G.R. No.

155223

April 4, 2007

BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA, Petitioner,

vs.
FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Bobie Rose V. Frias represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marie
Regine F. Fujita (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated September
11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839.
Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
which she acquired from Island Masters Realty and Development Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated Nov. 16, 1990.3 The property is covered by TCT No. 168173 of the Register of Deeds of Makati in the name of
IMRDC.4
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison (respondent), as the SECOND
PARTY, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 over the property with the following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00) receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six (6) months from the date of the execution of this contract within
which to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase the aforementioned parcel of land together within
(sic) the improvements thereon at the price of SIX MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to the FIRST PARTY of the SECOND PARTYs intention to purchase the same, the
latter has a period of another six months within which to pay the remaining balance of P3.4 million.
2. That prior to the six months period given to the SECOND PARTY within which to decide whether or not to
purchase the above-mentioned property, the FIRST PARTY may still offer the said property to other persons
who may be interested to buy the same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00 given to the FIRST PARTY
BY THE SECOND PARTY shall be paid to the latter including interest based on prevailing compounded bank
interest plus the amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00 should the property be sold at a price more
than P7 million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first six months from the execution of this
contract, no interest shall be charged by the SECOND PARTY on the P3 million however, in the event that on
the sixth month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST
PARTY has a period of another six months within which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos provided that the
said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last six months only. Under this circumstance, the
amount of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the property shall be
considered as the security for the mortgage which can be enforced in accordance with law.
x x x x.6
Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated check dated
February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered said check stale. 7 Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. 168173
in the name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified petitioner through a letter 8 dated March 20, 1991, which
petitioner received only on June 11, 1991, 9 reminding petitioner of their agreement that the amount of two million
pesos which petitioner received from respondent should be considered as a loan payable within six months. Petitioner
subsequently failed to pay respondent the amount of two million pesos.

On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint 10 for sum of money with
preliminary attachment against petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30.
Respondent alleged the foregoing facts and in addition thereto averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the
security for the loan by making a false report11 of the loss of her owners copy of TCT No. 168173 to the Tagig Police
Station on June 3, 1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition 12 for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of said title with the RTC of Makati, Branch 142; that the petition was granted in an Order 13 dated
August 31, 1991; that said Order was subsequently set aside in an Order dated April 10, 1992 14where the RTC Makati
granted respondents petition for relief from judgment due to the fact that respondent is in possession of the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered the provincial public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of
petitioner for perjury and false testimony. Respondent prayed for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and payment of two million pesos with interest at 36% per annum from December 7, 1991, P100,000.00
moral, corrective and exemplary damages and P200,000.00 for attorneys fees.
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of two million pesos. 15
Petitioner filed an Amended Answer16 alleging that the Memorandum of Agreement was conceived and arranged by her
lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada, who is also respondents lawyer; that she was asked to sign the agreement without
being given the chance to read the same; that the title to the property and the Deed of Sale between her and the
IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for safekeeping and were never turned over to respondent as there was no
consummated sale yet; that out of the two million pesos cash paid, Atty. Lozada took the one million pesos which has
not been returned, thus petitioner had filed a civil case against her; that she was never informed of respondents
decision not to purchase the property within the six month period fixed in the agreement; that when she demanded
the return of TCT No. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC from Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her
these documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991 which her secretary placed in her attache case; that the
envelope together with her other personal things were lost when her car was forcibly opened the following day; that
she sought the help of Atty. Lozada who advised her to secure a police report, to execute an affidavit of loss and to get
the services of another lawyer to file a petition for the issuance of an owners duplicate copy; that the petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy was filed on her behalf without her knowledge and neither did she sign the
petition nor testify in court as falsely claimed for she was abroad; that she was a victim of the manipulations of Atty.
Lozada and respondent as shown by the filing of criminal charges for perjury and false testimony against her; that no
interest could be due as there was no valid mortgage over the property as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud
and deception. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, counter-claim for damages and attorneys fees.
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996, the RTC issued a decision, 17 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2 Million plus interest thereon at the rate of thirty two (32%)
per cent per annum beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid.
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00 representing premiums paid by plaintiff on the
attachment bond with legal interest thereon counted from the date of this decision until fully paid.
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective and exemplary
damages.
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees of P100,000.00 plus cost of litigation. 18
The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation to pay respondent the amount of two million pesos with
compounded interest pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement; that the fraudulent scheme employed by
petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to her loaned money when petitioner executed an affidavit of loss
and instituted a petition for the issuance of an owners duplicate title knowing the same was in respondents
possession, entitled respondent to moral damages; and that petitioners bare denial cannot be accorded credence
because her testimony and that of her witness did not appear to be credible.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that she received from respondent the two million pesos in cash but the
fact that petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without respondents knowledge thus it is not

binding on respondent; that respondent had also proven that in 1993, she initially paid the sum of P30,000.00 as
premium for the issuance of the attachment bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, and P20,000.00 for the renewal
in 1995, thus plaintiff should be reimbursed considering that she was compelled to go to court and ask for a writ of
preliminary attachment to protect her rights under the agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a Decision dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with
modification, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the rate of interest is
reduced from 32% to 25% per annum, effective June 7, 1991 until fully paid. 19
The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as her commission and partly as a loan;
respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated check of one million pesos because she had decided not to buy the
property and petitioner knew of her decision as early as April 1991; the award of moral damages was warranted since
even granting petitioner had no hand in the filing of the petition for the issuance of an owners copy, she executed an
affidavit of loss of TCT No. 168173 when she knew all along that said title was in respondents possession; petitioners
claim that she thought the title was lost when the brown envelope given to her by Atty. Lozada was stolen from her car
was hollow; that such deceitful conduct caused respondent serious anxiety and emotional distress.
The CA concluded that there was no basis for petitioner to say that the interest should be charged for six months only
and no more; that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan; that interest should commence on June 7,
199120 with compounded bank interest prevailing at the time the two million was considered as a loan which was in
June 1991; that the bank interest rate for loans secured by a real estate mortgage in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32%
per annum as certified to by Prudential Bank,21 that in fairness to petitioner, the rate to be charged should be 25%
only.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 11, 2002.
Hence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED BANK INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SIX (6) MONTHS AS
CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IS
PROPER EVEN IF NOT MENTIONED IN THE TEXT OF THE DECISION. 22
Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at 32% per annum awarded by the trial court or at 25% per annum as
modified by the CA which should run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is contrary to the parties Memorandum of
Agreement; that the agreement provides that if respondent would decide not to purchase the property, petitioner has
the period of another six months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the last six months only; that the
CAs ruling that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the New Civil Code
which provides that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
We are not persuaded.
While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed since a simple loan
may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest, 23 we find no error committed by the CA in awarding a 25%
interest per annum on the two-million peso loan even beyond the second six months stipulated period.
The Memorandum of Agreement executed between the petitioner and respondent on December 7, 1990 is the law
between the parties. In resolving an issue based upon a contract, we must first examine the contract itself, especially
the provisions thereof which are relevant to the controversy. 24 The general rule is that if the terms of an agreement are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
prevail.25 It is further required that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. 26

In this case, the phrase "for the last six months only" should be taken in the context of the entire agreement. We agree
with and adopt the CAs interpretation of the phrase in this wise:
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six months each. The first six-month period was given to plaintiffappellee (respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase defendant-appellants (petitioner's) property.
The second six-month period was given to defendant-appellant to pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiffappellee decided not to buy the subject property in which case interest will be charged "for the last six months only",
referring to the second six-month period. This means that no interest will be charged for the first six-month period
while appellee was making up her mind whether to buy the property, but only for the second period of six months after
appellee had decided not to buy the property. This is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six months only".
Certainly, there is nothing in their agreement that suggests that interest will be charged for six months only even if it
takes defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.27
The agreement that the amount given shall bear compounded bank interest for the last six months only, i.e., referring
to the second six-month period, does not mean that interest will no longer be charged after the second six-month
period since such stipulation was made on the logical and reasonable expectation that such amount would be paid
within the date stipulated. Considering that petitioner failed to pay the amount given which under the Memorandum of
Agreement shall be considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the last six months continued to accrue until actual
payment of the loaned amount.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus, until the principal sum due
is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal
amount.28 It has been held that for a debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to
use the same after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust enrichment
on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.29
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned amount shall earn compounded bank interests, and per the
certification issued by Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum. The CA
reduced the interest rate to 25% instead of the 32% awarded by the trial court which petitioner no longer
assailed.1awphi1.nt
In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,30 we upheld the validity of a 21% per annum interest on a P142,326.43 loan.
In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,31 we sustained the agreement of the parties to a 24% per annum interest on
an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the interest rate of 25% per annum awarded by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and
reasonable.
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a fraudulent scheme
to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such finding is baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the
case for perjury and false testimony filed by respondent against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.32
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those actions
are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by respondent against petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioners act of trying to deprive respondent of the
security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to moral damages.1a\^/phi1.net Moral damages may be
awarded in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud. 33
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the event that respondent opts not to buy the property, the money
given by respondent to petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the property shall be considered as the security for the

mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that after they executed the agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner
gave her the owners copy of the title to the property, the Deed of Sale between petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate
of occupancy, and the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed the Deed of Sale. 34 However,
notwithstanding that all those documents were in respondents possession, petitioner executed an affidavit of loss that
the owners copy of the title and the Deed of Sale were lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she was of the belief
that since she had demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she thought that the brown envelope with
markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 already contained the title and the Deed of Sale as those
documents were in the same brown envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with
respondent.35 Such statement remained a bare statement. It was not proven at all since Atty. Lozada had not taken the
stand to corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners own witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to
establish petitioner's claim that the title was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's testimony that after the
brown envelope was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she placed it in petitioners attach
case36 and did not bother to look at the envelope.37
It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing of the petition with
the RTC for the issuance of new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173. Petitioners actuation would have deprived
respondent of the security for her loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC
set aside its previous order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages is proper. 38Exemplary
damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of example or correction for the public good. 39 The RTC awarded the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an
aggregate amount may not be the usual way of awarding said damages, 40 no error has been committed by CA. There is
no question that respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding attorneys fees because the trial courts decision did not explain the
findings of facts and law to justify the award of attorneys fees as the same was mentioned only in the dispositive
portion of the RTC decision.
We agree.
Article 220841 of the New Civil Code enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and, in all cases, it must
be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be granted. 42 Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant
to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a
suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 43 The award of attorney's fees is
the exception rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of facts and law
that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees
cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. 44 They must be clearly explained and justified by
the trial court in the body of its decision. On appeal, the CA is precluded from supplementing the bases for awarding
attorneys fees when the trial court failed to discuss in its Decision the reasons for awarding the same. Consequently,
the award of attorney's fees should be deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated September 11,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of
attorneys fees is DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES
GONZALES, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude.
It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any public officer or private
individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive
franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in
court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz,
Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority.
Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and
to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two (2) other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses,
and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents.
Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner
corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. 2 During its pendency,
petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also
ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
items were returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and damages.
Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus:

In its

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the
latter jointly and severally:
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% per annum
from January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items not
returned;

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and P15,000.00 for and as
exemplary damages; and
4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division,
modification, thus:

affirmed the Decision with

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the
dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against defendants
(petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her
application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26 pieces of
girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until
it is fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of P30,000.00, for and as
moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally against defendantsappellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID
NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE
CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS
WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are
nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the seizure was made
without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following
circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner
corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in
October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de
Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary
and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were
seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private
respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant.
Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing
so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal.
There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 8 These
facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure.
Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition
and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the
raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of
the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and
liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx

(6) Illegal search;

(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore
that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of
Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused
their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the
United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver,
responsible,viz:

10

the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly

[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred
by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms
that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly observed by
respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents')
merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents)
were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is,
thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's
instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances
should answer the trial court's query posed in its decision now under consideration as to why the
PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop
the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the
same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the

goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time
despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of
franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID
PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend immediately
unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search
warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound
the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body.
Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. 14
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of
scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private respondents' rights
are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause
the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the
raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with
Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the
plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral
damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless
nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents'
avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their
testimonies. Respondent Cruz declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am doing business with
borrowed money only, there was commotion created by the raiding team and they even stepped on
some of the pants and dresses on display for sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me
with accusing expressions. I was trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18
Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many people have been
watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for
which I am claiming P25,000.00 for damages. 19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like that what I have
been selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. Many people
were around and the more the confiscation was made in a scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts,
pants and dresses even those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in the
presence of market goers that morning. 20
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. 21 It will also serve
as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a

virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done
both by government and indirectly by private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest
from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl
scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of
this Decision until the payment thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, HERMINIGILDO
FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD,
NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA
ESTRELLANES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to
set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13
May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying
petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
The present controversy arose from the following antecedents:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial
labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private
respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989,
respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said
designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo
Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives.
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to declare null
and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled
"Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of Local Government, et al."
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses REYNALDO V.
TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA,
MAXIMO VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That during the period from February 1989 to February 1991 and subsequent thereto,
in the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor
HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P.
AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the performance of
their official functions and taking advantage of their public positions, with evident bad

faith, manifest partiality, and conspiring and confederating with each other did, then
and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury to Sectoral Members Bartolome
M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of
NINETY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P95,350.00) and ONE
HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00) representing
respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such
undue injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome
Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 2
On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations
issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been
done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. 3
The trial court expounded thus:
The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along
with 7 companion cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792, 87935, 88072, and
90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990, ruled that:
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government) may appoint members of the local legislative bodies
to represent the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a
determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the said sectors are of
sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after
consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned.
The Supreme Court further ruled
For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code even prescribe the time and manner by which such determination is to be
conducted by the Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that
the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are
of sufficient number to warrant representation, there will absolutely be no basis for the
designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector concerned to warrant
representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and
persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a prerequisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector are the ones primarily
interested in being represented in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court
considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body) as a
condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior determination by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of private
defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.

This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases, the Supreme Court invariably nullified
the designations where the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not complied with. Just to
cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of Valenzuela that the sectors
concerned are of sufficient number to warrant representation and there was no
consultation whatsoever with the associations and persons belonging to the Industrial
and Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private respondents
Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez are null and void (Romeo Llanado, et al. v. Hon.
Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769,
where the same is currently pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of
proceedings filed by petitioners. Said respondent Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it appears,
nevertheless, that the private complainants have been rendering services on the basis of their
respective appointments as sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity.
Having rendered such services, the private complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to their
office. Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide that the said
appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are entitled
to their salaries and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for the reason that before
such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at least de facto public
officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities.
In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered in Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld salaries for the services they have
actually rendered as sectoral representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that
may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of the
innocence or guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial Question
filed by the accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution in view of the decision promulgated by
the trial court nullifying the appointments of private respondents but it was, likewise, denied in an order issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification that the grounds stated in the said motion were a
mere rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the case in abeyance. 6 The dispositive portion of its order reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the accused which was scheduled today is
cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K. Mendoza,
Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to show cause in writing
within ten (10) days from service hereof why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their
failure to appear in court today for arraignment.
In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is to be filed by the counsel for the
defense, set this case for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all dates the trial
to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an order holding consideration of all incidents pending the
issuance of an extended resolution. 8

No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan set
the arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the scheduled hearing today which We
deem to be excusable, reset this case for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the merits on
June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones. Considering that the
accused come all the way from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no postponement will be allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan
the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the pendency of a prejudicial
issue before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the
proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e., the validity
of the appointments of private respondents and their entitlement to compensation which is already
pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that
private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due
process.10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the legality or validity of private respondents' designation
as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may
proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal
case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal
case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal. 12 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 13
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential
elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769,
constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the
facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing
of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance
with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed
with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their
refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral
representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made in
violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of
Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the
charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad
faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents' claims. Private
respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of
Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to
proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual
services rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition
filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely
eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. 17 Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered
services as sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents'
designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation
for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. 18
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de factoofficer
where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. 19
WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R.
CV No. 36769.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137567

June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC,
Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the
Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case
No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, 2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. 3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered
the filing of an Information6 against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of
the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal
case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9,
1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 8 In an Order9 dated
January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued
another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for
annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the
marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner
because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that
the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of

psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never
existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a
married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage,
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The
pertinent portions of said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova

cited in Donato vs. Luna

14

where this Court held that:

. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not
be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that

pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142362

May 3, 2006

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and MICHAELC. U. DE GUZMAN, Complainants,

vs.
JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO Undersecretary for Communications, Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated 21 February 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP 49422. The assailed Decision authorized the dismissal of a civil complaint against
respondent Josefina Trinidad-Lichauco (Lichauco), former Undersecretary for Communications of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), on the premise that the complaint constituted a suit against the State.
A brief rundown of the relevant facts is in order.
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive
Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications
carriers2 which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through its then
Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU,
the launch of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite itself to be owned by the
Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently organized as PASI). 3 The consortium was to grant the Philippine government
one (1) transponder free of charge for the government's exclusive use for non-commercial purpose, as well as the right
of first refusal to another one (1) transponder in the Philippine satellite, if available. 4 The Philippine government,
through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required
orbital slot(s) and frequency assignment(s) for the Philippine satellite.
PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the
International Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots, designated as 161 East Longitude and 153 East
Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 June 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking
for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to
PASI for its satellites, which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites. 5 Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter
dated 3 July 1996, confirming "the Philippine Government's assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to
[PASI] for its [Agila] satellites."6
PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations
for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its
capital, negotiation with business partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite
manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly "embarked on
a crusade to malign the name of [Michael de Guzman] and sabotage the business of PASI." Lichauco's purported
efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her offering orbital slot 153 East Longitude
for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997, despite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. 7 It was
later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown to
PASI.8
Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted on 23 January 1998 a civil complaint against
Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC, and the "Unknown Awardee" who was to be the recipient of orbital
slot 153 East Longitude. The complaint, alleging three (3) causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of
award, and damages. The first cause of action, for injunction, sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153
East Longitude should be enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot to PASI. The second
cause of action, for declaration of nullity of award, averred that the award to the unknown bidder is null and void, as it
was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority.9
The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged "crusade" to malign the
name of plaintiff [D]e Guzman and sabotage the business of [PASI]:

12. xxx
(a) On 4 December 1996, in a meeting with the members of the Board of Directors of plaintiff corporation,
defendant Lichauco then uttered disparaging and defamatory comments against plaintiff de Guzman. These
defamatory remarks triggered efforts from within the plaintiff corporation aimed at ousting plaintiff de Guzman
from his position.
(b) Defendant Lichauco, then an undersecretary of DOTC, wrote Mr. Jesli Lapuz on 5 December 1996 (barely
two days after plaintiff de Guzman wrote him) to deny that the DOTC has assigned the two (2) Philippine
orbital slots to plaintiff corporation. Defendant Lichauco falsely asserted that only orbital slot 161 E was
assigned to plaintiff, orbital slot 153 E was not.
In the same letter, defendant Lichauco branded as FALSE plaintiff de Guzman's claim that "Agila" is a
registered corporate name of plaintiff corporation.
A copy of the letter is attached as Annex E.
(c) Not contented, defendant Lichauco, again for reasons known only to her, and with malice aforethought,
made defamatory remarks against plaintiffs during a telecommunications forum held in Makati City sometime
in October 1997 in the presence of public officials and business executives.
(d) Defendant Lichauco did not spare plaintiff corporation from her unprovoked defamation. Defendant
Lichauco arrogantly said that she had asked President Fidel V. Ramos to sue plaintiff Michael de Guzman. With
the same degree of arrogance she threatened plaintiff corporation not to use the name "Agila", otherwise she
would fight plaintiff corporation and would make sure that the name of Agila would never be given back to
plaintiff corporation.
(e) To top it all, defendant Lichauco without basis and with evident bad faith, said that plaintiff corporation will
never pay its contractors.
(f) In December 1997, defendant Lichauco delivered the coup de' grace. Again, acting unilaterally, without
prior notice to plaintiff corporation and in gross violation of DOTC's earlier assignment to plaintiff corporation of
orbital slot 153 E, defendant Lichauco offered said slot to interested applicants. A copy of the notice of offer is
attached as Annex F.
13. Plaintiffs learned of defendant Lichauco's acts after orbital slot 153 E was offered for bidding. To plaintiff
coproration's knowledge, the orbital slot was eventually awarded to defendant Unknown Awardee.
x x x x10
The complaint alleged that since Lichauco's act of offering and awarding orbital slot 153 East Longitude was patently
illegal and violative of DOTC's prior commitment to PASI, Lichauco should be enjoined from performing any acts and
entering into or executing any agreement or arrangement of whatever nature in connection with the said orbital slot.
The complaint also averred that the purported award of the orbital slot to the "Unknown Awardee was illegal, and thus
should be declared null and void. Finally, the complaint alleged a cause of action for damages against Lichauco, cast in
the following manner:
xxxx
21. Defendant Lichauco attacked the good name and reputation of plaintiffs.
22. She willfully caused damage to plaintiffs by orchestrating the above-described acts which are contrary to law;
morals and basic norms of good faith.
23. She interefered with and violated plaintiff corporation's contract with DOTC by offering and awarding orbital slot
153 E to defendant Unknown Awardee.

24. Because of defendant Lichauco's reprehensible acts, plaintiffs suffered actual damages of at least P10 million each,
for all of which defendant Lichauco should be held liable to pay.
25. By reason of defendant Lichauco's illegal and malicious acts, plaintiff corporation's business name and goodwill
was tarnished, for which plaintiff corporation should be indemnified by way of moral damages in the amount of at least
P10 million.
26. For the same reasons, plaintiff de Guzman suffered and continue to suffer extreme mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and besmirched reputation, for all of which plaintiff de Guzman should
be indemnified in the amount of at least P10 million.
27. Defendant Lichauco should also be sanctioned, as a deterrent for public good, to pay each plaintiff exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P5 million.
28. In order to protect and enforce their rights, plaintiffs were compelled to institute this suit, engage the services of
counsel and incur litigation expenses, for all of which plaintiffs should be indemnified in the amount of at least P500
Thousand each.11
xxxx
In sum, petitioners sought the following reliefs for the three (3) causes of action:
xxxx
3. After trial of the issues, render judgment as follows:
[a] On the first cause of action, making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction;
[b] On the second cause of action, declaring the offer and award of orbital slot 153 E to defendant Unknown
Awardee null and void.
[c] On the third cause of action, directing defendant Lichauco to pay the following sums:
i. P10 million each to plaintiffs as actual damages;
ii. P10 million to plaintiff corporation as moral damages;
iii. P10 million to plaintiff de Guzman as moral damages;
iv. P5 million each to plaintiffs as exemplary damages;
v. P500 Thousand each to plaintiffs as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
x x x x12
The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, and subsequently raffled to Branch
214. On 2 February 1998, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order against Lichauco, who received the summons
together with the complaint on 28 January 1998. Lichauco failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, but
eight (8) days after the lapse thereof, she filed a Manifestation and Motion asking for a new five (5)-day period, or until
25 February 1998, to file a responsive pleading to the complaint. However, she filed instead a Motion to Admit with
attached Motion to Dismiss on 27 February 1998. She rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on
the grounds that the suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent; that the complaint
stated no cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek
recourse with the Office of the President.

In an order13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It characterized the defense of state
immunity as "at very least a contentious issue which can not be resolved by mere allegations in the pleadings but
which can be best threshed out in a litig[i]ous forum where parties are accorded enormous (sic) opportunity to argue
for the ascertainment of whether the act complained of are indeed within the parameters and prerogatives of the
authority exercising the same."14 The RTC also noted that the allegations in the complaint regarding the ultimate facts
sufficiently presented an ultra vires act of Lichauco, and that she was being sued in her personal capacity. As to the
argument pertaining to the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that the principle is not an
inflexible rule, and may be dispensed with when its application would cause great and irreparable damage or when it
would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 15
Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently nullified the RTC order in the Decision now assailed before us. The Court of Appeals sustained the
contention that the complaint is a suit against the State with the following ratiocination:
The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against the state.1avvphil.net
The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad faith was done in the exercise of and in
pursuance of an official duty. Her duties are as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. The Undersecretary shall:
(1) Advise and assist the Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department objectives and
policies;
(2) Oversee all the operational activities of the department for which he shall be responsible to the Secretary;
(3) Coordinate the programs and projects of the department and be responsible for its economical, efficient
and effective administration:
xxxxxxxxx
It is apparent from the above enumeration that the petitioner is directly under and answerable to the DOTC Secretary.
We can therefore conclude that her official acts such as the said "notice of offer" was with the blessing and prior
approval of the DOTC Secretary himself.
Being an official act, it is also protected by the presumption that the same was performed in good faith and in the
regular performance of official duty.
"Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. - As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or
executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in the line of his official duty. In order that acts may be done within the scope of official authority, it is
not necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or requested by a superior
officer, but it is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters committed by law to his control or
supervision, or that they have more or less connection with such matters, or that they are governed by a lawful
requirement of the department under whose authority the officer is acting. Under this principle, state building
commissioners who, in obedience to a stature, discharge one who has been employed to construct a state building,
take possession of the work, and place it in the hands of another contractor, are not liable to the former contractor in
damages, since in so doing they are merely acting in the line of their duty. An officer is not personally responsible for
the necessary and unavoidable destruction of goods stored in buildings, when such buildings were destroyed by him in
the lawful performance of a public duty imposed on him by a valid and constitutional statute."
xxxxxxxxx
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. - Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to
exercise his judgment in matters brought before him he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting
he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous or mistaken

decision, however, erroneous judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the
officer's authority, and without willfulness, malice, or corruption." (43 Am. Jur., pp. 85-86).
In Sanders vs. Veridiano[16], the Supreme Court held:
"Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government,
and within the scope of their authority, it is that government and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for
their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United
States government as their principal. This will require that government, viz.: the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where
we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign States
sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption
of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by
such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. This too is well-settled."17
Preliminarily, we discuss the procedural grounds cited by petitioners which they assert are sufficient to have caused
the dismissal of Lichauco's petition before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners claim that contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Lichauco failed to attach all pleadings and documents relevant to her petition, and
that those that were attached were merely "duplicate original copies." Lichauco counters that for the viability of her
petition for certiorari, all that she needed to attach were her motion to dismiss, the RTC orders acting on such motion,
her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to dismiss, and petitioners' opposition to said motion for
reconsideration. She claims that only these motions and submission were relevant to the resolution of her petition. 18
In her comment, Lichaucho claims that she did not have to attach the complaint to the copy of the petition she sent to
the petitioners herein, since the latter obviously retained the original copy of the complaint they filed. 19 However, her
petition before the appellate court does not indicate that the same complaint was included as an attachment, and
indeed, there is a curious absence of any averment on Lichuaco's part that she indeed attached the said complaint to
her petition.20 Certainly, in a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint, the very
complaint itself is a document relevant and pertinent to the special civil action. It should be remembered that unlike in
an ordinary appeal that is given due course,21 the case record is not automatically elevated to the court exercising
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari; hence there is an even more impelling need to attach all pleadings
and documents to the special civil action, as mandated under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
After all, how could the court a quo properly ascertain whether or not the motion to dismiss itself should have been
granted if it did not have a copy of the complaint sought to be dismissed itself.
Nonetheless, the requirement to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1, Rule 65 is read in relation to Section
3, Rule 46, which states that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the documentary requirements, such as
the attachment of such relevant pleadings, "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition." The procedural
rule accords sufficient discretion to the court hearing the special civil action whether or not to dismiss the petition
outright for failure to comply with said requirement. If the court does dismiss the petition on that ground, the dismissal
would be justifiable under Section 3, Rule 46, and generally such action of the court cannot be assailed as constituting
either grave abuse of discretion or reversible error of law. If the court, on the other hand, takes cognizance of the
petition despite such lapses, the phrasing of Section 3, Rule 46 sufficiently justifies such adjudicative recourse. Indeed,
the ultimate logic behind rules of procedure being the promotion of the objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, 22 the higher interests of justice may at times sufficiently
warrant the allowance of the petition for certiorari despite such lapses, especially if they are nonetheless correctible
through subsequent submissions.

In any event, the Court is willing to overlook Lichauco's failure to attach the complaint in her petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, an oversight sadly ignored by the appellate court. There are weighty issues at hand
relating to the doctrine of state immunity from suit and the requisites of a motion to dismiss.
There is a connective issue between these two aspects in that if the State is sued without its consent, the
corresponding suit must be dismissed. At times, it would be teasingly obvious, even from the moment of the filing of
the complaint, that the suit is one against the State. A cursory examination of the caption of the complaint can
sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as when the suit is directly initiated against the Republic of the Philippines,
any foreign government, or an unincorporated government agency as the named respondents. In such cases,
obviously there is need for immediate caution, although if it is somehow established that those respondents had given
their consent to be sued, the suit may nonetheless prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the
complaint as "acting Secretary of the [DOTC]."23 The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or
financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.24 However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal
because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.
Petitioner insists that Lichauco is being sued for her acts committed in excess of her authority, ultra vires in nature,
and tortious in character. The Court of Appeals responded that such acts fell within Lichauco's official duties as DOTC
Undersecretary, thus enjoying the presumption that they were performed in good faith and in the regular performance
of official duty. This rationale is pure sophistry and must be rejected outright.
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith" or "regular performance of official duty", yet these
presumptions are disputable25 and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.26 Many civil actions are
oriented towards overcoming any number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly be geared
towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence overcome the disputable
presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the perceived indisputability
of the presumptions, the judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a
given case, nothing more. Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save perhaps for the
provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever adopted as a jurisprudential rule, no public officer could ever be
sued for acts executed beyond their official functions or authority, or for tortious conduct or behavior, since such acts
would "enjoy the presumption of good faith and in the regular performance of official duty". Indeed, few civil actions of
any nature would ever reach the trial stage, if a case can be adjudicated by a mere determination from the complaint
or answer as to which legal presumptions are applicable. For example, the presumption that a person is innocent of a
wrong is a disputable presumption on the same level as that of the regular performance of official duty. 27 A civil
complaint for damages necessarily alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would serve
as basis for the award of damages. With the rationale of the Court of Appeals, such complaint can be dismissed upon a
motion to dismiss solely on the ground that the presumption is that a person is innocent of a wrong.
So obviously, the Decision of the Court of Appeals cannot receive the imprimatur of this Court. Still, the question of
whether Lichauco may validly invoke state immunity from suit to secure the outright dismissal of petitioners' complaint
warrants closer examination.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three (3) causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her
performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153 East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to
nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself. Evidently,
the first two causes of action stem from Lichauco's act of offering orbital slot 153 East Longitude for bidding, through
the Notice of Offer which was attached to the complaint.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Lichauco asserts that she is being sued for issuing the aforementioned Notice of Offer, which
fell within her official functions as DOTC Undersecretary for Communications. She claims that it was Secretary
Lagdameo who authorized her to offer orbital slot 153 East Longitude for bidding, and she thus acted well within the

scope of her authority to advise and assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department
objectives and policies.
The Notice of Offer cites Department Circular 97-01, signed by then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile, as authority for it.
The Court has examined the aforementioned Department Circular, issued on 17 October 1997, which establishes the
"Guidelines on the Procurement of Orbital Slots and Frequency Registration of Philippine Satellites". Therein, the DOTC
is mandated "to conduct a bidding process in case there are competing applications for any one of the assigned or
applied-for-orbital slots"28. Further, the Department Circular states that "the DOTC shall publish in three newspapers of
general circulation a notice of offer for the government assigned, initiated and applied for orbital slots." 29
Thus, insofar as the first two causes of action are concerned, Lichauco may have a point when she asserts that they
were based on acts which she performed in her capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. But does this necessarily mean that
these two causes of action may thus be dismissed on the basis of state immunity of suit?
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the government will
result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit against
the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where the government official concerned
performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability
of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or
respondent.
On this point, our ruling in J.M. Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration 30 is material. Petitioners therein had filed a
special civil action for prohibition to nullify Republic Act No. 2616, or law that directed the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate in Quezon City. Impleaded as respondents were the officials and government agency tasked to undertake such
expropriation. The respondents alleged that the petition for prohibition was actually a suit against the State without its
consent. The Court, through then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, debunked the argument,
ruling instead that the petition was within the ambit of judicial review:
[T]he power of judicial review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from the relevant provisions of
the Constitution. This power may be exercised when the party adversely affected by either a legislative or executive
act, or a municipal ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate suit to test its validity. The special civil action of
prohibition has been relied upon precisely to restrain the enforcement of what is alleged to be an unconstitutional
statute. As it is a fundamental postulate that the Constitution as the supreme law is binding on all governmental
agencies, failure to observe the limitations found therein furnishes a sufficient ground for a declaration of nullity of the
government measure challenged. The argument then that the government is the adverse party and that, therefore,
must consent to its being sued certainly is far from persuasive. x x x x 31
The Court further noted that it was well-settled for the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, "it is
enough if the respondents or defendants named be the government officials who would give operation and effect to
official action allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality."32
Unlike in J.M. Tuason, the case at bar does not seek to nullify an unconstitutional law or measure. However, the first
two causes of action do sufficiently impute grave abuse of discretion against Lichauco in her official capacity. Since
judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it
necessarily follows in such instances that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or
respondent in the appropriate suit.
Moreover, if the suit had been directed against Lichauco alone, and in her personal capacity, yet it sought, as it now
does, the nullification of the Notice of Offer or the awards thereon, such remedy could not avail even if granted.
Lichauco, in her personal capacity, cannot be directed to set aside the Notice of Offer, the award of the bid, or to issue
a new award herself. It is only because Lichauco was sued in her official capacity as the DOTC Undersecretary that she,
or her successors in office, could be judicially compelled to act in such fashion.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since
said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These
causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of
state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the

nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in
relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner
impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that at the time of the filing of the complaint, Lichauco herself was already the acting
head of the DOTC, owing to the sudden death of then Secretary Enrile a few days before. At that stage, any suit
seeking to nullify the Notice of Bid and the alleged award to the "Unknown Bidder" should have properly denominated
Lichauco as the respondent, and not the DOTC.
Nonetheless, as to the first two causes of action, there was a viable ground to dismiss the complaint: the nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. Indeed, such ground was alleged by Lichauco in her Motion to Dismiss. Yet the
principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies admits to several exceptions. In its Order denying the motion to
dismiss the complaint, the RTC adequately dispensed with the objection, applying the established exceptions to the
rule of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. To wit:
Turning to the matter pertaining to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is fundamental that this principle is
not an inflexible rule. It yields to many accepted exceptions. (Rocamora vs. RTC - Cebu, G.R. No. 65307). As in this
case, this principle can be dispensed with when its application would cause great and irreparable damage and when it
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
When the subject orbital slot 153 E was bidded out to other applicants, the damage and injury plaintiffs stand to suffer
was clear, present, and substantiated that this Court was impelled to provide urgent needed measure such as the
issuance of writ of injunction against the public defendant. Indeed, under the circumstances then obtaining it was
impractical for the plaintiffs to first proceed to the administrative official concerned before taking court action. 33
A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action, anchored as it is on alleged acts that are tortious in
character or otherwise beyond the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered
several disparaging and defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false assertions against them in her letter
to the Land Bank President.
The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the trial to be determined on the basis of the evidence.
However, if proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded by the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals :34
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the
rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a
State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.35
The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on the merits, it is established that the public official concerned had
committed illegal or tortious acts against the plaintiff. How does it apply in relation to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of state immunity from suit, necessarily lodged before trial on the merits?

Our ruling in United States of America v. Reyes36 warrants due consideration. The Court therein, through then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled that a motion to dismiss averring immunity from suit of
a State and its functionaries was actually grounded on the specific ground for dismissal of the lack of cause of action,
for even assuming that the defendants had committed the injurious acts complained of, "no action may be maintained
thereon, because of the principle of state immunity."37 Pertinently, the Court noted that "a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint."
Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by the State's immunity from suit, to
hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical admission has to be deemed a
concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or damaging acts against the petitioners, which if true,
would hold her liable for damages.
Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the defense of state immunity from suit in regard to the third cause of action
with the assertion that the acts complained of constituting said cause of action fell within her official functions and
were not tortuous in character. Still, to establish such assertions of fact, a full-blown trial on the merits would be
necessary, as would the case be if Lichauco raised the defense that she did not commit these acts complained of.
Certainly, these defenses cannot be accorded merit before trial, factual as they are in character.
All told, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying Lichauco's Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 February 2000 is SET ASIDE
and the Order dated 14 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court is ordered to try and decide the case on the merits with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159186

June 5, 2009

JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City;
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ
ofpreliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision 2 dated April 30,
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company
Primetown Property Group.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of
said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter,
spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from
Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining
checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is
Closed."Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the
checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's
fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231. 3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed
suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238. 4
Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and
Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a
prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings. 6 Petitioner
prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were
finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
Partial Motion for Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I. 9 The subsequent motions were denied in the Order10 dated
October 18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction11before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 12 denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001. 14
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not
the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein
are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn
Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and
distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather
the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the
validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the
subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the
annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly,
even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced
therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 17
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE
CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME
CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER. 20
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the
present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and
damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of
consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court
rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows
that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been
issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be
rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to
stop payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to
the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and
Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were
issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The
checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such
issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the
suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.22
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 23Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other.24
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is
whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they
have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks
and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense. 25
In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void,
such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores,
and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the
interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the
outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In
fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been
breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been issued."
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless
checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a
check issued as an evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an
ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
xxxx
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of preexisting debt - is malum prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode
the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.28
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a
deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was
filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil
complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was
based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the
private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner
because the material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the
purpose or condition of its issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231
and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases
against him. The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of
testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and
to put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed "trial."Thus, all
the defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the
proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184861

June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision 1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007 2 and
March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias
City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and
Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 4 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City.
The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of
BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by
filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as
well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 6 in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related
such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the
criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to
Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question 7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no
prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element
is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned
that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are
without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated
filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for
suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed
decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC
ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate
delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private
respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted.
And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the
civil action any less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61
ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197. 11
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July
7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the abovequoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was
amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend
a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This,
petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is
related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must
be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent
conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have
presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of
law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had." 14 In the instant
case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent"
directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena 15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan
did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the
suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is
closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the
RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with
itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is
impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that
the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor
or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with
Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action
during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should
govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and
the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a
mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay
the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal
charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the
criminal cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private
respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted
more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the
proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction
agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction
agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of
the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly
argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private
respondents positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question
to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is
absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null
and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of
paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the
checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held
in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, 22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which
the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance
are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or
the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear
intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration
for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a
prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange
for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for
which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of
petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner
was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed,
petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for
lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the
matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is
this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of
the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 080005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172060

September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72
(RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City
held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case
could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is

whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004
as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for
pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005.8 Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action
was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately

related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. 16 At the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled inTenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183805

July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in
an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley
G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the
instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004
had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled:
"Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage)
nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in
the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of
the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion
that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City

which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court
submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in
Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[ 7]
dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF
THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE
OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING
AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF
FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN
THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO
OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE
DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN
THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was
filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8,
1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if
there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting
when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution
of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void
ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus,
the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated
July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161075

July 15, 2013

RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas,
Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order
issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the arraignment of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending between him and the complainant in the trial courts in
Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans
totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz. 2 In accordance with its option to purchase
the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration
of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders),
a joint venture partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really
TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious. 4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been
paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. 5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for
injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of
theP41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against
Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutors Office. 6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case). 7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an
information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120),
which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case). 8

On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence
of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing
reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. 9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecutions motion for
reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, 11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTCs questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held
liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the
Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case
show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of
Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question
are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondents culpability for the questioned transactions is identical in all the
proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the
criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of
Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view
of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take
judicial notice of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of
action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private
respondents arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an
offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil Case
No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case). 13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing and
De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite
criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the
Cavite criminal case denied Consings motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter,
Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his arraignment
and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its decision on
May 31, 2001, granting Consing petition for certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and
permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases
had been finally decided.

Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the
May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193,
and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA, 14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are
liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is
declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be
determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of
the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through
falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the
purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt
may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal
Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of the
previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of
the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel
mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in
abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before
the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that
no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the
fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on
February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation
of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the
criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal
cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: "In cases
of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (j)
That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with
"grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at
bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA,
citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that

under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would
cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the States motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was
not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in
the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and executory, and
could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that he had acted
as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a contract that had
involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and
held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the
issue of the respondents culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals
with the same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing,
Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We
are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March
18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of
December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No.
71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in
arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 991418), which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the issue of
whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which
would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as an
independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully
authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. 20 It argues that the CA correctly took
cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil case, just
like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the
Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that
as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial question, because the sole
issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapitals Makati civil case were not
intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil cases
could be validly considered determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the suspension of
Criminal Case No. 00-120.

Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension
of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an
independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case
with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a
"wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which
they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title." 22 As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension
of a criminal case.23 This was precisely the Courts thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at
bar.24
Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with
Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and
Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consings being a mere agent of his mother who should not be
criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also
been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are
liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is
declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be

adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40

prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time
it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of
the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in
his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30,
no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de
un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly
in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

G.R. No. 182836

October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated 27
February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao)
granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of
his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in
case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the
following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature
delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other death benefits,
the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties
still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). 9 In a
Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the
sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X,
Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit
their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The
Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
(MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations
as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugans child was
only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the
womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the
same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA
the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound
the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution 17 ruling that
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is
"death"; (2) such death must be of employees "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death";
(b) such death must be of employees "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.18
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The
fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during
the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their
dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to
pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death
benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 under Section 1, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with pay and
other death benefits because no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever
stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel
pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and
other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20 November
2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails
to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that
such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA
provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a
legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a
legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following

[Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share
this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the
expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the
latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality
upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only
sadly misses this crucial point. 20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the
literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never
acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate
relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII,
Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought
to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons,
must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be
lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as
a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters
death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil
Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, 25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid
of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child
could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality,
as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
(Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now,
there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were
validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos
claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that
in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of
labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v.
National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum
of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While
petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it
insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What

petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of
the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other
death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.