A Platonic Reading of Plato's Symposium

Lloyd P. Gerson
University of Toronto
1.
The American poet and critic John Jay Chapman (1862-1933) in his book Lucian, Plato,
and Greek Morals (Oxford, 1931), wrote, "to the historical student, to the man who not
only knows something of books, but something of the world, the Symposium of Plato is
seen to have been in every age since Plato the most effective plea for evil that one can
point to or recall. The moral disease which it inculcates is apt to break out in any age and
to poison the young. The Symposium has always been the vade mecum of those who
accept and continue the practice which it celebrates. To them it is a sort of lurid
devotional bookthe sulphurous breviary of the pederast." This is not a view of the
dialogue to which scholars today generally subscribe. 1 Why not? What precisely are the
grounds on which we can confidently or even reasonably eliminate any particular
interpretation of a Platonic dialogue? Some would say, indeed, that there are no grounds
for eliminating any interpretation. Let a thousand flowers bloom. If "interpretation" here
means, roughly, "what the dialogue has inspired me to think" or "what I learned from the
dialogue," then it is difficult to argue with this approach. Most, though, would use
"interpretation" more narrowly, based on some sort of criteria for interpretation. This is
where things get interesting. Because now we can ask the question, "what sort of criteria
and assumptions must we bring to our reading of the dialogue?" I say "must" and not
"can" because I am myself assuming that these criteria and assumptions are supposed to
be the right ones, or at least criteria and assumptions which are such that, at the end of the
day, statements beginning "this dialogue teaches that" or "Plato in this dialogue
claims" are not purely arbitrary.
Regarding Symposium, interpretation is at least in part inspired by some of the
extraordinary claims made by the interlocutors. Here are some of the claims found in
Diotima's speech in Symposium as reported by Socrates. Diotima picks up Socrates'
assertion that love is the desire to possess beautiful things (204D-E). She replies, "What
will one have who has beautiful things?" Socrates cannot answer and she says, "Suppose
someone changes the question using 'good' in place of 'beautiful' and asks "what is it that
the lover of good things loves?" Socrates now confidently replies that he will have good
things. In reply to the next question, "what it is he has who has good things?" Socrates
says, "This is an easier question; he'll have happiness." So, "this wanting [good for
oneself] is what this love is (205A5)." Later on, Diotima formulates a definition of love:
"love is [desire for] the possession of the good forever (206A11-12)." 2 And its "work"
(e[rgon) is "birth in beauty in the body and the soul (206B3-8)." This birth in beauty or
reproduction is "what mortals have in place of immortality (206E7-8)." It is the
replacement for immortality (207Dff). Birth in beauty is of two sorts: bodily and
1

Though it is an interpretation implicit in the culture that, say, produced Brideshead Revisited.
[Estin a[ra sullhvbdhn, e[fh, oJ e[rw~ tou` to; ajgaqo;n auJtw` ei\nai ajei, picking up ejpiqumiva from
205D2.
2

spiritual or intellectual (208Eff). But it is clear that the latter is superior to the former
(209C7-D1).
When Diotima turns to the "higher" mysteries of love, she proceeds to explain an
ascent or progression or "right order" (ejfexh'" te kai; ojrqw'") of spiritual or intellectual
love, from individual beautiful bodies, to all beautiful bodies, to beautiful practices and
laws, to beautiful areas of knowledge, to, finally, beauty "by itself" (210A4ff). It is only
when the lover has reached this goal that he is able to give birth, not to "images"
(ei[dwla) of virtue, but to true virtue, because he is in touch with true beauty (212A4-5).
And thus he will attain immortality, if any human being may.
These passages are puzzling precisely because we are unsure what tools to bring
to their interpretation. The apparent denigration of the individual as love object, the
casual conflation of the beautiful with the good, the claim for the ubiquity of love as a
psychic phenomenon aimed at the good, the distinction between bodily and spiritual
beauty and love, the imitation of immortality, the superiority of the spiritual to the bodily
and the further superiority of one who produces "true virtue" as opposed to one who,
presumably, produces mere images of it, and, finally, the very idea of an "ascent" or
"right order" of ascent to the vision of a separate Formall of these "mysterious"
statements have evoked in readers the awe and wonder Socrates reports that he felt
himself when Diotima uttered them. If one takes these claims seriously, it is certainly
possible to question them. Why, for example, should we believe that there is a "right
order" to the ascent or even that there is an ascent? Or what reason have we for agreeing
that spiritual beauty is superior to bodily beauty or that true virtue is produced only by
one having experienced philosophical knowledge of beauty itself? Indeed, why should
we accept that goodness has anything to do with beauty at all?
One familiar replytypically, tacitly assumed rather than defendedis that there
is no reason to accept Plato's "vision" because Plato does not explicitly argue for it. 3 We
can, nevertheless, appreciate its poetic splendor alongside of and perhaps even above
those of other "visions" of love, including those of the previous speakers in the dialogue.
Another replyequally familiaris that every single one of Diotima's claims is
expatiated upon elsewhere in the Platonic canon. So, for example, we can refer to Meno
and Gorgias to understand why "all desire the good;" we can refer to Apology and Lysis
to illuminate Diotima's account of what a philosopher is; we can refer to Phaedrus and
Timaeus to make the distinction between the quasi-immortality of the a[nqrwpo" and the
real immortality of the immortal part of our soul, that which Laws calls "the true self;"
we can refer to Philebus to understand the relationship between the good and the
beautiful and we can refer to Republic to understand the notion of a hierarchical ascent to
the intellectual world, including the ajrchv of the hierarchy; and, finally, we can refer to
Phaedo to understand the difference between "images" of virtue and true virtue. 4
The former view holds that since every dialogue can be shown to stand on its own
two feet dramatically, so it must be assumed to stand on its own two feet
philosophically. 5 And if the cues or concepts necessary to clarify the philosophical views
3

See, e.g. Press 1995: 133152.

Such a view is the contradictory of the rarely maintained position that Diotima's speech contains an anti
Platonic doctrine of love. See Neumann 1965: 3359.
5
A stellar example of this mode of interpretation is Tejera 2000. A different and more interesting example
is Shorey 1933, who believes that Plato's philosophy is a unity and that that entire philosophy has to be
4

expressed are not already imbedded in the individual dialogue, then those views must
remain fragmentary probes or aperus. On this view, the only tools needed to interpret a
Platonic dialogue are knowledge of Attic Greek and perhaps some knowledge of the
historical context of the work. By contrast, the latter view maintains that the proper
context for the interpretation of any dialogue of Plato is Platonism itself. Such a view
invites disbelief, owing to the not unreasonable suspicion that it is hopelessly entangled
in a form of Meno's paradox. How can we know what Platonism is without mining the
dialogues? But if we do that in a way that does not already presuppose what Platonism
is, then we are never going to be in a position to construct Platonism out of the individual
building blocks, the dialogues themselves.
Owing to such difficulties, a "middle" position is sometimes sought. One middle
position asserts that some material from other dialogues can be licitly used to interpret
any one. The principle of selection is almost inevitably developmentalist in some way.
Thus, if we can distinguish, say, early, middle, and late Platonic dialogues on
philosophical grounds (whether we identify the first with Socratic philosophy or not), we
can use material from one period of development to interpret dialogues from the same
period, but not from any other. According to most proponents of this view, material from
Phaedo, Republic, Gorgias, Lysis, and Meno would probably be eligible for use in
interpreting Symposium, but material from Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws would not. 6 But
surely, apart from the inherent and well canvassed problems with developmentalism as
such, this principle of selection as stated is too strong. For proponents of its use would
in fact want to exclude only those dialogues or their parts which maintain a view contrary
to the one maintained in Symposium. And here the problem is determining the view
being expressed in Symposium so that one could maintain that what is being expressed in,
say, Timaeus is contrary to that. For example, it is often supposed that Symposium does
not acknowledge or maintain real immortality, but rather only the quasi-immortality
possible in reproduction, whether physical or "spiritual." If this is the case, it is incorrect
to suppose that the immortality proclaimed in Timaeus and Laws can be read back into
Symposium. Two things are wrong with this: (1) Republic, a dialogue that on this view
may be adduced on behalf of interpreting Symposium, maintains a view of immortality
that at least appears to be pretty close to Timaeus, and (2) Timaeus does not maintain the
immorality of the a[nqrwpo" anymore than does Symposium, if the a[nqrwpo" is
understood as the composite of the immortal part of the soul plus the mortal parts of the
soul plus the body. Only if we insist on identifying the person or true self with the
a[nqrwpo" would there seem to be any opposition between Symposium and Timaeus. 7 But
to hold that the former dialogue so identifies the person would be to put it into conflict
with the view directly implied in, for example, Phaedo, a dialogue supposedly usable for
interpreting Symposium.

adduced in order to understand each dialogue. Yet, his account of each dialogue fairly consistently refuses
the adduction of material from elsewhere.
6
Cornford 1971: 119131, provides an excellent example of a very vigorous, though selective, use of
Republic in interpreting Symposium (especially in the application of the doctrine of the tripartite soul to the
higher mysteries, along with a reluctance to allow that genuine immortality is present in Symposium), but a
disinclination to use much of anything else.
7
See Corrigan and Corrigan 2004: 224234, for some perceptive remarks on how Symposium must be
understood to be focusing on the soul-body composite or the embodied person, not the true, immortal self.

Another middle position eschews developmentalism in favor of a strictly

circumscribed type of Platonism as a device for interpreting the dialogues. Typically,
this approach rejects the indirect traditionincluding Aristotle's testimonyas relevant
to reconstructing Platonism. Among its most adept practitionersscholars such as
Harold Chernissthis rejection itself requires limitations on the extraction of doctrine
from the dialogues. 8 For example, separate Forms are asserted but the superordinate
status of the Idea of the good is disallowed. It is difficult to see the justification for this
approach beyond the unwillingness to have Plato say anything that the scholar regards as
embarrassingly silly. 9 Hence, Plato "lite." 10
Recoiling from the entanglements of developmentalism and the philosophical
insubstantiality of mitigated Platonism, various sophisticated forms of the first position
what I would term principled hermeneutical Alzheimer's diseasehave been proposed. I
have no quarrel with these ways of reading Symposium unless they purport to seek out
and defend philosophical claims. Even the view that the structure of the dialogue,
including the succession of speeches, and the Alcibiadean farce at the end, have a
philosophical point is one that I believe is not available to one who holds this position
consistently. And here I include the idea that the dialogues have principally a protreptic
function among the philosophical claims that this view is in no position to make. 11 This is
so because Symposium does not come supplied with an instruction sheet which states:
reads this dialogue protreptically. In order to get to the protreptic conclusion, one has to
8

Cherniss 1944 and 1945 is the mirror image of Robin 1908. Often the rule seems to be: "if I can't
understand the argument or if the argument seems silly to me, then Plato could not have held the doctrine
whose expression is the conclusion of the argument."
9
Strauss 2001 provides an elegant example of the pitfalls of combining the principle of "reading Plato
dialogue by dialogue" and yet bringing to the dialogues a mitigated Platonism. Strauss, 200, declares that
in Diotima's speech, the good is not identical with the beautiful and then, 238, Strauss says that the
beautiful is the good. Strauss's way of dealing with such absurdities is to proclaim that what we have in
Diotima's speech (and in the dialogue as a whole) is a "poetic presentation of philosophy." In such a
presentation, there is no compelling need for consistency.
10
Kahn 1996 elaborates what I regard as the least objectionable form of this interpretation. On Kahn's
view, all the dialogues prior to Republic should be read "proleptically," that is, as anticipating or pointing to
that work. Kahn, however, cannot explain why all the dialogues, including Republic, are not proleptic to
Platonism itself. The limitation to Republic seems arbitrary. A similar problem is faced by Allen 1991: 85,
who thinks that in Symposium beauty and good are "equivalent" and "at the same level" because this
dialogue "looks forward" to Republic. Neither of the specific passages that are what Symposium
supposedly looks forward to (507B4, 532B1) say precisely this about beauty and good. The first passage
just says that there is a aujto; kalovn and a aujto; ajgaqovn. The second passage just says that aujto; o{ ejstin
ajgaqovn has to be grasped in order to grasp the being of each thing. Better passages for Allen's case might
be: 509A6 where Glaucon says that the good is ajmhvcanon kavllo" and 508E5 where Socrates says that the
good is kavllion than knowledge and truth, though the use of the comparative in the latter passage tells us
at least, I take it, that to; kalovn is not being treated like an ordinary Form. Indeed, one might reply that the
Idea of the good is no ordinary Form either. It is not clear why Allen thinks that Symposium does not look
forward to Philebus 64E565A5 where beauty is treated as an aspect of good, not identical with it. Allen
does add that "beauty is the sensuous aspect of goodness," though what this means in the context of his
assertion that beauty is identified with that which is beyond being I have no idea. Surely, it is not just the
sensuous aspect if laws and institutions which can be called "beautiful." In my view, what underlies the
interpretations of both Kahn and Allen is a reluctance to face squarely full-blown Platonism.
11
Whether the protreptic aimed at drawing readers to the philosophical life generally or to "enrolment" in
the Academy, I have never understood why it is supposed that a protreptic precludes a heavy dose of
doctrine. For example, the explicit protreptic function of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles
depends entirely upon the force and extent of the argument therein.

appeal to dialogues like Phaedo, for example, and to its remarks about philosophy and
lovgo". And I say, "If you can use Phaedo, then I can use Philebus." And if you say, "I
renounce Phaedo and therefore forbid you Philebus," I reply, "that's fine if you don't
want to explicate Plato's philosophy but are interested in something else. But if you do
want to explicate Plato's philosophy, then in order to understand Symposium's
contribution to that, we need Philebus and Phaedo, and much else besides." 12
What is the basis for supposing that Platonism is more than just the empirically
arrived at collection of claimswhether consistent or inconsistentin the dialogues?
One sort of evidentiary consideration is, of course, Aristotle's testimony in regard to
Plato's unwritten teaching. I don't discount this or intend to belittle it, though I do believe
that this testimonyexcept in certain crucial detailsmostly confirms what is present in
the dialogues rather than adds anything new. 13 More significant, I believe, is that there
was any oral teaching at all. Plato was evidently not just a writer of dialogues. The
relevant context for interpreting the dialogues must include ongoing Academic
discussions. 14 This fact alone renders for me hollow the claim that Plato is forever
occluded for us by his authorial mask. 15
A different sort of evidentiary consideration is the analysis of the position that
arises when one takes together the contradictories of the philosophical positions of Plato's
predecessors rejected in the dialogues. By "Platonism" I mean, as a starting point,
roughly, what results if you reject Eleaticism and its implicit nominalism, the materialism
of the "giants" in Sophist, Protagorean epistemological relativism, extreme
Heracliteanism, the doctrine that the soul is a aJrmoniva of bodily parts, and the hedonism
of the "subtle thinkers" in Philebus. I realize that many find a certain tentativeness or
equivocation in many positive doctrines expressed in the dialogues. I find no such
tentativeness in the arguments offered on behalf of rejecting the above positions. If you
add to the Aristotelian testimony the position that emerges from the conjunction of the
negation of the above rejected views, then that is basically what Platonism is. 16 There is
an additional and highly controversial potential adumbration of this position. That
includes whatever is entailed by this position whether Plato endorsed the entailment or
not or even whether he was aware of it or not. So, for example, Plato endorses some
consequences of the rejection of nominalism, like the possibility that two things, though
they be self-identical, can be the same, though he does not explicitly consider other
implications of the rejection of nominalism, like the equivocity of being. Such a
contentious adumbration of Platonism allows for the possibility of varieties of Platonism,
depending on how many implications you can figure out and how many you embrace. 17
12

A nice summary of the elements from later dialogues needed to illuminate Symposium can be found in
Corrigan and Corrigan 2004: 236 and n119.
13
Cf. especially Miller 1995: 225244.
14
See Miller 1995: 239243.
15
This is, incidentally, why the analogy of Shakespeare's plays adduced on behalf of the view that Plato's
dialogues are to be read nondoctrinally is false. We have no evidence of Shakespeare having a view of
literature or of life other than that which we find in each individual dialogue. So, we can safely ignore his
"real" intention and avoid what aesthetic theoreticians have long recognized as "the intentional fallacy."
For the interpretation of all the dialogues as plays, see Arieti 1991.
16
Perhaps more precisely, Aristotle's testimony indicates his interpretation of one version of Platonism
which is just the position that emerges from rejecting the above mentioned competing philosophies.
17
See Gerson 2005.

Let us take for granted the fact that if Plato believes A, and A entails B, it does
not follow that Plato believes B. 18 But someone who is more interested in Platonism that
in the working of Plato's own cognitive apparatus is probably going to be more interested
in whether or not A actually entails B than in whether or not Plato believed that it did.
Disciples will differ here. For example, they might differ on whether Plato's commitment
to the immortality of the soul is necessarily a commitment to personal immortality,
however this may be defined. Or they may agree that a commitment to the immortality
of the soul does entail a commitment to personal immortality, though they might differ as
to whether or how moral deserts have any meaning for the immortal person.
I believe it is both the case that Plato was a Platonist and that his disciples
embraced varieties of Platonism. By this I mean simply that Plato was the exponent of a
distinctive philosophical position that later disciples identified as "true philosophy" or
"wisdom" or "Platonism." 19 In the dialogues, and for reasons that need not be rehearsed
here, Plato does not address, or address unequivocally, a lot of the implications of his
basic position. I have argued at some length recently that Aristotle was a dissident
Platonist, embracing most of the elements of Platonism, but not enough to preclude his
dissidence. 20 In this paper, I am interested in how Platonism illuminates Symposium, in
particular, Diotima's speech. The best argument I can come up with for my interpretation
of Symposium is that Platonism does illuminate it and nothing else does. If applying
Platonism removes our puzzles, and nothing else does, what better argument could there
be for this interpretation?
I am henceforth going to ignore interpretation of the role of the earlier speeches in
the dialogue, principally because they have never been supposed to be constitutive of
Platonism. This factif it is a factdoes not obviate the need for an answer to the
question of how, if at all, the speeches support the delivery of the Platonic message. A
very brief answer to this question, along the lines of the above construction of Platonism
through a via negativa is that these speeches all reveal inadequate conceptions of love
inadequate because they are not expressions of Platonism. And yet their inadequacies,
paradoxically, reveal the depth of the Platonic doctrine because no one, Platonist or antiPlatonist, is completely unacquainted with or oblivious to various expressions of love or
beauty or goodness. 21 As Aristotle would say, the truth is broad enough for no one to
have missed it completely. 22
18

But we might, with Sedley 2004: ch. 1, expect to find in Plato's later works efforts to "reclaim his
Socratic heritage" by locating Socratic philosophy within a Platonic embrace, that is, we would find him
drawing out some of the implications of the Socratic inspiration.
19
Proclus, Platonic Theology I 6, 19 (S.W.), calls Plotinus and others "exegetes of the Platonic revelation"
(tou;~ th`~ Platwnikh`~ ejpopteiva~ ejxhghta;~). Proclus goes on to make clear that Plato was not the
first or only vehicle of this divine revelation. The justification for distinguishing Platonism from what
Plato says is that Plato is himself articulating or expressing an "ancient tradition." We call what Plato says
"Platonism" because he was the greatest exponent of this tradition.
20
See Gerson 2005.
21
I believe that this interpretation is at least consistent with a central element of that of Rowe 1998: 246
247; 258, namely, that the central desire of the lover is for the good. Rowe holds that Diotima transforms
this into a desire for quasi-immortality. I would prefer to say that the latter is an expression of the former
rather than its transformation. Cf. Allen 1991: 77 who concisely catalogues the ways in which Diotima's
speech corrects the claims of al the previous interlocutors. Also, Buchner 1965: 16 who argues that
Diotima's speech provides a "criterion" by which the truth in each of the previous speeches can be judged.
22
See Metaphysics II 1, 993a30ff.

2.
Plotinus stands out among Platonists as absorbed with understanding what Plato
has to say about e[rw" in the light of Platonism. It is not merely that he wrote a treatise
(III 5 [50]) devoted to the topic, but he endeavored to integrate the concept of e[rw" fully
into Platonic metaphysics and psychology. Most remarkably, he employs Plato's concept
of e[rw" in his characterization of the One or the Good, the first principle of all, as a
"lover of itself." 23 This is remarkable because, as we know, e[rw" in Symposium at any
rate, is a concept from which connotations of "lack" or "deficiency" are seemingly
inseparable. 24 Yet the absolutely first principle of all is without limitation or imperfection
of any kind. How can this be? Why does Plotinus take from Plato the appropriateness of
applying the concept of e[rw" to the One?
Let us begin with Plotinus' interpretation of the lover in Symposium. Plotinus
assumes that the life of the a[nqrwpo", the life of the body-soul composite is held by
Plato to be inferior to the life of the real person. 25 He seems justified in interpreting Plato
in this way if he is justified in assuming that what Plato says in Alcibiades, Phaedrus,
Phaedo, Republic, Timaeus, and Laws can be legitimately adduced on behalf of
understanding the qualified immortality to which an a[nqrwpo" may aspire. 26 So, the
happiness attendant upon the possession of good things will vary according to whether
we are talking about the happiness of the "composite" or the happiness of the real
person. 27
If this makes sense, we can perhaps next resolve an ambiguity in the contrast
between the higher and lower mysteries. When in the higher mysteries, the lover attains
his goal, he gives birth to true virtue, not its images. What is true virtue here supposed to
be and what are its images? How does the offspring that is true virtue differ from the
offspring of the spiritual or intellectual love in the lower mysteries? I cannot fathom how
anyone could understand what Plato means by "images" of true virtue without adducing

23

Enneads VI 8 [39] 15, 12: Kai; ejravsmion kai; e[rw~ oJ aujto;~ kai; aujtou` e[rw~, a{te oujk a[llw~ kalo;~
h] par aujtou` kai; ejn aujtw`.
24
Plotinus, Enneads III 5 [50] 7, 915; 1924, acknowledges this feature in his interpretation of the myth
of the birth of e[rw".
25
See ibid., I 4 [46] 16, 913: Oujk e[stin ou\n ejn tw` koinw` [i.e., the composite of body and soul]
eujdaimovnw~ zh`n. Orqw`~ ga;r kai; Plavtwn ejkei`qen a[nwqen to; ajgaqo;n ajxioi` lambavnein kai; pro;~
ejejkei`no blevpein to;n mevllonta sofo;n kai; eujdaivmona e[sesqai kai; ejkeivnw oJmoiou`sqai kai; kat
ejkei`no zh`n. Plotinus is here referring to Symposium 212A as well as to Theaetetus 176B1.
26
O'Brien 1984: 185205, argues that the immortality attained by one engaged in contemplating the Form
of beauty and in thereby becoming virtuous is genuine immortality. It is a gift of the gods, like that
awarded to epic heroes. Cf. 212A. This is in contrast to the quasiimmortality of the lower mysteries.
O'Brien is followed, though without attribution, by Dyson 1986, who argues that philosophersthose who
are privy to the higher mysteriesexperience the "personal survival of the ephemeral soul (67)" owing to
their having pleased the gods.
27
See Gerson 2004: 217248, where I argue that Aristotle similarly distinguishes between the happiness of
the composite and the happiness of "that which we are especially," namely, intellects. I adduce Aristotle
here because Plotinus was bolstered in his interpretation of Plato by finding the same distinction in
Aristotle. Porphyry, Plotinus' pupil, tells us that Plotinus' teacher, Ammonius Saccas, was one of the first
to show that Aristotle was a Platonist.

what is said in other dialogues. 28 In addition, I cannot fathom what the reason would be
for not adducing other dialogues, given that the material for an answer to these questions
is readily available there. One may indeed suppose that the offspring that is true virtue
do not differ at all from the offspring of spiritual love and that the images referred to are a
rhetorical flourish on Plato's part. Yet, the offspring of spiritual love are lovgoi about
virtue (209B8). 29 The offspring of contact with the good or intelligible beauty is true
virtue, not lovgoi about it. 30 As Plotinus argues elsewhere, the images of true virtue are
identical with the "popular and political" virtues of Phaedo. 31 One could, I suppose, take
the images of true virtue as deceptive images or counterfeits of virtue. But only one who
is reading Symposium in the light of the Platonism as expressed in the other dialogues
would realize that, for Plato, not all images are deceptive.
According to Plotinus, the true virtue itself is the virtue attained by the
philosopher in contrast to popular and political virtue. 32 The latter is identical with the
virtue produced by those who are pregnant from spiritual love (209A-B). True virtue is
the virtue of the "aristocratic" human being in books VIII and IX of Republic in contrast
to the virtue available to all members of the state, as described in book IV. It is the virtue
that constitutes "assimilation to the divine" (oJmoivwsi" qew'/). 33 This assimilation is the
process by which an a[nqrwpo" achieves immortality, not its simulacrum. The
achievement is to identify oneself with the "human being within the human being." 34
This is, of course, the soul, or, more accurately, the immortal or rational part of the

28

At Lysis 219D25 Socrates argues that things that are dear for the sake of the "primary dear" (prw'ton
fivlon) are only "images" (ei[[dwla) of the "true" dear, namely, the first. Although he does proceed to argue
that the good is dear (220B7), it is not clear that it would be appropriate to read back into Lysis what is said
about the Idea of the good in, say, Republic. On the other hand, the logic of the Lysis argument provides
the framework for its application to the Symposium argument. There are, of course, several big inferential
steps from: when each of us loves or desires some concrete good (e.g., health), anything we pursue for the
sake of that we do not truly love to: there is one thing (the Idea of the good) that we all truly love. Note
also that whereas in Symposium it is the product or the e[rgon of love that is the image, in Lysis it is the
putative object of love that turns out to be the image.
29
Cf. 210A78 where the first step on the ascent within the higher mysteries is love of one beautiful body
which produces kaloi; lovgoi.
30
See Cratylus 439AB where Socrates contrasts learning about things "through themselves" and learning
about them through "names" (ojnovmata). Previously, at 425A, he describes a lovgo" as consisting of names
plus "verbs" (rJhvmata). Cf. Sophist 262E. The point is not, I think, that the addition of verbs turns the
image of the thing into something else.
31
See Enneads I 2 [19] on the grades of virtue. The "popular and political" virtues are described in Phaedo
82A10B3. Cf. 69B67, where this sort of virtue is called an "illusory faade" (), fit for slaves.
Cf. Protagoras 323A7, B2; 324A1 where Protagoras uses the term "political virtue" in the same way
without of course the pejorative Platonic overtones. Cf. Republic II 365C34 and VI 500D8 with VII
518D3519A6 where the "popular" virtues are identified as the "socalled virtues of the soul" and
especially 619C7D1 for participation in virtue by "habit" (e[qei) "without philosophy." At 430C3, courage
is characterized as "political." At 443C10D1, characterizing justice, Plato contrasts "external" behavior
with "internal" virtue, which is concerned with what is "truly oneself and one's own" (ajlhqw'" peri;
eJauto;n kai; ta; eJautou').
32
Cp. Phaedo 82B1 ejpitethdeukovte"; Symposium 209C1 ejpithdeuvein.
33
Theaetetus 176B.
34
Republic IX 589A7B1. As Price 1989: 30, points out, both Phaedrus (245C5246A2, 276E5277A4)
and Laws (721B7C6, 895E10896E2) recognize both quasiimmortality and real immortality in the same
dialogues.

soul. 35 The achievement is thus naturally contrasted with the endowment of immortality
for anyone with a human soul.
One who achieves immortality insofar as this is possible for a mortal a[nqrwpo"
produces true virtue rather than images of it because he is "in touch with true beauty
(212A5)." The contrast then is not just between the products of the one who follows the
higher mysteries and the one who follows the lower, but also between intelligible reality,
on the one hand, and images of it, on the other. All of the objects of e[rw" other than the
true beauty are images, including all of the objects loved by the practitioners of the lower
mysteries. 36 The sublation of the individual love object as the focus of the account of
e[rw" is thus inseparable from the whole point of the ascent. 37 That ascent aims at selftransformation via assimilation to the divine. This assimilation is impossible without the
ascent because focusing on any love object other than beauty itself stops the assimilation.
The love of images will enable productionsince that is the e[rgon of e[rw" in any
casebut it will not result in self-transformation.
To see this point clearly it is essential that the relation between beauty and the
good be understood. The simple reading of the text has Diotima conflate beauty with the
good. 38 If these two are not virtually identical, then it remains obscure or even
scandalous (as in the view of Gregory Vlastos) why the pursuit of the beautiful wherever
one finds it is not sufficient for the achievement of immortality. 39 Indeed, one can either
suppose that real immortality is not part of this story, in which case it is hard to see why
anyone should privilege the immortality gained by spiritual love over physical love
35

See Timaeus 41CD, 69C56, E1, 90A, C13. Cf. Republic X 611B9612A6: Laws IV 713B8, XII
959B34 That Symposium is denying immortality to the a[nqrwpo" and not to the rational or divine part of
the soul that is identical with the real person was seen long ago by Luce 1952: 137141, refuting Hackforth
1950: 4345. Cf. 208B14 for the explicit contrast between the participation in "immortality"
(ajqanasiva") by that which is "mortal" (to; qnhvton) and by that which is "immortal" (ajqavnaton).
36
See Enneads VI 9 [9] 9, 4143: ... kai; o{ti tau`ta me;n ta; ejrwvmena qnhta; kai; blabera; kai; eijdwvlwn
e[rwte~ kai; metapivptei, o{ti oujk h\n to; o[ntw~ ejrwvmenon oujde; to; ajgaqo;n hJmw`n oujd o} zhtou`men.
37
Cf. Price 1989: 4849, who disagrees and takes the true virtue to be identical with the products of
spiritual love and so to require interpersonal relations.
38
For example, Robin 1964: 9, just assumes that "belle" and "bon" are synonymous, though in his
concluding remarks (183189), he does adduce Philebus 64E65A on behalf of understanding the
relationship between good and beautiful. Cf. Grube 1935: 21, 30. One motive for the conflation is, I
suspect, the assumption that if beauty and good are not conflated, then Plato's own argument in Symposium
is actually refuted by an argument in Philebus, an argument against Eudoxus' conflation of pleasure with
the good on the grounds that there are goods other than pleasure. See Philebus 20E22E; 60B61B. If,
however, beauty is not conflated with good, then a similar argument can be made adducing goods that are
not beautiful.
39
See Vlastos 1973: 334. Vlastos complains about the denigration of the individual as love object in
Symposium. Cf. Neumann 1965: 41, who makes the same complaint, referring to scholars going back to
Wilamowitz who share this view. Vlastos is well answered by Levy 1979: 285291. As Levy argues,
Vlastos's definition of love"wishing good things for someone for that person's sake"is neither
necessary nor sufficient for love. Only, though, if one gets the relation between beauty and good right, can
the charge of egocentrism in the pursuit of the beloved be dismissed. Cf. Warner 1979 for a different sort
of response based on a defense of the claim that qualities not persons are the objects of love. Mahoney
1996 argues that love is egoistic at the "lower levels" but non-egoistic at the "highest level." This seems to
me to presuppose a false dichotomy if in fact everyone desire the good for themselves. Allen 1991: 9598,
brings out very clearly the specious contrast of e[rw" and ajgavph used to fuel the dichotomy
egoistic/selfless love. Indeed, this interpretation also rests heavily on the mistaken idea that the e[rgon of
love is its purpose such that one reproduces in order to get something for oneself, in this case quasiimmortality.

except one who prefers that sort of love. Or, again supposing the separation of the
beautiful and the good, it is hard to see why "good" cannot be a property univocally
predicable of anything beautiful. So, on this interpretation we bid farewell to hierarchy
or ascent. 40 Such was the approach of Epicurus, for example, who, identifying the good
with pleasure, infamously proclaimed, "I spit on the beautiful if it does not bring
pleasure." 41
If, however, the good is in fact a reference to the Idea of the good and, as Plotinus
assumesbasing himself on Philebus (among other texts)the beautiful is that Idea in
its attractive aspect, there is a hierarchical, Platonically based, difference between the
good and any image participating in it. 42 What everyone really desires is the good itself,
not an image of it. 43 The fact that people will settle for images of beauty, when they will
never settle for images of good, is owing to their belief that images of beauty can be
something other than just images of good; they can be really good. If, however, beauty
and good are inseparable as Plotinus holds and as Plotinus believes Plato holds, then a
devotion to real good entails a devotion to real beauty and to the psychological
inevitability of the ascent beyond images, individual or otherwise. 44
More than psychological inevitability, there is ontological necessity. For sensible
images of beauty, though they be real cases of beauty, are not really real. 45 Moreover,
though souls are more beautiful or higher up in the scale than are bodies, they are
themselves images and inferior to the model. In fact, (a) "beautiful" is, on Platonic
metaphysics, univocally predicable of all that it is predicable, and (b) the inferiority of
beautiful bodies is owing to the bodily, while souls are not inferior in this way. The
possibility of understanding the inferiority of the beauty of souls over against the model
depends upon there being some additional criterion for ranking beauties. I mean some
criterion other than intelligible vs. sensible. 46 Timaeus gives us just such a criterion,

40

Nussbaum 1986: 176184, thinks the gradations in the ascent can be preserved despite univocity if the
grades are grades of increasing quantity. But on this view, the "vast sea of beauty" should be "higher" in
the scale than the Form of beauty, though in fact it is not.
41
Cp. Tolstoy's remark in What is Art?, "What a strange illusion it is to suppose that beauty is goodness."
42
Enneads, VI 7 [38] 30, 29ff alluding to Philebus 64E565A5. Cf. Republic VI 517C23 and Phaedrus
250E which stresses the easy accessibility of beauty to our senses. At I 6 [1] 9, Plotinus explains in one
sense the intelligible world is primarily beautiful, in which case, the good has beauty
probeblhmevnon...pro; aujth`~. In another sense, the good is itself the "primal beauty" because it is
virtually what the intelligible world is. Cf. Murdoch 1970: 412, 5960, 92ff, who expresses a similar
view.
43
Cf. White 1989: 152157 for a criticism of the view that (a) love is of the beautiful and (b) the beautiful
is identical with the good. White, though, 155156, misinterprets Philebus as maintaining the identity of
the beautiful and the good. Since White thinks that Symposium denies this, he rejects the relevance of the
Philebus passage here. But see n19 for a concession that "good" and "beautiful" may be "co-extensive."
44
See Republic VI 505D59; Enneads V 5 [32] 12, 1925.
45
Cf. Republic V 479E7480A13. Rosen 1968: 270, maintains that "Diotima's description of beauty does
not presuppose the theory of Ideas." Yet, the diminished reality of the sensible world and its description as
that which is "not really real" is a direct inference from the separation of the really real, that is, of the Ideas.
46
Price 1989: 40, puzzlingly, claims that the recognition that beauty is beauty wherever it is found (210C4
5) "confirms a reduced valuation of, and commitment to, an inferior object, whether individual physical
beauty (B56), physical beauty in general (C56), or any individual beauty (D13)."

10

since there soul is composed of a mixture of indivisible and divisible oujsiva. 47 Without
adducing Republic, the inferiority of bodily beauty to psychic beauty is unexplained;
without adducing Timaeus, the complex superiority/inferiority of psychic beauty is not
explained either.
It is common for the relation between beauty and good in Diotima's speech to be
understood as follows. When Diotima "shifts" (metabalwvn, 204E) from asking "what
will one have when one has the beautiful" to "what will one have when one has the
good," she is generalizing, treating "beautiful" as but one example of "good." 48 So, on
this view, what one really desires is the good, which one supposes is achieved by
"possession" of the beautiful. 49 Apart from the obvious objection that the beautiful
would seem to be an instance of beauty itself, not of the good, there is the more profound
objection that treating the beautiful as an instance of the good makes utterly obscure the
motive for affirming a hierarchy of beauty, of love, and of the products of love. No one
instance or beautiful example of good is more of an example than another. Perhaps it
will be replied that the beautiful is not here being considered as an example of the good,
but as a means to it or an instrument of it. But if we take the beautiful as a putative
means to the good, like money or power or the way that Epicurus take the beautiful as a
possible means to the good conceived of as pleasure, and say that just as one desires the
latter because they are thought to be a means to the good or happiness, so that is why one
desires to possess beautiful things, it still remains obscure why this should produce a
hierarchy; why, for example, true virtue should result from loving and possessing beauty
itself but not from loving and possessing beautiful bodies or even other beautiful souls. 50
One requirement for keeping beauty and good united within a hierarchy is in
supposing that real immortality is an implicit part of the story. 51 Without this, not only is
there no way to privilege one type of lover over another, there is no way (or almost no
way) to distinguish the real and the apparent or the "higher" and the "lower" good. On
what basis could one argue that the e[rgon of a love that produces human babies is
47

See Timaeus 35A with 41DE. Plotinus generally treats the myth of the birth of e[rw" as an allegory of
the creation of a property of soul; hence, Povro" and Peniva stand for indivisible oujsiva and divisible
oujsiva. respectively. See especially III 5. [50] 59. Cf. III 6. [26] 14, 10ff.
48
See, e.g., Gould 1963: 46: "The beautiful is but a special, electrifying example of the good that which,
when possessed, will make us happy." By contrast, Bloom 1993: 134135, apparently completely
unfettered by textual scruples, goes from "Diotima insists on a distinction between beautiful and good" to
this distinction indicating "the conflict between the aesthetic and utilitarian ways of life." As it turns out,
though (151), Diotima is really confused about the relation between beauty and good, unlike Socrates in
Republic.
49
Cf. Meno 78B5; Gorgias 468A78. See Price 1989: 16. who thinks that "beauty" and "good" are
interchangeable, though not synonymous. But Price goes on to analyze their connection in a way that
makes hierarchy unintelligible. He takes the ascent as one of increasing generalization rather than
gradation in being. Cf. 38ff.
50
That the beautiful and the good are habitually related by Plato is clear from Lysis 216D2: levgw ga;r
tajgaqo;n kalo;n ei\nai; Protagoras 360B3: eij kalav, kai; ajgaqav; Hippias Major 297B23: eij a[ra to;
kalovn ejstin ai[tion ajgaqou`, givgnoit a]n uJpo; tou` kalou` to; ajgaqovn. In none of these passages,
however, is hierarchy implied. Cf. Alcibiades I 115A116E, where Socrates tries to persuade Alcibiades
that something kalovn, since it is good, could not also be bad. Even if we endorse Socrates' argument, there
are no grounds here for hierarchy. Indeed, since the argument maintains that something is good just insofar
as it is kalovn (see 116AB), hierarchy would seem to be precluded.
51
Ferrari 1992: 253 and n14, recognizes that the hierarchy is not explained in Symposium. Ferrari thinks,
though, that the tripartite soul of Republic provides the relevant basis for the hierarchy.

11

inferior to the e[rgon of a love that produces epic poetry? 52 There must be a standard
against which such judgments can be made. And, granted that everyone desires the real
good and immortality, without real immortality, one's own evaluation always trumps an
objective standard. 53 I mean that one has to be shown that, given that one thing is really
good and another only an image or illusion of good, one has no rational option but to aim
for the former.
There is one textually based reason for resisting this approach. This is that the
ultimate vision revealed in the higher mysteries is of the Form of beauty itself, not of the
entire intelligible realm, taken by Plotinus as an aspect of the Idea of the good. 54 Beauty
is in this passage characterized as "uniform" (monoeidev") and "itself by itself with itself"
(auto; kaq j aujto; meq j aujtou'), "simple" (eijlikrinev"), "pure" (kaqarovn), and "unmixed"
(a[meikton). How can these be reference to the entire realm of intelligible reality as
opposed to just the Form of beauty? Well, for one thing, if the ultimate vision is of a
single Form of beauty, then why is it that the e[rgon of this vision is birth in true virtue?
We might just as easily suppose that the vision of a Form of a virtue or of a Form of
virtue itself would produce such a birth. It would seem that on this interpretation, good
drops out of the picture. The previous conflation of beauty and good is ignored. For
another thing, if the ultimate vision is of the Form of beauty, then the penultimate vision
of "the sea of beauty," can hardly be a vision of other Forms. For the product of this
vision is "many and beautiful lovgoi and dianohvmata" (210D4-5), whereas the product
of the vision of beauty is true virtue. It does not make sense that the vision of one class
of Forms produces lovgoi whereas the vision of beauty produces virtue. 55
If, however, the penultimate vision is not of Forms but multiple propositional
truths about all intelligible reality, then it is even more unlikely that the ultimate vision is
of just a Form of beauty. For in this case, the hierarchy would make no sense. Assume
that beauty is a distinct oujsiva. Then, seeing the beauty in true lovgoi is no different from
seeing the beauty in novmoi or in ejpithdeuvmata or, indeed, in beautiful bodies. In
addition, if happiness is the result of the possession of the good, and the possession of the
good is just the possession of beauty, it is not at all clear why this Form as opposed to any
52

Cornford 1971: 127, for example, sees nothing problematic in saying that one type of beauty is "above"
another. When at Symposium 206C34 Diotima says: tivktein ejpiqumei` hJmw`n hJ fuvsi~ these words do
not indicate an alternative to the good that all desire. It is because humans desire the good that they desire
to reproduce. So, the effect of the primary desire is a secondary desire, secondary only in the sense that it
is the desire of the composite human not the desire of the real person. Cf. Dover 1980: 146147, who
remarks that "since on most occasions people have sexual intercourse for its own sake and not as a means
to procreationthe argument requires the assumption that humans, like animals, are impelled by forces of
which they are not aware."
53
At 210B7, the beauty of souls is said to be more "honorable" (timiwvteron) than the beauty of bodies.
Though one might build an objective standard on "honorable," how exactly within the context of
Symposium alone is this to be done? See Gerson 1997: 111. Cf. Crito 47E648A3; Gorgias 512A5;
Protagoras 313A6; Republic III 415A9; Laws V 727D8 on the superiority of soul to body. But in all these
passages, the superiority is owing to the fact that soul identifies us more than body, which is essentially a
possession. This could not be the reason for gradation throughout the ascent.
54
Ibid., I 6 [1] 9, 3536: to; kavllo~ tou`to ei\nai, ta;~ ijdeva~. Cf. V 8 [31] 9, 4042: Dio; kai; to; ei\nai
poqeinovn ejstin, o{ti taujto;n tw` kalw`, kai; to; kalo;n ejravsmion, o{ti to; ei\nai. Povteron de; potevrou
ai[tion tiv crh; zhtei`n ou[sh~ th`~ fuvsew~ mia`~
55
Dancy 2004: 287290, confuses the ultimate stage of the ascent with the penultimate stage. He identifies
the ultimate state with the vision of the "sea of beauty" and claims that the product of this vision is
additional lovgo" rather than true virtue.

12

other is supposed to render one happy. Surely, it is more plausible that "possession" of a
Form is the knowledge of it, and, if happiness is supposed to result from this possession,
it is with the knowledge of all the Forms that it arises. 56
The penultimate vision seems to correspond to the bottom section of the top half
of the divided line in Republic. 57 This mode of cognition, namely, "discursive reasoning"
(diavnoia) is a type of "understanding" (novhsi") as Republic later adds, and is inferior to
the mode of cognition that is most properly called "knowledge" (ejpisthvmh). 58 The one
who cognizes the "sea of beauty" is, in fact, on any reading of the text, gazing upon kinds
of science, not just the beauty of each. It is the content of each that is expressed in the
beautiful lovgoi. Thus, the ultimate vision would seem to correspond to the top section of
the top half of the divided line where cognition is of the Forms in the light of the first
principle of all, the Idea of the good. 59
I maintain, following Plotinus, that the Idea of the good is virtually all the Forms
analogous to the same way that white light is virtually all the colors of the spectrum.
Beauty is, as Philebus suggests, an aspect of the good, namely, the good as attractive to
us. That is, if the good were not attractive, we would not seek it. But goodness is more
than attractiveness. 60 And what is maximally attractive to us as rational creatures is
knowledge of all that is knowable. So, the reason why true virtue results from possession
of beautypossession of the good in the only way possible for usis that we are with
this possession imbued with the knowledge that is virtue. The ultimate vision of the
ascent refers to all the Forms distributively, that is, each and every Form, understood in
the light of the first principle of all. 61
A second requirement for keeping beauty and good united within a hierarchy is
that the love that is for the beautiful is identical with the desire that is for the good. The
56

Cf. Republic VI 490A8B7 where the achievement of the e[rw" of the philosopher is a vision of all the
Forms and a "birth" in understanding and truth. Allen 1991: 80, thinks that the hierarchy is based on grades
of universality, though there is nothing in the text to indicate this. At the same time, his correct observation
that the beauty of souls is not the same thing as the beauty of bodies undercuts his argument for a single
Form of beauty.
57
See Republic VII 510D511A. So Moravcsik 1971: 295; Sier 1997: 151153.
58
See Republic VII 533E7534A8. This corrects what he says at 511DE where he seems to identity
understanding just with knowledge.
59
Republic VII 511B2ff. The Symposium passage describing the ultimate stage of ascent (210D7E1):
kativdh tina; ejpisthvmhn mivan toiauvthn, h{ ejsti kalou` toiou`de, should be compared with Phaedrus
(247E12): th;n ejn tw` o{ ejstin o]n o[ntw~ ejpisthvmhn ou\san. The latter passage explicitly goes on to
take this knowledge as being of all the Forms. The words in Symposium (212A3): oJrw`nti w\ oJrato;n to;
kalovn, are usually taken to refer to intellect as that by which the beautiful is seen. But it is not clear why
this is not a reference to the Idea of the good, as in Republic VII 509B5, where the Idea is that owing to
which that which is knowable is knowable.
60
Plotinus, Enneads VI 7 [38] 22, 57: Esti ga;r e{kaston o{ ejstin ejf auJtou`: ejfeto;n de; givnetai
ejpicrwvsanto~ aujto; tou` ajgaqou`, w{sper cavrita~ dovnto~ aujtoi`~ kai; eij~ ta; ejfievmena e[rwta~. So,
we can cognize form, and hence beauty, without being attracted to it or without desiring it. With the
recognition of form as an expression of the good, we have, once again, the basis for hierarchy. The
"godlikeness" of intelligible form is easier to discern than the "goodlikeness" of bodily form because the
latter is occluded by body. If we agree that beauty is form, we certainly would need to say that we can
recognize form or beauty without being attracted to it or loving it.
61
Cf. Republic VII 517B7C4 where the Idea of the good is said to be aijtiva pavntwn ojrqw'n te kai;
kalw'n in to;n nohtovn tovpon. Also, Timaeus 28A8B2 where the demiurge produces that which is kalovn
because he is using as a model intelligible reality; 30D2. Cf. Price 1989: 43, "In effect the Form of beauty
constitutes the world of Forms qua objects of love." I would say: "not just in effect."

13

latter, though, is achieved by a cognitive experience, a vision of intelligible reality. It is

one thing to make the general point that when you think you desire x, you really desire y,
if x is a counterfeit of y. But is it plausible to apply this general principle to the present
case and say that when you think you desire heterosexual or homosexual intercourse,
what you really desire is knowledge of Platonic Forms? Of course, it will not do to reply
that the latter desire is a substitute for (in the Freudian sense) the former. If anything, it is
the other way around. How can we make sense of the implicit claim that there is only
one real desire and that the desire is for the knowledge of the good?
In some way or another, it must be shown that the subject of the desire for the
putative counterfeit x is not the real subject. This is, not surprisingly, exactly how
Plotinus understands the claim. 62 My main point, however, is not that Plotinus has
interpreted Plato correctly, but that Plato himself in numerous places identifies the "real
person" with the ideal knower. He does this with sufficient clarity and frequency that
there is no reason to hesitate to call this doctrine a central tenet of Platonism. 63 But he
does not say this in Symposium. One could, I suppose, say that Plato, when he wrote
Symposium, had not yet figured out this part of the picture. In that case, we must be
prepared to say that when Plato wrote Symposium, though he had a view about hierarchy
and its metaphysical analysis, he really had no clue how to fit the human soul into this
picture. He grasped the difference between real virtue and its images, but he did not
realize that subjects engaged in practicing the former were not identical with subjects
engaged in practicing the latter. This is, of course, a possibility. But it would require, in
addition, that we athetize Alcibiades I, or at least that part where Socrates clearly
distinguishes between the soul and the body, and identifies the "real self" with the
former. 64 We would also need to "deal with" Gorgias and its affirmation of personal
immortality (albeit in a myth). At some point, though, one begins to lose enthusiasm for
these hermeneutical epicycles. Why not simply admit that there is a philosophy called
"Platonism" and that Plato expresses it variously in the dialogues?
Finally, a last requirement for keeping beauty and good together within a
hierarchical ascent is the manner in which we conceive of the e[rgon of the desire for the
good. Treating the birth in beauty as an instrument for satisfying the desire for
immortality is psychologically lame, to say the least. 65 But this seems inevitable if the
desire for immortality is merely the desire for quasi-immortality. On this view, the
e[rgon turns out to be the steps taken to achieve this quasi-immortality, rather than the
natural result of the achievement of the desire for the good which is identical with the
natural result of the love of the beautiful. The e[rgon of love turns out to be a peculiarity

62

See especially Enneads VI 9 [9] 9, 22: Kai; ejkei [in the intelligible world]` genomevnh givgnetai aujth
[the soul, that is, real person]; kai; o{per h\n. In this chapter, Plotinus is interpreting the underlying doctrine
of both Symposium and Phaedrus.
63
It is also a central tenet of Aristotle, a fact which ought to mitigate the criticism that Plotinus is "reading
his own views" into Plato. See Nicomachean Ethics X7, 1177b301178a8. See also the line here
referred to, namely, IX8, 1169a2: [intellect]
Also, IX 4, 1166a223; IX8, 1168b313. See Gerson 2004: 217248.
64
See Alcibiades I 129B1131A1.
65
So Rowe 1998: 253. Rowe, though, thinks that despite the implausibility of the claim, it would appeal to
the Symposium's interlocutorsPhaedrus, Pausanias, and the rest. And that is why it should be taken
ironically.

14

of certain people, not the necessary property of love that it is evidently supposed to be. 66
Either people really want the good itself, in which case the psychological explanation for
birth in beauty is rendered null and void or else they really want, say, physical or spiritual
offspring, in which case beauty and good are, once again, pried apart. The latter
alternative could only appeal to one who supposes that Symposium can be understood on
its own. The former alternative holds that in talking about the e[rgon of love, Diotima is
making a metaphysical point, one which draws beauty, good, and e[rw" even closer
together. The achievement of the good, that is, the knowledge of intelligible reality,
necessarily results in the birth of true virtue because that knowledge is extensionally
equivalent to true virtue. 67
Here is an additional consideration on behalf of this interpretation. At the
beginning of Republic Book Two, Glaucon, no doubt expressing a common Greek
notion, says that there are three kinds of good. There is (a) a good that we desire for
itself; (b) a good that we desire not in itself but only for its consequences and (c) a good
that we desire both for itself and for its consequences. Socrates, of course, wants to argue
that justice belongs to the third kind. If we suppose that the good desired in Symposium
is, too, of the third kind, we can make sense of the idea that its achievement produces true
virtue as a consequence. If, on the other hand, we take the products of lovethe births
that occur in beautyas a means to achieving some good, namely, quasi-immortality, we
deprive ourselves of an explanation for the love of offspring except as a means and of an
explanation for the hierarchy of products.
Here we have an answer to the question regarding Plotinus' extraordinary claim
that the Idea of the good has e[rw" of itself. This claim is, in effect, an abductive
inference from the claim that goodness is essentially self-diffusive. And the proof that
goodness is essentially self-diffusive relies upon the self-evident multiplicity of
intelligible forms in the universe. That the knowledge of intelligible reality necessarily
produces true virtue is one expression of the necessary production of intelligible form
from the good. 68 The good must love itself if in the achievement of its desire it
necessarily produces.
Meeting the above three requirements actually enables us to understand why the
pederast embraces his "sulphurous breviary" without delusion while at the same time
meeting them enables us to understand the inadequacies of an interpretation based on that
embrace. Plato, understood Platonically, has given us a way not just to acknowledge the
manifest diversity of desire but to order that diversity hierarchically. One is of course
free to reject the hierarchy, or even to reject its presence in the dialogue, but not I think
without abandoning hope for its coherent interpretation.

66

Cf. Republic I 353A911: Nu`n dh; oi\mai a[meinon a]n mavqoi~ o} a[rti hjrwvtwn, punqanomeno~ eij ouj
tou`to eJkavstou ei[h e[rgon o} a]n h] movnon ti h] kavllista tw`n a[llwn ajpergavzhtai.
67
Cf. Enneads V 4 [7] 2, 2628 where Plotinus introduces the principle that generation is a product of the
perfection of an activity. Contra White 1989: 154 who argues that "birth in beauty" is the "means" to the
only sort of immortality available to mortals. On White's view, the production of true virtue is presumably
another "means."
68
The prior expression is the demiurge's production of order in the universe, Timaeus 29E. Because the
demiurge is good, he is without fqovno". "Being ungrudging" is a negative way of characterizing the e[rgon
of love. But even in the case of the demiurge, the production is a result of the good that he possesses, not a
constituent of it.

15

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