A Theory of Professionalization in Politics

Author(s): Gordon S. Black

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Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), pp. 865-878
Published by: American Political Science Association
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A THEORY OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

IN POLITICS*

GORDONS. BLNCIK
University of Rochester

whole cast of the political elites is modified by

pluralism; the fanatic, the Messianic type, the
leader whose aim is to consolidate the supremacy
of some small group tend to trip themselves up on
the barrierof groups and.group loyalties. The Federalists, concernedwith maintaining the domination
of eastern financial and commercial interests, were
unable to compete with the Jefferson alliance; they
died out as a party. All important politicians have
been excellent negotiators of group alliances, from
Jefferson and Jackson to Roosevelt and Truman.'

Professionalization, in customary usage, refers

to the assimilation of the standards and values
prevalent in a given profession. Every profession, including politics, tends to have some set or
sets of values that are widely held and which define what it means to be a "professional" within
that field. These values are important because
they affect the likelihood that the individual will
achieve success in his profession. If the values
are widely held, those that deviate from them
are likely to be sanctioned by their colleagues,
and people who fail to maintain the minimal
standards of their profession are not likely to
obtain professional advancement. Those who do
behave according to the dominant values of
their profession, however, are likely to be accorded the status of "professional" in the eyes of
their colleagues, and that designation will contribute to the success of their careers.
In the profession of politics, as in other professions, there is seldom one set of standards and
values that prevails in all places at all times.
These normative elements are likely to vary
from political system to political system, to vary
within a political system, and to vary within the
profession of politics over time. In a highly centralized local political organization, for example,
the achievement and maintenance of a position
is likely to depend upon such values as deference
and loyalty to the leaders of the political hierarchy.
In a more decentralized political system, however, a different set of professional standards is
likely to be predominant. In the "pluralistic" political system, the politician is a principal broker
in the process through which collective decisions
are made. The man who is able to develop successful coalitions and who can work out acceptable compromises is critical to the decisional
process where interest conflict abounds. Robert
A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom have described the prevalence of such individuals in the
political process of the United States:
... social pluralism facilitates the rise of political
leaders whose main skill is negotiating settlements
among conflicting social organizations. Thus the

Dahl and Lindblom point. to what may be the

most critical of the political skills required for
success in American politics, a skill at bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. Explicit bargaining pervades the entirety of the political
process, from the development of electoral alliances to the formation of legislative coalitions,
and at the center of these processes stands the
politician. To be successful, the politician must
first forge a winning coalition from the kaleidoscopic variety of interests present in most constituencies. But it does not end there. The ability
to bargain also determines to some extent the
success of the representative in his legislature,
whether at the Federal, state, or local levels of
government. The ideologue who is unwilling to
bargain or the "citizen-politician" who is above
such behavior are not likely to be sought out for
alliances.2

Although there are undoubtedly many other

skills required of the successful politician, the
ability and willingness to bargain would appear
to be a necessary requirement for success in politics in the pluralistic political system. But the
ability to bargain presumes as well that the politician has a positive view toward the processes
of bargaining and negotiation. One feature of
American politics has been a widespread distrust
'Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Poli-

tics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper

and Row, 1953), p. 304.
'For a more detailed analysis of the attitudes
and orientations of "citizen-politicians," see Ken-

neth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis,

* The larger project of which this analysis is a

part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford
University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants GS 496 and GS 1898.

Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). This study and the

Prewitt study utilize data from the same source;
the City Council Research Project, directed by
Heinz Eulau.

865

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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOL. 64

of the politician,a distrust that probablystems

in part from the particularrequirementsof the
political role; for examplethe requirementthat
the politician hargain with the diverse groups
and individualsaround him.3 For some reason,
"bargaining"seems to be viewed as slightly "unethical"to many people, particularlythose segments of the populationthat have accepted the
grandmyth of the ProgressiveEra that in every
conflictsituationtllere exists a "right"decision.4

equally skilled at bargaining;not all politicians

are even favorably disposed toward bargaining.
Why is it that some individualsseem to learn
the norms, values, and attitudes of the pluralistic politicalprocessmore easily than others?
One answer to these questions may eome
from an understandingof the motivationsof the
men who enter the political arena. Some men
appear to seek offices in order to enllancetheir
nonpo]itical eareers, others may enter polities
because of a sense of civic obligation,while still
I. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENTERING
others may not have sought their oilee at allTHB POLITICAL ARENA
they may have been thrust into it by their
If there does exist a widely held antagonism friends. These and many other motiarationsare
toward "politicians"and toward "bargaiining," commonin politics, but the.y are not the kixlds
one wondershow it is that some people develop of moti+rationthat one would associate with
skills and Xalues congruent with the require- those who seek political careers.5
ment.sof politics. Do they enter into politics beThis study is coneernedwith one type of lnocause they are skilledat ba.rgainingand compro- tivation that may be related to the socialization
mise or do they develop these skills after they of potential politicians; the desire for political
enter the politicalarena?And what accountsfor advancement.Althoughmany people entlerpolithe variationsin norms and values among those ties in order to enhclncetheir nonpolitieal caactive in politics? Clearlynot all politioiansare reers,other individualsseek sueeessthroughpolitics wheresuccessis measuredin terms of politDahl alld Lindblom, op. cit., 333-334. VVilliamC. ical advaneement.Accordingto JosephA. SehlesMitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the inger:
American Politician," Western Political Quarterty, The centralassumptionof ambitiontheoryis that
12 (June, 1959), 683-698. Donald E. Stokes, "Pop- a politician'sbehazrioris a responseto his office
ular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical goals. Or, to put it anotherway, the politicianas
Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D
office seeker engagesin political actKs
and makes
Lasswell (eds.), Et1iics and Bigness (New York: decisionsappropriateto gainingoffice.6
3

Harper and Elow,1962).

4The ideology of the "municipal reform movement" is an important component in local politics.
The thrust of the arguments was for "good government," the ''pllblic interest," and a kind of Burkean
politician who could stand ahove the conflict and
who would reach the "right solution" to a problem
rather than pandering to "selfish interests." These
reforms were to come abotlt through the adoption
of such institutional changes as at-large elections,
city manager plans, and nonpartisanship. The importance here is that the i(leolo$y of the municipal
reform movement specifically rejected the "pluraliSt5' view of the decisional process; and this point
of view has been extremely popular in California
where this study was condlleted. This is reflected
in the fact that all of the cities in this study operate
under nonpartissnship,nearly all have at-large elections, and most have either citarmanagers or city
administrators. For a rexiew of the historv of the
municipal reform rnoxrement,see Samuel P. Haxrs,
"The Polities of Reform in Mllnicipal Government
in the Progressive Era,' PsrtcifiGCorthwest Quarterly, I;Y (October, l 964), 157-169. On the Progressisre Movement in California, see George E.
Mowrv. The Celifornia Progressives (Berkeler and
Los Angeles, 1951)?pp. 86-104.

Oneclassicstudy of politicalmotivationis Max

Weber's"Politicsas a Yocation."He distinguishe,
betweenthe men who are involared
in politicson a
marginalbasisaas an avocation,and the men who
either "live for"or "live off"politics,those whose
polities are a vocation or a "calling."From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, H. H. Gerth an(l
C. WVright
Mills, trans.and eds. (New York: OsfordUniversityPress,1958),pp. 77-128.In addition
to Weber'swork,this study reliesrea+rily
on three
recent studies of political motivation: James D.
Barber,TheLzwmakers:RecruitmentandAdaptQtion to Leyz.slative
Life (New Hanren,
Conn.:Y&le
IJniversityPress,1965);JosephA. Schlesinger,
Ambitionand Polttics:PoliticcllCareersin the United
States (Chicago:RandMcNally,1966);andJames
Q. Wilson,The AmfzteurDemocrat:ClubPolitics
in ThreeCities (Chicago:The Universityof ChicagoPress,1962).
Sehlesinger,ibid., fi. NVilsondistinguishesbetween"amateurs"
and"professionals"
withthe same
faetor of ambition; the office goals of the indi+idual. He argues that: {'The professional,for
whom politics primarilyhas extrinsicrewards,is
preoecupiedwith maintaininghis positionin party
5

1970

A THEORY

OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

This motivation, the desire for political advancement,should be related to an individual's

commitmentto politics in general,to his willingness to assumethe risks and to pay the costs of
furtheringhis career, and perhaps, as we shall
explore in this study, to the extent to which he
internalizesnormsand values congruentwith his
political aspirations.The decisionto seek political advancementrests on the politicalambitions
of the individual;and althoughit may be valuable to know what forces or experiencesin the
past of the individualproducepoliticalambition,
we suggestthat the presenceor absenceof ambition itself is the critical interveningfactor between an individual'spoliticalpast and his political future and between his initial political values and those of the professionalpolitician.
Two Levels of Political Commitment

Although the arguments presented here are

not restrictedto any singleset of politicalofficeholders, the data are based on a study of the
city councilmenof the San FranciscoBay Area.7
As part of that study, 435 city councilmenwere
interviewedfrom eighty-sevencities. The interview was quite lengthy and includedboth open
and closed questions. The tables in this paper
employ questionsfrom this interviewalong with
some additionaldata on the cities themselves.It
is important to remember that these respondents
all were officeholders at the time of the interview.

The decisions that "potential politicians"

make reflect their level of commitmentto politics relative to other alternatives. Politics is,
more than many other pursuits,a risky venture,
particularly for the officeholder.Although the
severity of the risk is differentfor differentpoliticians, the fact of political defeat is a fact that
many aspiringpoliticiansare forced to live with
continuously.Even if one has been relatively
successful for a time, many budding careers
have been endedwith a single defeat.
For those individualswho hold office,it is useful to distinguishbetweentwo differentlevels of
political commitment;commitmentto the position the individualcurrentlyholds (in this case,
the office of councilman)and the commitment
and elective offices. Winning is essential, although
sometimes electoral victory must be subordinated
to maintaining the organization." Ibid., 17.
'The larger project of which this analysis is a
part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National
Science Foundation under contract GS 496 and
GS 1898.

IN POLITICS

867

to seek other politicalor governmentalpositions.

The formerwill be referredto as positional commitment and it reflectsthe value the officeholder
places on the achievementand retention of the
position he currently holds. The latter will be
referredto as progressive commitment and it reflects the generalizedaspiration of the officeholderfor otherpoliticalor governmentaloffices.9
These two types of politicalcommitmentneed
not be highly correlated; that is to say, those
who are progressivelycommittedto politicsneed
not necessarily be high on positional commitment. With regardto the case at hand, a councilman may have run for the council, not because he was particularlyconcernedwith local
politics,but becausehe wishedto use the council
as a springboardfor other politicaloffices.Likewise, a councilmanwho places a high value on
his job as a councilmanmay see that as the limit
of his involvementin politics.
One method of measuring the commitment
of councilmento their officeand to the achievement of other officesis simply to ask them about
their commitment, i.e., about the value they
place on these offices.A second measure of an
individual'scommitmentto a given alternative
(or career) is the extent to which the individual
is willingto invest in that alternativerelativeto
other alternatives.Every position in a prospective careerhas a set of investmentcosts attached
to it. These costs might include the fulfillment of a skill requirementthrough prolonged
education,the cost of expensive equipment,or
other types of investments. The common denominatorof all investmentsis that they entail
some element of risk; and this risk is the cost
that will be sustained if the individualfails to
achieve benefits commensuratewith his investment.
Although it is impossibleto aggregateall the
investment costs for the individual,we do have
two factors which would seem to be relatedin a
rough fashion to the relative investments that
these councilmenhave made in politics. These
are the size of the city and the extent of the
competitionfor officein the city. City size is iraportant for two reasons:the largerthe city, the
larger will be the electorateto which the councilmanmust appeal and the more costly in general will be his campaign.Also, the larger the
city, the more time and effort will the duties of
the position of councilmanrequire. For both
reasons, an individual'sinvestment in polities
would appear to be associatedwith the size of
the politicalunit in which the individualserves.
'Schlesinger makes a similar distinction between
static and progressive goals in his ambition theory
of recruitment. Op. cit., 10.

868

THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

In -addition, those who run for office in cities in

which the elections are closely contested are
likely to have to campaign more vigorously for
their office and thereby pay higher costs. Thus,
the councilmen from the larger and more competitive cities are likely to have made a greater
investment in politics than those who come from
the smaller and less competitive cities,9 and this
variation in their investment in politics should
be related to their commitment to politics in
general.
Therefore, we are employing three estimates
of the councilman's commitment to politics: (1)
two surrogate measures for the initial investment of seeking the councilmanic position, the
size of the city and the average closeness of the
vote in city elections; (2) the councilman's expressed desire for the office of councilman; and
(3) the councilman's expressed intention of
seeking other political and governmental offices.
The first reflects the risk the councilman sustained in seeking the councilmanic position, the
second reflects his positional commitment, that
is to say, the value he places on his current position, while the third reflects his progressive commitment to politics.
II.

POLITICAL

COMMITMENT

SOCIALIZATION

AND

THE

OF POLITICIANS

What is it that sets the "politician" apart from

other participants in the political process? If we
were to conduct a study of professional politicians, we would probably locate a large number
of attitudes and values that are somewhat distinctive of politicians as a group.10 In this study
9Both the size of the city and the closeness of
the vote in elections are related to the cost of
running for office, the amount of time and effort
the councilman puts into his campaign, and some
of the psychic costs of, electoral contesting. Both
relationships are positive and strong; and these results can be seen in Gordon S. Black, The Arena of
Political Competition'*(Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill, forthcoming).
"0Although there are a large number of studies
that explore the attitudes and values of politicians
of various kinds and a large number of studies that
explore the attitudes and values of the general public, only a few studies actually compare the attitudes of politicians with the attitudes of the general
public, and these restrict themselves to attitudes
on public policy. See Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45-56;
Charles P. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The
Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this
REVIEW,60 (March, 1966), 66-72.

REVIEW

VOL.

64

we are concerned with two general attributes

that probably differentiate politicians as a group
from other individuals in the society.
The first involves the councilman's definition
of his role on the council and the manner in
which he believes others define that role. An officeholder need not see himself as a "politician,"
especially at the local level. He may define himself and his work on the council in strictly nonpolitical terms, and he may perceive that politics
is irrelevant to his activities on the council. At
the same time, he may perceive that the citizens
in his community do not define his role as that
of a politician. He may believe that they simply
see him as another citizen, or perhaps as a public servant, but not as a politician. In fact, many
local officeholders are probably loath to consider
themselves as "politicians" because of the negative connotations of that term for so many people.
One element, therefore, in the politician's socialization process is the extent to which the individual defines his activities as "political," or
sees himself as a "politician." But an individual's role is not entirely self-defined; a role is also
defined by the expectations of others." Of
equal importance, then, is the extent to which
the officeholder believes that the citizenry of his
community defines his role as "political." These
two sets of expectations form one dimension of
the politician's socialization process.
A second element in that process has to do
with what many students of American politics
believe to be the dominant skill in politics in this
country, a skill at bargaining. While we do not
know the actual extent to which these councilmen engage in bargaining, we do have information on their perception of the extent to which
bargaining occurs on the council and on their attitude toward bargaining in general. If a councilman is going to acquire some skill at bargaining, it seems safe to presume that he must begin
to see bargaining in a positive light. If a councilman engages in bargaining behavior on the
council, it also seems safe to presume that he
"1Robert K. Merton suggests that the occupant
of a given status, in this case the councilmanic position, has a role-set that is the ". . . complement of
role relationships which persons have by virtue of
occupying a particular social status." For the councilman, the public is a "significant other" with
which he interacts, and what we are examining
here is the councilman's perception of how the
public defines his role in the position he occupies
of councilman. Social Theory and Social Structure
(New York: The. Free Press of Glencoe, 1957),
pp. 368-370.

1970

A THEORY

OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

will perceive that bargaining occurs on the council.

These two elements probably precede the acquisition of skill in political bargaining. In a
sense, they are necessary-but not sufficient conditions for becoming a skilled bargainer. While
those who are favorably disposed toward bargaining may, of course, never acquire the skill to
bargain, they are much more likely to acquire
that skill than those who are antagonistic toward bargaining.
Returning to our earlier argument, then, we
should expect to find that the three components
of political commitment are related to the likelihood that an individual will internalize the political attitudes and role definitions outlined above.
We can summarize these hypotheses in the following set:

IN POLITICS

869

issue is the pattern that exists across all of the

variables. Each of these empirical propositions
examines a slightly different aspect of the
broader theoretical hypothesis that an individual's commitment to a given career, in this case
politics, is related to the extent to which the individual internalizes the norms and values associated with his profession.
The Role of the Councilman as a Politician

On the whole, the city councilmen in this

study do not see themselves as "politicians."
Over half of the councilmen (54%) define the
councilmanic position in strictly "nonpolitical"
terms, i.e., that the position requires no political
skills whatever. When asked how the citizens
viewed their position, only 10% of the councilmen indicated that the citizens in their communities tended to view them as "politicians." Of
Hypothesis Set I: The larger the city and the more the remainder, 62% believe that the citizens
intense the electoral competition in the city, (1) think of the councilman as a "public servant"
the more likely is the councilman to see himself as while 28% of the councilmen believe that the
a "politician," (2) the more likely is the council- citizens of their community simply think of
man to believe that the citizenry defines his job them as another "citizen."
as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the
These views, which tend to subscribe to the
councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on position that local politics is apolitical in characthe council, and (4) the more likely is the council- ter, disguise a considerable amount of variation
man to have a positive opinion about the impor- in the pattern of attitudes. As a part of our first
tance of bargaining.
hypothesis set, we suggested that the councilmen
in the "large" cities with "closely contested"
Hypothesis Set II: The higher the positional com- elections would be the most likely to define their
mitment of the councilman; (1) the more likely is own role in political terms, while the councilmen
the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) from the "small" and essentially non-competithe more likely is the councilman to believe that tive cities would be the least likely to think of
the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," themselves in political terms. In addition, the
(3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive effect of the two variables should be cumulative,
that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the that is to say, both variables should have a posimore likely is the councilman to have a positive tive effect on the likelihood that a councilman
opinion about the importance of bargaining.
will see himself as a "politician."
In order to test this proposition we divided
Hypothesis Set III: The more intense the progres- the cities into two categories,
those above 30,000
sive commitment of the councilman to seek other in population and those
below.12 The measure of
political or governmental offices; (1) the more competitiveness for the city was the closeness of
likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politi- the vote
among the various candidates for office.
cian," (2) the more likely is the councilman to be- This measure was obtained by
calculating the
lieve that the citizenry defines his job as that of a Mean Deviation of the vote among
all the can"politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman didates who received more than 15% of
the
to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council,
vote, and then the scores (Mean Deviations) for
and (4) -the more likely is the councilman to have
2The selection of 30,000 as a cutting point was
a positive opinion about the importanceof bargainan arbitrary decision on my part. I do not suggest
ing.
that this particular cutting point has any special
These three sets of hypotheses link the risk virtue that sets it above other cutting points in the
that councilmen sustained to obtain the council same general range of cities. My only real concern
seat, the commitment they have for their posi- was to choose a point that seemed large enough to
tion on the council, and their ambition for other separate out the cities in which the costs of running
offices to the various perceptions, attitudes, and for office were significant, but small enough that I
values discussed above. Although we will exam- had sufficient councilmen in the large cities for the
ine these variables two at a time, the important analysis.

870

THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

five elections in each city were averaged to obtain a measure of the closeness of the vote for
the city over a ten-year period.'3 The councilmen were then divided according to whether the
city in which they were elected was "high" or
"low" on the measure of the closeness of the
vote.'4 In Table 1 these two variables are correlated with the councilman's view or role definition of his job as a councilman.
TABLE

1. THE COUNCILMAN'S

OF HIS POSITION
FOR OFFICE

Average
Position's
Closeness
Requirements15 of Vote

%o
Politician or
political skill
Nonpolitical
Respondents
*

70
30
(73)

Low

Small Population
Average
Closeness
of Vote

COUNCILMAN'S

COMMUNITY

IN HIS

BY THE RISK OF RUNNING

FOR OFFICE

Citcizend
Cite
View of
Position

OF THE

PERCEPTION

IN HIS COMMUNITY

Large Population

Small Population

Average Closeness

Average Closeness
of Vote

of Vote
High

Low

(11)**

11
66
23
(122)

6
59
34*
(108)

High

Low

%
(12)* (85)

High

Low

46
54
(136)

32
68
(114)

32
Politician
Public Servant 56
11*
Citizen
Respondents
(62)

(73)

(230)

* Rounding error.
** Too few cases to analyze.
N

(250)

Too few cases to analyze.

13 These

2. THE

VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY THE CITIZENS

64

BY THE RISK OF RUNNING

IN HIS COMMUNITY

Large Population

High

ROLE DEFINITION

TABLE

VOL.

REVIEW

cities are all, in effect, multiple member

districts. There were, on the average, more than
two candidates for every office, and there were always more than two councilmanic positions at
stake. The Mean Deviation (or Absolute Deviation
as it is sometimes called) is computed by determining the sum of the absolute deviations from
the mean number of votes per candidate and then
dividing that sum by the number of deviations.
The Mean Deviation is a measure of dispersion
around the mean, but it differs from the standard
deviation in that it weighs every deviation the
same, rather than weighing extreme scores more
heavily. In almost all cases, the measure of the
closeness of the vote, the Mean Deviation, was
determined from five elections in each community,
and the average was taken and is used here.
"The cutting point was a score of 13% for the
average of the Mean Deviations. The range of the
variable was from 8%oto about 18%, but there were
four cities that never had contested elections. This
cutting point was chosen because it stood at the
middle of the range.
15 The question for this variable was: "Which of
the following would you say comes closest to your
conception of the requirements of the job of City
Councilman? The councilman then chooses between
the first indicated that the
four statements;
job was a "tough political job" that required the
councilman to be a "real politician," the second
suggested that the job required "some political
skills," the third indicated that the job required the

Among the "high risk" cities, i.e., those that are

"large" and closely contested, 70% of the councilmen define their job on the council as that of a
"politician," or at least they indicate that the
position requires political skills. Among the "low
risk" cities, however, only 32% of the councilmen
describe themselves as "politicians" or indicate
that their job requires political skills. Thus, there
is a 38% increase in the number of councilmen
who define their position in political terms as one
increases the risk attached to running for the
council. Although the small number of cases in one
column makes it impossible to determine whether
the two variables have a fully cumulative effect
across the whole table, an increase in the closeness of the vote among the small cities does show
a corresponding 14% increase in the percentage
of councilmen who define their position in political terms. The relationships here seem fairly
clear: the greater the investment risk in running
for the council, the more likely is the councilman
to define his position in political terms.
This same pattern is observed when the dependent variable is the councilman's perception
of how the citizens in his community view his
role as the councilman. (See Table 2.)16
"ability to get along with people," but was not
political, and the fourth statement suggested that
a City Councilman was a "public servant." In dividing the Councilmen, the Councilmen who chose
the first two statements were grouped together and
the Councilmen who selected the second two statements were grouped together.
"This question was: "In your opinion which of
the following best describes the way the people in
your community view the job of being a City
Councilman?" The responses were "a real politician," a "publicservant,"or "as just another citizen
and by no means a politician."

1970

A THEORY

OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

Among the "high risk" cities, 32% of the councilmen think that their constituents view them
as "politicians" while only 11% of the councilmen
believe that their constituents view them as "just
another citizen." In the "low risk" cities, the pattern is just the opposite; only 6% fall in the
"politician" category while 34% of the councilmen believe that the citizens in their community
view them simply as a "citizen." And, as in the
previous table, an increase in the closeness of the
vote, i.e., risk, is associated both with an increase
in the tendency of councilmen to answer "politician" and with a decrease in the tendency to respond with "citizen." The net increase across the
columns is 26% as opposed to a 38% increase in
the previous table.
One might argue that the positive relationships between size and competition, and the two
variables of role perception are a function of
some other factor besides investment risk. The
differential willingness to incur the risk of running for office reflects only one dimension of
commitment, and we need not rely on these two
variables by themselves.
The other two dimensions of commitment are,
in this case, the councilman's positional commitment and his progressive commitment to politics. As a measure of the councilman's commitment to his position on the council, they were
asked how much they wanted the office of City
councilman during their last campaign for the
council.'7 Their answers reflect the value the
councilmen placed on their office at the time of
their last election. In addition, the councilmen
were asked whether or not they intend to seek
other political or governmental offices, i.e., the
councilman's progressive commitment to politics. Councilmen were divided on this question
into those who may seek other offices and into
those who will not seek such offices.
The pattern of relationships in Table 3 is similar to that found in the previous two tables.
Among those councilmen who are both positionally and progressively committed to politics,
75% indicate that they think of themselves as
"politicians" or see their position as requiring
"political skills." Among the least committed
"Positional commitment was measured with a
scale item that asked the Councilman to estimate
his "desire and efforts to be elected to the Council
during (his) last campaign." Progressive commitment was determined by asking the Councilman
whether there were "any other political or governmental positions-local, state, or federal-which
you would like to seek?" Councilmenwho indicated
any interest in such positions were grouped together.

TABLE
HIS

871

IN POLITICS

3. THE COUNCILMAN'S

POSITION

BY

THE

OBTAIN

OTHER

OFFICES

CONTROLLING

ROLE DEFINITION

OF

DESIRE

TO

COUNCILMAN'S
OR

POLITICAL
BY

HIS

GOVERNMENTAL
ORIGINAL

DESIRE

FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

(Desire for Council Seat)
Position's
Requirements

Considerable
Desires
Prob.

%
Politician or
political skill
Nonpolitical
Respondents

75
25
(60)

Other Offices
No
N

%
52
48
(58)

Some and Little

Desires Other Offices
N
No
Prob.

No
(118)

47
53
(75)

%
38
62
(142)

(217)

group of councilmen, those who had only "some

or little" desire for their position and who do
not intend to seek other political or governmental offices, only 38% consider themselves to be
politicians or see their position as requiring political skills. Some 62% believe that the councilmanic position is entirely nonpolitical in character. The pattern across the table is also similar
to the previous two tables: both of the variables
of political commitment are related to the councilman's definition of this role, and the effect of
the two variables is cumulative. In Table 4 the
same pattern of effects occurs again.
Among those councilmen who are the most
committed to politics, those who placed a high
value on obtaining their present council seat and
who may seek other political and governmental
offices, 35% think that the citizens in their community define their role as that of a "politician"
while only 6% believe that the citizens look upon
the councilman simply as another "citizen." The
pattern is reversed among the least committed
councilmen with 6% choosing the "politician"
category and 28% selecting the "citizen" response.
Again, as before, the percentage of councilmen
who believe that the citizens in their communities
think of the councilman as a "politician" increases
as the councilman's commitment to politics increases, from 6% to 17%, to 20% and then 35%.
There is a corresponding decrease in the percentage who respond with "citizen."
The pattern of relationships in Table 4 is
common to all of the previous tables and the relationships are about the same in each case. In
each case, the percentage of the councilmen who
either se4 themselves in distinctly political terms
or who believe the citizens in their communities
see the councilman in these terms increases with
the level of commitment of the councilman. The
more extensive the councilman's political commitment, the more likely is he to begin to define

TABLE
VIEW

POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE AMERICAN

R72

CILMAN'S

DESIRE

ORIGINAL

TO OBTAIN

DESIRE

BY THE COUN-

OTHER

FOR HIS SEAT

OR

POLITICAL

HIS

BY

CONTROLLING

OFFICES

GOVERNMENTAL

OF THE

PERCEPTION

4. THE COUNCILMAN'S

OF HIS JOB HELD BY CITIZENS

ON THE COUNCIL

(Desire for Council Seat)

Perceived
Citizens'
View of
Position

Politician
Public Servant
Citizen
Respondents

Considerable
Some and Little
S
C
Desires Other Offices Desires Other Offices
N
N
Prob. No
Prob. No

35
60
6*
(52)

20
56
24
(55)

No
--

(107)

17
59
24
(63)

%
6
66
28
(129)

(192)

* Rounding error.

his role as that of the "politician."These findings tend to confirmall of the hypothesesstated
earlier.
Discussion
On the whole, the councilmen in the San
FranciscoBay Area do not think of themselves
as "politicians,"nor do they believe that the citizens in their communitiesthink of the councilman as a "politician."When offered a choice,
they prefer to think of themselves as "public
servants"or as just another"citizen,"and a majority of the councilmenspecificallyreject the
notion that the job of the councilmanmight either be politicalor call for politicalskills.
In general, Americans appear to hold curiously ambivalentviews about the "politician"in
this society. On the one hand, certain political
roles such as the President, Senator, or Mayor
are rated very favorably when comparedwith
other occupationalroles.18On the other hand,
the profession of politics is not so highly esteemed; in fact, a large segment of the public
apparentlythinks that politicsis necessarilycorrupt and dishonest.' One reason for this view
has been suggestedby Dahl and Lindblom:
18 See "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," Opinion News, 9 (September 1, 1949), 3-19;
Mapheus Smith, "An Empirical Scale of Prestige
Status of Occupations," American Sociological Review, 8 (1943), 185-192.
9H adley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, Public
Opinion 1935-46 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 584; Mitchell, op. cit.,
683-698; National Opinion Research Center, The
Public Looks at Politics and Politicians, Report
No. 20, March, 1944.

REVIEW

VOL.

64

. . . the role (of the politician) calls for actions

such as compromise, renunciation, face-saving of
oneself, which are morally ambiguousor even downright immoral to people with morally rigorous
standards.?
If the role of the "politician" is viewed as negatively as the evidence suggests, this may account for the majority of the councilmen in this
study who prefer to define their job and its activities as nonpolitical. The city council is relatively low on the hierarchy of political positions
in most instances, and these cities are not only
small, but they are nonpartisan as well. Nonpartisanship was intended as a means of insulating
the local polity from influences from the partisan political environment, and although that insulation appears to be less than complete in
most cases, the existence of nonpartisanship
probably does segregate the nonpartisan community somewhat from the surrounding partisan
polity.2' All three factors, the small size of most
of the communities, nonpartisanship, and the
nominal status of the councilmanic position
probably contribute to the recruitment of councilmen who have attitudes and values that are
less "political" than those found in partisan politics.22

At the same time, however, a sizable number

of the councilmen tend to deviate from the rest
of their colleagues and from the general public
in that they are willing to think of themselves as
"politicians." While the arguments above might
explain why most of the councilmen think of
their role as "nonpolitical," we must seek alternative explanations why a minority nevertheless
deviate from the general pattern. Our initial
hypotheses suggested that the factors of differential risk and political commitment may be related to the likelihood that councilmen will
Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit., p. 334.

See, for example, Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political
Quarterly, XII (June, 1959), 452-457; A. Clarke
Hagensick, "Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on a Nonpartisan Election System,"
Western Political Quarterly, XVII (March, 1964),
112-119; and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R.
Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics under the
Nonpartisan Ballot," this REVIEW, 53 (December,
1959), 1056-1066.
'Although we have no data with which to compare these councilmen to councilmen elected under
a partisansystem of elections, these councilmen are
quite antagonistic toward partisan politics at the
local level. Over 90%1o
believe that the community
would be worse off with partisan elections, and
nearly 90% believe that "better people" are elected
under nonpartisan elections.

1970

A THEORY

OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

adopt norms and values congruent with the

larger political environment, and the tables
tended to confirm these hypotheses. In each
case, the adoption of the "political"role was
positively and cumulativelyrelated to the risk
the councilmanwas willing to sustain to obtain
his seat, and to his positional and progressive
commitmentto politics.
In each table, however,a sizableproportionof
the councilmendo not conform to the general
pattern within the table. In the lowest risk cities
and among the least committed councilmen,
some of the respondentsstill think of their job
as "political." Conversely, some of the more
committed councilmenthink of themselves in
"apolitical terms." One plausible explanation
for this is that we are not tappingthe full range
either of the risk undertakenby officeholdersor
of the commitmentthat politicianshave to their
positions and to political careers.For this reason, the variables of risk and commitmentas
measured here should not be expected to account for all of the variance in the role definitions of the councilmen.This factor will be discussedlater.
III.

THE

COUNCILMAN

BARGAINING

AND

THE

PROCESS

Bargainingas a means of reaching decisions

pervadesthe Americanpoliticalsystem.It is the
modus operandi within virtually every major
political institution in the society such that the
very term "politics"is analogouswith bargaining for many people.Althoughthis prevalenceof
bargainingis seen by many students of politics
as one of the most importantpositive characteristics of this society, it is doubtfulthat the general public views bargainingin such a favorable
light. Bargainingappears to connote to many
people "behindthe back deals"in "smoke-filled
rooms"'or the pursuit of "private gain" at the
expenseof the "publicgood."
At the same time, however,the city councilman is called upon to reach decisions among
conflictingdemands; and although such policy
conflicts are limited in scope to the confinesof
his community,they may be just as important
to the participantsas the broaderissues of public policy that arise at the state and federallevels of government.And like other governmental
decision-makers,and perhaps unlike decisionmakersin business and industry, the city councilman can seldom act independentlyand authoritatively in reaching his decision. He is
forced, instead,to bargainand negotiate among
the conflictinginterestsin his community.
In order to determinethe councilman'sperception of and attitude toward the bargaining

TABLE

873

IN POLITICS

5. THE COUNCILMAN'S

WHETHER
COUNCIL

BARGAINING

BY HIS ATTITUDE
BARGAINING

PERCEPTION

OF

OCCURS ON THE
TOWARD

THE

PROCESS

Attitude Toward Bargaining

Amount of
Bargaining
Some
None
Respondents

Positive Negative
90
10
(145)

22
78
(179)

(324)

process, the councilmen were asked: "City councilmen sometimes talk about decisions in terms
of bargaining-do you think this goes on in your
Council?" This question was employed to determine whether or not the councilman perceived
that bargaining occurred on the council; while
his attitude toward bargaining was determined
by coding his responses to a series of probes
about the bargaining process. Table 5 shows the
relationship between these two items; the councilman's perception of whether bargaining occurs
on the council by his attitude toward bargaining
as a technique of decision-making.
The councilman's attitude toward bargaining
is clearly related to whether he perceives that
bargaining occurs on the council, and the extent
of the relationship is striking. Although alternative hypotheses are possible, it appears to be the
case that a councilman's attitude strongly affects
the manner in which he defines the behavior
that occurs on the council. If he believes that
bargaining has positive consequences for council
decision-making, he tends to define at least some
of the interaction that occurs as "bargaining behavior." If he does not hold this view, the councilman, who may be observing similar behavior
to those who hold a positive view of bargaining,
defines the behavior that occurs as something
other than bargaining.
What is more important for this analysis,
however, is whether the councilman's view of
the bargaining process, both his attitude toward
bargaining and his perception of the extent of
bargaining, is a function of the variables of risk
and political commitment. In Table 6, the councilman's evaluation of bargaining and his perception of the extent of bargaining on the council are correlated with the two variables of electoral risk, the size of his city and the closeness
of the vote in city elections.
In both parts of the table the pattern is almost precisely the same. In those cities with
substantial electoral risk, the large and competi-

874

THE AMERICAN
PERCEPTION

OF THE

ON THE COUNCIL

AND HIS

TABLE 6. THE COUNCILMAN'S

AMOUNT

OF BARGAINING

BY

THE

OF BARGAINING

AS TO THE DESIRABILITY

JUDGMENT

RISK

OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE

RUNNING

FOR

OFFICE

IN

HIS

TABLE
AMOUNT

Amount of
Bargaining

Small Population

Average
Closeness
of Vote

Average
Closeness
of Vote

High

Low

%o %
60
40
(90)

Evaluation

Positive
Negative
Respondents

%
37
63
(132)

(292)
N

of High

Low

High

Low

48
52
(114)

35
65
(98)

Bargaining

59
41
(71)

(15)*

* Too few cases to analyze.

(86)

(106)

THE
THE

BY

OTHER

PERCEPTION

OF THE

ON THE COUNCIL

AND HIS
OF

DESIRABILITY

COUNCILMAN'S
OR

POLITICAL
BY

CONTROLLING

HIS

THAT

DESIRE

TO

GOVERNMENTAL
ORIGINAL

DESiRE

(Desire for Council Seat)

Low

47
53
(161)

ABOUT

64

FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

High

(16)*

Some
None
Respondents

OF BARGAINING

BARGAINING
OFFICES

Large Population

VOL.

7. THE COUNCILMAN'S

JUDGMENT
OBTAIN

COMMUNITY

REVIEW

(212)

Amount of
Bargaining

Considerable

Some and Little

Desires Other Offices

Desires Other Offices

Prob. No
N

Prob.

No

68
32
(60)

52
48
(58)

55
45
(76)

37
63
(143)

Evaluation of High
Bargaining
%

Low
%

High
%

Low
%

54
46
(59)

37
63
(103)

Some
None
Respondents

Positive
Negative
Respondents

57
43
(51)

46
54
(46)

(118)
N

(97)

(219)
N

(162)

tive cities, about three-fifthsof the Councilmen two measures of the bargaining process.
In the first part of the table, the councilman's
have both a positive attitude towardbargaining
and believe that bargaining occurs on their perception of whether bargaining occurs on the
councils.At the other end of the continum,the Council is related to both measures of political
cities with the lowest electoralrisk, only about commitment. The more committed a councilone-third of the councilmenbelieve that bar- man is to his office, i.e., his positional commitgaining occurs on the counciland evaluate bar- ment, and the more committed the councilman
is to seek for other political or governmental ofgainingin positive terms. A second commonelement in both parts of the table is the increasein fices, i.e., his progressive commitment, the more
the perception and positive evaluation of bar- likely is he to believe that bargaining occurs in
gainingthat is associatedwith an increasein the the councilmanic decisional process in his comelectoral competitivenessof the city, in which munity.
The relationships in the second part of the tathe councilmanholds his office.Electoralcompeble,
however, deviate somewhat from the general
tition has the effect of increasingthe cost, and
that has been observed throughout this
pattern
the
risk, of seeking the councilmanic
thereby
The variable of progressive commitanalysis.
position; and those councilmenwho were elected
in the small cities that were competitiveseem to ment follows the predicted pattern: the more
have a more favorable view of the bargaining committed councilmen are more likely, on the
processthan those councilmenelectedin the less whole, to have a more positive orientation toward bargaining; but the variable of positional
competitivesmall communities.
The pattern of relationshipsfound in Table 6 commitment is only slightly related to the counis congruentwith the results of earlier tables. cilman's attitude toward bargaining. Although
The variablesof electoralrisk, i.e., city size and the relationship between the councilman's desire
for his position and his attitude toward bargainthe closenessof the vote in city elections,were
ing follows the predicted positive direction, the
related both to the role expectationsof councilmen and to their at itudes toward the bargain- strength of the association is very small and is
ing process in their communities.In each in- not significant at the .05 level.23 The argument
23 Tests of significanceand measuresof association
stance the councilmenwho are elected in high
risk cities are more likely to hold "politicized" have not been presented with the data for two reaattitudes about their role in the local political sons. All of the tables with the exception of this
process.But electoral risk only reflects one as- one show associations that are significant at the
pect of the politician'scommitmentto politics; .05 level with the Chi-square test of significance.
and in Table 7 the measuresof positional and For that reason, the presentations of significance
progressivecommitmentare correlatedwith the levels is redundant. Also, the argument rests on a

1970

A THEORY

OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

in this paper, however, is based on the results of

a number of hypotheses and a number of tables,
and a separate interpretation for this case does
not seem warranted, especially because the direction of the effect that does occur is positive,
even though it is small. At the same time, it does
suggest that positional commitment for the
councilmen may not be as strong a measure of
the councilman's generalized commitment to
politics as is the councilman's desire to seek
other political and governmental offices.
With the exception of the case just discussed,
the results of these and the earlier tables seem
to confirm the general hypothesis that the socialization of the officeholder is linked to his
generalized commitment to politics and to a political career of sorts. But before turning to a
discussion of these findings, there is an alternative hypothesis that requires examination.
IV.

SOCIAL

PLURALISM,

POLITICAL

RISK,

AND

COMMITMENT

In the analysis above, the variable of community size has been employed as a measure of
electoral risk. For most of the councilmen and
for most officeholders in general, the avenue of
advancement is via the electoral arena, and that
arena has a set of costs attached to it that al
potential officeholders must at some time pay.
These are fixed costs and they must, in varying
degrees, be paid by every candidate whether or
not the candidate wins. They constitute a risk
for the candidate in the sense that the candidate
will lose all or at least part of these costs if the
candidate loses. Although the risk of seeking
office will vary considerably from candidate to
candidate, depending upon a large number of individual factors, we have argued that these costs
will, in general, be an increasing function of the
size of the city and the degree of competition in
city elections.
At the same time, however, the variable of
city size reflects a second dimension of commuset of relationships,rather than a single relationship,
and the test of significance for all of the tables is
significant at less than .0001 level. Measures of
relationship such as the tau-beta or tau-c would be
misleading because we only have a limited range of
the independent variables of commitment. Obviously, political commitment extends down to people who have little or no interest in politics and
upward to people who make politics their exclusive
career. Restriction of the range of the independent
variable, as in this case, would naturally lower the
measures of relationship between the independent
variables and the dependent variables in the study.

IN POLITICS

875

nity life, the extent of the social pluralism in the

community. From Madison to the present, students of political life have recognized that the
size of a- political unit is highly related to the
diversity of groups, factions, and interests that
will be present in the unit. In this study the cities range from several that are less than 2500 in
population to the largest, San Jose, which is over
400,000 in population. We have employed 30,000
as the dividing point for dichotomizing the variable of city size, and although the size of a city
is not a perfect indicator of social pluralism, it
seems obvious that the cities over 30,000 are, on
the whole, considerably more socially pluralistic
than those under that size.24
The importance of social pluralism in this instance derives from its relationship to bargaining. Where a community is highly pluralistic
such that no one group, faction, or interest can
dominate a community, bargaining becomes a
necessity. Thus the size of a city may be related
to the councilman's perception of and attitude
toward bargaining through the intervening effect
of social pluralism and not because of the factor
of risk. In an empirical sense, both the variable
of social pluralism and the variable of risk are
multi-dimensional constructs, and it is not at
present possible to establish a single indicator
for each variable; and for that reason, it is not
possible to test which of the two variables, social
pluralism or risk, is responsible for the shift in
the councilman's attitudes toward the bargaining process.25
Although we cannot establish which of these
two factors associated with city size is producing
the effect on the councilman's orientation toward bargaining, it is possible to show that a
primary dimension of political commitment, the
councilman's desire to seek other political or
governmental offices, is related to the councilman's attitudes and orientations even when the
effects of size are controlled. In this manner the
4See, for empirical evidence, Jeffrey K. Hadden
and Edgar F. Borgatta, American Cities: Their Social Characteristics (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1965). They show correlative evidence that size is
strongly related to the social, demographic and
ecological diversity within a community.
' The cost factors in electoral politics cannot be
cumulated because it would involve making interpersonal comparisons of utility. The variables of
social pluralism cannot be aggregated because we
know of no theoretical method of integrating the
characteristicsof social pluralism.For these reasons,
the factor of size, which is roughly related to both
risk and social pluralism,is employed as a surrogate
measure that approximatesthe variables.

876
TABLE

THE AMERICAN
8. THE COUNCILMAN' S DEFINITION

OWN POSITION

S REQUIREMENTS

MAN S PERCEPTION
BY THE PEOPLE
CILMAN'S
ERNMENTAL

OF HIS

AND THE COUNCIL-

OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD

IN HIS COMMUNITY

DESIRE

POLITICAL SCIENCE

FOR OTHER

OFFICE

BY THE COUN-

POLITICAL

CONTROLLING

BY

OR GOVTHE

TABLE

9.

AMOUNT

THE COUNCILMAN'S
OF BARGAINING

JUDGMENT
OR

PERCEPTION

OF THE
AND HIS

DESIRE

GOVERNMENTAL

SIZE

64

ON THE COUNCIL

AS TO THE DESIRABILITY

BY THE COUNCILMAN'S
ICAL

VOL.

REVIEW

OF BARGAINING

FOR OTHER

OFFICES

POLIT-

CONTROLLING

BY THE SIZE OF HIS CITY

OF HIS COMMUNITY
Large Population

Large Population
Position's
Desires Other Offices
Requirements Prob. No
N

%
Politician or
political skill
Nonpolitical
Respondents

73
27
(52)

%g
63
37
(41)

(93)

Perceived
Desires Other Offices
N
Citizen's View Prob. No
of Position
%
%
Politician
Public servant
Citizen
Respondents

43
50
7
(42)

37
50
13
(38)

(80)

Small Population

Amount of
Bargaining

Desires Other Offices

N
Prob. No

46
54
(80)

33
67
(164)

Desires Other Offices

N
Prob. No
%
%
21
56
23
(73)

4
65
31
(149)

%
Some
None
Respondents

(244)

(222)

influence of political commitment on the politician's socialization process can be established irrespective of the effect of social pluralism.
Both of the independent variables, city size
and the councilman's ambition for other political
or governmental offices, are positively related to
the councilman's role orientations, but the important consideration here is that the councilman's progressive commitment to politics is related to his role orientations even when the variable to community size is controlled. Thus, even
if we cannot distinguish between the effect of city
size as a measure of social pluralism from the
effect of city size as a measure of electoral risk,
it is possible to show that one of the other measures of the councilman's commitment to politics
is related to his orientations toward his role as
officeholder. We can obtain additional evidence
for this finding by examining these two independent variables with regard to the councilman's
orientations toward bargaining.
In Table 9, as in the previous table, both of
the independent variables are related to the
councilman's orientations toward the bargaining
process. Thus when size is controlled, the councilman's ambition is still related to his perception of and attitude toward the bargaining process. In fact, of the 29% net shift across the
whole table with regard to the extent of perceived bargaining, about 19% is associated with
the councilman's ambitions while 11% is associated with the size of the community. Of the
26% net shift in the councilman's evaluation of

Desires
Prob.

Evaluation

66
34
(61)
Desires
of Prob.

Bargaining
Positive
Negative
Respondents

Other Offices
No
N

%
47
53
(51)

Small Population
Desires Other Offices
Prob.
No
N

(112)

Other Offices
No
N

54
46
(94)
Desires
Prob.

60
40
(50)

50
50
(44)

53
47
(76)

(94)

%
37
63
(190)

(284)

Other Offices
No
N

%
34
66
(135)

(211)

bargaining, about 15% is associated with the

councilman's ambition while 11% is associated
with the size of his city. This means that, on the
whole, the councilman's ambition is more
strongly related to his perception of and attitude
toward bargaining than is the variable of city
size.
V. CONCLUSIONS

The issue of political ambition, or political

commitment, has been with us for some time,
but we still know very little in any precise fashion about the relationship between the politician's ambitions and the values and attitudes ho
adopts towards the political process. Max
Weber, for example, examined the emergence of
the "professional politician" in a number of
countries, and he then proceeded to relate this
new type of political participant to a number of
aspects of the political system.26 More recently,
James D. Barber, in his study of the Connecticut legislature, explored the relationship between
the state legislator's involvement in the legislature and his attitudes and orientations toward
the political process.27 And James Q. Wilson has
' Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 83, 87.
Barber divides his respondents into four groups
on the basis of two variables; the legislator's willingness to return three or more times to the legislature and his activity as a legislator. Both of these
variables are similar in character to those of this
study in that both variables reflect the willingness
to invest in politics, and the findings of his study
are similar to the findings in this study. For ex2

1970

A THEORY

OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

suggested that the "amateurs" in the political

club movements of California, Chicago, and
New York have quite different styles, attitudes,
and values than the "professional politician" and
that these differences are, in part, a function of
the different motivations of "amateurs" as opposed to "professional" politicians.28
But perhaps more than anyone else, Joseph A.
Schlesinger has elevated the variable of political
ambition to a central place in the study of the
political process, particularly the recruitment
process. In his seminal study of the opportunity
structure in the United States, Schlesinger suggests:
To slight the role of ambition in politics, then, or
to treat it as a human failing to be suppressed,is to
miss the central function of ambition in political
systems. A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking
down as one unable to restrain ambitions. Representative government, above all, depends on a supply of men so driven; the desire for election and,
more important, for re-election becomes the electorate's restraint upon its public officials. No more
irresponsiblegovernment is imaginable than one of
high-minded men unconcernedfor the political futures.'
The findings of this study, although limited in
scope to city councilmen, suggest the politician's
ambition, or more broadly, his political commitment, are not only related to the recruitment of
politicians, but to the socialization of councilmen
as well. What we found in nearly every case was
that the more committed councilmen, those who
were willing to take the greatest risk and who
expressed the most desire to proceed to other
political or governmental offices, were also the
most likely to express attitudes and values appropriate for success in a decentralized and pluralistic political system.
One possible implication of these findings is
that both the recruitment process and the socialization process for politicians may be evaluated
ample, among the most committed of his subjects,
those willing to return to the legislature and who
have a high activity level (Law-makers), 55%
identify themselves as "politicians" and 82% have
engaged in major negotiations. Among the least
committed group, those not willing to return three
times and low on legislative activity (reluctants),
only 33% identify themselves as "politicians" and
only 47% have engaged in major negotiations. Op.
cit., pp. 25-26, and 166-167.
2 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 1-31.
29 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 2.

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in light of the utility calculus of the politician.30

When one examines the ambitions and political
commitment of prospective politicians, we are in
fact examining the rational calculus that the political actor makes with respect to a given set of
alternatives. To say that a man is politically
ambitious is to say that he places a high value
on the alternatives within a sequence of political
roles. In this case, we asked the councilmen to
evaluate both their current position and the
next position they may seek. In addition, we
constructed a rough estimate of the amount of
risk that they had to sustain in order to obtain
the councilmanic position that they held at the
time of the study. All of these elements are components of the utility calculus.
What is less obvious, however, is that attitudes
and values may be also a part of the rational
actor's utility calculus. Suppose, for example,
that some attitudes will increase the probability
of success in a given career sequence while other
attitudes might have the converse effect; they
might make it much more difficult to achieve
success in a given career. The rational actor, if
his desire is to move up the career sequence, is
likely to adopt those attitudes which increase his
probability of success in that career, unless of
course, the set of attitudes in question is very
repugnant to him such that adopting them
would involve a very high cost. But if he refuses
to adopt the attitudes, he may well have to pay
the cost of being less successful than he might
otherwise wish. In either instance the net result
would seem to be the same, and an examination
of higher levels in any career line should show
increasingly greater homogeneity of attitudes
and values, either because individuals adopted
the attitudes in order to be a success or because
the individuals who refused to conform were
screened out at lower levels in the career line.
The findings of this study seem to conform to
such an interpretation. On the whole, the more
ambitious councilmen, those willing to sustain a
substantial electoral risk and who also wish to
go on to other offices, tend to have role orientations and attitudes towards bargaining that are
congruent with the demands of the larger political environment. They are the potentially "professional" politicians.
In one sense, these results are more significant
than the data seems to suggest. The reason for
30Running for office is a form of political participation. For an analysis of voting behavior using
utility analysis, see William H. Riker and Peter C.
Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting,"
American Political Science Review, 62 (March,
1968), 25-42.

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this is that the empirical indicators of risk and

political commitment only measure a limited
range of these variables. This study is of city
councilmen, and, as such, the distribution of respondents only cover a small range of either risk
or commitment. Neither the uncommitted individual nor the highly committed, professional
politician is found among our subjects. Because
the distribution of respondents only covers a
small range of the independent variables, we
should only be able to predict a portion of the
attitudinal distribution of political activists. If
the subjects of the study had shown a greater
range of political commitment, we should have
found an even stronger set of relationships than
we found in the tables.
The findings here, however, are limited and
they will not permit an examination of some of
the broader issues in the recruitment and socialization of politicians. Our data strongly sug-

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gest that the ambitions of politicians are related

to at least some of the attitudes and orientations
that politicians have toward the political process. Apparently, the city councilmen in the
study are involved in the process of professionalization, and the more ambitious of the councilmen are learning a set of orientations and attitudes that will aid them in their pursuit of future political goals. Although it is not possible
with this data to show whether they are recruited because they had these attitudes originally or whether they were socialized into these
attitudes after they came on the council, we did
confirm our hypotheses that the presence of "politicized" attitudes is a function of the measures
of electoral risk and political commitment. The
consistency of the findings suggest that the relationship between the ambitions of politicians
and the process of professionalization is both
positive and strong.