its decision within 30 days from its
filing. The Supreme Court therefore can also review the declaration but to what extent? Only as to the factual basis of the
declaration. If there is sufficient factual basis, then it can no longer question the decision of the president in declaring martial law
or suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
This was in the wake of the Oakwood mutiny where Senator Trillanes became popular. Here, in the wake of this
Oakwood mutiny, President Arroyo issued a presidential proclamation and an order, both declaring a state of rebellion.
Thereafter, she called out the armed forces of the Philippines to suppress the rebellion. The question is Is it necessary for the
president to declare a state of rebellion. Another question would be Is it within the power of the president to declare a state of
rebellion? Because under section 18, she may only declare martial law. So, is it within the power of the president as
commander-in-chief to declare a state of rebellion? The Supreme Court explained that the calling out of the armed forces by the
president is just an exercise of the ordinary power of the president as commander-in-chief. She may call out the armed forces
whenever she deems it necessary to suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. This is an ordinary power of the president
which is not subject to judicial review. When she declared a state of rebellion, what shes doing is just giving notice to the nation
that such state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. In fact, in the exercise of her ordinary
powers, there is no need to such a declaration. This, according to the Supreme Court, is a superfluity. Its superfluous. Its too
much. There is no need to make the declaration that there is a state of rebellion.
Nonetheless, when such declaration is made, there should be no effects as to the constitutional rights. So there is no
effect changing the systems that are, in case, it cannot violate or diminish constitutionally protected rights. There is nothing to it.
Its just an ordinary power of the president to call out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. Its
not the same as declaration of martial law. This case came up because we are so allergic with anything that has to do with martial
law or anything that resembles martial law. That is why this case really made an impact for fear that it is an exercise of
declaration of martial law. The Supreme Court said that it is not.
IBP vs. Zamora
Estrada called out the marines to conduct visibility patrols in Metro Manila because of the alarming increase in
criminality rates. It is just a calling out of the armed forces and not an exercise of the extra-ordinary power of the President. The
question here, Can the supreme court review the factual basis? Remember that under section 18, we said that the role of the
Supreme Court in case of declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, is to review in a proper proceeding
the factual basis. Take note that the review of the factual basis is true only when the President exercises his extra-ordinary
powers. In this case, what was the President exercising? Just an ordinary power of calling out the armed forces. So the Supreme
Court is trying to say that when he exercises this discretion or this discretionary power, which is solely vested on his wisdom, the
court cannot be called upon to override the presidents wisdom or substitute his vote. This is fully discretionary of the president,
thus it is beyond judicial review. The only time that the Supreme Court can review this is, following its authority, when there is
allegation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, there is factual basis. But in this case
you do not have a factual basis because he declared a state of rebellion. You cannot do that. He merely called the armed forces
which is fully discretionary of him. So thats the ruling of the Supreme Court.
Lacson vs. Perez
Here, another incident happened under Arroyos administration. There was an attempt by the rallyists to break into
malacanang. Here, President Arroyo again declared a state of rebellion. The same issue of Can the Court look into the factual
basis of the exercise of the power by the President in calling out the armed forces to suppress rebellion? Remember that in IBP
v. Zamora, 2000 case, the Supreme Court said it cannot. It is fully discretionary power of the President. But in this case decided
in 2001, the Supreme Court said yes but look at how it reached its decision. The factual necessity of calling out the armed
forces is not easily quantifiable and certain pertinent information might be difficult to direct cross or might not actually be
available to courts in the exercise of the presidents power of calling out the armed forces, on-the-spot decisions, and making
imperative and entirely necessary decisions in emergency situations. In proper cases, the court may look into the factual basis of
the legislative power, however, it is no longer feasible because the case has already been filed. What kind of decision is this?
Parang binayot. It can but its difficult. It can but its not longer feasible. The state of rebellion has already been lifted. It can but
the information may not be available.
Compare this with the 2000 decision (IBP v. Zamora), the Supreme Court said facedown that it cannot because it is an
exercise of something that is within full discretion of the President. Otherwise, if the supreme court can substitute its judgment of
the president, it would be an encroachment on the power of the president, which is a violation of the separation of powers. What
did section 18 provide? The Supreme court can only review the factual basis in case of declaration of martial law or in case of
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thats it. For me, IBP v. Zamora is the more logical decision of the
Supreme court because if you really look at Lacson v. Perez, its just saying in a proper case, the court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the power but the proper case is, under section 18, only in the exercise of
extra-ordinary powers of the president.
Now, what are the effects of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus? Under the
Legaspi paragraphs (23:16), a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the constitution. This third paragraph is
touched in the negative. Meaning, these are prohibited. These are more on prohibitions. So the state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the constitution. It does not supplant the functioning of the functioning of civil courts or legislative
agencies. It does not authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies where civil courts are able to
function. It does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. See? It practically rejects the thought of
jurisprudence that we once have under the martial law of Marcos. It no longer automatically suspends the privilege of the writ.
Military courts no longer have jurisdiction over civilians. The constitution does not suspend the functioning of civil courts and
legislative bodies.
Olaguer vs. Miltary Commission
This was decided in 1987 immediately after the creation of the 1987 constitution, which is the landmark case or
authority in stating that military tribunals do not have jurisdiction over civilians even during martial law. This is practically
debunking its earlier decision against Ninoy Aquino, who was tried before a military tribunal and it is in this case that the
supreme court said that the military tribunal has jurisdiction over him. So it overturned its earlier decision. So, this is Olaguer v.
Military Commission. The words of the dissenting justice are now the words used as a majority opinion. They now quoted Justice
Teehankee (25:49) who was then dissenting the majority decision at that time. So, civilians are not to be tried by military courts
because the constitution guarantees them due process. Due process means trial for judicial means. Now, the military tribunals are
under the executive department. It is a system put in place for the president to control the actions of the military, the discipline of
the military. So, it is suppose just for the military. It uses the rule of law. It uses laws true only to the military. It cannot therefore
be used to try civilians. You are, say, tried for murder and you are tried before a military tribunal. The rules therein to be used are
within the executive department. The executive implement the laws and the rules. It cannot therefore also be the judge. So, here
theres also a violation of separation of powers. Military tribunals are provided by the legislature for the president as the
commander-in-chief to aid him in commanding the army and navy, and not to try civilians.
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
During the anniversary of the EDSA People Revolution I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017,
which resembles the declaration of martial law by Marcos. Thats why we said that we are so sensitive and allergic to anything
that resembles martial law. The proclamation was also elevated for questioning by the Supreme Court. So the President said, I,
hereby command the AFP, as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Philippines, to suppress all acts of lawless
violence as well as any acts of civilians..... (28:34) and as provided in section 17, I hereby declare a state of national emergency.
So the president here declared a state of national emergency but in place of what happened thereafter, they questioned it as
already a declaration of martial law. Why? Because after that, in place of the declaration, the police already implemented orders
of foreclosure of certain publications. Oblate assemblies were alternately disbanded and prohibited. I think it was also that
Guingona was among those bombarded with water guns to disband the assembly based on this declaration. Arrests and seizures
were made without judicial warrants.
So the first question is, Is this declaration a declaration of martial law? The supreme court said that if you read the
declaration, it is merely a declaration that there is an existing emergency. Theres nothing more to it. Its just like the state of
rebellion that the president is merely announcing to the public that there is such a condition-that there is a national emergency. It
is not by itself a declaration of martial law. So, its not invalid. Its proper. But, may the president issue decrees during the
existence of national emergency? Because it is stated here to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees promulgated by
the president. To this extent that the president can issue or promulgate decrees, this proclamation is invalid. The president can no
longer issue decrees even in a state of emergency, much more in a state of declaration of martial law. On the ground that the
president can issue decrees, this proclamation is invalid. So, even considering that after the proclamation, the police and the
military arrested individuals without warrant, they foreclosed offices, the proclamation can be judged as unconstitutional
(31:15) on the basis of these illegal acts. The proclamation itself is not illegal. But the acts are illegal. So, the focus would be the
declaration of the acts as illegal rather than the declaration of the promulgation as illegal. So, the Supreme Court maintains that
the presidential proclamation 1017 is not illegal because the president may call out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence,
rebellion, or invasion but it is illegal insofar as it grants the president authority to issue decrees. But as far as the legality of the
police and the militarys actions are concerned, these are separate. These should not make the proclamation illegal.
Section 19 provides the executives power of executive clemency. Note that there is a reason why they separate
paragraphs 1 and 2:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this constitution, the president may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, AFTER conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the congress.
So, in paragraph 1, all these are acts of the president alone but these can be exercised only after conviction by
final judgment. So, paragraph 1 provides for executive clemency such as reprieves, commutations, pardons, remissions,
and forfeitures. These can be done by the president alone but only after conviction by final judgment. In the second
paragraph, the president can also grant amnesties. Now, he can do this with the concurrence of the majority vote of the
congress. Amnesties may be granted before or after conviction by final judgment.
What was the purpose of allowing the president to grant executive clemencies such as those enumerated in
section 19? This is a tacit admission that human experience are not perfect and there are infirmities in the
administration of justice. The power therefore exists as instrumental for correcting these infirmities. But is there more
noble purpose for allowing the president to grant executive clemencies? Sometimes, it is for mitigating whatever
harshness might be generated by the stringent application of the law. Sometimes also, it is more expedient than
prosecuting the accused. Sometimes also, it is necessary to grant executive clemency of amnesty to unite the people.
Example is amnesty for rebels. Instead of prosecuting them one by one, invite them to go back to the mainstream
society. Instead of prosecuting them one by one, its more expedient and gives far better results. So, these are the
functions of executive clemencies.
In fact, recall your article 5 in the revised penal code when the judge thinks that the strict application of law
will result to undue harshness, what will be the option of the judge? He has no option but to impose the penalty even if
its harsh but he is enjoined to recommend to the president that this person be given pardon. This is one of the functions
of the president that cannot be delegated. This cannot be exercised by an alter ego like say the Department of Justice
will determine who will be entitled to pardon between etc etc. This is something that the president must personally
perform himself.
What are the forms of executive clemencies under section 19? We have reprieves, commutations, forfeitures,
remissions, and of course pardon and then amnesty. What is a reprieve? It is a postponement of an execution that
depends to a day certain. So abstain execution. In other words, prolonging the ruling. The punishment will still be
implemented. Thats reprieve.
Echegaray vs. Secretary
Remember Echegaray? He was the first person to be convicted and penalized under the death penalty law.
Now, his conviction was already final and decided by the Supreme Court. He filed a motion for reconsideration.
Theres already a schedule for his execution, so he filed a motion for execution that maybe his execution will be
transferred to another date because he heard that there is a going to be a law-that the bill that the congress is preparingrevoking the death penalty law. So because of that, the Supreme Court rendered (37:34) this motion. The question is
that this is also decreed, right? Isnt the Supreme Court encroaching upon the presidents power to tend (38:03) the
decree? That the President can exercise the decree does not mean that the Supreme Court cannot also exercise its
powers under the constitution to control its judgments. It is still within the authority of the Supreme Court to issue or
promulgate orders regarding the rights even of convicts. Even a convict has some rights. Now this can be under the
judicial power of the Supreme Court to govern as long as it is within its limit of jurisdiction. In the same way that the
congress cannot so enact a law repealing the death penalty. In other words, it also has the effect of pardon but it doesnt
mean that they have encroached upon each others power.
Commutation would be an issue in the part of punishment as substitution of a penalty for the one originally
imposed. Say the penalty is forty years and then commuted to destierro. Thats commutation.
Another form is remission of fines and forfeitures. So this merely prevents to the collection of fines or
confiscation of property. But if the fines were already collected or the properties were already forfeited and then they
are already in the hands of a third party, it cannot work to get this money or property from the third party.
Pardon, on the other hand, exempts an individual from punishment the law attached to the crime he has
committed. So here, there is already a determination that he has committed a crime. He is guilty thereof but he is
exempted from being punished. Thats pardon. Now, it already is an act of generosity. What is the effect of pardon?
Monsanto v. Factoran
It explained that pardon does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and conviction thereof. It
releases, however, the party from all punitive penalties as consequences to his criminal act. Even accessory penalties
such as disqualification or disabilities based on the finding of the Court. Pardon looks into the future. It forgives but it
does not forget. Pardon may be relieved from the disability of advisory of teachers (41:32) which end up to
conviction until it reached the state of bad character. Pardon does not use of fact to restore convicted felon to public
office, necessarily forfeited by reason of the conviction. In this case of Monanto v. Factoran, the accused here was an
assistant treasurer. Before conviction, she was pardoned. There was already a conviction but it was appealed, so
pending appeal, she was pardoned. Now, part of the accessory penalty of her conviction is disqualification from
service. Since she was pardoned instead, the disqualification no longer exists. Therefore,... (42:28). The Supreme Court
here explained that pardon looks forward. It forgives but it does not forget. It does not forget that you are an assistant
treasurer and you committed malversation of funds. In other words, what it means by removal or disqualification is that
you may be allowed to re-apply. You are not disqualified to apply for public office but it does not mean that
automatically you are reinstated.
Garcia vs. Chairman of COA
He is a public official. Now in Monsanto v. Factoran, we have said that pardon is generally regarded as ?
(43:18) so that in the eyes of the law the offender is innocent as though you have not committed the offense. It does not
however... It looks forward. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon
may release an individual from all the benefits... unless expressly granted upon innocence. In this case of Garcia v.
Chairman of COA, a public officer here was administratively dismissed. Theres an administrative decision dismissing
him from service on the ground of dishonesty. Based on the facts of that case, a criminal case was filed against him...
The court said he is innocent. So based on the decision of the trial court, the president granted him pardon in the
administrative dismissal. Now, since his pardon was based on this innocence, the result or consequence would be
different from Monsanto. In this case, he would be entitled to reinstatement and back wages. Here also you can see that
pardon is applicable not only in criminal cases but also in administrative cases because in Garcia v. Chairman,
involved is an administrative case dismissing an employee.
Article VII Sec 18 2nd to the last paragraph
The suspension of the privilege of the writ (Habeas Corpus) shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
So in other words, if youre not a rebel and you are not part of the invading party then you need not fear because you are not
affected with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
If you are arbitrarily detained, you can still go to court and question your detention because notwithstanding the suspension the
right remains to question your arbitrary detention. It will only affect those judicially charged for rebellion or directly connected
with invasion.
Last paragraph.. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
If you are studying the RPC, there is a provision there on arbitrary detention, meaning, authorities can just detain you
for these number of hours depending on the offense allegedly committed, if they exceeded on that number of hours, they have to
be released if there is no charge. So this period, they have to be charged so as not to consider the detention arbitrary. For light
penalties the maximum number hour of detention is 12 hours, for correctional penalties 18 hours, for afflictive penalties 36 hours.
Within that maximum periods you have to be charged otherwise you have to be released. Now here in the last paragraph, you
have to be charged within 3 days meaning from 36 hours it is increased to 72 hours that is the only effect of the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Sec 19. (1) Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
(2) He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.

An amnesty is the grant of general pardon to a class of political blunders, also includes tax amnesty which is a general
pardon imposed upon persons in violation of any revenue or tax laws. So here it refers to absolute forgiveness or waiver on the
part of the government. For example an amnesty for rebels, it denotes forgiveness of the government. What is the difference of
pardon and amnesty when they are both forgiveness? When you say pardon, this is granted by the Chief Executive alone but
when you say amnesty, it can only be granted only when there is a concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
Pardon is a private act meaning you will apply to the President and the President will grant you pardon, and only the two of you
know that you are the pardonee, therefore, if your case is with the court or something you may plead that but you have to prove
that because pardon is a private act, it is between the president and the pardonee. While amnesty is a public act usually granted by
a presidential proclamation by amnesty, it is a public act therefore courts must take judicial notice of the amnesty because it is a
public act. Pardon is granted to one when before or after conviction? Only after conviction may pardon be granted but amnesty
may be granted before or after the institution of criminal prosecution or sometimes after conviction. So if you are a rebel
therefore there is no need to be filed a case against you because in fact you can apply for amnesty. Pardon looks forward, it only
relieves the person of the punishment because it is granted after conviction, the fact of conviction remains, you are only relieved
of the punishment, you are forgiven of the punishment while amnesty looks backward as if you have not committed the offense,
tax amnesty for example when you did not pay the estate tax of the deceased, there is a certain period that you have to pay the
estate tax but most of us fail to do it that case sometimes is a matter for tax amnesty it is as if you have not violated the tax law,
so if you are a rebel returnee it is as if you are not considered as a rebel. Amnesty abolishes or puts into oblivion the offense itself
pardon condones the infractions of the peace of the state so usually the ordinary crimes murder, homicide, old age and the like.
Amnesty is addressed to the crimes against the sovereignty of the State like political offenses wherein forgiveness is for
expedient for the public welfare that prosecution and punishment. Pardon is usually given to individuals but amnesty is given to a
class of persons. But for example you are a rebel forgiveness is not exclusively through amnesty, you may still be granted pardon.
Just to emphasize reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures can only be granted after
conviction by final judgment.
People vs. Casido
It provides for an example of how this can be applied, here, the accused was already convicted but he appealed his
conviction while his appeal is still pending he applied for pardon and it was granted take note the appeal is still pending he
applied for pardon and it was granted. What is the status of his pardon? It is void because the Constitution says pardons can only
be granted after conviction by final judgment, this convition is not yet final. Recall in Monsanto v. Factoran, where the Supreme
Court said that pardon amounts to abandonment of the appeal. The SC said in this case that the ruling in Monsanto v. Factoran is
merely an obiter because he should not have been granted pardon while the appeal was still pending. The correct ruling is that
any appeal pending and granting pardon is supposed to be invalid.
People vs. Patriarca
Patriarca is a member of the NPA, he appealed his case and applied for amnesty because there was a presidential
proclamation 347 granting amnesty to rebels, he applied. The amnesty was granted, what is now the effect of the grant of
amnesty to his appeal? Amnesty can be granted even before final conviction. This is the correct application of the Monsanto case,
the grant of amnesty would tantamount to the abandonment of the appeal. In the case of People v. Casido, the pardon was still
granted while the case was still pending appeal they file a motion to withdraw the appeal, the motion to withdraw must have been
done before the application of pardon hence already too late. To sum up, the following are Constitutional limits of the Executive
Clemency, first in case of impeachment, second the grant of reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures only after conviction by final judgment, third the grant of amnesty is with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress, four there is a provisiom on Art IX-C section 5 that no pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence
for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
COMELEC.
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall,
within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Section 20 grants the Chief Executive to contract or guarantee foreign loans, it is the Constitution itself that grants it to
the power of Chief Executive. Under the 1973 Constitution, the contracting or guarantee of loans is subject to the limitations of
the laws but during that time it is the contracting authority himself who make the laws. Under the 1987 Constitution this power is
still limited subject to the limitations of the law and it must be with the concurrence of the Monetary Board subject to the
limitations provided by law.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
It talks about treaties and international agreements which is within the authority of the Chief Executive but is not valid
without the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
The entering of treaties and international agreements is only one of the powers of the Chief Executive, other powers
include the power to appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain, power to recognize governments and to withdraw recognition, the power to
contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the RP, and the power to deport aliens. Treaty as defined in the Vienna
Convention is an international instrument concluded between states in written form and governed by international law. On other
words as long as it is an agreement between two or more states, the international law would consider it as a treaty regardless of
how it is titled or designated, it can be called an act, protocol, agreement, convention, exchange of notes, however, you may call
it as far as the international law is called a treaty but as far as we are concerned we must distinguish if it is a treaty or executive
agreement because if it is a treaty or international agreement the Constitution requires that it must be with the concurrence of 2/3
of the members of Senate but if it is an Executive Agreement something that is less formal than a treaty there is no need for the
concurrence of the Senate.
International agreements including political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of permanent character usually take the form of treaties example is the GATT, it involves some arrangement with
regards to our national policy on Filipino First Policy because it is a treaty we agree to welcome foreign goods and products so
that would be an example of a treaty. International agreements embodying adjustments of detail, well established national
policies and arrangements of foreigners staying in our country usually take the form of executive agreements, so they cover the
subjects such as inspections of the vessels, navigational dues, aircraft and customs matters, commercial relations, general
international claims, copyrights, trademarks, etc. Convention on the Laws of the Seas that should be in a form of a treaty,
arrangement is more or less permanent in character. Executive Agreements however do not require the concurrence of the Senate.
USAFFE vs. Treasurer
The Philippine Government undertook to return to the US government in 10 annual installments a total of 35 million
dollars advanced by the US to the National Defense Forces of the Philippines during this war the US gave us the budget but there
are some 35 million US dollars that were not spent in the war efforts so we enter into an agreement that we return it on
installment basis nagastosnasiguro, installment on 10 years so it is an agreement between the US and the Philippines, is it a
international agreement or a treaty or an executive agreement? Because in this case it was questioned for lacking the concurrence
of the Senate. This is as what you can see a mere executive agreement, it does not include political issues or changes of national
policy it is only a loan and does not require the concurrence of the Senate.
Commissioner vs. Gotamco
The host agreement of WHO because we are hosting the WHO in our country that agreement provides among others
that WHO will be exempted from certain taxes. Is that Host Agreement a treaty or an executive agreement? That does not
political issues or change of national policy. Is a less formal type of agreement with the WHO thus there is no need of
concurrence of the Senate.
Bayan vs. Executive
They are questioning the VFA as to which provision would govern Section 21 of Art VII or Section 25 of Article 18 provides:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
They are questioning the validity of the VFA in that it was stated in the transmittal of the President and needs the concurrence of
the Senate under Section 21 of Art VII, they contend that there is a provision that governs that under Section 25 of Art. 18, the
Supreme Court held that Art XVIII Sec. 25 is indeed the provision that govern the military bases, troops and facilities which is
subject of the VFA but it does not counter to Art VII Sec. 21. Section 25 Art 18 states military bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate so that phrase is
referring to Sec. 21 Art VII so there are no contradiction but there are other requirements when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.
Lets go to deportation power, The State has the power to deport undesirable aliens now who may exercise that power?
That power is based on jurisprudence and may be exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such action necessary for the
domestic tranquility of the nation, the Chief Executive can exercise it if he finds the aliens is staying in the country and is
injurious to public interest and he may even in the expressed absence of a law deport them.
Deportation power therefore is lodged exclusively in the President of the Philippines subject only to the Revised
Administrative Code and other future legislations and he has even full discretion to determine whether an alien is so undesirable
to affect the security or interest of the State, he has full discretion meaning that deportation proceedings are not within the
jurisdiction of the Courts it is the Chief Executive through the Bureau of Immigration which has the authority to determine facts
for the determination of propriety of deporting an alien the only requirement being that the President of the Philippines finds his
stay in the country injurious to the safety, welfare, and interest of the country.
Only discretionary means he has full authority so before when there is no yet expanded authority of the SC to
determine grave abuse of discretion maybe the President can deport an alien because he does not like his face is it allowed? Yes
because he has full discretion. They cannot do that right now because under the 1987 Constitution, the SC may check his

discretionary act on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, if you observe, there is no
provision in the Constitution which provides for the power to deport but jurisprudence would say that the power to deport is
inherent in the State and it is exercised by the Chief Executive who has the authority to secure the interest of the people. It is
fundamental that an executive order for the deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial commission in a case. The intention of
the law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion.
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis
of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures.
Section 22 is the authority of the President to prepare the budget which will now be the basis of the appropriations bill.
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any
other time.


Judicial Department
Art. VIII
Section 1. (1) The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
(2) Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Before judicial power is only to settle actual controversies in involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and now we have this expanded authority to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Judicial power
therefore is to settle actual controversies between adverse litigants. So if I ask you what is justiciable question as against political
question? Justiciable question would be under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Department but when you say political question it is
beyond the reach of the Judicial Department that would be your first distinction so based on section 1 it is justiciable if it involves
actual controversies and to determine grave abuse of discretion.
A purely justiciable question implies a given right that is legally demandable and enforceable, so there is a right, there
is an act violative of that right and there is a remedy granted by law. If any of these elements are absent, then it is not justiciable.
Again there is a right, a violation of that right, and a relief granted by law. Bottle of Softdrinks with an ipis inside, can you now
go the court and file your case and demand payment of damages, there has to be a right, a violation of that right and a relief
granted by law. If there is a right it would be the right to be served clean food, was there a violation? Yes if you drank it. As to
the damages that is another issue because you have to prove damage. Did you fell ill or sick. But if it does not happen there is no
justiciable controversy you are going to court in futility.
Buac vs. COMELEC
In this case a plebiscite was held to determine whether the constituency are for cityhood the result of the plebiscite is
NO. They dont want to become a city, the petitioner questioned the result alleging among others fraud in the election, etc etc. but
the bottomline is he does not agree with the result, he questions the NO. Is it justiciable or political questions, in this case if you
observe there is no respondent. Who will be called to answer this allegations? WALA. On this score alone there is no justiciable
question. He is questioning the vote of the people like the People of the Philippines ousting Marcos. Is the decision of the
majority a political question? You cannot go to the court now and saying that they are wrong in the voting for NO in other words
during the election the notoriously corrupt candidate won, you cannot question that the peoples decision is wrong, that is a
political question not justiciable. There is no respondent in the first place.
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society
SJS questions upon a petition naming Velarde, Manalo, Cardinal Sin, Villanueva, Soriano who are religious leaders as
respondents, the petition prayed for the resolution of the question WON the act of the religious leaders in endorsing the
candidates for elective office is violative of the Constitution. This petition is in fact a declaratory relief meaning there is no
violation yet they are saying what if they are telling their flock to vote for particular candidates, is it violative of the Constitution?
Now the question is, is that question justiciable? What is the question asking for? It is asking for an opinion by the Court, there is
no yet violation, apparently the violation he is pointing out is the violation of the church and state. So here you can see that the
question is not justiciable, it is conjectural merely anticipatory. There is no actual controversy, so it is not justiciable.
So Estrada is asking the Court that Arroyo is merely performing an acting president. Arroyo said, that her presidency is
a political question because she compared her presidency with Corazon Aquino, remember in the case of Corazon Aquino it
upheld that it is a political question, it is a revolutionary kind of government, her rising to power is contravention in fact of the
1973 Constitution. So it is extraconsitutional that something the SC can no longer question or determine because it is the people
themselves who decided the matter so it is a political question. The Supreme Court cannot say that people you are wrong, so that
is a political question. Now here in Arroyo, she is claiming that it is a political question of course not it is a justiciable question it
just so happens that she is the VP and by the rule of Succession in the Constitution she became the president so it is
Constitutional. The issue therefore is justiciable won Erap resigned and her rise to power is valid and pursuant to the
Constitution. It is justiciable and not political.
Political questions would therefore be, those questions under the constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity and my example before whether you want to be a city or to vote for this, we rarely exercise that revolutionary
power which we have so that is a political question and delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government it is
concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom not legality of a particular measure.
Going back to the people, if they voted for this candidate, you are questioning the wisdom of the people, it is a political
question. If the congress decided to enact the RH bill and if you are really against that bill can you question that law based only
on the argument that it is not yet appropriate for our culture, etc etc. No. because you are questioning the wisdom of the law, the
legislative department has full discretion, in fact, plenary authority, to determine what law to enact what measure to enact. So it is
fully discretionary. We can only persuade but to dictate and to nullify the law just because we dont like it is questioning the

wisdom. So that is a political question, remember the case of Marcos v. Manglapus? In that case the Court said it is not a political
question it is justiciable WON she can ___. What if you disagree with the pardon granted by the President? It is beyond our
capacity to question. It refers to the full discretion of the President.
There are questions that are justiciable. Meaning the courts have jurisdiction to settle these questions. There are also
questions that are considered as political. Meaning, they are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. It is within the full discretion of
the people in their sovereign capacity or within any of the department of the government where the discretion is given. So in the
case of political questions, the courts may not have jurisdiction over these issues. But we said that there is an expanded
jurisdiction of the SC granted by Section 1 Article 8 wherein the courts are given the authority to determine whether there is
grave abuse of discretion. It is like saying that they may entertain questions that may be political questions by nature but only on
"whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion".
When we say "grave abuse of discretion", any abuse of discretion will not suffice. The abuse must be GRAVE. So even
if there is an abuse of discretion, it will not suffice for the court to take jurisdiction over the issue because it will still remain a
political issue.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious, whimsical exercise as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of an impossibility. Power is exercised in an arbitrary and despondent manner by reason
of passion or hostility.
Last night a student asked me regarding pardon. Isn't it that pardon can only be granted after final conviction? Now
what about the pardon granted to Erap by Arroyo, which, according to him, was granted immediately after the promulgation of
the decision but before the end of the period for the finality of the decision even if there was no appeal yet. Had it reached the SC,
it would have not been valid but since there is no complaint, there is no case. In this system, there is no case when there is no
complaint. But if you are asked to file a complaint, what would be your ground? Constitutionality of the act of the President
because she violated a provision of the Constitution because the pardon should have been granted after the finality of the
decision. So, what happened there? There was grave abuse of discretion because it was fully discretionary on her part to grant the
pardon but she abused the discretion. That may be an instance of grave abuse of discretion, theoretically since such act was really
never placed in question.
The issue there is whether it was necessary for the President to declare a State of Emergency. Ordinarily, you would
say that it is within the full discretion of the President. But here, the SC entertained the question accepting theoretically the
allegation that there may be grave abuse of discretion. Ultimately, it was found that there was no grave abuse of discretion. In this
case, the SC gave due course to the petition. The SC said that the court may entertain it on the basis of expanded jurisdiction but
the judicial inquiry can go no further to satisfy the court not that the decision of the President is correct. It is not within the power
of the court to determine the correctness of the decision made by the President but to determine whether the President acted
arbitrarily.
That gives you an idea that when you file a case of grave abuse of discretion, it is not to correct the decision of the
President but to determine whether or not he/she acted arbitrarily. Meaning, there is no basis for his/her decision. Making such
out
of
thin
air
or
out
of
the
blue.
Section 2. (1) The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
(2) No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
Section 2 gives us the role of the Congress in relation to the Judiciary. The creation of the courts, therefore, is within
the Congress, not the SC. However, the jurisdiction of the SC as enumerated in Section 5 cannot be reduced by the Congress
because they are fixed. Relate that also with what is provided in Article XI that the Congress may not increase the appellate
jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Fiscal autonomy:
- This is enjoyed not only by the Judiciary but also by all Constitutional Commissions (COA, COMELEC, CSC, as well as the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman)
It
guarantees
full
flexibility
to
allocate
and
utilize
their
resources.
In
other
words,
they
do
not
need
the
dictation
or
the
control
of
the
DBM.
- It authorizes the power to levy, assess and collect fees, fixed rate of compensation as provided by law.
Further, Section 3 says that once there is already an amount appropriated for their office, it shall be regularly and
automatically released after approval. Unlike in the other departments of the government na staggard ang pagrelease ng budget.

They have to prove first na they needed such amount for a project although there is already an appropriation. Then they have to
request DBM to release the budget.
CSC vs. DBM
The SC said that it is unlawful or invalid for the DBM to withhold the rest of the budget appropriated for the CSC. In
this case, the annual appropriation for the CSC is 285 million. The DBM released only 279 million because according to the
DBM, there is a shortfall in the revenue. The SC said that whether or not the shortfall is true, this office has fiscal autonomy. Its
budget should be automatically released. Otherwise, they would not be any different from any other office in the government
which do not enjoy fiscal autonomy.
In other words, the SC is given a free hand to use its budget according to the allocation.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at
least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
So, that is your composition. 1 Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, a total of 15. It may sit en banc or in a division.
The division may be of 3, 5, or 7. The decision of the division is the decision of the SC itself. It is not a different body or organ of
the SC. It is not true that the SC en banc is the appellate body of the decisions of the division. You cannot appeal the decision of
the division to the en banc. To be clear, the SC may decide en banc or in division.
How
do
they
decide
cases?
What
is
required?
Vote of the majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
When you say en banc, it is not necessary that all 15 are present. What is required is a quorum.
There are 15 of them, what is the quorum? 8, so they can decide a case.
How many votes are required when there are 8 who actually participated? 5. Therefore, the least votes required to
decide a case en banc is 5.
What
about
when
they
decide
the
case
in
a
division?
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three
of such Members.
So,
if
it
is
a
7-member
division,
what
would
be
the
majority?
4.
What
if
quorum
lang
of
the
7,
what
is
the
majority
vote?
Quorum is 4 so 3 votes would be the majority.
As provided by the Constitution, in no case shall it be decided without the concurrence of at least 3 members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
So, you heard of the case of Justice Puno retiring in 2010. In time for the elections. I think that time ang election is May
11, 2010 and he will retire a day before since he already reached the compulsory age for retirement.
Relate this with midnight appointment wherein the President cannot make any appointment within 2 months from the
next election and before the end of this term.
Does the prohibition on midnight appointment cover appointments to the SC?
De Castro vs. JBC
The question is whether or not the JBC may start the selection process of the next CJ in lieu of the retirement of CJ
Puno.
Here, the SC said that the prohibition on midnight appointment do not cover appointments to the judiciary. The SC in this case is
banking on the last sentence "Any vacancy SHALL be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof." Ang laki ng
meaning ng shall. Meaning it is mandatory. If you recall the case, the issue for us is whether it is Arroyo who will appoint or the
next President. Kasi by May 11 we would already know who will be the President. But as we all know, it was Macapagal-Arroyo
who appointed Corona. The SC gave the imprimatur to Macapagal-Arroyo by saying that the Constitution says that it is
mandatory to fill the vacancy. Therefore, it is not covered by the prohibition. The SC said it is mandatory and between the
prohibition in Art VII Sec 16 and Art VIII Sec 4 which is a mandatory command (mandatory na command pa) , the latter should
prevail validating the appointment made by Arroyo.
To my mind, it says, within 90 days from the occurence thereof. Hindi pa naman pasok. When will the 90-day period
end? May 10 sya nagretire diba? So, August 10 pa naman mag end ang 90 days. There really was maneuvering on the part of

Macapagal-Arroyo to make an appointment. And for the SC to revisit a prior jurisprudence saying that midnight appointment
cover appointments to the judiciary which we will touch later in the appointments in the lower courts.
So, paragraphs 2 & 3 (label these as cases that must be heard en banc) talk about cases that must be heard en banc.
What are these?
1) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement or law;
2) All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc. In other words, the SC is given
authority to add categories of cases which it may deem is necessary to be heard en banc.
3) All cases including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations;
Nos. 1 & 2 therefore involve consitutionality of the acts of Congress and issuances of the President.
Public Interest vs. Elma
Here, Elma was appointed both as the chairman of the PCGG and also as Presidential Legal Counsel. SC said that these
appointments are unconstitutional. You cannot be the chair of PCGG at the same time the Presidential Legal Counsel because the
latter reviews the work of the offices under the President including the PCGG. He cannot review his own work. Elma moved for
reconsideration. The decision, by the way, was made by a division. He contended that since the issue involves constitutionality of
his appointment, the Constitution requires that it must be heard en banc. Is he correct? No, what the constitution requires to be
heard en banc are issues involving the constitutionality of laws, treaties, PDs, ordinances, promulgations. Here, the issue is
constitutionality of his concurrent appointments. The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be
heard and decided en banc. Simply therefore, not all cases alleging unconstitutionality of something is required to be heard en
banc. The cases are specific.
Next
category
of
cases
which
must
be
heard
en
banc:
4) Cases heard by a division when the required majority in the division is not obtained;
What if when they decided the case it's a tie vote. Say, a division of 7 members, 6 actively participated and the vote is
3-3, what would happen to the case? According to the Constitution, it must be heard en banc. Don't be confused. It does not mean
that the case was appealed. There is no appeal because there was no decision yet. The situation is one wherein the required
majority vote in a division is not obtain and the case should be referred to the SC en banc as mandated by the Constitution.
Illustration:
Say, a division of 3 members and the vote is 2-1.
Q: Is there a decision?
A:
No,
because
the
required
Here, the case should be referred to SC en banc.
majority
under
Sec
(2)
is
at
least
3.
Fortich vs. Corona

Here, the 2nd division of the SC decided the case against the respondents. So, there was a decision made by a division.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. The MR was resolved by a vote of 2-2. The respondents here contended that
since the required majority vote was not obtained, it must be referred to the SC en banc. Is that contention correct? Take a look at
the provision under Sec 4 (3): CASES or MATTERS heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. No issue about that. When the required number is not obtained, the
CASE shall be decided en banc; xxx Notice that in the 2nd sentence it only mentions the word CASE while in the 1st sentence, it
refers to cases or matters. In other words, there is a distinction between a case and a matter. Here, you can see that when majority
vote is not obtained, a CASE is referred to the SC en banc. It is clear that ONLY CASES can be referred to the court en banc. In
the present case, the required majority vote was not obtained in the RESOLUTION. The referral of a case to the court en banc
due to a tie vote or due to lack of the majority vote is not applicable to a resolution.
1)
2)
So, what happens?

If the case is decided by a tie vote, the is no decision. The only resolution is to refer the case to the court en banc.
If there is a decision and in the MR, the resolution is a tie vote, the motion is denied. There is a decision which stands.
Thus, the failure of the division to resolve the MR does not leave the case undecided. The prior decision stands in lieu
of the failure of the division to muster the necessary votes to resolve the MFR. In short, the MFR is lost. The decision
must be affirmed. So long as there is a decision, such decision will remain.
Firestone vs. CA
Here, the Third Division rendered a decision adverse to the petitioners (private complainants) and the Republic. They
filed a Motion for Recon. Subsequently, they also filed Motion to Refer the case to the Court en banc. The division, by a vote of
4-1, denied the Motion to Refer. What was resolved, is the Motion to Refer. Now, one dissenter, Justice Purisima, asked the
Court en banc to assume jurisdiction over the case. Can the court do so? Take note that the Motion for Recon has not yet been
resolved. That's the first distinction here in the case as compared to the case of Fortich vs Corona. In Fortich vs Corona, the MR
is resolved 2-2. Here, the MR is still pending. So, can the court do so? Apparently, the answer is YES because there is a SC
Circular 02-89 which provides for cases that may be considered as en banc cases. In the enumeration therein:

xxx
9) All other cases as the court en banc by majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention.
xxx
Earlier, we said that the SC has a leeway to add to the cases that must be heard en banc. So they issued this SC circular adding
thereto the aforequoted. This case, by the way, involves vast tracts of land that may be lost by the Statenif the decision is to be
followed. So, the SC, by majority of its actual members, decided that this is one case that merits the attention of the SC en banc.
The original decision of the SC is that the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional by a vote of 6-7. A Motion for Recon
was filed. The SC denied the MR by a vote of 7-5.
1st MR: denied by vote of 7-5
2nd MR: the vote is 6-6
Ngayon, pinasok na nila ang issue ng tie vote.
1) Q: How many MR can you file in the SC?
A:
Under
the
rules,
you
are
allowed
with
only
1.
2) They focused their attention on the 2nd MR by saying that the last decision, which tackled the issue of the constitutionality of
the Cityhood Laws, is the decision in the 2nd MR which is 6-6. Which to me, is utterly false. It is not a decision. It is merely a
resolution on the motion. The decision is yung 1st decision.
The SC used the separate opinion (not the main opinion pa talaga) of Justice Puno in one case, the Lambino case,
wherein he opined that a deadlock vote of 6 is not a majority vote. We do not have any issue on that.
But
didn't
we
say
that
CASES
are
different
from
MATTERS?
We are talking about matters here as this involves a Motion for Recon. The SC said in this case, "as may be noted, the
aforequoted Sec 4 of Art VIII exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving constitutionality of a statute without
distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter in a motion for reconsideration." What it is
harping on, therefore, is that the Constitution requires a majority vote in deciding cases involving questions of constitutionality of
a law.
Petitioners said that there is a SC rule which Sec 7 Rule 56 and Administrative Matter 99-1-09-SC governing the
procedure in case of tie votes. Let's read the rule. It says:
SECTION 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. - Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original
action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (11a).
That is in their rules. That is consistent with jurisprudence. How come they were able to make a decision contrary to his
rule and established jurisprudence?
It says: xxx but since the instant case falls under Sec 4 (2) Art VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provision ought
to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the case shall be decided with the concurrence of the
majority of the members who actually actually took part in the deliberations of the instant case and voted thereon. To repeat, the
last vote on the issue of the constitutionality xxx
"Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, viz:
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall
be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the
Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration
is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the
Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a
prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31
March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution."
Meaning, that since we are talking about the constitutionality of a law, exempted sya sa rule na ginawa nila and sa
jurisprudence that have been established. It made a necessary exemption on issues or cases dealing with constitutionality of laws.
After that, they reconsidered the case all over again and it validated the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.
Read the dissenting opinion. According to the dissenter, Sec 7 and the Administrative Matter on the rule on tie vote
apply to all cases heard by the court en banc which includes not only cases involving constitutionality of a law but also all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc.
There was actually no distinction. There can be no one rule for cases involving constitutionality of a law and another
rule foe cases which the Constitution requires to be heard en banc because both of them are the same. The Constitution requires
that these cases be heard en banc.

The rule is: A case is decided. MR is filed. If it is denied, MR is lost. Decision remains. A tie vote on the 2nd MR does
not leave the case undecided. In this case, there was a decision and a resolution both denying the petition.
I don't know. Only history will judge how the Sc decided these cases. This is just to show you what happened. Ewan ko
kung paano nyo ianswer sa bar. Maybe you just cite the case. Memorize the citation. But for me, there are cases which the
Constitution requires to be heard en banc. If the division does not reach the majority required, it must be referred en banc. When
you say referred en banc, it only refers to CASES, not matters.
Going back to the tie vote issue. When the tie vote is on the main decision, meaning, there is no decision. It has to be
reliberated. But if there is a decision and the tie vote is on the MR, it means that the MR is not granted, case is not reconsidered.
That's the rule.
5) Cases where the court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down in a decision either rendered en
banc or in division;
Meaning, of there is a need to reverse an established principle of law, it has to be decided en banc.
6) Administrative cases involving the discipline or dismissal of members of the lower courts;
Refer that to Sec 9.
7) Election contest for President or Vice President;
You met that provision in Art VII Sec 4.
8) All other cases as the court en banc, by majority vote of its actual membership, may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention (which was discussed in the case of Fortich vs Corona).
These
are
the
cases
which
must
be
heard
by
the
SC
en
banc.
To wit:
1) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement or law;
2) All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc;
3) All cases including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations;
4) Cases heard by a division when the required majority in the dividion is not obtained;
5) Cases where the court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down in a decision either rendered en
banc or in division;
6) Administrative cases involving the discipline or dismissal of members of the lower courts;
7) Election contest for President or Vice President; and
8) All other cases as the court en banc, by majority vote of its actual membership, may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention.
Section 5 paragraphs 1-6 are the powers of the powers of the Supreme Court. Paragraphs 1-2 refer to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Paragraph 1 being the original jurisdiction - original jurisdiction means that the complaint may be filed
directly with the Supreme Court. Usually, in our process, original jurisdiction begins in the lower courts until it reaches the SC in
its appellate jurisdiction. But the Constitution gave the SC certain kinds of cases its original jurisdiction exercises original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consul. Those complaints against such officials may be
filed directly with the SC. And other cases petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
Dont be intimidated by this terms you will learn these in remedial law. But for now you can take this to your remedial law that
cases for original certiorari would refers to cases for the determination of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. So if that is the ground for your case, it is that certiorari. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, these type of cases you can directly file with the SC.
Paragraph 2 refers to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. So it starts with review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari. Dont be intimidated by the term certiorari. This time certiorari is a type of appeal. You will
learn this later on. Just keep in mind that in paragraph 2 refers to the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, so it started somewhere. As
the law or the Rules of court may provide final judgement and orders of the lower courts in the following cases a-e.
Gerochi vs Department of Energy
Let us look at letter a. The SC has appellate jurisdiction over a) all cases in which the constitutionality of validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. Are you familiar with this term? These are the case that must be heard by the SC en banc. In paragraph
2 it states appellate jurisdiction. It therefore means that lower courts can exercise jurisdiction or determine the constitutionality of
laws, validity of treaties or international agreements, or presidential decrees, etc. So in other words, when it is an appeal to the
SC, SC must hear it en banc. That is what it means. Going to the case of Gerochi vs Department of Energy, here, the petitioners
filed a complaint questioning the validity of the EPIRA, Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001. It is questioning the
constitutional validity of a law. Looking at our enumeration, we have this understanding when questioning the constitutionality of
a law it must begin in the lower court because the SC exercises jurisdiction only in an appellate capacity. But in this case of
Gerochi, they filed directly with the SC, and the SC said this case must be dismissed because it has no original jurisdiction. It is
supposed to be filed in the lower court but petitioner, herein complainants filed the complaint with the SC. The Supreme Court
said we have no original jurisdiction over that case, in such type of cases we can only exercise appellate jurisdiction. But the SC

said, maybe you can take it as a grave abuse of discretion case. So it is a certiorari petition, in that case the SC may have original
jurisdiction. Nonetheless and this is the important part of the decision, there is the DOCTRINE OF HEIRARCHY OF COURTS,
because under the Rules of Court these cases for petition for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, or habeas corpus is
being shared by the lower courts. Other courts, the lower courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. Under the Rules of
Court, the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals also have original jurisdiction over certiorari cases, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. So they share concurrent jurisdiction. In other words, we can file it anywhere RTC,
CA, or SC. But because of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts, the litigants must observe the hierarchy of courts. So
ordinarily, you must begin with the lower court even if the SC has original jurisdiction. The only time, it has long been
established that the Court cannot entertain direct resort to it, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or exceptional or compelling circumstances justify the attainment of the remedy within and call for the exercise of its
express jurisdiction. Only when the desired redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts that the petitioners should then
file it directly to the SC, example in this case when certiorari is against the president. Of course the RTC will not rule on that. But
if it is certiorari against the Regional Director of DILG or anywhere else notwithstanding the level, the hierarchy of courts must
be technically observed.
Going back to the appellate jurisdiction, there is an enumeration in a-e. These are categories of cases over which the SC
exercises its appellate jurisdiction. Letter a is very important, it is the exercise of judicial review - review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirmon appeal or certiorari all cases in which the constitutionality of validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
What is the power of judicial review? Of course it is a power flowing from judicial power to settle actual controversies.
But what is the power of judicial review specifically? It is the power of the SC to declare if laws, treaties, international
agreements, presidential decrees, etc are constitutional. In other words, when we are talk about judicial review, we are talking
about constitutionality. When the SC is called to determine the constitutionality of legislative acts or the executive issuances, we
talk about judicial review. In this instance, this is where the SC checks the constitutionality and validity of the acts of co-equal
departments. When the SC does so, it does not mean the SC is superior over the Executive of Legislative Departments, because
here when the Judiciary mediates or decides it does no assert any superiority, does not nullify or invalidate the act legislature but
only assert the solemn obligation to determine of conflicting claims against the authority of the constitution. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. It is the SC who shall determine constitutional rights. It just happens that it would be determined against a co-equal
branch. It does not mean to say that SC is superior over the other branch. It is merely an aspect of judicial power to determine
cases of controversies.
So what we see here is the SC exercising authority in validating or invalidating a co-equal branches issuances, acts,
laws, etc. In other words, when the SC is called to determine the constitutionality, it being to check the other departments work,
it will do so with caution. So that when the SC exercises the power of judicial review, it only does after compliance or fulfilment
of four essential requisites.
Power of Judicial Review
Requisites of a Judicial Inquiry
First, it will go through the technicalities, because as much as possible SC does not want to touch on the work of the
other departments. In this jurisdiction, the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of the law. Because in fairness,
it should be presumed that Congress studied the enactment before they agreed to pass it. The presumption is always the
constitutionality of the issuance because in all fairness, it is presumed that the president knows what he is doing and that he has
studied the measure before he has issued it. Thats why there are four requisites, and that is the rationale.
The SC may only entertain questions of constitutionality of the acts of the other departments or in other words the shall only
exercise the power of judicial review first: there must be an actual case of controversy, second: the party must have locus standi,
third: the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and fourth: the issue of constitutionality is the very
lis mota of the case.
A) Actual Case or Controversy
We will discuss them one by one. What do you mean by that there must be an actual case or controversy? We have
already discussed this in our discussion with justiciable questions. There is an actual case or controversy if the issue is ripe for
adjudication. So if youre drink has a cockroach and as long as you have not yet drank it, it is still not ripe for adjudication. There
is yet no actual case or controversy. In other words, the SC has no have authority to pass upon issues of constitutionality through
advisory opinions, nor an authority to resolve in hypothetical or framed constitutional problems, or even in friendly suits that we
agree to file a suit for the SC to determine whether or not it is constitutional.
Dumlao vs. Comelec
Here the petitioner Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He filed a certification for candidacy for the
position of governor. The Comelec meanwhile, enacted a law which provides that those who have already retired as an elective
officer and who has received his retirement benefits to which he fits and runs again for the same position will be disqualified.
There was that passage of provision of law. He filed immediately a case Now the question is, is th4ere an actual case or
controversy? The SC said none. There was that law, but was there any proceeding that you were disqualified by virtue of the law?
None. Was there a decision of the Comelec that affected you that you will bring up a certiorari proceeding? None. Were you

disqualified? Not yet. In this case the SC will not touch the constitutionality of this provision because in this case there is no
actual case or controversy.
Tan vs. People
The petitioners here were convicted of violation of a law when they were caught in possession of a dump truck loaded
with narra and white lauan lumber without required documents. So they were caught and prosecuted pursuant to the provision of
that law. They questioned that law, the constitutionality of that law on the ground that there is that provision that penalizes also
mere possession of firewood, bark, or even grass, or shrub, or flowering plant (you cut grass) is a violation. To them it is
unconstitutional on the ground of the lack of substantial due process. The law is unconstitutional. The SC said, they were not
convicted of its commission, so as far as SC is concerned there is no case or actual controversy regarding that provision.
Therefore, the SC did not exercise its power of judicial review. it will only pass the constitutionality of that provision when there
comes a case or actual controversy of possessing grass. But at this time, there is no actual case or controversy.
Pormentero vs. Estrada
What did the SC do there? The issue is the constitutionality of the interpretation of an act. What is the interpretation in
the constitution which makes a president ineligible for reelection? How did the SC evade the question of constitutionality in this
case? Since that section requires the reelection and Estrada was not reelected then there is no actual case or controversy - without
considering that the question is of his candidacy.
De Castro vs. JBC
De Castro again is the case of Puno retiring and Judicial Bar Council is starting to select candidates for the appointment
by the President. Issue is who will make the appointment, the out-going President or the in-coming President? Another issue is
whether or not it is considered a midnight appointment? Another issue is if the issue is ripe for adjudication? Because the issue
was filed at the time when Puno was not yet retired. What would have been your answer? Nothing yet. The thing that they fear
was that it might happen, and you will see it will eventually happen. The very issue is whether or not the JBC will send out the
nominees to the president for her to choose. Ultimately the issue is whether the president can appoint the SC Chief Justice. There
is nothing yet, right? The JBC did not even continue with the selection process. So here the SC nonetheless said that there is an
actual case or controversy. The fact that the JBC began to conduct an selection for nominees pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the out-going or incoming President, make the situation
ripe for judicial determination. /22:20 ///Maybe it can filter pass the question because the issue is of transcendental importance.
B) Proper Party
The second requisite is locus standi. Locus standi is simply standing. What do you mean by standing? It is the right of
appearance in court of law. For example, Miss A has a debt to Miss B, now who has the right to go to court? Does C have
standing? Does C have a right to question the debt? No. C has no standing - that is locus standi, when you go to civil law that is
your real party in interest. Now when does have the right of appearance?
General Rule: Direct Injury Test
The general rule is, that person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has personal and substantial
interest such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. That is the direct injury test. Only
these persons who qualify under this test will have the standing to sue, to question the constitutionality of law and presidential
enactments.
Agan, JR. vs. PIATCO
The case involves the concession agreement between the government and PIATCO concerning NAIA3. After building
NAIA3, terminal 1 and 2 will no longer be used. So for those working there, even as service providers, filed this case questioning
the government and PIATCO. The general rules, only parties to the contract shall have standing to question the contract. The
question here is do these persons which have no affiliation with terminal 1 and 2 which shall no longer be used once terminal 3 is
done have standing? Questioning the constitutionality of the contract and using the direct injury test, yes, because they will be
directly affected by the effect of the contract. They will lose their means of livelihood first and foremost, they have that claim.
Osmena vs. Comelec
Petitioner Osmena and Garcia were running for president and governor respectively questioned the provision of
election law, which banned political advertising, prohibiting mass media selling free of charge print ads for campaign purposes.
Banning media giving up for free campaign space. According to Osmena and Garcia, this does not level the playing field. It is
discriminating against the poor candidates who cannot afford. But SC said you cannot question the constitutionality of the law.
Why? Because you are not a poor candidate. What should have been done? Get someone, a poor candidate, to file the case, who
may not be able to afford file the case in the first place.
Other valid standing
Taxpayers suit
But take note we are questioning the constitutionality of a governmental act. Sometimes, most of us are affected by the
act but it is just not sufficient na there is that direct injury to have sufficient standing before court. The difficulty in public act is
that one way to represent the public in questioning the governmental act. So sometimes the SC will allow liberalization of the

direct injury test. So it will allow, as long as the litigant represents the public in some way. Sometimes you will have cases that
are called taxpayers suit, here as long as the litigant is affected by the expenditures of public funds for there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed. In fact a taxpayers suit will prosper as long as there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed. In fact a taxpayers suit will prosper as long as there is a claim that public funds are illegally dispersed, not necessarily
when you are already affected - as long as there is a claim that public funds are illegally dispersed or that the public money is
being defected to any improper purpose, or that there is a leakage of public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional
law. So here, in matters of public right, the people are real parties.
Voters Suit
There are also instances that the SC will allow a voters suit. As long as you can prove that you are a voter and that
there is a showing of public interest in the validity of the election law in question and that the achieved measure has an impact on
voting rights, a voters suit maybe allowed.
Quinto vs. Comelec
The provision of law or that law in question is that law sustaining the prior law which make an appointed official filing
a certificate of candidacy ipso facto resigned. It was the law that exempts elected officials. With the new law, when elected
officials file a certificate of candidacy are no longer ipso facto resigned. There is now a distinction between an appointed and
elected official. So they questioned the validity of that law arguing violation of equal protection. The litigants filed as a voter,
they are not yet candidates. As they were not candidates they were not affected by the law. But the SC said this is a voters suit as
long as there is a showing that the measure has an impact on voting rights because it would now limit the choice of voters.
Legislators Suit
How about a legislators suit? Once again, the Legislature as a body (Senate vs) or a member of Congress (Pimentel
vs), here Congress in this case as party litigant is either against an HR or member thereof as Senator or Congressman. When
may they file the suit? Of course there is no direct injury there. So as litigators, they may file when the measure allegedly
infringes upon the prerogative of legislators.
Senate vs. Ermita
What is EO 464? It prohibited officials from appearing before a legislative inquiry. So this infringes upon their
prerogative as legislators because they can no longer exercise their duty to enact law because the President prohibited these
officials from attending a legislative inquiry. So in this case, a legislators suit may be allowed.
In Ople vs Torres, questioning the validity of the national ID system. The petitioner is actually a senator. Can he alone question
the law? Yes, because it infringes upon his prerogative as legislator, alleging that the president is now acting like a legislator
himself. It is beyond his power to legislate a national id system.
Sanlakas vs. Executive
It is about the Oakwood Mutiny where the president declared a state of rebellion. The petitioners here questions the
validity of the proclamation are some members of the Congress and another group, a party list organization. As to the members
of Congress, do they have standing? Yes, because the president is allegedly declaring martial law in the guise of a state of
rebellion. The declaration of a state of rebellion presidents is tantamount to Congress power to grant power of emergency
powers. How about party list organizations? No, they have not demonstrated that their legal rights are infringed by the
declaration which would justify their standing in court.
Pimentel vs Ermita
This was the case wherein the president appointed 8 individuals in various departments all in acting capacity. The
appointment was made while congress was in session and the Commission on Appointments had been duly constituted, but in
this case the president did not submit the appointments for approval by the Commission on Appointments. Can a congressman
question the validity of the appointment? SC said it must be noted that though COA is under the legislative department it is
independent from the legislative department itself. So if being a congressman is your qualification alone will not have standing. It
does not infringe upon the prerogative of the legislator. But if you are a congressman and a member of COA then you have
standing.
Citizens Suit
There is no category as long as you are a citizen you may file this suit. When can you do that? When it concerns a
public right, the object of the suit being is to enforce a public duty. Usually, in these cases it is either the rights involved are those
rights in the bill of rights. For example in Chavez vs PCGG, Akbayan vs Aquino, Chavez vs PEA, they are invoking their right to
information and the right to access to public information. So here a citizen will have standing.
Chavez vs PCGG, they would want that PCGG will make public their compromise agreement with the heirs of Marcos. So they
have standing as citizens.
Exception to locus standi
Transcendental Importance
Now, there are times that SC will bend backwards some more just to allow a suit regardless whether you are a citizen.
They will not dwell in hyper-technicality if the issue is of transcendental importance. So in these cases, the SC will waive the rule
on locus standi. So it will liberalize some more, as long as the case are of transcendental importance, they have been allowed to

sue even if litigants have failed to show direct injury. Remember that the rule in locus standi is a mere procedural technicality.
This is the doctrine of transcendental importance.
So in Tatad vs. Secretary, members of an organization were allowed to question the oil industry regulation law. Not
because they have standing but because the oil regulation issue is of transcendental importance.
Bayan vs. Executive
It questioned the Visiting Forces Agreement VFA. None of the suitors were found to have standing to question the
VFA. It does not infringe upon the prerogative as legislators, as taxpayers there is no use of public funds, a citizens suit cannot
claim a public right, nonetheless the SC entertained the issue because of transcendental importance.
Randy David arrested when Macapagal Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of emergency. David of course has
standing because he was arrested by virtue of the proclamation. Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. also has
standing allegedly because of direct injury resulting to illegal arrest and unlawful search by virtue of the proclamation.
Congressmen alleged there was a usurpation of legislative powers. So of course they have standing. Let us go to Loren Legarda
questioning the proclamation. But SC said she has not standing as taxpayer because there is no allegation of illegal disbursement
of public funds. As a former senator is of no consequence, because she is no longer a senator she can no longer sue since there is
no infringement of prerogative as legislator when you are no longer a lawmaker. As media personality, still no standing because
the enforcement has not prevented her from pursuing her career. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest is likewise
of no relevance, because it does not affect the proceeding in the presidential electoral tribunal. But still the case proceeded
because of transcendental importance. KMU by the way is an organization which also filed a claim here, and SC said that all
organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members. So KMU asserted that the proclamation violated the
members rights to peaceful assembly and were deemed with legal standing.
To summarize, the following maybe filed with the courts taxpayers, voters, legislators, concerned citizens suit,
maybe afforded standing to sue provided that the following requirements are present. Number one, the case involves
constitutional issues. Number two, for taxpayers there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. Number three,
voters there must be a valid showing the validity of election laws or that their voting rights will be affected. For concerned
citizens if the concern is a public right. And some cases, citizens are litigants in case of transcendental importance. And
legislators suit, there must be claim that there is an infringement of their prerogative as legislators.
No Standing
There are a lot more cases that I think are important. These are cases when the SC declared that you have no standing.
It is important to know when you have no standing.
TELEBAP vs Comelec
TELEBAP (telecommunications and broadcast attorneys of the Philippines) is questioning an election law which
requires that radio and television provide time free of charge for the Comelec. So these are the lawyers of media companies
questioning the validity of the law. SC said lawyers have not shown that they have proper standing as citizens on the occasion of
transcendental importance.
Velarde vs. SJS
In the case SJS has not shown that they have a proper or that they have been deprived of their votes. But they did bring
up the principle of the separation of church and state.
IBP vs Zamorra. IBP questions the validity of the presidents act of calling out the marines. IBP primarily anchors its standing on
its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the constitution. SC said if that is the only invocation of IBP it is not
sufficient. It is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. None of them have suffered any
form of injury as a result of the deployment of the marines. Nonetheless, the case proceeded because of transcendental
importance.
C) Question of constitutionality must be brought up at the earliest opportunity
Third requirement, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. When you file for a
proceeding you plead all your allegations and issues there, because it will be the basis on the trial and only the issues discussed in
the trial will be the basis for appeal. In other words, if you fail to plead the issue, it will not be heard during trial. It will not be
heard in trial, it cannot be a ground for appeal. Therefore the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity. It cannot be raised for the first time in the SC. So in the case of Sta. Rosa vs. Amante, the SC did not entertain the
question of constitutionality because it was raised for the first time in the SC. But nonetheless it is technicality that maybe waived
by the SC.
D) Lis Mota
The last requisite is your lis mota. The question of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. It must be an
issue that the SC cannot hold the entire petition without confronting the issue of constitutionality. It is at that instance that the SC
has no choice but to determine the constitutionality of the issue. If the SC can have other grounds to decide the case without
touching the case of the issue of constitutionality then it is not the very lis mota of the case, therefore the SC will not exercise the

power of judicial review. The rule is evasion, because you know the issue is really touching core upon the very path of other
departments encroach the acts of the other departments. As long as they can evade the issue of constitutionality they will find
other grounds to decide the petition without touching the lis mota of the case.
There you have it. There must be an actual case or controversy, the petitioner must have standing and against not just
anybody, but questioning the act of the other department. It must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and finally, the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case.
Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
The presumption is always on the constitutionality that is why we have this very technical requirement before the SC
may even start to look at your arguments in the petition. Now lets say that they have exercised their power of judicial review.
What are now going to be the effects of declaring the measure or act as unconstitutional?
There are 2 views. The general/ orthodox view, if the act is unconstitutional it is not a law and thus does not confer any
rights, impose no duty, or offers no protection. But there is a complication. It is too simple. It disregards the fact - who declares
the unconstitutionality of a law in the land? SC. How long does it take to decide the case? It would be some period of time before
the SC can determine the unconstitutionality of a law. No one else can determine constitutionality of an act, you cannot just
impose it is unconstitutional. It must be decided by the SC.
The view disregards the fact that before the law is declared unconstitutional, it has been for some period of time
effective. That it has been given some effect and the people were told to obey it. Rights were already affected. So the exception to
this orthodox view is what we call the modern view or the doctrine of operative fact. Because you cannot blame someone who is
implementing the law, because you cannot judge whether or not a law is unconstitutional or not, so this is a recognition that for
some time the law has been an operative fact. The SC recognizes the view that the actual existence of a statute prior to the
affirmation of the unconstitutionality of an act that it is in actual existence and therefore has consequences, which cannot be
erased by a mere judicial declaration.
Planters vs. Fertiphil
Planters is a private corporation involving fertilizers. President Marcos enacted a letter of instruction invoking that
capital on the domestic sale of fertilizers in the Philippines (parang nag-tatax sa sale ng fertilizers), and the beneficiary is
Planters, a private corporation. One of the companies to pay is Fertiphil. The letter was later declared unconstitutional. Question,
can Fertiphil recover the amount back? Using the orthodox view, SC said yes. The Letter is unconstitutional therefore it is not a
law. Not a law therefore it confers no rights, imposes no duty, and no protection. What about Planters, they contend that they
have no fault and proposed application of the modern view. SC said no, the doctrine of operative fact only applies in equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effect of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The doctrine is applicable
when declaration of unconstitutionality will impose am undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. What
happened here, we cannot allow Planters to prosper from an unconstitutional law. Just as equity dictates Planters must refund the
amount paid by Fertiphil. This is also related to the principle of unjust enrichment. Although Planters may argue that they have
no fault, it is still unjust enrichment.
Flores vs. Drilon
The law creating the Subic Bay Authority provides that in its first year of operation from the effectivity of the act the
Mayor of the City of Olongapo may be the appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SBA. So by virtue of this
provision, Gordon who was the Mayor of Olongapo City will also serve as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the SBA.
Now we know that in the Constitution and even in the Local Government Code the mayor is prohibited from being officiated in
another position, it being prohibited also in the constitution. So this provision was later declared unconstitutional. What happens
now to the salaries, emoluments, and per diems received by Gordon? SC applied the modern view he was at that time a de facto
officer, there is no question that he has rendered his service for this he must be paid or compensated. So he gets to keep it, so how
about the public enactments at the time? His issuances as long as they are legitimate remain to be valid. So that is the application
of the orthodox view.
Tan vs, Barrios
Remember the Olaguer doctrine that military tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians. What is the reality of it all?
There are still those imprisoned. There are still being persecuted. There are already those who have served sentence, sentenced by
the military tribunal, right? There were those who were acquitted by the military tribunals, and there were those who have availed
of amnesty despite being prosecuted by the military tribunal. How do we apply now the Olaguer doctrine, which that military
tribunals have no authority to hear, to try civilians? What happened to those currently serving sentence? SC said that they are
free, and that the DOJ will try to investigate if there are proper criminal charges to be filed against them with the proper courts.
So start the investigation all over again. What about those who were convicted and have served their sentences? DOJ tried to
investigate if there are proper criminal cases that may be filed against them, is that correct? The military tribunals after all do not
have jurisdiction. The SC said that no, we will apply the modern view. For this category of persons who have served sentences,
double jeopardy effects, notwithstanding that the military tribunal had no jurisdiction. They have already served sentence. It is
unfair (fair play and equity), if the civil law will be applied all over again and they will be subjected to another conviction. How
about those who have already been acquitted by the military tribunals? Modern view shall be applied, because it will be unfair.

What happens to the other provisions of the law that were not declared unconstitutional?
Tatad vs. Secretary
The SC said the general rule is that where a part of the law is declared unconstitutional and the other part is declared
valid, the valid portion may stand on its own. However, when that part of statute is so mutually connected and dependent or when
the legislature intended them to be taken as a whole, the nullity of one part shall vitiate the rest.
Now, in some instances, only provisions of law will be declared as unconstitutional. What happens to the rest of the
law that were not declared as unconstitutional?
In the case of Tatad vs. Secretary, the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that where part of the statute is
unconstitutional while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. Thats the
general rule. However, when the parts of the statute are so mutually independent and connected as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In other words, if only one provision has been
nullified for being unconstitutional but it affects the entire law itself, then the entire law is declared as invalid. It will affect the
law. But if it is separable and the law can stand on its own, then the law will remain valid except for that provision.
Now we have another concept we call the Concept of Relative Constitutionality. Here, the concept is that a statute that
is valid at one time or constitutional at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances without
amending the constitution.
Central Bank Employees vs. Bangko Sentral
Bangko Sentral for your information is a GFI or Government Funding Institution. Just like your SSS, GSIS, Landbank,
DBP. They have a category of their own separate from ordinary government offices. Before, after the Central Bank Act, those
with Salary Grades 10 below are under the Salaries Standardization Law. Kasama sila with the rest of government public
servants. While those in the higher ups, they were given the authority to be exempt from the salary standardization law. That is
the Central Bank Act. Now, later on, the laws governing SSS, GSIS, Landbank, yung mgs GFIs, were amended to the point that
all employees in these institutions are now exempted from the salary standardization law. Their offices can determine their own
salaries kaya mataas ang sweldo ni Maam Galas. Because they are not covered with the salary standardization law. Now,
naiwan si Central Bank. Their employees ranking from salary grade 10 below are still covered by the salary standardization law.
What is the constitutional issue there? EQUAL PROTETCTION. _____ the statute. The Central Bank Act is valid. But because
of altered circumstances, it becomes unconstitutional. That is the concept of Relative Constitutionality.
Ok, question, may inferior courts exercise the power of judicial review? The answer is in Section 5, paragraph 2 and
tell me if yes or no. What is judicial review? The power to determine the constitutionality of a law, enactment, agreement, etc.
Whats your answer? Paragraph 2 is the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Meaning, that it starts somewhere, the
inferior courts. So whats the answer? YES. Lower courts may exercise the power of judicial review. By this we mean Courts of
General jurisdiction and the courts in contrary to courts of special jurisdiction. So the Courts with general jurisdiction are only
the Regional Trial Courts and Court of Appeals. So RTCs and CAs may exercise the power of judicial review.
That is also the ruling of Planters vs. Fertiphil. But theres a caveat. Yes, the power of judicial review flows from
judicial power and since inferior courts are possessed of judicial power, it may then be inferred that the power of judicial power
is not an exclusive power of the Supreme Court. But, considering that, what is the mandate of the Constitution? When it comes to
constitutionality issues, how shall it be heard? It must be heard en banc. Considering that the Constitution requires that a
declaration of constitutionality of a law, treaty, agreement, etc., the Supreme Court must sit en banc. Lower courts must keep in
mind that the becoming _____ of inferior courts demand conscious clear vision of the position they occupy in the interrelation
and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. What do they mean by this? Huwag magpadalos-dalos sa pagdeclare ng constitutionality or unconstitutionality. Just let them raise these issues in their pleadings. The final interpolation(?) will
be of Supreme Court. (Inaudible sentence here. Sorry.)
Ok, lets summarize the effect of unconstitutionality. It could either be via the general rule, the Orthodox View. Any
constitutional act, is not a law. Therefore it vests no right, imposes no duty and accords no protection. The Modern View will
apply as a rule of equity and fair-play. Here, the law is an Operative Fact meaning that they have consequences before being
declared as unconstitutional. Another effect, where parts of the statute is constitutional and the other is invalid, the valid portion
if so separable from the invalid may stand and be enforced. The exception is that, if it is so interrelated with the invalidated
provision, then the nullity of one provision will vitiate the rest of the provisions of the law thus the entire law will be vitiated.
And number 4, a statute which has been valid at one time may be void at another time because of altered circumstances.
Ok, allow me to continue. We were talking about Section 5 which talks about the powers of the Supreme Court. We
were talking about 1 and 2 which is about the jurisdiction of Supreme Court which is part of the powers of the Supreme Court.
Paragraph A being among the categories of cases to which the Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction but we make a
special consideration with letter A because it speaks about the power of judicial review. So if I go on, dont be confused. We are
just continuing with the categories of cases over which the Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction.
Letter B involves the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. Letter
C, all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. Letter D, all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher. Now, observe that in Letter D, it does not say automatic review, right? Automatic review of death
penalty actually including reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the constitutional mandate is that it exercises appellate jurisdiction
over all criminal cases when the penalty if reclusion perpetua or higher. Jurisprudence however and the rules of court provides
that it be an automatic review when it comes to death penalty. How automatic is the review?
People vs. Esparas

The accused here was tried inocencia (?), wala siya. She became a fugitive of justice from the moment that the trial
began after her arraignment. So the trial proceeded up to his conviction. She was meted with the death sentence. She was not
around. She was hiding. The question is, should the Supreme Court automatically review the sentence? The Supreme Court said
YES. The mandate is automatic review. No less than the life of the accused or the convict as at stake. All death penalty cases will
be reviewed by the Supreme Court regardless of the wish of the convict or the will of the court. Because here, she did not appeal.
Nothing _____ right is at stake. Any government decision authorizing the state to take right ____ made as possible. The power is
more if a sacred duty which has to be discharged to ensure the people that the innocence of the people is its concern not only
crimes that are light but crimes which shake the conscience. The crime was in violation of the Drugs Act, RA 6425.
Ok, proceed. Number 3 of the powers of the Supreme Court. Assign temporarily judges In other words, it is within
the power of Supreme Court to designate judges to stations other than their own stations. Thats why meron tayong mga judges
na ____ judge. They are a judge of this sala and a judge of another sala because there is no judge available for that sala. The only
limitation would be that the designation shall not exceed 6 months. But on this theres an exception, but only if the judge
consents. And if youre the judge, you need consent.
Number 4, Order a change of venue Now, our trials are governed by rules. Now the rules would say that there are rules on
venue where you can file a case, usually it depends on the residence of the parties. In criminal cases, it depends where the crime
was committed. The usual controversy here is where the crime was committed in a place where the accused is still a politician,
someone hari-hari sa lungsod. The rules would say that in criminal cases that venue is jurisdictional. Pag ibahin mo yung venue,
wala ng jurisdiction ang ibang courts. Only the Supreme Court can order the transfer of the venue.
You have the Ampatuan Cases. That case happened where? In Maguindanao. We know that it is being heard in a
Quezon City court. But that was after several judges refused to take the case. It is only the Supreme Court who can order the
transfer of the venue. It is not the parties who can request for the case to be transferred. Because in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. Why? You need to hear the case in a place where the crime was committed because more probably than not, all the
evidence are there, all the witnesses are there. So for convenience.
Ok finally. Rationale lang ito. Promulgate rules Rulemaking-power of the Supreme Court. It has been given the
rule-making authority or power. It enhances the rule-making power of the Court for the first time, it was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning constitutional rights. Remember sometime in 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated its rules on
Habeas Data and the rules of Writ of Amparo. These are rules which would implement or enforce constitutional rights. The rights
to be secured in your homes, in your property. So for the 1st time, the Supreme Court is given this rule-making authority for the
enforcement of constitutional rights. Normally, that would have been the power of the legislature. So, they now, they did
promulgate the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data. And then, they also were given the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. Special courts are created by who? Congress. But the Supreme Court is
given the authority to disapprove the rules of procedure of these special courts or quasi-judicial bodies. More importantly, it took
away the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. For example, this Petition for recognition. Rules of Court would provide that government offices, GOCCs, are not
exempt from payment of legal fees. Yun ang nasa rules. They must pay legal fees. Now we have GSIS. Undeer the GSIS Act,
which is an Act of the Legislature, GSIS is exempt from the payment of legal fees. Meron na tayong conflict dito. Which would
prevail? The Act, GSIS Act, which provides that it is exempt from payment of legal fees or Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court? By virtue of this rule-making authority, exclusive rule-making authority on rules governing pleadings, practice
and procedure in Court, the rules of the Supreme Court will prevail. The exemption granted by Congress would now be an
encroachment of that rule-making authority.
Theres another violation to the authority of the Supreme Court in this case. Remember that we said that the Supreme
Court enjoys fiscal autonomy. What does it include? The authority to levy assessed fees. So if the Congress exempt GSIS, then it
violates that independence of Supreme Court particularly its authority to have fiscal autonomy. So here, we can now see that
there is meaning in Paragraph 5 particularly in the promulgation of rules concerning _____ fees.
The Supreme Court by the way is the body that governs the admission to the practice of law. When it comes to the
practice of law, the practice is being governed and regulated by the Supreme Court. It includes from the time of admission to the
bar, the practice, and continued practice. Now, they also have the power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Thats
why in the IBP, its supposed to be a private organization, how come it is being regulated, regularly reports to the Supreme
Court? Because under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has authority over the IBP up to the point that it may regulate or
review the acts of its officers.
Garcia vs. De Vera
There was an issue with this Leonard De Vera. Anyway, he also made a controversy in this case because hes supposed
to be a member of the Integrated Bar based in Paranaque-Las Pinas but he cannot get elected as president of the chapter because
marami siyang kalaban. What he did was to transfer himself in the southern part. Pumunta siya ng Agusan del Sur Chapter. Di
siyempre, he was elected as president. There was an issue with his qualifications. If you are the president of the chapter, they
have their own rules that the can get elected as IBP National President. I think it was the time for the Agusan Chapter to be
president kaya nagpa-president siya doon. There was an issue with his qualifications. Now the question is, can the Supreme Court
come in pero organization naman yan nila. Supreme Court said, lets go back to the Constitution. Section 5 Paragraph 5 says we
have the rule-making authority over the IBP including the acts of its officials, so we have jurisdiction to determine qualifications
of their officers.

Last na lang, because Section 5, Paragraph 6 gives the Supreme Court the authority to appoint all employees and
officials of the judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In other words, if you want to apply as Clerk of Court, saan ka
maga-apply? Sa Civil Service? No. You have to apply with the Supreme Court. If you want to apply as the clerk of court of the
municipal trial court of Bislig, will you apply to that court? No, you will apply in the Supreme Court. So the Supreme Court has
the sole authority to appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary but in accordance with the Civil Service Law. You
connect that with Section 6. Punta na tayo ng Section 6. Because Section 6 provides that: The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all the courts and the personnel thereof. In other words, if there are administrative cases against
officers and employees of the courts, from the highest presiding officer of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk
or janitor basta employee siya ng court, only the Supreme Court should have administrative jurisdiction over these cases because
only the Supreme Court have administrative supervision over these employees. Meaning the ombudsman cannot investigate a
clerk of court or judge in their office. Although we know that the ombudsman have administrative supervision over government
employees.
Maceda vs. Vasquez
The Supreme Court explains that Section 6 exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision of all
court officers and personnel from the presiding judge of the CA down to the lowest MTC Clerk by virtue of its power. It is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws and take proper admin action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power without running
afoul with the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. So the example would be Dolalas vs. Ombudsman, Mindanao. Dolalas is the
judge, he was charged with dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and unnecessary dealing with the administration of justice, before
the office of the Ombudsman. These are all administrative cases. Now the Ombudsman justifies taking cognizance of the case
because according to the Ombudsman, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, unnecessary dealing with the administration of justice is
in relation to her failure to dispose a criminal case for _______ scandals for 5 years. What is thought to be determined according
to the Ombudsman is that the _____ resulted in injury to the complainant through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence for an undue advantage of any party. Familiar? This is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. So to the Ombudsman, criminal case naman ito ultimately. This is not an administrative matter. And the Supreme
Court said, notwithstanding, to determine that criminal case, you have to go back to the rules of court, to the code of conduct of
justices in the code of ethics. Thereby, you have to determine administrative liability on the part of the judge before you can go
on trying the criminal case for anti-graft and corrupt practices. Thus, the proper way to do it is to refer the case first to Supreme
Court before the Ombudsman can file the criminal case. Thats how exclusive the power of Supreme Court has over
administrative matters of its judges and employees.
Rivera vs. Pelayo
The issue here is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against a judge of
the RTC in connection with his handling of cases before the court. The criminal cases that were filed were violation of Articles
204 and 205 of the RPC. Whats 204 and 205? Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. And the other one is also in relation to
that. It is in relation to the rendering of judgment. Its a criminal case by the way. Can the Ombudsman take cognizance of that
case? And the Supreme Court said NO. Before you can determine that, before a criminal action is adjudged, cannot be
entertained ; there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is indeed unjust.
And who has the power to review the order of the judge? To say it is unjust? Not the Ombudsman. Only the Supreme Court.
Thats why in this case, the proper way is to refer it first to Supreme Court even if criminal case ang finile.
Fuentes vs. Ombudsman
Judge Fuentes of Davao City is now facing criminal charges of graft and corruption against the Ombudsman again in
relation to his issuance of a writ of execution to the Department of Public Works and Highways. Didnt we discuss this before
that suability is different from liability? So DPWH is supposed to pay just compensation to the litigants and there was a judgment
_____ just compensation. But DPWH failed to pay to they filed and asked for a Writ of Execution. So Judge Fuentes issued the
Writ of Execution attaching the bulldozer, backhoe para ibenta para ibayad forgetting the Doctrine of State Immunity. Anyway,
he was charged for this. The charge was criminal in nature. RA ____, graft and corruption case. The Supreme Court still said
because this is in relation to the discharge of his functions as a judge, it must still be referred first to Supreme Court.
Heto, Caoibes vs. Ombudsman. Ito, sigurado na talaga akong sa Supreme Court na talaga ito. There are 2 judges in the same Hall
of Justice, mag-kaaway, nagkita sila sa Hall, nagsinumbaganay. Of course the complaint would be physical injuries. Anyway, the
Supreme Court said that the altercation happened within the premises of the Court. So, its still with the Supreme Court.
Garcia vs. Miro
Garcia here is a Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. He was involved in vehicular accident. The case filed was
reckless imprudence. The complaint actually was for murder and then it was downgraded to reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. Question, who has jurisdiction? Refer it to the Supreme Court or Ombudsman? In this instance, it was not committed
in relation to his functions as a judge. So he is in this case treated as an ordinary citizen but he is a public officer. If ever a case
will be filed, it will be with the Sandiganbayan. Therefore, Ombudsman is the prosecutor. So Ombudsman has authority in this
case. So you can now distinguish.
CSC vs. Andal

Andal here holds the position as Security Guard II. Security Guard II under the plantilla of the Supreme Court. It was
found out later on that when he took the CSC exam, they revealed the pictures of the seat plan, ito na yung pagtake ng exam. It
was found out that there was another person who took the exam for him. Yung grade niya medyo mataas, 81.03. So he was
charged administratively with the CSC because he took the exam of the CSC. He was a security guard. Question, who has
authority over this administrative case? Since he belonged to the Supreme Court, only the Supreme Court will have authority.
CSC will have no authority. It will be an encroachment upon the admin supervision powers of the Supreme Court.
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for
fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Par 1 refers to the SC and lower courts or courts which have several members and not single-judge courts.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years,
the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
The membership and composition is in par 1. If you observe, there are members which are ex officio members.
Meaning, we have positions by virtue of their existing positions. If you look at the ex officio members, they are the CJ as
chairman, Secretary of Justice, and a member of the Congress. The three represent the separate branches of our govt. This is the
central component in the ex officio membership in the JBC. The regular members come from the private sector. These are major
stakeholders in the appointment of the justices of the SC and judges. They are mentioned in par 2.
The regular members shall be appointed by the president with the consent of the Commission of Appointments. They
are included in the list of appointments delegated to the president.
The principal function of the JBC (par 5) is to recommend appointees to the judiciary. Now, I mentioned earlier that the
ex officio members of the JBC shall be composed of the three great departments. Prior to the 1987 Consti, the members of the
judiciary were appointed by both the Exec and Legis. In the 73 Consti, the Exec is now one with the Legis. Everyone who
wanted to become judges will make sipsip with Marcos.
There was a problem in around 1994. The Congress allowed one member of the Senate and another from the HOR to
sit in the JBC. But during that time, they only had one-half vote each. At around 2000, the JBC allowed full votes to each. But it
was constitutionally challenged.
Chavez vs. JBC
Chavez questioned if the Consti allowed having both members of the Congress to have full votes. SC reviewed the
practice. When you say Congress, it means two houses. You cannot remove one and call it Congress. But lets look at the
provision. If you base on statutory construction, it clearly says A REPRESENTATIVE. So it is a single member. If the intention
of the framers was to allow two, then they should have done so. The intent really is to have a seven member JBC because an odd
number will always be favorable when it comes to voting. If we allow two from the Congress, then the setup is that the Congress
will have two votes and will have an advantage over the Exec and Judiciary.
So what is the effect if the act is declared unconsti? It is not valid and is not valid. If we apply this orthodox view, what
will happen? Since this practice was already declared unconsti, does it mean that all the activities of the JBC before is null? In
this case, the SC applied the modern view or operative fact doctrine. Then all the past proceedings will be declared valid. Only
prior proceedings will be declared unconsti.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.

Appointments to the judiciary do not need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. That is a Consti
provision.
Ninety days from the submission of the list only applies to lower courts. What about vacancies in the SC? It is still 90
days but from occurrence of the vacancy.
So when the list is submitted to the president, he shall appoint only from the list. He cannot appoint another not in the
list. If he does not like the list, he can ask the JBC to send him another list of nominees.
Take note that temporary appointment is not authorized because it is the president who appoints. What happens if there
are vacancies and there is a need to fill? Based on Section 5, the SC can assign judges to temporary stations. Temporary
appointments are not allowed but temporary designations are allowed.
Is the appointment in the Judiciary included in the prohibition of midnight appointments? We go back to Section 18(?)
of Art. 7 in relation to Section 9 wherein it says that appointments shall be made within 90 days and we also relate it to Section 4.
In Re: Valenzuela
Two RTC judges were appointed within the two month prohibited period. Is the president prohibited from appointing?
SC that the president is not allowed to members of the lower court or of the Judiciary. The appointments of those judges are void.
Temporary designations can fill-up the vacancies in the lower courts.
De Castro vs. JBC
The Court changed its mind. This was when Puno retired as CJ and the question was asked if Arroyo may appoint a
new one. The Court said that Section 4 is mandatory which states that the president should appoint a new one. Arroyo would be
held liable if she failed to do it. Since it was not mentioned or included anywhere in the Consti, the Court assumed that it is safe
to say that it is not included in the prohibition of midnight appointments. It is mandatory to make the appointment within that
period. (mam is not convinced of this ruling)
There seems to be a loophole because they discussed about appointments in the SC. What about appointments in the
lower courts? The current theory is that appointments in the judiciary is not included in the prohibition.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts,
shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Tatad vs. CIR
Salaries of members of the Judiciary are taxable. I dont know why they argued why it is not taxable.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Members of the Judiciary have the mandatory retirement age of 70. With that, they can only be removed unless they
behaved badly or when they reach the age of 70. They can be removed by impeachment.
What about abolition of office or reorganization? It is not prohibited as long as it is done in good faith. Technically,
there is no removal from office because the removal implies that the office still exists after the ouster.
Dela Llana vs. Alba
The SC upheld the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Relate this to In Re: Puno.
The second sentence of Section 11 provides that the SC has the power to discipline judges of lower courts. This is
included in the enumeration of en banc cases. Does this mean that the SC shall sit en banc in disciplining judges?
People vs. Gacott
Judge Gacott was reprimanded and fined with 10k by the second division. He argued that the second div cannot
discipline him because the Consti says it must be en banc. The Court made a distinction. The SC en banc can order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. Only when the penalty of dismissal has been penned out shall the SC sit en banc. If the penalty is dismissal, suspension
of more than one year, and a fine of more than 10,000, these are the cases when the SC must sit en banc. Lower than that,
divisions may discipline judges.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
This is to maintain the principle of Separation of Powers.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached
in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any
Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same
requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

So ganito yan: you make a case, they argue, they make a vote, assign someone to pen.
Theres only one writer of the main opinion but there are those who write their dissents. This is in compliance of the
Consti requirements. If you dissented, you must write the reasons therefore. This is to dissuade the justices from participating. If
they failed to do this, will the decision be affected? No. This is more on the duty of the justices.
Pedragosa vs. COMELEC
Here, two commissioners took no part without stating their reasons. Is the decision still valid? Yes. The requirement
has nothing to do without the vote. A judge shall be subjected to disciplinary procedures if he keeps on abstaining.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
Par. 1 refers to every decision of the lower court. Facts and laws must be stated to inform the parties for the reasons of
the decisions so that if anyone appeals, he can point out facts and usage of laws to which he disagrees. The second purpose is to
assure the parties that a decision has been reached after thorough study. Next is that the decision may convince the losing party
that the decision is right and may no longer appeal the case thus reducing the dockets of the courts. Finally, the decision will
constitute the body of case laws which may become useful later on.
Note: Par. 1 refers to decisions. Decisions are the final determinations made. During trial, the Court may issue several
resolutions because, during trial, the parties may bring small issues that the court may resolve. These are called minute
resolutions. Example: Motion for Postponement. The court will not resolve this in the decision but through a resolution. In these
minute resolutions, facts and laws are not necessary.
People vs. Bugarin
A criminal case involving a rape of a minor (a victim of her father). The trial court merely stated, or made a summary
or the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution as well as that of the defense. So, the facts are stated, but after the facts are
stated, the trial court said, the issue is simple, is the private complainant credible in her story on how she was raped? The answer
of the court is an undoubtful [?] a definite YES. So the SC said that the decision as penned in its form violated section 14, Article
VIII. As a result, does it invalidate the decision motu propio? The SC said, normally if the decision does not comply with section
14, they would remand the case back to the trial court, for the trial court to comply with section 14. In other words, it does not
mean that the decision is automatically invalid, it will be remanded, or the court will make an explanation. But here, the SC said,
the case has been running [?] for some time, so in this case, took the of reviewing both the facts and the law/questions of law in
this case. Normally, when the case reaches the SC, the SC is only constitutionally mandated to review errors of law and not of
facts, because it is the duty of the trial court to determine issues of facts. But when it comes to the SC, it is not a trier of facts, but
to review errors of law. But in this case, the SC decided to review the facts and the conclusions of law.
There is what we call memorandum decisions. These are cases when the appellate court merely adopts the lower
courts decision if it agrees to the findings. These are not violative of the Consti provision. The features are as follows:
It is rendered by an appellate court
It incorporates the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court
These are allowed for reasons of convenience and expediency because the appellate court must only copy the lower courts
findings. But, for this to properly be applied, the following are required:
Francisco vs. Permskul
1. The memorandum decision cannot incorporate the findings of fact or conclusions of law only be remote reference.
Meaning, the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum
decision. The decision referred to must be attached as annex to that memorandum decision.
2. This type of decision must be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the name accepted by both parties or
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require extended discussion
of the laws involved. In other words, a memorandum decision can only be used when the case is a simple one.
Despite the convenience accorded by memorandum decision, its still desirable that the appellate judge exerts some effort in
restating his own verse the findings of fact of the lower court presenting his own interpretation of the law, instead of merely
parroting the language of the court a quo as if he cannot do any better. Magpakitang-gilas ka naman sabi ng Court.
Now this requirement is not applicable in decisions of administrative bodies.
Dadubo vs. CSC
The SC said that the CSC is an administrative body. Therefore this requirement is not applicable to it.
Padua vs. Ranada
Involving the toll regulatory board, that is the body, which fixes toll rates, in issuing a resolution regarding the fixing of
these rates, the toll regulatory board is performing an administrative function. It is an administrative body, so the requirement in
Section 14 (1) is not required in these decisions.


What about the second paragraph? So here we are not talking about decision, but denial to give due course to a petition
or denial of a motion for reconsideration. The refusal to give due course to a petition is not a decision. The denial of a motion for
reconsideration is not a decision. In fact, it is written via a resolution. So in these cases, it is not required that the facts or the law
which the denial to give due course to the petition must be stated. What is only required is to give the legal basis. Now, lacking
merit is a legal basis. So that is sufficient.
Petitions reach the court; the first base is for the SC to determine, whether to give due course to the petition; that is not
going to the merits of the petition or the allegations; what should be determined first is that it could be merely procedural such as
the case was filed out of time. There is no need to go to the merits to give due course to the petition. Or lack in form or substance,
the SC may not entertain the petition and simply refuse to give due course. So there is no decision to speak of. And the
requirement is only to state the legal basis of the decision.
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding
judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have
been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.
Section 15 is the period for decisions. Here, we can see that the period for decisions are Constitutionally mandated. But
what is the reckoning point for these periods? It is the date of submission of the case for decision or resolution.
In par. 2, the usual practice is that we file a case for motion submitting the case for decision. From that moment on,
both parties are notified that it is already the last pleading and that that is when the period would start. What about the
Sandiganbayan? It is in the level of the Court of Appeals as far as salary goes. But as to its function, it is like a trial court because
it is a starting point for cases. What is the period for deciding cases before the Sandiganbayan?
In Re: Problems of Delays
It was argued that period for decision is like the lower collegiate court which is 12 months. SC said that the
Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court in the same level as the CA but functions like a trial court. Therefore, the
judgement shall be rendered three months after the submission for resolution.
What is the effect if this period is not complied with? It is under par. 3. Despite the expiration, the court is still
mandated to render a decision. Another effect is what is stated in Licaros.
Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan
Licaros here is a public officer charged as an accessory to the crime of robbery, the case was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. He asked for a separate trial for his defense; completed his evidence, submitted his case for decision as early as
1986, I will defer the deciding of the case pending the completion of the presentation of evidence of your co-accused; completed
4 years after (1990), in year 2000, the case has not been decided, does this violate Section 15? OF COURSE. The mandatory is
just 3 months. It took 14 years, and there is still no decision. What did licaros do? Filed a case dismissing the case invoking the
right to speedy disposition for cases. The SC said there is a violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases, and because of
the delay, there is no need to decide on the case, so the case should be dismissed.
Another effect of delay:
In Re: Judicial Audit
Audit of the RTC in Davao City, in Branch 14 under Judge Layague, it was found out that there were several cases
pending for decision and resolution totaling to 100 more or less cases for the decision or resolution. So, he was asked to explain
the delays. According to him, the delay was due to his ailing health, and there was no clerk of court and legal researcher. The SC
said, nonetheless, you are liable because that is a mandate of the Constitution. So, he was fined P25K.
Violation of this Consti provision will have the ff effects:
(1) Notwithstanding the expiration of the date, the court is still mandated to render a decision with utmost dispatch;
(2) The case could be dismissed, if it is found out that the delay results to violation of speedy trial or speedy disposition of
cases;
(3) The judge causing the delay could be held administratively liable.


ARTICLE IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
What are the consti commissions?
1.
Civil Service Commission: personnel office of the govt. It administers the civil service. All action of personnel within
the govt is within the functions of the CSC. All civil service rules and regulations must be complied with by the govt. The CSC
is just an administrative agency. It exercises powers pertaining to an administrative agency including executive powers, quasijudicial powers, and quasi-legislative powers. Quasi-legislative is rule-making power.
What is the scope of its authority? The CSC embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the govt
including GOCCs. Theres one dept not governed by CSC except the application of its rules. It is the Judiciary. All activities
within the Judiciary personnel are not in the jurisdiction of the CSC except when it comes to CSC rules and regulations.
2.
Commission on Election: discharged with the administration of all important electoral processes from election of
national officials, local officials, baranggay officials, or even SK officials. It also governs activities such as plebiscites and
referendum. It exercises powers pertaining to an administrative agency including executive powers, quasi-judicial powers, and
quasi-legislative powers.
Under the Consti, it is also vested with Judicial powers. What is that? To be the judge with exclusive original jurisdiction over
contests relating to elections returns and qualifications of all officials. And also appellate jurisdiction over all municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction.
3.
Commission on Audit: The auditing office of the govt. What is its function? Its function is to examine the accuracy of
the records kept by accountable officers and together with the expenditures having made in the qualitative law.
It is where the people can verify whether their money has been spent properly. Functions of the commission include examine and
audit all forms of government revenue, all forms of government expenditures, to promulgate accounting and auditing rules, to
decide administrative cases involving expenditures of public funds and pursuant to CA 327 as amended by PD 1445, all money
claims against the government should be filed before the COA. So, part of its function is to settle all government accounts.
So what is a money claim? Money claim is a demand for payment of a sum of money, reimbursement or compensation arising
from law or contract due from or owing to a government agency. In case of money claims in this nature, if you do not file it with
the court, you file it with the COA.
Parreno vs. COA
In this case the AFP stopped the petitioners monthly pension. The petitioner is a retired PC officer and the stoppage of
the payment of hi pension is in accordance with sec 27 of the RA 1638, a law which provides that a retiree loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retired benefits terminated upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship.
According to him he is still entitled to the benefits and he questions the validity of that law. He files his money claim because it is
a money claim pursuant to pension law before the COA. The COA refused to give due course to his petition because according to
COA, it has no jurisdiction over it, the case involving the determination of the validity of that particular section of the law. The
case depends on the ascertainment on validity or the question or assails a section of law. So, does the COA have jurisdiction? So,
what is the petitioner asking the COA? To exercise the power of judicial review, when you as a tribunal to determine
constitutionality of the law, so what is that? The power of judicial review so, does the COA have that? No, it does not. According
to the Supreme Court, this power pertains only to the Supreme Court and to lower courts up to the RTC because it only flows
from the judicial power. So, in this case only money claims, pure and simple money claims can be filed in COA. The issue on
constitutionality must be filed with the regular courts and only then can the COA have jurisdiction over the money claim.
Why are these offices called Consti Commissions? Because they perform key functions of the govt. What would
happen if the COMELEC would be under the Exec? It was removed from it to make it independent to make the election
processes more credible.
Its also the same with the COA. Even govt bodies need external auditors. Our national setup would also require
auditors independent from the three great departments.
Article IX provides features which would protect the independence of these Consti Coms. What are these?
1. They have their own powers of appointment provided that these comply with the rules and regulations of the CSC.
2. They enjoy fiscal autonomy. The Consti requires that all those who enjoy this will enjoy automatic release of their funding
and are not subject to any condition which the DBM would place upon any other govt agency.
3. The third instance is the salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased
during their tenure. The salary of commissioners may not be decreased during their continuance in office.
4. The commissioners have a fixed term.
So you refer to art 9-B sec 1(2) or paragraph 2, art 9-C sec 1(2) or paragraph 2 and art 9-d sec 1(2) or paragraph 2
referring respectively to the members of these particular constitutional commissions. So whats the term of these commissioners?
They have a fixed term of 7 years. Common also to these provisions is this staggered appointment or the first appointment. So,
there is that what you call a rotational system in place and also, appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term.
In no case shall any member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary capacity. The term is 7 years, there is a rotational
system. Now, for the rotational system to work two conditions are required. Number 1, the terms of the first commissioners start
at the same date. Second, the vacancy due to resignation or death should be filled in for the unexpired balance or the term.
In other words, the successor or the person who succeeds pursuant to a vacancy shall only serve for the unexpired
period and not for the whole term of 7 year anew. Now, first appointed, we said that the term of the first commissioners shall
start on the same date, this means that the common starting point of the appointment to these commissions is on February 2,

1987. Whats the relevance of that date? Thats the effectivity date of the 1987 Constitution, so all of them, those who are first
appointed, their terms begun on February 2, 1987. The staggered system is that some served for 3 years, some for 5 years and
some for 7 years, then so on and so forth.
Gaminde vs. COA
Gaminde was appointed as a commissioner. She succeeded commissioner Barlongay whose 5-year term ended on
February 2, 1992 that means his starting point is February 2, 1987 as the first appointed pursuant to the provisions of the
constitution his term would only be for 5 years so, his term ending in 1992. However, he conveniently served up to March 1993,
more than a year so that the one who succeeded him, Gaminde, was only appointed in June 1993. Now, according to the
commission on appointments, Gamindes term which is for 7 years would end February 2, 1999, counted from 1992 to 1999. She
started serving in 1993, so her computation, 1993 plus 7 years, her term should end in 2000. Is her contention correct? SC: we
have a rotational system, we have a common starting point and there should also be a common ending. So, it should be always 7
years thereafter even if the tenure is less than 7 years. Actually she served until 2000, during that service shall be considered as
de facto officer. She is still entitled to receive her salary and emoluments for all the services rendered.
5. These commissions exercise independent rule making power, they can make and promulgate rules and regulations. The
Supreme Court in fact does not have power over these commissions. The SC does not need to approve or cannot revoke
except only in the exercise of judicial review
6. The commissioners are removable only by impeachment.
Qualifications
Common Qualifications:
1. Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
2. 35 years old at the time of appointment.
3. Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
Special Qualifications:
CSC
-Proven capacity for public administration
-No additional educational qualification but in reality you cannot be in the government if you are not CSC eligible
COMELEC
-Holders of a college decree however a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
-For the seven commissioners, at least 4 of them including the Chairman must be lawyers
COA
-CPAs with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years
-Either youre a CPA or a Lawyer. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession.
Appointment:
The commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent commission on appointment.
Again, appointment in a vacancy shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor and in no case
shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Ultimately the question is, is an ad interim
appointment an appointment in of temporary or acting capacity. The answer of the Supreme Court is no. An ad interim
appointment is a regular and permanent appointment. This can only be revoked in two accounts, either they are by-passed or
rejected by the commission on appointment when the latter is in session.
At one time, the President designated Commissioner Yorac as acting chairman. Is this valid? SC said that the President
cannot make temporary appointments so the President cannot make as acting chairman. The choice of temporary chairman falls
under the discretion of the Commission and cannot be exercised for it by the President if there is no chairman yet. The
commissioners left can choose among themselves who will be acting as chairman. This is the same thing happened in the SC
when Corona was convicted in the impeachment. There was a vacancy in the SC Chief Justices seat. President Aquino has not
yet appointed a replacement so who was the acting SC Chief Justice? It was Justice Carpio and the choice was made among the
justices and not by the President. So, theres a contingency rule where in those who are left can choose who the temporary or
acting chairman.
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Decisions of Consti Commissions are final and executory because they have the exclusive domain as to the matters
exclusively vested to them by the Consti. Is there a way for us to question these decisions? Yes, by grave abuse of discretion via
certiorari petitions. Not that the decision is not correct but whether or not the decision was made arbitrarily, whimsically, and
capriciously.
Note: a law was enacted RA 7902, an act expanding of the jurisdiction of the CA. Here, the decisions of the
constitutional commissions may be appealed to the CA. So in this case, from the constitutional commissions you will bring the
case to the CA and not directly with the SC pursuant to RA 7902.
ARTICLE XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
This is your go-to section when you are lost in your answer. You just answer Public office is a public trust. You
memorize this as a last resort answer in the bar.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 2 provides the process of impeachment as a process of removal of public officers listed who are officers that
are impeachable and listed also the grounds of impeachment and emphasizes that all other public officers not listed there may be
removed from office as provided by law but not by impeachment. So who are the impeachable officers? The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
Office vs. Mojica
The subject of the question on whether or not he is an impeachable officer is the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
So you have the Ombudsman, there is only one Ombudsman. He has Deputy Ombudsmen in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. So
here, he is the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The SC emphasized that the list in section 2 is exclusive. Other words, only
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman not his deputies are impeachable officers. In other words, the Deputy can be removed from office in any other
manner provided by law except by impeachment. So if you use this last sentence, you can also say that only these are
impeachable officers because all other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment thats why it bolsters the doctrine that this list is exclusive. Is the VP an impeachable officer? No because the list is
exclusive.
In Re: Raul Gonzales
This involves the disbarment of Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan. The Chief Justice or any other member of the SC is
required to be a lawyer or member of the Philippine Bar and under section 2, he is an impeachable officer. The question is, can he
be disbarred for violation of Canons or the ethics or Code of Conduct? SC said that a public officer who under the constitution is
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as qualification for his office who may be removed from office only by
impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Why? To grant the complaint for
disbarment of a member of the Court during his incumbency would in effect be would the circumvent and hence to run about of
the constitutional mandate that the members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction
of certain offenses listed in art 11 sec 2 of the Constitution. The same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman who is
required by the constitution to be a lawyer, so he cannot be disbarred. He has first to be impeached because disbarment would
result to him the stripped off of his profession as a lawyer. So, if he is no longer a lawyer, he is now disqualified to hold office
that is why he cannot be disbarred. He has to be removed from office first through impeachment that is the only way he can be
removed from office that also goes with the Ombudsman, members of COMELEC that have to be lawyers and members of the
COA who are not CPAs. Lets say Im a CPA-lawyer and Im a commissioner of COA, can I be disbarred? Yes, because that
would not disqualify me from being a member or commissioner of the COA. Im a CPA. Im still qualified to hold that office.
What are the grounds for impeachment?

Culpable violation of the Constitution: means wilful/ intentional not mistake in application of the Constitution
Treason
Bribery
Graft and corruption
Other high crimes
Betrayal of public trust
Out of those grounds, only the four have a definite definition in our laws. What are the definitions of the last two
grounds? This is in the discretion of whatever office is given the authority to impeach. This is a purely political question.

Who is this office who may initiate impeachment proceedings?
Read section 3 Paragraph 1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
Paragraph 6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
Therefore, the Congress has been given specific functions when it comes to impeachment. The one who has the
authority to initiate the proceedings is the HOR. The judge shall be the Senate.
Francisco vs. HOR
The HR is saying that the SC has no authority to review, modify or exercise judicial review over its decisions in
initiating the complaint cited in US authorities, now according to the SC, there is a difference between the US constitution and
the Philippine constitution when it comes to JR(judicial review) or judicial power., when it comes to the US constitution the
power of JR is merely implied it is not written there, merely implied acquiesced by the people over century of practice. Now in
the Philippines we know that the power of JR is granted and judicial power is even expanded to include grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction. Now another distinction with respect to the HR over impeachment proceedings is that
while it bestows the power of impeachment to the HR without limitation, in the Philippines, the constitution provided the
limitations to these powers. We will read later on section 3 paragraph 2 3 4 and 5, now these limitations include the manner of
filing, the required vote to impeach, and the 1 year bar of impeachment of one legislative official. Now in other words in our
system, who will determine whether or not he impeachment court exceed its authority or already violated the constitution with
regards to the limit? So who will be magcocorect sa impeachment court? Its the judiciary exercising its expanded jurisdiction to
determine grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess jurisdiction and that is also the exercise judicial review, so in short
the judiciary may exercise judicial review over the impeachment proceedings. The provisions in the constitution, show that the
constitution does not intend the manner of impeachment proceedings to the sole discretion of congress instead it provided for
certain limits.
Gutierrez vs. HOR
SC said that Francisco case cannot exercise the expanded JR as a duty, and that the power is to determine whether there
is grave abuse of discretion, in this case, the Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. There is no doubt that
questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of
promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment so according to the SC this are well within the limit to invoke judicial
power or the power if judicial review.
-
Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Impeachment initiation is in par 2, 3, 4, and 5. These are the proceedings with the HOR.
What is par 2 saying?
The complaint must be verified. It is under oath. The verified complaint may be filed by the Congressman himself or a
citizen with the endorsement of a Congressman. It is then forwarded to the proper committee which is usually the Committee on
Justice. That Committee will check the verified complaint and will recommend for the filing or against it. If it recommends for
the filing, then it will be called the Articles of Impeachment. It then goes back to the HOR and will vote upon that
recommendation. What is the vote required? 1/3. After this, it will be filed with the Senate.

Par. 5 gives a one year ban. The purpose is to protect the public official to prevent frequent harassment. Otherwise, he
will be spending the rest of his term answering complaints. On the other side of the coin, the one year ban is also placed to allow
the legislature to perform its principle task which is legislation. Impeachment proceedings will take much time of the time of the
legislators.
When do you say that the subsequent complaint is already banned by the one year prohibition?
Francisco vs. HOR
This case concerns the impeachment of CJ Davide and other associate justices. The first verified complaint was filed by
a citizen (Erap). He filed it on June 2, 2003. On Oct. 22, the Committee determined it to be sufficient in form but not in
substance. They recommended for its dismissal. The following day, 1/3 of the HOR signed the impeachment. Is the subsequent
verified complaint allowed or is it covered by the one year ban? SC said that the impeachment complaint is not initiated when it
is transmitted to the Senate because that is not initiation but the end of the proceedings with the HOR. It is also not initiated when
the HOR deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee because something prior to that has already been done.
The action of the House is already the first step in the proceeding not its initiation. It is initiated when a verified complaint is filed
to the Committee of Justice for action. This is the first step which triggers the series of steps that followed. Initiation takes place
by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the Committee.
Gutierrez vs HOR
In this case, the verified complaint was filed July 22, 2010. On Aug 2, another complaint was filed. Both complaints
were referred together to the Committee on Justice at the same time although filed at different times. Is the second complaint
already barred by the prohibitive period? When is it initiated? From the time it was filed and to the referral. Meaning, the first
case does not start the running because it was not yet referred. So both verified complaints may be given action by the Committee
and that is the initiation of the proceedings.
In par. 6, the oath is Consti mandated. They call a session just for oathtaking. The required number of votes to impeach
is 2/3 of all the members. This is an absolute 2/3.
In par. 7, is there an appeal or motion for reconsideration? It depends on the rules of the Senate when it comes to MFR.
But as to appeal to judgements for impeachment, it is final. The only way we can question it is when we can make a case for
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are confirmed in the cases of Francisco and
Gutierrez that the SC may not exercise its expanded authority in impeachment cases. Once you are impeached, you are now open
for trial and would no longer have protection.
Estrada questioned his criminal cases. He said that the cases should not have been filed because he was not impeached.
The SC said that he misinterpreted this provision. It only means that the judgement of impeachment is removal of office and may
be held liable for prosecution. It does not say that it will be contradictory if you were acquitted. It has nothing to do with the
criminal charges.
Par. 8 provides that the Congress has the authority to promulgate the rules for impeachment. Gutierrez questioned the
proceedings because, according to her, the new set of Congress provisionally adopted the rules of procedures of the prior
Congress but published after the date the complaint was filed against her. In other words, when the complaint was filed, there was
yet no published rules of procedure on legislative inquiry. She cited Neri wherein the Senate failed to publish their rules. Now the
SC said that Gutierrez cannot find refuge in the Neri decision because only this legislative inquiry is the sole provision which
requires duly published rules of procedures. Par. 8 gives authority the Congress the authority to promulgate. It does not require it
to be published. When the Congress adopted the rules of the prior Congress, it would be sufficient.


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Constitutional Law 1

Based on the Lectures of Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

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To establish the structure of the government or form of government.

Elements of the State:

Lim Kai Chong Case

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League of Cities vs. COMELEC

Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC

Easier Solution to get the 20%:

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Abas vs. SET

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Legislative Inquiry (Sec. 21)

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Fortich vs. Corona

So, what happens?

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ARTICLE XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

What are the grounds for impeachment?

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