Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Pakistan Horizon.
http://www.jstor.org
ENVIRONMENTAL
TYPOLOGIES
reflectthe genuinedesiresof the populationin theirforeignpolicypreferences. In our analysiswe will base our findingson the actionstaken
by the rulingelite but at the same instancewould pointout the misperceptions of the foreignpolicy makingapparatus. In other words the
environmental
considerationsof Pakistan'sforeignpolicywould be taken
as the global adjustmentsin termsof frequencyof interactionwith the
internationalactors.
2. Shahram
StatesandtheThirdWorld:Motives,
"TheUnited
Chubin,
Objectives,
Third
andInternational
World
Policies,"
ed.,Christoph
Bertram,
Conflict
Security
(London:
The Macmillan
Press,1982),p. 87.
3. GeraldSegal,TheGreatPowerTriangle
Press,1982),
(London:The Macmillan
p. 153.
52
RawMaterials
Investments
theNational
Interest:
D. Krasner,
4. Stephen
Defending
Princeton
NewJersey:
andU.S. Foreign
Press,1978),p. 56.
University
(Princeton,
Policy
debateby
afterthorough
thepoliciesareformulated
5. In democratic
societies,
ofthesociety.But therethe pressure
factions
various
groupsare notmonopolized
in democraticsocietieson occasions
by one group. In fact the government
the opposing
views.In non-democratic
withthe opposing
countries,
compromises
withan openmind.
are notaccepted
opinions
53
There has been change in the natureof the major issues, e.g., the
cold war has turned into a detente and the North/Southconflict,
still continuing
which had started on the issue of anti-colonialism
about SouthernAfrica,has largelyshiftedto economicgrowth;there
has been changeinthe salienceofissue-areas- the gravityofinternational conflictshas moved fromsecurityto economics,resources,
and ecopolitics- and the majordangerspots whichhave gradually
shiftedfromEurope to the MiddleEast and Africa....6
formofCENTO was carriedwell inthe late 1978. The loss ofEast Pakistan
towardsour securityshould have
in 1971 and the American-indifference
been a powerfulenoughcatalystto quit CENTO, butit never materialized. Moreover,the emergenceof the PersianGulfregionin 1973 should
also have been yet anotherreasonto leave the Americanbackedalliance
system. Such an action was necessaryfor a preferencefor more closer
m a Changing
Relations
World(Oxford:Oxford
6. JosephFrankel,
International
Press,1979),
p.200.
University
eds. HedleyBullandAdam
"A New International
7. Elie Kedourie,
Disorder,"
Clarendon
TheExpansion
International
Press,1984),p. 355.
Watson,
of
Society
(Oxford:
54
establishclose contactswith the westernneighboursof Pakistan. Moreover such relationswere based on the principlesof limitedgains,in the
formof gettingforeignexchangeremittancefromthe Pakistanisworking
in that area and gettingsome grantsto purchasemilitaryequipment.
In otherwords,alternativesecurityunderstanding
as well as arrangementsshould have been made. In realityit was the Islamic Revolution
in Iran(1979) and itsconsequenceswhichsaw the collapseofthisoutdated
alliance. Otherwise,apparentlythe policy makerswere still not ready
to quit CENTO. On the otherhand, SEATO became ineffective
and
ultimatelycollapsed as the People's Republic of China and the United
States began to develop new understanding
of cooperation. The role of
Pakistanshould not have been that of a silent spectator. In fact, we
should have been more vigilantto the changingcircumstancesin our
regionalas well as global milieus. JamesN. Rosenau,narratesa policyof
adjustmentsas follows:"...The politicalorganismis alwaysexperiencing
both continuitiesand change,and thus it is always in motion,slipping
behind,movingahead, holdingfast,or otherwiseadjustingand changing
in responseto internaldevelopmentsand externalcircumstances."8
The propositionthatPakistanis a militarily
weak nationand,therefore,
cannotfreelyexerciseitsforeignpolicygoals,is disputedbysome analysts
of foreignpolicybahviour.There are a varietyof factorswhichcan compensate for being weak in militarystrength. For example, apart from
skilfuluse ofdiplomacy,whichwe havealreadymentioned,
thereare such
factorsas mobilizingof the masses (Iran is a good example); effective
ofa state.These elements,
leadershipand economicandsocialadvancement
"often enable small states to exercise influencetotallydisproportionate
to the rankand status accorded by the objective elementsof power."9
8. James
N. Rosenau,TheStudy
of Political
Printer,
Adaptation
(London:Frances
1981),p. I.
9. Agrippah
T. Mugomba,
"SmallDeveloping
StatesandtheExternal
Operational
TheYearBook
1979
underthe
Environment,"
, Vol.33,p. 212;Published
ofWorld
Affairs
oftheLondonInstitute
ofWorldAffairs.
auspices
55
The degreeofimportance
given,eitheras a matterofoptionor imposed
fromthe external surroundings,is the core of the formulationof the
environmentaltypologiesof Pakistan'ssecurity. The physicalpresence
of a securitythreat,as well as the meansto avoid it, shouldbe takenin a
similarconceptual meaning. The considerationof neighbours,as being
the vitalfactorsby themselves,will be accepted withreservation.Howcannot
ever,at the sameinstancethe importanceofgeographical
continuity
be overlooked. We agree withJ.D.B. Millerwhen he writes,
to anystate,because of
been important
Neighbourshavetraditionally
the highincidenceof communication
with themthroughtrade and
travel;the possibilityof quarrelsover disputedborders;the problem
of what kindsof restrictionsare needed in order to ensure that
neighboursdo not gain too much advantage from one's own
in December 1979and
(i) The Russianoccupation of Afghanistan
the continuouspresenceofthe RussiantroopsfocussedPakistan'sattention
towardsitswesternenvironment.Afghanistan
has beena sourceoftension
because of its Pakhtoonistan
policysince the independenceof Pakistanin
it
1947. However, never became a serious threatfor Pakistan'ssecurity
and thus remainedin the second categoryof the NormalCircumstantial
Type. In March1978,PresidentDaud visitedPakistanamongspeculations
that the futurewill witnesscloser ties between the two culturallyand
religiouslysimilarcountries. But Daud's assassinationin April of the
same year changedthe situationforthe worse as faras Pakistan'sdefence
interestswere concerned. Accordingto a descriptionof the Soviet invasion, the Russians "dramaticallytransformedPakistan's geostrategic
situation."All of a sudden Pakistanfaced the spector of Soviet troops
The
frontier.
virtuallyeverywherealong the thirteen-hundred-mile
II. W. Howard
"Pakistan's
fora Foreign
Search
after
theInvasion
Wriggins,
Policy
ofAfghanistan,"
Pacific
Affairs
1984),p. 285.
(Summer,
57
The policymakersofPakistanhadalmosttotallyfocussedtheirattention
towardsAfghanistan
since December 1979,thusturningit into Immediate
AttentionType environment. The environmentturned into such a
categoryon which the Pakistaniauthoritieshad no control. However,
60
z
0
F
z
t
<
S ~
< I
lu
-i
c
<
H
1
il
z:
IL
H
z
Z
7
Z
a
z:
>
z
T
H
~
Z
:
I
<
XI
(/)
<
(
S
<
.
><
v
<3
!_
<
"
t1
U
I
<
-S:
*o
.2
U
&
2
<5
^ t m
ON (30LO un
>
LO
?
ON
-
fS 1
1 vO ON
M t (S - - -
00
00
ON
N -
- -
-1 NO
(S "
!>.
-
ON-04
u
U
LO LO ON VOON00
t 't " N - O
CO
CN
^4
O
00 -CS
Oj
00
-
LO
00
5
-
-
On -
S 8 8
ES
no -
*4*
00
00
00
-
m
I
- -
.
U.
<1>
<
^h
<2
.E
^
-
< 3
CL
< Io
S
S
5^2
" 5
11 < -
S
=
8
^>"5
<=!1-
__
+J
u
v
=
<
if
3
^
6J
-J
tf
F
z
H
<
5
Z
Z
IL
f=
Z m
LU 00
T
* V.
Z
i-
-g
-
>
Z
U
m 4J
?2
Zee
-
W
Z '
O
"
<
0
H
Z
LL
<
U
:
CL
>
V
<
Q_
O
"
tf
|0
- 4^ fS
- LO
- ^- ON
-vO ^(N ON
tO
?
CO
2
- ; >0 ov
00 CO
^Kr^oKroo
~
- fN -
***
?
j
g
O N ro
- co on lo*
-m (s
. -
I
00
- U
U
V Q)
0
N N t ^ t ^ ^
- - - 00
ON
- ON
- - LO
-
S
0
1
^ ^ ^ I
N
T I
^
1
I
- n ^
LO T*
__
i ^ i
I
I
LO
CO
4
ON
+J
U
u. 3
f
00
ON
1ON
~
-
U
<
>
=
i
I
II
^ I
X^
NO
I
CO hv
LO
II
0 .
N OO I
^ "**
LO I
I
I
II
II
$2
.E
I
u
to -
3
.2
2 CL
c:
_Q
**
c
5
00
.?
TD d) =
52-^|
* 8 S g =
g
h
< J . w
62
^
.2
*
P
Jrt
J
w
3
<
4
^