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Ivo Barlac
Nations arc formed and arc kept alive by the fact that they
have a program lor tomorrow.

The Fearful Asymmetry of War:

The Causes and Consequences of
A revolution only lasts fihccn years, a pc"od which coincider
with the clfcctivencss of a generation.

From "The Revair olrhe M ~ I I c s1930


T h e mass- feel that it is easy to fleefrom realiry wtlen it is the

most difficult thing in the world.

Jose Ortega y Gasset

Selections from his writings



Yugoslavia's Demise
For ruhereas ruickediress is fearful, it beareth witfor a troubled coizscieirce
ness of its condet~r~ratior~:
always forecastctl~grievotrs tltitrjis.
For /ear is notl~ingelse but ' I yieldhlg up o f the
sltccours front tltoright.
And ruhile tlterc is less expectation from witl~iir,the
preater dot17 it corort the ignorn)lce of that cause

La ciuilisatioir est rrire Pcole drr courage; elle se mesure

arcx risrrltats de 19e//ortqtie I'l~o17ttne
fait pour vaincre
ses crabrtes cl)i1rr6riqr~es,
ct portr corrnaitre /es vrais
dangers qrri le nret~aceitt.llrogr?s est torrt ce qui sera 6
I'l~oitrnteorr qui l'aide d uaitrcre les perrrs imagitraires,
6 dicorrurir et 6 Pliinitler lcs urais dangers. La civilisation est le risrtltat drr progrks entendu de cette

Ferrero ( 1 941)


in Swiss exile, faraway

from his Tuscan L'Ulivcllo, at the beginning o f the third year of
the perlultimatc European war. He had it ~ublishedin New
The Yugoslav.
York "icause des censures qui s'y sont ~nulti~liies."'
war, which to dare has been waged only briefly in Slovenia, in J U ~ ;
1991, and ever sincc then with vengeance in Croatia, might not yct


I v o llanac
.. ., . , . .
successor.to' the European war'of 1939-194s;.
iq,Secmto be ;!
i i;.+
. ^ o f earlier-and seeds of future;
and global conflicts@his is to say that in this war, as in
thosc that prefigured i t at the time of the Ottoman and Habsburg
collapse, local differences escalated at moments of vast systemic
breakdowns. Brittle hierarchies tollapscd under the wcigkt of idcological debris. Nations sought liberation and the redress of old
wrongs. The shells of old states that had lain at the bottom of
imperial oceans for decades or centuries reemerged and were reforged
into shape by blows of battle, in the same graving docks, moreover,
as the new ships of state. At tlie same time, the majority of
intellecnrally lazy and temperamentally haughty statesmen of the
Great Powers (to return to nineteenth-centuryterminology) tended to
belittle the warnings and the distress of local conflicts. This i s not
because they were ill informed, but'because they were manageable
wax that acknowledges the flame of power and fear-the power of
old privilege and the fear of uncertainty.
The task of assessing the causes-and perhaps even the conscquences-f
the war that has destroyed Yugoslavia has become a
scholarly wager of battle. Diffurent from the time of Fcrrero, censorship is increasing only slowly in our academic Switzerland. What is
more noticeablc i s tlie audacity of the grand sitnplificrs. Hoary
legends arc rcsurrccted and new ones launched. Media impresarios
:selm>theenragis for thciistagedSerbo-Croat gladiatorial combats.
T h e winning thesis speaks to the irascible hatred that governs tlic
Balkan savages. Otherwise perfcnly respectable journals print such
revelations as the following:

Y~cgo:lavia: 7'/?eFearful Asyn~~?tefry

of W a r

,.. ,. .-. .,..*


* I


Ri;d~mati;.MiloJevit;:and everynne'else in Yugoslavia are victims of '.

.Wq&3 For ccnrurics their forcbcars lived in a state of povcrry and
illiteracy, where rumor filled the vacuum created by the abrcnce of
books and documentation. Then came four-and-a-half decades o f
Communist totalitarianism, when many, matiy books were puhlished-all containing lies. Shc Serb-Croat war in Yugoslavia i s the
upshor of a few million minds, all collccrively disoriented, and all finally
granted free cxprcssion.~
Tliosc who arc dcstincd to colnmand are fearful of thosc \\,lie are'
dcstincd to obey; in Fcrrcro's terms, Cain fears Abcl. The Atlanticist
uncase with self-deternli~intion
that has attended the revolution in the


dead world of socialism is part of the fcarful asymmetry of our tinics.

The Left fears the revolutionary patrimony of Mazzini and Garibilldi.
T h e Right proclaims that only fools rejoice when great cmpires fall.
"The symmctr). prefigured by Alexis de Tocqucville of a world
divided between America and Russia is over."J Much the same scc~l~s
to obtain for small cmpires like Yugoslavia. Perhaps Ferrcro w;is
right when he saw cupidity and ambition as the consequence of war,
whereas fear was a t the cosmic origin of war.'
One of the hurdcns in writing about theSouth Slavs is thc onerous
necessity of telling the story from the beginning. T h e knowledge of
South Slavic affairs i s indeed limited in the Wcst, as i s evident from
virtually all historical references in the media, including the highbrow
press. For the sake of brevity this much should be notcd:ihe currcntb
conflict among the South Slavs, specifically between the Serbs and the a
Croats, is not ancient, unless the term ancient encompasses the end o f p
the nineteenth ccntury, and it is not religious, although religion has3
played a-, - part
...- in
- . -the encounter. Thecurrent conflict is primarily%
ideological and political? In order to understand i t one must bcgin
with the continuity of individunl South Slavic national clites and,
states (where they existed), with special emphasis on national and!
-political ideologies, npt with "mc,dcrnization" studies and research of
social structures. Serbia i s
important from this point of
view. With tlic fall of the mcdioval Serbian state to the Ononian!
T u r k e t h c process that commenced in 1389 with the Serbian defeat
at the Battle of Kosovo and ended in 1459 with the abolition of the
vassal Serbian despotate-the Serbs lost not only their independence,
but also their native landed elites. National leadership passed into the
hands of thc autocephalous Scrhian Orthodox patriarchate (15571766), whose prelates substituted not only for the gentry, but for its
tasks in national culture and historical memory. Hence, the Serbia*
uprisings against the Turks (1804, 1815) were hy,dcfinition,both$
confessional and national, which translated into a lastingsuspicion of&
religious and national dive
for'the growth of 'the 'Sc
s6"ih;viid toward souther
. (183l:i#j3;'1,6;18,'
~crbian-indc&l ~;)uthSla
and hrouglit ahout .mi economy of peasant smallholders, intolerant of
class iliffcrcnccs.




luo Ucrnac

Yugoslavia: The Fearfit1 Asy17t1netryof War


tary, respo~lsiblefor the security police) were opposcd to this

"anarchy" of options. This meant that the reformists, who ha&
adherents everywhere, but especially in the industrial republics ofd
Slovenia and Croatia, opened a l l fronts in their war against central3
ism, including the scnsitivc and taboo question of equality among t h q
republics and nationalities. One of the first shots in this war was the
Central Comminec (CC) lettct of March 1959:to all Party organizations, in which the Communists wcrc pointedly reminded that the
equality of minorities must be maintaincd and furthered. The letter
alluded to the situation of the Albanian minority, which constituted
a regional majority in Kosovo."
The dccisive lnomer~tin the political evolution of Yugoslavia
dur~ngthe troubled 1960s was the point when Tito ioined the
rcformists.This happened in 1962, at the Sixth Plenum of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) CC, when Tito stated that "we
have to take decentralization as our point of departre."~l He
increasingly sided with Edvard Kardelj, the leading Slovenc Communtst and Party theoretician, who conncctcd, in the most explicit way,
rhc problems of economic relorln with national equality.1' Tito
became convinced that the maintenance of (predominantly Serbian)
centralisr dominance, which frequently took the Inask of Yugoslavism, increasingly weakened the regime. Bur despite Tito's effort to
bring the Serbian Party organization along to his point of view, in
Serbia he encountered silence and obstruction. T h i s led to a clash. At
the Fourth Plenum of the SKJ CC (July 1966), which followed the
recessionary economic reform of 1965, Tito decided to strike at
Rankovit's security serviccthe organizational base of centralist
resistance. But the fall of Rankovit, in the words of a Serbian Titoist,
had already engendered Serbian fears:

either maintailling the looscncd command systcm in politics and
econonlia or advancing into a "socialist" market econonly through.
a gradual introduction of "democratic" and "deccntrolizitlg" policies. The centr:llist forces headed by Serbian cadres (chief among
them Being Alcksandar Rankovit, the Party's orgallizational secre-

In Belgrade we already had various slogans that wctc launched by

hostile clernents. One is, for exampic, that this is struggle against
Serbian cadres; another, what will now happen with Scrbia, who will
represent Serbia's interests, etc.14

nit removal of Rankovii and the purge of the security service

signalcd greater balance in nationaliy relations. Serbian predominancc in the federal agencies was incrc:tsit~~l~
chnllenged. as wcrc the
strongarm methods in dealing with the nonJcrbs. Cronts and
Bosnian Muslin~sgained grvut~d.But the grcatest wi~~t,crswere


ivo Uanac

Yugoslavia: T l ~ eFearfil Asyn~nrctryo f War

Albanians, the excesses of RankoviC's police havitlg been especially

notable in Kosovo. T h e province's Albanian majority (77.4 erccnt
of Kosovob population in 1981) increasingly wcrc cmpowcrcd. As
Scrbian fc:lrs accordingly swelled, Dobrica &sit, a lcatling Scrbian
novelist, started criticizing the Party policy. In May 1968, at pn SKS
plenum, h e said that the I1:lrty could no longcr afford:
nor to k~luwabout the widespread bclicf in Scrhia that t l l e relations
bcnvecn Skipcrars [Albanians] and Scrbs are worsening, tllar theScrI>s
and hlontmcgrins fccl thro~rcned,that rhcrc are pressures few thertl to
syste~natiemigrate [from Kusovo], tliar the Scrl~sand Montenc~
<ally are hcing removed frum the positions of Iradcrsbip . . that the
proper scalc of chauvinist l~cntand nationalist psycltosis among tllc
of rllc Skipcrar nationality i s nor being taken. . . .I>

demonstrations of ~ o v c i n b e r1968,
whcrc thc
, .
republic" was first voiced, only increased Serbian! fears
about the growing Albanian menace. - *
The same cannot be said of Tiro. His confidence in the Kosovar
Albanian IJarryelite continued to grow. He co-opted and rnarginalizcd the Belgrade student demonstrators in June 1968, thereby
pushing asidc the most serious challenge by "progrcssivc" unitaris~n
in his declining years. He cncouragcd the growing dccentraI'ization of
thc Yugoslav smtc ("federalizing the federation") and thc reaffirmation of Croatia. Despite his clash with the Croatian Party leadership
in 1971, he purged, too, the creative Serbian Party lcadersllip of
Marko Nikczit and Latinka PcroviC in 1972. H e thcrcby wcakened
the Serbian establishment, in which the anticctltralist Scrbs (Miloi
Mini? and Mirko I'opovit) became unusually prominent. The crown
of Tito's discrepancy with Serbia was the constitutio~lof 1974, hich
raised Scrhia's autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodi a to
the lcvel of virtu31 republics while simultaneously introducihg a
system of absolute parity and proportionaljry in thc relations among
the rcpuhlics and i n their participation in'thc fcdcral organs. Thc
wisdom of this arrangement has hccn indisputc ever sincc. The
copstitution's chief structural wenknescthe fact tllat it was predicatcdon the pcrmancnt rule and unity of the SKI-hccamc evident
. only much later.
Serbia's ullllappincss with the constitution c~f1974 and
graded status of thc aotonolnous provinces was noticcahlc in thcilatc

. Kosovo


1970s. Dragoslav Drain Markovii-, the prcsidc~ltof Scrbia, initiated

a commission chargcd with the ways and tneans of "constitutillg SR
Scrbia as 3 single state and socio-political cotn~nu~lity."
The commission's materials, known as the "Blue Book," wcrca source of conflict
in the Scrbian Icadcrship in July 1977, as was M:lrkovii-'s notion that
thc "cqu:llity of all ltllc constituent parts of Yugoslavia] cannot be
rcalizcd u~tdcrconditivns of inequality for the Scrbs."'Wcvcrthclcss,,
the wholcsalc Scrbian campaign against Tito's constitution corn-,;
mcncid %tirTiti?sdc;lth in 198d:Serbian lcadcrs found thcir prctcxt
in the m:lssivc Albanian dcmot~stratiollsthat shook Kosovo and
pro~nptcdthe usc of firearnis in March-April 1981. Thcir calls for
the dinlirn~tionof autonomies could only be accomplished by cxaggcrating tllc Albanian menace, and incrc:lsingly that of the Vojvodina
autononlists," who were themsclvcs not ncccssarily membcrs of
Hungarian, Croat, Slovak, or Romanian communities, but who wcrc
most ohcn indigenous Serbs. This mobilizatio~lwas innately antiAlhanian, but also anti-Titoist, and anti-Yugoslav. :The elite of
Scrbian intelligentsia lent a hand to this vociferous campaign4
Gojko Djogo's 1981-1982 poetic cyclc Vur~crtavrenlora (Wooly
Times), which was banned and contrihutcd to the author's imprisonmcnt, was one of the first direct attacks against the late Tito ("the
old rat from Dedinie").l7 There followed bcwildcrcd revisionist
histories of Vladimir Dediier, the chief function of which was to
rcmove Tito frotn the pedestal of infallihility,'n and the tllinly veiled
" fictions of Dobrica &sic,
in which Scrbian Communists of the
prewar pcr-iod were cast in the role of executors of Comi!ltern's
anti-Serbian conspiracics. "How could YOU," says one of Cosii's
protagonists to 3 ranking Conlml~nist,"how could you, man, f()llow
the orders of the Kremlin and of the cos~no~olitan
knaves from the
Co~nintcrn,and proceed to tear down Yugoslavia, your fathcrland,
for \vhich you made war over a number of years and for whicll half
of your [Serbian] people died?Explain to me, what kind of meningitis
seized you. and so many Serb Communists that you are thick with
the darkest enemies of your p e o p l ~ ! " ' ~
The spiritual ccntcr of Scrbian intcllcctual renationalizatior was
the Scrbian Acadcrny of Scicnces and Arts (SANU). In May 19x5, at
SANU's annual mccting, rnernhcrs dccidcd to organize a commission
for rhc writing of n ~ncniorandumthat would express SANU's
thinking on thc current situation in Yugoslavia. A draft vcrsioll of



luo nanoc

The Fearfit1 Asyn~nzettyof War

this memorandum was "blown" in a countercampaign by orthodox

Titoists that c~mtnenccdin September 19116. I t was this alternately
condonned and glorified draft that has subsequently acquired altnost
legendary proportions as Tile Mentorrr~tdtrnlof SANU. Rctrospcctivcly, this curiotls document was a child of self-restraint. Written at
a time whcn political discourse was still i~tarxismrtc,it studiously
minced away the whole of Tito's edifice. A summary passage isworth
'Ilie economic reform of 1965 was in essence a change in the hasio
strategic direction of social development: the project of politicnl
dcniocrntiration was s~~bstitutcd
for a project of economic libcralization. 1 . 1 1 ~iden of sclf.management, whose essence is the disalienation of
politics, wassubstirutcd for the idea of decentralization, which brought
ahout the establishment of regional centcrs of alienated power. The
ethics of solidarity and social iustice were substituted for the spirit of
posscssivc individualism and apology d l group interest. Political voluntarism, which was daring and dynamic in the first p~stwardecades,
\r.hcn i t could count on the mass support of the pcopl'c, now hecame
static and dctcrlnincd in the defense of thcsystcm, c v e l ~whcn it liccamc
evidcnt that the system is inconsistent and inclfectivc.'?

~ m tltat
~ n t oTito
, .'


pnd Serbia. The.
y c ; r r o t i ~ ~ ~ l i s s u p p o sdependence
on Comintern's~anti~Serbianism
~ ~ ~ l i c ~ ~ n c m p t ~ ~ t o ~ r C i I i i e ewide
~ i t strate$c
s " w o r latid
d ~ tactical.
~ ~ r i t y s ~ [ t h c " C d m i n t e r n ] ~ t c n dtoward
e d ' the breaking up of
I t found its ideological justification in the confrontation
bcwccn the 'npprcssing' Serb, nation and the rcniaining 'oppressed'
. . u . .,L!. . . .
.. were
. ,.
subjugation" of
"Scrbilhy .Slovcbin
'and Croatin;
.... ~ . ,
the '~policicaland 'econotni~domi..
*. .i.i.~~~v+...-r..-.+.+rrLu. #..#,*& .4*"the.constitution




, ~:t ~.~ n c:q u:,.,.~ l ~~,.+.,yYa:~:j,...--.
~ : i n : ~ t h e ~ f e d e r ' a j ~I)Ul~--.e. ~ n o-c t.d. e..', ."the
%rbs tn:l<oscivo:.(.
r e ? .;
. . . .."... !
cultural g~no~ide','
. . ,.- ,..
a i d Metohia is the &crest
*defeat tn theltber4tioiiiirug~les~that
Scrbia icd from Oraiac [Karag'.


djordjc uprising against theTurks1 in 1804 to the [Partism] uprising

in 1941"). the drclinc of Scrb presence attd cultural autonomy in
Croatia ("exccpti~igthe [wartinte] period, never have the Serbs df
Croatia been so i~tiperilcd[rtgroioril as today"), thc growtlt of Serb

15 1

autonomous centers ("the political leaders of AP Vojvodittn arc not

working in favor of proximity and integration; they seek still grcatcr
indcpcndcnce and separation from SR Serbia"), the disintegration of
Scrb culture along republic lines ("the usurpation and division of Serb
culturnl licritagc goes very far; it is taught in schools tltat [Montcncgrin poet and rulcr Petar I1 I'ctrovii- Njegoi is not a Scrb writer"), and
Scrbophobia." Serbia was simply not understood in the rich northwest (Slovenia, Croatia) and the poor southeast (Bosnia-Hcrccgovina, Knsovo, Ivlacedonia). I t was a victim of the "anti-Serb
The memorandum hccnme public knowledge four months after
the Tenth Congress of the SKS, and in some respects the expectations
of the documettt and of tlic new leadership of tlie SKS became
intertwined. ~ l i i . S c ~ bParty
i ~ n convened its highest decision-making?'
body in M a y 1986 in a defiant mood.;~Thedecorations hchind the
congressional dais were don~inatednot by the riwal portraits of Tito,
but by an cnortnous stylized fist. l'he new prcsidcnt of the SKS C C ;
was Slohodan MiloSevic (b. 1941), the former chairman of the Bank!
of hlgrade (Bcoyadska hmka), who was not a known ~~uantity
the wider public. With him, the Serbian Communists acquired a:
t ~ i i l i t a t i tleader, who was ittcreasingly in agrecmcnt with the basic'
prcniiscs of the rnemorattdum. MiloScvii: quickly scnscd an opportunity in Serbian fears. H e put the Kosovar Communists on a permanent defensive with charges about their complicity in the alleged
"genocide" of Serhs.23 By Noventber 1986 radical Kosovar Serbs
started a campaign against Kosovo's twice- urged and generally
docile Albanian cotnmunisr leadership. Serb delegations descended
on the Federal Assembly in Belgrade and made emotional pleas for
protection against the allegedly widespread politically motivated
rapes of Serbian women by Albanians ("the Serb has taken a vow to
remain in Kosovo; let them rape, we shall rape, too").24 The
stereotype of fertile Albanian families that will drown the Serbs in a
sea of white skullcaps increasingly received official sanction.2J
MiloJcvit's encouragement of Albanian stercorypcs was in the
function of his imtncdiatc political solution-the revision of the
constitution of I974 hy 3 sharp rctluction in the acttonomy of Kosovo
and Voivodina. Spcaking to t h c Party activists in Kragujevac i n
Dcccnihcr 1986, lic formulated his program:


i v o Uat~nc

Y~rsoslavia:'r11c Fearfit1 Asylnmetry of W a r

Scrbia does not seek to be morc of a republic than other'republics, hut,

it i s certain, she cannot perniit to be less of a republic tha11tlic otI1crs.
The fact that Serbia has two socialist autonomous piovi~~ces
in her
composition cannot be 3 reason for her to be reduced to her inner


because he was awarc that Serbia's control o\.er the
provinces would make her "more of a repqblic than the others" (hcr
representation in the federation would bcniarly tripled hy a slci$ht of
legal mind), hc predicted that:

the changes that Ihave nienrioned will be difficult t r ~ncliicvc. l'hkse

arras and individuals whose interests arc being imperiled (rrgro:u~t2;rr]
will be against [chnngc].l6

Since the Yugoslav constitution could be chnngcd only' by unanihous

agreement o f all six republics and two autonomous provi,nces,
MiloZcviC could only prevail by putsch.
MiloieviC's intentions could be realized only by a i l l political and
national homogenization of Serbs. H e announced his illtentions in
the night brnvcen April 24 and 25, 1987, when he delivered a
passion:tte speech to the Serb reprcscntativcs on thc Field of Kosovo,
sortle hours aher their mcctit~gwas marred in a clash with the
prdominantly Albanian Kosovar police. Miloicvii- took a qtand
-- gainst the police and absolved the Serbs of any ideological dpviations in their attenipts to undo the autonomy of Kosovo. ':;\'cry
briefly," he said, "meetings like this are not the meetings of natiotralists. These meetings are not hostile meetings."i7 But in order to
upset the years of Titoist policy in Kosovo, MiloSevii- needed first to
purge thc SKS of any waverers. This was accomplished it1 Septcn~bcr
1987, at the Eighth Session of the SKS CC, when he purged Dragiia
Pavlovi2 and Ivan Stambolii-, thercprescntatives uf 3 solnewhat morc
moderate wing of Scrbian Communists, from the leadership.
T h e Serbian communist opposition to MiloicviC was awarc of how
Miloievit fined into the gallery of Serbian fears, but also of i t s own
marginalism. Bogdan Bogdanovit, former mayor of Belgrade, architect-builder, and the conscicncc of rlic Serbian Lcft, sctit n lcncr to
h l i l o L r i t in \vliich l i e said tliat Scrbia was tircd of l ~ c1c:rdcrs
a ~ i dIrcr
misdircctcd history:

Scrbia is tired of hrr fear of abstrncrion, of higher ahstrartions. allove

all, she i s tired of her simplified reasoning. of her eoncrctisni-the lnost


in tilc worltl. . . Serbia on the East, Serbia on the margins of

civilization,tired of [lie civilization tliat has never really ~OUCIIL.~
. . SerI,ia is tired of her wrangle with Europe, which S ~ does
understand, of her wrangle with Central Europe, which
belinlcs 2nd disdains, she is tired of hcr inexplicable and co~nicnl
Austropllobia . . . tired of her Eastern option, of her mini-Messiallist
obsession, tired of her all.populnr and all-progressive
I'ronirtlicuso. of hcr ercrnnl orthodoxy, political and every other.. . .


111 a sciisc. Bokdanovit anticipated MiloSevit's next step. the

crcntio~lof ncw mass org:inizations that ~ o u l d
try to destabilize 3s
much (I( Yugoslavia as was possihlc tllrough cxtralcgal violence.
.Tlicsc "meetings of solidariry" were thc spearhead of what
hliloScvi?'s controlled mcdia increasingly called "the antibureaucratic rc\~olution." The "return of the pcople" to politics meant mass
demonsrrations organized by various Serbian nationalist leaders, and
ultimntcly by Milojcvit's police, against the co~istinrtedleadcrships
of KO~OVO,
Vojvodina, and Montenegro, all of which were ousted
under pressure in 1988 and early 1989, only to be replaced by the
offjciak that were devoted to MiloScvii-. But these were areas
vulnernblc to Miloscvit's bullying. The real obstacle lay clsewhcrc, in
the northwest-in Slovenia and Croatia.
'Serbia's relations rvitli the "northwest" wen always tenuous.?
M o r e exactly, during the interwar ptriod,Cr.oatia.was the lender o h
resistance to Scrbinn supremacy, and was treated accordindy~This
rGlc co~itinucdin the postwar period, but with n differcnce.werca~
".tlic intcnvar Croat struggle, led hy the Croat Peasant Parry of S i e p a ~
Radii- (who was mortally wor~ndedon the floor of the Belgrade
parlinnlcnt in 1928) and Vladko Matck (who was jailed and exiled
by the dictatorial rcgirnc of King Alexander in the early 1930s),'waG
morally clear and unblentished, Croat natiotialism becalne stained b~
of UstaJas (1nsurgents);a militant independence orbanlza-i,
tion that graduated into fascism.:.ltaly and Gcrmany nurtured this
organization in tire 1930% alternately promoting or demoting the
Ustagn role to fir the frosty or balmy weather in relations with
Brlgr;lde. After the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in 1941, Mussolini and
Hitlcr installed thc Ustaaas in power in Zagrcb, making them the
nilclnls o f ;lJcpclldc~ltrcgitnc of the newly created lndcpcndcnt Statc
of Cr~~;itin,
an [t;l[c~-Gemmattccrrtdornir~i~tm
predicated on the aboli~~~


Iuo Banac

Yugoslnvin: .l./~eFearfir1 Asyttttltctry of War

'Had the Croats been asked in 1941 whether thcy favored inde.
pcndencc, most of them probably would have rcspondcd affirmativcly.'Berlin and Rome capitalized on this scntin~cntto impose
pseudo-iridependcncc onto a strangely'lopsidcdCroatia, which was
simultaneously reduced in the areas of solid Croat n~ajoritics(DaI.
maria) and enlarged where the Croats constituted a minority (IlosniaHercegovina). Morcover, they also i~nposcd an ideological
dici.itorship of the mit~usculcUstiin organization, whose extint
military units ill Italy did not exceed more than some 500 men .in
April 1941. Had the UstaSas simply minded thc wartime Axis st~;;c.
thcir notoriety probably would not have surpassed tlrar of thk
Vlaamschc Nationaalverbond in Belgium or the ~ationnal-Socinlistischc Bcwcging in the Nethet1ands:But their rccortl was so appalli~~g
(violent persecution of the Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, antifascist Croats)
that i t became an irresistibleargumentfor anybody opposc(l11otonly
to Croat independence, but to Croat individuality itself. Hcnccforth,
Croat self-intcrcst of whatever provenance (includi~lgrcform c o n
munist and liberal) could easily be tarrcd with thc brush of fascis~ll,
by thc help of innuendoes, critninally construcd. I t was a temptation
that no embanlcd Serbian or centralist tende~~cy
failcd to i ~ t i l i z eaftcr
the war. Morcover, the tendency was to exaggerate Usta3:l crin~cs.
So, for example, rhc notorious UstaSa concentratio~lcamp a t Jascnovac, which claimed the lives of some 60,000 to 80,000 inmatcs, not
all of then1 Serbs, was recklessly routed as the "third largcst extcrmination camp in Europe," in which 700,000 "Serbs al(~nc"wcrc
murdered by the Ustaias.'o
crimes was mcant to buttress the thcsis
about the vastncss of thcir support. In fact, only a minority of tllc
Croats sided with the Ustagas. In the abscnce of a Croat noncommunist resistance movcment, Croats massively participatqd in r l ~ c om
Partisans and thcrcby gave ample testimony to thc~r
anti-UstaEism. In the second half of 1944 the Partisan nlovcmcnt o f
Croatia coi~ntedsome 150.000 combatants under arm* 100,070 in
operative units made up of Croats (60.703 or 60.66 pcrccnt). Scrhs
(24,528 or 24.5 1 percent). Slovenes (5,113 or 5.1 1 pcrcc~lt),and.
othcrs.Jl (The participatiot~of Scrbs in Croatian Partisat] units was
llighcr than thcir pcrcclltage ill the population of Croatia-14.5
perccllt in 1948-and can bc cxplaincd by the harsllncss of Usraja
anti-Scrb terror.) Yet all.thr evidence of Croat antif:~scisr~~
did not



seem to rchabilitatc the Croat n:ltional movcmcnt. Outsidc o f

Yugoslavia, Tito, Ivan I<ihar, and the elite of Croat Partis:~nswere
only Yugoslavs. I\ut A~ltcI'avclit a l l t i his Usta9as were Croats. And
if Croat Corntnu~lists,likc Andrija t Icbrang in 1948 or thc reformist
leadership of thc Lcaguc of Con~nlt~nists
of Croatia (SKH) in 1971,
dernonstrntcd a11 cxccss of pcrmittcd Croat natio~~al
allegiance, they
too became UstaSas, both a t l l c l ~ r l c and abroad. In Miloievii-'s
arrangcmcnt, this posthumously happened to Tito. In the words of
Brana Crni-cvit, a Bclgradc satirist and polemicist who i s close to
I t is clcnr rllat ilroz [.l.itol, d r f ~ r l d i rhc
n ~ lndcpcndc~ltState of Croatia,
conccnlcd [he truth about Jarcnovoc :~nd
tlic gcnocidc against the Scrbs.
I t i s even clenrcr that tile Yugoslnvi.~of [Tito's rctrcnt a t ] Urioni was
Uroz's toy-a piece of (:ornmunist tonlfoolery with a new lndcpclldcnt
State of Croatia under tile ideological chocolate. . . . 'l

The sccotid picturc ( s c e ~ l ) f r o mScptembcr 1989 shows t(le

ghoulish catcIi:~'~T\vou s t a ~ a s ,thcir military caps clearly labclcd wlth
the lcrtcr U,are anglitlg on a hank of a river. Their rod i s anached to
a barbed wirc wit11 which thcy play a hooked Serb child with a
characteristic jujko?d on i t s blccding head. One of the child's eyes is
plucked out. Additional children's corpses are floating down the
river. Limbs of othcr children are sticking out of a fish basket. The
Ustaias' idiot faccs arc alight with the excitement of the game. They
arc enjoying thc sport of netting and clubbing their victims. As a result,
communist or othcr attempts that point to the crimes of tllc Serbian
chctpiks, must be sccn as equivoc:ltion. In the wurds of 7 h Metilo~
ratldtrttt of S A N U , "thc symmetry in historical faults, i~nposcdby the
ruling [co~nmurlist]itlcology and pulitics, cannot be acccptcd.""
Eugen Dido Kvatcrnik, a lcadi11~
member of the Ustaia 1nOvemCnt
personally responsible for the scale of anti-Serb violence,
had the occasion to reflect on this subject f;om '.ir .!neasy exile in
Bllenos Aircs during the 1950s. t i e correctly concluded that "antiScrbinnisln was thc csscncc of the UstaSa doctrine, i t s roisi)tt d'ctre
ce~erlrlll crttseo."~' That h c i n ~
so, Serbian nationalist historiogmplly, aligned to hlilo?cvii.'s tnovcmcnr, sct Out to prove that CvcrY
rcsir;r:lncc to UcIKr;lJc, not just anlong thc Croats. neccss;lrily tcllclcd
direction o f Ustaiisln ant\ jic~locide. And, no less ilnportallt.
that Ustaiis111\\.as not ;Ipcriod piccc, typical of the 3gC o f fascism,

Yicgoslavia: The Fearfitl Asytt~tttetryof W a r


faulty intcrpretntions, ten quotes (spanning the period from 1700 to

1902), four incidents (only one of them serious), and ex post facto
jottings of Ivali Rihar, Kresti? concluded that the:
gcnocidc. against rhc Scrbs in Ustaja [Croatia1is a specific phcnomengn
in our [Scrh]centuries-old common life with tllc CroatqThe protracted
of the genocidal idea in certain centers of Cront society,
which, ;IS Dr. Ribar wi~ncsses,did not necessnrily liavc some narrowbur rarllcr a hrond-base, took deep root in rhc consciousness of many

9-continued Croat tendency.dTlic first explicit st;ltcmcllt on this topic

was an essay by the historian Vasiliie Krestii. ill 1986. Basing i t on

Less sophisticntcd writers reduccd thcsc conclusions to a simple

assertion about the "genocidal nature" of the Croats, or, less
to a statclnent that all Croats wcre really UstaCas.
In 1989 the Croats wcre only slowly regaining their grip after the
period of great "Croat silence" that had obtained since December
1971, whcn Tito removed the reformist leadership of the SKH
headed by 5avka Dnbzcvit-Kutarand M i k o Tripalo. Thcse moderate
Communists pursucd a course of reforms very sin?ilar to Dubzek's
reform inovcmcnt in Czcchoslo\*akia.Thc Croat reformers, like all
the East Eurupcnn "revisionists" of the 1960s and early 1970s, fell
because they sought to loosen thc command system in politics and
economy. Tito would not permit this coursc of action. "I tell you
opcnly," he said in Deccmbcr 1971, "Yugoslavia would fall apart
wcrc i t not for the League of Communists-if [the league] rushed
Iicndlong into dcclinc."J7 As 3 rcsult, the removal of Croat reformers
was justified as ;I nxtsurc in tlic strugglc against divisive nationalism,
\r*Iiicli tlic ref(lr1ncrs nllcgcdly used as a base for pressure against the
fcdcral center. But, as so oftcn happens, the scope of the purgc
bcsatnc uncontrollnblc and profoundly offended the Croat national $
especially when i t took the form of'rev~nihismby the$
~ e t , b ~ i n o r iin
t yCroatia:The SKH, which only recently (for the first
time since the war) regained a modicum of respectability as an
ilistitution that was uncmharrasscd by its Croat trappings, once again
hccamc the p;lrty of repression and careerism. Its dubious national
loy;iltics wcrc ~ ~ n ~ l c r s sby
o rt~l di redefinition
of Croat nationalism as
the pri~~cipal
h3stio1iof ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t I n~ l'ito's
r r c words,
~ ~ I "for
~ t iaso ~ ~ . "
Ion1: as we havc nn opponent hcforc us, we must strike at him, we
must hit him. Ifreasonin): rlc)cs~~'t
work, there arc other mcans."~"

Yrrgoslauia: ,177~Fearful Asymnrctry of \Vor

In 1972 Tito's handpicked group of new SKH I C ~ ~ C ~the
S , Husiks
and Bil'aks of Croatia, used the "othcr means" to strike at thousands
of Croat political and cultural figures, lmprison~ncntsand show
tria!s, firings and purges in the univc "$tiesand tllc news nicdia,
massive political and "economic" emig tlon,
and !he exalta Ion of
suborrlcd witncsscs and corrupt police agents a'cconipanicd the
suhmission of Croatia.,ThcIcddi"~ fig";&of pdstco~munistkroatia
lcaders'of thc~new'pariies)wercarnong
~ I i c l ~ p r i s o n eThe
Q Gtholic Church, whosc hierarchy was reviled,
bur not prosecuted, became the only vehicle for cdntrary opinio~~s.
The real effect, at least for the Croats, was the lasting dcleb'
of Yugoslavia. The quiet putsch of 1971-1972, which the \Vestern
reporters played down in the inteiest of maintaining Tito's proWestern onal alignment, made Croatia an extra in the politics of high
Titnism:Croatia's leadership from 1972 to 1989 was fundamentally
illegitimate. I t mattered little whether this cast included corrupt
dogmatists like Stipe Suvar, the penultimate head of the Federal
Party, or the opportunistic operators like Ante Markovit, tllc last
premier of Yugoslavia. Nor could the marginalization of Croatia be
improved by the fact that Serbia, too, became marginalizedin the
purge of its liberal leadership i n 1972, nor by the (con)fcdcralist gains
in the constitution of 1974.
Tllc imposed leadership of the SKH bungled along in rhc late
1970s as the vaumurc (but not the squire's hall) of Fortress Tito.
lnurcd to the method of political disqualification, thc Croatian
Titoists felt that thcy could easily silence the nationalist Serbian
intelligentsia aftcr the death of Tito. And, indeed, Stipe Suvar tried to
put pressure on the Scrbian lcad~rshipwithhis role of "dcviationists"
("The White Book" of 1984), which was always bulkier in its
Belgrade part than i n the sections for his well-patrolled Zagreb. But
thisstratagcm became useless thc moment the SKS joined forces with
the nationalist dissidents and started encouraging thc obloquy of
"Red Ustaias" for the denationalized Croat Titoists, Tllc irony of this
predicament nlusr have escaped the Croatian leadership, which took
some tinie to get i t s bearings. Morcovcr, it was gcnuincly difficult to
adjust to an iconoclast like Miloicvi?, who was hcndi~igor clcstroying
all of Tito's rulcs. As a result, the Croat Titoists ,k>trghramorrg
themselves ahout rhc best way to stop MiloCcvii. (Suvar's "lcf$sts"




versus Mika Spiljakqs"haretoiscs"), but, being a compromised and

thinning establishment, thcy simply had no wl~crewithalto mount
the only successful strategy-a democratic altcrnativr. That rask
would befall Slovenia.
i;Zt;{$$J+j.e@$$ave tended to constitute the blunt angle of the
Yugoslav triangle. Least numcmus-but most industrially prospcroueamong the principal South Slavic nations, their lands were
covctcd by ltalo-Gcrman imperialistic projects, which divided Slovcnia bcnveen thcmsclvcs in wartilne. Their history, too, unlike that of
Croatia, was not burdened by traditions of statcl~oodthatare rooted
in thc gentry, which made them less disgruntled with Serbian
primacy. For as long as lcome and Vienna (or Berlin) represented a
threat, the Slovenes found fewer risks and greater advantages in the
Yugoslav state than in any alternative. Moreover, since no issues of
territory or minority status created problems in their relations with
the serbs, the S ~ O V C I ~ C Ssaw no advantage in backing Croatia. During
the interwar period, as well as rhe period under Tito, their leaders
skirted the Serb-Croat battlefields, always to the advantage of
Belgrade. As a rcsulr, tllcy rverc permined greater iceway in CxPrcssing doubts ahout centralism, as IJdvard Kardeli,.Tito's heir apparent,
reguInrly did f r o n ~1957onward. Kardelj's reformism was predicated
on gradu3)dtccntmlization. As the chief architect of Tito's constitution of 1974, Kardclj probably {lid not anticipate that his handiwork
would prompt the storm of Scrbian resentment. H e was not fated to
confront it. Kardclj died a year before his chief. Part of his illegitimate
inheritancewas a widely held Serb notion that a Croat and 3 Slovene
had sealed Scrbian fate for four decades.
Slovcnian \cadcrship would have been troubled by such charges i n
more volatile timcs. In the 1980s, however, Slovenia was not
threatened by Italy, Austria, and othcr Western countries, which
were no longer ellenlies but models to be emulated. Instend, the only
to Slovenia's drcams of gradual Westernization was to be
found in Yugoslavia. Repression against the Albanians of Kosovo,
the growing involvement of the Yugoslav PCOP~C'S
Army UNA) in the
K~~~~~ cluagrnire, tl1c rctrograJe policies of Slobodan Miloicvict~lcsc
tllc source of worr?. in Slovenia. l l y Collt'"Qf' from the
o f tllc 1 y ~ ~the
s ,Parry lcadcrsllip in Ljubljana put confidence
in what
thCll c311cd Eurocommunis~n,a tcndcncy that clllminntcd intllc :idoption of t l i c slogan "Europe now!" in f Y 8 Y . Indeed,

thcrc wcrc few discernible differences between such tcchnoc?atic

Italian Communists as Giorgio Napolitano and Milan Kubn;thc
leadcr of the Slovcne Communists. T h e similarity was expressed'in a
libcr:rl a t t i ~ d ctoward the growing "altcrnativc movement"-the
democratic opposition that increasingly combined Slovcne natiotlal
demands with harsh criticism of the JNNScrbian policies in Kosovo.
' ~ ~ ~ S l ~ ~ e n . e ~ ~ r c v i v a 1 ~ ~ ' I A ? w h s ~handihork
~ ~ ~ e n t i a lofI ~ elite
~iitcllp,alg..athcredabove all around the journal Nova revijcr (New
&,yj%);~~n.dof v n r i o ~ u c k r a k e r r a n dsocial rebels, who were best
~ ~ p ~ ~ q n ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ t h c ; i ~ n o ~ t i c : w c e (Youth):
k l y - ~ lTllis
a d i rpin
cnlly (.cntral European dissident milieu, unhampered and to some
extent even encouraged by the liberal Slovcnian leadership, became
the envy of the Croat opposition and the refuge of Croat, Bosnian
Muslim, Albanian, and even Serbian dissidents. Slovene dissident
journals published the first legal statements by the 1971 generation of
silenced Croat intellec~uals.MIadina was the.first Yugoslav journal
that went after the JNA to expose the corruption of leading gcncr$s,
including that of Admiral Branko Mamula, the federal secretaryof
defense rMamula go home!")>9 and arms trafficking with the
repressive regimes likc that of Mengistu Hail6 Mariam in Ethiopia.
Slovene intellectuals likc Taras Kermauner wcrc the first to challeige
the chauvinism not only of Serbian leadership, but of the broad
consensus of intellectual opinion. I n his "Letters to a Serbian friend,"
Kcrmauncr recommended that his counterparts:
abaridon [their] centralism, demands for a united rail system, for a
comrnon educational program, for the Kosovirarion of Yug"slavia, for
a unirary Yugoslav official language, for homogeneous society! For
everything that rhc other nations reject! Should you travel wirh 11s to
C~thcrn,which is to say Civil.Society, you willbe able to live as you I
wish! Nobody will expect you to submit to other$, nor will ybu need to
crack the whip over the unsuhmissive.~o
As "the Slovcne syndrome" became the chief alternative r'o
Milojevif and theJNA, notably as a result of a military trial against
Mladirra's writer Jancz Janja in June 1988 on the trumped-up charges
of div~tlgingmilitary secrets, Slovcne criticistns hccanle evert more
poitrtcd. 'nit Slovcnian Pany press irrcludcd den,;rnds or1 Srrhi;~to:
give full autonomy to Vojvodinn and Kosovo and the proble~nof SR
Scrhia will be rcmovcd. Or otherwise: reconcile yourselves for o~lce,

with tllc


lllcparticipationof Serbia in the creation of a second

lcomnlullistlYugoslavia was less essential than ill the creation of the

first [irltcnvar] Yugoslavia!Give up, while there is still tilnc, the myth
that scr1,ia will play the main role ill the Balkans and lYu6oslavial."

Slovenia was taking a stand that traditionally bclongcd to Cr0atia.A~

in the eyes of Milofvit's controllcd media, the Slovenes
became political Croats.
In his "Eleventh Letter to a Serhian frierld," Kerniauner declared
tliat, thoudl Catholic, he would rcrriain ;rri i~icorrigihle"Calvinist."
and that ;In analysis of Slovcne Catholicism would show the infusion
of Pro[csta~lttllcrnes that diffcrc~ttiatcdSlovenes llot ollly from
"Orthodox, Muslim, and Stalinist Yugoslavia, but also from the rest
of C~thulicY~gos\avia,"41The disclaimer, though largely fallacious,
was important. T ~ Ccommunality of Slovcncs andCroats~was3~~uilp,
.on their common Catholic tradition, the l i n k ~ t l ~ a t ' w o ~ l d n o t ~ b e ~ ~ ~ s ~ ! $
on the Serbian polemicists:W+t'i'tiii,ri~in~I~,
1987 i n d 1 9 C w a S
of a,.. . .,. .. campaign against thcCatholic 'Church, a n d
. ,. , , agaitlst the Vatican, which was hcing presented as histora'8.
niotiv3tcd by a "blind hatred toward Slavdom and 0nho.r
that the ail11 of the Vatican in the 1930s Was
to "Catholicize the Serbs with the :aid of the Concbrdat," which failed
to take
over the obiections of the Serbian Orthodox Church;
that having failed, the "Vatican lost intercst in good relations with
Yugoslavia 2nd worked with all powers at its disposal, that is,
clericalist politics, indoctrinated priests, and the Ustajjs--the
' >34.l


ing-rarll of Croat cliauvinism-to destroy Yugoslavia

'r11c allti-catholic authors did riot overlook Slovene Catholicism.
lndcCd, it was claimed that Slovcne Catholic prelates, like Bishop
Anton Jegli? of Ljubljana, had taken the lead in loyalist ProHabsburg attacks on Serbia in 1914 and that the Slovene Catholic
press had iflvcnted the slogan "Hang the Serbs from the willow
trecs!"44 B U it
~ was tile Croat CathoIics who were cast in the lead role
of tllc Vati~at1.sdoriiestic accomplices. The third picture[J, from Janu:lry 1990, shows at1 inquisitorial Catholic prelate with
an l l s r a i a IJ \lnder h i s
cross. There is a dccorativc CYC on his
hc is playing with a wreath of threaded
Ilulilatl cycs. His sitlister smile watches over Serbian children that arc
held captive hchinJ barbed wire, most of their CYcs plucked out.4s

Ytrgoslovin: T/I~Fearfir1 Asytntrretry of War


the Catholic Church in Croatia was the institutional home of+

unworthy and evcn criminal clerics and laymen in thc course of
Axis-dependent Ustaia dictatorship. But so was the Scrbian Ortho9
dox Church, whosc clergy produccd their share of Chcmik conl- r
mandcrs:~Thc point, horvcvcr, was not whether eithcr ccclcsiastic~l
organization failcd to hold the hand of political gangsters in thcir
respectivc backyards. The Catholic Church was simply to bc secn SI;
an anti-Scrbian and anti-Yugoslav institution. In the words of
Milorad EkmcSit, a lcading Scrb historian, in the ninetccnth and
twentieth ccnturics, the "Yugoslavs were as unitcd as the Catholic
Church succccdcd in tnaintaining Croat and Slovene scparatisnl."
Therefore, the full inrcgration of the South Slavs always dcpcnded on
the "downfall of religious sentiment," but mainly among the Catholics." The fear of Catholicism i s often presented less clcgantly.
Extremist Serbian painter Milit Starikovit (MiliC of MaCva), recently
put it this way: "The papal penetration of the East i s relying on an
artificially created Croat nation . . and soon [will be rclying] on the
Nazi-Croat state of extreme proselytistic intentions."'"
The various systcnls of collusion not only extcnd to covert ties
benvecn the Vatican and Moscow (in 1934, "at thc rccommcndatit~n
of the Vatican, Josip Broz rrito] revived the broken channcl bctwccn
the Comintcrtl and Ustaia terrorists in the ~migration"'~),but
embrace other conspirators, including thc Masons and nlodcrnism
(in the system of columnist Drag05 Kalajit and the Scrb Party of Saint
'Sava),J') Macedonians and Muslims. The fourth picture from the
Serbian Grand Guignol (see Ft'ip~trc4) is titled "A House Built on
Coopcration."J' I t sllows the cotlrention between a Catht~licbisl~op
and a Muslim i ~ n a nover
~ a Scrll child. "Catholicize!" shouts the
rnitercd prelate. "Yok," the fczzcd Muslim with an unplensant razor
shouts in Turkish negation, "Circumcise!" The dispute is rcsolved in
the lower frame. 'She bishop and the imam, in n virtual parahlc of
how nationalist Serbs view the fate of Bosnia-Hercegovin:~,smilc at
one another as the former plucks the child's eycs out and the latter
. .
holds t l ~ echild by thc foreskin.
T h e Croat rcnctions to thc nlanufacturc of Scrhian fears wcrc slow
and typicnlly incrcilulous. In tlic absence of ally strong ccntral
authtlrity, wit11cotncrvativc Titoists still ntore or lcss in cllnrgc in the
lntr IYXOs, rlic Croat politicnl scene ~lccdcdncw strategies of
sclf-dcfcnsc atld ncw forces to intplcrncnt thetll. MiloicviCs r u l i ~ ~ g

prelate cotlld llavc hecn Archbishop Alojzijc Stcpinac( 1 898-

1960). the m~tn11x1linllof Croatia, who rvns rllc favnrirc

Serbian polctntc~stsilcsllitc his frcqucnt protests ag,linst


'Shc t:trgct, howcvcr, rr-1s not tIlar spccilic,
hc sure


The Fearfit1 Asynlntetry of War

I K S * rcllanled
StrU"ure of 3

tile socinlist h r t y ~,fScrl,ia ((lqin1y y t ~

Leninist c d r c

Imrty, hut su~~~iturll

idc(llob, of


Titoist communism with a hybrid of anti-Westernism, Serbian ttationalis~n,and bellicosity. Miloicvit's hold over the Serbian 1':lrtystate with all r ~ i tf s attendant instruments of persuasion and control
Icgitim:ttcd artd popl~larizedthe Scrbian culmrc of fear. An equivalent dcvclopnic~it\rqas irrrpossiblc withirt the Croatian contmr~~iist
organizatio~t..flit Croat variant of Central European "rcfolution"
(as T. Garton Ash put it) meant t l i e decriminalization of dissent, hut
not a liccltsc for hoary suprcrnacist ambitions. By the spring of 1989
the lirsr Croat " a l t c r ~ l a t i v e groups" got t l ~ c i rstart, among thcnl the
Cro:~rSucinl-1.ibcr:iI Alliance (Iatcr Party, HSLS), the Association for
Yugoslav Dcrnocratic l~iitiativc(UJDI), thc Croat Democratic Union
(HDZ), and numerous othcrs. These groups, most of which were
registcrcd as lcgal parties by the end of the year, reprcscntcd the
wliolc political spectrum from post-Marxist Yugoslavism and social
dcrriocracy to the Croat irltcgral right. With the cxception of the Scrb
minority organizations, all of tlient (including the rcvivcd C o ~ i i ~ l l u nists, newly renamcd the Parry of Democratic Change) were set on a
dcfcnsc coursc agni~lstMilokvit's Serbia.
111January IYYO, t h e League of Communists of Yugoslavia hcld i t s
forrrtecntl, (:idlast) corlgrcss and proceeded to fall apart in the
struggle l~ctwccnM~loicvii-and his opponents, notably the dclcgatio~isof Slovcninn nnd Cro~tialtCom~nunists.With the collapse of
the Titoist parry thc wholc Yugoslav project, which was held and
mnintni~lcdby communist methods of governance since the war,
itsclf ground to a halt. As a result, the dcrnocraticoption could not be
a s[;ttcwidc solutio~~.
Multipnrty politics and the absence of coercion
and idcologic~ilcontrol succccdcd in a pieccrncal fashion in those
republics where tltc Comrlil~nistsbecame agreeable to changes, first
in Slove~iia,illen Croatia, and finally in Macedonia and BosniaHercegovina. I t could not succeed in the nonexisting center, whose
only viable pxrt w:~sthe terrified and disoriented JNA, the Partyarmy without the I'arty and increasingly without a country. N o r
could i t succccd irt Scrhia and Montcncgro, where tlie renationalized
1'3rn-state r c ~ ~ ~ t i s t i ~itself
r ~ t eunder
a ncw label, but with far harsher
conscquenccs for tltc minorities, notably Albanians. The anxictics o f
tile Scrbia~i-hloutc~legri~i
axis and tltc JNA wcrc fuclcd h!, the
~changcsd ill rhc "nortliwcst."
TI1c first frrc nlirl ~tiultip;irtyclectiorls in posnvnr Yup)slnvia wcrc
hcld ill Slovctiin a ~ i dCroatia in April and May 1990. Serbian puhlic


I v o Uanac

opinion grectcd them with fear. Thc caricarurc, of the croarian

~ I ~ c t i o n s fi urC 5 S ~ O W Sfour Urtdar in black unifclrmsriding
their h u m d 6 u r d c n in an aquatic racc that is chccrcdby

T l ~ cF c a r h l Asynrttterry of W'rr


knifc-wiclding Ustaias on both sidcs of the pond." :It is ralllyl

remarkable to what cxrcnt the last ties of trust bctwecn thcScrbs
..... ..,. . ,.b11$,,
- Croats.,&eliedb,y
a rriontli' ticfoie the massacre
,..., : > - .:!
, . . .-,...,....,.. ..*. ........ ~.
of i
abienCroanan polrcernen
hy .the
rrrcgulars in Borovo$
. _ . A ' . . . .". .... , .
-, .. "
. .Scrbian
i s the bcginriing of$
.< ,
the Croatian war.::lt should bc remembered, howevcr, that the
Scrbian nationalist c;lmp did not regard the victory of thc nationalist
pnrtics in Slovenia (DEMOS) and Croatia (HDZ) as a clualitativcly
new develop~ncnt.'They viewed the Croat Communists as ollly
somewhat lcss "Ustnioid" than I'ranjo Tudjrnan, whosc predictable
historicism was cxl~cndcdin a scrics of futile ncgoti;~tionswith
Milo3evi6, whose i~ctworki n thc JNA and the Scrb co~~lmunitics
Croatia and Uusnia-Hcrccgovir~ahad already laid the
for war.
In January 1991, the JNA tried to prcvcnt the sclf-arming of
Croatia and tlrcrcby provokcd a state crisis. The consequences wcrc
mcagcr for Croati~,but in the process the JNA emancipated itself
frorn any fcdcral control. Thc disappearing govcrnmcnt of prime
minister Antc Markovii- should be mentioned in this context alone.
.I~licrc followcd more futilc negotiations among the ic:~dcrsof the
republics (nut all of whotn wcrc cqu:lI in powcr, even in relative
tcrnls) and hopclcss internationally sponsored atrernl)ts at jump
starring the vchiclc of the wrecked fcdcral presidency, whosc four
Serbian-Montcncgrin mcmbcrs blockcd the four reprcscntativcs of
the othcr republics in rnaintainil~gthe system of rotating chairmanship and evcry othcr aspcct of rcgular proccdurc. In J~ltleSlovenia
and Croatia proclai~ncdthuir inilcpcndcncc and incurrcd further JNA
intervention that WIS ~pot~sorcil
and finnnccd by Scrbi:l.:By Septcrn3
ber Slovenia's indcpcndcncc was no longer in doubt; the ,conflict$
having turned into a bloody war of conquest ("lil>cration," 'in#
Belgrade parlancc) of all Cro;ltian nrcas with- a significant'Scrb$
The sloppy and hrutish rnanncr of the JNA should be notcd.Tito's
army was purgcd of or dcscrted hy most of its non-Serb sontmandcrs
ill Jtlnc 199 1. In t h c war that followcil, thc JNA was dc-Tiroizcd :lnd
'Ihis quict proccss was rcally a v n t revolution.
cspccially i f the role of 1':trtis;tri Croati;~is kcpt in m i i d in the cnrly
llistory thc JNA. 'lllc ;irlrly's ideological nttrihutcs 1111longer hcing
clear, i t cntcrcd itrro c o ~ ~ s c n s ~rcl;ltions
with various irrcgttlar

Y ~ q p s L ~ v i'rhc
a : 1:carfrd Asytnt~rctryof War
Serbian units that were connected with the MiloieviC-sponsoredSerb
"autonomous regions" of Croatia and ~osnia-~crce~ovin<as
as with other extremist private armies of Serbian provenance [nota.
changes in the
bly the renewed Chemik units of Vojislav L ~ e l j )The
JNA's officcr cadre, as well as tlie presence of the "irrcgulais" and
undisciplined reservists in the JNA's war machinc, cxplain the
brutality of attacks in Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, Pctrinja, Katlnvac,
Zadar, and Dubrovnik. After a balance sheet of some 10,000 dead
and 500,000 refugees, after the shooting of the llclicoptcr with the
ECobservers in January 1992, the degencratc JNA i s astonished otlly
about the absence of fear among its opponents. A Llvlgradc reservist
who rcwrned from the Vukovar front noted thnt i t i s generally
assumed that Croats are cowards: "But, that i s not 'true. Thej: fight
b i t thcir bravery
like lions. Never mind whether thry are,right
cannot be denied.""
' 1
have been no p,d~Mar
istateSThat state was held together by the'skillful use.bf fear: tbp fear:
a return, to the wsrtimc


.. F%$



were not
imadnary Tito's illegitimate r e ~ o l u ~
QC*J hUr*
hecause i t
Milo~cviPsideologically transformed revolutionary
Serbia, have generated new fcars:



Cc gouvernemcnt rCvolutionnairc cst Is regime de l a pcur par excel. Icacc, son des~ininfernalest que plus il cherche 1sc mcttre i I'abri, plus
il a pcur dcs dangers, vrais et imaginnircs, qui ie rnenacent."


of Tit~ism~revanchismaf.the
. .. ..... er isnkcoalition"~hi.EaCdbyCroatia;'idWestern'Europc headed
$y7ieim~dfj"Europc must know," MiliC of M a i v a wrote from the
ruins o f Vukovar i n Decemhcr 1991 that:
Vukovar was liberated from the Croat Nazis. They wcre helped by
Gntral Europcan scum. They crawled from tilidcr the papal tiara, as a
dart of a scrprnt's tongue tlinr protruded front tlie bluatcd Kraut and
Eurocomtnunalovcrstretchcdanus. The figures of Genschcr, Kohl, van
dcn Brork, dc Miclirlis. Muck. and Waldhcinl will hclpCIII fillis11 my
new painting "711~htncking of Christ," in thc ltlanncr ofi Ilnscb. 'Ihc
title will he at~gnir~itcd
ittto "'The Mocking of Serhisn Christ."'"


James Baker's State Dcparrmcnt strengthcncd Miloicvie's fcars

through its dogcd support for the integrity of Yugoslavia on what
amounted to a .I.iroist modcl, its cncouragcmcnt of an integralc
military forcc, and its maladroit criticisms of ~crmany,~m:C.?h?%
its own fcars, one of t l ~ etriorc notahlc being thc>fgl.(~fnation,?lismf
It is almost as i f i t were not understood in Washington that the East
European struggle for national identity cannot bc separated from any
movement for dctnocrncy and human rights. All the samc, the
th;lt lack a nuanced understanding of nationalism
should not c~nbnrrassthemselves as I'rcsident Bush certainly did in
his Kiev sprcch uf 1 August 1991 by confusing indepcndencr: with
"local despotism." A proper i~nderstandingof natio~lalism,by the
Left no less tlrnn hy Wcstcrn governments, presupposes political
analysis. Nationalisms can be ns far apart as thc socialism of Franpis
Mincrand i s from the socialism of Pol Pot. Moreovcr, in Eastern@
Europe, and not here alone, frecdom is thc same as indcpcndcnceiB
Any premature attempt to influence events in the direction o f
intcrdcpc~tdcncc\\,illnot work until the socictics of Eastcrn Europe
arc sccurc in thcir inationhood. The most far-reachingc~~nsequctice
the dclnisc of Y u g o ~ \ a vmight
be Wcstcrn splits ovcr these issues.
that the fragmentation of'cx-communist
I t is entirely
multinntio~islstatrs (Czechoslovakia, the USSR,Yugoslavia) is only
the heginliing of the breakdown of large systems. The growth oh
centralized i~idusrrinlsocictics, cer>ainlyin Eastern Europe, might j q t
have cXcecdedthe liuman potential for adjustmcnb Snialler, though
not nccii&rily autarkic, states, organized as units.ofproducrio.n,
midit yet become scarcity's answer to the gluttonous capitaligt
market. Their size will be limitcd by their aspirations to legitimacy.
Serbian socicry, too, will find its way to legitimacy through the
knowlcdgc of the cause that brouglit it torment.
Ivan Diurit, 3 noted Serbian historian, one of the lositigcandidatcs
in [Ilcprcsidcntialclcctions that wcrc won by MiloScvii. in Dccctnber
1990, and, of late, an exile in France, recently noted that after the
breacll of thc Saloliika frorit itr 1918 Scrbia's pcasantaoldicrs:

1,) kiss,Ilr Crotlld

tior nt Kaimnki-alan [tlie post- 1913 (rolltier
serhin\.nor at Velcs (crntml Macedol~ial,!lor at Skorlic

~ hut at tI,e~poi111o l ~
thc currcllt~
frontier hct\recn
serhiaallJ hlnccJ,~ilia.r\ltIi,~i!~:li
Srritis entcrcd the First \Vorld War

ahcr Macedollin bccnlnc a part of its tcr~,tory, the pcasafits fult tllc
limits of Serbia. Likewise, when tlie Panisiris retrcarcd frolrl scrl,ia in
1941 across the Uvac river [into thc Sandiacj, these ,inter~lnriol,alist
fighters ohen took a l u m p o f Serbian soil and p u t i t in,thcir kcrc~,iCfs.
People feel very deeply what is thcirs and what is rlot tlicirs.'~*

a k c y w3rtil~lc rhcorrrical Jocumcnr, Tiro drrcribcd prcwar Yugo<lavia irr ihc

k,llr,u.ing w.y: ''Born i n Corlu, Londorl, and I'nris, rhc Yugoslavia 01 Versmlles
hccnntr thc n\c,!i typical country of nativnal oppression in Eur~pc.Cro.lrs.
Slovcncs, and hlontrnrgrins wcrc subordinarc pmplcs-uncqual subject o f
Yup,osl:~via. hlnicdoni~r~s,
Alhanianr, and others wcrc enslaved and cxposcd l o
cxtcrm~nation, hlurlin>, Gernlrn, and Hungxian rninvritics servcd as mm.al
changc or a n ih~rrrutncntin the r t r u d c against rhc Croats and otlicr pcoplcs o f
Yugoslavia." Iorip Ilroz Tiio, "Nacionalno piranjc u Jugoslaviji u svictl~~sti
n a r o d n ~ ~ o s l ~ ~ b ~ brrrhc;'
~ d t I ~ i kSobrma
cficld (Uclgradc: Komunisi. 19821, vol.
13, (1982): 96.


Thercforc, h e a l i n g hcnvcen Serbia a n d h c r neighbors, a h o v c all, w i l l

m c a n t h e ncccprnncc of Scrbia's real borders. And t h e fcar o f r c n l

crocodiles, n o t of thc

w i t c h doctor's m a s k

of fcar.

IDu5an U i l ~ n d t i i1lirror;jv
Socij~lirriikcFrclcrorirvrc RcpsblirtejugnrLvije: Gl~rt.rti
procrri, 1918-IY.P.5. 3rd cd. (Zagrcb: Skulskn knjiga, 1985). 264.

Izlhid., 295.
l l A t thc Eighth Cnngrcss ofthc SKJ (Deccmbcr 1964). Kardcli noted rlrlr rhcUpoinr
of dcp~rturclor ccc~nomicrelations among thc narionalitics i s ccnainly rhc
cconomic indrpmdcnce that will guaranrcc cach pcople work indcpcndcncc and
frcc disposal with thc fruits of tabor, that is, thc building of thc rnnrcrial barc for
thc dcuclopmrnt of its awn colturc and civilization." For his pan, i t was at t h ~ s
Parry congress that Tito cxplicirly condcrnned unitarism. Hc dcnounccd those
individuals who "confound the unity of pcuplcs wirh the liquidnt~nnof natir~ns
m d thc creation of sontcthing new, artificial; that is, a unitary Yugoslav nation.
which lookr n hii likr auimilnlion and horcaucraricccn~ralizaiion,Itkc unitarism
and heeerr~oni\rn."
O r n kotrgrcs
SKI (Uelgmdc: Kulturn. 1964). 97, 32.


IdFrorn tllc disc~~ssion

of Jovan \Jesclinov citcd in G l u r r i plat!',,:

ko,n;rru Sat,car ko,,,,,nisra
Jtrgr,slovijc (Drlgradc: Kornttnisr, 1966). 42. Those
wcrc not thc "slognns" of lunc "hosrilc elcmmts," but of the csmblishmcni.
According to Rnjka Diakovii-, the chicf of rhc Srrbian srcuriiy apparrNs efler rhc
lall o f Rankovit, the c a ~ n p a i gaginst Rankovit and thc sccuriry srrvicc. nptahly
in Kosovo, "openeJ tnisrn~srprcciscly of thc Serbs and Scrb cadrrs." C ~ t c drn
Zdmsko Vukovii-. Od dc/omrrcijo SDD do tnrlspoka i librrr~lizma: n l o j i
rrrnogrofiki zlrpisi IYh6-IY72. Eo,/;tre (Bclgr.adc: Naralna k n j i p . 1989). 7.7.

'Roben D. Kaplnn. "Croarianism." T1,r Nrw Rc(,rrblic (2s ~~~~~~b~~1 9 ~ 1 )18.

J"Russia and Ccrm.rny," London Times. 23 Dccembrr 1991.
'Frrrcro. 44.
'On the hism~yo f South Slavic rclarions. with spccinl rcfcrrncc to narional
idcolrlcicssscc l v n Banac. T l ~ eNarional Qacrriott Lr Ytrgoslovia: o,,gi,,,
Politics IIlhaca. N.Y.: Comcll Univcrsiw Prerr. IY841.

lsDohrica &s\t, S~vensoi inogvir: Oawri i o g t d i (Riickn: 0tok.r Kcriorani.

1982). 59. G>sie's parry carcrr cndcJ u.i~It
this spccch; his carccr i n dissiduncc

'Fcrrcro. 42.

. ..


"R~riiirwrcrroabrc ( l t c l p ~ l I
~ May
] ~ 1989. 2.
1 ihc ri,,hrr llc,l,~cr ,he
I)adaba h;ls hcrn ~~~isucccssful
i n its c h n s to illcare
matcri;llin Fifiurrs 1-5 hrftlre thr drtc of pr~hlicarinn.I'crsnris harirlp il~klrlll.l~i,lll
p c n a i n i n ~lo thr\r rights arc rcqucstcd to contact tlie l>Lmd,rbrsrclitllrirl ,,f,i((.


"Coiko Diopo.
- . \'wrote vrrttrrna (London: Naja rct. 1982). 65.

lhc 1980s bfckground t o the currcnr South Slavic conflicts, scc /vo nanac,
'P?st-(hmunlsm as Post-Yugoslavistn: T ~ ~ugoslav
i n lvo Banac. cd., 6 s u n r Europe i r i Rc~*oh,ri~,t(Irh;ica, N.Y.:
Cotticll Univcrsiry Press. 1992),168-87.

lXVladinlir Dcdilcr, Nor*ipriloziw b;ografiir,]or~pu Brow Tita (Ri~rka:Libunliia.

198 1). Tiw.5 rrl.,~i,,,,s wirh ihc Sovicts;his lovc affairs. rhe Panis:ln uscofl:rror
and n~g~vtiatinns
witlr thcGcrrnans i n 194.1 nrc~nllllla~hc"llll'cls
that 1)rdiicr irpcrird in l l t i s collrrti1111.



luo ilaitac

scrhs: "This fcar, which had a defcnsivc ch3r.lcter. 62C rise

lrd to gen',cidc apninst the Scrbs i n Croatia." IlliJ.,4.
~ ~ ~ Work
~ ~jr i rcplc~c
r ' .with
~ methodoh~~icrl
errors, nn~tably111 the arc3 o f
..Rm,,cida~ i<lcasnvia thc tlungari:ln m l d c l o f a
~f rl,rcrontS
,,cople,",,.),ich, nota brnc, i s nr, lnorc pcculi.rly Hungarian than
~ tu absorb
~ the
to French nationhood,
why isitt),al l-lullsrrlalls,
too, did itor dcvclg!p cquivalcnr " j i c n o ~ i ~ l ideas"?
a gcncric
s,,bst;tulc for na~ionalin~bnlanccsa ~ l dtc~lsionsof evcV

(y ~~~~~b~~

"Wc high Alh.rfiinl1 fcniliry i s frcqucntly cxplaincd as a conscious progra,,,. ln

crf 3 mcnjhcr of a Bclgradc rcscarch institute, his i s
case of
a l l c ~ dM l n l i m traditilln. but o f a dccply conceived infernal
to f<,rcc
Serbs 10 emigrate h l n l their agc-old hcnnhr by ~ 1 mcnns
.vailJhlc.- ~il."
Voln'Jrii.. "Clavni pn>hlemi srpskog narnda," O~odil,,,,~ ( N O V ~ przov.) ( 8
Augurt 1991): 9.
' Y l o b a l ~ nMiloievii. C;odine rasplrra (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989), 121.
l'lbid.. 140.

'*wdmBogdanoviE, Mnvouzicr:
Gsarcc, 1988). 47.

" ~ c i a s e n o v a cfigures arc tnkcn from a reconstruction by M ~ T ~prrien,

himself a
f"rt'1er inman illJnsnn~vnc,w h r ~clain~sthan tllc total numhcr ,finmales
it)the usraja camps mnjicd front 80,000 to IZO,OOO. see t l j k o K~,,BI,,
"R3s~litaniei.scnovatkog rnira." Danas (Zagreb) (7 N O V C 1989):
~ ~ ~ 23.
~ dn
'he qucstiolt o f the Sccond World War !osscs on thc r c r r i ~ of
o ~yugorlnvia
actllal cange
Ustaia complicity, sce Ljubo Boban, 'yascnovac
Malti~'Jlation o f History." Eda European Poliriu ntrd Sohrie, 4 (3)(1990):
580-92. According to rcccnr statistical analyses, yugoslavia lost 1,014,000
pcople (or 5.9 pcrccnt o f its p~~pulation)
i n rhc war. scrbs lost487,000 (6.9
pcrccnt), Croars 207.000 (5.4 pcrccnt). Bosnian Muslims 86,000 (6.8 pcrcenl),
and Jews 60.000 (77.9 pcrccnr) of their conationali. Bogoljtrb ~~i.~,,ii., &tt,e
Drr'~ofis l r f ~ k rma
r ~ ~u j~igosb~,i;i(London: Naic dclo, 1983). 124-26.

Jugosl~t,ijc, 1988, VOI. 3,371.

"8rana G n h v i t . "Odaklc potcti."

nroZl-iro,~ ~ ~ # ~ , ; $ nT,rd
, ~ (Zngcb:
NIP "Vicsnik." 19711. 27.

''lbid., 32.
p ~ ~ d , '.~h.lnm,,l.,
~ , ~ ~ go
, I,,,c!.'

Dug. (Belgradc)(21 junc


" K n j i f ~ e novine (Bclgradc), IScptcmbcr 1989, 2.

J'"Mcm~mndum SANU," D u ~ (Bclgndc)
uunc 1989): 46.11 isto the credit o f ~ r .
Mihailclviethal hc notes thccrimcsof thcChcmik.; i n somc of his caricatures, c.g.,
K n i i i r u ~ l ettot,inr l&lgradc)(lS Scptcmbcr 1990): 2.
"CilcJ i n Jcrc J~rch. Polo stoljri,t hn~atskepol;fikc (flucnor i\irrs:
Iiwatskc reviic, 1960). n. I14, yo.
"'Vasiliir Krcrtii., "O g l ~ c r jicttwida
naJ Srhinta u NDH," ~,~,,i~~,,~
Srplrrtlllrr 19Hh): 5. It is significant that Krcstii. ~ttribatcstl,ctlrifiill
I'( at lrfisl sonlr "grt~ctiidal ideas" 10 thc Cmat -frar (,f ahx,rpri,,n- b y rl,c

I - -

,4ll,~J;r!,, (Ljul~lixnat(12 Fchruav 1988): 1.

K ~ ~ , , ~IS;J,~
~ ~
, ~ ~ prijureli~,
~ .
(Khgcnfurt: Z a l o i b ~Urava, 19B9),



. ~ nst~temr,,,r
, ~ ~b y~vIllko

RUS, ori*nally pablishcd in the Liubli.\na daily Dele

( ~ . b ~ were
~ ) , Filed in ~il",.d
vukrlii, "l'roroci mri~>ic," KrViiemle novine
(Brlgrade) ( I Scprcrnber 19881. 1.

Menrabrc u m k e rroljinirnto (zagrrb: A~~~~~

"No SJtisfacto~srudy o f thc Urtaias cxism in nny Irnguagr. h , r the early

Ihc movclncnr, sm l a m a J. Sadkovich. lulin,, O,pporr fur cronlia,,~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ w , , , ,
1927-1937 1Ncw York: Carlaad, 1987).



lJAzcm vllali. an Albanian and thc hcad o f the KOSOVO

partr co,,,minre,
with a counlcwhnrgc that Scrbs whrr cmigrarc frnnr Kosovo, c~pccia~ly
Nals and norablcs, arc cowards. "Tko r u kukavicc;
(hgrcb), (4
November 1966): 6.
Spasoievit "Ostatak naroda ustaic," NIN (Bclgr.ldc),
1986): 13.

of W ~ l r

'1Kcr1nauncr. 147.
4,Dmpuljub R, ~,vojinovii
and DC,.,, V. Lutii, rds., Vnnhtnruo tr inre Hrirlovo:
(Ilcl~rndc: Nuva kniign, 1988). 70, S1 1.
< i t C jnmonE cquivalcnt anti-Catholic public.rions
pcarcdtI. tl,csame tin,c:H~~~~ ~ t(psrtd.l.
~ Ubicr
~ 81 ~b o i j r fJ1te (Bcljir~dc:
vilnji;, 1987); vladirnlr D ~ J ~v,~~l r i~h r,ni Jnseta~uac: Dok:on~lrli(Bcl~ ~ I987);
d , ~il.,, ~ ~ l ~ iUrrajkt
i r : . zloeini grrtucida i r l l d i o j f A'ldr'i;
~ ~ ~ , ~I9x6.
k ~ godine.
~ i ~ , VUIS.
(~clgradc:Kad, 1988). C ~ P .vol. 2, Par' 5.


-tjv~jinovii-, 74-73.

ttouir,~(Bclgmdc) ( I S JJIIUJV

19901. 2.

in tvcn.hln~cd

account of Snpinac's cpi~copatc,cspccially the Ustaia period,

src ~
lTI,? lfi;plc ~hlyrh: A l.i/r of Archhisbop Aloizilc SrrP~flac
(Bnuldrr, Orlo.: East Europcati h11111ogr3pll~.1987).

ah,ilorad ~k,,,~(-it. " ~ ~ dJugoslaviic."

~ i ~ NIN
~ (Belgrade)
~ ~ t (16 November 1990):
56. 59.
, " ~d i, l, i ~~~h~
hqilii ~ ~ . ~ k ~"Hrvatsko
~ i t ) , l u d i l o i Pandorina kuliia,"
Poglcdi (Kragt~jcsac)(17 January 1992): 25.
4Ypctsr~ i l ~ ~ ~ ~ -0i.isriti
i i . ~Fuhu
~ ~iz torinc!"
~ ~ k Srbijn
i , (Bclgradc) (9 August
1990): 29.
r ~ > ~~ j ~~ , ~d i i ~ "~~i ~,i k. ~o %uk laa b r a n o m krugu (od krcdc)." Bc'i orno (klg r d c ) (.1)(1YY I ) : 8-9.

(l\r~lgrade)(lS ~ ~ p t c t ~1990):
~ I ~ c r 2.

llh',~,i>~~ret101.1,11~ (Ilclgradc) ( I April lVYO):2.

~ l~llli~,


I>t,x,r~ (Ilclprndc)(7
19y1): 25.