You are on page 1of 10


Michelle Josephine Eden M. Silva

On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in Calamba, Laguna. On May
2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and
ex parte appointment as special administratix over the estate. Motion was granted.
There was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of
deceased, and in behalf of their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by
CFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate
sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed from him.
CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule.
administratrix upon a bond of P30k.

Preciosa became


What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
RULE 73, SECTION 1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in
which he had estate. The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.
Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the
time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not waive it, merely
requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse. However,
venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended to be with CFIs independently from the place of residence of the deceased.
SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make
the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name,
last residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks
administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
Resides means actual residence. It should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In its popular sense the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. As
distinguished from legal residence or domicile requires bodily presence and an
intention to make it ones domicile.

Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix.

Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja

Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was
declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa
Tangco whose estate is being settled in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son
of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.
After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land
situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop
standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana
be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has been resolved
by the court or by agreement of the parties.
Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed
out elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva
Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest. The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.
Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay
harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between
Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?
In Franco vs. OBrien, it was held that the question of ownership is one which should be
determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not
the property is alleged to belong to the estate.
In another case it was held that the general rule is that questions as to title to property
cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings or stating the rule more
elaborately, When questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings.
Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its
jurisdiction in acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such
question has been squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no
consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said
properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being

interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the
A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment
as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28,
1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953,
Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said
petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed
upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954,
said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on
appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and
What is the situs of the residence, Pampanga or Quezon?
It is not disputed that Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart
was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at
889-A Espaa Extention, in said City. While transferring his belongings to this house, soon
thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr.
Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that
he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile
is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47;
In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar,
if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which
the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice;
(2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to
appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and
dismissed appellee's petition.

GR 75773
Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to be appointed as administratrix of the
properties of the deceased spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva.
Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the
exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition,
inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not
of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have already received their
inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of lands.
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of Lino
Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy but included the 5 parcles of land mentioned by private
respondent. Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the
inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to them.
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 before
the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil Case No.
16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land as part of the
estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to render an
accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription and laches. However, petitioners
opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the action was not barred by prior
judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the
question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate action.
ISSUE: Whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership.
Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a
separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of a certain property.
They were indebted to Esperanza Taedo, and these debts were chargeable against the
conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her
daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. In the probate proceedings in the
CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed a suit for
collection against Eulalio Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this
sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta
Macasaquit, the conjugal property was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as administratrix of
the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an action to ask that the sale made by the sheriff
of the property be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole
and absolute owner thereof.
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against
Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit. The probate proceedings were instituted in
accordance with Act No. 3176:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration
and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail
themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of
said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and
obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for
the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected
without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time
the liquidation and partition was made.

The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation
and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be
made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.

When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of
the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or
intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio
Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife Fausta
Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness
chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by
law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.

Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the
children of his late sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual
filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the administration of Pascuals estate.
Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these were
donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The
SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from enforcing the order.
Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed
of donation inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the
donation. When she reached the age of majority, she had the donation registered but found
out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title
which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.
Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Ofelias TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of
possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling
that Ofelias TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.
Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula.
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final
determination in a separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties, it can determine whether or not the properties

should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such determination is not conclusive

and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.

The petition is an action for recovery of sum of money based on an extra-judicial agreement.
Eleuterio was married to Juanita, although their union was not blessed with a child. Upon
Eleuterio's demise, Juanita invited her three in-laws to participate in the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of her husband, they being the only heirs.
Almost eight years after the signing of the extra-judicial settlement, Juanita's in-laws filed a
complaint for revocation and annulment of the extra-judicial settlement of estate of
Eleuterio, naming Juanita as defendant. In due time, however, Maximo and Trinidad withdrew
as plaintiffs, leaving Concepcion, represented by her daughter, Amelia Tinoco, to pursue the
The complaint alleges that Juanita, by means of strategy and stealth and through fraud and
illegal means, convinced and lured the plaintiffs therein in executing the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Eleuterio M. Muoz; that defendant Juanita has not paid each of
the plaintiffs the amount of P55,788.00 or a total of P167,364.00 contrary to the stipulation
in the said document.
The trial court, while upholding the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement, is of the belief
that petitioner Concepcion was not paid the balance of her share giving credence to the
affidavit of respondent Juanita signed in 1980 acknowledging such fact.
The affidavit, however, was executed on the same day that the extra-judicial partition was
signed. On that very day, it is understandable that respondent did not have the cash to pay
her co-heirs and as she testified, she had to sell some properties in order to give her in-laws
their agreed share.

On the other hand, the appellate court, while also finding the Extra-Judicial Settlement valid,
found that all the heirs, namely Concepcion, Trinidad and Maximo were indeed paid their
The extra-judicial settlement agreement is a contract, wherein the parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that the
legitime of the compulsory heirs are preserved. In the absence of fraud and provided all
requisites are met, the same should be upheld as valid and binding between parties.
Extra-judicial partition, being a speedy and less expensive method of distribution of the
estate, is specifically provided for in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, that in the
absence of a will and where the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs
may divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed, the parties,
of course, are duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights agreed upon in the
document. A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a
partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.

G.R. No. L-31454 December 28, 1929

Estate of the deceased Francisco Arquiza. ISIDRA GAAS, ET AL. vs. PILAR FORTICH
January 23, 1926, Francisco Arquiza, of Cebu, made his last will and testament in which he
bequeathed all of his property to Pilar Fortich his then wife. Later, upon his death, this will
was admitted to probate as his last will and testament. Pending the administration of his
estate, Isidra Gaas as natural guardian of the minors, Felicisimo Arquiza and Soledad
Arquiza, respectfully prays this honorable court to declare said minors to be the legal heirs
of the deceased Francisco Arquiza and for such other and further relief to which they may be
To which the executrix made a general and specific denial, and alleged the following special
First special defense, alleges:
That the petitioners Soledad and Felicisimo, surnamed Arquiza, alleged acknowledged
natural children of the deceased Francisco Arquiza, represented by their guardian ad
litem Isidra Gaas, have no right to succeed in the properties of the herein deceased
Francisco Arquiza; and as
Second special defense, alleges:
That assuming that there is merit in the petition which is objected to by this pleading, the
action to acknowledge the aforesaid minors has prescribed.

In a well considered and exhaustive opinion, the lower court sustained the petition and
found that all of the legal rights of Federico Arquiza was vested in the petitioners, who were
his legitimate children, and that, as such, they were entitled to one-third of the estate.
I. The lower court erred in holding that the alleged signature of Francisco Arquiza in the
original Exhibit C is genuine.
II. The lower court erred in holding that Federico Arquiza, father of the appellees Felicisimo
and Soledad Arquiza, was a natural son of the deceased Francisco Arquiza.
III. The lower court erred in declaring them entitled to one-third of the estate left by him, and
in not dismissing the petition of the appellees.


Upon the question of the signature, the lower court says: It was genuine.
Professor Del Rosario is an expert witness by profession and was brought from
Manila to Cebu to uphold the theory of the opponent and is no more disinterested
than the opponent's attorneys, while Mr. Calhoun is a banker living in Cebu and
has absolutely no interest in the present case of the parties thereto. Professor Del
Rosario did confine himself to a statement of the facts, and his opinion thereon,
with his reasons for his opinion, but his testimony is really a brief for the
opponent. In the light of these facts, the court cannot but regard his opinion as
strongly biased.
In the instant case, the record is conclusive that the father acknowledged
Federico Arquiza as his child, and it is also conclusive that at the time of his birth
or conception, his parents were single. The finding of the lower court that
Federico Arquiza was a natural son of Francisco Arquiza is well sustained by the


As to the fifth assignment of error, the lower court cites and relies upon the case
of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil., 1017), and says:
This is not an action to compel the recognition of Federico Arquiza under the
provisions of the Civil Code. Such an action is barred. This is a proceeding to obtain a
declaration of the rights of the petitioners as the legitimate children of Federico Arquiza to
inherit in representation of their father from their grandfather. It was not necessary for
Federico Arquiza to bring an action for recognition because he had acquired the
of a recognized natural child under Law 11 of Toro by the tacit recognition of his father. His
rights were transmitted to his legitimate children, and they had no need to
bring an action against
Francisco Arquiza or his heirs to compel the recognition of their
father, Federico Arquiza, as the natural
son of Francisco Arquiza.
If Federico Arquiza were still living, he could intervene in these proceedings for the
distribution of the
estate of his natural father, without the necessity of a proceeding to
compel his recognition, as is required
by the Civil Code; and Francisco Arquiza having
left no legitimate descendants, or ascendants, Federico Arquiza, if he had survived his
father, would have been entitled to one-third of the latter's estate.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
If the testator leaves no legitimate ascendants or descendants, the acknowledged
natural children shall be
entitled to a third of the estate.
And article 843 provides:
The rights granted natural children by the preceding articles are transmitted on their
death to their legitimate descendants.

The facts found by the trial court and sustained by the evidence bring the appellees
within those provisions.