Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11908

February 4, 1918

ANTONIO M.A BARRETTO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE SANTA MARINA and "LA INSULAR," defendants-appellees.
Alfredo Chcote and Jose Arnaiz for appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Kincaid and Perkins for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The material facts upon which our disposition of this appeal necessarily turns are set out at length in
our opinion in the case of Barretto vs. Santa Marina, decided December 2, 1913 (26 Phil rep., 200).
This court having ruled against the plaintiff's contention in the former case, he now sets up a claim
for interest at the legal rate upon the amount of the purchase price of his share (participacion) in the
business from the 1st day of July, 1909, to the 22d day of November, 1910, the day upon which it
was turned over to him.
The finding of facts, and the reasoning upon which we based our rulings in the former case, are
manifestly conclusive in the present case as to the plaintiff's claim of a right to interest from the first
of July, 1909, to the third of May, 1910.
In the former case we held that the sale of plaintiff's share (participacion) in the tobacco factory was
consummated on the latter date; that the valuation set upon his share (participacion) in business
was determined as of that day by the committee charged with the duty of ascertaining the cash value
of this share (participacion) in order to determine the exact amount which the parties had agreed
upon as the purchase price to be paid therefor; and that the committee had included that the
plaintiff's share of the profits of the business down to the third of May, 1910, in their estimate of the
value of his share (participacion) in the business of that date.
These rulings were made after a review of the same record which is now relied upon by the plaintiff
in support of his claim of interest upon the amount fixed by the committee as the true value of his
share (participacion) in the business. We find nothing in the record of the contention of counsel in
this regard which would justify or necessitate a modification or reversal of the conclusions reached
by us in our former opinion.
Plaintiff's share (participacion) in the business having been sold on the 3rd day of May, 1910, for a
stipulated price, that is to say, for its value on that day as fixed by the valuation committee, it is very
clear that he is not entitled to interest on the amount fixed by the committee, prior to the date on
which the sale was consummated (3rd of may, 1910).
So also plaintiff's contention that he should be allowed interest on the amount of the purchase price
from the date of the sale, May 3, 1910, down to the day upon which the money was actually turned
over to him, November 22, 1910, cannot be sustained. Under the express terms of the agreement
for the sale on May 3, 1910, the plaintiff agreed to accept, and the defendant to pay, the amount
which the committee should find to be the true value of plaintiff's share (participacion) in the
business as of that day. Under the agreement the defendant neither expressly nor impliedly
obligated himself to pay interest on that amount pending the report of the committee. The only
contractual obligation assumed by him was that he would pay the amount fixed by the committee in
cash immediately upon the making of the award by the committee, and in accordance with its terms.
The committee's report is dated November 14, 1910, and it appears that promptly upon the
submission of this report, the amount awarded the plaintiff (P280,025.16) was paid over by the
defendant to the plaintiff in cash; and the letter of counsel for plaintiff dated November 17, 1910,
tendering a formal deed of sale of plaintiff's share (participacion) in the business and making
demand for the purchase price as fixed by the committee, read together with the formal deed of sale
executed November 22, 1910, with its acknowledgment of the receipt of the purchase price, leaves

no room for doubt that at that time the parties understood and accepted the purchase price therein
set forth as full payment of plaintiff's share (participacion) in the business in exact conformity with the
conditions imposed in the agreement consummated to May 3, 1910.
The right to interest arises either by virtue of a contract or by way of damages for delay or failure
(demora) to pay the principal on which interest is demanded, at the time when the debtor is obligated
to make such payment. In the case at bar where was no contract, express or implied, for the
payment of interest pending the award of the committee appointed to value the property sold on May
3, 1910, and there was no delay in the punctual compliance with defendant's obligation to make
immediate payment, in cash, of the amount of the award, upon the filing of the report of the
committee.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below dismissing the complaint in this case sine
die should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.