License v Authority

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUZ GONZALES-FLORES, AccusedAppellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City,
finding accused-appellant Luz Gonzalez-Flores guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and of
three counts of estafa against Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo, 2 and Larry Tibor and
sentencing her to suffer four prison terms and to pay indemnity and damages to
complainants.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470, the information for estafa against accused-appellant
alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and true identities
have not as yet been ascertained, and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. y CASTAEDA in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which she made to said complainant to the effect that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the
processing of the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said complainant to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P45,000.00, which amount once
in possession, with intent to defraud FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471, also for estafa, the information charged:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and true identities
have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they
made to said complainant to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent
papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA
to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on

the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the
same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the
amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud complainant
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said RONALD F[RE]DERI[Z]O Y
HUSENIA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, another case for estafa, the information averred:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and whereabouts
have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to
said complainant to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said complainant to give and deliver, as in fact gave
and delivered to said accused the amount of P38,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations
and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and
were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P38,000.00 which amount
once in possession, with intent to defraud LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the amount of P38,000.00,
Philippine Currency.cralaw : red
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, the information for illegal recruitment in
large scale charged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and whereabouts
have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously canvass, enlist, contract and promise employment to the following
persons, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA
2. LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN
3. FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. Y CASTAEDA
after requiring them to submit certain documentary requirements and exacting from them the
total amount of P128,000.00, Philippine Currency, as recruitment fees, such recruitment
activities being done without the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated

against three (3) or more persons individually or as group as penalized under Articles 38 and
39, as amended by P.D. 2018, of the Labor Code. 6
When arraigned, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges, whereupon the
cases were jointly tried.
The evidence for the prosecution is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On August 6, 1994, at around 1:00 p.m., complainant Felixberto Leongson, Jr. chanced upon
his neighbors, Cloyd Malgapo, Jojo Bumatay, and accused-appellant, who were talking in front
of his house at 68-C East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
Complainant was asked by accused-appellant if he was interested to work as a seaman in
Miami, Florida, United States of America. He replied that he was interested to work abroad but
he had doubts regarding his qualification for the job. Accused-appellant assured him that this
was not a problem because she could fix his application. All he had to do was pay P45,000.00
as processing fee. Accused-appellant told him that Jojo and Cloyd were departing soon.
Complainant told accused-appellant that he would consider the offer.
That night, Accused-appellant came to see Felixberto and reiterated her proposal. Felixberto
said he wanted the job but he only had P10,000.00. Accused-appellant told him the amount
would be sufficient as an initial payment.
Accused-appellant came back with Joseph Mendoza, whose brother-in-law, Engr. Leonardo
Domingo, according to accused-appellant, was recruiting seamen. Thereafter, Accusedappellant and Mendoza took complainant, Cloyd, and Jojos wife, Clarita, to a house on Second
Street, near Camp Crame in Quezon City, where the latter were introduced to Andy Baloran. 7
Complainant and his companions were told that Baloran was an employee of the National
Bureau of Investigation and he would take care of processing the applications for employment.
Baloran told complainant and the other job applicants that those who would be employed would
be paid a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, plus tips, and given vacation leaves of 45 days with
pay. Baloran asked complainant to submit his picture, bio-data, and birth certificate, which
complainant later did. Accused-appellant then asked complainant to give her the P10,000.00 as
initial payment. Complainant handed her the money and asked for a receipt, but accusedappellant told him not to worry and assured him that she would be responsible if anything
untoward happened. Complainant, therefore, did not insist on asking accused-appellant for a
receipt. Accused-appellant said she gave the money to Baloran.
Two days later, Baloran and Domingo went to the compound where Felixberto and accusedappellant were residing and called Felixberto, Cloyd, and Jojo to a meeting. Domingo told the
applicants that he was the chief engineer of the luxury ocean liner where they would embark
and repeated to them the salaries and other benefits which they would receive. He told them not
to get impatient.
Accused-appellant later saw complainant to collect the balance of P35,000.00. Complainant
was told to give the money to accused-appellant at Wendys in Cubao, Quezon City on August
12, 1994.
At the appointed date and place, complainant and his wife delivered the amount to accusedappellant who, in turn, handed it to Baloran. No receipt was, however, issued to Felixberto.
Another meeting was held on August 16, 1994 at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati City by accused-

appellant, Domingo, Baloran, Mendoza, the Leongson spouses, the Malgapo spouses, and Jojo
Bumatay. The applicants were told by Domingo that they would be employed as waiters and
attendants in the luxury liner and asked them again to wait a while.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
On August 18, 1994, Accused-appellant saw complainant again to collect the P25,000.00
balance. Felixberto paid the amount to accused-appellant four days later. As in the case of the
first two payments, no receipt was given for the P25,000.00. Accused-appellant told him that
she would turn over the amount to Baloran. Although complainant regularly followed up his
application with accused-appellant, he was told each time to have patience and to just wait for
the call from Domingo or from Baloran. But Felixberto never heard from either one of these two.
8
Felixbertos testimony was corroborated by his wife, Maria Luz, who said that accused-appellant
claimed she could help her husband get a job as a seamen despite the latters lack of formal
training. She knew of the three payments made to accused-appellant, totalling P45,000.00, and
witnessed the last two payments of P10,000.00 at Wendys, Cubao, and P25,000.00 at
accused-appellants residence. Maria Luz said she met Baloran, Mendoza, and Domingo and
discussed with them the job offered to her husband and the salaries and benefits appurtenant
thereto. 9
Complainant Ronald Frederizo, a resident of 68-A East Riverside, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, also testified. According to him, in the morning of August 10, 1994, he received a
call from his sister, Elsa Cas, at Far East Bank, Binondo Branch, Manila, asking him to go home
because accused-appellant, their neighbor, was in his house recruiting seaman for employment
abroad. Ronald said that when he arrived home, he was told by accused-appellant that he had
to pay P10,000.00 as initial payment for the processing of his application. Ronald withdrew the
amount from Elsas account. Then, Ronald went with accused-appellant to a house on Second
Street near Camp Crame in Quezon City. On the way to that place, Accused-appellant assured
him that he would receive a salary of US$1,000.00. At an apartment on Second Street, Ronald
saw his neighbors, complainant Felixberto, Jojo, and Cloyd. Baloran and Mendoza were also
there. Accused-appellant introduced Baloran to Ronald, Cloyd, and Jojo. She told them that
Baloran was going to take care of their applications and that he could pull strings at the NBI.
Ronald paid accused-appellant P10,000.00 for which no receipt was issued. He was assured by
accused-appellant that he would be able to leave for his job abroad in one or two weeks. He
was told to be ready with the balance of P35,000.00 for the plane ticket on August 12, 1994.
Hence, on August 15, 1994, Ronald mortgaged his land in Batangas just so he could pay the
P35,000.00 remaining balance. Accused-appellant went to Ronalds house to meet him.
Thereafter, Ronald, Elsa, and accused-appellant took a cab to Mandarin Hotel in Makati City.
Accused-appellant told Ronald to have no fear because the persons whom he was dealing with
were her relatives. Elsa gave the P35,000.00 to Accused-Appellant. Ronald no longer asked for
a receipt because he trustedAccused-Appellant. At the hotel were Felixberto and his wife,
Baloran, and Domingo. Domingo showed Ronald and Felixberto his identification card and said
that he was the captain of a ship. He told them that they would receive a salary of US$1,000.00
plus other benefits. He also assured them that he would inform them of developments in their
applications through Accused-Appellant. After the meeting, Ronald went to his office and
tendered his resignation. Ronald followed up his application almost every week but every time
he was told by accused-appellant to be patient 10 because Domingo had not yet called.
Complainant Larry Tibor said that on August 10, 1994, he went to the house of his cousin, Elsa

Cas, at 68-A East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, because
accused-appellant was there recruiting seamen to work abroad. Larry was then looking for a
job. Accused-appellant introduced herself and told him that she could get him a job abroad if he
had the necessary documents and P45,000.00. Larry said he had only P3,000.00. He was told
by accused-appellant to bring the amount the next day for his fare and certification. As
instructed, Larry paid the amount in the presence of his sister, Junet. He asked for a receipt, but
accused-appellant told him to trust her. Accused-appellant instructed Larry to prepare extra
money as his initial payment was insufficient. Larry left for the province to get a loan. He went to
accused-appellants house on August 15, 1994 and paid her an additional amount of
P35,000.00. Again, no receipt was issued to him. Thereafter,Accused-appellant took him to
Mandarin Hotel where he was introduced to Baloran and Domingo. Larry kept waiting for a call,
but none came. He was later told by accused-appellant that he could not leave yet because
Baloran was sick and he had to postpone his trip. 11
Junet T. Lim, Larrys sister, testified that she was present her when brother paid P3,000.00 to
accused-appellant, although no receipt was issued. She stated that she asked accusedappellant questions to make sure she could help Larry get a job abroad as a seaman. Janet
said accused-appellant was able to convince her that she could do so. Junet also testified that
she accompanied her brother in following up his job application for about three months until
November 1994, when they realized they had been defrauded by accused-appellant, Domingo,
and Baloran. 12
Realizing that they had been deceived, complainants went to the Baler Police Station 2 in
Quezon City on November 11, 1994 to file their complaints for illegal recruitment and estafa
against accused-appellant, Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza. Felixberto executed his sworn
statement 13 on the same day, while Ronald and Larry gave their respective statements 14 on
November 12, 1994.
On November 14, 1994, complainants went to the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and discovered that accused-appellant and her companions did not have
any license or authority to engage in any recruitment activity.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Felixberto and Ronald asked the court to order accused-appellant to pay them back the
placement fees of P45,000.00 which each of them had paid and moral damages of P200,000.00
for each of them for the shame, anxiety, and loss of jobs they suffered. They also sought the
reimbursement for litigation expenses they each incurred, amounting to P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees and P500.00 per court appearance. Larry, on the other hand, sought the
recovery of the total amount of P150,000.00 for placement fee, travelling expenses from the
province to Manila to follow up his application, and the anguish and shame he suffered. 15
In her defense, Accused-appellant Luz Gonzales-Flores, a resident of 68-B East Riverside, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, testified that she knew Felixberto Leongson, Jr., who was
her neighbor and a nephew of the owner of the house in which they were staying. She came to
know Ronald Frederizo and Larry Tibor through Elsa Cas. Accused-appellant denied having
promised complainants overseas employment and having collected money from them.
According to her, she came to know Andy Baloran and Engr. Leonardo Domingo through
Joseph Mendoza, who referred her and her son, Noli, to them in connection with their own
applications for overseas employment. She came to know Joseph Mendoza through Elsa Cas
and Felixberto Leongson, Jr.
Accused-appellant claimed that she and Noli agreed to pay Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza

the total sum of P90,000.00 for their application fees. Since she did not have enough money to
cover the amount, she asked her neighbors and friends to help her get a loan. Felixberto and
his wife offered help and introduced her to Jenny Tolentino, from whom she got a loan of
P15,000.00 guaranteed by Felixbertos wife. Accused-appellant said she used the amount to
pay for her and her sons recruitment fees. Accused-appellant claimed that she paid the total
amount of P46,500.00 for her recruitment fee in three installments, i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza
at her house, P10,000.00, and P16,500.00 to Baloran at the Mandarin Hotel. She alleged that
she also gave them several pieces of jewelry worth P10,000.00. According to her, no receipts
were issued for the money and jewelry she gave.
Accused-appellant said that because Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza did not make good their
promises, Accused-appellant filed a complaint for illegal recruitment and estafa against them on
November 7, 1994 in the NBI, including as her co-complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr.,
Ronald Frederizo, Larry Tibor, Eduardo Sibbalucas, Har Taccad, Romeo Gallardo, Joseph
Mendoza, and her son, Noli Flores. 16
Accused-appellant was investigated by the Baler Police Station 2 on November 11, 1994 as a
result of the complaints filed against her by Felixberto, Ronald and Larry. Thereafter, she was
detained. 17
On November 24, 1994, she appeared before the NBI accompanied by a policewoman to
comply with the subpoena 18 issued regarding her complaint. According to NBI Agent Jesus
Manapat, Accused-appellants complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. 19
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court rendered its assailed decision on November
23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in three
(3) counts having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby convicted of said crimes
and is sentenced:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of P100,000 in Criminal Case No. Q94-59473;
(2) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470;
(3) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471; and
(4) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3) MONTHS
of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472.
The accused is also directed to pay: (a) Ronald Federi[z]o, the amount of P45,000.00 as and by
way of actual damages; (b) Felixberto Leongson, Jr. P45,000.00 as and by way of actual
damages; and (c) Larry Tibor, P38,000.00 as and by way of actual damages.
The accused is further directed to pay to the said private complainants moral damages in the

sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) each.

SO ORDERED.20
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE JURISPRUDENCE AND
AUTHORITIES CITED, I.E., PEOPLE VS. COMIA, PEOPLE VS. MANOZCA, PEOPLE VS.
HONRADA, PEOPLE VS. TAN TIONG MENG, PEOPLE VS. VILLAS AND PEOPLE VS.
SENDON BECAUSE, WITH DUE RESPECT, THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AVAILING
IN SAID CASES ARE DIFFERENT AS IN THE PRESENT CASE; ANDchanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
II. [THE LOWER COURT] ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE OF THE
ACCUSED ON VERY MATERIAL POINTS. 21
The contentions are without merit.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, Accused-appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in
large scale, the essential elements of which are: (1) that the accused engages in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13 (b) or in any of the prohibited
activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that the accused has not complied with the
guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the
securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas;
and (3) that the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually
or as a group. 22
In these cases, according to the certification of the POEA, Accused-appellant had no license or
authority to engage in any recruitment activities. 23 In fact, this was stipulated at the trial. 24
Accused-appellant claims, however, that she herself was a victim of illegal recruitment and that
she simply told complainants about job opportunities abroad.
The allegation is untenable. Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement"
as referring to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. The same article further states that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.25cralaw:red
The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused-appellant sought out complainants and
promised them overseas employment. Despite their initial reluctance because they lacked the
technical skills required of seamen, complainants were led to believe by accused-appellant that
she could do something so that their applications would be approved. Thus, because of
accused-appellants misrepresentations, complainants gave her their moneys. Accusedappellants companions, Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza, made her ploy even more plausible.
Accused-appellant contends that all she did was to refer complainants to Domingo, Baloran,
and Mendoza. However, under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment includes "referral,"
which is defined as the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for employment after

initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement

officer, or bureau. 26 In these cases, Accused-appellant did more than just make referrals. She
actively and directly enlisted complainants for supposed employment abroad, even promising
them jobs as seamen, and collected moneys from them.
The failure of complainants to present receipts to evidence payments made to accusedappellant is not fatal to the prosecution case. The presentation of the receipts of payments is not
necessary for the conviction of Accused-Appellant. As long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible testimonies and affidavits that the accused-appellant was involved in
the prohibited recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be justified. 27 In these
cases, complainants could not present receipts for their payment because accused-appellant
assured them she would take care of their money.
It must be remembered that the trial courts appreciation of complainants testimonies deserves
the highest respect since it was in a better position to assess their credibility. 28 In these cases,
complainants testimonies, to the effect that they paid money to accused-appellant and her
companions, Domingo and Baloran, because the latter promised them overseas employment,
were positive, straightforward, and categorical. They maintained their testimonies despite the
lengthy and gruelling cross-examination by the defense counsel. They have not been shown to
have any ill motive to falsely testify against Accused-Appellant. Naive, simple-minded, and even
gullible as they may have been, it is precisely for people like complainants that the law was
made. Accordingly, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 29
In contrast, Accused-appellants defense is merely denial. Time and again, this Court has ruled
that denial, being negative evidence which is self-serving in nature, cannot prevail over the
positive identification of prosecution witnesses. 30 Here, complainants positively identified
accused-appellant as one of those who represented that they could be deployed for overseas
work upon payment of the fees.
Accused-appellant claims that she herself had to borrow P15,000.00 from Jenny Tolentino,
guaranteed by Maria Luz Leongson, to defray her own and her sons application expenses. The
claim has no merit. Maria Luz Leongson, who is Felixbertos wife, testified that accusedappellant sought her help to guarantee a loan to pay the tuition fees of her daughter and the
rent of the apartment in which she and her family were staying, 31 and not to finance her and
her sons overseas job applications.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accused-appellant likewise testified that she paid in cash a total of P36,500.00 in three
installments, i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza at her house, and P10,000.00 and P16,500.00 to
Baloran, at the Mandarin Hotel. This testimony cannot be deemed worthy of belief. When crossexamined, Accused-appellant could not remember the dates when she allegedly made these
payments. For someone who was jobless 32 and looking for employment, it is very doubtful that
she would pay considerable sums of money to strangers without even remembering at least the
month or the year when the same were supposed to have been paid.
Accused-appellant further contends that if she was indeed a conspirator in the illegal
recruitment transactions with complainants, she would not have filed a complaint 33 in the NBI
against Domingo and Baloran. The complaint was, as already stated, dismissed and it is
apparent that accused-appellant filed the complaint only to make it appear that she herself had
been the victim of swindling and illegal recruitment. First, the complaint shows that it was filed
on November 7, 1994, even before she was detained at the Baler Police Station 2 upon the
sworn statements of complainants. Complainants were included as complainants in a complaint

filed by Accused-Appellant. Yet, the complainants were never told, nor did they ever knew, of
the complaint until the trial of these cases. Second, Accused-appellant could have easily told
them at least of the complaint because Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo and Elsa
Cas, a relative of complainant Larry Tibor, were her immediate neighbors. Third, it is also
noteworthy that despite her claim that she paid P10,000.00 to Mendoza, Accused-appellant
made the latter a co-complainant in the complaint she filed with the NBI.
More importantly, Accused-appellants defense is uncorroborated. Not one of the persons she
included in her complaint to the NBI was ever presented in her defense in these cases. Nor did
she present Domingo, Baloran, or Mendoza to corroborate her statements. It is probable that
had she presented any of these persons, their testimonies would have been adverse
to Accused-Appellant. 34
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced
from the mode in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
which point to a joint purpose and design. 35 In these cases, the fact is that there was
conspiracy among accused-appellant, Domingo, and Baloran in recruiting complainants for
employment overseas. The evidence shows that each had a role in that conspiracy. Domingo
posed as a representative of the luxury liner in recruiting crew for the vessel. Baloran
represented himself as the person who would actually process complainants travel documents,
while accused-appellant acted as a scout for job applicants and a collector of their payments. It
was only Mendoza who did not misrepresent himself as someone capable of helping
complainants go abroad nor collect money from them. 36
In sum, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale. The imposition on accused-appellant of the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 is thus justified.
Accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code committed
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
Both elements of the crime were established in these cases, namely, (a) accused-appellant
defrauded complainant by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (b) complainant
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation as a result. 37 Complainants
parted with their money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false
pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end,
complainants were neither able to leave for work overseas nor did they get their money back,
thus causing them damage and prejudice. 38
The issues that misappropriation on the part of accused-appellant of the money paid by
complainants and their demand for the same were not sufficiently established are immaterial
and irrelevant, conversion and demand not being elements of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-59470 and Q-94-59471, the amounts involved are both P45,000.00,
as testified to by complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr. and Ronald Frederizo. Pursuant to Art.
315, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the ruling in
People v. Gabres, 39 the trial court correctly meted accused-appellant the maximum penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor in each case. This is so considering that the maximum penalty
prescribed by law for the felony is six (6) years, eight (8) months, and 21 days to eight (8) years
of prision mayor. The amounts involved in these cases exceed P22,000.00 by at least
P20,000.00, necessitating an increase of one (1) year for every P10,000.00. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the sentence is thus from six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. The trial court can exercise
its discretion only within this period. Thus, the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court
should be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, where the amount involved is P38,000.00, the indeterminate
sentence which should be imposed on accused-appellant should range from four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Mercado, 40 the fact that no receipts were presented
to prove the amounts paid by complainants to accused-appellant does not prevent an award of
actual damages in view of the fact that complainants were able to prove by their respective
testimonies and affidavits that accused-appellant was involved in the recruitment process and
succeeded in inveigling them to give their money to her. The award of moral damages should
likewise be upheld as it was shown to have factual basis.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, finding
accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa against complainants
Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo, and Larry Tibor is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATIONS that, in the cases for estafa, Accused-appellant is sentenced:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470, to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471, to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE

and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in
large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No.
442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses
Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 5, alleging That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both
dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity
to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1)
Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4)
Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7)
Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having secured the
required license or authority from the Department of Labor. 1chanrobles virtual law library
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of
them was arrested. 2Hence, on February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the case archived but it
issued a standing warrant of arrest against the accused. 3
Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, one of the offended parties, Rogelio
Salado, requested on March 17, 1989 for a copy of the warrant of arrest. 4Eventually, at around
midday of February 26, 1993, Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paraaque police. 5On
March 8, 1993, her counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested that it be set for
hearing "for purposes of due process and for the accused to immediately have her day in
court" 6Thus, on April 15, 1993, the trial court reinstated the case and set the arraignment for
May 3, 1993, 7on which date of Agustin pleaded not guilty 8and the case subsequently went to
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the
witness stand and he declared that sometime in March or April, 1987, he was introduced by
Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in the latter's residence
at Factor, Dongalo, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself as the manager of the
Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be
deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing
fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the
corresponding receipt. 9
Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives,
went to the office of the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw

Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency. He submitted his biodata and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of the original
amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee. Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they
subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance that they could leave for abroad. 10
Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that
Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which
each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to leave for the promised
overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he decided to go
to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover
Placement Agency. They discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job
applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and
to demand the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00. 11
Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo
Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see
Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so
that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband
could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin
P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of P4,000.00. 12
Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to
report to its office because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or
March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his wife's passports. Despite
follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he and his wife failed to
leave for abroad. 13
Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a
job in Oman with the Clover Placement Agency at Paraaque, the agency's former office
address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who introduced herself as the manager of the
agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter. He submitted
several pertinent documents, such as his bio-data and school credentials. 14
In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement
fee, and in September of that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued
receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office once in a while to
follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he failed to
leave for abroad as promised. Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be
refunded but Loma Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in installments. 15
As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7,
1993. He testified that in February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry
Alvarez, at her residence in Paraaque. She informed him that "madalas siyang nagpapalakad
sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman with a
monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00. 16

On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at
the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of
the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for abroad before the end of
1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up his application but
to no avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could
only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no
longer find her. 17
Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce
were her neighbors at Tambo, Paraaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of
the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple was able to send her son, Reynaldo
Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through Lorenzo
Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she
acceded. 18
Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was
perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented
by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the complaint thinking
that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses. She failed to do so
because in truth, so she claims, she does not know the present address of the couple. All she
knew was that they had left their residence in 1987.19
Although she admitted having given P500.00 each to Rogelio Salado and Alvarez, she
explained that it was entirely for different reasons. Salado had supposedly asked for a loan,
while Alvarez needed money because he was sick at that time. 20
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a
principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve the
penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. 21
In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments: (1) her act of
introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce
spouses; and (3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to
the complainants. 22These three arguments being interrelated, they will be discussed
together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Herein appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment
activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a)
when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three

or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another; or (b) when illegal
recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused in this case were not authorized to
engage in any recruitment activity, as evidenced by a certification issued by Cecilia E. Curso,
Chief of the Licensing and Regulation Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, on November 10, 1987. Said certification states that Dan and Loma Goce and
Nelly Agustin are neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. 23Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her counsel agreed to
stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit applicants for overseas
employment. Appellant, however, denies that she was in any way guilty of illegal recruitment. 24
It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to the Goce
spouses. Being a neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's overseas job
application was processed and facilitated by them, the complainants asked her to introduce
them to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she complied with their
request. Such an act, appellant argues, does not fall within the meaning of "referral" under the
Labor Code to make her liable for illegal recruitment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement. 25On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant
for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected
employer, placement officer or bureau. 26
Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced complainants
to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond that. The testimonial evidence hereon show that
she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution
witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of
working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as
the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused
spouses who owned the placement agency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for
appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As
such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was
therefore engaging in recruitment activity. 27

Despite Agustin's pretensions that she was but a neighbor of the Goce couple, the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses paint a different picture. Rogelio Salado and Dionisio Masaya
testified that appellant represented herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency.
Ramona Salado was offered a job as a cutter/sewer by Agustin the first time they met, while
Ernesto Alvarez remembered that when he first met Agustin, the latter represented herself as
"nagpapaalis papunta sa Oman." 28Indeed, Agustin played a pivotal role in the operations of the
recruitment agency, working together with the Goce
couple.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker
abroad." 29It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had
the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give
her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. 30
It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of their
applications. Her act of collecting from each of the complainants payment for their respective
passports, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses
unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law. In fact, appellant
demanded and received from complainants amounts beyond the allowable limit of
P5,000.00under government regulations. It is true that the mere act of a cashier in receiving
money far exceeding the amount allowed by law was not consideredper se as "recruitment and
placement" in contemplation of law, but that was because the recipient had no other
participation in the transactions and did not conspire with her co-accused in defrauding the
victims. 31That is not the case here.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellant further argues that "there is no evidence of receipts of collections/payments from
complainants to appellant." On the contrary, xerox copies of said receipts/vouchers were
presented by the prosecution. For instance, a cash voucher marked as Exhibit D,32showing the
receipt of P10,000.00 for placement fee and duly signed by appellant, was presented by the
prosecution. Another receipt, identified as Exhibit E, 33was issued and signed by appellant on
February 5, 1987 to acknowledge receipt of P4,000.00 from Rogelio and Ramona Salado for
"processing of documents for Oman." Still another receipt dated March 10, 1987 and presented
in evidence as Exhibit F, shows that appellant received from Ernesto Alvarez P2,000.00 for
"processing of documents for Oman." 34
Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were lost, hence only xerox copies
thereof were presented and which, under the circumstances, were admissible in evidence.
When the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof
of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy
or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. 35
Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the prosecution as secondary
evidence are not allowable in court, still the absence thereof does not warrant the acquittal of
appellant. In People vs. Comia, 36 where this particular issue was involved, the Court held that

the complainants' failure to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the accused therein, as well
as their consequent failure to present receipts before the trial court as proof of the said
payments, is not fatal to their case. The complainants duly proved by their respective
testimonies that said accused was involved in the entire recruitment process. Their testimonies
in this regard, being clear and positive, were declared sufficient to establish that factum
probandum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting the version of the prosecution
witnesses, their statements being positive and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit
than the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of appellant. The lame defense
consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 37
The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case essentially involves the
credibility of witnesses which is best left to the judgment of the trial court, in the absence of
abuse of discretion therein. The findings of fact of a trial court, arrived at only after a hearing
and evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of witnesses,
certainly deserve respect by an appellate court. 38Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court
on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.39
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate herself from conviction, appellant argues that there is no proof
of conspiracy between her and the Goce couple as to make her liable for illegal recruitment. We
do not agree. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish that appellant
confabulated with the Goces in their plan to deceive the complainants. Although said accused
couple have not been tried and convicted, nonetheless there is sufficient basis for appellant's
conviction as discussed above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In People vs. Sendon, 40we held that the non-prosecution of another suspect therein provided
no ground for the appellant concerned to fault the decision of the trial court convicting her. The
prosecution of other persons, equally or more culpable than herein appellant, may come later
after their true identities and addresses shall have been ascertained and said malefactors duly
taken into custody. We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule and course of procedure
should not apply in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176264 : January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. TERESITA "TESSIE" LAOGO,

APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition assails the July 31, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 01664, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 693-M-2001. The RTC found appellant Teresita "Tessie"
Laogo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo was the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel Consultancy,
a travel agency firm located along Padre Faura Street in Manila. On March 7, 2001, an
Information[3]was filed against appellant and a certain Susan Navarro (Susan) in Malolos,
Bulacan charging them of the crime of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale). The information reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Susan Navarro and Tessie [Teresita]
Laogo of the crime of illegal recruitment, penalized under Art. 38 in relation to Art[s]. 34 and 39
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1412, committed
as follows:
That in or about and during the months of May and June 2000, in the municipality of Bulacan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, knowing that they are non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the
Department of Labor to recruit and/or place workers in employment either locally or overseas,
conspiring, confederating together and helping each other, did then and there wi[l]lfully,
unlawfully and feloniously engage in illegal recruitment, placement or deployment activities for a
fee, which they received from complainants Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday, Rogelio Enriquez y
Buenavidez, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. y Fernandez, Dante Lopez y Enriquez, Teodulo dela Cruz y
Mendoza, Edwin Enriquez y Panganiban and Gary Bustillos y de Guzman by recruiting and
promising them job placement abroad, more particularly in Guam, which did not materialize,
without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
That the crime is committed in a large scale tantamount to economic sabotage as the
aforementioned seven persons were [recruited] individually or as a group.
Contrary to law.
The charge stemmed from the following set of facts.
Sometime during the second week of March 2000, Susan invited several individuals including
six of the seven complainants - namely, Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez,
Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos - to her house in Bulacan, Bulacan to
celebrate the town fiesta. Appellant was among the several guests in Susan's house during the
said occasion.

According to Teodulo dela Cruz, during the fiesta, Gary Bustillos introduced him to Susan as
somebody who could help him find work abroad. Since Susan was Gary's aunt, Teodulo
immediately trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in
Guam, USA. Upon Susan's instruction, Teodulo filled up an application form[4] and gave her
P3,000.00 after the latter promised to process his application to work abroad.[5] On May 22,
2000, Susan accompanied Teodulo to appellant's travel agency office in Ermita where he paid
an additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee.[6] A receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo
Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by Susan.[7] Months later, when Susan's promise
to send him abroad remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to
appellant's office and to Susan's house to follow up their application, but the two always told
them that their visas have yet to be released.[8]
Similarly, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. also met Susan through Gary, who himself was seeking help from
Susan to work in Guam. At Susan's house, Billy saw Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, and Rogelio
Enriquez. Like him, the three were also seeking Susan's help to work abroad.[9] Susan
introduced Billy to appellant, who promised him that she will send them abroad within three
months.[10] After the meeting, Billy issued to Susan two Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and
May 10, 2000, bearing the amounts P23,000.00 and P44,000.00, respectively, as partial
payment for his placement fee.[11] On May 19, 2000, Billy also went to appellant's travel agency
in Ermita and personally handed an additional cash of P6,000.00 to Susan, who thereafter gave
the money to appellant. Appellant issued a corresponding receipt[12] for the P6,000.00 cash
bearing her signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several
months, no word was heard from either Susan or appellant. Sensing that something was wrong,
Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan and filed the complaint
against Susan and appellant.[13]
Dante Lopez testified that he was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to appellant and Susan.
Susan identified herself as an employee of appellant's travel agency. The two told him that they
can send him and his companions to Guam within the span of three months.[14] Lopez paid both
accused P6,000.00 to process his papers, covered by a receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing
appellant's signature.[15] Appellant's promise, however, turned sour after three months. When he
confronted appellant, the latter told him that he would be sent to a different country. Left without
a choice, Lopez waited. Again, the promise remained unfulfilled.[16]
According to Rogelio Enriquez, he also met appellant during the town fiesta when Susan invited
him to cook for her guests. Susan introduced appellant as someone who could send him to work
abroad. Eager about the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave his P3,000.00 cash to Susan for
the processing of his visa and employment documents.[17] He saw Susan hand the money to
appellant.[18] A week later, Rogelio gave an additional P900.00 to Susan.[19] No receipts were
issued on both payments since Rogelio failed to complete the required P6,000.00 placement
fee.[20] Months passed but Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or appellant. Apprehensive,
Rogelio verified the status of the Laogo Travel Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that neither of the
accused nor Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved,
Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed the complaint against Susan and appellant.
Edwin Enriquez also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his application to work in
Guam. According to him, Susan's husband and appellant were present when he gave the
money to Susan during the town fiesta.[21] Susan issued a receipt dated May 16, 2000 to Edwin.
The receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and was signed by Susan with a
description which says "Payment was for Placement Fee."[22]

Two other persons, namely Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday and Gary Bustillos, Susan's nephew, were
among the seven who filed the complaint against Susan and appellant. The two, however, later
decided to withdraw their complaints after executing their respective affidavits of desistance.[23]
On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest[24] were issued against Susan and appellant. When
arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.[25] Susan, meanwhile, remained at large. An alias
warrant of arrest[26]was issued by the trial court against her but to no avail.
During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal activities undertaken by Susan.
She insisted that Susan was not in any way connected with her travel agency and that she
confronted the latter when she came to know of Susan's recruitment activities. Appellant
claimed that she even had to rename her travel agency to Renz Consultancy and Employment
Services to avoid being associated with Susan's recruitment activities.[27]
Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susan's house during the town fiesta, but denied
knowing the other complainants. According to appellant, she came to know Rogelio when Susan
specifically identified him as the one who cooked the dishes after some guests prodded Susan.
[28]

Unsatisfied with appellant's explanation, the trial court promulgated a Decision[29] finding her
guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The fallo of the trial court's July 16, 2002 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Teresita (Tessie) Laogo y Villamor guilty as principal
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of P500,000.00 as imposed
by law[;] to indemnify the private offended parties x x x actual damages, as follows: Teodulo dela
Cruz - P15,000.00, Billy dela Cruz - P73,000.00, Dante Lopez - P6,000.00, Rogelio Enriquez P3,000.00, and Edwin Enriquez - P12,000.00[;] and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In the service of her sentence the said accused, a detention prisoner, shall be credited with the
full time during which she had undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of
Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pending the actual apprehension of the other accused Susan Navarro, [who is] still at-large, on
the strength of the warrant of arrest earlier issued, let the record be committed to the archives
subject to recall and reinstatement, should circumstances so warrant for due prosecution
against her of this case.
SO ORDERED.[30]
Appellant filed an appeal before this Court, but said appeal was transferred to the CA following
our pronouncement in People v. Mateo.[31]
In her Appellant's Brief[32] before the CA, appellant insisted that she had no hand in the
recruitment of the complainants and maintains that the recruitment activities were made solely
upon the initiative of accused Susan Navarro.[33] Appellant anchored her defense on the
testimonies of the complainants who declared that the transactions and the payments were
made not with her but with Susan.[34]Appellant admitted that her consultancy firm was merely
engaged in the business of assisting clients in the procurement of passports and visas, and
denied that her agency was involved in any recruitment activity as defined under the Labor

Code, as amended.[35]
On July 31, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision affirming appellant's
conviction.[36] The CA noted that although at times, it was Susan with whom the complainants
transacted, the records nevertheless bear that appellant had a hand in the recruitment of the
complainants. The CA pointed out that appellant, together with Susan, repeatedly assured the
private complainants that her consultancy firm could deploy them for overseas employment,
[37]
leading the appellate court to conclude that appellant consciously and actively participated in
the recruitment of the complainants.[38]
Aggrieved, appellant brought the case to us on appeal, raising the same arguments she had
raised at the CA.
We affirm appellant's conviction.
Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or
entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[39]
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when
the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group,
then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is
deemed a form of economic sabotage.[40]
But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly
authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to
send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order
to be employed.[41] It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment
from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad.[42]
Here, both the trial court and the CA found that all the five complainants were promised to be
sent abroad by Susan and herein appellant[43] as cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up
transactions between appellant and her victims were done inside the said travel agency.
Moreover, all four receipts issued to the victims bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel
Consultancy,[44] with two of the said receipts personally signed by appellant herself.
[45]
Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting together made complainants believe that
they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy
had the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had
none as certified by the POEA.[46] Absent any showing that the trial court and the CA overlooked
or misappreciated certain significant facts and circumstances, which if properly considered,
would change the result, we are bound by said findings.[47]
Appellant's contention that she had to change the name of her travel agency to disassociate
herself with Susan's recruitment activities is too lame to deserve serious consideration. In light
of the testimonies of the complainants that appellant with her co-accused promised them
employment abroad, we find appellant's act of closing Laogo Travel Consultancy and
establishing a new one under her husband's name[48] as just an afterthought, a belated decision
which cannot undo the damage suffered by the private offended parties. It could indeed hardly

be construed as a simple reaction of an innocent person, as it in fact smacks of a desperate

attempt of a guilty individual to escape liability or to confuse and dishearten her victims.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664 is AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 146964 : August 10, 2006]
ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment
alleged to have been committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period from August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused representing
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO CORPUZ, 1 NECITAS R. FERRE,
GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first securing the required license or
authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment.2
After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the case, 3 the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA C.
RODOLFO as GUILTY of the offense of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences her
[to] a penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT YEARS and to pay the costs.4 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that while the information reflected
the commission of illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of the two of the five
complainants was proven.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence presented by the parties as
follows:
[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August and September 1984,
accused-appellant approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus
individually and invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The accused-appellant
being their neighbor, private complainants agreed and went to the former's office. This office
which bore the business name "Bayside Manpower Export Specialist" was in a building situated
at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private complainants gave certain
amounts to appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee
(Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise, Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00
(Exhibit D). Appellant then told private complainants that they were scheduled to leave for Dubai
on September 8, 1984. However, private complainants and all the other applicants were not
able to depart on the said date as their employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure
was rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were
being hoodwinked, private complainants demanded of appellant to return their money. Except
for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not able to return private complainants'
money. Tired of excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal recruitment
against the accused-appellant.
To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for overseas employment,
the prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-appellant was
neither licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and Employment to recruit workers
for overseas employment.
For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private complainants to recruit them for
employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help in
securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private complainants to
the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency because she knew Florante Hinahon, 5 the
owner of the said agency. While accused-appellant admitted that she received money from the
private complainants, she was quick to point out that she received the same only in trust for
delivery to the agency. She denied being part of the agency either as an owner or employee
thereof. To corroborate appellant's testimony, Milagros Cuadra, who was also an applicant and a
companion of private complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit them. On the contrary,
they were the ones who asked help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C.
Tabing, the accountant and cashier of the agency, testified that appellant is not connected with
the agency and that he saw appellant received money from the applicants but she turned them
over to the agency through either Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda Marcos.6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the
penalty imposed due to the trial court's failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The appellate court thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the
appealed Decision EXCEPT the penalty x x x which is hereby changed to five (5) years as
minimum to seven (7) years as maximum with perpetual disqualification from engaging in the
business of recruitment and placement of workers.7 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, 8 the present petition was filed,
faulting the appellate court
I
x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESSES,
[AND]
II
x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies
of her witnesses, her companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountantcashier of the agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial court's and the appellate court's failure to consider that the
provisional receipts she issued indicated that the amounts she collected from the private
complainants were turned over to the agency through Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon. At
any rate, she draws attention to People v. Seoron 10 wherein this Court held that the issuance
or signing of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment.11
The petition fails.
Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable when the offense charged
was committed, 12 provided:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
Article 39.Penalties. - x x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating
any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof,
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine

of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the
discretion of the court;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
the Labor Code.13 If another element is present that the accused commits the act against
three or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large
scale.14
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior
Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, testified
that the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment.15 A Certification to that effect was in fact issued by Hermogenes C.
Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA.16
Petitioner's disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities from the very start does not
persuade in light of the evidence for the prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying
with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She contends that she
did not possess any license for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight
must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the
defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means any person,
corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to
engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended,
revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a person or an
entity to operate a private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in
recruitment and placement activities.
xxx
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the

Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing
Branch - both of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Yet, as complainants
convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan.17 (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in
recruitment, 18is "the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an
initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer
or bureau." 19Petitioner's admission that she brought private complainants to the agency whose
owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the
private complainants were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not
free her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that the
accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment.20 As the appellate court stated:
x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and
keeps the placement money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no license
to engage in recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to
two or more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment.21
Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the private complainants
when, in light of her claim that she merely brought them to the agency, she could have advised
them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no explanation.
On petitioner's reliance on Seoron, 22 true, this Court held that issuance of receipts for
placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is
"rather theundertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority" that
makes a case for illegal recruitment.23
A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which also applies to offenses punished by special laws.
Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole
for All Persons Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create A
Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes)
provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to

an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As
amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is within the prescribed
penalty for the offense, its addition of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business
of recruitment and placement of workers" is not part thereof. Such additional penalty must thus
be stricken off.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accessory penalty imposed by it
consisting of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and
placement of workers" isDELETED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Simple Illegal Recruitment

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183099 : February 03, 2010]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RACHELLE BALAGAN AND HERMINIA
AVILA, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the November 29, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification the July 19, 2006 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 118, Pasay City
convicting Rachelle Balagan and Herminia Avila (appellants) in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2683 and
03-2684, for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively, appellants come to the
Court.
The Informations in the cases read:
Criminal Case No. 03-2683
(For Syndicated Illegal Recruitment)
That on or about the period comprising March 21, 2003 to March 28, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, by falsely
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist, employ, and recruit workers for

overseas deployment/employment as Factory Worker in Ireland, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, for a fee recruit and promise overseas deployment/employment to private
complainant Michael O. Fernandez without first securing the required license or authority from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency.
Contrary to law.[3] (emphasis in the original)
Criminal Case No. 03-2684
(For Estafa)
That on or about the period comprising March 21, 2003 to March 28, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, defrauded
private complainant Michael O. Fernandez in the following manner to wit: that accused, with
deliberate intent to defraud and deceive and pretending to possess the capacity to contract,
enlist and employ or deploy private complainant as a Factory Worker in Ireland, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and did actually receive from private
complainant the total amount of Php.57,000.00 for and as his supposed work permit, job
placement or overseas deployment and POEA processing fees, knowing said manifestation and
representation to be false and fraudulent and once in possession of said amount and far from
complying with their promise of employment or deployment and despite demands to return the
amount paid, accused with intent to defraud, did misappropriate, misapply and convert to their
own personal use and benefit private complainant's Php. 57,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the said complainant in the total amount ofPhp. 57,000.00.
Contrary to law.[4] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
As summarized by the trial court which is supported by the records of the cases, the evidence
for the prosecution and that for the defense are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
Fernandez testified that sometime in February 2003, he together with a friend who knows
Rosabel Balagan, mother of Rachel, went to EGI Building located at Gil Puyat Street, Pasay
City purposely to apply for work abroad. Once in the said office, he was able to talk to Rosabel,
Rachel Herminia and some other applicants. He knows that Rachelle and Herminia were clerk
and secretary, respectively, at the said office and they entice people that they could send
workers abroad. The accused asked him if he was really interested in applying for work and
when he answered in the affirmative, Rosabel told him to submit his passport, ID pictures and a
"bank account" of P500.00. After he had submitted the requirements, Rosabel told him that the
amount of P150,000.00 is needed for deployment to Ireland and he will be able to leave by 28
March 2003. Rachel and Herminia affirmed to him the statements of Rosabel.
On 21 March 2003, he gave P37,000.00 to Rosabel and on the following day additional
P20,000.00, or a total of P57,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 asked by the accused. He was
supposed to give the money personally to Rosabel but the latter told him to hand the same to
Herminia who then issued official receipts nos. 263 and 264 to him. The receipts were signed by
Rosabel.
He and the other complainants whom he got acquainted with were not able to leave the country

on 28 March 2003. He then asked Rosabel to return the money to him but the latter refused to
do so. When he later on went to the POEA he learned that the accused are not licensed to
recruit workers for abroad. Thereafter, he lodged a complaint before the CIDG where he
executed his two (2) affidavits.
On cross-examination, he testified that it was Rosabel who promised to send him abroad; that
the family of Rosabel owns the travel agency that recruited him and he has no proof whatsoever
that Rachel and Herminia are business partners of the former; and that Herminia and Cristino
were more than mere employees of Rosabel because they act as her agents.
On additional cross-examination, he admitted that the receipts issued to him were for
documentation purposes only; that he was aware that the office was only a Travel Consultancy;
and that if not for his companion, Kim Folgueras, who referred him to the office of the accused,
he would not have come to know of Rosabel.
On redirect examination, he identified an application for tenant contractor identification card
showing, among others, the names of Rosabel Balagan as General Manager, Herminia Avila as
Secretary, Rachelle Balagan as Clerk, and an advertisement in the souvenir program of San
Manuel Town Fiesta 2003 showing the greetings from Rosabel Travel Consultancy, with the
name of Rosabel as President and General Manager, Herminia as Secretary and Administrative
Assistant, and Rachelle as Clerk and other names of the office staff.
He positively identified Rachel and Herminia. He also identified his two (2) affidavits.
When the prosecution called on Bolivar, the defense stipulated that said witness is a Senior
Labor and Employment officer at the POEA; that Rachel and Herminia were both not authorized
by POEA to engage in the business of recruitment for abroad as evidenced by a certification
issued by said office; and that a license for travel agency is different from that of a recruitment
agency.
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
Herminia denied that she has anything to do with the cases filed by Fernandez, much less with
receipt for the total amount of P57,000.00 which were signed by Rosabel and that she was
connected with Rosabel Travel Consultancy. She alleged that she and her husband Edwin were
also applicants at Rosabel Travel Consultancy as evidenced by an official receipt issued by
Rosabel which shows that they paid said office for their travel to Australia. To further support her
claim, she also presented her passport.
She further testified that she met Fernandez at the boarding house and often saw him when the
latter was following up his application at the agency; that she was included as an accused so
that Fernandez could use her in going after Rosabel who at that time was not yet arrested; and
since she was then living in the boarding house of Rosabel, Fernandez suspected that she
might know where Rosabel was hiding.
On cross-examination, she readily identified the name and picture appearing in the
advertisement in the souvenir program of San Manuel Town Fiesta 2003 as hers and admitted
that she has no conflict or misunderstanding whatsoever with Fernandez.
Like Herminia, Rachel denied Fernandez' accusation and that allegation that she received the
total amount of P57,000.00; that she had conspired with Herminia; that she was connected with

Rosabel Travel Consultancy; that she has any position in the said agency; and that she ever
talked to any of its clients. She identified the signatures on the receipts to be that of her mother
Rosabel. She testified that she only met Fernandez in the courtroom.
Again, like Herminia, Rachel admitted that her name and picture appear on the Tenants
Contractors Identification and Souvenir Program of San Manuel Town Plaza.[5] (italics,
underscoring and capitalization in the original)
By Decision of July 19, 2006, the trial court, as reflected earlier, convicted appellants of the
crimes charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, Rachelle Balagan and Herminia Avila are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment in
Criminal Case No. 03-2683 and Estafa in Criminal case No. 03-2684. Accordingly, they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2863- LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a FINE of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), each the maximum penalty under the law because the crime was committed
by non-licensees or non-holders of authority; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2864-Indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum. The accused are also ordered to indemnify Michael Fernandez
the sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Pesos (P57,000.00) with legal interest form the time of the
filing of the information.
In the meantime, let the cases be archived with respect to Arnel Cristino. Let an alias warrant be
issued against him.
Cost against the accused.[6] (italics and capitalization in the original; underscoring supplied)
As reflected too earlier, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. It modified the
penalty imposed in the case for estafa, however.
In the case for Syndicated Illegal Recruitment, the appellate court credited the position of the
Office of the Solicitor General that the prosecution failed to establish that the illegal recruitment
was committed by a syndicate.[7] It instead found appellants culpable of Simple Illegal
Recruitment.
Modifying the penalty imposed, in the case for Estafa, the appellate court, citing People v.
Logan,[8]thus disposed in the two cases:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 118 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-2683, appellants Rachelle Balagan and Herminia Avila are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment only, and are each
sentenced to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00
(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-2684, appellants Rachelle Balagan and Herminia Avila are found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and are each sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and is ORDERED to indemnify Michael O.
Fernandez in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php57,000.00) . (capitalization, emphasis
and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present appeal.
After a review of the records of the cases, the Court affirms the Decision of the appellate court
but modifies the penalty it imposed in the case for Estafa, following People v.
Temporada[9] which instructs:
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount
defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and
2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the five estafa cases at
4 years and 2 months of prision correccional since this is within the range of prision
correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall
not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is not prision mayor minimum as apparently
assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of
the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayorminimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental
penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00,
and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as
was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that
penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated
in People v. Emerito, insofar as the fraction of a year was utilized in computing the total
incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In accordance with the above procedure, the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00, the RTC
sentenced the accused to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months ofprision
correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. Since the amount
defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be added to the maximum period
of the prescribed penalty (or added to any where from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be validly
imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor, and not 9 years and 1
day of prision mayor.[10] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the assailed November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATION in that in the case for Estafa, each appellant is sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Illegal Recruitment in large scale
G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.

CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a
license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment
agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging
employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article
39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense
because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations.
Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever
two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. " 2

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial court
dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39
in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the
first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which
is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and
placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts
mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or mre persons as an indispensable
requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more
persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in
the body of the article may involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an offer
or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons
to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does not explain why
dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and placement consists of
an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with
two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is
made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely
lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer
of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them
shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be
deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property
entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima facie evidence that he has put them to
personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In
the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a
disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
(Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack
of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor
Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble with
presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public
discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close
advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or
not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions
that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against
illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better
life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of
their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of theirown
countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the
four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, CJ, Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
Illegal Recruitment as economic sabotage

[G.R. Nos. 141221-36. March 7, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO

HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused.
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accusedappellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in
Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439,
6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and Yolanda

Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment.[1]
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and
eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda
Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by
the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a
certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco
Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither
licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment; [2] the receipts
for the payment made by private complainants; and two documents signed by the Reichl spouses
where they admitted that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas for private complainants
and that they would return all the expenses incurred by them if they are not able to leave by
March 24, 1993,[3] and where Karl Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants the total sum
of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for the processing of their papers.[4]
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the
prosecution. She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the spouses Karl and Yolanda
Reichl at the residence of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. At the
time, she also saw the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin Coleng, Anicel
Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl told Narcisa that they
could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however, required her to pay the amount
of P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel documents. She paid the fee in three
installments. She paid the first installment of P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second
installment ofP25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on
December 27, 1992. She gave the money to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl
spouses at Matira's residence. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second
installment[5] but not for the third.Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was
not able to do so. Karl Reichl explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but
she could not yet leave for Austria because the hotels were fully booked at that time because of
the Christmas season. Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it still did
not push through. Narcisa stated that they went to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a
visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that she would be able to leave once
she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of Narcisa and that of the other applicants several
times but these proved to be empty promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with the three
accused at the residence of private complainant Charito Balmes and asked them to refund the
payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an agreement which was
reduced into writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private
complainants' departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment.[6]

Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her
sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco Hernandez at their residence in Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in Italy. When
she accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 for the processing
of her papers. In August 1992, Leonora, together with her sister and Francisco Hernandez, went
to Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora
handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her that she would be
able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses told Leonora to wait for about
three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited Leonora and
the other applicants to the house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some
matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the applicants that their departure would be postponed to
December 17, 1992.December 17 came and the applicants were still unable to leave as it was
allegedly a holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as
domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl
spouses promised the applicants that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in
January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora and collected the sum
ofP50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare. Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When
the applicants were not able to leave on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the
spouses again made another promise. Tired of the recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the applicants
decided to withdraw their application. However, Karl Reichl constantly assured them that they
would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The promised employment,
however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document stating that he would refund
the payment made by the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The document was
executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora St.,
Batangas City.[7]
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total amount
of P100,000.00 to the three accused.[8]
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the
court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for the job of domestic helper in
Italy and required her to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare her passport and
other papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she gave P25,000.00 to
Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City and Francisco
Hernandez introduced her to his business partners, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl. Francisco
Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses so that they could secure a visa for her. The
Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They said she and the other applicants would leave
on December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992, Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to
Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls. Francisco Hernandez again handed the
money to the spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez
who delivered the same to the spouses.Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the

payment made by Charito because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the other
applicants, Charito was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises made by the
accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally the Reichls told the
applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the Philippines that they would
not be able to send them abroad and that they would refund their payment instead. Hence, they
executed an agreement which was signed by Karl Reichl and stating that they would return the
amounts paid by the applicants. The accused, however, did not comply with their obligation.[9]
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took the
witness stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas job through
Francisco Hernandez. Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for the
processing of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the initial payment
of P50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who was then accompanied by Karl and Yolanda Reichl.
[10]
Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda
Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,
[11]
and another on January 3, 1993 in the amount of P51,000.00.[12] Three receipts were issued for
the payments.[13]
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that his
wife applied for the job of domestic helper abroad. In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez
introduced them to Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to
Italy. Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport, police clearance
and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee of P130,000.00.[14] They paid P50,000.00 on
June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The payments
were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and were received by Francisco Hernandez who, in
turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the
payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to secure a job for her
abroad. The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail on their promise. As with the other
applicants, Estela was also not able to leave the country.[15]
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the Philippines
on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in Europe. He came to the country
on July 29, 1992 to explore business opportunities in connection with the import and export of
beer and sugar.He also planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere in Batangas. Upon his
arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August
3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992. After
they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned
to Vienna on September 19, 1992.[16]

Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda
around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco Hernandez was allegedly looking for a
European equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting the
deal, he made some research on the background of the intended business. Realizing that said
business would not be viable, Karl Reichl advised Francisco Hernandez to instead look for a
second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco Hernandez again until he
left for Vienna in September 1992.[17]
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez allegedly
approached him and sought his help in securing Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl
Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the Philippines. On one
occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at Sombrero Island. Francisco
Hernandez told him that he would also bring some of his relatives with him and he would
introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez,
together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl at the house of his in-laws at No.
4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked him if he could help her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl
Reichl, however, was firm on his refusal.[18]
In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco
Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said that Francisco Hernandez merely told him that he
wanted to help his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised private
complainants that he would give them overseas employment. [19] As regards the document where
Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he claimed that he signed
said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him that private complainants
would harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He signed the document as he felt he had
no other option.[20]
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the
charges against her. She claimed that she was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various
informations, thus, she could not have committed the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl
further stated that she did not know of any reason why private complainants filed these cases
against her and her husband. She said that several persons were harassing her and pressuring her
to pay private complainants the sum of at least P50,000.00.[21]
After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6)
counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL

REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL -

1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment as charged in the
above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos.
6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal
recruitment, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433,
6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the above-mentioned
Criminal Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.

The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Years of prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen
(16) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa
Hernandez in the amount of P150,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to eleven (11)
years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Leonora Perez in the
amount ofP100,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 6432, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to sixteen
(16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Melanie
Bautista in the amount ofP150,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to fourteen
(14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Estela Abel
de Manalo in the amount of P130,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 6530, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years or prision correctional as minimum to thirteen
(13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Charito
Balmes in the amount ofP121,300.00; and

7. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the following
errors:
1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa
and illegal recruitment committed by syndicate and in large scale based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution which miserably failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment on
a large scale by cummulating five separate cases of illegal recruitment each filed by a single
private complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty verdict against
accused-appellant for the crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal
recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime does not ipso facto result in
conviction in the former.[22]

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and placement"
refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.[23] The law imposes a higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are considered an offense involving economic
sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.[24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellants engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and placement under
the Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to
private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the
placement fee, although they did not have any license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when

one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of having the
ability to send a worker abroad.[25]
Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private
complainants, which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the document marked at
Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private
complainants. We are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez
and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told them that they would
provide them overseas employment and promised them that they would be able to leave the
country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their
testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely testify against
accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter
represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad. The
minor lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief
do not impair their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on the material
points, i.e., that they met with the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to
give them overseas employment, and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were
not able to leave the country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected
to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
[26]
Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as Exhibit "C" where he
promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for the processing of their
papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco
Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing, whether in his testimony or in that of his
wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document. Mr.
Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the
paper he was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his
obligation to ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful
employment abroad. Such obligation arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him
and his co-accused to private complainants. The admission made by accused-appellants in
Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate
the fact that they also promised to procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J",
accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants paid the amount
of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accused-appellants
promised to refund to each complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00. This is an
acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants not only for
securing visas but also for their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of recruitment
were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila
from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed
in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that he was in

Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City
is only a few hours drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses were staying in Manila, it does
not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it
appears that the three accused worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each
other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez
introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and
Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would seek
employment for them in Italy.Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the
applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. There
being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-accused even if
he himself did not personally take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of illegal
recruitment in large scale by cummulating the individualinformations filed by private
complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429

That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are nonlicensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or
any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de Hernandez and to more than
three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de
Hernandez relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6431

That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor
holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other

authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and
promising for a fee to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three other
persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Leonora Perez y Atienza
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6433

That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are nonlicensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or
any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y Dolor and to more than
three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y
Dolor relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6435

That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are nonlicensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or
any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to more than

three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y
Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6437

That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment
or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Edwin Coling y
Coling relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6439

That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are nonlicensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or
any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Estela Abel de
Manalo relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to
said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6529

That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta.
Rita Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor
holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and
promising for a fee to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than three other
persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Anicel Umahon y
Delgado relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to
said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6531

That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are nonlicensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or
any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to more than
three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Charito Balmes y
Cantos relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a
violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.

We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with accusedappellants that they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in large scale based
on several informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held in People vs. Reyes:[27]

x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group, it must be understood as referring to the
number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise,
prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a
case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale
illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of
three or more persons whether individually or as a group.[28]
This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants. The
charge was not only for illegal recruitment committed in large scale but also for illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under
the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda
Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing private complainants to
apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic
helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants
should be held liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate which is also punishable
by life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39
of the Labor Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the
crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted
of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are
present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any
person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages. [29] It
has been proved in this case that accused-appellants represented themselves to private
complainants to have the capacity to send domestic helpers to Italy, although they did not have
any authority or license. It is by this representation that they induced private complainants to pay
a placement fee of P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Cost against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Illegal Recruitment v Estafa

G.R. No. 169076

January 23, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JOSEPH JAMILOSA, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph Jamilosa of large scale illegal
recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, and sentencing him to life
imprisonment and to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The Information charging appellant with large scale illegal recruitment was filed by the Senior
State Prosecutor on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or thereabout in the City of Quezon,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, representing to
have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for
overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and
promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Haide R. Ruallo, Imelda D.
Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center without first obtaining the required license
and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Contrary to law.2
On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of Appeals (CA), is as follows:
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: private complainants Imelda D. Bamba,
Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh.
Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she met the appellant in Cubao,
Quezon City on board an aircon bus. She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North EDSA,
Quezon City where she was working as a company nurse. The appellant was seated beside her
and introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. The appellant told her
that his sister is a head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles, California, USA and he could
help her get employed as a nurse at a monthly salary of Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00)
and that she could leave in two (2) weeks time. He further averred that he has connections with
the US Embassy, being a US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in
the Philippines for one month. According to the appellant, she has to pay the amount of
US$300.00 intended for the US consul. The appellant gave his pager number and instructed her
to contact him if she is interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.
On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her house
where she gave him the photocopies of her transcript of records, diploma, Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC) license and other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she
handed to the appellant the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in North EDSA,
Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. The appellant
likewise got several pieces of jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would
sell the same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said
money and jewelry. Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because
she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA on
February 25, 1996.
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled
departure to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant who was supposed
to be with them in the flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant called and informed her that
he failed to give the passport and US visa because he had to go to the province because his
wife died. She and her companions were not able to leave for the United States. They went to
the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but nobody knew him or his whereabouts.
They tried to contact him at the hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also
inquired from the US embassy and found out that there was no such person connected with the
said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that she is a registered nurse by
profession. In the morning of January 22, 1996, she went to SM North EDSA, Quezon City to
visit her cousin Imelda Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that she was going to meet the
appellant who is an FBI agent and was willing to help nurses find a job abroad. Bamba invited
Lagman to go with her. On the same date at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, she and
Bamba met the appellant at the SM Fast-Food Center, Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City.

The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad and told them that he has a
sister in the United States. Lagman told the appellant that she had no working experience in any
hospital but the appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one. The appellant asked
for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa and an additional amount of Three
Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.
On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North EDSA, Quezon City
wherein she handed to the latter her passport and transcript of records. The appellant promised
to file the said documents with the US embassy. After one (1) week, they met again at the same
place and the appellant showed to her a photocopy of her US visa. This prompted her to give
the amount of US$300.00 and two (2) bottles of Black Label to the appellant. She gave the said
money and liquor to the appellant without any receipt out of trust and after the appellant
promised her that he would issue the necessary receipt later. The appellant even went to her
house, met her mother and uncle and showed to them a computer printout from Northwest
Airlines showing that she was booked to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA on February 25,
1996.
Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called her because her
number was appearing in the appellants cellphone documents. The caller asked if she knew
him because they were trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to pay his
telephone bills in the amount of P100,000.00. She became suspicious and told Bamba about
the matter. One (1) week before her scheduled flight on February 25, 1996, they called up the
appellant but he said he could not meet them because his mother passed away. The appellant
never showed up, prompting her to file a complaint with the NBI for illegal recruitment.
Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the
appellant on February 13, 1996 at SM North EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda Bamba
introduced the latter to her. The appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of the FBI and
he could fix her US visa as he has a contact in the US embassy. The appellant told her that he
could help her and her companions Haidee Raullo, Geraldine Lagman and Imelda Bamba find
jobs in the US as staff nurses in home care centers.
On February 14, 1996 at about 6:30 in the evening, the appellant got her passport and picture.
The following day or on February 15, 1996, she gave the appellant the amount of US$300.00
and a bottle of cognac as "grease money" to facilitate the processing of her visa. When she
asked for a receipt, the appellant assured her that there is no need for one because she was
being directly hired as a nurse in the United States.
She again met the appellant on February 19, 1996 at the Farmers Plaza and this time, the
appellant required her to submit photocopies of her college diploma, nursing board certificate
and PRC license. To show his sincerity, the appellant insisted on meeting her father. They then
proceeded to the office of her father in Barrio Ugong, Pasig City and she introduced the
appellant. Thereafter, the appellant asked permission from her father to allow her to go with him
to the Northwest Airlines office in Ermita, Manila to reserve airline tickets. The appellant was

able to get a ticket confirmation and told her that they will meet again the following day for her to
give P10,000.00 covering the half price of her plane ticket. Singh did not meet the appellant as
agreed upon. Instead, she went to Bamba to inquire if the latter gave the appellant the same
amount and found out that Bamba has not yet given the said amount. They then paged the
appellant through his beeper and told him that they wanted to see him. However, the appellant
avoided them and reasoned out that he could not meet them as he had many things to do.
When the appellant did not show up, they decided to file a complaint for illegal recruitment with
the NBI.
The prosecution likewise presented the following documentary evidence:
Exh. "A" Certification dated February 23, 1998 issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Director II,
Licensing Branch, POEA.
Exh. "B" Affidavit of Alma E. Singh dated February 23, 1996.3
On the other hand, the case for the appellant, as culled from his Brief, is as follows:
Accused JOSEPH JAMILOSA testified on direct examination that he got acquainted with Imelda
Bamba inside an aircon bus bound for Caloocan City when the latter borrowed his cellular
phone to call her office at Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City. He never told Bamba that
he could get her a job in Los Angeles, California, USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave
SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba called him up
several times, seeking advice from him if Los Angeles, California is a good place to work as a
nurse. He started courting Bamba and they went out dating until the latter became his girlfriend.
He met Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh at the Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City
thru Imelda Bamba. As complainants were all seeking advice on how they could apply for jobs
abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma
Singh sign separate certifications on January 17, 1996 (Exh. "2"), January 22, 1996 (Exh."4"),
and February 19, 1996 (Exh. "3"), respectively, all to the effect that he never recruited them and
no money was involved. Bamba filed an Illegal Recruitment case against him because they
quarreled and separated. He came to know for the first time that charges were filed against him
in September 1996 when a preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Daosos of the
Department of Justice. (TSN, October 13, 1999, pp. 3-9 and TSN, December 8, 1999, pp. 2-9)4
On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.5 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment in large scale; accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), plus costs.
Accused is ordered to indemnify each of the complainants, Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman
and Alma Singh the amount of Three Hundred US Dollars ($300.00).

SO ORDERED.6
In rejecting the defenses of the appellant, the trial court declared:
To counter the version of the prosecution, accused claims that he did not recruit the
complainants for work abroad but that it was they who sought his advice relative to their desire
to apply for jobs in Los Angeles, California, USA and thinking that he might be charged as a
recruiter, he made them sign three certifications, Exh. "2," "3" and "4," which in essence state
that accused never recruited them and that there was no money involved.
Accuseds contention simply does not hold water. Admittedly, he executed and submitted a
counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation at the Department of Justice, and that he
never mentioned the aforesaid certifications, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 in said counter-affidavit. These
certifications were allegedly executed before charges were filed against him. Knowing that he
was already being charged for prohibited recruitment, why did he not bring out these
certifications which were definitely favorable to him, if the same were authentic. It is so contrary
to human nature that one would suppress evidence which would belie the charge against him.
Denials of the accused can not stand against the positive and categorical narration of each
complainant as to how they were recruited by accused who had received some amounts from
them for the processing of their papers. Want of receipts is not fatal to the prosecutions case,
for as long as it has been shown, as in this case, that accused had engaged in prohibited
recruitment. (People v. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574).
That accused is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, is
shown in the Certification issued by POEA, Exh. "A."
In fine, the offense committed by the accused is Illegal Recruitment in large scale, it having
been committed against three (3) persons, individually.7
Appellant appealed the decision to this Court on the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTERS
GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE PROSECUTION.8
According to appellant, the criminal Information charging him with illegal recruitment specifically
mentioned the phrase "for a fee," and as such, receipts to show proof of payment are
indispensable. He pointed out that the three (3) complaining witnesses did not present even one
receipt to prove the alleged payment of any fee. In its eagerness to cure this "patent flaw," the
prosecution resorted to presenting the oral testimonies of complainants which were "contrary to
the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits of life [under Section 3(y), Rule 131 of the
Rules on Evidence] and defied credulity." Appellant also pointed out that complainants
testimony that they paid him but no receipts were issued runs counter to the presumption under
Section [3](d), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence that persons take ordinary care of their

concern. The fact that complainants were not able to present receipts lends credence to his
allegation that it was they who sought advice regarding their desire to apply for jobs in Los
Angeles, California, USA. Thus, thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them
sign three (3) certifications stating that he never recruited them and there was no money
involved. On the fact that the trial court disregarded the certifications due to his failure to
mention them during the preliminary investigation at the Department of Justice (DOJ), appellant
pointed out that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which bars the presentation of
evidence during the hearing of the case in court. He also pointed out that the counter-affidavit
was prepared while he was in jail "and probably not assisted by a lawyer."9
Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that the absence of
receipts signed by appellant acknowledging receipt of the money and liquor from the
complaining witnesses cannot defeat the prosecution and conviction for illegal recruitment. The
OSG insisted that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt via the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses, which the trial court found
credible and deserving of full probative weight. It pointed out that appellant failed to prove any
ill-motive on the part of the complaining witnesses to falsely charge him of illegal recruitment.
On appellants claim that the complaining witness Imelda Bamba was his girlfriend, the OSG
averred:
Appellants self-serving declaration that Imelda is his girlfriend and that she filed a complaint for
illegal recruitment after they quarreled and separated is simply preposterous. No love letters or
other documentary evidence was presented by appellant to substantiate such claim which could
be made with facility. Imelda has no reason to incriminate appellant except to seek justice. The
evidence shows that Alma and Geraldine have no previous quarrel with appellant. Prior to their
being recruited by appellant, Alma and Geraldine have never met appellant. It is against human
nature and experience for private complainants to conspire and accuse a stranger of a most
serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. (People v. Coral, 230 SCRA 499, 510 [1994])10
The OSG posited that the appellants reliance on the certifications11 purportedly signed by the
complaining witnesses is misplaced, considering that the certifications are barren of probative
weight.
On February 23, 2005, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the CA.12 On June 22, 2005,
the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.13
The OSG filed a Supplemental Brief, while the appellant found no need to file one.
The appeal has no merit.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,

promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:
SEC. 6.Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated
under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. x x x
Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.14 Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.15
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3)
essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the
license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group.16 As
gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the trial court and
the appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA,
are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or
misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by
appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from
criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as consideration for the
"services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee
employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.17 As the Court held in People v.
Sagaydo:18
Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and
enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them

for employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave for work abroad nor
get their money back.
The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to produce receipts
as proof of their payment to accused-appellant does not free the latter from liability. The
absence of receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. As long as the
witnesses can positively show through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one
involved in prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the absence of
receipts.19
Appellants reliance on the certifications purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses
Imelda Bamba, Alma Singh and Geraldine Lagman20 is misplaced. Indeed, the trial court and the
appellate court found the certifications barren of credence and probative weight. We agree with
the following pronouncement of the appellate court:
Anent the claim of the appellant that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the certifications
(Exhs. "2," "3" & "4") allegedly executed by the complainants to the effect that he did not recruit
them and that no money was involved, the same deserves scant consideration.
The appellant testified that he was in possession of the said certifications at the time the same
were executed by the complainants and the same were always in his possession; however,
when he filed his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation before the Department of
Justice, he did not mention the said certifications nor attach them to his counteraffidavit.lavvphil.net
We find it unbelievable that the appellant, a college graduate, would not divulge the said
certifications which would prove that, indeed, he is not an illegal recruiter. By failing to present
the said certifications prior to the trial, the appellant risks the adverse inference and legal
presumption that, indeed, such certifications were not genuine. When a party has it in his
possession or power to produce the best evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible
and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is withheld for some sinister motive
and that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose. As aptly pointed out by the
trial court:
"x x x These certifications were allegedly executed before charges were filed against him.
Knowing that he was already being charged for prohibited recruitment, why did he not bring out
these certifications which were definitely favorable to him, if the same were authentic. It is so
contrary to human nature that one would suppress evidence which would belie the charge
against him." (Emphasis Ours)21
At the preliminary investigation, appellant was furnished with copies of the affidavits of the
complaining witnesses and was required to submit his counter-affidavit. The complaining
witnesses identified him as the culprit who "recruited" them. At no time did appellant present the
certifications purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses to belie the complaint against
him. He likewise did not indicate in his counter-affidavit that the complaining witnesses had

executed certifications stating that they were not recruited by him and that he did not receive
any money from any of them. He has not come forward with any valid excuse for his inaction. It
was only when he testified in his defense that he revealed the certifications for the first time.
Even then, appellant lied when he claimed that he did not submit the certifications because the
State Prosecutor did not require him to submit any counter-affidavit, and that he was told that
the criminal complaint would be dismissed on account of the failure of the complaining
witnesses to appear during the preliminary investigation. The prevarications of appellant were
exposed by Public Prosecutor Pedro Catral on cross-examination, thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that a preliminary investigation [was] conducted by the Department of
Justice through State Prosecutor Daosos. Right?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Were you requested to file your Counter-Affidavit?
A Yes, Sir. I was required.
Q Did you file your Counter-Affidavit?
A Yes, Sir, but he did not accept it.
Q Why?
A Because he said "never mind" because the witness is not appearing so he dismissed the
case.
Q Are you sure that he did not accept your Counter-Affidavit, Mr. Witness?
A I dont know of that, Sir.
Q If I show you that Counter-Affidavit you said you prepared, will you be able to identify the
same, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I will show you the Counter-Affidavit dated June 16, 1997 filed by one Joseph J. Jamilosa, will
you please go over this and tell if this is the same Counter-Affidavit you said you prepared and
you are going to file with the investigating state prosecutor?
A Yes, Sir.This the same Counter-Affidavit.
Q There is a signature over the typewritten name Joseph J. Jamilosa, will you please go over
this and tell this Honorable Court if this is your signature, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, Sir. This is my signature.

Q During the direct examination you were asked to identify [the] Certification as Exh. "2" dated
January 17, 1996, allegedly issued by Bamba, one of the complainants in this case, when did
you receive this Certification issued by Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A That is the date, Sir.
Q You mean the date appearing in the Certification.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was this handed to you by Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A At SM North Edsa, Sir.
Q During the direct examination you were also asked to identify a Certification Exh. "3" for the
defense dated February 19, 1996, allegedly issued by Alma Singh, one of the complainants in
this case, will you please go over this and tell us when did Alma Singh allegedly issue to you
this Certification?
A On February 19, 1996, Sir.
Q And also during the direct examination, you were asked to identify a Certification which was
already marked as Exh. "4" for the defense dated January 22, 1996 allegedly issued by
Geraldine M. Lagman, one of the complainants in this case, will you please tell the court when
did Geraldine Lagman give you this Certification?
A January 22, 1996, Sir.
Q During that time, January 22, 1996, January 17, 1996 and February 19, 1996, you were in
possession of all these Certification. Correct, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q These were always in your possession. Right?
A Yes, Sir, with my papers.
Q Do you know when did the complainants file cases against you?
A I dont know, Sir.
Q Alright. I will read to you this Counter-Affidavit of yours, and I quote "I, Joseph Jamilosa, of
legal age, married and resident of Manila City Jail, after having duly sworn to in accordance with

law hereby depose and states that: 1) the complainants sworn under oath to the National
Bureau of Investigation that I recruited them and paid me certain sums of money assuming that
there is truth in those allegation of this (sic) complainants. The charge filed by them should be
immediately dismissed for certain lack of merit in their Sworn Statement to the NBI Investigator;
2) likewise, the complainants allegation is not true and I never recruited them to work abroad
and that they did not give me money, they asked me for some help so I [helped] them in
assisting and processing the necessary documents, copies for getting US Visa; 3) the
complainant said under oath that they can show a receipt to prove that they can give me sums
or amount of money. That is a lie. They sworn (sic), under oath, that they can show a receipt
that I gave to them to prove that I got the money from them. I asked the kindness of the state
prosecutor to ask the complainants to show and produce the receipts that I gave to them that
was stated in the sworn statement of the NBI; 4) the allegation of the complainants that the
charges filed by them should be dismissed because I never [received] any amount from them
and they can not show any receipt that I gave them," Manila City Jail, Philippines, June 16,
1997. So, Mr. Witness, June 16, 1997 is the date when you prepared this. Correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, my question to you, Mr. Witness, you said that you have with you all the time the
Certification issued by [the] three (3) complainants in this case, did you allege in your CounterAffidavit that this Certification you said you claimed they issued to you?
A I did not say that, Sir.
Q So, it is not here in your Counter-Affidavit?
A None, Sir.
Q What is your educational attainment, Mr. Witness?
A I am a graduate of AB Course Associate Arts in 1963 at the University of the East.
Q You said that the State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice did not accept your CounterAffidavit, are you sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you receive a copy of the dismissal which you said it was dismissed?
A No, Sir. I did not receive anything.
Q Did you receive a resolution from the Department of Justice?
A No, Sir.

Q Did you go over the said resolution you said you received here?
A I just learned about it now, Sir.
Q Did you read the content of the resolution?
A Not yet, Sir. Its only now that I am going to read.
COURT
Q You said it was dismissed. Correct?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you receive a resolution of this dismissal?
A No, Your Honor.
FISCAL CATRAL
Q What did you receive?
A I did not receive any resolution, Sir. Its just now that I learned about the finding.
Q You said you learned here in court, did you read the resolution filed against you, Mr. Witness?
A I did not read it, Sir.
Q Did you read by yourself the resolution made by State Prosecutor Daosos, Mr. Witness?
A Not yet, Sir.
Q What did you take, if any, when you received the subpoena from this court?
A I was in court already when I asked Atty. Usita to investigate this case.
Q You said a while ago that your Affidavit was not accepted by State Prosecutor Daosos. Is
that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please read to us paragraph four (4), page two (2) of this resolution of State
Prosecutor Daosos.
(witness reading par. 4 of the resolution)

Alright. What did you understand of this paragraph 4, Mr. Witness?

A Probably, guilty to the offense charge.22
It turned out that appellant requested the complaining witnesses to sign the certifications merely
to prove that he was settling the cases:
COURT
Q These complainants, why did you make them sign in the certifications?
A Because one of the complainants told me to sign and they are planning to sue me.
Q You mean they told you that they are filing charges against you and yet you [made] them sign
certifications in your favor, what is the reason why you made them sign?
A To prove that Im settling this case.
Q Despite the fact that they are filing cases against you and yet you were able to make them
sign certifications?
A Only one person, Your Honor, who told me and he is not around.
Q But they all signed these three (3) certifications and yet they filed charges against you and yet
you made them sign certifications in your favor, so what is the reason why you made them sign?
(witness can not answer)23
The Court notes that the trial court ordered appellant to refund US$300.00 to each of the
complaining witnesses. The ruling of the appellate court must be modified. Appellant must pay
only the peso equivalent of US$300.00 to each of the complaining witnesses.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the conviction of Joseph Jamilosa for large scale illegal recruitment under
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant
is hereby ordered to refund to each of the complaining witnesses the peso equivalent of
US$300.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Theory of Imputed Liability

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 161757 - January 25, 2006]
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. Petitioner, v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division; HON. ERNESTO S. DINOPOL, in his
capacity as Labor Arbiter, NLRC; NCR, Arbitration Branch, Quezon City and DIVINA A.
MONTEHERMOZO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo
(Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1, 1997.1 The
deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet
Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for her
Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the
Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint2 before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese
broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that
she was underpaid.
The following day or on February 15, 2000, Labor Arbitration Associate Regina T. Gavin issued
Summons3 to the Manager of Sunace, furnishing it with a copy of Divina's complaint and
directing it to appear for mandatory conference on February 28, 2000.
The scheduled mandatory conference was reset. It appears to have been concluded, however.
On April 6, 2000, Divina filed her Position Paper4 claiming that under her original one-year
contract and the 2-year extended contract which was with the knowledge and consent of
Sunace, the following amounts representing income tax and savings were deducted:
Year
1997
1998
1999

Deduction for Income Tax

NT10,450.00
NT9,500.00
NT13,300.00

Deduction for Savings

NT23,100.00
NT36,000.00
NT36,000.00;5

and while the amounts deducted in 1997 were refunded to her, those deducted in 1998 and
1999 were not. On even date, Sunace, by its Proprietor/General Manager Maria Luisa Olarte,
filed its Verified Answer and Position Paper,6 claiming as follows, quoted verbatim:
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED FOR THE REFUND OF HER 24 MONTHS SAVINGS

3. Complainant could not anymore claim nor entitled for the refund of her 24 months savings as
she already took back her saving already last year and the employer did not deduct any money
from her salary, in accordance with a Fascimile Message from the respondent SUNACE's
employer, Jet Crown International Co. Ltd., a xerographic copy of which is herewith attached
as ANNEX "2" hereof;
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REFUND OF HER 14 MONTHS TAX AND PAYMENT
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
4. There is no basis for the grant of tax refund to the complainant as the she finished herone
year contract and hence, was not illegally dismissed by her employer. She could only lay claim
over the tax refund or much more be awarded of damages such as attorney's fees as said
reliefs are available only when the dismissal of a migrant worker is without just valid or lawful
cause as defined by law or contract.
The rationales behind the award of tax refund and payment of attorney's fees is not to enrich the
complainant but to compensate him for actual injury suffered. Complainant did not suffer injury,
hence, does not deserve to be compensated for whatever kind of damages.
Hence, the complainant has NO cause of action against respondent SUNACE for monetary
claims, considering that she has been totally paid of all the monetary benefits due her under her
Employment Contract to her full satisfaction.
6. Furthermore, the tax deducted from her salary is in compliance with the Taiwanese law, which
respondent SUNACE has no control and complainant has to obey and this Honorable Office has
no authority/jurisdiction to intervene because the power to tax is a sovereign power which the
Taiwanese Government is supreme in its own territory. The sovereign power of taxation of a
state is recognized under international law and among sovereign states.
7. That respondent SUNACE respectfully reserves the right to file supplemental Verified Answer
and/or Position Paper to substantiate its prayer for the dismissal of the above case against the
herein respondent. AND BY WAY OF x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . answer to
complainant's position paper"7 alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract was
without its knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising
therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an
Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was annexed to said ". . . answer to
complainant's position paper."
To Sunace's ". . . answer to complainant's position paper," Divina filed a 2-page reply,8without,
however, refuting Sunace's disclaimer of knowledge of the extension of her contract and without
saying anything about the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and Affidavit of Desistance.
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two more
years was without its knowledge and consent in this wise:

We reject Sunace's submission that it should not be held responsible for the amount withheld
because her contract was extended for 2 more years without its knowledge and consent
because as Annex "B"9 shows, Sunace and Edmund Wang have not stopped communicating
with each other and yet the matter of the contract's extension andSunace's alleged non-consent
thereto has not been categorically established.
What Sunace should have done was to write to POEA about the extension and its objection
thereto, copy furnished the complainant herself, her foreign employer, Hang Rui Xiong and the
Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang.
And because it did not, it is presumed to have consented to the extension and should be liable
for anything that resulted thereform (sic).10 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The Labor Arbiter rejected too Sunace's argument that it is not liable on account of Divina's
execution of a Waiver and Quitclaim and an Affidavit of Desistance. Observed the Labor Arbiter:
Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same
shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsel (sic), if any,
before the Labor Arbiter.
The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily
entered into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms and consequences
thereof.
A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter
before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the parties,
particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and conditions of
the settlement and that it was entered into freely voluntarily (sic) by them and the agreement is
not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.
And because no consideration is indicated in the documents, we strike them down as contrary
to law, morals, and public policy.11
He accordingly decided in favor of Divina, by decision of October 9, 2000,12 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents SUNACE INTERNATIONAL
SERVICES and its owner ADELAIDA PERGE, both in their personal capacities and as agent of
Hang Rui Xiong/Edmund Wang to jointly and severally pay complainant DIVINA A.
MONTEHERMOZO the sum of NT91,950.00 in its peso equivalent at the date of payment, as
refund for the amounts which she is hereby adjudged entitled to as earlier discussed plus 10%
thereof as attorney's fees since compelled to litigate, complainant had to engage the services of
counsel.
SO ORDERED.13 (Underescoring supplied)
On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC, by Resolution of April 30, 2002,14 affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
decision.

Via petition for certiorari, 15 Sunace elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed it
outright by Resolution of November 12, 2002,16 the full text of which reads:
The petition for certiorari faces outright dismissal.
The petition failed to allege facts constitutive of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondent amounting to lack of jurisdiction when the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
finding that petitioner Sunace International Management Services impliedly consented to the
extension of the contract of private respondent Divina A. Montehermozo. It is undisputed
that petitioner was continually communicating with private respondent's foreign
employer (sic). As agent of the foreign principal, "petitioner cannot profess ignorance of such
extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending complainant (sic) employment
contract necessarily bound it." Grave abuse of discretion is not present in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.17
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis on words in capital letters in the original; emphasis on words in small letters and
underscoring supplied)
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of
January 14, 2004,18 Sunace filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari .
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC's finding that Sunace knew of and
impliedly consented to the extension of Divina's 2-year contract. It went on to state that "It is
undisputed that [Sunace] was continually communicating with [Divina's] foreign employer." It
thus concluded that "[a]s agent of the foreign principal, 'petitioner cannot profess ignorance of
such extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending complainant (sic) employment
contract necessarily bound it.' "
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer Xiong.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker to Sunace, the onlybasis of
a finding of continuous communication, reads verbatim:

xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything about her saving in police station. As
we contact with her employer, she took back her saving already last years. And they
did not deduct any money from her salary. Or she will call back her employer to check
it again. If her employer said yes! we will get it back for her.
Thank you and best regards.
(Sgd.)
Edmund Wang

President19

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the above-quoted telefax message,
that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic)and therefore was aware
of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The
message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after
the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina's allegedly withheld savings does not
necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract. As Sunace points out in its
Reply20 filed before the Court of Appeals,
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to the petitioner
that the private respondent had t[aken] already her savings from her foreign employer and that
no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or the petitioner's
consent thereto.21
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that
it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15,
2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Divina's filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:
As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as
obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divina's] employment contract necessarily bound
it,22
it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer Xiong, not the other way around.23 The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer
cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
"owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.24
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code reading

The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent,
dealing directly with third persons.
thus applies.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the validity of the Waiver and Affidavit of
Desistance which Divina executed in favor of Sunace is rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent DivinaA.Montehermozo
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Pre-termination of Contract of Migrant workers

G.R. No. 153031

December 14, 2006

PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE RUSEL, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59976, which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
dated March 22, 2000 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018120-99; and the Resolution of the CA dated
April 10, 2002, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.2
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL
Shipping Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming
Marine Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV

Cemtex General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months with a basic
monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of
US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special
allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A
request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On
August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel
using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was
confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required
to board a plane bound for the Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against
PCL Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their
answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent liable for
unjust repatriation of the complainant.
Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:
1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his illegal
dismissal.
2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage
benefits.
3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living allowance,
overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.
4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages
from August 11 to 22, 1996.
5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3

Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In its
Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter but
modified the appealed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered
MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the complainant due
to his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the award of sick wage benefit
is deleted.
All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Decision of
May 3, 2000.5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6 In its Decision dated December 18, 2001,
the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC Decision.7
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
April 10, 2002.8
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed
from employment.
xxxx
II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners' right to pre-terminate
private respondent's employment.
xxxx
III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to the
award of attorney's fees.9
As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of
the NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his part to abandon
his job and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's very act of jumping from the vessel and
swimming to shore is evidence of highest degree that he has no intention of returning to his job.
Petitioners further contend that if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated
pain, it is unlikely that he is able to swim two (2) nautical miles, which is the distance between
their ship and the shore, considering that he needed to use his limbs in swimming. Petitioners
further assert that it is error on the part of the CA to disregard the entries contained in the
logbook and in the Marine Note Protest evidencing Rusels' offense of desertion because while
these pieces of evidence were belatedly presented, the settled rule is that additional evidence
may be admitted on appeal in labor cases. Petitioners also contend that Rusel's act of desertion
is a grave and serious offense and considering the nature and situs of employment as well as

the nationality of the employer, the twin requirements of notice and hearing before an employee
can be validly terminated may be dispensed with.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of argument,
that Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense that the termination of
his employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners' right to exercise their prerogative to
pre-terminate such employment in accordance with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels,
which provision was incorporated in Rusel's Contract of Employment with petitioners. Petitioners
assert that despite the fact that this issue was raised before the CA, the appellate court failed to
resolve the same.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to affirm the
award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months
because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these awards.
Petitioners further argue that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance,
should not be granted because they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services
rendered by a seafarer. Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel's wages from August
11-22, 1996 should be applied for the payment of the costs of his repatriation, considering that
under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just
cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation
from the seafarer's wages and other earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of
attorney's fees should be deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or
the NLRC which states the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded.
In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact which
have already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private respondent argues
that, aside from the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against
petitioners' favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule,
private respondent contends that the instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Private respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the former is
guilty of desertion. Private respondent further contends that the right to due process is available
to local and overseas workers alike, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on labor and
equal protection as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code. Private respondent
argues that petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract as
an alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that private
respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the award of attorney's fees,
private respondent contends that since petitioners' act compelled the former to incur expenses
to protect his interest and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy private respondent's lawful claims, it is only proper that
attorney's fees be awarded in favor of the latter. Anent the other monetary awards, private
respondent argues that these awards are all premised on the findings of the Labor Arbiter,
NLRC and the CA that private respondent's dismissal was improper and illegal.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court.10 Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a

re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based
its determination.11 Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with
greater force in labor cases.12 Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the
NLRC and the CA.13 The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration
Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined
to specific matters.14 In the present case, the question of whether private respondent is guilty of
desertion is factual. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that
private respondent is not guilty of desertion and that he has been illegally terminated from his
employment. After a review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the findings of these tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General15 and in the Marine
Note Protest16 which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that private respondent
abandoned the vessel in which he was assigned. However, the genuineness of the Marine Note
Protest as well as the entries in the logbook are put in doubt because aside from the fact that
they were presented only during petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC,
both the Marine Note Protest and the entry in the logbook which were prepared by the officers
of the vessel were neither notarized nor authenticated by the proper authorities. Moreover, a
reading of these entries simply shows that private respondent was presumed to have deserted
his post on the sole basis that he was found missing while the MV Cemtex General was
anchored at the port of Takehara, Japan. Hence, without any corroborative evidence, these
documents cannot be used as bases for concluding that private respondent was guilty of
desertion.
Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
what caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he was
suffering which was compounded by the inattention of the vessel's captain to provide him with
the necessary treatment inspite of the fact that the ship was moored for about two weeks at the
anchorage of Takehara, Japan; and, that private respondent's act was a desperate move to
protect himself and to seek relief for his physical suffering. Petitioners contend that the findings
and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were affirmed by the CA are based on
conjecture because there is no evidence to prove that, at the time he jumped ship, private
respondent was really suffering from an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private
respondent's confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court may
not rely on the letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to private respondent's Position Paper
because it was unsigned and it was not established who executed the same.17 However, the
result of the x-ray examination conducted by the LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26,
1996, right after private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines, clearly showed that there
is a soft-tissue swelling around his ankle joint.18 This evidence is consistent with private
respondent's claim that he was then suffering from an ankle injury which caused him to jump off
the ship.
As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the distance
between the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable pain by reason of
his ankle injury, suffice it to say that private respondent is an able-bodied seaman and that with
the full use of both his arms and the help of a life jacket, was able to reach the shore.

As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:

The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave. By
desertion, in maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from the ship,
without leave, but an unauthorized absence from the ship with an intention not to
return to her service; or as it is often expressed, animo non revertendi, that is, with an
intention to desert.19 (emphasis supplied)
Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be
evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a
voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the ship or
vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to
show that when private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning.
The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought
medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude
that he had the intention of deserting his post. Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the
burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause.20 The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness
of the employee's defense.21 In the present case, since petitioners failed to discharge their
burden of proving that private respondent is guilty of desertion, the Court finds no reason to
depart from the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's
dismissal is illegal.
In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 055-9622 known as the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels as their alternative basis in
terminating the employment of private respondent. Said Section provides as follows:
Section 19. REPATRIATION
xxxx
C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before the
expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer from such
port provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the
seafarer shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination
pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of
termination may only be exercised by the master/employer if the original contract period
of the seafarer is at least ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this
mode of termination shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect on January 1,
1997 while the contract of employment entered into by and between private respondent and
petitioners was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is wrong for petitioners to cite this
particular Memorandum because at the time of petitioners' and private respondent's execution
of their contract of employment Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 was not yet effective.
What was in effect at the time private respondent's Contract of Employment was executed was
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly provided under the second

paragraph of private respondent's Contract of Employment that the terms and conditions
provided under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 shall be strictly and faithfully
observed. Hence, it is Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 which governs private
respondent's contract of employment.
Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical provisions with
Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as follows:
SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the
expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seaman from such
port provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the
seaman shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination
pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of
termination may only be exercised by the master/employer if the original contact period
of the seaman is at least ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this
mode of termination shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court agrees with private respondent's contention that petitioners' arguments are
misplaced. Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for terminating private
respondent's employment because it is incongruent with their primary defense that the latter's
dismissal from employment was for cause. Petitioners may not claim that they ended private
respondent's services because he is guilty of desertion and at the same time argue that they
exercised their option to prematurely terminate his employment, even without cause, simply
because they have the right to do so under their contract. These grounds for termination are
inconsistent with each other such that the use of one necessarily negates resort to the other.
Besides, it appears from the records that petitioners' alternative defense was pleaded merely as
an afterthought because it was only in their appeal with the NLRC that they raised this defense.
The only defense raised by petitioners in their Answer with Counterclaim filed with the office of
the Labor Arbiter is that private respondent was dismissed from employment by reason of
desertion.23 Under the Rules of Court,24 which is applicable in a suppletory character in labor
cases before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC25, defenses which are not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived.26
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of
Memorandum Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 as basis
for terminating private respondent's employment, it is clear that one of the conditions before any
of these provisions becomes applicable is when the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a
period of three (3) months before the expiration of the contract of employment. In the present
case, private respondent's contract was executed on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve
months. He was deployed aboard MV Cemtex General on June 25, 1996 and repatriated to the
Philippines on August 22, 1996. Hence, it is clear that petitioners did not meet this condition
because private respondent's termination was not within a period of three months before the
expiration of his contract of employment.

Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied with the other
conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private respondent's earned
wages together with his leave pay for the entire contract period as well as termination pay
equivalent to his one month salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against
him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side.
However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly
only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed
in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or
abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made) governs in this jurisdiction.27 In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here
in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other
laws affecting labor apply in this case.28 Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing
in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a
seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a
written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal investigation
where he could defend himself personally or through a representative.29 Hence, the employer
should strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the
nature and situs of employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply
with these twin requirements.
Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22, 1996 were
applied to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-setting of the costs of his
repatriation against his wages for the aforementioned period is allowed under the provisions of
Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 which provides that when the seafarer is
discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his
replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other earnings.
The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has its
counterpart provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No. 41, to wit:
SECTION H. REPATRIATION
xxxx
2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall have the
right to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the seaman's balance of
wages and other earnings.
xxxx
It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right to recover the
cost of repatriation from the seaman's wages and other earnings only if the concerned seaman
is validly discharged for disciplinary measures. In the present case, since petitioners failed to

prove that private respondent was validly terminated from employment on the ground of
desertion, it only follows that they do not have the right to deduct the costs of private
respondent's repatriation from his wages and other earnings.
Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the private respondent is not
entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and
special allowance as well as attorney's fees because he failed to present any proof to show that
he is entitled to these awards.
However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private respondent's three
months salary as well as the award representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation
pay and special allowance should be modified.
The Court finds no basis in the NLRC's act of including private respondent's living allowance as
part of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." The
pertinent provisions of the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation of the
amount due to the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are excluded. In the
present case, since private respondent received a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, he is,
therefore, entitled to receive a sum of US$1200.00, representing three months of said salary.
As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance, it is
clearly provided under private respondent's Contract of Employment that he is entitled to these
benefits as follows: living allowance of US$140.00/month; vacation leave with pay equivalent to
US$40.00/month; overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special allowance of
US$175.00/month.30
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining whether
or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and can not leave
ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in
excess of said number of hours.31 In the present case, the Court finds that private respondent is
not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that he rendered
service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day.
On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private respondent is entitled
is the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was removed in the computation of private

respondent's salary, special allowance of US$175.00/month and vacation leave with pay
amounting to US$40.00/month. Since private respondent rendered service for two months these
benefits should be doubled, giving a total of US$710.00.
As to the award of attorney's fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,32 as follows:
x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation.
The instances where these may be awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for recovery of wages,
and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award
shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The
extraordinary concept of attorney's fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the
Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered x x x
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict
construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of
facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be
any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld
the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid
accordingly, as in this case.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states
that "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor]
Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor", and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living for the laborer."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the reasons
why attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private respondent was illegally
terminated from his employment and that his wages and other benefits were withheld from him
without any valid and legal basis. As a consequence, he is compelled to file an action for the
recovery of his lawful wages and other benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses. On
these bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated
December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the award of US$1620.00 representing

private respondent's three months salary is reduced to US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00
representing private respondent's living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special
allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof, an award of US$710.00 is granted
representing private respondent's living allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with
pay for the same period.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Working Chairperson), Callejo Sr., and Chico-Nazario JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., Retired as of December 7, 2006.