Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
401
402
[2012] 2 MLRH
[2012] 2 MLRH
403
[3] The plaintiff prays for the following reliefs against DW1 and DW2:
(i) An injunction to restrain the defendant whether by himself, his
agents or servants or otherwise whosoever from entering any part
of the land and from stealing, taking or harvesting any fresh oil
palm fruits or Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) from the land;
(ii) General damages for trespass.
(iii) Special damages for the fresh oil palm fruits or FFB stolen or
harvested from the land;
(iv) Exemplary damages in respect of for trespass and stealing or
wrongful harvesting of fresh oil palm fruits or FFB from the land;
(v) Interest on damages at 4% per annum on such damages from the
date of the writ till the date of full payment against the defendant;
(vi) Costs to be taxed unless agreed.
B. Defendants Defence And Counterclaim
[4] DW1 and DW2 respectively filed a defence and counterclaim (Encl 26)
and further filed amended defence and counterclaim (Encl 50 and 53) denying
trespasses and asserted their alleged Native Customary Rights (NCR) over the
land.
[5] The amended counterclaim was for the following remedies and relief:
(i) a declaration that the defendant and/or the residents of the
long houses (named as Rumah Banyang, Rumah Tumpa,
Rumah Nyipa and Rumah Dungat and/or Rumah Madel) have
customary rights in or over the said land or Lot 22 Kemena Land
District or parts thereof;
(ii) alternatively, a declaration that the defendant and the residents of
the aforesaid longhouses are in lawful occupation or possession
of the said land or Lot 22 Kemena Land District or parts thereof;
(iii) a declaration that the issuance of the said provisional lease over
the said land or Lot 22 Kemena Land District was/is null and
void ab initio for violation of s 15(1) of the Sarawak Land Code
Cap 81 or art 13(1) of the Federal Constitution;
(iv) alternatively, the said provisional lease was issued subject to the
native customary rights of the defendant and the residents of the
aforesaid longhouses in or over the said land or Lot 22 Kemena
Land District or parts thereof;
404
[2012] 2 MLRH
[2012] 2 MLRH
405
406
[2012] 2 MLRH
[12] In Subramaniam a/l Ns Dhurai v. Sandrakasan a/l Retnasamy & Ors [2005]
3 CLJ 539, the Court of Appeal at p 548 g held by Gopal Sri Ram JCA, as he
then was:
The title of a registered proprietor is indefeasible and good against the whole
world.
[13] The land law in Sarawak is based on the Torrens system of registered title.
It follows that the plaintiff will get the title immediately by registration. In
Awang Osen Bin Awang Mat v. Norhazlena Bte Abdurani & Ors [2004] 4 MLJ 238,
Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahim JC, (as he then was) had held at para 24:
The law therefore is well settled; that the registration conferred on
the registered proprietor an indefeasibility of title. Insofar as it relates
to the Sarawak Land Code it is manifested in s 132. Though the
indefeasibility of title may be challenged on the ground of fraud, such
ground cannot be used to defeat a title acquired by a registered bona
fide purchaser and for value. This is my view and is plain from the
reading of s 134(2) which states as follows:
Nothing in this code shall be construed as to place in doubt the title of
any person who is a purchaser in good faith and for value of any interest,
and who is registered as the proprietor of such interest, on the ground that
the registered proprietor through or under whom he claim was registered
as proprietor through fraud or error, whether such fraud or error consisted
in a misdescription of the land or otherwise.
[14] In Ng Yee Fong & Anor v. Ew Talalla [1986] 1 MLJ 25, Mohamed Azmi SCJ
in the then Supreme Court at pp 25-26 said:
As a matter of law, it cannot be disputed that a proprietor who establishes a
proprietary right is ex debito justitiae entitled to an injunction unless it can be
said against him that he has raised such an equity that it is no longer open to
him to assert his legal or proprietary title. Further as stated at p 30 in Kerr on
Injunctions (6th edition):
After the establishment of his legal right and of the fact of its violation,
a plaintiff is in general entitled as of course to a perpetual injunction to
prevent the recurrence of the wrong unless there be something special in
the circumstances of the case, such as laches or where the interference
with the plaintiff s right is trivial.
There is no issue here for the defendants to challenge the plaintiff s registration
as proprietor of the land. The plaintiff has a cause of action against any party
that trespassed on their land.
B. Native Customary Rights: Res Judicata
[15] Next, learned counsel for the defendants submit that the defendants as
set out in paras 2 to 4 of their respective amended defence and counterclaim
[2012] 2 MLRH
407
(encl 70: Bundle of Pleadings) are claiming Native Customary Rights (NCR)
over the land for themselves and the longhouses named.
[16] Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that this is not really an issue
at all as the defendants had failed to adduce any evidence to challenge the
plaintiffs title to the land or establish such NCR over the land. In any event
the court had granted earlier orders in Originating Summons No: 24-67-2005
(BTU) against the defendants and the other longhouses named: See exh PB(25)
and PB(26) at PB pp 33-40 and 41-47.
[17] Learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the evidence from DW1
and DW2 clearly admitted that they came from Sebauh District of Rumah
Sengok, Sungai Binyo, Pandan, 97000 Bintulu, Sarawak, which is out of the
area in Bintulu District where the land is located; and that they could not in any
way be in occupation or continuous and unbroken occupation or enjoyment of
any state land to create NCR over the land or any part thereof prior to 1st
January 1958: See Superintendent of Lands & Surveys, Bintulu v. Nor Anak Nyawai
& Ors and Another Appeal [2005] 3 CLJ 555. With the earlier orders of the court
exh PB(25) and PB(26), res judicata has set in and they cannot reopen the issue
in this later case.
[18] The court agrees with the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff
that it is plain and obvious that the defendants have no defence by setting
up NCR rights against the two actions against them by the plaintiff s as the
registered owner.
[19] The defendants, DW1 was born after 1958 and DW1 was only four years
old at the material time, too young for him to be able personally by his own
right to establish any NCR over the land.
[20] In the courts view DW3 and DW4, the defendants two witnesses did not
advance any credible evidence to support their NCR claim over the land. The
noticeable lack of support and absence of witnesses from the residents of the
long houses of Rumah Banyang, Rumah Tumpa, Rumah Nyipa and Rumah
Dungat and/or Rumah Madel (the said longhouses) is telling on the credibility
of the defendants claim for NCR over the land. There is ground here also
for the court to invoke adverse inference under s 114(g) of the Evidence Act
1950 by the failure to call such witnesses from the said longhouses, they being
purported beneficiaries of their counterclaim on their behalf for NCR over the
land. The defendants have not only failed to establish the creation of NCR
rights by their evidence, res judicata has also set in by virtue of the earlier orders
of the court, (exh PB(25) and PB(26)) against their claim for NCR rights over
the land.
[21] In consequence, the counterclaim against the plaintiff to set up NCR over
the land is also dismissed with costs to the plaintiff.
408
[2012] 2 MLRH
C. Trespass
Plaintiffs Case
[22] The plaintiff had adduced the following evidence of the acts of trespass
and taking of the FFB by the defendants which does not appear to be seriously
challenged as to their veracity by the defendants as follows:
1) PW1 (Executive director of the plaintiff): (Exh P1)
PW1 adduced the evidence of the facts which were not challenged
or disputed.
a) In 2007, the defendants who were sued with others in
Originating Summons No: 24-67-2005 (BTU) started
harvesting the FFB from the land and hence the instant two
actions were filed against the two defendants who were caught
and identified.
b) The defendants repeatedly trespassed or entered into the land
and harvested and removed unquantifiable amount of FFB
from the land from 16 June 2006 to 7 March 2008. This is
evidenced by the police reports tendered as (see exh PB(3),
PB(4), PB(5), PB(6), PB(7), PB(8), PB(10), PB(12), PB(19) and
PB(20) at PB pp [5-10]; [15], [19], [26], [27]).
c) The defendants were given numerous warnings about their
illegal harvest of FFB from the land of the plaintiff but of
no avail. They still entered into the land and stole FFB from
the plaintiff. They refused and neglected to stop entering into
the land or to stop the illegal harvest of FFB. The defendants
vehicles bearing registration numbers QME 5369 (DW1) and
QSB 1996 (connected to DW2) and were identified as the
mean of transport of the people into and for wrongfully taking
the FFB from the plaintiff (exhPB (16) and PB (14)).
2) PW2 (Estate Site Supervisor): (Exh P2)
PW2 knew the defendants personally who came very far away
from the land, which is outside the Bintulu District.
PW2 had in a few occasions seen the defendants using their
vehicles to carry away FFB which were stolen from the plaintiff.
He had taken photographs showing the defendants and a few other
people illegally harvesting FFB from the land: see 11 copies of
photographs taken by him marked as exh PB(9)(1-11) at PB
pp (11) to (14).
[2012] 2 MLRH
409
410
[2012] 2 MLRH
See also Karuppannan Chellapan v. Batakrishnen Subban [1994] 4 CLJ 479 FC;
Chen Yue Kiew v. Angkasamas Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 781 CA.
[2012] 2 MLRH
411
[31] The court finds on a balance of probability that the plaintiff had adduced
sufficient evidences to prove that the defendants had trespassed onto their land
for the purpose of illegally harvesting FFB from the land.
[32] In respect of the right to an injunction, in Chen Yue Kiew v. Angkasamas Sdn
Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 781. Arifin Zakaria JCA (as he then was) at pp 787i-789b
held:
... In the present case the claim by the respondent is premised on trespass
simpliciter by the appellant on the respondents land or the air-space above it
and that alone in our view is sufficient ground for the respondent to maintain
an action for trespass against the appellant. For support we would refer to the
decision of the Federal Court in Ng Yee Fong & Anor v. EW Talalla [1986] 1
MLJ 25, where Mohamed Azmi SCJ in delivering the judgment of the court
stated thus:
As a matter of law, it cannot be disputed that a proprietor who establishes
a proprietary right is ex debito justitiae entitled to an injunction unless
it can be said against him that he has raised such an equity that it is no
longer open to him to assert his legal or proprietary title. Further as
stated at p 30 in Kerr on Injunction (6th edition).
After the establishment of his legal right and of the fact of its
violation, a plaintiff is in general entitled as of course to a perpetual
injunction to prevent the recurrence of the wrong unless there can
be something special in the circumstances of the case, such as laches
or where the interference with the plaintiffs right is trivial.
The onus is therefore on the appellants to establish that there is something
special in the circumstances of the present case why the learned trial judge
ought not to have granted the injunction in favour of the respondent.
[33] Learned counsel for the defendants had submitted that the plaintiff having
been granted an injunction in Originating Summons No: 24-67-2005 (BTU) on
28 August 2008 (exh PB(25) and PB(26)) against the defendants, the plaintiff
should not be allowed to be granted another Court Injunction order.
[34] Learned counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that the complaints of
trespass stated in the pleadings are different acts or trespasses from those stated
in Originating Summons No: 24-67-2005 (BTU). A cause of action accrues
every time where there is a trespass.
[35] The court agrees with the submission of the learned counsel for the
plaintiff because according to the case of MBF Property Services Sdn Bhd v.
Madihill Development Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1998] 4 CLJ 136, Abdul Malik Ishak J.,
(as he then was), at p 150d-e had stated:
The plaintiff knew that they had trespassed and in law every continuance
of a trespass is a fresh trespass and in respect of which a new cause of action
arises from day to day so long as the trespass continues and persists. This is in
fact actually happening in the present case. Up to this very day, the trespass by
the plaintiff is continuing and it will remain unabated.
412
[2012] 2 MLRH
[36] Further the court will also consider when reading the earlier injuncting
orders (exh PB(25) and PB(26)) and the present orders prayed for that they
do materially differ in that there is now reference to injuncting the activity of
harvesting of FFB which was not clearly spelt out in the earlier orders.
[37] The court finds that with the dismissal of the defendants counterclaim
with costs, the plaintiff has also established its case of trespass of its land
against the defendants and would allow its claim for the injunction and trespass
with costs.
D. Assessment of Damages
[38] The court notes that the plaintiff claims for special damages, general
damages and exemplary damages in both suits.
1. Special damages
The paintiff has recovered a total of 11,190.00 kilograms of
FFB (See pp 28 and 30) or 11.19 metric tons from the defendants
which was the product of trespass on the land and the illegal
harvesting by the plaintiff in violation of the legal rights of the
plaintiff as the registered proprietor of the land.
2. General damages
3. Exemplary damages
[2012] 2 MLRH
413
[40] Further in Segar Restu (M) Sdn Bhd v. Wong Kai Chuan & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ
530, Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) at p 536 added:
The plaintiff in trespass is entitled even though he has sustained no actual
loss, to recover damages. Thus, where the defendants used the plaintiff s land
as a means of access to his accretion land owned under a licence without the
plaintiff s permission, exemplary damages was awarded to the plaintiff (Ooi
York Choo v. Lim Song Foundry [1963] MLJ 87 and Janaki & Anor v. Cheok Chuan
Seng & Ors [1973] 2 MLJ 96). The plaintiff should not throw these figures at
the court and pray for an order in terms. They must specifically prove them
(Zainal Abidin bin Sulaiman & Ors v. Hoya Holdings Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 31).
[41] The court would assess the exemplary damages in the following manner:
(1) The total value of the recovered FFB is RM9,850.55.
(2) Assuming this is divided in 2 that will give a value of RM 4,925.00
(3) Multiplying this value of RM4,925.00 x 10 will give a sum of
RM49,250.00. The multiplier of 10 is commonly used in criminal
proceedings by statute on the value of the subject matter or fruit
of the criminal activity to arrive at the sum of a mandatory fine.
The court of course notes that this is not a criminal proceeding or
414
[2012] 2 MLRH
[2012] 2 MLRH
415