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MERCEDITA
MATA
ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent
judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn LetterComplaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength
of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the
vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of
the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of
the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge
averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to
the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost
25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the
ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to
him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion,
he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it
might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they
would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day.
When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up
with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance
that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of
Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
Contrary to Law.[4]
POEA where she found out that the appellant was indeed not a
licensed recruiter.
For her part, appellant Olermo denied all the charges
against her.[20] She alleged that she was engaged only in visa
assistance. She denied ever having represented herself as
possessing authority to deploy workers for overseas
employment. She thus explained that she only offered
complainants Villanueva, Aquino-Villanueva, Aparicio and
Majarucon assistance in processing their tourist visas. With
respect to the accusation of complainant Berador, appellant
alleged that she was only helping him process his trainees
visa.
On August 23, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crimes charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Crim. Case No. 2860-V-93, the Court finds accused
Marlene Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in large scale as defined and penalized under
Article 38 in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. 2018, without any attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and hereby sentences her to a
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
(2) In Crim. Case No. 2861-V-93, the Court finds accused
Marlene Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(a) in relation to the
first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance
and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences her to a penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision mayor as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum. The accused
is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Napoleon
Aparicio the amount of P40,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(3) In Crim. Case No. 2862-V-93, the Court finds accused
Marlene Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(a) in relation to the
first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences her to a penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision mayor as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum. The accused
is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Mary Jane
Aquino-Villanueva the amount of P35,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(4) In Crim. Case No. 2863-V-93, the Court finds accused
Marlene Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(a) in relation to the
first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences her to a penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision mayor as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum. The accused
is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Ariston B.
Villanueva the amount of P35,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(5) In Crim. Case No. 2864-V-93, the Court finds accused
Marlene Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(a) in relation to the
first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences her to a penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
FIRST DIVISION
Section 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may
be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial court judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge,
or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may
also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by
complainant against Herman Medina were pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In
fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano
Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order of release
therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have
been issued by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of
Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City.
In this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was
absent or unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail
bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day
respondent judge ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid
and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at
their respective posts.
It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no
authority to grant bail to an accused arrested outside of his
territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule
114 as quoted above must be complied with before a judge
may grant bail.[14] The Court recognizes that not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.
[15]
Where, however, the law is straightforward and the facts so
evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[16]
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail
and issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that
certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can
approve Medinas bail and issue an order for his release. The
law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. In
the case of Espaol and Suluen v. Mupas,[17] we have stated:
Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of accused
whose cases were not only pending in other courts but who
were, likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial
jurisdiction is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violates
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It must be
emphasized that the rules of procedure have been formulated
and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these
rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes
respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance
therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions.[18]
It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a
judge owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient
in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at
all times.[19] When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge
can easily be the mainspring of injustice.[20]
Respondent judges predicament is further aggravated by
his unauthorized or irregular issuance of search warrants not
once but a number of times. To our mind, his violations cannot
be excused as mere lapses in judgment but blatant and
conscious disregard of basic rules of procedure.
Moreover, records show that he has been previously
charged and found guilty of similar charges. Respondent judge
has been previously fined Five Thousand Pesos for notarizing
the revocation of a Special Power of Attorney in violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-90. [21] In another
case, he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
negligence in the performance of duties for issuing a temporary
restraining order and granting a partys motion without the
benefit of a proper hearing. He was fined Ten Thousand Pesos.
[22]
Jr.,
C.J.,
Quisumbing,
FIRST DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03219952 the following documents to support the motion of the
prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest:
1.
2.
Affidavit-Complaint of private
complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.[3]
Copies of the checks issued by
private complainant in favor of State
Resources Corporation.[4]
Panganiban,
SECOND DIVISION
3.
4.
5.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the
Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding
the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest
may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation
or when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In
case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5)
[6]
6.
Supplemental
Affidavit
of
private complainant to include the
incorporators and members of the
board of directors of State
Resources
Development
Management
Corporation
as
participants in the conspiracy to
commit
the
crime
of
syndicated estafa. Among
those
included was petitioner Chester
De Joya.[7]
7.
Counter-Affidavits of Chester
De Joya and the other accused,
Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny S. Hao.
b.
Jurisdiction over the
defendant
or
respondent: This
is
acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission
by the defendant
or
respondent to the court or by coercive
SO ORDERED.