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CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

FACTS
The City of Manila (City) filed a petition to expropriate lands for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement, namely the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila.
The Chinese Community of Manila (Chinese) alleged that that it was the owner of
the land sought to be expropriated, and that it was neither necessary or expedient
that the parcels be expropriated for street purposes, and that if the construction of
the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were
available w/c would fully satisfy Citys purposes, at much less expense w/o
disturbing the resting places of the dead (it was a cemetery).
The RTC ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
The Citys contention: It has the authority to expropriate land, and it may
expropriate any land it ay desire, and that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question, that neither the court
nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefore.
ISSUE
(a) W/N the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation.
(b) W/N the cemetery is for public use (if yes, it cannot be subject for
expropriation.)
RULING
(a) YES. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. The courts must find (i) that a law or authority exists for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, but (ii) also that the right or authority is being
exercised in accordance with the law.
In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded
to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must
be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a
question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and, in our
opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the
right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent
domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those
questions.
However, the legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for
a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed

improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency
of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute
their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those
questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to
review it (the necessity and the expediency) It (the legislature) may designate the
particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be
reviewed by the courts.
But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be
taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts.
Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the
question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene.
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to
confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general
authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the
courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
(b) YES. It is of public use as evidenced by the promulgation by the Spanish
Governer-General to allocate this area for the burial of the dead for a certain race.
Note: Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to
the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the City.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. DELA CRUZ
FACTS
NAPOCOR is a GOCC mandated to develop hydroelectric power, produce
transmission lines, and develop hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines.
NAPOCOR decided to acquire and easement of right-of-way over portions of land
w/in Dasmarinas & Imus, Cavite for the construction & maintenance of the proposed
Dasmarinas-Zapte 230kV Transmission Line Project (Project).

PROPERTY DIGESTS ART. 435

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NAPOCOR filed a complaint for eminent domain & expropriation of an easement

right-of-way against Dela Cruz spouses as registered owners of the land sought
be expropriated. NAPOCOR then deposited P5688 to cover the provisional value
the land in accordance w/ Sec. 2, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court. It filed for a Writ
Issuance w/c was granted by the RTC.

of
to
of
of

Subsequently, Saulog filed a Motion to Intervene claiming ownership over the land
sought to be expropriated from spouses Dela Cruz. SK Dynamics (Dynamics) filed a
motion informing the RTC that NAPOCOR also took possession of a portion of its
property for the same purpose.
The RTC designated Parra (Cavite Provincial Assessor) as chairman. NAPOCOR
nominated Andaya (Municipal Assessor of Dasmarinas) as member. The
commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of the Dynamics property & fixed the
just compensation to be paid by NAPOCOR at P10k/sq.m. The price was affirmed by
the CA.
The commissioners did not afford the parties to opportunity to introduce evidence in
their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners
didnt issue notices to the parties to attend hearings.
NAPOCORs contention: The Commissioners Report fixing the just compensation at
P10k is exorbitant, unjust & unreasonable. The Provisional Appraisal Committee
Report set the just compensation of lots along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway at P3k/sq.m
only.
Dynamics contention: The valuation of a lot under expropriation is reckoned at the
time of its taking by the government. Since the writ of possession was issued on
Mar. 10, 1999, the price/value for 1999 must be the one to be considered.
ISSUE
(a) W/N NAPOCOR was denied due process when it was not given the opportunity
to present evidence before the commissioners.
(b) W/N the legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient.
RULING
(a) YES. In addition to the ocular inspection performed by the 2 appointed
commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing to
determine just compensation, and to provide the parties the following

Notice of the said hearings & the opportunity to attend them

The opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said

hearings

The opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the
said hearings
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. When the
principal issue in a case is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before
the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation. Trial w/ the aid of the commissioners is a substantial
right, and the absence of such violated the parties right to due process.

(b) YES, the legal basis to determine the just compensation was insufficient. The
commissioners arrived at the value of P10k/sq.m after their ocular inspection of the
property, wherein they considered the surrounding structures, the propertys
location and, allegedly, the prices of the other contiguous real properties in the
area. The recommended just compensation was determined at the time of the
preparation of the said report on Oct. 5, 1999.
The RTCs reliance on the said report is a serious error considering that the
recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strong factual
moorings. The report didnt indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by
the Orchard Golf Country Club, Golden City Subdivisoin, Arcontica Sports Complex,
& other business establishments cited. Also, the report didnt show how convenience
facilities, public transportation, and the residential & commercial zoning couldve
added value to the lots being expropriated.
No attempt was made to justify the recommended just price in the subject report
through other sufficient & reliable means such as holding of a hearing at w/c the
parties have had adequate opportunity to adduce their own evidence, the testimony
of realtors in the area concerned, the FMV and tax declaration, actual sales of lots in
the vicinity of the lot being expropriation on or about the date of the filing of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation.
The commissioners also didnt take into account that the Asian financial crisis in the
2nd semester of 1997 affected the FMV of the subject lots. Judicial notice can be
taken of the fat that after the crisis hit the real estate market, there was a
downward trend in the prices of real estates in the country.
The commissioners report is flawed because its recommended just compensation
was pegged as of Oct. 5, 1999 or the date when the said report was issued, & not
the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation,
or as of Nov. 27, 1998.
LAND BANK VS. HEIRS OF DOMINGO
FACTS
Angel Domingo is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. This land
was tilled by tenant farmers. Pursuant to PD 27 issued on Oct. 21, 1972, and EO
228 dated July 17, 1987, the actual tenant tillers are deemed full owners of the land
they till. Of the 300 hectares, 262 hectares were taken by the govt under its
agrarian reform program & awarded it to the farmers-beneficiaries.
Based on the findings of the Clerk of Court who conducted an ocular inspection, tha
land is irrigated w/ the use of water pumps installed by the farmers-beneficiaries.
The average gross production (AGP) is 91.42 cavans of palay per hectare & the land
is capable of 2 harvests in 2 years. However, the records show that the AGP of
91.42 cavans is covered by a TCT not among the titles included in the subject land.
Using the guidelines for just compensation embodied in PD 27 and implemented in
EO 228, the DAR fixed the value of the subject land consisting of 262.2346 hectares
at P2,086,735.09. The formula used to compute the land value was:

PROPERTY DIGESTS ART. 435

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LAND VALUE

=
=
=

Average Gross Production (AGP) x 2.5

x Government Support Price (GSP)
91.42 x 2.5 x 35
P 7,999.25

The GSP for one cavan of 50 kilos palay in 21 October 1972 was P35.
Despite receipt of P1,845,999.71 as partial payment from LBP, Domingo rejected
the final payment of P868,191.66. Thus, LBP deposited this amount in cash and
bonds and proceeded to distribute the subject land to various farmer-beneficiaries.
Dominos contention: Just compensation for the subject land should be determined
in accordance with the formula in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 which would amount to
P39,335,190.00 computed at P150,000 per hectare. (instead of just P2M)
ISSUE
(a) Whether the taking of Domingos Riceland should be reckoned from the
issuance of emancipation patents or upon the effectivity of PD 27 on Oct. 21 1972.
(b) W/N RA 6657 should apply in the determination of just compensation of
Riceland taken under PD 27 and EO 228.
RULING
(a) The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just
compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation
patents. An emancipation patent constitutes the conclusive authority for the
issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. It is from the
issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of
ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the
landowner.
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as
[of] October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood,
however, that full payment of just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.
(b) Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of this process,
the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the
said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, w/ PD 27 & EO 228 have only
suppletory effect.
Sec. 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, provides the guideposts for the
determination of just compensation: In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the

Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured

from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine
the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
There is no doubt that Domingos land was taken by the government under PD 27.
However, it was only in 1994 when LBP prepared the Land Transfer Payment Form
which was superseded by a Claims Processing Form issued in 2002.
REPUBLIC VS. PLDT
FACTS
Sometime in 1933, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an
agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and
received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines
of PLDT and vice-versa. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls. The
arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European
and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could
terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave
notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1958.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications (BOT) set up its
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to
call private parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual
form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the
signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of
the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of the many
rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for
his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since
1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and
prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a
Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT
subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.
On March 5, 1958, the Bureau of Telecommunications through the Director of
Telecommunications entered into an agreement with RCA Communicaitons, Inc.
PLDT complained to the BOT about this joint operation and warned the said bureau
that it was violating the conditions conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented
trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of
government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in
competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations
were not stopped, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections.

PROPERTY DIGESTS ART. 435

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The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958

that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on
a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to
enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian
countries provided that the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations
of the Public Service Commission and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross
revenues. Both contracting parties didnt consent to the proposal. Thus, the
Republic brought an action in court asking PLDT to execute a contract with it.
ISSUE
W/N PLDT may be compelled to enter into a contract with BOT.
HELD:
NO. Parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and
by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by
violence, intimidation or undue influence.
However, the Republic may, instead, exercise the sovereign power of eminent
domain and require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined
by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only
a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services
to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and
benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the
interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of
just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility
to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

Upon learning of the plan, De knecht, a resident of Fernando Rein, wrote to Pres.
Marcos and asked him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adopt the original
plan of going through Cuneta Ave. rather than Fernando Rein. The Human
Settlement Commission (human) recommended that it is better to go through the
original plan. MPH, however, insisted on implementing Fernando Rein.
De Knecht was contending that the choice of property to be expropriated cannot be
without reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the
legislature has delegated a power of eminent domain, the question of necessity for
taking a particular line for the intended rests in the discretion of the legislature
subject to review of the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness. The choice of property requires due
process as to whether or not the proposes location was proper in terms of public
interest. They were also invoking Equal Protection.
Republic, on the other hand contends that it chose the plan 2 because it wanted to
minimize the social impact and not because it wanted to save the Motels.
ISSUE
W/N the government may expropriate the property of de knecht and other property
in Fernando Rein.
HELD
No, even though the state has the right to take private property for public use with
just compensation, it may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private
property should be taken. It is odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA
was changed. The contention of MPH that it wanted to minimize the social impact
factor or problem involved was not well grounded. The report of the Human
Settlement Commission recommended that it is better to take the original plan of
going through Cuneta because there was a lower social impact and the cost
difference factor of the two proposed alignment is very minimal (cheaper ang
Fernando Rein).
It is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of eminent domain; the party
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice, that the equal protection
clause will not allow.
Note: RTC granted the writ of possession of the Republic of the Philippines as it was
abel to deposit the required 10%. Bautista is the judge.

DE KNECHT VS. BAUTISTA

REPUBLIC VS. DE KNECHT
FACTS
The Department of Public Works and Communication (now MPH) prepared a plan to
extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard, that the proposed extension, an adjunct of
another road building program would pass through Cuneta Avenue (plan 1)up to
Roxas Boulevard and that this route would be a straight one and goes southward.
However the said department suddenly decided to make the proposed extension go
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan St. (plan 2) which are lined with old houses and
instead of going immediately southwards it goes north first before going to Roxas
Boulevard.

FACTS
Following the case of De Knecht vs. Bautista, wherein the court rejected the
proposal of the MPH to go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan st. (Fernando St.)
because it was arbitrary and capricious. 2 years after the decision of the SC was
rendered, Congress enacted BP 340, expropriating the properties in Fernando
Street. The MPH was also able to buy 80 to 85% of the property in Fernando Street.
Because of the enactment of BP 340, RTC dismissed the case on the ground of the
enactment of the bill, De Knecht appealed to CA and was granted the appeal.

PROPERTY DIGESTS ART. 435

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ISSUE
W/N the De Knecht property may be expropriated after the supervening events.
HELD
YES. It is true that the SC held that the choice of Fernando St. is arbitrary and
capricious and should not receive judicial approval. This decision was based on the
report of the Human Settlement Commission that there is a lesser social impact if
the plan is to go through Cuneta Ave because the building and improvements
therein are mostly MOTELS. However the social impact factor which existed in the
earlier case has disappeared. All the resident in the Fernando area was relocated
and was duly compensated, the EDSA project is almost complete and only De
knecht, with her violent resistance, stands in the way of the project of reducing the
bottleneck traffic in EDSA and also to solve the flood control problem in other area.
BP 340 was enacted because of said supervening events to immediately solve the
problem. The previous judgment of the SC must not be in an obstacle to the
congress to make its own independent assessment of the circumstances and enact
the said law. The SC agrees with the wisdom and necessity of the enacting BP 340
and the decision of the SC must yield to subsequent legislative fiat.
Concurring opinion:
BP 340 is not a legislative reversal of the earlier decision. Because of the
supervening events, the factual basis changed and justified the enactment of the
law.
VISAYAN REFINING CO. VS. CAMUS AND PAREDES
FACTS
The Governor-General (GG) directed the Attorney-General (AG) to cause
condemnation proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of
land known as Camp Tomas Claudio w/c lies along the water front of Manila Bay.
The property was desired by the government for military and aviation purposes.
Condemnation proceedings were begun by the AG on Sept. 14, 1919, by filing a
complaint in the name of the Govt of the Philippine Islands. Visayan Refining Co,
Dean Worcester, and Fred Leas were named defendants because they are severally
owners of the different portions of the property in question.

(a) W/N a statute by the Legislature is needed before the Govt can exercise its right
of eminent domain.
(b) W/N land can be expropriated by the Government in absence of a legislative
appropriation especially destined to pay for the land to be taken.
RULING
(a) NO. The power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty, being
essential the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon
sovereignty or upon any Government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign
powers. Nevertheless, general authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is
expressly conferred on the Govt under Sec. 631 of the Philippine Bill.
The power of eminent domain must be exercised in subjection to all the restraints
imposed by constitutional or organic law. The are 2 limitations, namely:
1. no law shall be enacted w/c shall deprive any person of property w/o due
process of law
2. private property shall not be taken for public use w/o just compensation
The use of land by the Govt for military & aviation purposes is a public use w/in the
meaning of the provisions of law authorizing the Govt to acquire real estate for
public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. A military establishment
is essential to the maintenance of an organized society.
(b) NO. The existence of a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for
land to be acquired by the Govt through the exercise of the power of eminent
domain is not an essential pre-requisite to the institution and maintenance of
judicial proceedings for the expropriation of such land. All that can be required of
the Government is that it should comply w/ the conditions laid down by law.
There is no organic or constitutional provision in force in these Islands requiring that
compensation actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. However the
system of expropriation prescribed by our laws affords absolute assurance that no
piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken form an unwilling owner until
compensation is paid. Our courts are directed to make such final order and
judgment as shall secure just compensation for the land taken, & the right of the
expropriator is finally made absolutely dependent upon the payment of
compensation by him.

The AG immediately asked the court to give the Government the possession of the
land to be expropriated after the necessary deposit is made. The AG prayed the
court to fix P600k as the total value of the property & to put the Govt in immediate
possession when said sum should be placed at the deposit of the court. This was
granted by the CFI.

The preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of (i) a prepayment upon the
value of the property, if finally expropriated, and (ii) as an indemnity against
damage in the eventuality that the proceedings should fail of consummation.

Visayans Contention: The expropriation proceedings cannot be maintained by the

Philippine Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the
power of eminent domain for military and aviation purposes. Also, the deposit in
court of P600 k had been made w/o authority of law.

FACTS

ISSUE

MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. VELASQUEZ

That the Govt of the Philippines is hereby authorized, subject to limitations and conditions
prescribed in this Act to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, & convey title to real & personal
property, & may acquired real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain.

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Manila Railroad Company (MCC) instituted a complaint for the purpose of

expropriation 12 parcels of land for a railroad state site at Lucena, Tayabas. The
land was owned by Velasquez, and the latters rights were in turn bought Perez.
The commissioners fixed the value of the 12 parcels of land at P81k, and awareded
P600 to Perez as damages for the removal of uncompleted camarin.
MCCs contention: The amount is grossly excessive because the land has never been
used except for rice culture.
Commissioners basis for the value: The construction of the provincial building &
high school had increased the price of land in their vicinity. The neighborhood of
theses buildings had become a choice residential district. The population in the
vicinity had increased since it became known that the condemned property had
been selected as a station site by the railroad company.
ISSUE
(a) W/N CFIs have power to substitute its own estimate of value over the reports of
commissioners.
(b) When may the courts, w/ propriety, overrule the award of the commissioners in
whole or in part, and substitute their own valuation of the condemned property?
RULING
(a) YES. According to Sec. 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the report of the
commissioners on the value of the condemned land is not final. The judgment of the
court is necessary to give effect to their estimated value. Nor is the report of the
commissioners conclusive so that the judgment of the court is a mere detail or
formality requisite to the proceedings.

be obliged to exercise in dealing w/ the report as the particular circumstances will

usally present itself.
If improper conduct, fraud or prejudice be charged against the commissioners and
this charge be sustained it would e safer to set aside the award thus vitiated and
appoint new commissioners who could render a report not tainted by these things.
But when the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, or that they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of the evidence; or they have used an improper rule of assessment
in arriving at the amount of the award, then in such a case, if the evidence be clear
and convincing, the court should ordinarily be able, by the use of those correct legal
principles w/c govern the case, to determine upon the amount w/c should be
awarded w/o returning the report to the commissioners.
If the court is clearly of the opinion that the evidence relied upon by them is
untrustworthy, and that other evidence rejected by the commission and w/c fixes
the value of the property at a figure greatly at variance w/ their valuation of the
property bears the earmarks of truth, then it becomes the duty of the court to
substitute for the commissions award the amount indicated by such evidence.
The estimated value made by the appraisers is to be given great weight. Such
valuation must not be lightly set aside if there is a substantial testimony to support
it, unless error is plainly manifest, unless it is apparent that injustice has been
done, unless the commissioners have clearly gone astray or adopted erroneous
principles, or their award is grossly inadequate.

The judgment of the court on the question of the value of the land sought to be
condemned is rendered after a consideration of the evidence submitted to the
commissioners, their report, and the exceptions submitted upon hearing of the
report. By this judgment the court may accept the commissioners report
unreservedly; it may return the report for additional facts; or it may set the report
aside & appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part or reject it
in part. Any one of these methods of disposing of the report is available to and may
be adopted by the court according as they are deemed suited to secure the plaintiff
the necessary property and to the defendant just compensation.
The court may, in its discretion correct the commissioners report in any manner
deemed suitable to the occasion so that final judgment may be rendered and thus
end the litigation. There is ample authority in the statue to authorize the courts to
change/modify the report of the commissioners by increasing/decreasing the
amount of the award, if the facts of the case will justify such change. An award w/c
is grossly excessive or grossly insufficient in the opinion of the court may can be
increased or decreased, although there by nothing w/c tends to indicate prejudice or
fraud on the part of the commissioners.
(b) The court is permitted to act upon the commissioners report in one of several
ways, AT ITS OWN DISCRETION. The whole duty of the court in considering the
commissioners report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the
defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and to fulfill that duty the court will

PROPERTY DIGESTS ART. 435