The Myth of Responsibility

Gabriel del Carmen

1
We, as a species, have remained resolved with several assumptions regarding the
nature of our existence, resulting either from a necessity to assume or from our own
choice. I am concerned with the latter of the two that is to say, with choice although
I am concerned with it in a different manner than in the context I presented it.
The paradox of human perception is our seemingly intrinsic belief in intentional
causality (or a responsibility derived from free will) that coexists with our fundamental,
and also seemingly inherent, understanding of cause-and-effect. In reality these two are
mutually exclusive and cannot coalesce.
I intend to explore not only why we hold this perception, but the evident error in
this thinking. We are slaves to cause-and-effect and, therefore, we are essentially
nullified in justifiably believing in any truths in freedom of the will. Our belief in agency
is a myth of responsibility.
2
We will, as we should, begin with the falsehood in claiming responsibility. Once
we determine why, logically, free will cannot exist, we are free to have founded
contention in our lack of responsibility. My intention is not to simply regurgitate
philosophical determinism. Repeating what has been said multiple times over in previous
works will simply blur ones understanding of them, and those that have said it first have
said it much better than I ever could. However, some conclusions will inevitably overlap
with determinism; this is, however, for a better understanding of the argument
henceforth.
When one accepts responsibility for an effect, he claims that such an event would
not have happened if he had chosen differently at some time. To claim responsibility is to
claim a causal relationship with an event that only results from his agency. Thus,
responsibility necessitates freedom of choice for, without this aforementioned freedom,
there would be no capability for responsibility. Thus destruction of the theory of free will
serves as destruction of responsibility. Free will, in other words, is necessary for
responsibility.
Responsibility is simply impossible, as one is unable to choose differently. One
who claims responsibility is one who has forgotten cause-and-effect. Man is subject to
these laws just as he is a subject to the laws of gravity. We will return to the myth of
responsibility once we have effectively established that a belief in free will is unfounded.
3
To successfully debunk the free will myth (and, subsequently, the myth of
responsibility), we must search for the origin of our volition as it is typically
conceptualized. We know the Will of Man to be the product of the unique combination
of traits that create his personhood. This, however, remains ad hoc. From where do I
develop this unique combination of traits?
Predisposition (nature) and environment (nurture) answers our inquiry far beyond
a reasonable doubt. Cognitive scientists only debate the firmness of grip that nature and
nurture hold on our development. There is no discourse on whether or not this is the case.
Both control us. It extends far beyond influence, for influence implies there to be at least

a last word by the agent. We can safely say that nature and nurture control us, rather than
influence us, since they hold a totalitarian grip on our being.
The spiritualist is inclined to reject such a seemingly materialistic view of human
behavior. After all, the spiritualist contends, do we not have eternal souls that transcend
physical boundaries? Yet the illusory nature of free will would be evident even if one
were to support the notion (a ludicrous one, but a notion nonetheless) of an eternal and
metaphysical soul. Consider that the soul and the mind are essentially interchangeable, in
that one could argue that the mind and the soul both possess the same quantities. Even if
the mind were simply the biological vessel by which the soul transgresses its spiritual
boundaries into the realm of the physical, the soul would be a slave to the physical world
just as much as the mind is. There is much more to be said about the soul, but it is not my
present intention to prove the obsoleteness of the soul (I have done so elsewhere).
Therefore, we could say that we are agents of our own destinies if we were able to
control our nature and our nurture. Clearly this is an impossibility. The moment I witness
an infant who tells his mother what environment he feels he should be raised in so as to
best complement his predisposition is the moment I retract this position (after multiple
evaluations of my state of sanity or lack thereof), and even then there would be some
objection to the notion of free will. The infant, despite his sudden bout of pure sentience
and coherent thought, would still hold a predisposition, and this predisposition, since
there is no environmental factors anymore, would prove to be the only basis for his
decision making. It is evident that we neither control our nature nor our nurture.
For us to say we have our own agency would necessitate a third factor external to
our nature and nurture that has its own influence on our personhood. This third factor
must necessarily be somehow in the control of the individual. However, the paradox
is clearly evident; were an individual able to control this third factor of his own
development, he would be acting with his Will, which is what is being created by the
third factor, ad infinitum. This is, obviously, illogical. Thus, even if one were to reject the
fundamental premise that nature and nurture do not control our being, would have to
solve for this third-factor problem. The same problem occurs if you add a fourth factor,
a fifth, etc. For any of these to give any iota of freedom of the will, it must be so that it is
in the control of the agent, or the conscious self. But, since it is the conscious self that is
creating this Will, it cannot be self-sustaining and, thus, is a logical impossibility.
Let us assume, however, that we can logically overlook this glaring discrepancy.
The existence of our hypothetical third factor still does not solve for the illusion of
freedom of the will, for its grip on our being would still be shared with our nature and our
nurture. Our Will would only hold a fraction of our personality. True agency would still
be at a distance. This is impossible, and has simply been shown to not be the case.
The next line in the shoddy defense of free will is what I dub the Argument from
Developed Agency. From this, many argue that agency naturally develops with age; an
increase in consciousness, in other words, positively correlates with an increase in
autonomy. It is from these complexities of thought that breeds freedom of the Will. Our
capacity for action, for thought, for desire becomes larger.
How common this argument is! One would assume that, which such
commonality, there would be rational ground for this argument to stand upon. Simple
rational analysis, however, indicates this to not be the case.

We simply cannot escape the binds of cause-and-effect during our gradual

maturation. To prove this, we will represent the development of the individual with
Person A. From our hypothetical individual we will observe the incessant control of
causal relationships on our development. We never had a chance at free will and, thus,
the Argument from Developed Agency fails.
4
Person A was born. His German and Irish lineage made itself evident in his skyblue eyes and his beautiful and light brown hair. Even at birth he showed quite a bit of
resemblance to his mother and father. He was fortunate enough to be born of caring
parents with capacity to properly take care of this child.
Just as with any individual, Person A was born with a predisposition, which we
shall call property P. This property P was mixed with his environment, or property E.
The complexities of the interaction between P and E would fill a series of novels.
It would take literal lifetimes to undergo such a task. However, we do know with as much
certainty as one can know in this situation that P and E interacted in a way that
complemented each other in certain areas, combatted each other in others, and remained
indifferently in coexistence in the last fields. Property P never changes more
appropriately, it is dependent on your property E, which does, indeed, change. This
interaction between properties P and E create property I, which becomes you (and your
supposed Will). Property I doesnt remain stagnant either; you are constantly in new
environments with new individuals, which thus affect your Property I. Of course, you do
not choose these environments, as they are resulting from your current I property. These
environments interact with your property I and, thus, you change. However, the change
does not stem from the will. Since the environment is the result of your property I, and
the extent to which the environment influences you, the new modifications to your
property I would not be in your control. You, I, constantly changes.
Typically the Argument from Developed Agency states that, after you gain true
and completely developed sentience, you are able to choose. The contention stands that
you dont possess agency from birth, but it develops as you develop. We shall see why
this is a folly of thought.
Person A has developed after surpassing his alleged childhood constraints of
agency. Let us suppose he is put in a room much like the one I am currently sitting in.
He is sitting in front of a computer, with a desk (much like Bertrands) that supports the
laptop firmly. Posters of scientists and philosophers and movie stars veil the wall behind
them. For the purposes of understanding the illusion of Developed Agency, let us
presume that there are two buttons in front of him, each at equal distance. There are, in
fact, much the same, with one distinct difference. This difference lies in the color of the
button one was red, and the other was blue. Which will he choose?
It is, obviously, impossible to predict the choice he is going to make in this
hypothetical scenario; we dont have enough information. We havent enough detail, and
sometimes the source of action that an individual undertakes is fogged so that even he
does not see its origin. However, we can certainly observe those factors which will
determine his choice.
We know that he can only act from his I property, as this is from where the Will is
derived. There is no choice in his action other than what remains in such a property, and
this property is in constant fluctuation. The same property is the product of constantly

changing E properties with a set P property that Person A was never able to control.
While he was growing up, his E property was dependent on his previous I property, as
where he chose to go and who he chose to associate himself with was based from
previous experience. His P property was such that he reacted to these new environments,
but since the P and E properties are what composes his I property, or his identity, and it is
from this that the Will is developed, he never had a choice in the decision. Let us
consider the example again. He has a few choices: push the blue button but not push
the red button, push the red button but not the blue button, push both buttons, or push
neither of them. With the establishment of this thought experiment, we can observe how
Person A will make his decision, although without prior information we cannot determine
what he will choose. Perhaps he has grown up with a distaste of the color red; the very
color evokes feelings of utter disgust. Or perhaps he has been conditioned to not touch
that which could potentially bring about unforeseen consequences. Let us assume both of
these conditions are true; now, these things are engrained in his I property. These
conditions developed over many years, a micro evolution that was beyond his control,
as he was unable to choose his Will, which is from where his actions stem. His Will has
determined that he was going to go to a certain environment, but this environment was
the result of previous conditions which were also out of his control, as they stemmed
from his I property. In other words, the initial conditions are fixed, therefore the rest of
the conditions are fixed too. I will attempt to illuminate this in another thought
experiment. Lets say you build a mini track for a toy car. This toy car is no bigger than
the size of your thumb. It is the absolute best imaginable toy car, and it cannot break
down. The track youve built has just enough space to allow the car to go in one direction
it can go, in other words, only straight, and cannot stray to the left or the right. At the
beginning of this imagined track, you have a ramp that, at the very top, there is a board
that allows you to station the car without it falling off. This board only allows for the car
to fall in one way, and that way is down. When you give the car a little push, the car will
go down the slope and be finished. If one has any objections to this, I would surely love
to hear them. Now, imagine that we modify this track to increase the size of the board so
that it can fall in multiple ways downwards. This modified track also includes multiple
exits with different paths at each exit. This car will go through one of the exits, no doubt.
But which exit will the car choose? It is not as if the laws of gravity will suspend for
the car to fall a certain way out of his own volition. If you push the car to the left, without
a physical reason, it will not travel through the right exit. The initial conditions are more
than sufficient they are necessary. Obviously the way the track is built will matter, but
this is where environment assumes its role. What comprises the Will of the car is that
which is subject to the laws of gravity and the physical restraints that every object is
subject to on Earth. If you extended the track, that each possible exit point had another
series of choices, or exit points, to make, it would still only be able to fall one way,
unless there was something physical blocking that instance. The cars Will doesnt
change, but it is simply subject to the laws of gravity and physics, forever. This is the fate
it is doomed to, which is why the future environmental conditions are dependent on the
previous environmental conditions, but are still out of his control. This completely closes
the lid on the Argument from Developed Agency.
Therefore, Person A never developed agency, but, like the car, has simply
remained the product of factors beyond his control.

We must remember that Person A is a representation of each individual. We

know, a priori, that every individual in a society is born with a certain predisposition and
into a certain environment. Obviously, then, we can replace the simple Button Model
with a much more complex choice perhaps even a life changing one and see that the
environment is not different in nature, just more numerous.
Choice never existed, and could never exist.
Our story of Person A was not (and, I suspect, cannot be) all-inclusive. Truly is it
beyond current human ability to ponder every existing factor that forges our personhood.
However, the essential premises exist within our arch of a story.
6
We can extend causal determinism into the domain of biological determinism.
Consider the following: what is the origin of your thoughts? Are you, the purported agent
of your own thoughts and actions, able to predict what you will think next? Of course not.
Each thought is the result of one of the many biological processes that is going on this
very instant in your mind. Since you cannot control these internal biological processes,
and they result in your thoughts (which subsequently result in your behaviors, emotions,
etc.), you are not a free agent. This, coupled with the damning evidence of causeandeffect, essentially nullifies any notion of free will. Even if we were to adhere to the
frankly obsolete notion of a soul, our thoughts must come from somewhere and, if that
somewhere is not conscious, it must be unconscious. If it is unconscious, it cannot be in
our control, but rather controls us. It is inevitable that we regress to unconscious
processes in which we are not aware of and, if we are not aware of them, what is there to
say about free will?
7
Let us briefly discuss the compatibilist. Truly is this position the worst form of
intellectual cowardice. His power, or whatever one defines as power in an intellectual
discourse, is rooted in the notion that he can re-conceptualize a notion so as to fit his
agenda. Consider what the compatibilist is really saying Yes, Determinism is true. We
are merely products of our nature and nurture. However, we still have agency of our own
actions, as free will is actually more volatile than the Determinists make it out to be. Free
will is limited, and it is actually in existence, despite the truths of Determinism. Perhaps
we need a new conceptualization. The intellectual cowardice in this statement is
palpable. What is more lacking in courage than to have to re-define the terms of a debate
so as to win it? Worse so, they have sometimes been so audacious as to dub themselves
Soft Determinists, adopting every tenant of the Determinist philosophy sans the truthclaim that is of most value. There is poverty in compatibilism. The compatibilist
argument is not the middle ground between those who have faith in free will and those
who dont. Rather, it is the worst form of lukewarmness, and a pathetic attempt to have
ones cake and eat it, too.
8
We can now shift from the myth of free will to the myth of responsibility. We
must remember what has been defined as responsibility. If one is capable of choosing
differently than he did, then he would be held responsible for the outcomes that are
derived directly from the action. Since one is unable to choose differently, he is incapable

of responsibility. How can one who cannot choose differently be said to have
responsibility for his actions? He is bound by the laws of cause-and-effect as he is bound
by the many other laws nature rules us with.
9
Let us explore the implications of negating the existence of free will and of
responsibility.
For most, it is a denial of our basic humanity. Truly the nonexistence of free will
shifts our entire paradigm of human perception. The criminal cannot be blamed for his
criminality, as he was just the result of an unfortunate combination his control. The
virtuous man cannot be praised for his virtue, for any virtue of that man is not because he
willed it.
However, I argue the exact opposite. Realizing the lack of responsibility we all
have is the most humane journey we are able to embark upon. Imagine the utter
compassion all rational beings will mutually hold when it is seen as commonsensical to
reject the myth of responsibility. The mutual absolution of sins by one another will
become utterly eminent. Criminal justice systems will be solely focused on rehabilitation,
even perhaps perfecting the art of crime prevention. Recognizing the natural and
environmental controls that we are all slaves to will allow our mutual compassion to
flourish in a way we have never before seen. What a beautiful idea.
In discourses, once I have deliberated upon the logical basis for the illusion of
free will and the myth of responsibility, and all rebuttals have been exhausted, I face an
utmost refusal to adhere to reason. I feel as though I am an agent! I hear. I admit that it
truly feels as though we own our actions and are responsible for whatever we think. But,
as anyone with a passion for the brain will be unhesitant tell you, the brain has biases that
make even the most assured pragmatist question his very existence. So it is the
repercussions, they argue, that are too upsetting of the natural order to be considered true.
This is not an indication of its falsity. Even if one recognizes it as a depressing
Truth, it must still be treated as what it is Truth. After all, what choice do we have?