Pp. vs.

SanchezFacts:
While Gladys, 9 -year old girl, was left alone in their apartment, the accused entered in
her room and rapedher. This was done by the accused three times. The accused was later
arrested and taken to the police station.It was found out in the medico-legal report that there
was absence of any laceration in the hymen. Theaccused raised the defense of alibi,
contending that he was not there when the incident occurred.
Issue:
W/N accused is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
Yes. Even if there had been no lacerations of the hymen, it does not necessarily mean that there was
norape. A broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. The merest introduction of
the male organ into the labiaof pudendum is sufficient. The mere penetration of the
penis by the entry thereof into the labis majora of thefemale organ, even without rupture
of the hymen, suffices to warrant a conviction of rape.With regards to the degree of alibi of the
accused, the court ruled that alibi is inherently a weak defensebecause it is to fabricate and
difficult to disprove it. For alibi to be believed, credible and tangible proof
of physicalimpossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (36

SCRA 228) Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections gave his certificate of candidacy due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound system and loud speakers.
According to him, this violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Petitioner filed a case against
Commission on elections seeking a writ of prohibition and at the same time praying for a preliminary
injunction. The respondent argued that this authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act.
Issues:
Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the petitioner?
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose
such ban in the light of the doctine of ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest
fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The Constitution
prohibits abridgement of free speech or a free press. According to the Supreme Court, this preferred
freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the respondent Commission
did was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.

The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or

implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
taped jingles.

EN BANC

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

December 22, 2012 by Lagangang Butas

Estrada

vs.

Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

Petitioner:
Respondents:

Joseph
Sandiganbayan

(Third

Ejercito
Division)

and

People

Estrada
of

the

Philippines

Ponente: J. Bellosillo
FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its
constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it
is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender,
alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.
Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560 November 19,2001

Lessons Applicable:

Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine

Crim Law 1- mala in se

Crim pro proof beyond reasonable doubt

Laws Applicable: Art. 3 RPC
FACTS:
An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong
Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane Does of

the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with
his

co-accused,

who

are

members

of

his

family,

relatives

by

affinity

or

consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue

advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself,
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby unjustly enriching himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar

schemes or means
Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong'
Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane

Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling

Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for
his or their personal gain and benefit, public funds of P130,000,000.00, more or less,
representing a portion of P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with coaccused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,

Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane Does
For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks, More Or Less, And The Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of Stock, More Or Less, Of The Belle Corporation worth
P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00 respectively and by collecting or receiving, directly
or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, commissions
or percentages by reason of said purchases which became part of the deposit in the

equitable-pci bank under the account name Jose Velarde

by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages,
kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does,

P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the

Equitable-Pci Bank
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code

April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations,
docketed as:

1. Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659

2. Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e)
and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively
3. Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
4. Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code)
5. Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085)

April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. - Denied

April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused

June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than 1 offense Denied

Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:

1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)
2. W/N the Plunder Law dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions (crim
pro)
3. W/N the Plunder Law is a malum prohibitum (crim law 1)
HELD: Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.
1. YES

Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law

Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation.

Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration

series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration

pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to
(6) of Sec. 1 (d)

Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law

o The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice
o can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction
o a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
o the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle
o As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications

Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms

o overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.

2. NO.

The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.

o has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to
have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth

o Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth."
3. NO

plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea)

o Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense.
o In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the
offender is determined by his criminal intent
o The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case
of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se

Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103956, 207 SCRA 712 , March 31, 1992
Case Title: BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Case Nature: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Romulo R. Macalintal

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., CRUZ

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution
No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law|Commission on Elections|Freedom of Speech
Syllabi:1. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The COMELECs prohibition on posting
of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in
designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.2. Constitutional Law;
Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the
fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438
[1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be
guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.3. Constitutional Law;
Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle.The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width
and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas
designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad
that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1,
Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.4.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers
on mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution