G.R. No.

45815 May 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O.
BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY
COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City
Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362,
charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of
estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly
issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods
or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have
sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore
subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the
presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2
December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon
the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge
held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission

of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was

vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the
criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the
penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased,
which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without
prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.
Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing
that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order
dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed
by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as
counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the
Office of the Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the
Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente
Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having
been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas
City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City
Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked
that the petition be given due course.
After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court
considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court
had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal
information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its
refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter

jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in

1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces
and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged
with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the
penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not
exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of
the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the
penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d)
in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph,
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the
jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7
July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818
(effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium
period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of
a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law
in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action,
rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of
the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance with the above rule,
jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of
First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had
increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in

Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum

penalty which a city court could impose.
The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application
of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also
applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in
disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have
retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe
so.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is
determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty
imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a
criminal information. In People v.Purisima, 2 the Court stressed
that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal
competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it
is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by
what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by
the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the
misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the
facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for
by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the
complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume
jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)

The same rule was set forth and amplified in People

v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after
trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co
Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law
imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of
the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for
once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the
evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330) 5 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the
maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the
specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a
case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court
(provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above
referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.
In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking

cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction,
may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime
within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as
the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that
the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction
if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not
more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the
reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal
court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison
mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the
penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up
to prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court,
that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not
impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent
Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense
was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial
Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try
and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly
imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense
charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which
is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of
Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818

would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the

Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in
the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for
Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of
the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of
Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-35825 February 20, 1989

CORA LEGADOS, represented by ROSA LEGADOS, and
HON. JESUS ANGELES, petitioners
vs.
HON. DOROTEO DE GUZMAN, Judge, CFI, Br. II,
Zamboanga, VILMOR ICAO, represented by his mother,
SOFIA L. ICAO, respondents.
Lacaya & Tabiliran Law Office for petitioners.
Felipe G. Tac-an for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, effective August 14,
1981, grants to Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 1 "(e)xclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more
than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof. 2
The proviso altered and superseded the long standing doctrine
first laid down in a 1911 case 3 that an inferior court had no

jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction although the

penalty imposed is arresto mayor because conviction thereof
carried with it the liability imposed by Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code to acknowledge and give Support to the
offspring. The doctrine was made applicable whatever the
peculiar circumstances of the offender and offended party might
be, it not being permitted, upon considerations of consistency
and orderliness, "to speculate on whether or not an offspring
may still arise from the crime, whether or not the complainant or
the accused may be sterile or incapable of procreation, whether
or not the complaint was already pregnant by another man when
the crime was committed and various other factual
considerations before the jurisdiction may be fixed. 4
In the case at bar, long before the passage of B.P. Big. 129, 5 a
complaint for simple seduction 6 was filed with the then City
Court of Dipolog (Branch 11) 7 against Vilmor Icao. The
complaint was presented by the offended girl, Cora Legados,
represented by her mother, Rosa, and was subsequently made the
basis of an information filed by the First Assistant City
Fiscal. 8 After entering a plea of not guilty on arraignment, Icao
moved to quash the information on the ground that the City
Court had no jurisdiction to try the offense, and the fiscal who
filed the information bad no authority to do so. The Court denied
the motion and scheduled the case for trial on the merits. Icao
thereupon instituted an action of prohibition 9 with the then
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City 10 which, in due
course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the
proceedings in the City Court. It is this Order which is now
assailed in this Court as having been rendered with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the

respondent Judge, being consistent with the doctrine obtaining at
the time, i.e., that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the
crime of simple seduction. But, as already pointed out, the
doctrine has since been changed. Now, the offense is explicitly
declared by law to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction,
no longer of Courts of First Instance (since abolished and
replaced by Regional Trial Courts), but of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
WHEREFORE, the disputed Order of respondent Judge of
October 9, 1972 is SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to
the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City (which replaced the
City Court) for further proceedings. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:p
Whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial
Court or other first level court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal actions of libel, is the issue raised by
the People of the Philippines, as petitioner in the special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. The fairly
simple facts from which the issue has arisen are hereunder
briefly narrated.
On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against
Isah V. Red in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case
thereby initiated was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-60134
and raffled to Branch 82.
Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction of the offense. The Judge found
merit in the motion and by an Order dated March 29, 1995,
remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City "for proper action/disposition in the premises." His Honor
declared that "(u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which took

effect on April 15, 1994, exclusive original jurisdiction over 'all

offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years, irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof is vested in
the Municipal Trial Court. . . " The case was accordingly
transferred to the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where it
was docketed as Case No. 43-00548 and raffled to Branch 43.
Thereafter, the private prosecutor, "under the control and
supervision of the Fiscal," filed a "Manifestation and Motion to
Remand" dated August 1, 1995 praying that the case be returned
to the RTC. The movant invoked Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which pertinently provides that: 1
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of
written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense . . .",
and argued that
. . . Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court
(such as the Court of Tax Appeals) are special in character, and
should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of
other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a

general law. (De Joya vs. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893). Moreover, a

general law cannot repeal or amend by implication a specific
provision or a special law. Otherwise stated: a subsequent
statute, general in character as to its terms and operation, is not
to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment,
unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifested. This is so,
even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive
to include what was set forth in the special act. (Philippine
Railway Co. vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 35; Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA
190; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 207 SCRA
487).
The MetroTC denied the motion by Order dated August 14,
1995. It opined that "Rep. Act No. 7691, which took effect
on April 15, 1994, would partake of the nature of a 'modern' law
which impliedly repeals an 'ancient' law (the Revised Penal
Code) which is of 1932 vintage, which is inconsistent with the
later law . .; (and that) if the repeal makes the penalty lighter in
the new law, the new law shall be applied." 2 Later, the MetroTC
also denied the private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration,
by Order dated September 7, 1995. Still later, in an Order dated
October 18, 1995, it denied another motion by the same counsel
reiterating the plea to remand the case back to the RTC, and
further directed "the prosecution to present . . (its) next witness,"
trial having in the meantime commenced.
Now, in this proceeding, the State prays for judgment: "(1)
declaring the questioned Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 as null and void for
having been issued by the respondent court acting without
jurisdiction; (2) enjoining the respondent court from further

conducting trials in Criminal Case No. 43-00548; and (3)

commanding the respondent court to remand Criminal Case No.
43-00548 to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for proper disposition." It cites Jalandoni
v. Endaya (55 SCRA 261 [1974]), where this Court (a) drew
attention to the categorical language of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "it is a court of first
instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case," and
(b) indicated "thirteen (13) cases, from People v. Topacio, 59
Phil. 356 (1934) to Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303 (1971),
wherein this . . Court ruled that municipal courts do not have
jurisdiction over libel cases." 3 It further argues that in light
of Jalandoni, and Berces v. Guingona (241 SCRA 539 [1995])
to the effect that a subsequent statute, general in character as
to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a
special or specific enactment unless the legislative purpose to do
so is manifest or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists between them Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
may not be deemed to have been superseded by Republic Act
No. 7691.
This Court has already had occasion to resolve the issue,
substantially in line with the position taken by the People,
account having been taken of substantially the same arguments
adduced by the opposing parties in this case. In G.R. No. 122126
entitled Lydia Caro vs. Court of Appeals and Violeta Sarigumba,
involving the same jurisdictional issue as that specifically
presented in the case at bar, this Court promulgated a Resolution
on June 19, 1996 pertinently reading as follows:

Anent the question of jurisdiction, we . . find no reversible error

committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
contention . . that R.A. No. 7691 divested the Regional Trial
Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained.
While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and
one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal
Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal
Trial Courts' jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [21]),
said law, however, excludes therefrom ". . cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts . .
." The Court inBocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the
Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial
Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence,
the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior
courts cannot be applied to libel cases.
Moreover, Administrative Order No. 104-96 treating of the
subject:
". . DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR
KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS
DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES" issued on October 21,
1996 by the Chief Justice upon the advice and consent of the
Court En
Banc, inter
alia provides,
in
categorical
acknowledgment of the validity of the doctrine just adverted to,
that "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO
THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL

COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS."
The proposition is hereby reaffirmed, the Court perceiving no
argument advanced by respondents justifying its abrogation or
modification.
Concerning respondents' contention that the challenged orders
are now immutable, having become final and executory for
failure of the prosecution to take an appeal therefrom, it suffices
to advert to the familiar and uniformly applied axiom that only
final orders i.e., those that finally dispose of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the court respecting the merits of a
case can become final and executory in the sense of
becoming unalterable through an appeal or review
proceeding. 4 Interlocutory orders, on the other hand i.e.,
those which resolve incidental motions or collateral matters but
do not put an end to the case never become final in the sense
of becoming unchangeable and impervious to impugnation after
expiration of the period prescribed for taking an appeal from a
final judgment. 5
Respecting respondents' claim that venue is merely procedural,
suffice it to point out that unlike in civil cases, in criminal cases
venue is jurisdictional. 6
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Court's
Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October
18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further

taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 4300548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper
disposition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 154239-41

February 16, 2005

FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, and

EMMA C. DAGONDON, petitioners,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for the nullification of the March 20, 2002 Resolution 1 of
the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to dismiss Criminal
Cases Nos. 24505-07 as well as the June 13, 2002 Resolution
which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1994, in a meeting held at the residence of Atty.
Bernadette P. Encinareal, then Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro,
Jr. promised to give P10,000.00 to each of the 33 barangay
captains of the Municipality of Tudela, Misamis Occidental. The
Congressman assured the barangay captains that the amount was
his personal gift to each of them.
It turned out that the amount provided by Congressman Ramiro
came from his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) which
was remitted to the Municipal Treasurer of Tudela per Allotment
Advice No. F2-6781-94-315 in the amount of P220,000.00

under Check No. 497664; and Allotment Advice No. F2-778494-415 in the amount ofP110,000.00 under Check No. 497679.
Forthwith, petitioner Mayor Felix Sarigumba secured a cash
advance chargeable against the CDF of Congressman Ramiro
and submitted to the Municipal Treasurer Voucher Nos. 9411422 and 9412-445 in the total amount of P330,000.00. The
particulars contained in the said vouchers read: "to cash advance
the CDF for payment of snacks during assembly meeting for
peace and order meeting of 33 barangays of Tudela, Misamis
Occidental."
Petitioner Sarigumba, thereafter, gave P9,500.00 to each of the
barangay captains through two members of his staff, Loreta
Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. As per his agreement with the
barangay captains, each of the latter was to give P500.00 to the
Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) which would serve as
contributions for projects. The barangay captains thought that
the amount given to each of them was a "cash gift" or
"pahalipay" from Congressman Ramiro.2
Petitioner Sarigumba later liquidated his cash advance
of P220,000.00 via Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-478, stating
therein that the said amount was used as follows:
(1) "For the liquidation of cash advance amounting TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS, to furnish to
various barangays of Tudela under check #497664 for meals
and snacks during peace and order meeting as per supporting
papers hereto attached in the total amount of P220,000."3

The petitioner-mayor also liquidated his cash advance

of P110,000.00 via Voucher No. 9412-488, in which he stated
that he used the amount
(2) "For the liquidation of cash advance under check #497679
on V #9412-445 to cover up expenses on peace and order
meeting to various barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental
from CDF Fund under AA #F2-6781-94-315 in the total
amount P110,000. "4
He then supported his liquidation vouchers with attendance
sheets bearing the signatures of those who purportedly attended
the assembly meetings. Petitioner Emma C. Dagondon approved
Voucher No. 9412-478, while petitioner Sherlita R. Gallego
approved Voucher No. 9412-488.
Subsequently, Flaviano Zaide, William Gumisad, Edilberto
Quinalagan, Maria Pacaro and Virginia Tampoog, filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman against the petitioners
Sarigumba, Gallego and Dagondon, alleging, inter alia
That we strongly deny that there had been an assembly or
meeting where free meals and snacks during a peace and order
meeting were given to the barangay people in the year 1994 and
1995 except during the SOT at Barangays Napurog, Duangican
and Maribojoc but we knew for a fact that the said snacks were
not given from the above vouchers but the money out of the
above disbursements were given as cash gifts to the Barangay
Captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental. In support to the
liquidation of the withdrawal of the aforesaid amount were the
signatures of the barangay people not for the purpose as alleged

in those vouchers but obtained in different manners like

attendance during the monthly barangay assembly, or signatures
for the retention of the Tudela, Public High School at the Tudela
Central School while other signatures were obtained to
reimburse payment of a hand-set radio (two-way) procured for
the different barangays by the Mayor;
That signatures of the undersigned and numerous signatures of
barangay folks including children were forged or obtained under
other pretense by the aforesaid mayor in support of the vouchers
thereby cheating the people of their money.5
The Ombudsman requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to
conduct an investigation of the Peace and Order Campaign
Funds for 1994. The Auditor directed each of the barangay
captains who received the P9,500.00 from petitioner Sarigumba
to remit the said amounts to their respective barangay treasurers
and to submit the receipts the latter would issue thereon.
When the barangay captains received the letter of the COA, they
were surprised. They then secured receipts from their respective
barangay treasurers which indicated that they had returned the
amount they received from petitioner Sarigumba although no
such amounts had yet been received by the former. The barangay
captains were thereafter accorded a chance to re-liquidate the
amounts they received from the petitioner-mayor and they did
so.
In their Memorandum Report to the Provincial Auditor dated
December 3, 1995, the auditors declared that, with the barangay

captains submission of official receipts, there had been, in

effect, no loss of government funds.
When the Sandiganbayan received a copy of the COA Report,
its Committee on Legal Matters and Committee on Finance,
Budget and Appropriations, conducted an investigation, which
yielded the following findings as per Committee Report No. 9613:
4. That the amount released to each Barangay Captain was
only P9,500.00 and others P9,400.00 per affidavit submitted by
Loreta Salinasal, the Private Secretary to the Mayor.
5. That sometime in 1994 Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, [Jr.]
assured the Barangay Captains of a personal cash gift
of P10,000.00 for each Barangay from his own pocket, but it
was never meant that the amount would come from
Congressman Ramiros CDF for peace and order campaign in
the Municipality of Tudela. All Barangay Captains received the
amount as promised by Congressman Ramiro and disbursed it
for their personal benefit. But later on re-submitted liquidation
papers for Peace and Order Campaigns in their respective
barangays.
6. That the barangay captains changed their positions and
denied, as shown in their uniform testimonies, that the amount
was indeed for Peace and Order Campaign and not a personal
cash gift from Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The illegal
act was already consummated.

7. That COA initiated the investigation of the release of said

amounts only after the directive of the Ombudsman arrived.
Directing all Barangay Captains to return the amount
of P10,000.00 and to produce official receipts acknowledging
that said amount had been received by the Barangay Treasurers
even if no actual cash was turned over. It appears also that the
Municipal Treasurer issued official receipts without actual cash
involved to make it appear that said amounts were returned by
the barangay captains. The barangay then re-submitted
liquidations to justify the earlier liquidations where the forged
signatures of barangay constituents were first presented to COA
as liquidation of said vouchers. The amounts released were
already disbursed. The liquidation papers for P220,000.00
and P110,000.00 were already submitted to COA as final
liquidation. For all intent and purposes the act was already
consummated. The second liquidation would appear to have
been fabricated and had been compromised to legalize the
unlawful act.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
issued a resolution finding probable cause for malversation
against petitioner Sarigumba; two counts of falsification of
public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code also against the petitioner-mayor; and one count of
falsification of public documents against petitioners Dagondon
and Gallego.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed an Information for
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
against petitioner Sarigumba with the Sandiganbayan. The

accusatory portion of the Information docketed as Criminal Case

No. 24505 reads:
That sometime in November and December 1994 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela,
Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L.
SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Tudela, while in the performance of his
official functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official positions, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, embezzle and
appropriate unto himself and/or thru abandonment, or gross
negligence allowed other parties to misappropriate, embezzle
and/or use to some other purpose the total sum of P330,000.00
he had earlier obtained as cash advance from the Municipality
intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the different
Barangays of the same municipality, thereby constituting him a
special disbursing officer and for which he is accountable, to the
damaged (sic) and prejudice of the government and of public
interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Another Information for falsification of public document under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioners
Sarigumba and Gallego was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 24506 reads:

That sometime in December 1994, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province of
Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L.
SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, a
low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant,
both accused, while in the performance of their official
functions, committing the offense in relation to their office,
taking advantage of their official positions, in order to cover up
the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L.
SARIGUMBA intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of
the 33 Barangays of the same Municipality, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Liquidation Voucher
No. 9412-488 amounting to P110,000.00 by making it appear it
was for expenses during the peace and order meeting when, in
truth and in fact, both accused knew well that there were no such
peace and order meetings being held; furthermore, fabricated
attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as supporting
documents causing it to appear that persons attended such peace
and order meetings when, [in] truth and in fact, they did not for
there was no such meetings being held, to the damaged (sic) and
prejudice of the government and of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
A third Information was filed with the graft court against
petitioners Sarigumba and Dagondon for falsification of a public
document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The
inculpatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 24507, reads:

That sometime in December 1994 or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province of
Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L.
SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and EMMA C. DAGONDON, a
low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal
Accountant-Designate, both accused, while in the performance
of their official functions committing the offense in relation to
their office, were taking advantage of their official positions, in
order to cover up the misuse of public funds advanced by
respondent FELIX L. SARIGUMBA intended for the Peace and
Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of the same Municipality,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-478 amounting to P220,000.00
by making it appear it was for meal and snacks during the peace
and order meeting when, in truth and in fact, both accused knew
well there were no such peace and order meetings being held
and much more on the serving of meals and snacks; furthermore,
fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as
support documents causing it to appear that persons attended
such peace and order meetings when, [in] truth and in fact, they
did not for there was no such meetings being held, to the
damaged (sic) and prejudice of the government and of public
interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
During the hearing of March 30, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
expressed anxiety over the number of crimes committed, and
issued a Resolution worded as follows:

This morning, this court expressed its anxieties over the

correctness of the accusation herein against the Mayor and
separately against the municipal accountant for the alleged
malversation of sum of money and acts of falsification involving
the conversion of portions of the total amount by the accused. It
would appear that, considering that there are two amounts, two
(2) offenses may have been committed; furthermore, the
prosecution can clarify whether or not the alleged falsification
took place after the completion of the malversation or was part
of the total plan in order to effect the malversation without the
same coming to the attention of the examining authorities.
Answers to these questions might result in the re-arrangement of
the statement of accusation against the accused charged for
separate offenses.9
This prompted the Special Prosecutor to ask for a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to respond to the misgivings of
the graft court. In the meantime, the trial court deferred the
issuance of any warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
During the hearing of April 29, 1998, the trial court issued an
Order, quoted infra:
This morning, the Court expressed its uncertainty over the
propriety of proceeding with these cases as they stand at this
time considering that, on the basis of the very records of the
prosecution at preliminary investigation, it would appear that
there is a need to determine whether or not the barangay captains
did, in fact, receive the amounts allegedly distributed by the
accused mayor to them or whether or not any deficiency in the
liquidation of these cash advances were deficiencies in the

submissions by the barangay captains alone or the barangay

captains in conspiracy with any other official.

In a Memorandum to the Ombudsman dated December 21,

1998, Graft Investigator Pasion summarized his findings:

Considering the concurrence of Prosecutor Victorio U. Tabanguil

with the doubts expressed by this Court on this matter, as prayed
for by him, he is given sixty (60) days from today within which
to determine whether or not there exists probable cause against
Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba as well as the subordinate officials of
the Municipality of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, or against any
other persons not yet charged. Should he wish, he may summon
other witnesses herefor, including the initiation of another
preliminary investigation to summon the barangay captains or
such other persons who may have been involved in the receipt
and distribution of these funds. The prosecution shall furnish this
Court with all of its issuances and orders both in Manila and in
Mindanao, should the Deputy Ombudsman for that area deem it
wise to take over the case one more time.10

1. That the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amount

distributed by Mayor Sarigumba through his representatives
Loreta Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. That the amount actually
received by the barangay captains was only P9,500.00 as the
barangay captains agree to contribute P500.00 each to the
project of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC).

In the meantime, during the period of July 22 to 31, 1998, Graft

Investigation Officer I Elmer Ben V. Pasion of the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao conducted clarificatory hearings. In
the course of the proceedings, petitioner Sarigumba admitted
that he and the barangay captains had agreed that each of the
latter would contribute P500.00 for the ABC projects, and that
the amount actually received by each was only P9,500.00. The
said accused submitted deposit slips showing that the barangay
captains had deposited the amounts they received to the
barangay treasurers. It appears that the barangay captains
executed separate affidavits explaining the circumstances under
which they received the amounts from the petitioner Sarigumba
through his employees, and how the said amounts were spent.

2. That some of the Barangay Captains in good faith had spent

the money for their personal use having thought all along that
the amount distributed was a "cash gift" or "pahalipay" promised
by Congressman Ramiro. It was, however, refunded back to the
barangay government by the barangay captains concerned as
barangay funds upon learning that the amount distributed was
from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and intended for the
Peace and Order Campaign.
3. The requirement of COA for the 33 barangay units to issue
Official Receipts (Record, pp. 340-372) for the receipts of the
money corrected the recording in the Municipal Government of
Tudela and properly recorded the transfer of funds and
accountability to the 33 different barangay governments.
4. That the 33 different barangay governments subsequently
submitted their liquidations with the municipal government of
Tudela.
5. That based on the corresponding liquidation reports submitted
by different barangay units, only some of the barangays

conducted the barangay assemblies where meals and snacks

were served particularly during the Service Orientation Training
(SOT) with the 32nd Infantry battalion. That generally, the
amount distributed was not spent by the different barangay units
for meals and snacks in the peace and order assembly but on
some other immediate needs for their peace and order programs
as determined by the barangay captains.11
Graft Investigator Pasion thus recommended the withdrawal of
the Information for malversation and the retention of the
Informations for falsification, as follows:
1. Considering that during the clarificatory hearing, it was duly
established by evidence and by admissions that the barangay
captains did, in fact, receive the amount distributed by
respondent Mayor Sarigumba, the Information for Malversation
against the respondents is hereby recommended to be withdrawn
in the absence of evidence of shortage, taking, appropriation,
conversion or loss of public funds.
For lack of criminal intent, probable cause could not be
established against the barangay captains who, in an honest
mistake of fact, spent the money for their personal use, believing
in good faith that the money distributed was a cash gift or
"pahalipay" promised by Congressman Ramiro.
2. Respondents, however, were unable to satisfactorily explain
and justify the preparation of falsified Liquidation Vouchers No.
9412-478 and 9412-488 by making it appear therein that the
amount distributed [was] expended for meals and snacks during
the peace and order meetings when, in truth and in fact, peace

and order meetings were conducted only in some of the

barangays. Moreover, fabricated attendance sheets and list of
signatures were used as supporting documents for the questioned
Liquidation Vouchers causing it to appear that persons named
therein attended such peace and order meetings when, in truth
and in fact, they did not so attended (sic).
Premised, therefore, on the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in Domagas vs. Malana, 223 SCRA 359, that "In the
crime of falsification of a public document, the principal thing
punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed," it is hereby maintained
that the Informations for Falsification of Public Documents
against the accused Municipal Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba and
Municipal Accountants Emma C. Dagondon and Sherlita R.
Gallego be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan.12
The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Margarito P. Gervacio,
Jr., approved the said Memorandum, a copy of which was filed
with the Sandiganbayan by Special Prosecution Officer Victorio
U. Tabanguil on February 4, 1999.13 On February 22, 1999,
Special Prosecutor Tabanguil submitted a Review Memorandum
to the Ombudsman recommending that the three Informations be
withdrawn. However, the Ombudsman denied the
recommendation with the following notation: "Present the
Documents containing the false entries for the scrutiny of the
Court."
In their comment on the Memorandum of the Graft Investigator
Pasion, the petitioners reiterated that, as found by the
investigator, they had acted in good faith and that there was an

absence of damage and prejudice to the government. They, thus,

prayed that the cases against them be dismissed. Appended
thereto was the joint affidavit of the barangay captains.
Despite the Ombudsmans denial of his Review Memorandum,
the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion for the
withdrawal of the three Informations for falsification of public
documents on March 29, 1999.14
During the proceedings on October 17, 2000, the graft court
addressed clarificatory questions to the Special Prosecutor
regarding the Memorandum of Graft Investigator Pasion which
the Ombudsman concurred with.
Despite the responses of the Special Prosecutor, the
Sandiganbayan found probable cause against the petitioners and
ordered the cases to remain in the court docket.15 Warrants were
issued for the arrest of the petitioners. They forthwith posted
cash bail bonds for their provisional release16 which were later
approved by the graft court.
On December 26, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a
Manifestation17 with the Sandiganbayan reiterating his March
29, 1999 Manifestation and Motion.
The petitioners then filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Arraignment and to Motion to Quash" the Informations.
However, on February 15, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order denying the motion.18 The graft court, likewise, denied the
oral motion for reconsideration thereof made by the petitioners.

All of the petitioners were arraigned on February 19, 2001 and

pleaded not guilty.19
On May 28, 2001, the petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion to
Cancel Pre-Trial and Trial, Motion to Dismiss" the cases,
claiming that:
4. In the early part of May 2001, undersigned counsel, however,
received from the accused a copy of the Settlement and Balances
dated April 16, 2001, from the Commission on Audit, Province
of Misamis Occidental, Oroquieta City, clearly showing that the
amount of P330,000.00 subject of the controversy in the instant
case and which was disallowed in 1995 for lack of proper
documentation, had been fully settled and allowed as of April
16, 2001.20
The complaining witnesses, through counsel, opposed the
motion; the Special Prosecutor, however, concurred with the said
motion. After due hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution21 denying the motion of the petitioners on March 20,
2002. The graft court reiterated its finding of probable cause
against them. The petitioners then filed a motion for the
reconsideration thereof, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan
in its Resolution dated June 13, 2002.
The Present Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners assert that the court
committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction when it found probable cause against them,
denied their motion to dismiss the cases, as well as their motion

for reconsideration thereof. The petitioners proffer the following

arguments:
First. Petitioner Sarigumba did not make use of the P330,000.00
subject of the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 24506,
considering that the said amount came from Congressman
Ramiros CDF, and was distributed to and received by the 33
barangay captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, who
submitted the appropriate documents liquidating said amounts.
Moreover, as per the COA Report, the government did not suffer
any loss of funds and until clearance of the barangay captains.
Second. The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao and Special
Prosecutor Tabanguil recommended the withdrawal of the three
Informations in said case.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground
for certiorari, it must first be demonstrated that the lower court
or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or office, has
jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted
without authority.22

In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an

error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and which is only one of
judgment, such error is reviewable only by appeal. On the other
hand, if the act complained of was issued by such court or body
with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.23
In the present cases, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information,
has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The determination of its
existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers
after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of
an offended party.24 Probable cause is meant such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information or any offense included therein has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested.l^vvphi1.net In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction.25 Specifically, probable cause to
warrant arrest requires "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that

an offense has been committed by the person sought to be

arrested."26
Once the Informations are filed with the trial court, the
determination of the presence or absence of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, or for the
withdrawal of the Informations, or for the dismissal of the cases,
is addressed to its sound discretion. As such, the trial court is not
bound by the recommendation of the Prosecutor. The trial
courts exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general
rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the
trial courts appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the
conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well
as the conclusions of law. The general rule is that as long as the
trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by
appeal.27
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based
on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or
evidence appended to the Information.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the petitioners for one
count of malversation and two counts of falsification of public
documents against petitioner Sarigumba. The graft courts
finding was based on the allegation in the Information, the

Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause for the

filing of the said Informations, the documentary evidence
appended thereto, as well as the facts and circumstances
unearthed during the clarificatory hearing of October 17, 2000.
After the clarificatory hearings on the petitioners motion to
dismiss the cases, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for
the issuance of warrants for their arrest and for the court to
proceed to trial, on the following ratiocination:
It was not denied by the accused that the P330,000.00 came
from the Countrywide Development Fund of Congressman
Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The documentation for the cash advances
taken out by the accused mayor shows that the money was to be
used for "peace and order campaign."
Mayor Sarigumba is charged in the instant cases for
malversation of the total amount of P330,000.00, as well as for
falsification of the attendance sheets attached to the first set of
vouchers he had submitted to liquidate the cash advances
for P220,000.00 and for P110,000.00. It is claimed by the
accused, however, that since the liquidation was finally
approved, no injury resulted from the cash advances he had
made.
It will be noted that the cash advances were taken out by the
accused mayor with the following particulars: "To cash advance
the CDF for the payment of various expenses during the
assembly meeting for peace and order of 33 barangays of
Tudela, Misamis Occidental" as shown by the Prosecutions
findings.

From the clarificatory hearings conducted during the review

hereof, it appeared that the barangay captains were also under
the impression that the amounts given to them were the cash
gifts or "pahalipay" earlier promised by then Congressman
Ramiro. That was the reason why, as one of them explained,
they spent the amounts on personal matters although, later, they
were required to refund the same.
The complainant made a list of her own findings after going
over the receipts made by the barangay captains. According to
her, these documents were inappropriate for the liquidation of
the cash advances. Her findings ranged from inadequacy in the
amounts accounted for to impropriety of the expenditures
made vis--vis the purpose for which the funds were intended
per the terms of the voucher. Furthermore, there is also the
finding by the prosecutor at review that these were understood
by the barangay captains to be cash gifts and not for the purpose
for which they were purportedly drawn by the mayor.28
What militates against the petition at bench is the failure of the
petitioners to append thereto certified copies of the transcripts
taken during the clarificatory hearings. Without such transcripts,
the Court cannot review the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan and determine whether or not it committed grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
finding probable cause against the petitioners, and in denying
their motion to dismiss the cases.
Indeed, petitioner Sarigumba failed to establish that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in
finding probable cause against him for malversation.

Malversation is defined in Article 217 of the Revised Penal

Code, thus:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred
pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000
pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall bereclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the

penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly- authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1060, approved
June 12, 1954.)
The elements of the crime are the following:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property
for which he is accountable; and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted
the taking by another person of, such funds or property.29
The felony consists not only in misappropriation or converting
public funds or property to ones personal use but also by
knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the
same.30 The felony may thus be committed by dolo or by culpa.
The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is

imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with

intent or due to negligence.31 An accountable officer may thus be
convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage
in the officers account which he has not been able to explain
satisfactorily. All that is essential is proof that the accountable
officer has received public funds but that when demand therefor
is made, he is unable to satisfactorily account for the same.32
The law declares that the failure of the public officer to account
for such public funds or property upon demand by any dulyauthorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has
appropriated the same for his personal use.1vvphi1.nt
Based on the record, it is true that petitioner Sarigumba did not
make use of the P330,000.00 which he received from the
Municipal Treasurer which was chargeable to the CDF of
Congressman Ramiro; hence, there is no probable cause for the
charge of malversation by dolo against him. It must be stressed,
however, that the petitioner-mayor is also charged with
malversation by culpa under the Information, allegedly
committed by distributing P9,500.00 to each of the barangay
captains without bothering to inform them that the amount was
from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and that the money
should be used for the peace and order campaign in their
respective jurisdictions. All along, the barangay captains were of
the belief that the amounts they received were from the personal
funds of the Congressman and that they had unfettered use of the
money, for whatever purpose they chose.

Indeed, Barangay Captain Cosme D. Sarabia admitted that he

used the P9,500.00 he received from the petitioner to pay his
personal debts. The petitioner and the barangay captains agreed
to remit P500.00 each from the amounts they received from
petitioner Sarigumba to the ABC for its projects. Indeed, the
barangay captains were astounded when they received the
directives from the Auditor to remit the amounts they received
from the petitioner to the barangay treasurers, and to submit
receipts as proof that they had followed the directive. However,
the barangay captains merely secured receipts from the barangay
treasurers without actually refunding the amounts, and were only
later given a chance to liquidate the same.
The bare fact that the barangay captains were able to return the
amounts they received from the petitioner or liquidate the same
after demand therefor does not preclude the finding of probable
cause for malversation. As this Court held in Kimpo v.
Sandiganbayan:
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or
reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission
of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the
offender which, at most, can merely affect the accuseds civil
liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance
being analogous to voluntary surrender.33
Indeed, the matter of whether the barangay captains were able to
liquidate the said amounts and whether the bases thereof are
justified are matters of defense during trial, and not before trial,
in a motion to dismiss the case.

Whether or not the barangay captains acted in good faith is a

matter of defense on the part of the petitioner Sarigumba. Even
if the barangay captains had indeed acted in good faith, still, if
petitioner Sarigumba had failed to make it clear before or when
he distributed the money to them that the money was for the
peace and order campaign in their respective barangays, he may
be criminally liable for malversation by culpa.
Likewise barren of merit is the petitioners claim that there is
colorable truth in the allegations of petitioner Sarigumba in his
liquidation vouchers, that the amounts given to the barangay
captains were used mostly or substantially for snacks or related
expenses and that there was no probable cause against him for
malversation, and against all the petitioners for falsification. It
must be stressed that the barangay captains themselves
disavowed such claim in their respective affidavits.
Demosthenes Singidas of Barangay Cahayag declared that there
was a peace and order assembly which coincided with their
Barangay Assembly in 1994, where he gave P50.00 for meals to
those who attended and that he spent a total of only P4,000.00.
Adelaida Paigan of Camating admitted that she spent the money
for seminar registration (no specific amount), a hand- held radio
antennae (no amount also), P85.00 for the peace and order
campaign, food and snacks for the soldiers who guarded the
election at around P1,000.00; Service Orientation Training
(SOT) meals and snacks in the amount of P1,184.00, and
leveling and improving barangay roads in the amount
of P2,000.00. She also declared that papers were passed for
signatures of the population of Camating, but there had been no
peace and order assembly held for the release of said amount.

For his part, Francisco Jerusalem of Barangay Casilak San

Agustin alleged that he was given P10,000.00 by the mayor for
no stated purpose; that he did not want to receive it; and that it
was given to him as "cash gift." He did not even know that the
money was for the peace and order campaign. He stated further,
however, that he spent the money for meals and snacks during
the peace and order assembly and for the SOT but did not state a
specific amount. Gaudencio Olarte of Barangay Upper Centro
averred, among others, that he used the P10,000.00 for the
jackets and flashlights of three (3) barangay tanods; and for the
construction of an outpost and a playhouse for the day-care
center. There was also a peace and order assembly in his
Barangay in 1994 where the attendance was taken, and he served
meals and snacks with no statement as to where he got the funds.
Edilberto Castro of Barangay Centro Hulpa declared that he
received the P10,000.00 which he thought came from
Congressman Ramiro for the election of the ABC President,
Emeterio Valmoria and that he divided the P10,000.00 among
his councilmen and the members of the peace and order council.
Edilberto Cobrado of Barangay Colambutan Bajo asserted that
he did not have his constituents sign for peace and order
assembly. He maintained that he served snacks during the peace
and order assembly but out of his personal money.
The P10,000.00 which he believed to be a cash gift from
Congressman Ramiro was spent for a barangay tanod outpost,
posts for every purok and meals for visitors of the barangay.
Delio Cagas of Barangay Colambutan Settlement admitted that
he received the P10,000.00 and thought that the money was for
his own use and that it was up for him to spend it or share it with
his councilmen. Perlito Yamaro of Barangay Duanguican alleged
that in 1995 a "Barkadahan" which was a sort of peace and

order assembly was held, during which the attendees signed their
attendance in the record book. He also admitted that he received
the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayor through Mrs.
Salinasal, and it was up for him to spend it.1awphi1.nt
Equally damaging to the petitioners is the admission of Juan
Gumilos of Barangay Gala that he received theP10,000.00 from
Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its purpose. Eduardo Rara
of Barangay Gumbil was as candid when he stated that he
received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal and learned that it
was a "cash gift" coming from Congressman Ramiro. Nido
Madrazo of Barangay Maikay likewise stated that he received
theP10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its
purpose. It was somehow conveyed to him that the money was
for his own use, and that it was up to him how to spend it.
Feliciano Sumader of Barangay Mitugas also admitted that he
received P10,000.00 which he shared with his councilmen. He
also bought a battery charger for a hand-held radio, aerial
antennae, battery pack, and also spent some for the Lupong
Tagapayapa. He had no receipts to prove his claim.
Cosme Sarabia of Barangay Nailon alleged that he received
the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal which he believed was a
"cash gift" promised to him by Congressman Ramiro. Luther
Limbaga of Barangay Silongon declared that he received
the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayors secretary, and that he
believed it was a "cash gift" to encourage him to vote for
Emeterio Valmoria who was then running as ABC president. He
added that he gave P150.00 each to seven (7) CVOs from
December 1994 to July 1995, meals and snacks for the assembly
and the SOT. Sabino Dagondon of Barangay Taguima averred

that he received the P10,000.00 in cash from Mrs. Salinasal and

it was said to be for his own use. Vicente Lagas of Barangay
Tigdok even admitted that he did not hold a peace and order
assembly in 1994, only the monthly regular meeting, and that no
meals and snacks were served. He also stated that he used
the P10,000.00 for wire and antennae in the amount of P500.00
(no receipt); gave P200.00 each for councilmen including his
secretary and treasurer; P3,800.00 for food items when barangay
officials conducted patrols around the barangay; and
spent P100.00 during the seminar of hand held radio users.
Cipriano Sumondong of Barangay Yahong alleged that he
received the P10,000.00 as cash gift from Congressman Ramiro
and that he presumed the money as the promised "cash gift."
Caridad Lagunay of Barangay Bongabong alleged that she
received the P10,000.00 as "cash gift" and was told that it was
up to her how to spend it. She alleged that there was no peace
and order assembly but only the monthly barangay assembly
where the names of those present were checked against the
logbook. When asked what she did with the P10,000.00, she
answered: "I bought some things for the barangay office like
curtains, plates, chairs and dividers and others." Bebiana Saligan
of Barangay Barra declared that she received the P10,000.00 as
"cash gift" from Congressman Ramiro for voting for Emeterio
Valmoria as ABC president but after three weeks, she was
required to submit an attendance sheet. This confused her, and it
was only then that she decided to return theP10,000.00 to the
municipality. Rodolfo Ontulan of Barangay Basirang averred
that he received the P10,000.00 from Loreta Salinasal at the
mayors office for the incoming election of the ABC president.
He, however, stated further that he used the P10,000.00 to buy a

hand-held radio antennae in the amount of P500.00 and that he

gave P100.00 to each member of the barangay council.34
In fine, no less than the barangay captains belied petitioner
Sarigumbas claims in his liquidation vouchers that the cash
advances the latter received from the CDF of Congressman
Ramiro were used for meals and snacks during the peace and
order meetings.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 124644

February 5, 2004

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,

vs
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive
Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C.
Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by
Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, Branch 21.
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy,
a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the
Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner
was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at
theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St.,
Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident,

resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On

February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the
RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No.
90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad
Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The accusatory
portion of the amended Information reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with
intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney
Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45
service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon
him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his
death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N.
NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN &
95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.1
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively
suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential
Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised
of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on
October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending
the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2

The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the

RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner
posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on
December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 4 the
Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act
No. 408,5 in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822
and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC,
had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and
officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25,
1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He
alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for
only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be
reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6 the PNP Region V
Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting
information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners
suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994,
the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the
order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day
preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice.
The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994. 7 Trial thereafter
proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner
commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994,
he filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the case. Citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 denying the

motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a
preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime
charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office
as a member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it
was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the
petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case,
and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit
the offense charged in connection with the performance of his
duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to
the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a)
the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident;
(b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the
petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the
petitioner was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the offense
was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant."11
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on
March 15, 1990, he was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on
alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04
issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner
adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario
and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was
on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that
the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the

performance of his official function. The trial court added that

upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13the issue had become
moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the
jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to
the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27"
as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial
court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the
Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14 and
R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion
therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.nt

the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto.

It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her
complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official
mission when the shooting happened.

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration 15 of the said

order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of
Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was
committed by him in relation to his official functions. He
asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to
the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was
enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16

WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET

ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that
after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense
charged in the Information herein was committed by the
accused in his relation to his function and duty as member of the
then Philippine Constabulary.

The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the

mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and
unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples
Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official
mission when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued
an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It
declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on
official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended

Information and to allege that the offense charged was
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to
R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the
complete records with the stenographic notes, to the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March
11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended
Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by
the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in
relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof;

(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the

complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the
stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein,
are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable
Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for
appropriate proceedings.17
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel AlfonsoCortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to
the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned
that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, 18 the
RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the
prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had
commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the
rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue
with the case and render judgment therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on
May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his
evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the
RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the remand of the case to the RTC.

The petitioner contends that when the amended information was

filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still
in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was
charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal, and the crime was committed while in the
performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975
provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the
PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to
office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC,
the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be
applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the
law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the
petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in
accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to
the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied
retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the crime committed by the petitioner when the amended
information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved
petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975
had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given
retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court

The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law

and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the
case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined
by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the
statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action,
unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.
The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the
Information.19 Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the
inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.20
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No.
1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .21
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction
under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in
relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the

intimate relation between the office of the offender and the

discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It
is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law.22 The amended
Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his
office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had
jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24,
1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include
therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in
relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing
that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in
effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged
in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to
a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or
Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police

Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with

homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be
applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be
applied retroactively.23
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1552

December 16, 2004

DANTE M. QUINDOZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL G. BANZON, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received the Letter-Complaint1 dated August 1, 2002 filed by
complainant Dante M. Quindoza against Judge Emmanuel G.
Banzon, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Mariveles, Bataan. Complainant charges respondent with gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in connection
with respondents disposition of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325,
02-7326, and 02-7332, all entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Dante Quindoza, et al." for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and
Light Coercion.
The antecedents follow.
On May 8 and 22, 2002 respectively, complainant ordered the
disconnection of the water and electrical service of the housing
unit illegally occupied by Renato Caralipio (Caralipio), 2 and the

electrical services of the housing unit of Hermito de Asis (de

Asis) for non-settlement of accounts with the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority and expiration of lease. 3 Because of
the incidents, criminal cases were filed against the complainant
with the court of respondent judge. Criminal Cases Nos. 027325 and 02-7326 stemmed from the incident involving
Caralipios house,4 while Criminal Case No. 02-7332 related to
the disconnection of electric service in the house occupied by de
Asis.5
On June 4, 2002, the complainant filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash in the three criminal cases on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and failure to allege an offense. Complainant averred
that he is the incumbent Zone Administrator of the Bataan
Economic Zone (BEZ) and that his position has a salary grade
"28" under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. 6 He contended that it
is not respondents court but the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the three criminal cases.
Complainant claims that in open court during the hearing of his
motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326
on June 20, 2002, respondent ordered his incarceration, without
right to file bail, until such time that he shall have ordered the
reconnection of the water and electrical services of Caralipio and
de Asis. According to the complainant, respondent should not
have ordered the reconnection of electricity in de Asiss housing
unit during the hearings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 027326 because the disconnection incident relating to de Asis is the
subject of the third case, Criminal Case No. 02-7332, and the
motion to quash therein was to be conducted on June 27, 2002
yet.7 He also points out that it was erroneous for the respondent

judge to include the reconnection of the water services in de

Asiss house because only the disconnection of electricity was
complained of in Criminal Case No. 02-7332.8 Complainant
further avers that he made a formal written request9for a copy of
the transcript of stenographic notes of the June 20, 2002 hearing
in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 to avail of the
proper judicial remedies but respondent refused to release the
transcript. He prays that his pending cases be reassigned to
another court and that respondent judge be ordered to inhibit
himself from handling any case involving BEZ or any of its
officers and employees.10

supplies of the occupants who could not afford to file a case

against him, without even bothering to explain the
disconnections although they were effected in violation of due
process of law.15 Respondent prays that the complaint against
him be dismissed and that complainant instead be held
administratively and criminally liable for his illegal acts.16

The OCA indorsed the complaint and required respondent to file

his comment thereon.11

On March 3, 2004, the OCA submitted its Memorandum,

recommending that respondent be fined Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for oppression and abuse of authority, and gross
ignorance of the law.

Thereafter, respondent submitted his Comment dated September

20, 2002 and another Comment on November 29, 2002.
Respondent has not disputed complainants allegations in the
latters September 20, 2002 Comment.He argues, however, that
it is improper and premature for complainant to insinuate bias
and improper conduct on his part when the issues which gave
rise to the Letter-Complaint are still being ventilated in
court.12 He asserts that complainant should have appealed the
assailed order instead of filing an administrative case against
him because as the Court held in Barroso v. Arche,13 when a
litigant disagrees with a ruling of the judge the proper remedy is
not to file an administrative complaint but an appeal which
points out the errors in the decision. 14Respondent further claims
that complainant was arbitrary in effecting the disconnection of
water and electrical services of residents within the BEZ
alleging that complainant disconnected the electrical and water

Complainant submitted on October 25, 2002 his Reply, pointing

out that respondent judge failed to refute the charges against him
but instead made unsubstantiated allegations against the
complainant.

On August 4, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest

whether they would be willing to submit the case based on the
pleadings filed within ten (10) days from notice. Both parties
complied and replied in the affirmative,17 with respondent
adducing additional documents and arguments in his defense.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
OCA.
Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by
R.A. No. 824918 clearly provides that employees of the executive
branch classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 are within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not

of the MTC. Clearly, any crime committed by complainant, a

salary grade "28" employee, in relation to his office falls under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The record shows that the
crimes allegedly committed by complainant were in relation to
his office as director of the BEZ.
When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.19 Respondent judge undeniably erred in denying
complainants motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325,
02-7326 and 02-7332 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the OCA correctly observed, respondent judges
act of ordering the incarceration of complainant and threatening
not to grant him bail at the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 027325, 02-7326 and 02-7332 until he shall have reconnected the
water and electric supply connections of Caralipio and de Asis
indubitably constitutes oppression and abuse of authority This is a clear case of oppression and abuse of authority.
Respondent acted like a petty tyrant requiring obedience from
those around. He had no authority to order the incarceration of
complainant even if the latter refused to comply. In criminal
cases, a court can only do three things: (1) convict the accused
and sentence him accordingly; (2) acquit the accused and release
him from detention if he is detained or cancel his bail if he is
bonded; or (3) he can dismiss the case for any of the grounds
provided by law.20
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct

constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct 21 are

considered serious offenses which may be penalized with either
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension
from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00), may be imposed. However, as recommended by
the OCA,22 a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is
appropriate. This is the first offense of respondent.
In his Manifestation23 dated September 24, 2004, respondent
claims that during the pendency of the instant case, complainant
has been charged with several criminal complaints for violation
of Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code involving the exparte demolition of several houses in Mariveles, as well as
complaints for qualified trespass to dwelling and light coercion,
all of which were assigned to his sala. Complainant has been
charged, respondent adds, with violations of human rights before
the Commission on Human Rights. Moreover, while asserting
that complainant was high-handed and tyrannical in the
performance of his duties respondent stresses that complainant
filed the instant case to get even with and force him to be lenient
with complainant in the cases pending before his court.
The Court finds the cases adverted to irrelevant to the resolution
of the instant administrative complaint. If there is merit in the
cases against the complainant, then the same should be decided
in the courts concerned, but not in this forum at this time.
Complainant seeks to disqualify the respondent judge from
handling his pending cases and those that may be filed against

the BEZ or any of its employees and officers. The Court grants
the inhibition sought with respect to the pending cases, including
the cases mentioned by respondent in his Manifestation dated
September 24, 2004.
Considering the animosity generated by this administrative
complaint between complainant and respondent judge, it would
be in the best interest of justice to remove any doubt that may be
cast upon respondent judges ability to resolve said cases with
impartiality. However, there is no basis for respondents
inhibition from hearing any other case involving the BEZ or any
of its officers and employees.
However, with regard to cases still to be filed the recusal sought
is premature and therefore should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court orders respondent Judge Emmanuel
G. Banzon, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
Mariveles, Bataan, to pay a FINE in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. He is also ordered to inhibit himself from hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326, 02-7332, and 03-7760,
03-7761, 03-7762, 03-7763, 03-7764, 03-7765, 03-7766 and 037781 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan
involving complainant Dante M. Quindoza.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario,

JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., on leave.

G.R. No. 143047

July 14, 2004

RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure for the nullification of the September 23,
1999 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division),
which denied the petitioner's omnibus motion with supplemental
motion, and its Resolution dated April 25, 2000, denying the
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the same.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2committed as follows:

That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and

for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking
public officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as such,
while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in
the operation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or
users to enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the
city government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement
for actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust
operations, knowing fully well that he had no participation in the
said police operations against drugs but enabling him to collect
from the coffers of the city government a total amount
of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the government
as well as the public interest.3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled
to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion 4 for the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers
charged or, in the alternative, for the referral of the case either to
the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for
appropriate proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that
under Administrative Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991, he is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under
Republic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential Decree No.

1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try

cases involving crimes committed by officials of local
government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG
27 or higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as
the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." He
contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime charged
against him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial
notice of Adm. Order No. 270.
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor asserted that the petitioner was, at the time of the
commission of the crime, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those
public officers who, by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975, 5 is classified
as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original
jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary grade under
Adm. Order No. 270.
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying the petitioner's omnibus motion. According
to the court, the Information alleged that the petitioner has a
salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the
petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.6
On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion
to his omnibus motion,7 citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling

of this Court in Organo v. Sandiganbayan,8 where it was

declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to the law
creating the Sandiganbayan, "collated the provisions on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was
made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes
and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary
grade of accused government officials and employees."
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on
October 28, 1999 and entered a plea of not guilty.9
On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's September 23, 1999
Resolution.10 The motion was, however, denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.11
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari,
contending as follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05
February 1997 made the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a
trial court depend not only on the penalty imposed by law on the
crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and
salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia B. Organo
versus The Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,"
G.R. No. 133535, 09 September 1999, settles the matter on the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court which

is over public officials and employees with rank and salary grade
27 and above.

included as among those falling within the exclusive original

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was
allegedly committed, he was already occupying the position
of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence,
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No.
7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has
jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that
under Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is only a component
city, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are
classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25.
Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.

A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the

qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
such officials of the executive branch other than the regional
director and higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule,
otherwise, is to give a different interpretation to what the law
clearly is.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the

Special Prosecutor, contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly
provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the
members of theSangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification
and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Congress
approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was
aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section
4, subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were
specifically included therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the
members of the sangguniang panlungsod are specifically

Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27

and higher as the sole factor to determine the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could
have simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a
Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express wordings in both
RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 specifically including the
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
only means that the said sangguniang members shall be within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of
their Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are
very well aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned
as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the
legislature has explicitly made the officials so enumerated in RA
No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature

of these officials' functions and responsibilities as well as the

power they can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.13
The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who
was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that

to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period
is the time of the commission of the offense. This is plain from
the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these
two provisions which reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
[exclusive]16 original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

The Court rules in the affirmative.

Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606," took
effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No.
8249, entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." The amendatory law took effect on February 23,
1997 and Section 4 thereof enumerates the cases now falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act
No. 7975 or Rep. Act No. 8249, applies in the present case, the
reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
crime.15 However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No.

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book II] 17 of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense:

In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the

Sandiganbayan, the crime charged was committed from the
period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The applicable
law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined
in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:18

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code,19where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and

officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of

regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as

Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;20
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;21

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions

of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.22
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as

prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers

occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.23
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes
of determining the government officials that fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped
them into five categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive
branch with SG 27 or higher, Rep. Act No. 7975
further specifically included the following officials as falling
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an
exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the
executive branch as "occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." In other
words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in
the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials
specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975,regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No.
3019 only to officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4
a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, with the phrase "officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category in
paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to "[a]ll other
national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and up under
the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989" would have
sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress
included specific officials, without any reference as to their

salary grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these

officials, regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically
included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction, for
had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for
such enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that
words in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if a
reasonable construction which will give them some force and
meaning is possible.24
That the legislators intended to include certain public officials,
regardless of their salary grades, within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the legislative history of
both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of
Senate Bill No. 1353, which was substantially adopted by both
Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator
Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in
the government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the
court.
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in
instances where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher
or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a

certain grade upwards,

Sandiganbayan.

which

shall

remain

with

the

effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution

to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers

such as the justices of the Supreme Court and constitutional
commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public

officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower,
devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials
whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other
specific public officials holding important positions in
government regardless of salary grade;26

The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public

officers who will be subject to the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of
Congress, judges and justices of all courts.25
More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator
Roco, of Senate Bill No. 844, which was substantially adopted
by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 8249.
Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
Rep. Act No. 7975, thus:
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO

By way of sponsorship, Mr. President we will issue the full

sponsorship speech to the members because it is fairly technical
may we say the following things:
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975
was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and
leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became

Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of

P.D. No. 1606, amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were
specifically included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them "big
fish" and their positions important, regardless of their salary
grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or
higher under the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and
Management in 1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No.
7975 was approved. For example:

Category

New
Title

Position Grade

16.
FOREIGN
SERVICE

RELATIONS

Foreign Service

2533

Provincial Government Department

Head

Foreign Service Officer,

Class II27

2328

City Vice Mayor

26

Foreign Service Officer,

Class I29

2430

City Vice Mayor

II

28

City Mayor

2834

18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE

City Mayor

II

30

Local Executives

19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE

City Government Department Head

2431

Sangguniang Members

City Government Department Head

II

2632

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member

25

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member

II

27

35

Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member

26

Office of the City and Provincial

Prosecutors36
Prosecutor

IV

29

Prosecutor

III

28

Prosecutor

II

27

Prosecutor

26

Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod and prosecutors, without any distinction or
qualification, were specifically included in Rep. Act No. 7975 as
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, the consuls, city department heads, provincial
department heads and members of theSangguniang
Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or
lower, were also specifically included within the
Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the
respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and
had taken into account, these officials' respective salary grades
when it deliberated upon the amendments to the Sandiganbayan

jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No.

7975, specifically including them within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it obviously intended cases
mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials
enumerated in (1) (a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary
grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the
intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of a statute.37 From the congressional records and
the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature
undoubtedly intended the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid
subsequent laws, to be included within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which
provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower than
SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, 38 can only be
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG
27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration
in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those
officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below
SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts
"where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the
entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in

statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and

phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order
to produce a harmonious whole.39 And courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at
all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is
to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its
every word.40
In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged
with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. Members
of the Sangguniang Panlungsodare specifically included as
among those within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, 41 or even Section 4
of Rep. Act No. 824942 for that matter. The Sandiganbayan,
therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioner's case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran ** accused,
along with her brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar
ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari
assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,
denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed
by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a

student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1,

2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to
the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of
the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student
councils within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with
the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D.

SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa,

defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the

aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of
her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her
office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently
representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the
Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying
and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000
and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and
despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to
return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the

Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction
over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from
the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast
to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and
did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to

receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board
of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive
funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners
interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in
relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the
prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of
defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR,
she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the
corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a
public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated,
hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an
essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition,
petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses
covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A.
8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
other offenses committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall
under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which
provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27"
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of

government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection
(g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of
their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of
law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of
the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general
powers of administration and corporate powers in the university,
such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by
law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the
university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to
enact for the government of the university such general
ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent
with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties
and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its
discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an

investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can
act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the
case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to
those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This
draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board,
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that
the same of P15 Million was received from former President
Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a
defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the
merits of this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS
OF
JURISDICTION
IN
NOT
QUASHING
THE
INFORMATION
AND
DISMISING
THE
CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
OFFENSE
CHARGED
IN
THE
19
INFORMATION."
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below,
namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;
(b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and
she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not
committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily,
the
denial
of
quash is not correctible by certiorari.

motion

to

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright

on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a
petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.20Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often

dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid

multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court
clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions,
thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final
judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go
to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order
denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an
answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or
if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made
with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a

motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the
respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a
motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense,
this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge
from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent
judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the
petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double
jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to
desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss
the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion
to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and
the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
The
jurisdiction
of
the
set by P.D. No. 1606, as
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

Sandiganbayan
amended, not

is
by

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We
note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash
before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the
instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or
typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this
claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of
the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct

required of public officers and employees, based on the concept

that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A.
No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it
now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27"

and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act

of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of
senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as

Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade
"27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate

jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan.
In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said

public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall

exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private

individuals. We quote:

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary

notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be

unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation
with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage
of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government,
in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation
shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity
in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall
include close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise to
intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved
on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the
said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or

cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined
in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No.
3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and
provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan
the offense of estafa.

has

jurisdiction

over

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends

that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,

petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or
an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan,
ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words,
petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that
a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that
the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. 36 Optima
statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa
ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon
ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees

mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their

office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see
no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created
originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for
the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other
national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated
as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on
February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite
an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter
of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated
November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office
of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed

NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the
President and allotments for its maintenance and operating
expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item
Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with
greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of
the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases
to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter
would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial
of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the
nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive,
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact
that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.

This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called
upon to define a public officer. InKhan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
definition of a public officer.39The 1987 Constitution does not
define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our
political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it
exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64).
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

regent

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of

Mechem of a public office:

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does
not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent.

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an

Petitioner
is a public officer.

UP

student

individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign

functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. InGeduspan v. People,43 We held
that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed
there by express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. 45 By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an

essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and
is not a corporation created for profit.50
The
offense
in
relation
to
to the Information.

charged
public

was
office,

committed
according

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public

officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over
the offense because it was not committed in relation to her
office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the

governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was

done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in
the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an
answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. 52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while
in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x
x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on
this ground.
Source
of
funds
is
a
defense
be raised during trial on the merits.

that

should

It is contended anew that the amount came from President

Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came

from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is
averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of
the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that
the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should
be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54
A
lawyer
owes
and honesty to the Court.

candor,

fairness

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,

misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition forcertiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners
counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that
"a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v.
Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different
from that with which he was authorized. We severely

reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may

warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and
accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not
act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson,
Nachura, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez,

Corona*,

G.R. No. L-4922

September 24, 1951

MANUEL MONTILLA, as Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur,

and FAUSTINO S. TOBIA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ZOILO HILARIO, as District Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and HON. FLORO
CRISOLOGO, respondents.
Dominador D. Pichay and Manuel D. Villanueva for
petitioners.
Honesto Ricolcol for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution bars Senators and
members of the House of Representatives from, among other
inhibitions, appearing as counsel before any court "in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office."
This case comes before us on a writ of certiorari to the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and involves the consideration of the
scope of the aforequoted constitutional provision. The provincial
fiscal and the private counsel for the complainants seek to have
set aside an order of Judge Zoilo Hilario of that court overruling
their objection to Congressman Floro Crisologo's intervention as
defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 129 "for murder with
(and) frustrated murder" against the municipal mayor and three
members of the police force of Santa Catalina, Ilocos Sur.

The information charges that the defendants, "taking advantage

of their respective public positions, conspiring together . . . did
then and there . . . assault, attack and shoot with their firearms"
several persons "with the intent to kill" and did kill one Claudio
Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three others.
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that
the official positions of the accused were connected with the
offenses charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution of
stated that the motives for the crimes were "personal with
political character." It does not even appear, nor is there
assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in
line of duty or in the performance of their official functions.
Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the relation
between the crime and the office contemplated by the
Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such
that, in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element
of the crime as defined in the statue, such as, for instance, the
crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, title Seven,
of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of
human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a
private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the
fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of
the commission of the crime.
Incidentally, this might serve as a warning against disqualifying
a lawyer legislator on the basis of what is alleged and not on the
nature of the offense itself. Were the petitioners' proposition
sustained, the result would be that in every case in which the
accused is a public officer or employee, the prosecution could at
will keep a member of Congress from entering an appearance as
attorney for the defense. The prosecutor could do this by the
simple expedient of making the necessary averments, even
though, as a matter of fact, there was no evidence that the office
held by the defendant had anything to do with the offense.
By the same token, the fact that, as alleged, the defendants made
use of firearms which they were authorized to carry or possess
by reason of their positions, could not supply the required
connection between the office and the crime. Firearms however
and wherever obtained are not an ingredient of murder or
homicide. The crime in question, for example, could have been
committed by the defendants in the same or like manner and
with the same case if they had been private individuals and fired
with unlicensed weapons. Murders or homicides by private
persons with guns, licensed or unlicensed are the general rule
and by public officers the exception.
Tested by its consequence, the petitioners contention on this
point is, like the contention discussed in the preceding

paragraphs, untenable. Little reflection will show that this by

contention the right of legislators to appear as counsel would
depend on whether the weapons used were the offenders'
property or part of their official equipment; and since this matter
is extraneuos to the definition of the crime of murder, the
attorneys' qualification or disqualification would lie at the mercy
of the prosecuting officer. Surely, it could not have been the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to make the
operation of the provision in question hang on a factual
consideration so slender and uncertain; on a contingency that
could only be determined after the trial was over, when the
attorneys' services were no longer needed.
The petition is denied without costs.1wphl.nt
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and
Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14595

May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of
First Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR
LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R.
POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO
LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD
HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA,
SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES, respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari , with mandamus and
preliminary injunction, against Hon. Gregorio Montejo, as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and
Basilan, and the defendants in Criminal Case No. 672 of said
court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said
criminal case, it is prayed that, pending the final determination
thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction issue, enjoining
respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of said case;
that, after due hearing, the rulings of respondent Judge, rejecting

some evidence for the prosecution therein and not permitting the
same to propound certain questions, be set aside; that said
respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller
Lim be declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent
Judge, disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as
counsel for the accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the
filing of the petition, we issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance,
that the ruling complained of are in conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective
Joaquin
R.
Pollisco,
Patrolman
Graciano
Lacerna
(alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi, Special Policemen
Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo and
several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No. 672,
with murder. It is alleged in the information therein that, during
May and June, 1958, in the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of
Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Brown "organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes", consisting of regular
and special policemen, whom he "armed with pistols and high
power guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police
headquarters hereinafter referred to as sub-station at TipoTipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his command, orders,
direct supervision and control, and in which his codefendants
were stationed; that the criminal complaints were entertained in
said sub-station, in which defendant Pollisco acted as
investigating officer and exercised authority to order the
apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for

days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing

them to the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958;
one Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown,
without any warrant or complaint filed in court, and then
brought to, and detained in, the aforementioned sub-station; that
while on the way thereto, said Awalin Tebag was maltreated,
pursuant to instructions of Mayor Brown, concurred in by
Pollisco, to the effect that Tebag be mauled until such time as he
shall surrender his gun; that, once in the sub-station, Tebag,
whose hands were securely tied, was subjected, by defendants
Lacerna, Hasbi, Pollisco, Dinglasa, and other special policemen,
to further and more severe torture, in consequence of which
Tebag died; that, in order to simulate that Tebag had been killed
by peace officers in the course of an encounter between the latter
and a band of armed bandits of which he formed part, the body
of Tebag was brought, early the next morning, to a nearby
isolated field, where defendant Hasbi fired twice at said dead
body from behind, and then an old Japanese rifle, supplied by
Mayor Brown, was placed beside said body; and that, in
furtherance of the aforementioned simulation, a report of said
imaginary encounter, mentioning Tebag as the only member of a
band of armed bandits whose identity was known, was submitted
and respondent Hasbi caused one of his companions to shoot
him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected
the following evidence for the prosecution therein:
1. Exhibit A A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding
Officer of the PC Detachment in Basilan City, who investigated
the case, showing that on June 5, 1958, he and Lt. Clemente

Antonio, PAF, found nine (9) detainees in the Tipo-Tipo substation. This was part of the chain of evidence of the prosecution
to prove that persons used to be detained in the aforementioned
sub-station by the main respondents herein, without either a
warrant of arrest or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer
in charge of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to
the whereabouts of Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter,
was arrested in his house, by policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt.
Sarrosa took possession of this letter in the course of his
aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 These are the transcript of
the testimony of Tebag's mother, before the City Fiscal of
Basilan City, when she asked an autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V Consisting of the following, namely: a
sketch of the sub-station; pictures of several huts therein,
indicating their relative positions and distances; a picture
depicting how the body of Tebag was taken from a camarin in
the sub-station; a picture showing how Patrolman Hasbiwas shot
by a companion, at this request; and a picture, Exhibit T,
demonstrating how Mayor Brown allegedly gave the Japanese
rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag's body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona
Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of their testimony as
witnesses for the prosecution, these exhibits were not admitted
in evidence, which were presented to show how they were able

to observe the movements in the sub-station, the same being

quite small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) Amenola
said that these effects were given to him by Mayor Brown in the
latter's office, and that he then saw therein the Japanese rifle,
Exhibit Y, which was later placed beside the dead body of
Awalin Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ, KK and LL These show that on
April 28, 1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz)
executed affidavits admitting participation in a given robbery;
that an information therefor (Exh. KK) was filed against them on
May 2, 1958, with the municipal court of Basilan City (Criminal
Case No. 1774); and that, in compliance with warrants for their
arrest then issued, they were apprehended and detained in the
sub-station, thus corroborating the testimony of prosecution
witness Yakans Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the effect
that Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) were together with
them, in the aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was
maltreated and died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as
confirming Pollisco's statement, Exhibit TT-18, before the City
Fiscal of Basilan city, on June 21, 1958, admitting that
Fernandez was in the sub-station on June 5, 1958, on account of
the warrant of arrest adverted to. Through the exhibits in
question the prosecution sought, also, to bolster up its theory that
Kallapattoh and Fernandez disappeared from the sub-station
after Tebag's death, because the main respondents herein
illegally released them to prevent them from revealing the
circumstances surrounding said event.

7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM These are sketches of a human

body and pictures purporting to show the points of entrance, as
well as of exit, of two (2) bullets wounds found on the body of
Tebag. Respondent Judge rejected these exhibits and did not
allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the Medico-Legal Section of
the National Bureau of Investigation, to answer questions asked
by the prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of said
bullets wounds were parallel to each other, which, the
prosecution claims, would have been impossible had Tebag been
alive when he sustained said wounds..
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain
questions propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show that the injuries
sustained by Tebag in the large intestines must have been
inflicted when Tebag was dead already, and did not allow Dr.
Reyes to draw lines on Exhibits II and MM, indicating the
connection between the points of entrance and those of exit of
said wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 These are records of the office of the
City Fiscal of Basilan City showing that the Japanese rifle,
Exhibit Y, two rounds of ammunitions and one empty shell were
received by said Office from the Police Department of Basilan
City on June 17, 1958. These exhibits were presented to show
that said rifle tallies with the description thereof given by
prosecution witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June
14, 1958, when said weapon was still in the possession of
respondent Pollisco, and hence, to establish Amenola's veracity.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution
were rejected by respondent Judge, viz:

1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 These are daily records of events of

the police department, Lamitan District, Basilan City, including
the Tipo-Tipo region. They do not mention the killing therein, by
the police patrol, of any outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby
contradicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of respondent
Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the
record clerk of the City Fiscal's office to identify said exhibits,
upon the ground that it was too late to present him although
when the exhibits were marked by the prosecution it reserved the
right to identify them as part of official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 Respondent Pollisco had testified
that on June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about one Awalin; that
he told Aisa that Awalin was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat
of the city government; and that he (Pollisco) suggested that
Datu Unding be advised not to worry, because there was no
evidence against Awalin. To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the
prosecution presented the exhibits under consideration, for the
same show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin
Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and released on bail
on June 23, 1958; that Pollisco could not have truthfully
informed Aisa on June 4, 1958, what Dong Awalin had been
taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government and
that there was no evidence against him; for he was then a
detention prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in mind,
therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom Aisa had
inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show that, testifying
before the City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco said that he twice
ordered Patrolman Lacerna on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin
Tebag to him (Pollisco) for investigation.

3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 These are the testimonies before the

City Fiscal, of defense witness Mohammad Sali who, on cross
examination by the prosecution, denied having given it. Thus the
predicate therefor was established by the prosecution which
sought thereby to impeach Sali's veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 These are the testimonies,
before the City Fiscal of the main respondents herein, who gave
a different story before respondent Judge. The prosecution thus
sought to impeach their veracity as witnesses in their own
behalf, after laying down the predicate in the course of their
cross examination.
5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 These are sworn statements
made by defendant Hasbi before the City Fiscal. They were
presented in rebuttal, after laying down the predicate, to impeach
his testimony in court.
6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 With these exhibits the
prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco's testimony to the effect that
prosecution witness Lianson Arip had a grudge against him, he
(Pollisco) having charged him with theft in the City Fiscal's
Office. It appears from said exhibits that Arip's affidavit,
implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas Pollisco's
affidavit charging Arip with theft, was dated June 20, 1958, so
that said statement of Arip could not have been influenced by
Pollisco's subsequent act.
In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by
respondent Judge in dealing with the aforementioned evidence
for the prosecution, petitioner herein cites the liberality with

which the lower court admitted, as evidence for the defense,

records of supposed achievements of the Tipo-Tipo sub-station
(Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I
21 and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and a
letter of commendation to a peace officer assigned thereto (Exh.
7), including an article in the Philippine Free Press (Exhs. 23
and 23-A).
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower
court had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting
the aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution, and in not permitting the same to propound the
questions, already adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct
and rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned questions,
are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 627.
Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this
stage of the proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the
outcome of that case, it is elemental that all parties therein are
entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their respective
pretense. In this connection it should be noted that, in the light of
the allegations of the amended information in said case and of
the records before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the
accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of
the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their
respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a
certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence lest they
may be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be
defeated or appear to be defeated. The danger of leading to such
result must be avoided, particularly in cases of the nature,
importance and significance of the one under consideration.

With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim

may appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as
defendants in said criminal case, the Constitution provides that
no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall
"appear as counsel ... in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation of his office ... (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.).
The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case
No. 672 are "accused of an offense committed in relation" to
their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily
elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended
information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City,
as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high
power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo,"
which is under his "command, ... supervision and control,"
where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as
well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons
without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his
codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as
committed by the main respondents herein, according to the

amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately

connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he
was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
The case of Monllito vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49,
relied upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of
the prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not
in point, for, as stated in the decision therein:
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that
the official positions of the accused were connected with the
offense charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated
that the motives for the crimes were personal with political
character. It does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the
crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in
the performance of their official functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed
and respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to admit the
aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution,
as well as to permit the formulation, of the questions already
referred to, with costs against the respondents herein. It is so
ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City,
and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C.
ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE
PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE
YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME
GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA,
and EDGAR HILADO,respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

At issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether it is
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the
Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases
for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein some of the
accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for
ransom with murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City
against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the PNP,
namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto,

Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan, and Vicente

Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations, later
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47
of the said court, are similarly worded, except as to the names of
the victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and
Danilo Lumangyao in the second, thus:
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSONDUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS
PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M.
TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY
DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION),
POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE
OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE
PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR
GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA,
TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS
PRINCIPALS
BY
PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO,
BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August
6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio
Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common
criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for
the accessories for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum
of P353, 000.00, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously to wit:

Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette YansonDumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction
cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M.
Torres, taking advantage of his position as Station Commander
of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the
direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis
C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose
Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R.
Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions,
and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap
and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. (Criminal Case No. 9415562 and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. 9415563), shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening
of August 7, 1992, failing in their aforesaid common purpose to
extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident
premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of motor
vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victims, while
being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and
Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gargar [and
Lumangyao, in Crim. Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of
violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpses in a
makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime
of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00
each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to
the heirs of said victims, to wit:

P 50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

50,000.00 actual damages;

300,000.00 compensatory damages
(Lost income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
50,000.00 exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248 in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code). 1
These cases were consolidated.
Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later,
they filed their respective motions for bail. At the hearings
thereof, the prosecution presented state witness Moises
Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the
commission of the complex crimes. After the completion of his
testimony, the trial court, per Judge Edgar G. Garvilles, granted
bail in favor of only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp. Adonis
Abeto, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr.,
Charles Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and Cesar Pecha. The other
eight accused who were denied bail are now detained at the City
Jail of Bacolod City. 2
Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established
that in response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette

Dumancas, P/Col. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for

Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao who were allegedly
members of the group that had swindled the Dumancas spouses.
On 6 August 1992, Police Officer Mario Lamis, together with
civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin Divinagracia,
Jaime Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises Grandeza,
arrested and abducted the two swindling suspects. Conformably
with Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to Dragon
Lodge Motel. There, they were investigated by Police Inspector
Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente
Canuday, Jr.. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound,
where Jeanette Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of
the group that had swindled her. She then asked about the money
that the group had received from her. Upon being told by
Lumangyao that the money had already been divided among his
partners long time ago, she said to the accused, specifically to
Dominador Geroche: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or
police and I will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could
be filed against them." Thereafter, the two suspects were
transferred to D' Hacienda Motel, then to Moonlit Inn, then to
Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel, where the two
were shot and killed. The team forthwith went to the office of
P/Col. Torres and reported that the killing had been done. The
latter told them: "You who are here inside, nobody knows what
you have done, but you have to hide because the NBI's are after
you." 3
Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court
started to receive the evidence for the accused. Accused Torres
and Abeto presented their respective evidence. Presentation of
evidence by the other accused was, however, suspended because

of the motions of several accused for the inhibition of Judge

Garvilles. Despite opposition by the prosecution, Judge
Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing both
cases, which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by
herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.
On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the
transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on
the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion, 4 the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records,
the State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private
prosecutors. 5
In its order of 15 August 1994, 6 the trial court, thru respondent
Judge, ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction
over the subject cases because the informations do not state that
the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers. Citing People vs. Montilla, 7 it held that
the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP officers
took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense
charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating circumstance.
It further stated that a public office is not a constituent element
of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense
intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion
for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared
that the trial of the case should continue.

Relying on People vs. Montejo, 8 the prosecution moved to

reconsider the said order. 9
On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying
the motion because People vs. Montejo is not applicable, since in
that case there was (a) an intimate connection between the
offense charged and the public position of the accused and (b) a
total absence of personal motive; whereas, in these cases, no
such intimate connection exists and the informations emphasize
that the accused were moved by selfish motives of ransom and
extortion.
The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the
evidence for the other accused. Accused Gargallano, Fernandez,
Lamis, Delgado, and Geroche, as well as his three witnesses, had
already completed their respective testimonies when, upon
motion of the prosecution, the respondent Judge voluntarily
inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The cases were then reraffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge
to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan.

On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues,

and arguments adduced in the petition as well as in the
comments of the private respondents, we gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. Most of them submitted their memoranda, while the
petitioner and some of the private respondents adopted their
initiatory pleadings as their memoranda.
On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette YansonDumancas filed an urgent motion for the grant of bail, 12which
we noted on 15 May 1995. 13
Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are
convinced that public respondent Judge Magallanes committed
no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it is his court and not
the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the two cases for
kidnapping for ransom with murder.
At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law
governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which
pertinently provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment

on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the public respondent or his successor to desist from
proceeding with the trial of the subject cases. 11

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and

employees in relation to their office, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by Law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
16,000.00:PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law
does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in
their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions
or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, in their respective jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or

controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said

public officers and employees.
Applying this section, we held in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 14 that
for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction
over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or
employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is not enough that the
penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also
necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in
relation to their office. We reiterated this pronouncement
in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 15 Natividad vs. Felix, 16 and Republic
vs. Asuncion, 17 In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down
in Montilla vs. Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the
office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised
Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle in People vs.
Montejo 19 that the offense must be intimately connected with the
office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that
the offense was committed in relation to the office must be
alleged in the information. 20
There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the
court below are higher than prision correcional or imprisonment
for more than six years. The only question that remains to be
resolved then is whether the said offenses were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.

Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner

submits that the crimes charged in the subject cases were
connected with public office because the accused PNP officers,
together with the civilian agents, arrested the two swindling
suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not
out of personal motive, and if they demanded from the two
suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses
and later killed the two; they did so in the course of the
investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner
further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading
"taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the
Philippine National Police" and "taking advantage of their
respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the functions
attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are
sufficient to show that the offenses charged were committed in
relation to their office. The petitioner then concludes that the
cases below fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, 21 and not by the
result of evidence after trial. 22
In Montejo 23 where the amended information alleged:
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has
organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes
consisting of regular policemen and . . . special policemen,
appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns
and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo, which is under his
command . . . supervision and control, where his codefendants

were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted

the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the
authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line
with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to
the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions and would not have peen committed had they
not held their office; besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime; thus, there was an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the
accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the
latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting
the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the
two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and
killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the
evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking
advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the
informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the
definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office."

In Montilla vs. Hilario, 24 such an allegation was considered

merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, 25 and
not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office, It says:
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the
fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of
the commission of the crime.
Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the
allegation that the accused public officers committed the crime
of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of
their official positions," this Court held that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information
[did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between
the discharge of official duties and the commission of the
offense."
Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the
offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of
the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court 27 and not of the
Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.
In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of
this case and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to
Dismiss all filed in July 1995, it is contended that even assuming
that the informations do charge the accused PNP officers with

crimes committed in relation to their office, still the Regional

Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject cases in
view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, introduced by R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on
30 March 1995, whose Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sanggunian panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang

panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade

"27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of

consul and higher;

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials

and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection

with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

(a) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the

positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or

employees, including those employed in government-owned or

controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them. (emphasis supplied).
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan
partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, 28 as amended; R.A. No.
1379; 29 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code; 30 it retains only cases where the accused are those
enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally,
national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses
or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed
penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough
that they are committed by those public officials and employees
enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However, it retains
its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases
filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos.
1, 31 2, 32 14, 33 and 14-A. 34
The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 because
none of the five PNP officers involved therein occupy the rank
of chief superintendent or higher, or are classified as Grade "27"
or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and of the five, P/Col. Nicolas
Torres has the highest rank,viz., Senior Superintendent whose
salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18."

Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in

the said cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by
the five PNP officers in relation to their office, it would appear
indubitable that the cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the
court a quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further
amended by R.A. No. 7975:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent 35 or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. 36 Under
the above assumption then, the cases should have been filed with
the Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed,
the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by P.D. No. 1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan be affected by R.A. No. 7975?
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by
subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another
tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally
terminated. 37 Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the
case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed

before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their

jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations
were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even
if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations
in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with
offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction
thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming
further that the informations had already been filed with the said
tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the
Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view
of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That
section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal
cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall
be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were
previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No.
1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the
courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975,
shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet
been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to
the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be
transferred again to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.
As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette
Dumancas and Nicolas Torres, the same must fail. Section 17,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 17 Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be
filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence
or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the
same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested
in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of
said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the
accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application
therefor may be filed only in the particular court where the case
is pending, whether for preliminary investigation, trial, on
appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may
apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality
where he is held.
In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accusedrespondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases
against them are pending were denied sometime in February,
1994
In Enrile vs. Salazar, 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of
Appeals, 39 this Court said: "Only after that remedy [petition to
be admitted to bail] was denied by the trial court should the
review jurisdiction of this Court [be] invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there."

There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have

questioned the denial of their applications for bail in a petition
for certiorari either before the Court of Appeals or this Court. It
was only on 26 December 1994, when they filed their respective
comments on the instant petition, that they challenged the denial
premised on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them
was not strong. Even if their respective Comment and
Reiteration of Motion for Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's
Motion for Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as
petitions forcertiorari, still the same would not prosper for not
having been seasonably filed. While the Rules of Court does not
fix a time-frame for the filing of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, existing
jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable
period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or
order. 42 And, in Philec Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A.
Young 43 it was held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court should be filed within a reasonable period
of three months from notice of the decision or order. Here, about
nine to ten months had already elapsed before the respondents
assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event, the
private respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from
reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged
orders are AFFIRMED, and the motions for bail of accusedrespondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are
DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is
LIFTED, and the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City is

directed to immediately resume the hearings of Criminal Cases

Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to thereafter resolve them with
reasonable and purposeful dispatch.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. that the two (2) informations subject of the present
petition should remain in the Regional Trial Court, I arrive at
this conclusion based solely on the provisions of Rep. Act No.
7975.
It is my considered opinion, unlike the majority, that the accused
PNP personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2)
informations in relation to their office. The wording of the two

(2) informations clearly shows that P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres

used his authority over his subordinate officers when he ordered
them to arrest the two (2) swindling suspects/victims in
connection with the complaint of the Dumancas spouses. This
act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his
position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In
turn, the other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2)
victims were performing their functions as law enforcers under
orders from their direct superior. Under such circumstances, the
two (2) informations would have been properly filed with the
Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the time was P.D. No.
1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their office where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correctional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00.
The above view notwithstanding, Rep. Act No. 7975 has revised
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under said revised
jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction
over offenses committed by PNP officers with ranks below that
of superintendent or its equivalent, whether or not the offenses
are committed in relation to their office. In the present case,
none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of superintendent
or higher.
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 7975 also provides that upon
effectivity of said Act, all criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606 where trial has not
begun in said court, shall be referred to the proper courts.

In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been
committed in relation to the accuseds' office, as earlier
discussed, yet, the cases were not filed in said court. Since the
cases now fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
under the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975, they can
remain in said regional trial court.
On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas
should be granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan that the Court should exercise its discretion, disregard
technicalities and rule on the motion for bail filed with this
Court.
Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should, in my view, be
released on bail for the following reasons:
1. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as
accused merely because they were the ones who complained to
the police that the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is
no showing that the spouses knew, much less instigated, the
kidnapping and murder of the victims. Of note is a portion of the
testimony of the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator
turned state witness, Moises Grandeza, where he declared that
Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador Geroche to bring
the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and that she
would call a certain Atty. Geocadin so the proper cases could be
filed against them. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack
of any criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during
the trial.

2. The situation of Jeanette Dumancas is no different from that

of her husband who was granted bail by the trial court.
3. Jeanette Dumancas came back from abroad even after the
charges against her had been filed. Certainly, this is not
indicative of a probability of her later jumping bail should she be
released on bail.
4. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the
absence of direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by
inducement as alleged in the two (2) informations, is
antagonistic not only to her constitutional right to bail but also to
the ideals and demands of a just and humane society.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I fully agree with much of what my esteemed colleague, Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. has Mitten in this case. However, at least
with respect to petitioner Jeanette Dumancas, I think this Court,
mainly for humanitarian reasons, should exercise its discretion
to grant said petitioner her constitutional right to bail, pending
the determination of her guilt or innocence in the trial court.
The facts so far established in the case at bench with respect to
the spouses Dumancas as narrated in the court's opinion simply
show that they were civilians who complained to the authorities
(respondents herein) to the effect that they were swindled by
Rufino Gangar and Danilo Lumangyao, the alleged murderkidnapping victims. After respondent Jeanette YansonDumancas identified them, the lone witness for the prosecution
in this case testified that she requested the accused, specifically

Domingo Geroche to "bring (the two men) to the PC or police"

so that she could in the meantime locate her attorney for the
purpose of filing the proper charges against them. Possibly out
of sheer overzealousness, or for reasons not yet established in
the trial court, both men were brought elsewhere and shot. Thus,
apparently, the only reason why the spouses were charged as
principals by inducement was because, as possible victims of a
group of alleged swindlers, they initiated-through their
apparently legitimate complaint the chain of events which led
to the death of the victims in the case at bench.
This narration clearly casts enough doubt regarding the strength
of the evidence of guilt against Mrs. Dumancas, which ought to
be sufficient for us for us to exercise our discretion to grant bail
in her case. The trial court has already refused to grant her
petition for bail, which under the facts and circumstances so far
available to the lower court, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion, subject to this court's action. While I agree that
normally, a motion for reconsideration should be addressed to
the trial court or to the Court of Appeals (if the said motion were
denied by the lower court), I see no reason why, here and now,
we should not exercise our discretion, for compelling
humanitarian reasons, to grant Mrs. Dumancas her constitutional
right to bail. Firstly, she is the mother of two minor children,
aged seven (7) and one (1) years old, who have been deprived of
her care for over a year. Second, even with the knowledge that
she would face possible arrest, she came back to the country
from abroad, risking-incarceration in order to face the charges
against her.

Without prejudice to whatever the lower court would in the

course of hearing the case, deem appropriate, I vote to grant
Mrs. Dumancas' petition for bail.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. that the two (2) informations subject of the present
petition should remain in the Regional Trial Court, I arrive at
this conclusion based solely on the provisions of Rep. Act No.
7975.
It is my considered opinion, unlike the majority, that the accused
PNP personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2)
informations in relation to their office. The wording of the two
(2) informations clearly shows that P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres
used his authority over his subordinate officers when he ordered
them to arrest the two (2) swindling suspects/victims in
connection with the complaint of the Dumancas spouses. This
act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his
position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In
turn, the other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2)
victims were performing their functions as law enforcers under
orders from their direct superior. Under such circumstances, the
two (2) informations would have been properly filed with the
Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the time was P.D. No.
1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses

committed by public officers in relation to their office where the

penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correctional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00.
The above view notwithstanding, Rep. Act No. 7975 has revised
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under said revised
jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction
over offenses committed by PNP officers with ranks below that
of superintendent or its equivalent, whether or not the offenses
are committed in relation to their office. In the present case,
none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of superintendent
or higher.
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 7975 also provides that upon
effectivity of said Act, all criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606 where trial has not
begun in said court, shall be referred to the proper courts.
In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been
committed in relation to the accuseds' office, as earlier
discussed, yet, the cases were not filed in said court. Since the
cases now fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
under the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975, they can
remain in said regional trial court.
On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas
should be granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan that the Court should exercise its discretion, disregard
technicalities and rule on the motion for bail filed with this
Court.

Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should, in my view, be

released on bail for the following reasons:
1. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as
accused merely because they were the ones who complained to
the police that the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is
no showing that the spouses knew, much less instigated, the
kidnapping and murder of the victims. Of note is a portion of the
testimony of the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator
turned state witness, Moises Grandeza, where he declared that
Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador Geroche to bring
the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and that she
would call a certain Atty. Geocadin so the proper cases could be
filed against them. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack
of any criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during
the trial.
2. The situation of Jeanette Dumancas is no different from that
of her husband who was granted bail by the trial court.
3. Jeanette Dumancas came back from abroad even after the
charges against her had been filed. Certainly, this is not
indicative of a probability of her later jumping bail should she be
released on bail.
4. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the
absence of direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by
inducement as alleged in the two (2) informations, is
antagonistic not only to her constitutional right to bail but also to
the ideals and demands of a just and humane society.

I N F O R M AT I O N
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986
ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Jesus L. Santos Law Office for petitioner in L-64548.
Prudencio Cruz for petitioner in L-64559.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Before us is a decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the
4548 and G.R. No. 64559 of the crime petitioners in G. R. No. 6
of Falsification of a Public Document, as defined and penalized
under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge in this case reads in full as follows:

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses

ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ and ELINO CORONEL
Y SANTOS of the crime of Falsification of Official Document
as defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of January, 1977, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y
PEREZ, a public officer having been duly appointed and
qualified as Senior Labor Regulation Officer and Chief of the
Labor Regulations Section, Ministry of Labor, National Capital
Region, Manila, conspiring and conniving with the other
accused ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS, also a public officer
having been duly appointed and qualified as Labor Regulation
Officer of the same office, taking advantage of their official
positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
prepare and falsify an official document, to wit: the CS Personal
Data Sheet (Civil Service Form No. 212) which bears the
Residence Certificate No. A-9086374 issued at Manila on
January 12, 1977, by making it appear in said document that
accused ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ had taken and
passed the 'Career Service (Professional Qualifying Examination
on 'May 2, 1976' with a rating of '73.35% in Manila' and that he
was a '4th Year AB student at the Far Eastern University (FEU),
when in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, accused
ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ had not taken and passed
the same nor was he a '4th Year AB student, thereby making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act

No. 1379 will reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification
of an official document mentioned, even tangentially or by
implication.

Manila, Philippines, January 21, 1982.

RICARDO
Special Prosecutor

A.

BUENVIAJE

We hold that the proceedings in the court a quo are nun and
void ab initio. The Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
case.

Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and
penalizes a wide range of offenses committed by public officers,
from knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204
to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but falsification of an
official document is not included. This is punished in Article 171
under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.

Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic
Act No. 1379;
(b) Crime committed by public officers and employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office. (Emphasis
supplied).

The nearest approach to the claimed jurisdiction is paragraph (c)

of the above-quoted section, which speaks of crimes committed
by public officers and employees in relation to their office.
Under existing jurisprudence, however, the crime imputed to the
petitioners cannot come under this heading.
The pertinent case is Montilla v. Hilario, 1 where a municipal
mayor and three policemen charged with murder and frustrated
murder retained Rep. Floro Crisologo as their counsel. The
prosecution sought to disqualify him on the ground that a
member of Congress could not appear as counsel "in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office." 2 The Supreme Court allowed his appearance,
interpreting the underscored phrase in this wise:
The information charges that the defendants, 'taking advantage
of their respective public positions conspiring together ... did
then and there ... assault, attack and shoot with their firearms'

several persons 'with the intent to kill and did kill one Claudio
Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three others.
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that
the official positions of the accused were connected with the
offenses charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated
that the motives for the cranes were 'personal with political
character.' It does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the
crimes were committed by the defendants in fine of duty or in
the performance of their official functions.
Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the relation
between the crime and the office contemplated by the
Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fan
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such
that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element
of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the
crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven,
of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of
human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a
private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality

arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the
fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of
the commission of the crime.
Montilla must be read with People v. Montejo 3 which laid down
the exception to the basic rule. In this case, a city mayor and
several members of the police were also accused of murder They
retained as their counsel Sen. Roseller Lim who was also
challenged on the basis of the same Article VI, Section 17, of the
1935 Constitution. The legislator was disqualified because, as
the Court put it, there was on the face of the information an
intimate connection between the commission of the offense and
the discharge of public office that made the crime an offense
committed in relation to the office of the accused.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim
may appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as
defendants in said criminal case, the Constitution provides that
no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall
'appear as counsel ... in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation of his office ... (Art. VI Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.).
The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case
No. 672 are accused of an offense committed in relation' to their
office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily
elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended
information that 'Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as
such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special

policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high

power guns and then established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo,' which
is under his 'command, ... supervision and control,' where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complainants
and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court,
and that, in fine with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as
committed by the main respondents herein, according to the
amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their afraid offices. The co-defendants of
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he
was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
The difference between Montilla and Montejo is that whereas in
the former the murder was committed outside office hours and
for personal or political motives, the victim in the latter case was
killed while he was undergoing custodial investigation in the
police sub-station. The crime in Montejo would not have been
committed were it not for the fact that the accused were actually
discharging official functions at the time.

The case of Montilla vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49,

relied upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of
the prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not
in point, for, as stated in the decision therein;
'From the allegations of the information it does not appear that
the official positions of the accused were connected with the
offers charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated
that the motives for the crimes were personal with political
character. It does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the
crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in
the performance of their official functions.'
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged
falsification was committed by the accused, if at all, as a
consequence of, and while they were discharging, official
functions. The information does not allege that there was an
intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and
the commission of the offense. Besides, falsification of an
official document may be committed not only by public officers
and employees but even by private persons only. To paraphrase
Montilla, public office is not an essential ingredient of the
offense such that the offense cannot exist without the office.
Clearly, therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense
committed in relation to the office of the accused, it did not
come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that
all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio. 4

WHEREFORE, the petitions are granted and the decision of the

Sandiganbayan is set aside, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 132738

February 23, 2000

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (1st Div.); HON. IGNACIO
M. CAPULONG, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 134,
Makati;
ROBERTO V. HARINA, Branch Sheriff; RODOLFO M.
CUENCA, WORLD UNIVERSAL TRADING &
INVESTMENT COMPANY, S.A. (represented by its
Attorney-in-Fact, M.M. Lazaro & Associates);
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES and/or PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order to annul the resolution 1 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division), dismissing motu proprio for
lack of jurisdiction PCGG's petition for certiorari. In addition,
petitioner asks for the following incidental reliefs:
a. To declare null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati,2
b. To quash and cancel the corresponding writ of execution and
notices of garnishment issued in said case;

c. To enjoin respondents CDCP/PNCC from making any

payments on the judgment and for the other respondents to
return or refund any payments made in violation of PCGG's
resolution dated November 20, 1997.
The facts are as follows:
World Universal Trading & Investment Co., S.A. (WUTIC) was
a sociedad anonima registered in Panama, but was not registered
or licensed to do business in the Philippines. It is represented by
its attorney-in-fact, M.M. Lazaro & Associates. Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines, now known as
Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC), is
a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It was under sequestration by the PCGG.3 On July
24, 1987, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan 4 a complaint
against Rodolfo M. Cuenca for the sequestration of PNCC for
acquiring in an illegal manner assets in the Cuenca-owned
corporations, to wit: Construction Development Corporation of
the Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction
Corporation (CDCP/PNCC), Asia International Hardwood
Limited, a Hongkong-based company, and Construction
Development Corporation International Limited, Hongkong, a
wholly-owned subsidiary or alter ego of CDCP/PNCC, among
other entities. The case is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan.1wphi1.nt
Sometime in 1991, claiming to be an assignee of Asia Hardwood
Limited (AHL), a Hongkong-based company owned by Rodolfo
M. Cuenca, WUTIC, through its attorney-in-fact, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati, a complaint5 against

CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgment which WUTIC had

obtained in Hongkong against Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines International Limited (CDCPI),
Hongkong, a corporation wholly-owned by CDCP/PNCC.
After trial on the merits, on December 14, 1994, the trial court
rendered judgment6 in favor of WUTIC. The trial court
considered CDCP/PNCC and CDCPI as "one corporate entity"
and held them liable to pay WUTIC the amount of
US$2,994,513.65, with 12% interest per annum, from November
28, 1991, until fully paid, or its equivalent in Philippine currency
at the time of payment, plus three million pesos (P3,000,000.00)
as attorney's fees, and five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) as litigation expenses, and costs of suits.
In due time, CDCP/PNCC filed with the trial court an appeal
from said decision to the Court of Appeals.7 On October 17,
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the
decision of the trial court. On March 19, 1997, the Supreme
Court, by a minute resolution denied the petition for review filed
by CDCP/PNCC.8 On July 7, 1997, the Supreme Court denied
CDCP/PNCC's motion for reconsideration of the minute
resolution.9
On October 9, 1997, upon motion of WUTIC, the trial court
issued a writ of execution against CDCP/PNCC. Subsequently,
Sheriff Roberto V. Harina issued notices of garnishment against
the accounts, shares of stocks and income of CDCP/PNCC with
various banks and corporations.10

Sometime in October 1997, PCGG Commissioner Herminio A.

Mendoza, as board member of PNCC, attended a PNCC board
meeting, and discovered the writ of execution and notices of
garnishment. PCGG noted that substantial stockholdings or
equity in CDCP/PNCC, CDCPI, AHL and the shareholdings of
Rodolfo M. Cuenca in CDCP/PNCC were under sequestration or
otherwise impleaded in the sequestration case11 pending with the
Sandiganbayan. However, PCGG did not participate in the
action before the trial court to enforce the foreign judgment.
Hence, PCGG had no opportunity to verify and evaluate
WUTIC/AHL's claim, vis a vis that of Rodolfo M. Cuenca.
Additionally, PCGG claimed that the Regional Trial Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint to enforce a foreign
judgment and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
considering that the case involved a sequestered corporation, and
sequestered stockholdings of Rodolfo M. Cuenca. PCGG
contended that the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, pursuant to E.O. No. 14 and 14-A, over cases
involving sequestered assets.
On November 20, 1997, after realizing that WUTIC/AHL's
claim could be Cuenca's in disguise, PCGG issued en
banc Resolution No. 97-188 enjoining PNCC and/or any person,
agent, representative acting in its behalf and stead from taking
any action that would dissipate and/or affect the assets of
CDCP/PNCC, without getting prior clearance and approval from
the Sandiganbayan.12
On December 1, 1997, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
petition for certiorari to annul the Regional Trial Court's

decision in Civil Case No. 91-3291, and the corresponding writ

of execution and notices of garnishment.

On March 10, 1998, PCGG filed this petition

for certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan's resolution.14

On January 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan motu proprio dismissed

the petition. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had no jurisdiction
to annul the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The
Sandiganbayan held that the case before the trial court was for
enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not for recovery of illgotten wealth. Hence, it ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
action for annulment of the decision of the trial court. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that not every claim against a sequestered
asset or entity falls within its jurisdiction. It further stated that it
only had appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional
Trial Court in criminal cases involving offenses relating to
public office, and not over civil cases. Moreover, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that the Regional Trial Court decision in
Civil Case No. 91-3291 has become final, and that, pursuant to
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to annul the judgment, not the Sandiganbayan.

On March 23, 1998, we required respondents to file comment on

the petition, to which they complied.

Meanwhile, on January 28, 1998, in violation of the PCGG

Resolution No. 97-188, WUTIC and CDCP/PNCC, entered into
an agreement on the manner of satisfying the trial court's
decision. According to WUTIC, the Regional Trial Court,
Makati approved the agreement.13 As per agreement, on January
29, 1998 PNCC paid WUTIC fifty percent (50%) of the
judgment debt. The balance was payable in twelve (12) months.
CDCP/PNCC already paid the February, March and April 1998
installments.

We give due course to the petition.

Petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it, without any motion to dismiss filed
by any of the parties. Petitioner further avers that, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over all PCGG cases involving ill-gotten wealth,
whether civil or criminal, and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases. Since CDCP, as the party
liable, is a sequestered corporation, then the complaint to enforce
a foreign judgment against CDCP is a PCGG case, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, including
jurisdiction to annul the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, pursuant to the exclusive and original jurisdiction it has
not only on principal cases involving "ill-gotten wealth," but
also on all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such
cases.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition without a motion to dismiss filed by any
of the parties. We rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to

annul the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in a

sequestration-related case.
It will be noted that three corporations involved in this petition,
PNCC/CDCP, AHL and CDCPI, Hongkong, are under
sequestration and are defendants in the sequestration
case15 pending before the Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims
against CDCPI, amounting to US$2,994,513.65 plus twelve
percent (12%) interest per annum and other costs, and assigned
the same to WUTIC. Eventually, WUTIC obtained a favorable
judgment in a Hongkong court to claim the indebtedness,
amounting to about US$5,132,842.56 against CDCPI. Due to the
closure of CDCPI in Hongkong, WUTIC filed a case with
Regional Trial Court against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a foreign
judgment obtained against CDCPI. Considering that it was
initially a claim by AHL against CDCPI, Hongkong, both
corporations known as Cuenca-owned and under sequestration,
there is valid ground for PCGG to evaluate the validity of
WUTIC's claim as a legitimate assignee, or merely a dummy
corporation set up to circumvent the sequestration case. It should
be noted that despite the initial sequestration orders and the case
filed with the Sandiganbayan against stockholdings of Rodolfo
M. Cuenca and the so-called Cuenca-owned corporations,
including AHL, PNCC/CDCP and CDCPI, the PCGG was not
made a party in the civil case in Hongkong and the case to
enforce the foreign judgment filed with the trial court.
Considering the interconnections between the participating
corporations in the said transaction, and the existence of the
sequestration case, PCGG should have been informed of the
above cases to question and verify the veracity of the claim.

We are aware of various schemes employed to circumvent

sequestration orders, dissipate sequestered assets, and thwart
PCGG's efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth. Even the
Sandiganbayan intimated that there is a possibility that WUTIC
is a dummy corporation formed by Rodolfo Cuenca, or his alter
ego, to reach the sequestered assets.16 Hence, there is a need to
vigorously guard these assets and preserve them pending
resolution of the sequestration case before the Sandiganbayan,
considering the paramount public policy for the recovery of illgotten wealth.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan that it has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the Regional Trial Court's judgment in a
sequestration-related case. We have held that the Sandiganbayan
has original and exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal
causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also
over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such
cases.17 Consider the fact that PNCC/CDCP and CDCPI and
Rodolfo Cuenca's equity thereat are in custodia legis in the
sequestration case pending with the Sandiganbayan.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan itself recognized that WUTIC
could be a dummy corporation formed by Cuenca himself.
Sequestered assets and corporations are legally and technically
in custodia legis, under the administration of the PCGG.
Executive Order No. 2 specifically prohibits that such assets and
properties be transferred, conveyed, encumbered, or otherwise
depleted or concealed, under pain of such penalties as prescribed
by law. Considering that PNCC/CDCP and AHL are sequestered
corporations, and WUTIC's claim is questionable, the payment
of a substantial amount of money can result in the deterioration

and disappearance of the sequestered assets. "Such a situation

cannot be allowed to happen, unless there is a final adjudication
and disposition of the issue as to whether these assets are illgotten or not, since it may result in damage or prejudice to the
Republic of the Philippines."18
Republic Act 7975, an act amending P.D. 1606, provides that the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over all civil and
criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, or the so-called illgotten wealth cases. Since we have ruled that the civil case
before the Regional Trial Court is considered as arising from,
incidental to, or related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, then
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in such case.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and
SETS ASIDE the resolution dated January 8, 1998 of the
Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Civil Case No. 180. Let the
records be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.