Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16642

April 18, 1962

ANTONIO RAGUDO and EUGENIA PAREDES, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
EMELITA R. PASNO, represented by her Father,
ENRIQUE R. PASNO as her guardian ad-litem, defendant-appellee.
Joaquin M. Trinidad for plaintiffs-appellants.
Parentela and Parentela for defendant-appellee.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Appeal from an order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.
In the Quezon Court of First Instance, the spouses Antonio Ragudo and Eugenia Paderes filed
this complaint on October 12, 1959, to annul the order of the justice of the peace of Tayabas,
same province, declaring Emelita R. Pasno their adopted child, which order, dated July 31, 1959,
was already final. The spouses alleged substantially that they had been induced by Emelita's
parents to believe that the adoption proceeding in the justice of the peace court, "was merely for
the purpose of transferring to 8-year old Emelita some guerilla educational benefits available to
Antonio Ragudo."Plaintiffs further alleged that the adoption had been secured "thru fraud and
misrepresentation used by defendant Enrique Pasno (father of Emelita) upon the plaintiffs, as the
latter never intended to adopt" Emelita "as their child".
Instead of answering, the defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint, arguing that as the
justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance to take
cognizance of adoption cases, the latter has no jurisdiction to interfere or annul the order issued
in said adoption proceeding.
Upholding defendants' contention, the judge dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
There is no question that a justice of the peace court has jurisdiction over adoption cases.
(Republic Acts 643 and 644). Courts of First Instance also have jurisdiction over the same.
But this is not an adoption case. This is a civil action to annul an order of a justice of the peace
court, allegedly obtained thru fraud. It is based on sec. 43 of Act 190.1 Of such action, justice of

the peace courts cannot take cognizance. And it falls within the general jurisdiction of courts of
first instance.
It is argued for the appellees that under Art. 348 of the New Civil Code, fraud is not one of the
grounds for revocation of an adoption. The appellants reply, quite correctly, that those grounds
refer only to an adoption validly decreed not to an adoption void from the beginning because
tainted with fraud. Anyway, this is an argument that should be submitted when the case is
considered on the merits.
The appealed order is reversed and the case is hereby remanded for further proceedings.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24668

July 31, 1968

ANDRES LAPITAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SCANDIA, INC., and GENERAL ENGINEERING CO., defendants-appellees.
Florido and Florido for plaintiff-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo and Jesus P. Garcia for defendant-appellee
Scandia, Inc.
Jose R. Limchin for defendant-appellee General Engineering Co.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his complaint for rescission and damages against
appellees Scandia, Inc., of Manila and General Engineering Co. of Cebu.
Lapitan's complaint in the court below averred that on April 17, 1963 he purchased from
Scandia, Inc., through its sub-dealer in Cebu City, General Engineering Co., one ABC Diesel
Engine, of 16 horse power, for P3,735.00, paid in cash; that he bought the engine for running a
rice and corn mill at Ormoc City, Leyte; that defendants had warranted and assured him that all
spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores, enabling him to avoid loss due to long
periods of waiting, and that defendants would replace any part of the engine that might break
within twelve months after delivery. Plaintiff further charged that on June 28, 1963, the cam
rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship and it stopped
functioning; that the sellers were unable to send a replacement until August 29, 1963; that barely
six days after replacement the new part broke again due to faulty casting and poor material, so he

(Lapitan) notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of sale; that he sought
return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay. He, therefore, prayed (1) for
rescission of the contract; (2) reimbursement of the price; (3) recovery of P4,000.00 actual
damages plus P1,000.00 attorney's fees; (4) recovery of such moral and exemplary damages as
the court deems just and equitable; and (5) costs and other proper relief.
After filing answers disclaiming liability, Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the total amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the municipal court, under Republic Act 3828, amending the Judiciary Act by
increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases involving P10,000.00 or less.
After argument, the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,
invoking Cruz vs. Judge B. Tan, 48 O.G. 1320, 87 Phil. 527.
Unable to obtain reconsideration, Lapitan appealed directly to this Court, arguing (1) that
rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and (2) that as he claimed moral and
exemplary damages, besides the price of P3,735.00, P4,000.00 actual damages, and P1,000.00
attorneys' fees, the value of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose
a mortgage, 1 this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination
of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within
the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that
the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively
cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967;
Manufacturers' Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no cogent
reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or
resolution) should be differently treated, a rescission being a counterpart, so to speak, of

"specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an
investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had
in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify
the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to
make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be
so by this Court, arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March
31, 1967 (the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the
validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a
judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage); Baito v.
Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to support created by
the relation, etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963
(the validity or nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same
nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by
the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for
rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary
estimation a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be
compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant,
and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action
and discouraging multiplicity of suits.2
Of course, where the money claim is prayed for as an alternative relief to specific performance,
an equivalence is implied that permits the jurisdiction to be allocated by the amount of the
money claim (Cruz vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 627). But no such equivalence can be deduced in the case at
bar, where the money award can be considered only if the rescission is first granted.
We, therefore, rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not capable of
pecuniary estimation, and that the court below erred in declining to entertain appellant's action
for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is reversed and set aside, and the case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion. Costs
against appellees.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
Footnotes
G.R. No. 80040 September 30, 1988

ISMAEL AMORGANDA and TRINIDAD G. AMORGANDA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ESTANISLAO SAYCON and CLARA SAYCON,
respondents.
Marcelo G. Flores for petitioner.
Leo B. Diocos for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the decision * rendered by the respondent appellate court on 17
July 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09614, entitled: "Estanislao Saycon, et al., petitioners,
versus Hon. Eleuterio E. Chiu, etc. et al., respondents," which set aside, for being null
and void, the order issued by Judge Eleuterio E. Chill on 23 April 1986 in Civil Case No.
8794 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, restraining the defendants therein,
now private respondents, from cultivating, taking possession of, gathering the fishes
and shrimps or other products thereon, or committing acts of interference or disturbance
in the plaintiffs' possession of the fishpond in question, and directed the dismissal of
said Civil Case No. 8794.
The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows:
On 30 July 1977, herein private respondents, spouses Estanislao and Clara Saycon,
leased to herein petitioners, spouses Ismael and Trinidad Amorganda, a fishpond
located at Cabalulan Manipis, Tanjay Negros Oriental, which "land is a part or portion of
PLA No. 2086 containing an area of SEVEN (7) hectares, more or less, 'in the name of
Pedro Saycon, lessors' deceased father,' " for a period of ten (10) years from said date.
Rentals in the amount of P3,000,00 a year for the entire lease period were duly paid to
and received by the lessors. On 30 January 1981, the lease period was extended for
two (2) years, to expire on 30 July 1989. Again, rentals for the extended period were
paid to and received by the lessors. Then, on 20 December 1982, the lessors, in
consideration of another advance rental on the fishpond, again agreed to extend the
lease period for another eight (8) years from 30 July 1989 and terminating on 31, July
1997. 1
On 5 January 1986, however, the lessors, herein private respondents Estanislao and
Clara Saycon, harvested bangus and shrimps from the fishpond without the knowledge
and consent of the lessees, herein petitioners Ismael and Trinidad Amorganda.

Consequently, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against the
private respondents before the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental. The complaint was
docketed as I.S. Case No. 86-F and is still pending preliminary investigation therein. 2
Then, on 27 February 1986, the private respondents, allegedly with the aid of armed
men, forcibly entered the leased fishpond and prevented the petitioners and their
workers from entering the premises. As a result, the petitioners filed a complaint against
the private respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 8794, to compel the private respondents to return the leased
premises to them and for damages in the amounts of. (1) P25,000. 00 every three (3)
months or P100,000.00 a year, until possession of the fishpond is restored to the
lessees; (b) P20,000.00, as moral damages and P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
(c) P10,000.00, as attorney's fees and P500.00 per appearance in court of counsel; and
(d) such other actual expenses and damages as may be proved during the trial. The
petitioners further prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued
restraining the private respondents, their agents or persons acting in their behalf, from
cultivating, taking possession of, or committing acts which would disturb or interfere with
petitioners' possession of said fishpond. 3
Finding the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to be sufficient
in form and substance, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on 4 March
1986, directing the private respondents, defendants therein, to refrain from cultivating,
taking possession of, gathering fishes, shrimps and other products from the land in
question until further orders, and set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing
on 13 March 1986. 4
On 26 March 1986, the private respondents filed their Answer to the complaint, alleging
that the private respondent Estanislao Saycon is not the true owner of the property
which he had leased to the petitioners, but the government of the Philippines, because it
reverted to the government after the license of Pedro Saycon, late father of private
respondents Estanislao Saycon, was cancelled and all improvements existing in the
area forfeited in favor of the government; that the petitioners have no right whatsoever
to the fishpond because their earlier rights were lost upon the cancellation of the license
of said Pedro Saycon and the area declared open for disposition to any interested party
and qualified applicant; that the trial court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
disputes relative to possessory rights over the fishpond in question, which belongs to
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR); that the herein petitioners failed
to exhaust all administrative remedies before resort was made to the courts; and that
the petitioners have no cause of action since the fishpond in question had been forfeited
in favor of the government and petitioners are not applicants for permit to operate or
lease the same from the government. 5

On 23 April 1986, the trial court granted the application for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction "restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the defendants, their
agents, servants, and/or any person acting in their behalves from cultivating, taking
possession of, gathering the fishes and shrimps or other products thereon, or
committing acts of interference or disturbance in the plaintiffs' possession" of the
fishpond in question upon the filing of an injunction bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 6
The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, but their motion
was denied on 11 June 1986. 7
Consequently, the private respondents filed a petition with the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) to annul and set aside the order of 23 April 1986 on the
grounds that: (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the complaint filed
is in the nature of recovery of possession and should have been filed in the Municipal
Court of Tanjay Negros Oriental, where the land is situated, in accordance with Rule 70
of the Rules of Court; (2) there is no cause of action because "(w)hen the BFAR issued
an Order confiscating the fishpond in favor of the Government and declaring the
contract of lease between Saycon and the Amorgandas to be null and void, the rights of
the Amorgandas for (to) possession over the fishpond was (were) not anymore existing;
they might have some rights for sum of money from the Saycons. The respondents
have no right whatsoever to step in the shoes of the government; and (3) nonexhaustion of administrative remedies in that the action should have been filed with the
BFAR before resort was made to the courts. 8
The herein petitioners in due course filed their comment with the Court of Appeals 9 and
on 17 July 1987, the respondent appellate court issued the decision in question,
declaring null and void the order of the regional trial court of 23 April 1986, for the
reason that the complaint is one for recovery of possession over which the regional trial
court has no jurisdiction, and directing the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. 8794 of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental. 10
On 10, August 1987, the petitioners filed, by registered mail, a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, 11 but the respondent appellate court denied the motion
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. 12 Hence, the present recourse.
The Court gave due course to the petition. 13
The petitioners raise two (2) issues, to wit:
(1) whether or not the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
respondent appellate court had been filed out of time and the said decision, is already
final and executory; and

(2) whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental has jurisdiction over the
case.

On the procedural issue, it appears that counsel for the herein petitioners received a
copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals on 24 July 1987. Pursuant to the rules, 14 he
had fifteen (15) days from said date, or up to 8 August 1987, within which to appeal
therefrom or file a motion for its reconsideration. Counsel for the petitioners, however,
filed the motion for reconsideration only on 10 August 1987, or two (2) days after the
expiration of the reglementary period. Counsel for the petitioners, in explaining the
delay, claimed that the last day for filing the motion for reconsideration, 8 August 1987,
fell on a holiday, a Saturday, so that he filed the motion for reconsideration on Monday,
10 August 1987, the day following a holiday and Sunday.
Saturday, 8 August 1987, however, was not an official holiday so that the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period. But a strong
compelling reason, i.e., the prevention of a grave miscarriage of justice exists in this
case that would warrant a suspension of the Rules and excuse the delay of two (2)
calendar days in the filing of said motion for reconsideration.
The private respondents have admitted to have unilaterally terminated the lease
contract executed between them and the petitioners, and prevented the latter from
entering the fishpond, subject matter of the lease contract, despite the fact that the
lease between them is to expire only on 31 July 1997, and that rentals have been paid
to private respondents by the petitioners up to said date. Their (private respondents)
excuse is that they have lost their right over the land since said land, which had been
previously leased to their late father, Pedro Saycon, had been forfeited in favor of the
government.
Indeed, the private respondents have lost whatever right they may have had over the
fishpond in question after said land had been forfeited in favor of the government. In his
Order, dated 11 April 1985, the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) categorically stated that the heirs of Pedro Saycon, among them the
private respondent Estanislao Saycon, "have no more leg to stand on, much less
anymore personality to assert any right over the area under OFP No. F-234-B. 15 That
being the case, what right had the private respondents to enter the fishpond and
exclude the petitioners there from? The fact that the Director of the BFAR, in his Order
of 11 April 1985, had ordered that any occupant thereon should vacate the premises did
not give the private respondents license to renege on their obligation under the contract
6f lease and eject the petitioners from the land. As correctly stated by the trial court in its
order dated 23 April 1986, "(t)he Order of the BFAR (Exhibit "L") relied upon by the
defendant (private respondent herein) is of no moment, for the government is not a

party in this case. The said Order would become material and relevant only when the
government takes legal action against any possessor of the fishpond in question. 16
Besides, the private respondents who appear to be guilty of coercion, stand to unjustly
profit from their fraudulent and deceitful act at the expense of the petitioners who may
not be able to recover the rentals advanced by them to the private respondents.
One other reason for suspending the Rules and allowing the petitioners to appeal is that
there is no indication that, in filing the motion for reconsideration on Monday, 10 August
1987, instead of Saturday, 8 August 1987, counsel for the petitioners was motivated by
a desire to delay the proceedings or obstruct the administration of justice. His mistaken
belief that Saturday is a legal holiday appears to be pardonable since the courts of
justice do not hold office on Saturdays. Anyway, the delay of two (2) calendar days
one of which was a Sundayin the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not
prejudice the cause of the private respondents, or that said private respondents suffered
material injury by reason of the delay.
In Lagunzad vs. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court said, and we quote.
We cannot just more petitioner's plea for a review of his case in this instance. There is
not the slightest indication of malice on his part or of a desire to delay the proceedings
and to transgress the rules on procedure. If at all, his was an honest mistake or
miscalculation worsened by some fortuitous occurrence which we deem condonable
under the circumstances. For we have, in many cases granted relief where a stringent
application of the requirement of timeliness of pleadings would have denied a litigant
substantial justice and equity. Suffice it to note that the rules on technicality were
promulgated to secure not to override substantial justice. As it should be in this case
especially because the petition appears also to be impressed with merit.

The other issue raised by the petitioners is: whether or not the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental has jurisdiction over the case.
The respondent appellate court, in its decision under review, found that the regional trial
court has no jurisdiction over the case since the object of the complaint was to recover
possession of the land which the herein private respondents had secured by means of
force, threats and intimidation. Said the appellate court:
... It is quite obvious from the foregoing that the object of the complaint is to recover
possession of the property in question which private respondents acquired as lessees
thereof, but of which they were deprived by petitioners by means of "force, threats and
intimidation." The complaint thus alleges the facts which confer exclusive jurisdiction in
the Municipal Trial Court to try the case. (Sec. 33(2), BP 129). The Honorable respondent
Court being devoid of jurisdiction over the main case, it was, likewise, without jurisdiction
to issue the writ of preliminary injunction dated 23 April 1986. 18

We do not agree. While the herein petitioners' complaint in the trial court alleges that
they were dispossessed of the leased fishpond by the lessors, herein private
respondents, by means of force, stealth and intimidation, so that the complaint would
appear, at first blush, to be one for forcible entry and damages, the action is, in reality,
one for specific performance, i.e., to compel the private respondents, as lessors, to
comply with their obligations under the lease contract and return the possession of the
leased premises to them, and for damages due to their (private respondents') unjust
occupation of the land. Such action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and
comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts. Thus, Article 1654
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
(a) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render
it fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it
suitable for the use it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the
entire duration of the contract.

In De Rivera vs. Halili, 19 the Court said that the action to compel the lessor to comply
with his obligation "to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the lease for the entire duration of the contract" is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the court of first instance, now the regional trial court.
In Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., 20 the Court, speaking through the eminent Mr. Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, also said:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action
is one not capable of peculliary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like in the suits to have the defendant
perform his paint of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. ...

Since the present action is to compel the private respondents to perform their part of the
contract of lease "to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the

lease for the entire duration of the contract," the action is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. 21
The respondent Court of Appeals, therefore, erroneously classified the present action as
one for forcible entry and damages which is cognizable exclusively by the municipal trial
court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from should be reversed and set aside.
We also find no merit in the claim of the private respondents that the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In
Pitargue vs. Sorilla 22 the Court ruled:
... The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and
alienate public lands, ... must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the
Government of the exercise of their respective functions or powers thereon, such as the
authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, and the
authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising
therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered affirming the order issued by the trial court on 23 April 1986 in Civil
Case No. 8794 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental. With costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18138

May 19, 1966

HONORIO J. HERNANDO, plaintiff and appellant,

vs.
J. FRANCISCO, Commodore, PN, Flag Officer in Command Philippine Navy,
HON. ALEJO SANTOS, Secretary of National Defense, and HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ,
Auditor General, defendants and appellees.
Harold M. Hernando for plaintiff and appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General A. E. Torres and Solicitor E. D. Ignacio for defendants and
appellees.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing a
petition for reinstatement.
Before the lower court, the parties have submitted the following stipulation of facts:

1. That petitioner Honorio J. Hernando has been in the Government service since January
17, 1938, receiving appointments to the following: Boatman, Cape Bojeador Light
Station, January 17, 1938; Lightkeeper (apprentice), Bureau of Customs, January 28,
1939; Lightkeeper, Bureau of Customs, December 9, 1940; Acting Lighthousekeeper,
Bureau of Customs, November 21, 1945.
The appointments received by the petitioner to the abovementioned positions are
herewith enclosed as Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "A-3".
That petitioner is a Civil Service Eligible in the position of lightkeeper having passed the
examination taken on December 31, 1940 with an average of 82%, as shown in the
attached certificate dated July 23, 1941 of the Bureau of Civil Service which is attached
herewith as Annex "A-4".
That the administrative charges were filed against the petitioner by Mr. Ignacio Guinto of
Barrio Buraan, Burgos, and Mr. Marcelo Vea, an employee of the lighthouse service at
Cape Bojeador. Counsel for respondent reserves the right to present a certified copy of
the charges of Mr. Ignacio Guinto and Mr. Marcelo Vea.
Petitioner was asked to answer within 72 hours said charges as per letter dated June 23,
1954 of Provincial Auditor J. Manalo of Ilocos Norte. The petitioner requested for an
extension of time to answer the charges of Mr. Guinto in his letter dated July 12, 1954
and on July 16, 1964 he also asked an extension of time to answer the charges of Mr.
Marcelo Vea. On July 16, 1954, the petitioner filed answers to the charges against him
dated July 14, 1954 (charges preferred by Mr. Marcelo Vea). ... .
3. That the Provincial Auditor conducted an investigation of the administrative charges
and rendered a report of the same embodied in his 2nd Indorsement dated August 25,
1954. All the documents and papers in support of said indorsement report and as
enumerated therein, are attached herewith. This report was forwarded to the Flag Officer
in Command of the Philippine Navy, who upon receipt of said report wrote a letter to
petitioner dated November 29, 1954 suspending him. ... .
4. That after the expiration of the two months period of suspension of petitioner, said
petitioner thru counsel filed a petition dated May 29, 1955 for reinstatement with the
Philippine Navy. A similar petition for reinstatement was filed in the Bureau of Civil
Service. These two petitions, however, were denied by the Flag Officer in Command of
the Philippine Navy and the Bureau of Civil Service, respectively. Upon receipt of said
denial, petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration. The petitions for reinstatement, the
orders of denial and the Papers in support thereof, and the petition for reconsideration are
herewith attached to this stipulation of facts as ... .

5. That while his administrative case was pending the Flag Officer in Command of the
Philippine Navy likewise referred the matter to the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte for
the institution of criminal charges against petitioner if any, and a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Provincial Fiscal who, however, dismissed the same
as shown by a 2nd Indorsement dated September 12, 1955, made by Provincial Fiscal
Ulpiano C. Dumaual of Ilocos Norte, copy of which is herewith attached as Annex "E"
together with the envelope addressed to Atty. Harold Hernando which is post stamped on
September 27, 1955 and marked as Annex "E-1".
6. That based on said dismissal Annex "B", the petitioner filed in the Bureau of Civil
Service a petition dated May 27, 1958, attaching thereto copy of Annex "E" hereof. Copy
of said petition dated May 27, 1958 is herewith attached as Annex "F".
7. That on August 18, 1958, the petitioner received a decision of the Bureau of Civil
Service in Administrative Case No. R-11545 dated May 29, 1958 thru a letter of
transmittal dated August 6, 1958 from the Administrative Officer of the Headquarters of
the Philippine Navy. Said letter of transmittal and decision dated May 29, 1958 are
herewith enclosed as Annexes "G" and "G-1", respectively.
The counsel for respondents reserve the right to file with this Honorable Court the sworn
statement of petitioner dated May 5, 1956 as mentioned in page 2 of the Decision of the
Bureau of Civil Service, Annex "G-1" hereof.1wph1.t
8. That on August 26, 1958, the petitioner filed by registry, a petition for reconsideration
with the Bureau of Civil Service. As petitioner has not received any action of the petition
for reconsideration, he filed a memorandum dated September 30, 1958, enclosing
therewith Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" ...
9. That on August 10, 1959, petitioner filed his complaint in the above-entitled case
against respondents who filed their answer to said complaint on September 12, 1959.
10. That under date of September 22, 1959, the Administrative Officer wrote a letter to
the petitioner enclosing therewith the resolution of the Bureau of Civil Service denying
the petition for review of petitioner. ... .
11. That as of May 27, 1959, the position of Lightkeeper of Cape Bojeador which was the
position formerly occupied by petitioner Honorio Hernando, was still vacant as per
certification dated May 27, 1959 by Mr. Felipe Roque, Chief Lighthouse Service,
Philippine Navy, copy of said certification is herewith enclosed as Annex "J". Counsel for
respondents, however, reserve the right to file a certification with this Honorable Court as
to the present status of said position.

12. That the parties in the above-entitled case agree that all the annexes herewith shall
form integral parts of this stipulation of facts.
13. That counsel for respondents request a period of fifteen (15) days from today within
which to file certified true copies of the documents which they have reserved to present
above.
The main issues raised by the appellant before the lower court are: (1) that there was a denial of
due process of law; (2) that the Provincial Auditor did not have the authority or power to
investigate a civil service employee; and (3) that there was no waiver of formal investigation in
his alleged sworn statement dated May 5, 1956.
The lower court, after examining all the documents attached to the record and pertinent to the
case, found that the investigation conducted by the Provincial Auditor was tainted with serious
irregularities and conducted ex-parte and appellant was not notified of the dates of the
investigation and did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses as against him and
present evidence in his behalf. But the said court prevented itself from delving deeper into the
alleged irregularity of the investigation because according to it there was a waiver on the part of
the appellant and he is estopped from questioning it as shown in the sworn statement executed by
him on May 25, 1956, the pertinent portion of which states:
SWORN STATEMENT
I, Honorio Hernando, of legal age, married and resident of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, do hereby give the following answers
to the questions propounded to me by Mr. J. Manalo, Provincial Auditor for Ilocos Norte
(in the presence of his defense counsel, Atty. Harold Hernando), as follows:
QUESTION 1 Mr. Hernando, I am presenting to you this petition for reinvestigation
of the complaints preferred against you by Mr. Ignacio Guinto and Mr. Marcelo Vea,
marked Exhibit "K". This request for reinvestigation of the case was dated February 14,
1956, and signed by your defense counsel, Atty. Harold M. Hernando. In paragraph 2 of
this request, it states as follows: "2. That the respondent is no longer interested of being
reinstated to his position but solely for the fact that he wants to be cleared out of his name
and reputation against any criminal or administrative complaints so that he is free as well
as being fully qualified for any other position if ever he applies for a job or any position,
both in the government and in private offices." Is this petition yours?
ANSWER 1 Yes, sir.

Q. 2 Pursuant to what you have stated in the above-quoted paragraph of your request
for reinvestigation, are you willing to be separated from the service of the governmental?
A. 2 Yes, sir, provided that the criminal aspect of the charges should no longer be
pursued, and for the further fact that I want my case to be cleared out from any and all
complaints against me in connection with this case, so I want to maintain my good name
and reputation to the public provided that the criminal aspect of the case be quashed and
that the administrative charge against me be terminated or dismissed as I am willing to be
separated from the government service. I would respectfully pray to this Honorable office
also that if there is say administrative penalty that may be imposed upon me on the
administrative aspect of the case, that the same be a light one and/or without penalty
considering the length of time now that I am suspended from office and the moral
suffering of my family because of my said indeterminate suspension up to the present
time so that I will be free and qualified again to enter and/or be employed with the
government or to any private office. Being a civil service eligible, with more than sixteen
years of continued and efficient service in the government and in the light of justice and
equity, may I suggest and pray that this is sufficient to merit the non-imposition of any
penalty whatsoever in the administrative aspect of my case and praying further for such
other remedies as may be most equitable in the premises, and that the criminal aspect of
the case be quashed.
Q. 3 In view of your statement above, are you willing that your request for
reinvestigation of said cases be discontinued provided I recommend that only the
administrative aspect of the complaint be taken into consideration and that the criminal
aspect be quashed?
A. 3 Yes, sir.
Q. 4 I remind you that I have only the power of recommendation, but suppose my
recommendation to quash the criminal aspect is not approved, what do you say?
A. 4 I respectfully pray that my petition for reinvestigation be totally discontinued and
provided that the criminal aspects of the cases be quashed.
Q. 5 Do you have something more to say in connection with the case?
A. 5 May I humbly pray to this Honorable Office of the Provincial Auditor to
recommend through the office of the Civil Service, that my petition for reinvestigation be
discontinued and the criminal aspect of the case be quashed. That my indeterminate
suspension up to the present time is sufficient penalty for me because the nature of the

complaints against me involve very little amount and that I am a civil service eligible.
That I be allowed and/or will be qualified to enter any government or private office again.
The lower court in inhibiting itself from ascertaining the alleged irregularity of the investigation
because of the above-cited sworn statement, dismissed the complaint on June 1, 1960 on the
ground that appellant's "inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as
having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated" and "that a Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to decide cases involving the removal,
separation and suspension of subordinate officers and employees as this matter is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service (Sec. 695, Revised Administrative
Code).
Motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal having been denied, appellant has interposed
this appeal on questions of law, namely, (1) whether or not the Commissioner of Civil Service
has the exclusive charge or jurisdiction to conduct all formal administrative investigations; and
(2) whether or not the chief or head of the office can delegate to the Provincial Auditor the power
to investigate the appellant.
Appellant insists that all formal administrative investigations conducted against civil service
employees are covered by Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code which, in part,
provides that
The Commissioner of Civil Service shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over the
removal, separation, and suspension of subordinate officers and employees in the Civil
Service and over all other matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such subordinate officers and employees, and shall have exclusive charge of all formal
administrative investigations against them. ...
and therefore the Commissioner of Civil Service has the exclusive charge or jurisdiction to
conduct formal administrative investigation on the charges against him.
While it is true that the abovequoted provision grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Civil Service
Commissioner over the removal, separation and suspension of subordinate officers and
employees in the civil service, it is also true that "Executive Order No. 370, dated September 29,
1941 provides that administrative proceedings may be commenced against a government officer
or employee by the head or chief of a bureau or office concerned. It is only after the investigation
that the record of the case, with comment and recommendation of the investigator is forwarded
to the Commissioner of Civil Service." (Castillo, etc., et al. vs. Froilan Bayona, etc., et al., G.R.
No. L-14375, Jan. 30, 1960). And in the case of Pastoriza vs. Superintendent of Schools, G.R.
No. L14233, September 23, 1959, wherein it was argued that only the Commissioner of Civil

Service or his immediate subordinates could validly conduct such investigation in view of
Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code, this Tribunal stated:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 370 a complaint against an officer or employee of the
government is to be filed with the head or chief of the bureau or office where he is
working and the officer or employee concerned shall be required to answer the complaint
within 72 hours after receipt thereof. If the officer or employee elects to be heard on the
charges, a hearing will be held by the chief or head of office who shall, after said hearing,
forward to the Commissioner of Civil Service the records of the case with his comment
and recommendation. In other words, the Commissioner of Civil Service has absolutely
nothing to do with or has no anticipation whatever in the investigation from the time the
charges are filed until termination. The Commissioner takes cognizance of the case only
after the investigation is finished, when he receives the records. In effect, said executive
order completely divests the Commissioner of his "exclusive power of investigation."
Besides, Republic Act No. 2260, which took effect on June 19, 1959, has changed the Civil
Service' jurisdiction from "exclusive" to "final," and the procedure under Executive Order No.
370 substantially conforms in its general outline to the new legislation. It would be useless to
object to the application of the new law on the ground of initiation of proceedings before its
approval, because it contains no saving clause as to matters previously arising, and it being
procedural in nature, no vested rights may be invoked. (Pastoriza vs. Supt. of Schools, supra).
As regards to the contention of appellant that the provincial auditor is not the proper head or
chief of the bureau or office and therefore without power to investigate, we have Executive
Order No. 370, series of 1941, Section I of which states:
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a government officer or employee by the
head or Chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any person
which shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or
cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or Chief of the bureau or office concerned may,
in his discretion, take action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances on the case
so warrant.
It is believed that the proceeding was properly commenced when the Superintendent of the
Lighthouse Service (admittedly to be the proper head or chief of the appellant) wired the
provincial auditor to, investigate the case. The Civil Service Board of Appeals itself has laid
down a ruling to the effect that the authority to investigate can be delegated and not contrary to
due process (Administrative Case No. R-14493, February 26, 1957). This delegation of the
authority to investigate has recently been upheld by this Court in the case of Armando Esperanza
vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L- 21810, April 30, 1966.

Furthermore, Section 25(c), Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules concerning procedure in
administrative proceedings clearly states that administrative investigation "shall be conducted by
the head of Department or agency concerned or his authorized representatives, unless the
Commissioner, upon request and for justifiable reasons, designates a special investigator or
investigators pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 2260. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear, therefore, that when the Superintendent of the Lighthouse Service wired the Provincial
Auditor of Ilocos Norte to conduct the investigation, the latter became the authorized
representative of the former. And when the appellant submitted himself to investigation without
objection on this ground, he is considered to have waived any formal imperfections in said
investigations. Indeed, due process in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable in
administrative proceedings. (Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188.)
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.