SOCRATES VS.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner was the City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, who assumed
office on Jun. 30, 2001. On Jul. 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 incumbent Barangay Officials
of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly(PRA) to
initiate the recall of petitioner as mayor. On the same day, the PRA passed a
resolution declaring loss of confidence and requested the Comelec for recall
election. Petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition to nullify and deny due course
the recall resolution but it was dismissed for lack of merit. The Comelec gave due
course to the recall resolution and fixed the campaign period for 10 days.
Edward M. Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. His
candidacy was challenged by his opponents for the position. His opponents filed a
petition with the Comelec to disqualify him on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three consecutive full terms as mayor immediately prior to the
present recall election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edward M. Hagedorn is qualified to run in the recall election
despite having served his three full term for the same position.
RULING:
Yes. The Court cited the three-term limit rule in the Constitution and its
reiteration in the Local Government Code, according to the Court, These
constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that
an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.

ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councillor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms for the 1998-2001; 2001-2004; and 2004-2007 terms,
respectively. However, in 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, he was
preventively suspended for 90 days because of criminal case he was facing before
the Sandiganbayan, but the suspension was later on lifted and he was allowed to
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, respondent filed his COC for the same position.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course or cancel his COC
on the ground that had been elected and had served for three terms, and that his
candidacy for the fourth term violates the three-term limit rule.
The 2nd division of Comelec ruled that the three-term limit rule does not apply
to respondent because he was suspended for 90 days thus failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term. The Comelec en banc on the other hand,
confirm the decision of the 2nd division.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of
the three-term limit rule; and
b.) Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code.
RULING:
a.) A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint
one since no vacancy exists. To allow a preventively suspended elective
official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this
reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating
the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the
interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates.
a.) Preventive suspension does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the
suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily
committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain
the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the
temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands.
Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact
opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and
involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The
easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and noncomparable. But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures
is the more important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit

rule. Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total
incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective
interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing
the three-term limit rule. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not
involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not
be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

ADORMEO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002
FACTS:
Private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga was elected mayor in Lucena City in 1992
for which he served the full term. He was re-elected in 1995 for which also he
served the full term. In 1998 election, his supposed last term, he was defeated by
Bernardo G. Tagarao. However, Tagarao was recalled in 2000, and Talaga won in
then recall election. Talaga served the unexpired term of Talaga until Jun. 30, 2001.
In 2001 election, respondent Talaga filed his COC for the same position.
Petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course and to cancel the
COC of Talaga on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule. Respondent
argued that his defeat to Tagarao in the 1998 election interrupted the
consecutiveness of his term as mayor. The Comelec 1 st division declared respondent
disqualified to run for the same office. But the Comelec en banc reversed the
decision of the 1st division and declared respondent qualified to run.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had already served three consecutive terms.
RULING:
No. In disposing of the issue, the Court upheld the ruling of the Comelec en
banc that private respondent was not elected for three consecutive terms.
Furthermore, the Court said, for nearly two years, the respondent was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998
elections.

BORJA VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondent Capco was elected vice mayor of Pateros for 1988 1992.
However, he became mayor upon the death of the incumbent mayor on September
2, 1989. In the May 11, 1992 elections he ran and won as mayor for a term of 3
years from 1992 1995, he was again re-elected in the May 8, 1995 elections for
another term from 1995 1998.

On March 27, 1998 private respondent filed his COC for the same position for
purposes of May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Borja, opposing candidate, filed with
the Comelec a disqualification case against respondent on the ground of violation of
the three-term limit rule. The 2nd division of the Comelec declared respondent
disqualified to run for the position, but the Comelec en banc reversed the said
decision.
So election day came in and respondent garnered the highest number of
votes and was declared the winner candidate.
Petitioner contended that respondents service as mayor from September 2,
1989 to June 30, 1992 when he took over in place of the deceased incumbent
mayor on that time should be counted as service for full one term for purposes of
counting the three-limit.
ISSUE:
Whether a vice mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of
law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a full one
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.

RULING:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.

LATASA VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao
del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term, the
Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of
Digos.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for
the May 14, 2001 elections. On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For
Disqualification against petitioner Latasa on the ground of violation of the threeterm limit rule.
The Comelec 1st division rendered its decision disqualifying petitioner Latasa.
Petitioner files his motion for reconsideration but remained unacted until the day of
the election. Petitioner Latasa won the election and was proclaimed the winner
candidate. However, on August 27, 2002, the Comelec en banc confirmed the
decision of the Comelec 1st division disqualifying petitioner Latasa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is eligible to run for mayor in the newly created
component city of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms in
the municipality of Digos.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not
convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different
from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same
as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who
elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same
inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
The Court said that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

ONG VS. ALEGRE

G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Francis Ong has served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte,
for three consecutive terms from 1995 1998, 1998 2001; and 2001 2004.
However, his election in 1998 for the term 1998 2001 was contested, but the
decision declaring his proclamation null and void in said election came out only on
July 4, 2001, this time, petitioner was already starting to serve his term for 2001
2004.
For purposes of the May 10, 2004 elections, petitioner filed his COC for the
same position. Private respondent Alegre, his opposing candidate, filed with the
Comelec a petition for disqualification on the ground of violation of the three-term
limit rule. The Comelec 1st division dismissed the petition but it was reversed by the
Comelec en banc upon motion for reconsideration by respondent Alegre.
Petitioners main contention was that, he has not fully served the three
consecutive terms because his election election in 1998 was contested and in fact
his proclamation was nullified the the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners assumption of office as mayor from 1998 2001, may
be considered as one full term service for purposes of counting the three-term limit.
RULING:
The ruled petitioner Ongs assumption of office in 1998 2001 constitutes,
service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.
Furthermore, the Court said that, while it is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines
Norte ruled that it was Ongs opponent who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and,
therefore, said opponent was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However,
that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired.
Petitioner Ongs contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998
mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than
a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
According to the Court, the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary
view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would
under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such
term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.