Dr.-Ing.

Jochen Bredemeyer
Head of Research
Flight Calibration Services GmbH
Hermann-Blenk-Str. 32A
D-38108 Braunschweig
Germany
E-mail: brd@flightcalibration.de

FLIGHT INSPECTION OF THE SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR

SIGNAL-IN-SPACE
ABSTRACT
The effectivness of the SSR as a main backbone
of ATC is affected by the accumulation of signals in
space due to civil, military and also illegal transmissions on both SSR uplink and downlink channel. Conventional methods to inspect the performance of SSR
as introduced in DOC8071 are not qualified to identify
the real contents within the bandwidth of those channels in case of serious problems.
In contrast to this a proper investigation of the SSR
should include a view to the basic incoming pulse
shape of telegrams aboard the inspecting aircraft. An
experimental system to record the actual SSR Signalin-Space and some algorithms to analyse the contents are introduced in this paper as well as various
measurements done with it during test flights: Heavily overcrowded air spaces induce a high radio load
triggered by SSR ground stations and ACAS initiated
transponder responses. The results derived from the
analyzed SSR video data allow a detailed separation
of the involved telegram formats (Mode 1,2,3/A,C,S)
so the systems main benefit to be focussed on is
the numerical evaluation over time and motion. Further potential included is to detect interference apart
from regular SSR telegram transmissions which block
transponders or prevent receivers from getting a valid
aircraft response.

INTRODUCTION
Already during World War II U.S. and British Allied Forces developped so-called IFF (Identification

Friend or Foe) techniques which led to the first releseas of those systems. Developments continued
after the war ended and in the meanwhile also civil
aviation realized the benefit of active identification of
aircraft so the ICAO decided in 1954 to establish a
civil derivative in compability to the military variant IFF
Mk X [7]. It mainly bases on a airborne transponder
being interrogated on the uplink channel 1030 MHz
and responding on the downlink channel 1090 MHz.
The steady growth of air traffic in the past decades
in contrast to fixed frequency resources evokes the
question in what way the high radio load on both
channels diminishes air traffic control capabilities.
The wide-area introduction of the newer, selective
SSR variant Mode S would contribute to a strong reduction of the radio load: Its main advantage against
the conventional Modes 1,2,3/A,C is the capability to
transmit selective calls to prevent the majority of airborne transponders from responding. However, for a
still unknown period the conventional modes must be
maintained because not yet all aircraft are equipped
with a Mode S transponder. Furthermore, european
countries have currently no operable Mode S ground
stations. In Germany i.e., there exists just one experimental interrogator in Gotzenhain near Frankfurt
whose Mode S extensions are switched off most of
the time.
Before the introduction of the Mode S based Airborne Collision Avoiding System (ACAS) the uplink
radio load on 1030 MHz could be estimated with a
known number of ground interrogators. In contrast to
this, an unknown number of non-selective responding transponders led to a drastic radio load increase
on the downlink channel 1090 MHz.

1030 MHz

Band filter

Pre Amp.

Log. Amplifier

Low pass filter

Uplink channel

1090 MHz

Baseband signal
Band filter

Pre Amp.

Log. Amplifier

Low pass filter

Downlink channel

Figure 1: Receiver for both SSR channels

To make things even more difficult, the growing ACAS
equipment extent of aircraft actually increases the
traffic on 1030 MHz because ACAS instruments act
like ground stations and interrogate on the common
uplink channel.
In Germany like in most other countries there exists
currently no flight inspection of radio load on the SSR
channels. The following sections therefore describe
an experimental system and new analyze methods to
perform a selective investigation on both uplink and
downlink channel.

RECEPTION OF SSR SIGNALS

Transient, short pulsed signals with a high dynamic
range require logarithmic receivers because a conventional automatic gain control (AGC) cannot quickly
enough adapt the current signal strength.
Modern logarithmic amplifiers directly operate in the
RF band with a low noise figure and due to their
implicit rectification they deliver directly a baseband
video signal. As shown in fig. 1 the expense to
contruct a complete double channel receiver can be
highly reduced applying those types of amplifiers.
Preselecting the RF signal with a steep band pass filter and pre-amplifiying it enables to feed the log. amp.
directly so we get the SSR video at the output. An

analog-digital converter can be connected after the

signal is fed through an anti-aliasing low pass filter
and a further linear amplification.
SIGNAL RECORDING
In order to investigate the effectiveness of different
analyzing methods a continous recording of the video
signal is required. The signal processing of raw data
is done in post processing to test if the calculated solutions are reproducible.
The constant bandwidth of SSR signal contents is a
contrast to the continously increasing speed of computers. The bandwidth of modern PC architectures
allow a recording speed of 20 MByte/s or more without loss of data which corresponds to the selected
8 Bit wide A/D conversion at a sample rate of 20 MHz.
The recording system is the one as introduced in [1]
and bases on an CompactPCI platform with LINUX
as its operating system. The author suggests to replace the old-fashioned method of recording and visualizing SSR video data with an oscilloscope and
camera-based system described in [4, Att.A to App.F]
by a modern variant as mentioned before.
In addition to the radar raw data the PC also records
the real time-synchronized flight path data from the
Flight Inspection System (FIS) with a repetition rate
of 0.1 s.

Uplink 1030 MHz

IN-FLIGHT MEASUREMENTS

1.6 s

According to former investigations of FAA and DFS [6]

the air space above Frankfurt is regarded as the one
with the highest radio load in the world on both uplink and downlink channel. During the ferry flight on
17-Sep-2001 to a regular flight inspection in Switzerland the Frankfurt/Main air space was passed by a
few NM at 07:00 UTC. The crossing height was flight
level 286 and both SSR channels were recorded for a
few minutes as shown in the geographic scenario in
fig. 2. The labeled moments are referenced to the
beginning of the time synchronization with the FIS
whilst the Airport Surveillace Radars (ASR) identify
Frankfurt Airport and Gotzenhain is the only radar in
Germany with Mode S capability. To perform that test
flight the experimental system was installed aboard of
DCFMB and connected to a bottom L-band antenna
just as to the FIS.

0s
06:58 Uhr UTC
50s
Measurement on
100s
downlink channel
150s
1090 MHz
200s
250s
300s
350s
400s
450s
ASR FFM North
Gtzenhain
0s
50s
100s
ASR FFM South
150s
200s
250s
07:07 Uhr UTC
300s
Measurement on
350s
uplink channel
400s
1030 MHz
450s
500s

Latitude []

50.2
50
49.8
49.6
49.4
8.5

8.6

8.7

8.8

P3

Mode:
1 : 3 s
2 : 5 s
3/A : 8 s
C : 21 s
max. 24.6 s

2 s

P1

P2

P4

Mode 1,2,3/A,C
Intermode
Suppression

2 s

sync.
phase
revers. 1 2 3 4

Bit:

P6

Mode S
3.5 s

0.25 s
0.5 s

4.75 s

19.75 s (short)
33.75 s (long)

Downlink 1090 MHz

0

20 s

A4

F2

20.3 s
F1

50.8

50.4

0.8 s
Suppr.
0 dB
-9 dB
Reply

1.45 s

WGS84 Coordinates
50.6

0.8 s
P2

P1

8.9

C1

A1

A2

C2

0.45 s

P1

C4

Mode 1,2,3/A,C

Data Bits
P3

P2

56 oder 112 s

P4

Mode S

1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0.5 s
1 s

1 s

1 s

3.5 s
8 s
Preambel
0

Bit:
4

3
4
2
Data Bits

1
9

10

11

12

13

Longitude []

Figure 3: SSR telegram formats

Figure 2: Flight path and moments of the measurements on 17-Sep-2001

CORRELATION OF SSR TELEGRAMS

To separat the received SSR telegram formats

in uplink and downlink one has to compare the
recorded Signal-in-Space data with the known SSR
telegram patterns. The relevant formats are shown in
fig. 3 (refer to [2]).

The conventional uplink formats differ in their distance

between P1 and P3 while the amplitude of pulse P2
indicates a side lobe transmission and prevents the
transponder from replying. In case of Mode S there
is a preambel consisting of P1 and P2 followed by the
DPSK (Differential Phase Shift Keying)-coded data
pulse P6. Mode S SLS (Side Lobe Suppression) is
realized by a pulse P5 which jams the Sync Phase
Reversal so the transponder does not react either.
Furthermore, Mode S capable radars can add a following pulse P4 to the telegram which only triggers
conventional transponders. This feature is especially
used by ACAS which recognizes also conventionally
equipped aircraft by transmitting Whisper-Shout sequences [2, Att. A 3.1.2].

The content of a reply to all conventional interrogations is surrounded by two frame pulses F1 and F2
within a constant interval whereas a Mode S reply is
led by a 4 pulse preambel.
Generally the existence of those relevant pulses has
to be checked in order to recognize a valid interrogation or reply. However, i.e. if many transponders reply
in a highly overcrowded air space there may occur
Synchronous Garbling so the radar signal procession
cannot anymore detect single reply formats.
In contrast to this, the recorded video raw data of the
experimental system allows to test and to optimize
software algorithms which offer a better performance.
A well-known method of pattern recognition is the discrete autocorrelation function (ACF) [5]:

SS (m) =

N 1

s(n)s(n + m)

n=0

It comprises a stepwise multiplication and summation of the SSR model sequence s(n) with the raw
data with a total length of N . In case of m = N it
reaches maxmimum compliance and therefore indicates a valid telegram at a clear time of arrival.
Selected correlation patterns s(n) like the GPS Gold
Codes cause steep maximums and a large main-toside-lobe ratio but SSR telegrams are not trimmed to
reach maximum correlation performance. Therefore
it is necessary to include further security checks if a
maximum is found.
The application of the ACF with SSR signals is illustrated in fig. 4. In the upper diagrams two recorded
sequences are displayed: A military Mode 2 and a
Mode S interrogation.
The model patterns below include different valuations
during pulses and gaps which leads to a better maximum detection performance: Passing by single steps
n N during its run the ACF reaches negative values
if one or more recorded pulses are shifted into pattern gaps as shown in the lower diagrams whereas

<

the main maximum is achieved if a total congruency

of model pattern and recorded data is given. Due to
the fact that a conventional Mode 2 interrogation may
include a P2 in case of SLS the valuation within this
pulse duration is set to zero in order not to falsify the
ACF result. As a result of adapting different model
pattern valuations it was possible to correlate telegram formats down to the receiver base noise level
90 dBm.
Things are getting more complicated if the downlink
channel is concerned where it becomes clear that the
evaluation of the ACF maximum cannot be the only
criterion to be taken into consideration. Fig. 5 shows
the corresponding diagrams of two downlink telegram
formats. Within the Mode 1,2,3/A,C (left) reply frame
pulse 4 octal numbers are encoded so 4
3 = 12 gaps
or pulses are statistically distributed. The model pattern regards those positions as neutral and therefore
its portions of the total ACF value are zero. Only the
two frame pulses F1 and F2 effect a positive ACF
value which leads to a fairly unusable main-to-sidelobe ratio comparing the results with the uplink channel. Consequently, another aspect must be the amplitude of the frame pulses at their known positions. The
linear difference of their A/D converter values can be
expressed in dB due to the calibration curve of the
LogAmp so a logarithmic threshold is applicable.
Focussing on the Mode S downlink format (right)
things are easy as on the uplink channel: A relatively long preambel preceding the information pulses
causes a unique positive maximum without ambiguity.
Summing up those aspects we point out the following
necessities to detect sucessfully SSR telegram formats applying the ACF algorithm:


Maximum value of ACF as a mark of identification

Signed valuation of model telegram patterns

Ratio of significant pulse amplitudes

Interrogation Mode 2

Interrogation Mode S

Baseband signal

Baseband signal

75

65
70

80

Level [dBm]

Level [dBm]

75
85
90
95

80
85
90
95

100

100

105

105
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

10

Zeit [s]

Congruency: maximum of ACF

50

-0.5

40
-1

30
20

A/D converter value

60

Valuation

A/D converter value

70

-1.5

-2
5

0.5

120
0

100
80

-0.5

60

-1

40
-1.5

20

10
4

35

140

0.5

80

30

160

90

25

Congruency: maximum of ACF

1

20

Zeit [s]

100

15

10

Valuation

-2
0

Zeit [s]

Zeit [s]

Passage of ACF to maximum

Passage of ACF to maximum

3000

8000

2000

6000

1000
4000

SS(m)

SS(m)

0
1000
2000

2000

3000

4000

2000

5000
4000

6000
7000

6000
0

Zeit [s]

10

Zeit [s]

Figure 4: Autocorrelation function in the Uplink channel

Reply Mode 1,2,3/A,C

Reply Mode S
Baseband signal

Baseband signal
75

65
70

Level [dBm]

Level [dBm]

80
85
90

75
80
85
90

95
95
100

100
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

10

20

30

Zeit [s]

Congruency: maximum of ACF

0.5

50
40

30
20

-0.5

A/D converter value

60

Valuation

A/D converter value

70

10
0

-1
10

70

15

20

120

100

0.5

80

60

-0.5

40

-1

20

-1.5

25

80

-2
0

Zeit [s]

Zeit [s]

Passage of ACF to maximum

Passage of ACF to maximum

1000

2000

1000

2000

SS(m)

SS(m)

60

Congruency: maximum of ACF

1

50

Zeit [s]

80

40

Valuation

2000
3000

4000
6000

4000

8000

5000

10000

6000

12000
0

10

Zeit [s]

15

20

25

Zeit [s]

Figure 5: Autocorrelation function in the Downlink channel

PRESENTATION OF RADIO LOAD CALCULATIONS

By applying the decribed techniques it becomes possible to perform a refined analysis of the collected
SSR raw data. Within the FIS time slot of 100 ms all
telegrams are summed up and displayed over a time
axis which corresponds to the flight path as depicted
in fig. 2.

Downlink Mode 1,2,3/A,C

1800
total number
thereof > 80dBm

telegramm rate [10 s ]

1600
1400
1200

800
600
400
200
100

200

300

400

500

time [sec]

Downlink Mode S
70
total number
thereof > 80dBm

telegram rate [10 s ]

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

On the uplink channel 1030 MHz a more detailed subdivision of conventional modes can be achieved according to fig. 3.
The results of pure military Modes 1 and 2 are shown
in fig. 7. In contrast to the total number of correlated
interrogations those with a level above 77 dBm are
separated (left) which corresponds to the minimum
trigger level (MTL) of transponders according to [3,
sec. 3.8.1.7.5.1]. Generally these evaluations concern real interrogations (P1 P2) whereas a distinction between main and side lobe interogations is possible by making full use of the SLS-indicator P2. The
result (right) describes a high portion of interrogations
received from the main lobe.

>

1000

0
0

The number of Mode S replies (below) is ten times

smaller than the conventional radio load. It mainly encloses the Mode S transponder squitter broadcasts
and replies to ACAS interrogations of aircraft.

100

200

300

400

500

time [sec]

Figure 6: Downlink telegram rates

Evaluating the downlink channel first fig. 6 depicts the
total number of correlated replies including all replies
down to the limit of the receivers sensitivity. More
than 15000 conventional telegrams/s (above) statistically significate that every 67s a 21s-lasting reply is received. Setting the minimum threshold up to
80 dBm on the contrary shows that most of the telegrams in space are fairly weak.

An expected higher activity can be determined in the

squawk interrogation Mode 3/A and in the civil altitude interrogation Mode C rate as depicted in fig. 8.
Mode A interrogation rates of civil radars are higher
than Mode C and in addition with military Mode 3 the
amount of 3/A is clearly higher than Mode C in general.
The preceding considerations did not include Intermode C interrogations elicited by ACAS WhisperShout acitivity. Nowadays more and more aircraft are
equipped with ACAS which leads to the measured
high interrogation rate as shown in the upper two diagrams in fig. 9: A large number of more or less far
away ACAS-equipped aircraft transmit whisper-shout
sequences whose initial transmissions are of weak
output power. This explains the big difference between the total number of correlated telegrams and
those above MTL. Comparing the two numbers above
MTL one can derive that the activity of ACAS Intermode C and Mode C ground interrogation is mostly
balanced.
In the lower diagram the Mode S interrogation rate is
presented. Due to the fact that the Mode S extension

of Gotzenhain
radar was disabled during the test flight
the activity is traced back only to ACAS-equipped aircraft. Like before the majority of detected telegrams is
below MTL what indicates a huge number of aircraft
flying at a large distance.

Uplink Mode 1 P1>P2

Uplink Mode 1 and side lobes

30

35

total number
thereof > 77dBm
1

20
15
10
5
0
0

total number
thereof P1>P2

30

telegram rate [10 s ]

telegram rate [10 s1]

25

25
20
15
10
5

100

200

300

400

0
0

500

100

Uplink Mode 2 P1>P2

total number
thereof > 77dBm

500

total number
thereof P1>P2

35
1

telegram rate [10 s ]

400

40

30

telegram rate [10 s ]

300

Uplink Mode 2 and side lobes

35

25
20
15
10
5
0
0

200

time [sec]

time [sec]

30
25
20
15
10
5

100

200

300

400

500

0
0

100

time [sec]

200

300

400

500

time [sec]

Figure 7: Military interrogations

The composition of both Intermode C and Mode S
radio load is higher than the combined interrogation
rate of civil SSR radars. As a result of this, the uplink
channel is affected more and more by the increasing
equipage grade of ACAS. On the uplink channel one
cannot distinguish between military, civil ground station or ACAS-elicited replies so a definite statement
about the influence of ACAS is not derivable.

CONCLUSIONS
An experimental system capable of receiving and
recording SSR signal-in-space as video raw data was
introduced in this paper. In context with the described
algorithms to detect different uplink and downlink telegrams formats it is now possible to evaluate the SSR
radio field load .

Currently all calculations are processed after the

recordings are finished. Within the first steps to establish its usage as a radio field monitor it is necessary to investigate various methods and algorithms
to improve their performance with respect to a high
detection security. The main aspect is to get reproducable results that are based on proper scientific methods.
In order to generate instant results it is necessary to
implement tested and approved software algorithms
as hardware. Due to the fact that all operations deal
with integer values the implementation could be realized with highly integrated Complex Programmable
Logic Devices (CPLDs). The technical conditions can
be taken for granted nowadays.
The integration of a mobile radio field monitor into

Uplink Mode 3/A P1>P2

Uplink Mode 3/A and side lobes

90

100

total number
thereof > 77dBm

total number
thereof P1>P2
80

70

telegram rate [10 s1]

telegram rate [10 s1]

80

60
50
40
30
20

60

40

20

10
0
0

100

200

300

400

0
0

500

100

Uplink Mode C P1>P2

300

400

500

Uplink Mode C and side lobes

45

60
total number
thereof P1>P2

total number
thereof > 77dBm

40

50

35

telegram rate [10 s ]

telegram rate [10 s1]

200

time [sec]

time [sec]

30
25
20
15
10

40
30
20
10

5
0
0

100

200

300

400

500

0
0

100

time [sec]

200

300

400

time [sec]

Figure 8: Mode 3/A and C interrogations

flight inspection procedures comprises the potential
to get an overview of the current radio field load. Especially in critical air spaces a cyclic SSR flight inspection would provide a differentiated analysis of the
current status and may early detect the reason for a
reduced reachability of aircraft transponders by SSR
ground stations due to garbling effects. Furthermore,
the analysis of recorded video data could also reveal
jamming signals which possibly block transponders
and may help to locate the disturbance source. The
systems main benefit is therefore the effective assistance of maintaining the backbone of ATC.

ABBREVIATIONS
ACAS
ACF

Airborne Collision Avoiding System

Autocorrelation Function

A/D
AGC
ASR
ATC
CPLD
DFS
DPSK
FAA
FIS
GPS
IFF
MTL
SLS
SSR

Analog to Digital (Conversion)

Automatic Gain Control
Airport Surveillace Radars
Air Traffic Control
Complex Programmable Logic Device
Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH
Differential Phase Shift Keying
Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Inspection System
Global Positioning System
Identification Friend or Foe
Minimum Trigger Level
Side Lobe Suppression
Secondary Surveillance Radar

500

Uplink Intermode C

REFERENCES

120
total number
thereof > 77dBm

telegram rate [10 s1]

100
80

[2] ICAO: Annex 10 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation. Volume IV: Surveillance
Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems. Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization,
1995

60
40
20
0
0

100

200

300

400

500

time [sec]

Uplink Intermode C and side lobes

140
total number
thereof P1>P2

telegram rate [10 s1]

120
100

[3] ICAO: Annex 10 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation. Volume I: Radio Navigation
Aids. Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization, 1996
[4] ICAO: DOC 8071, Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids. Volume III: Testing of Surveillance Radar Systems. Montreal: International
Civil Aviation Organization, 1998

80

, H. D.: Signalubertragung.
[5] L UKE

Berlin : Springer, 1999

60
40

0
0

100

200

300

400

500

time [sec]

Uplink Mode S
300
total number
thereof > 77dBm
250
200
150
100
50
0
0

7. Auflage.

[6] M ALLWITZ, R. ; WAPELHORST, L. ; PAGANO, T.

1030/1090 Megahertz Signal Analysis Frankfurt,
Germany. DFS/FAA Report. 1996

20

telegram rate [10 s1]

[1] B REDEMEYER, J.:

Funkfeldmessung als
Spezialanwendung der Flugvermessung. In: Ortung und Navigation (2001), Nr. 1, S. 8390

100

200

300

400

500

time [sec]

Figure 9: Intermode C and Mode S interrogations

[7] S TEVENS, M.C.: Secondary Surveillance Radar.

Norwood : Artech House, Inc., 1988