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China is increasing investment in Mexican oil to sustain its
economy China wants to crowd the US out of the market
Knowland 6/10/13 [Don, writer for The World Socialist Web Site, published by
the International Committee of the Fourth International, the leadership of the world
socialist movement, Chinas president visits Mexico and Central America seeking
economic ties]
President Barack Obama. Xis trip comes just a month after Obamas own visit in early May to Mexico
and to Central America. Xi arrived in Trinidad just as US Vice President Joe Biden finished a six-day trip
Xis trip is
part of a stiffening response by China to US attempts to undercut
Chinese efforts to assure itself worldwide access to critical mineral
resources, and to encircle China under the guise of its pivot to Asia
policy. There the US has stoked Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam into increasingly abrasive relations
to Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil aimed at shoring up US economic interests in the region.
with China over competing claims to various islands in the oil and gas-rich East China and South China
Seas. China
heavily in South America in recent years, striking major trade deals with the regions governments.
Beginning in 2009, it
Brazil, Latin Americas foremost economy , as well as its number one source of foreign direct
investment. In the decade spanning 2000 to 2010, trade between China and Latin America as a whole
increased 1,500 percent. By 2010, it had risen to $261.2 billion, gaining steadily on US-Latin American
trade, which amounted to $351 billion last year. Between 2002 and 2011, Chinese foreign direct
worsened after former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011. More fundamentally,
their economic relations have been unbalanced. In 2012 the value of Chinas exports to Mexico were ten
times those of Mexico to China, $57 billion to $5.7 billion.
other minerals, oil, cotton and car parts, and imported electronics, toys, plastics and furniture. Mexico
and China also have been direct competitors in supplying the US market with manufactured goods.
Mexican businessmen have long felt threatened by China undercutting them as a cheap labor platform,
particularly in electronic and consumer products industries. A decade ago Mexicos average labor costs
were nearly three times higher than Chinas. Recently that labor-cost differential has narrowed sharply,
eating into Chinese cost advantage, so Mexico has regained some US market share. According to at least
one report this year, hourly wages in Mexico are now lower than in China. Mexican companies still
complain that Chinese workplace rules on flexibility, lower quality control and lack of respect for
director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel,
concrete, said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexicos Center for Business with Asia at the private
Monterrey Technological Institute. Evidently
Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long
been dominated by the US. It also recognizes Chinas rise as a geopolitical
player far beyond Asia. In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has
part,
arrived to stay, the worlds second economic power," Mexican vice minister of foreign affairs Carlos De
oppose protectionism and try to resolve trade disagreements through consultation. He and Pea Nieto
agreed to end a dispute over Chinese textiles that had led to litigation. The Chinese sought to sign at
least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism (a huge Mexican industry), science and
technology during Xis visit. All that was accomplished, however, were agreements to cooperate on
commercial defense, and on access for Mexican tequila and Mexican pork to the Chinese market.
Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said it was too soon for a free-trade agreement between
the two countries, perhaps reflecting caution as to the effect of courting China on Mexicos neighbor to
the north. Mexico, along with the US and other Pacific Rim countries, but not China, is party to the TransPacific Partnership negotiations, an effort to increase trade among the Americas, Asia and Australasia.
Mexico is keen not to jeopardize those talks. Xi also visited Trinidad and Tobago, with which China has
had diplomatic ties for almost 40 years. Trinidad is also a major trading partner in the Caribbean for
China. Xis meetings in Trinidad were aimed at buying up liquified natural gas (LNG). Chinas LNG
purchases rose 20 percent last year; it is eying Trinidads surplus now that the United States is shifting
from Caribbean LNG imports to greater reliance on domestic shale gas extracts. During this phase of Xis
trip, China utilized the checkbook diplomacy it has pursued in Africa. It promised $3 billion in
concessionary loans for 10 Caribbean countries, whose leaders flew in to meet with Xi. Costa Rica is the
only Central American country with diplomatic relations with China; the other Central American
countries recognize Taiwan, a legacy of US dominance of the region. Xi ended his trip with a visit there
with Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla. The Chinese announced $2 billion in deals with Costa Rica,
including $1.3 billion for joint construction of a refinery on the Caribbean coast, and hundreds of millions
for a new highway. Chinchilla said her country was pursuing additional agreements on investment in
accord to boost investment and economic cooperation with 15 Caribbean nations, and a one-year free
In
contrast, according to a report published last year by Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based
think tank, China has made $75 billion in loan commitments in Latin America
trade agreement with Colombia. The US offered no concrete plans for investment or economic aid.
over the last six years, topping total lending by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
total
consumption of the five basic commodities grain, meat, oil, coal and steel
has already surpassed that of the USA in all but oil , [39] leading many
analysts such as Hutton to wonder how the global supply of energy can cope with
the emergence of such a hungry economy without conflict over
increasingly scarce resources. [40] The development of China and its interests in the
region is therefore key. Roett & Paz argue that what matters most for Sino-Latin
American energy relations is not where China is today but how it compares
with its position in the world at the start of the twenty-first century and
where it is likely to be in 2030. [41] Due to the triangular relationship
between China, the U.S, and Latin America, any shift of the equilibrium
towards China cannot fail to impact upon the United States . Bajpaee moots the
idea: While not a zero-sum game, growing inter-linkages and interdependence between China and Latin
America is likely to come at the cost of the United States relations with its neighbours, which will only
undermine U.S ability to access the regions energy resources. This will force the U.S to rely on energy
resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle
[43] It must surely be in both sides best interests to avoid such a scenario.
With the United States preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has
obviously been busy carving out a large sphere of influence for itself
in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With the presence of China being felt everywhere, from the
backwaters of the Amazon to mines in the Andes, U.S. dominance in its own backyard is
no longer unquestioned or unrivaled. Opinion is divided on whether China's economic
engagement is guided only by commercial interests or is a ruse to divert attention from Beijing's
geostrategic goals in the region. Some contend that the Chinese presence in Latin America marks the
end of the Monroe Doctrine, while others are more skeptical. Over the long term, Chinese intentions in
Latin America may not be as benign as some China-watchers suggest. Nor can China's expansion be
equated with Japan's or Spain's interest in Latin America because of the highly competitive nature of the
U.S.-China relationship. Beijing calculates that one of the consequences of the burgeoning Sino-Latin
American trade and resource dependency will be a widening of the gap between U.S. and Latin American
interests. As U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger PardoMaurer points out: "China has its own set of political, economic and military interests, requiring us to
carefully distinguish between legitimate commercial initiatives and the possibility of political or
diplomatic efforts to weaken the democratic alliances we have forged." While Beijing's forays do not
indicate a seismic change in the balance of power within Latin America, the very presence of China does
that these countries will not play "the China card" in their relations with the United States. Likewise, the
revival of the old ideological debate over which political system -- Chinese authoritarianism or Western
democracy -- delivers more people from poverty, and whether wealth or elections are a greater measure
of freedom does not bode well for Washington's efforts to promote transparency and democracy. Beijing's
strategic interests and unconditional investments prop up many authoritarian regimes, thereby
undercutting Washington's ability to persuade them to change their behavior. Just as the United States
can no longer take the Latin American countries' allegiances for granted, its access to the region's
Chinese jets have headed off an American spy plane over Taiwan, raising
tensions between Beijing and Washington . But Conn Hallinan says the conflict is a
worldwide competition, and both the US and China are out to secure oil
resources. China has warned that relations with the US might become tense after two Chinese
fighter jets intercepted a U2 reconnaissance plane over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory. In
response, Beijing's Defense Ministry said the US must end such flights, as they have severely undermined
mutual trust and remain a major obstacle to the development of military ties. However, US Admiral
Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has announced that America will continue to
Hallinan, of
Foreign Policy in Focus says that this conflict is part of the worldwide
competition for energy resources between the number one and the number
two energy users in the world. I think their [Chinese] anger is justified," Conn Hallinan told
RT. The danger here is that people make mistakes and when
mistakes get made between nuclear powers, that is something we all
run reconnaissance missions near Chinas coastline despite the objections. But Conn
need to worry about. Mainly China is worried that the US could put its
thumb on their energy resources. The South China Sea contains rich oil and gas reserves
and some of the worlds most geo-strategically vital naval routes. " This is part of a worldwide
competition. Right now the US is the number one user of energy in the
world and China is number two. 80 per cent of Chinese energy supplies
move by sea. They either move through the Straits of Hormuz, which is controlled by the American
Fifth Fleet, or they move through the Straits of Malacca, which is controlled by the American Seventh
Fleet, Hallinan said. They
Extinction
The Straits Times, June 25, 2k (Regional Fallout: No One Gains in War Over
Taiwan. Straits Times. Lexis)
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale
war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better
serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would
embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear
war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases
and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In
the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China
were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as
opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted,
Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in
the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between
India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and
dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General
Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean
War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military
defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict
and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two
choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the
US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US
estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities.
Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer
disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear
weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies,
told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although
the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it.
He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked
dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass,
Uniqueness - mexico
China is prioritizing engagement with Latin America especially with Mexico
AP 6/5/13 [Associated Press, Xi visits US, Latin America as leader of more
confident China after decade of explosive growth,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-05/world/39748386_1_trade-growthbeijing-china-s]
BEIJING President Xi Jinping meets his American counterpart, Barack Obama, this week after stops in
the Caribbean and Latin America as the leader of a more confident China following a decade of explosive
top 10 percent in six of the past 10 years. It passed Japan as the worlds second-biggest economy and
By 2012,
China was a bigger trading partner than the United States for 128 countries,
rebounded quickly from the 2008 global crisis, which still has Western countries limping.
while the U.S. was ahead in just 72, according to an Associated Press tally of export and import data
gathered by the International Monetary Fund. That is a reversal from six years ago, when the U.S. led in
Chinese system worked well, said Steve Tsang, director of the China Policy Institute at the University of
Nottingham. But the financial crisis and the sense that the Chinese were able to deal with it more
One
sign of Chinas confidence may be Xis itinerary: He meets Obama on Friday
and Saturday only after stops in Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico and does it
in California, rather than pushing for a ceremony-laden White House
encounter as previous Chinese leaders did. That suggests Beijing feels it no
longer needs American help to burnish its image and wants to focus on
practical matters, Tsang said. Xi Jinping is sending a clear signal that, Ive got
other priorities that I want to attend to first , he said. Xis predecessors faced a more
effectively, at least until now, suggests to the Chinese leadership that Chinas system worked.
uncertain diplomatic outlook. Jiang Zemin spent the 1990s guiding Beijing out of its diplomatic isolation
following the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. Hu Jintao, who
succeeded Jiang in 2002, oversaw efforts to win China a bigger role in the World Bank and other global
bodies. Beijing also stepped up its presence in U.N. peacekeeping work after spending the 1980s and 90s
Xis visit
to the Caribbean and Latin America highlights Chinas growing presence in a
region on the U.S. doorstep. Trade with China is smaller than that with the United States
for much of the region, but is expanding faster an important element for
governments that want to find future sources of growth. Over time, that might
prompt emerging economies to see their interests more aligned with Beijing
following the late supreme leader Deng Xiaopings doctrine of keeping a low profile abroad.
on trade, climate change and other global issues. The voices of emerging powers are getting louder,
said Chen Yuanting, a Latin America specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an official
think tank. Since
Trinidad, Xi met leaders of nine Caribbean countries and showed off Chinas growing financial muscle,
promising them loans totaling some $3 billion. We really welcomed that generosity, said Trinidadian
Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar. The money kept flowing at Xis next stop in Costa Rica, where he
Moving
on to Mexico, Xi and President Enrique Pena Nieto said they would take
steps to move toward more balance in their trade. Mexico imported $57 billion in
goods from China last year, while exporting only $5.7 billion back. With new leadership in
China and in Mexico, I think this trip represents an effort on both sides to
promised a $900 million line of credit to finance the possible modernization of an oil refinery.
put the relationship on a new and more positive path , said Matt Ferchen, a Latin
America specialist at Tsinghua University in Beijing, in an email. Other Latin American countries such as
Chile and Brazil have profited from selling iron ore, soybeans and copper to China, but Mexico competes
with China as a manufacturer and, like the United States, runs a large trade deficit with Beijing. In a joint
Uniqueness - mexico
China is increasing its influence in Mexico in an attempt to get
oil and as a signal of strength to the US
NYT 6/4/13 [Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building Trip to Mexico]
President Xi Jinping of China arrived in
Mexico City on Tuesday for a three-day visit intended to smooth over
relations that have long been prickly. China has moved forcefully to secure oil and
SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, Mexico
other commodities in South America over the past decade. Mexico Latin Americas second-largest
economy has played a different role though, not supplying China but competing with it to export
manufactured goods like electronics and clothing to the United States. President Xis visit to Mexico,
coming only two months after President Enrique Pea Nieto of Mexico traveled to China, is an effort to
Caribbean, further securing his nations foothold there. In Trinidad and Tobago, he met with 10
Caribbean leaders and promised $3 billion in loans for projects in the region, according to Bloomberg
News. Among the loans was one for $250 million to build a childrens hospital in Trinidad, the
Caribbeans largest energy supplier. China has given billions in loans and aid to Caribbean nations to
build stadiums, roads, ports and tourist resorts, and Mr. Xis visit came days after Vice President Joseph
R. Biden Jr. met with 15 regional leaders in Trinidad, drawing a sharp contrast about what the two
countries had to offer the areas tiny economies. Mr. Biden announced no new initiatives, though he
spoke about providing help for clean energy research and education and promised to dismantle
remaining trade and investment barriers. On Sunday, Mr. Xi traveled to Costa Rica which has no
diplomatic ties with Taiwan and promised almost $300 million in loans to finish building a highway. The
trip sent a clear message to other Central American countries that by withdrawing their recognition of
Taiwan they could get goodies too, Kevin P. Gallagher, a professor at Boston University, wrote in an e-
Latin American leaders have long complained that Washington pays too
little attention to the rest of the hemispheres concerns, and China has
begun to take advantage of that perception . As Latin America and the
Caribbean become less dependent on the United States, they have another
economic ally, and that economic ally is a superpow er, said S. Lynne Walker, the
mail.
director of the China-Americas program at the Institute of the Americas in California. Matt Ferchen, a
Xis
itinerary may also be intended as a message to the United States .
China wants to remind the U.S. that just as the U.S. has influence in regions
close to China, China too has rising influence in the Americas , he wrote in an escholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, suggested that President
mail. Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward
changing their frosty relationship.
Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back
education. We agree on the importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship, Mr. Pea
China
could also send a strong message by announcing investments in Mexican
manufacturing, experts said, perhaps in the automobile industry. At least having the possibility of
Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports.
greater Chinese investment on the table might allow China and Mexico to move beyond their up-till-now
Chinas interest in
natural resources leaves little doubt that it is looking at future oil deals in
Mexico. In a symbolic move, Mexicos state-owned oil monopoly, Pemex,
signed an agreement during Mr. Pea Nietos visit to China in April to ship
30,000 barrels a day to Sinopec, a state-owned company there.
quite dysfunctional and competitive relationship, Mr. Ferchen wrote. Still,
Uniqueness - mexico
China and US are competing for influence in Mexico and
China is ahead
Ellis 6/6/13 [R. Evan Ellis is associate professor with the William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, China's New Backyard,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_ameri
ca]
Portuguese, most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United States still held a dominant
left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, characterized her
discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a
children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects,
publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade
between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President
Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make
no mistake: China is now a presence in the region. Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only
the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist
Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing
rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica.
Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirtsleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort
in California, sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to
engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference
shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders .
Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi
might be able to make up the most ground . Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's
engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao,
China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself
from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming
the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade
countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the
Americas, relatively independent of the United States.
uniqueness
US is decreasing investment China filling in
Munoz 6/9/13 [Heraldo, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UN Development
Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, The United States turns to
an emerged Latin America,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136984021498867.html]
The United States is still the region's top foreign investor . In 2012, US exports to
South and Central America plus the Caribbean totaled $205bn, compared with $110bn in exports to
United States has become Brazil's second commercial partner after China. Bilateral trade between the
countries stood at about $100bn but Vice President Biden said there is "no reason" why that number
could not be $400-500bn.
Uniqueness/link
Chinas influence is growing in Latin America and competes
with US interests
Cerna 11 [Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at
Kennesaw State University, China's Growing Presence in Latin America:
Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, China Research Center, a
think-tank providing peer reviewed research on US-China relations]
Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the
trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very
this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern
neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically
and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching.
least,
must deregulate their financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preference to US
firms, and allow private US firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for
new-found Latin American friends. These offers will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports
the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: n $3bn in commitments to eight
Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; n $1.3bn to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit;
A $1bn credit line from the Export-Import Bank of China to Mexico for
its state-owned oil company. This financing comes on top of $86bn in financing already
and n
provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. To put it into proper perspective, consider
requires that Chinese firms are hired to conduct the bulk of the envisioned project work. In just a few
years, China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two (for Peru and
Mexico) trading partner. These are not just any countries. They are the most important economies in
Latin America. Of course, the US is still the most important economic partner for the region overall.
America. It has not worked out that way. So far, reset has essentially meant making
the same old offer, but via new faces.
Deals with few requirements. China can bargain on the spot without a lot of
caveats. Its transactions are based on simple exchanges. Their leaders have
broad authority to negotiate foreign deals without worrying about legislative
oversight, the rule of law, or altruistic objectives. Unlike Western leaders, Chinese
leaders represent state monopolies-which mesh well with Latin American
government ownership or management of telecommunications, mining, and energy
industries. They do not need to build up Latin American trade capacity to deal with diverse
businesses.
The United States and China have competing inter ests in Latin America.
Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable,
democratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the
region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform
for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In contrast, China represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances.
Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presidents,
and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and industrialization
America's strength is
competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction .
As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States
should: Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. polthat might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty.
icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricultural and steel
subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with
Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and
Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth. Adopt more comprehensive
relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves
vacuums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers
can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism,
expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11]
Cut red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest
extent possible. Performance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every situation.
Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcotics cooperation and Article 98 letters that
withhold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies
in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions
absolutely necessary, it should tailor them to suspend only economic aid that
is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests.
China has any interest in the internal economic workings of its trading partners is ignorant of the depth
of the peaceful rise, Chinas non interference policy and its new found ambivalence towards ideology as a
ignores the fact that every nation-state attempts to reap soft power advantages, it is intrinsic to the
nature of international politics. Political and cultural elements in Chinas burgeoning relationship with
US engagement
with Latin American countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to
develop military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic and academic
accounts often suggest that the 19th century Monroe Doctrine continues to
be pursued by contemporary US policymakers, with a presumed desire to
keep China out of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese initiatives in the
hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin Americas own
leadership has responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how
engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United
States. Colombias close relationship with the United States, for example, made the military leadership
of the country reluctant to procure major military items from the PRC.28 The same logic has also
applied to countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom
embracing the PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with
the United States. The degree to which a bad relationship with the United
States has propelled a positive relationship with China has increasingly
gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez to diversify away
the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran. At the political level,
from Venezuelan dependence on the United States as the nations primary oil export market, for example,
opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese construction projects, the purchase of Chinese
US refusal to
sell F-16 fighter aircraft and components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted
Venezuela to engage with China, and other countries, to procure military
hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after the United States
blocked it from acquiring a comparable aircraft from the Czech Republic. 30
commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese oil companies.29
to-people exchanges, with private sector support. The administration should develop a common agenda
with Brazil on issues like Chinese currency and global trade in agriculture that triangulates the
American Democratic Charter. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are all
increasingly at risk; open, universal access to the Internet could help support each of these, though more
must be done to promote collective action in their defense. The U.S. should also promote the
Organization of American States and work toward fundamental reforms to make it a more effective
instrument to promote the broader agenda, including human rights. Current efforts by Brasilia, Caracas
and others to build a new hemispheric architecture, insofar as they seek to undermine democratic and
human rights norms and protections and seek to exclude the U.S. and Canada, should be resisted and
the trade
agenda remains one of the best tools that the U.S. has to promote a broader
strategic agenda. By organizing existing free-trade partners into a more coherent group, and then
denounced, by civil society, member governments and the United States. In this regard,
working to build their economies through greater integration, for example, in the Asia-Pacific region,
the U.S. would simultaneously be able to promote a trade and investment regime
consistent with economic competitiveness while also building a broader
hemispheric consensus around democratic ideals that would implicitly
highlight differences between the U.S. and China . Despite conventional wisdom, trade
is not a dirty word in the hemisphere. In fact, recent scholarship has found that positive attitudes
toward the U.S. are correlated with increased trade with the United States.
One way for the U.S. to improve its regional standing would be to again promote the idea of a
The coincidence between this weeks Latin American trips by U.S. Vice
President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping highlight the
undeclared competition between the U.S. and China in Latin America , and
across the globe. The new competition is a struggle over the economic, legal, and
political norms that will prevail as the global center of gravity shifts from the
Atlantic to the Pacific in the course of the twenty-first century. The U.S.-China
competition is not a resurrection of the cold war, where the U.S. and Soviet Union actively promoted their
respective concepts for a global order. Rather, it is an unintentional, yet inevitable struggle. Consistent
with Chinas millennial history, the principal goal of PRC is to advance Chinese national power, wealth
and security. Although the PRC does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, the mercantilist
way that it is promoting its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international
norms that it did not create means that Chinas rise is wreaking havoc on the international system.
observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat
at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In
the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru,
to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect
is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free
addition,
Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but
recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington , whose focus on
terrorism and the middle east and rigid U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has
left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons . Net foreign
direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in
2003. [71] This economic neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez,
but the more moderate social democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended
the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still
denied. MES substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade
of the open market as a lower cost, less politicized alternative to the United States.
Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been
the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed onethird of the world's new oil production and become the world's secondlargest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on
imports, which increases the instability of its energy security . Diversification is
inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production
capacity naturally became a destination for China . China must better protect
its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer . It must
also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain.
Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and
Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also
focused on its energy sector.
Trade relations between China and Latin America are growing. China is
forming solid economic alliances and providing an attractive alternative to
dealing with the United States. The United States cannot afford to lose economic or political
clout to China or it may lose Latin American support for important [*413] interests such as human rights,
than by aggressively pursuing the FTAA. The United States should not hide behind the legal framework of
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture because this increases Latin American resentment and encourages
these countries to seek other trading partners like China .
understand and address the needs of each Latin American country and
sectors such as the oil industry. It must also work with Latin American governments to build
the infrastructure necessary to support future, mutually-beneficial free-trade agreements. Due to the
factors outlined in this Note, such as increasing anti-U.S. sentiment, the growing popularity of leftist
China's
high demand for commodities has driven up the price of metals, agricultural
products, and oil. n74 China is a major importer of raw materials, a plentiful
commodity in Latin America. n75 This makes doing business with China very
attractive to Latin American countries, especially Brazil. n76 For example, China's top
2. China's Investments in Key Sectors in Latin America: Oil, Commodities, and Infrastructures
steel maker, Baosteel, is considering a joint venture with Brazil's Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, the
world's top iron ore miner. n77 Latin America and the Caribbean provide over thirty percent of U.S.
dollars, making China Brazil's second-largest trading partner [*388] after the United States. n80 Brazil is
China's largest trading partner in Latin America and annual bilateral trade has tripled since 2000. n81
Both countries recently took part in a workshop entitled "Brazil and China in the 21st Century," at which
Chinese entrepreneurs sought Brazilian partners in economic sectors such as oil and agriculture. n82
China seeks to invest directly in Brazil's infrastructure, n83 where it has agreed to invest between $ 3
billion and $ 4 billion in railways and refineries. n84 With Argentina, China seeks not only bilateral trade
agreements but also to become an investment partner, particularly in the infrastructure and
transportation sectors. n85 To this end, Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, and Chinese President, Hu
Jintao, signed an agreement on June 28, 2004, which enables both countries to jointly begin construction
The United States should build on its existing relationships with oilproducing countries in Latin America. Like China, it should establish
partnerships in order to secure oil for its future consumption beyond
maximum current output. For example, the United States currently consumes all
of the oil that Mexico exports. Given the energy shortages in the United States since [*399]
2000, U.S. companies should have partnered with Mexican firms to increase
Mexico's oil production. Instead, China and Mexico are taking steps to jointly
develop Mexico's oil industry so that Mexico can expand its production and
export capacity. n148 Like China, the United States must invest in the
infrastructure that will allow for successful joint exploration for oil and other
commodities. Infrastructure projects provide a large incentive for Latin
American countries to trade with China since these projects will improve their
infrastructure, employ thousands of workers throughout their countries, and bring economic
United States will bring jobs and other economic opportunities to the region and in the process dissipate
anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America.
link mexico
Mexico is super important to China
Dominguez 6 [Jorge, Professor at Harvard University, Chinas Relations With
Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]
China is also a
significant foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the stock of accumulated Chinese
direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with clothing manufacturing accounting for a third and
Link - oil
Competition over access to oil markets is zero sumif the U.S. increases its
influence in Latin America, this directly limits Chinese market access
Markman, 06 (Jon, editor of the independent investment newsletters Strategic
Advantage and Trader's Advantage , How China is winning the oil race, 4/26,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P149330.asp)
The United States is the world's greatest consumer of energy at present, but China is
the world's fastest-growing consumer. That puts us in direct competition for any
new sources of crude oil, natural gas, coal and uranium that materialize through exploration and
discovery, not to mention any current sources that profit-seeking producers decide to
put up for grabs. Increasingly, new energy sources that China is acquiring are in
countries that Americans find distasteful . Many of them are in Africa, in countries with
horrific human-rights records such as Sudan, Chad and the Republic of the Congo. And much of the
energy is controlled by rapacious despots in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan and in Southeast
Asia's Myanmar. Energy acquisition is a zero-sum game in which there are winners and
losers. Any new energy that China obtains for its fast-growing economy is
unavailable to us forever. So you just have to wonder whether the United States' antipathy for
dealing with the worst of the world's rogue states has led inexorably to $4-a-gallon gasoline this spring.
soft power
is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on
objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment
position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United
States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size
of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could
be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC
impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular
situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology . The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of
who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that
Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism,"
countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional
terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of
global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin
America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC,
because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology
development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future,
and will be a power to be reckoned with globally . In general, this perception can be
while
Biden highlights how much has changed in the 8 years since the April
2004 U.S. Congressional hearings on China and Latin America, when U.S.
administration officials took comfort in the degree to which the U.S.
dominated China in terms of influence in the region . In Rio de Janeiro, Biden talked
president
about a U.S. strategic partnership with a Brazil that had already had one with the PRC since 1993, with
China-Brazil trade exceeding U.S.-Brazil trade by an expanding margin. Nor could it be overlooked that
Brazilian President Rousseff had traveled to China before her first visit to the U.S. T he
Latin
America agenda of Chinese President Xi Jinping also illustrates the
confidence of Chinas new 5th generation of leadership, with the choice of three
destinations in close proximity to the United States illustrating how quickly
the PRC has moved beyond the discourse of the previous administration
respect for the U.S. backyard. The trip to Trinidad and Tobago is the first visit by a Chinese
President to the Caribbean, excepting his predecessors November 2008 trip to Cuba. The soft power of
China in the Caribbean also was on display, as seven full heads of state from across the region made the
pilgrimage to Trinidad for an audience with President Xi, as he held court in the Marriott Hotel in Port of
Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow Chinas economic
growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other
hand, sees Chinas energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its
national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many
withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of Chinas strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic
Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains
largely inwardly focused and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and
territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign policy of keeping a low profile,
Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely,
assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent
Washington is truly ready for a shared global energy partnership. This would require accommodating
very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum
producers and regions, the role of the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing
we
looking at China and Latin American oil as [a] panda or a dragon ? asked Jeremy
Martin, director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas. Estimates project that
Chinas demand for oil will grow from 8 million barrels per day (mbd) to 16 mbd by 2030;
current imports as a percentage of consumption are over 50 percent .
Beijings general strategy for satisfying Chinese demand consists of securing
access to a diverse array of material reserves and inserting itself into
production positions in oil projects. Beijing is pursuing a strategy to assure
that all of its oil reserve and production eggs are not in the same basket .
Despite its ready economic capital, the Chinese must face increased competition for
oil resources as they undertake their strategy against the backdrop of a
global shift to peak access; in todays world there are few easy targets and
access to resources has been seriously diminished .
including the Andes Petroleum purchase of all of Encanas assets in Ecuadoras areas of successful
cooperation. In addition to the China Brazil loan-for-oil agreement, China will also cooperate with Brazil
in the development of renewable energy sources such as biofuels. However, given that Latin America only
accounted for 7.58 percent of Chinas oil imports in 2008, Sun doubted that Latin America would play a
strategic role in guaranteeing Chinas future energy security. While opportunities for growth and
investment are present for both China and Latin America, Chinas national oil companies are confronting
risks of social conflict at the local level, political instability, intense competition, environmental clauses,
transportation costs, and the uncertain U.S. response to Chinas presence in the region. Sun also
China's strategy has alarmed the United States, the world's largest energy
consumer, and raised concerns among some in the US that China is not only challenging
the United States' historic dominance in Africa, Latin America, and Asia but also undermining Western
damaging US
interests and values as China has vied for energy resources in some of the
most unstable parts of the world and often ignored the promotion of transparency, good
governance and responsible behavior with its partner nations. It is particularly a concern of
the US as China has pursued deals with countries that are off-limits to
Western companies because of sanctions, security concerns or the threat of bad publicity. Some
observers have worried that China's active quest to secure energy supplies
in Africa and Latin America may have fueled an energy cold war. In this case, it is not
efforts to promote transparency and human rights in these developing countries,
totally a surprise to see that when CNOOC put together an $18.5 billion takeover bid for California-based
firm Unocal Corp in early 2005, the fierce opposition in US Congress prompted CNOOC to abandon the
bid.
China is now the world's second largest demander of oil and is projected to
consume 14.2 million barrels daily by 2025 with a net import of 10.9 million
barrels per day. n75 In 1998, Beijing reorganized its state-owned petroleum assets into two
vertically-integrated firms: the China National Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC") and the China
Petrochemical Corporation ("Sinopec"). n76 Other major firms include the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation ("CNOOC") and China National Star Petroleum. n77 To date, the Chinese government still
holds majority shares in CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC; the Chinese government "[has] not give[n] . . .
century.
As a hegemon, the U.S. can affect the supply, prices, and delivery of the
resources that China needs, thereby slowing Chinas emergence as a great
power. American companies can bid up the price of oil, influencing resource prices and Chinas ability
to buy those resources. The U.S. military can threaten Chinas oil supplies should
conflict with Taiwan or Japan erupt. American oil companies have worldwide resource
partnerships and deep pockets against which Chinas neophyte national oil and resources companies
destabilize it. Washington must be mindful of these worries and not exacerbate them
needlessly.
the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. " Clearly
there is an
interest by China in Mexican oil." The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in
the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean
countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica. China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for
almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the
only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China. U.S. trade still dwarfs China's
Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and
agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit. Mexican
exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at
almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games
and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as
copper and lead. Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past
decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according
to the U.N. economic agency for the region. Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw
materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But Mexico's exports go
China imports
three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for
overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border. Beteta noted that
its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which
has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said. At the same
time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy
reform bill to allow greater national and international investment in its oil
sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of
many people." State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small
steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been
minimal. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are
exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and
about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region
cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the
private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently
beneficiary of China's economic growth, and its leading economic indicators, including consumer
spending, have improved as a result. The latest official figures indicate that Japan's real GDP rose at the
annual rate of 6.4 percent in the last quarter of 2003, the highest growth of any quarter since 1990.
Thanks to China, Japan may finally be emerging from a decade of economic malaise. But that trend might
not continue if China crashes.
Chinas the biggest driver in global economic growth and dwarfs the US in
economic growth
Washington Times, Patrice Hill, Editor, July 26, 2007,
http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20070726/BUSINESS/107260073/1001
China, this year for the first time, has dislodged the United States from its long reign as
the main engine of global economic growth, with its more than 11 percent growth
eclipsing sputtering U.S. growth of about 2 percent, according to the International Monetary
Fund's 2007 projections released yesterday. China's growth, which has been fueled by
booming domestic building and commercial development, as well as soaring exports,
has accelerated even as U.S. growth dropped to 0.7 percent in the first quarter under the
weight of a profound housing recession. China is expected to drive a hearty 5.2 percent expansion of the
global economy this year, the IMF said. The United States, with one-quarter of the world's economy and
the richest consumer markets in the world, has dominated global growth for decades. But China's
emergence has been foreshadowed for years by its pull on world commodity markets, where it has driven
up the price of raw materials to record levels, from oil to copper, in its race to build and export goods
around the world. "This year for the very first time with its very strong growth expected, and with the
growth slowdown in the United States China will be contributing the largest part to the
increase in the global growth measured at market exchange rates, " said Charles Collyns,
the IMF's deputy director of research. China will provide one-quarter of the annual growth
rate of the world economy, and, Mr. Collyns said, "if you add together Russia and India as well,
you get over half of global growth coming from the emerging-market countries."
New York. ``As the Chinese leadership now moves to bring its overheated economy under control,
important to understand the global implications. '' Roach said in an interview. ``When
it's
today's Chinese economy sneezes, Asia -- and possibly even the rest of the world -could catch a cold.'' China's slowdown already is evident in commodity markets, said John
Mothersole, an economist for Global Insight Inc. in Lexington, Massachusetts. Commodity prices soared
by 40 percent during 2003 and the first four months of 2004, the biggest jump in nine years, largely
because of China's buying of products such as steel, copper, nickel and oil, Mothersole said in an
interview. Commodity prices this year, as measured by Global Insight's Industrial Materials Index,
already have declined 12 percent from their April peaks ``and the slowing in China was a major part of
that,'' Mothersole said. Shipping rates that more than tripled from the end of 2002 through the first six
weeks of 2004 partly because of China's purchases have fallen about 45 percent since April, based on the
Baltic Dry Index, which measures dry bulk freight rates.
source of the Chinese slowing represents broader global themes at work, its effects
could be much larger. I would note in this context that we do not think Chinese authorities are
setting policies to slow growth at present. While they are working to restrain bank lending and limit the
frothiness of their equity market, they maintain stimulative fiscal policies and continue to maintain a
broadly accommodative monetary policy stance through their efforts to manage currency appreciation .
Will Hutton, author of The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a Partner or Face It as
an Enemy: Because the country has been so open to imports, has been the single most
important stimulus to the Asian and, thus, world economy over the past five years, China's
stagnation would trigger a global slowdown, maybe even recession. On the plus side, oil
and commodity prices would fall. On the negative side, there would be all the ills of a
slowdown, but on top there would be major financial implications. The World Bank
estimates that if China's growth rate fell by just 2 percent, up to 60 percent of China's bank loans would
become nonperformingso threatening both China's and, via Hong Kong, Asia's financial system . The
flow of saving to finance the U.S.'s deficit would dry up, probably forcing U.S.
interest rates upso worsening the economic slowdown. Kenneth Rogoff,
economics professor at Harvard University: A sharp slowdown in Chinese growth
represents the single biggest risk to U.S. and global growth today. China's massive
excess savings have been helping to hold down mortgage interest rates everywhere.
Trade with China has been a major driver in the revival of U.S. productivity that has helped boost growth
and lower inflation. Above all, China's generally peaceful integration into the world economy has been
helping lower market volatility, thereby driving up the price for risky assets such as housing and equities.
Most investors are far too sanguine about the risk of a China meltdown, forgetting that
China is still very much a poor developing country with huge political, social, and financial
vulnerabilities.. The immediate impact on the United States would be through a sharp rise in interest
rates and market volatility, and a concomitant drop in equity and housing prices. The U.S. may not export
a lot of goods to China, but it sure exports a lot of treasury bills and other bonds. Over time, if the
meltdown persisted, the U.S. would suffer because globalization, and China in particular, has been a
major factor in helping spur innovation and productivity growth.
such views could spiral out of the government's control, producing a new challenge
to the stability of the regime.
impact narcoterrorism
Chinese investment in Latin America is crucial to fighting
nacrotrafficking
Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus
on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and
Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?,
Inter-American Dialogue, May]
The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that
has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada
together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China
purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available
for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the
U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on
contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over
human rights abuses in Venezuela. Finally,
Friction between
China and the U.S. has so far focused on the question of China's undervalued
exchange rate, its human rights record, relations with rogue states and
the issue of Taiwan. However, the competition over energy resources is now
becoming an additional area of contention. While China and the U.S. have launched the
U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, both states are also engaged in a competition for
energy resources in Russia, the Caspian, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. This
competition could foreseeably combine with other areas of friction.
Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 2004. Setting the Stage for an Energy Cold War
For example, if the U.S. were to side with Japan on its territorial dispute in the potentially oil and gas rich
strategic blocs
or alliances could form in the international energy arena. Latin
America is likely to emerge as a major stage of this energy
competition or confrontation.
East China Sea or support India over China in meeting its growing energy needs,
impact us econ
Chinese investment in Latin America causes investment in US
markets
Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus
on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and
Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?,
Inter-American Dialogue, May]
the United States under the advantageous tax terms of the Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA), or production in Colombia, Panama and Peru in order to enter the United States under the
bilateral free trade agreements those nations share with the United Statesalthough the ability to meet
the provisions of the relevant agreements (particularly domestic content requirements) in order to realize
such tax savings is questionable. To date, Chinese investments in final assembly operations in Latin
American countries, with an eye on entering the US market, have been limited. To a lesser extent,
projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 78 percent. This
success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued
there are numerous voices in the U.S. that wish to inflate the China
threat. For them, Chinas global energy dependence is a godsend, an excellent mechanism for limiting
Chinas rise and challenge to the U.S. But there are also ears in China that thrive on
expressions of American concerns about Chinas rise . Mistrust of America
runs surprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; since most Chinese
are Realists and believers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try
to stop their rise and see it doing so, even when it is no t. And while American
concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, they must not drive Americas China policy. The
message must be clear: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to the bilateral, triangular
and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a silent and often invisible
bringing influential academics and middle level policy makers together to discuss how Chinas rise in a
particular region can be best managed to insure a win-win scenario. Conferences in the West on these
issues tend to be run by the U.S. congressional committees and reflect the concerns of a declining
hegemon. No doubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on the table. But the first step is to get
people to recognize that U.S.-China interdependence occurs at the global level, and that
regional
competition poses a serious threat to the bilateral relationship . Only then can the
potentially negative implications of Sino-American triangularization be better managed.
Prevents extinction
Wittner 11 professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany
(Lawrence Wittner, Huffington Post World, 11-30-2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-warchina_b_1116556.html)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all,
for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their
deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up
providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension
between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's growing
economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's
claims in the South China Sea , increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened
U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear
war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United
States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons . The U.S. government
threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict
over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used
Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any
weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward
its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack
on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously,
NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy
was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by
launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union . Furthermore, if
U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to
championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly
expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are
deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced
that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear
arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S.
government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government
has a total inventory of roughly 300 . Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons
can reach the United States. Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear war with
China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear
weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm
of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation
poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations
would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wasteland s. Also, radioactive debris sent
aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear
winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and
generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this
catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its
nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number
of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has
plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and
nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of
a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is
to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing.
The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-
China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their
survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.
outdated Cold War-style empire, it is bound to come into needless conflict with other
powers, especially China. Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I
Britain toward Germany, the United States should take a page from another chapter
in British history. In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British
peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power, knowing both
countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them.
Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States
could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of
influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial
Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at
present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run
counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather
than neo-containment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear
conflagration.
US interfering in Chinas vital interests spurs US-Sino Nuclear War
Ivan Eland - Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent
Institute, Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute - 4/11/05
(Coexisting with a Rising China,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494)
As during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and the
recent tensions between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons will likely restrain the
conduct of both China and the United States in any crisis. And crises will likely
arise. During the Cold War, neither superpower conducted direct military action in
the other superpowers primary sphere of influence (eastern Europe for the Soviet Union
and the Western Hemisphere for the United States). If one superpower stirred the pot in the
others backyard, it usually did so covertly or by proxynot directly . In other words,
the competition between the superpowers was usually constrained to peripheral
regions of the world over marginal interests and did not occur in core areas over
primary interests. Nuclear weapons can restrain competition and inhibit
conventional war between powers possessing them. They induce caution because their
effects are so horrific. Thus, they can dampen conflict, but at great risk of annihilation.
Catastrophe can occur if there is a miscalculation or misstep . But nuclear weapons are not
going away anytime soon, and both China and the United States already possess them. Although antiChina hawks see as ominous the modernization of Chinas strategic nuclear force, there may be some
positive aspects to it. Right now the Chinese have only about twenty long-range nuclear weapons with the
range to strike the United States. They are very vulnerable to a U.S. preemptive or preventive nuclear
attack. The U.S. threat to those missilesexacerbated, at least in Chinese minds, by
President Bushs new preventive war doctrinemight force China into a use or
lose situation. In that scenario, China might find the need to launch its missiles
before they are preventively attacked by the United States. In the Cold War, nuclear
stability was thought to be enhanced if both sides possessed a survivable second strike capabilitythat
is, powerful nuclear weapons that would survive a fi rst strike by the other side in order to retaliate, thus
diminthe independent institute ishing the incentive to launch a bolt-out-ofthe- blue attack in the fi rst
place. Th e current vulnerability of Chinese obsolescent nuclear forces comes from their need to be
launched from vulnerable fi xed land-based silos and their inability to be fi red quickly. Th ey need to be
assembled before launch because the warhead and liquid fuel are stored separately from the missile.
Modernization of Chinese nuclear capabilities entails building solid fuel missiles that are mobile (the DF31 and DF-31A extended range intercontinental ballistic missiles) thus improving rapidity of fi re and
limiting the enemys ability to detect the missiles by increasing the area in which they can be deployed.
Both attributes should enhance their survivability. Also, further increasing the survivability of the Chinese
nuclear deterrent is the planned deployment of the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile on a
new class of ballistic missile submarines.45 Th erefore, a modest Chinese nuclear modernization,
although not to be celebrated, should be expected and should not be alarming to the United States. Yet
it would be dangerous for China and the United States to count solely on nuclear
weapons to reduce or eliminate conflict between them. That strategy might lead to a
tense situation similar to the forty-year Cold War between the Soviet Union and the
United States. In an attempt to avoid conflict with the other power, China and
especially the United States must do some soul searching to reassess and more
modestly construe their vital interests.
Expanding the US empire into Chinas spheres of influence alarms China
leading to nuclear conflict
Ivan Eland - Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent
Institute, Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute - 4/11/05
(Coexisting with a Rising China,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494)
Reducing the chances of future SinoU.S. conflict requires more drastic changes in
U.S. policy than in Chinese policy, mainly because the United States is in Chinas
face, not vice versa. The United States has alliances, forward force deployments,
and overseas military bases in East Asia and the Pacific that ring China. It is also
improving bilateral relations with other Asian powers (for example, India and Russia) that can help to
counter China. In other words, the United States has developed a stealthy neocontainment
policy toward China in the postCold War years. In contrast, the Chinese have no
alliances, military deployments, overseas bases, signifi - cant antiU.S. bilateral
diplomacy, or containment policy in the Western Hemisphere directed against the
United States. If they did, the United States would be very alarmed and hostile. Th e
United States has a much better human rights record and political and the independent institute
economic system than does China, but its foreign policy is far more aggressive. Th e conventional wisdom
is that democracies have benevolent foreign policies and authoritarian governments have aggressive
ones. Th e historical record and the aforementioned U.S. and Chinese examples show this claim to be
erroneous. Th e U.S. invasion of Iraq, a country halfway around the world that posed little direct threat to
the United States, is an example of U.S. hegemonic behavior. In recent years, China has not invaded even
a neighboring country. From a U.S. perspective, China is a rising power and should be watched, but
current costly distractions have diverted attention, eff ort, and resources from that purpose. China
must be careful about expanding its sphere of infl uence to avoid alarming other
Asian nations, but the United States must conduct a wholesale reassessment of its
informal, but expansive, Asian empire. Th e mainstream view in U.S. policy circles,
among Democrats and Republicans alike, is that an expansive U.S. Empireboth in
Asia and around the globeenhances security. In fact, the opposite is true. Th e U.S.
homeland would be much more secure if the United States worked on reducing the
chance of a needless confl ict with a nuclear-armed China.
continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social
stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a
relatively centralized, government-driven economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its
domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group
of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and
allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a
government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in
business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.
same negative consequences as the U.S., Japan and Europe if military equipment it
or others pass to regimes such as those in Iraq or Iran is used to impede the free
flow of oil from the Middle East or elsewhere. Continued political instability in Afghanistan or
Central Asia will have similarly dire consequences for Chinas chances of tapping Caspian energy
supplies. However, it remains to be seen if Chinas energy interests will be enough to alter Chinas
militarys perceptions of its own more general strategic interests, particularly on the issue of weapons
non-proliferation. China may continue to perceive a benefit in diverting U.S. strategic engagement away
from Asia. Chinas leaders may view larger strategic interests in Asia beyond the energy sector as
better served by diverting US diplomatic attention and military assets away from the Asian theatre to
places like the Middle East. This latter interpretation of Chinese interests will depend
possibility of a major supply disruption will continue to exist and with it, the risk
that rivalry could emerge during a time of crisis.
Chinese adventurism in the South China sea crushes relations with the US
and makes cross-straight war inevitable
Cossa, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum of the CSIS, 1998 (Ralph, "Security
Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of
Conflict," http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications
%20of%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf)
Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations. A use of force by the PRC in the South China Sea
would have a particularly devastating affect on U.S.-PRC relations. Despite recent
improvements brought about by Chinese President Jiang Zemin's successful visit to the U.S. last fall,
these relations remain fragile, with debates continuing in both capitals as to how
much one side can or should trust and cooperate with the other. A Chinese act of
aggression in the Spratlys would likely tilt the debate in the U.S., perhaps irreparably. Were a major
showdown to occur between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, it would be
difficult for Japan and for many of China's other neighbors (and primary investors) to remain
neutral. Open conflict between the U.S. and PRC would also likely signal an end to U.S.
adherence to a "one China" policy.
The United States must realise that it is partly responsible for any military
tension with China by backing it into a corner t hrough its relations with Taiwan, India,
and Japan. Mahbubani suggests that given how vulnerable Chinese leaders feel in the
face of U.S pressure, it is only natural for them to look for ways to
counterbalance U.S power. [138] Subsequently a redressing of the security imbalance should
be looked at if the United States desires to see an improvement in bilateral relations with China on this
superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install
and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has
changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but
surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs,
structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of lowinflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis.
The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40 per cent
of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US's fastest-growing export
destination. Mexico is America's second-largest foreign market (valued at $US215 billion in 2012). US
exports to Central America have risen by 94 per cent over the past six years; imports from the region
have risen by 87 per cent. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent.
American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous
neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse
interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the
world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by
Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US
efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica
show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the
White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an
ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada,
and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice
attempted to exercise a "veto power" to halt or reverse what has become a policy of prudent and reliable
The United States has no motive to fear new ChineseLatin American contacts, for four reasons. First, it should be emphasised that relations
between Latin America, China, and the United States are characterised by
an asymmetrical dynamic in which the United States operates as a global
power, China as a regional power, and Latin America as a non-threatening
periphery. The three parties may manage this asymmetry confidently by
avoiding ambiguity, conflict or miscalculation. Second, Latin America, China, and the
engagement towards China.
United States do not constitute a strategic triangle: the bilateral ties of each pair are not closely
intertwined, nor are they equally vital for all parties. The reciprocal significance of Washington-Beijing
relations is, for each side, greater than their respective relationships with Latin America. At the same
time, the weight of the United States in the external and internal politics of Latin America is much more
important than that of China, and Latin America is not among China's highest priorities when compared
to other countries (particularly, the more developed ones) and regions (especially its closest periphery).
Furthermore, the history and recent evolution of this triangle has not had notable implications for the
international balance of power, nor does it appear that it will in the near future. Third, it should be
analogy, if we consider that Asia today contains several great contenders (India, Japan, China, and
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in June 2008, Erikson once
again pointed out that While Chinas expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some
U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that Chinas
involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and
well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood. Indeed,
the United States concern over the closer relationship between China and
Latin America is incorrect and unnecessary . It is well-known that Latin America has been
on the way of reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract
more foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only
Chinas relations
with Latin America are for economic purpose, not for political intention
against the U.S. China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so
there is no need for China to challenge the American influence in Latin
America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside
world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push
forward South-South cooperation. As a matter of fact, further cooperation
between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and
development in Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly
be in the favor of the United States.
one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with.
2NC China
Meta-Overview
China will see the plan as an act of the US encroaching on their
sphere of influence and start a war with the US to protect their
interests. If China cant meet its increasing oil demand its
economy will collapse and bring the entire world economy down
with it.
Impact WALL
The disad outweighs the case Extend 1NC RT and Straits an
oil war will go nuclear because China is worried that that the
US is after its energy resources. They have made it explicit that
they are willing to use force including nuclear weapons. A USSino war would drag in other countries who would either try to
expand their own spheres of influence or who have been
attacked by China in the past.
The disad turns case because if China doesnt have access to oil
to fuel its economy it would collapse and trigger the impacts of
the case, additionally a lack of access to oil could drive China
to disregard environmental regulations and drill unsafely or
burn more coal, therefore destroying the environment.
Uniqueness WALL
1. Extend Knowland, the US is backing down in Mexico and
China is taking this as an opportunity to invest in Mexico
because of their increasing oil dependency.
2. US is decreasing investment China filling in
Munoz 6/9/13 [Heraldo, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UN
Development Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, The
United States turns to an emerged Latin America,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136984021498867.html]
The United States is still the region's top foreign investor . In 2012, US exports
to South and Central America plus the Caribbean totaled $205bn, compared with $110bn in exports
United States has become Brazil's second commercial partner after China. Bilateral trade between
the countries stood at about $100bn but Vice President Biden said there is "no reason" why that
number could not be $400-500bn.
Xi's tour of
Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to
California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office.
That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a
confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan
Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg. " In the past
Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US., always making
reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis said. "You dont hear any of that
from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."
percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world.
the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. " Clearly
there is an
interest by China in Mexican oil." The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in
the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean
countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica. China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for
almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the
only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China. U.S. trade still dwarfs China's
Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and
agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit. Mexican
exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at
almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games
and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as
copper and lead. Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past
decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according
to the U.N. economic agency for the region. Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw
materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But Mexico's exports go
China imports
three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for its
citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a
high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power ," he said. At the same time, Pena
Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to
allow greater national and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't
overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border. Beteta noted that
revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people." State
roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy
ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and about 7 percent to the
"Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In April, during
Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. " China is the
principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said
Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological
Institute. "Evidently
Link WALL
Extend Ferguson and Malik, any action by the US to invest in
Mexicos oil will be seen as a threat by China who is
trying to secure oil to meet their rapidly increasing
demand and that China has acknowledged that any
conflict over oil would spark a war.
Chinese perception of access to Latin America determines its
actions
Ellis 10 [R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University,
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, National Defense University,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to
underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the
sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and
lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites
soft power
is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on
objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment
position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United
States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size
of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could
be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC
impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular
situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology . The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of
who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that
Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism,"
countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional
terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of
global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin
America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC,
because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology
development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future,
and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be
while
AT Cooperation/Sharing Solves
They say the US and China have agreed to share a sphere of
influence, but just because their governments have said
this doesnt mean that they will actually act on it and
when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union secretly agreed
to divide Europe into spheres of influence they pursued
this goal with violence and Germany ended up breaking
the pact by invading the Soviet Union
AT No China War
They say China doesnt have the military capabilities for a war,
but the Straits card says that a war between the US and
China would eventually go nuclear because there would
be no world powers to check countries like Russia who
could try and takeover Europe and that China has
threatened to use nuclear weapons.