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Spring 2013
Consumption-Savings Decisions
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Introduction
Consumption-Savings Decisions
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c2
y2 t2
= y1 t1 +
1+r
1+r
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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subject to
y2 t2
c2
= y1 t1 +
c1 +
1+r
1+r
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
4 / 26
c2
c2
y2 t2
c2
c2
y2 t2
y1 t1
c1
y1 t1
c1
c1
c1
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
5 / 26
c2
(1 + r )u 00 (c1 )
=
>0
y1
s1
c1
u 00 (c1 )
=1
=
>0
y1
y1
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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Consumption Variation
Consumption-Savings Decisions
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
11 / 26
c2
(1 + r )u 0 (c2 ) u 00 (c1 )(y1 t1 c1 )
=
r
c1
s1
=
r
r
Substitution effects:
c1
u 0 (c2 )
c2
(1 + r )u 0 (c2 )
=
<
0,
=
>0
r subst
r subst
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
12 / 26
Income effects:
c1
c1
(1 + r )u 00 (c2 )(y1 t1 c1 )
c1
=
=
r inc
r
r subst
00
c2
u (c1 )(y1 t1 c1 )
c2
c2
=
=
r inc
r
r subst
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
13 / 26
c2
c2
weH(1 + rH)
weL(1 + rL)
weH(1 + rH)
weL(1 + rL)
weH
weL
weH
weL
c1
c1
The effect of an increase in the real interest rate for a lender (left)
and a borrower (right).
Econ 3307 (Baylor University)
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
14 / 26
The Government
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of an interest rate
r , allocations for the household c1 and c2 , and allocations for the
government G1 , G2 , T1 , T2 such that:
1
G2
T2
= T1 +
1+r
1+r
The credit market clears in the initial period (total savings S1 = 0):
S1 S1p + S1g = S1p B1 = 0 S1p = B1
where S1p = N(y1 t1 c1 ) and B1 = G1 T1 .
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
16 / 26
Walras Law
Conditions (1), (2), and (3) automatically imply (4).
c1 +
c2
y2 t2
C2
Y2 T2
= y1 t1 +
C1 +
= Y1 T1 +
1+r
1+r
1+r
1+r
Thus,
S1p
= Y1 T1 C1 =
Y2 T2 C2
1+r
Also,
G1 +
G2
T2
= T1 +
B1 = G1 T1 =
1+r
1+r
G2 T2
1+r
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
17 / 26
Ricardian Equivalence
Suppose the government leaves G1 and G2 unchanged but reduces
1
initial period taxes by t1 = T
N per household.
The deficit increases by T1 and the government must raise second
period taxes by T2 to pay back the increased debt:
G1 = T1 T1 + (B1 + T1 ), G2 + (1 + r )(B1 + T1 ) = T2 + T2
G2
T2 + T2
G1 +
= T1 T1 +
1+r
1+r
Before the tax cut,
G1 +
G2
T2
= T1 +
1+r
1+r
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
18 / 26
Ricardian Equivalence
What are the macroeconomic effects of this deficit-financed tax cut?
The consumers intertemporal budget constraint becomes
c1 +
y2 (t2 + t1 (1 + r ))
c2
= y1 (t1 t1 ) +
1+r
1+r
c2
y2 t2
c1 +
= y1 t1 +
1+r
1+r
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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Ricardian Equivalence
Summary:
I
SP1
S1P + T1
B1
B1 + T1
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
20 / 26
Taxes change by the same amount for all households, i.e. it is not the
case that certain households receive the initial tax cuts and different
households pay the future tax increases.
The increased government debt is paid off during the lifetimes of the
people alive when the debt was issued.
Lump-sum taxation.
Consumption-Savings Decisions
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
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z }| {
Gt + (1 + r )Bt1 = Tt + Bt Bt = (Gt Tt ) +(1 + r )Bt1
Bt = dY0 (1 + g )t + (1 + r ) dY0 (1 + g )t1 + (1 + r ) dY0 (1 + g )t2 + . . .
Bt = dY0 (1 + g )t + (1 + r )(1 + g )t1 + (1 + r )2 (1 + g )t2 + + (1 + r )t
Bt
1+r
(1 + r )2
(1 + r )t
Bt
=
=
d
1
+
+
+
Yt
Y0 (1 + g )t
1+g
(1 + g )2
(1 + g )t
Econ 3307 (Baylor University)
Consumption-Savings Decisions
Spring 2013
24 / 26
X
Bt
=d
Yt
n=0
1+r
1+g
n
"
#
1+g
1 + r t+1
=d
1
g r
1+g
If r > g ,
Bt
Yt
If r < g ,
Bt
Yt
d 1+g
g r in the long run.
Consumption-Savings Decisions
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Consumption-Savings Decisions
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