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TESP10701R0/KSB February 26, 2013

TESP10701R0/KSB

February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. SCOPE 2. INTRODUCTION 3.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

SCOPE

2.

INTRODUCTION

3.

SYSTEM DESIGN

3.1 General System Design

3.2 System Architecture

3.3 Ethernet Topology

4.

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 General SAS Functionality

4.2 Bay Level Functions

4.3 System/Station Level Functions

5.

PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Message Performance

5.2 System Performance

6

RELIABILITY AND SYSTEM DESIGN

6.1 Reliability Aspects

6.2 General Design Requirements

7.

IEC 61850 AND IEC 62439-1 COMMUNICATION PROFILE

7.1 Introduction Related to IEC 61850

7.2 Typical Architecture and Required Communication Services Related to IEC 61850

8.

CONFIGURATION TOOLS/SERVICE AND SUPPORT SYSTEM

9.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Compliance With Standards

9.2 Vendor’s/SOLUTION PROVIDER’S experience and Proposal for the SAS

10.

PROJECT EXECUTION

10.1 Engineering

10.2 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)

10.3 SAT (Site Acceptance Test)/Pre-commissioning and Commissioning

10.4 Design and Operating Requirements

10.5 Services, After Sales and Maintenance

11.

DOCUMENTATION

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 12. CYBER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 13. KEMA CERTIFICATION 14.

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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

12. CYBER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

13. KEMA CERTIFICATION

14. ADDITIONAL SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM

15. DRAWINGS

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 1.0 SCOPE This Transmission Engineering Standard (TES)

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

1.0

SCOPE

This Transmission Engineering Standard (TES) specifies Substation Automation System (SAS) required for 110kV through 380kV system voltage for the transmission system of National Grid, Saudi Arabia.

2.0

INTRODUCTION

2.1 The Substation Automation System (SAS) shall be installed to monitor, control and protect all the substation equipment connected to SAS. Monitoring and control shall be from the remote control center (Power Control Center/SCADA Master Stations) as well through local means within the substation (e.g. Bay Oriented Local Control with Mimic, Local HMI contained in the Control IED and Station HMI).

The Substation Automation System (SAS) comprises full station and bay protection as well as control, monitoring and communication functions and provides all functions required for the safe and reliable operation of the substation. It shall enable local station control via a PC by means of a human machine interface (HMI) and control software package, which shall contain an extensive range of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) functions. It shall include Communications Gateway, station bus, inter-bay bus, time synchronization system and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) for bay control & protection.

The attached diagram entitled, “Substation Automation System Diagram (Conceptual)”, Fig 07-01, is conceptual drawings for substation SAS configuration.

The Communications Gateway shall enable and secure the information flow with remote Power Control Center and other remote Master Stations. Besides performing protocol conversion, the Communications Gateway will perform Network/Port Address Translation from internal SAS IP/Port addresses to external IP/Port addresses in integrated units/computers.

The station bus shall provide the interconnections between the station level subsystems (Front End/Station computer, Operator’s Workstation, Engineer’s Workstation, printer etc.). The inter-bay bus shall provide independent station-to-bay and bay-to-bay data exchange. The bay level intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) for protection and control shall provide the direct connection to the switchgear without the need of interposing components and perform control, protection, and monitoring functions.

The SAS control and monitoring system (SCMS) shall implement a network redundancy based on IEC62439-3 PRP 1 (Parallel Redundancy Protocol) as shown in the attached Substation Automation System Diagram (Conceptual)”, Drawing Fig 07-01, and as further explained in this Standard. Implementation of IEC62439-3 PRP 1 (Parallel Redundancy Protocol) applies to both the station LAN and bay LAN at all voltage levels.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 2.2 All the SAS components shall comply with latest

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2.2 All the SAS components shall comply with latest revision of SEC standards wherever applicable.

2.3 Summary of Main Functional Parts of SAS

2.3.1

As a summary, the SAS shall contain (but may not be limited) to the following main functional parts:

2.3.2

Bay Control Intelligent Electronic Devices (Control IEDs) for control and monitoring.

2.3.3

Bay Protection Intelligent Electronic Devices (Protection IEDs) for the internal substation's protection applications as well as for protection of external equipment connected to the substation.

2.3.4

Unless otherwise specified, combined control/protection IEDs with the control IED function and protection IED function (for each item of switchgear to be controlled) may be combined into one unit. Combined control/protection IEDs are to be used at the medium voltage levels only (34.5 kV and below).

2.3.5

Redundant Managed hardened Ethernet switches providing managed Ethernet Local Area Networks communications infrastructure.

2.3.6

Supporting Power Supply equipment such as inverters UPS, etc.

2.3.7

Peripheral equipment like printers, display units, key boards, Mouse, KVM switches, etc.

2.3.8

Station Human Machine Interface (Station HMI)/ Station with process database. The Station HMI shall contain as minimum: fully redundant two (2) Front End/ Station Computers, fully redundant two (2) Operator's Workstation, fully redundant one (1) Engineering Workstation, and related applications software, operating systems and firmware to support full Station HMI operation.

2.3.9

Separate Redundant Communications Gateway for remote supervisory control via SCADA Master Station(s) and for interconnecting external SOE Master Stations. One side of each Communications Gateway shall face the internal SAS Inter-bay bus using IEC 61850 and the other side of each Communications Gateway shall face the external SCADA and SOE Master Stations which will communicate using IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 608705-104 protocols, and support IEC 61850 communication with SCADA master stations for future use.

2.3.9

Redundant GPS Receivers (e.g. Master Clock).

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 2.3.10 Redundant standalone Firewalls to provide one of the

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2.3.10 Redundant standalone Firewalls to provide one of the means for cyber security for the SAS.

2.3.11 Quantities of VF Modems to support the IEC-101 interconnections between the SCADA Master Stations and the redundant Communications Gateways.

2.3.12 Collection of the relevant data concerning the substation and distribution of the data where needed.

2.3.13 Data exchange between the different system components via the inter-bay bus (for data exchange between bay level IEDs) and other communications buses (such as station bus for interconnecting the station level subsystems:

Operator’s Workstations, Engineering Workstation, Front End Computers, and Printers etc).

2.3.14 Bay-oriented local control panels with mimic diagram. One of the functions of the Bay-Oriented local control panels with mimic diagram is to provide emergency local operation of related Bay switchgear in the event of failure and/or disabling of the Bay Control IED(s).

2.3.15 Local Control Cubicles (LCC’s) for all High Voltage (above the medium voltage (34.5 kV and below) level) switchgear which will be installed in the related High Voltage GIS Switchgear Rooms which will house/contain the Control IED’s, Bay-oriented local control panels with Mimic Diagram and required Annunciator Panels.

2.3.16 For the Medium Voltage level (34.5 kV voltage and below), unless otherwise specified differently in other sections/appendices of the main PTS, combined Control/Protection IED’s which are to be mounted/installed in the Low Voltage Compartments of the Metal Clad Medium Voltage Switchgear as specified in latest revision of 32-TMSS-01 (for Metal Clad Switchgear) and as specified in latest revision of 32-TMSS-03,( Metal Clad GIS Switchgear), and with these IED’s fully integrated into this Metal Clad Switchgear by the SAS Solution provider /Sub Solution provider .

2.3.17 SAS Cubicles/Panels which will contain SAS equipment which includes, computers, Ethernet switches, firewalls/routers, VF modems, maintenance displays, common alarm panels and related annunciators, terminal blocks, MCB’s, internal cabling/wiring, etc.

2.3.18 Protection Cubicles/Panels which will contain Protection IED’s. terminal blocks, physical switches, MCB’s, auxiliary relays, internal cabling/wiring, etc.

2.3.19 All cabling/wiring/terminations required to provide for a fully functional SAS installation to be provided/installed by the SAS Solution provider and interconnected between SAS equipment as well as any SAS equipment and external Communications/WAN/LAN equipment. The only exception to this

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 cabling/wiring requirement will be the cabling/wiring between the

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cabling/wiring requirement will be the cabling/wiring between the Control IED’s and external switchgear, the Protection IED’s and external switchgear, and thecombined Control/Protection IED’s and the external switchgear which can be run and terminated at the switchgear end by the Substation Solution Provider . (however for the IED to switchgear cable connections at the IED end and this cable termination shall be performed by the SAS Solution provider).

2.3.20 Other devices, equipment and software (not mentioned above) which will provide for a fully integrated and operational SAS at the substation.

2.4 Definition of Terms

2.4.1 HMI Human Machine Interface: Display screen, either part of an IED or as a stand-alone device, presenting relevant data in a logical format, with which the user interacts. An HMI will typically present windows, icons, menus, pointers, and may include a keypad to enable user access and interaction.

2.4.2 IED Intelligent Electronic Device: Any device incorporating one or more processors, with the capability to receive or send, data/control from, or to an external source, for example electronic multifunction meters, digital relays, controllers. Device capable of executing the behavior of one, or more, specified logical nodes in a particular context and delimited by its interfaces. Also see definitions relating to Protection IED, and Control IED.

2.4.3 Bay

A substation consists of closely connected sub parts with some common

functionality. Examples are the switchgear between an incoming or outgoing line, and the bus bar, the bus coupler with its circuit breaker and related

isolators and earthing switches, the transformer with its related switchgear between the two bus bars representing the two voltage levels. The bay concept may be applied to 1 1/2 breaker and double bus substation arrangements by grouping the primary circuit breakers and associated equipment into a virtual bay. These bays comprise a power system subset to

be protected, for example a transformer of a line end, and the control of its

switchgear that has some common restrictions such as mutual interlocking or well-defined operation sequences. The identification of such subparts is important for maintenance purposes (what parts may be switched off at the same time with minimum impact on the rest of the substation) or for extension plans (what has to be added if a new line is to be linked in). These subparts are called 'bay' and may be managed by devices with the generic name 'bay controller' and have protection systems called 'bay protection'. The bay level represents an additional control level below the overall station level.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 2.4.4 Bay Level Functions Functions that use mainly the

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2.4.4 Bay Level Functions

Functions that use mainly the data of one bay and act mainly on the primary equipment of that bay. Bay level functions communicate via logical interface 3 within the bay level and via logical interfaces 4 and 5 to the process level, i.e. with any kind of remote input/output or with intelligent sensors and actuators. Control and data acquisition functions related to the bay level functions may be performed at the bay level Control IED(s)/Local

HMI(s)/Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram, or indirectly through the station HMI interface or the SCADA Master Station(s). Protection functions related to the bay level functions are performed through the bay level Protection IED(s) dedicated specifically for protective relaying function(s).

2.4.5 Station Level Functions Functions applying to the whole substation. There are two classes of station level functions i.e. process related station level functions and interface related station level functions. Control and data acquisition functions which are related to the station level functions for each substation indicated in Section 2.1 and which may include control and data acquisition from the local HMI, Station HMI, and with the SCADA Master Station(s) providing external (outside the substation) control and data acquisition capabilities.

2.4.6 Process:

The scheme which contains the actual conventional switchgear which includes Breakers, Disconnect Switches, Tap Changers, Instrument transformers and all instrumentation like Gas Density Monitors, etc.

2.4.7 Process Level Functions All functions interfacing to the process, i.e. binary and analogue input/output functions for example data acquisition (including sampling) and the issuing of commands. These functions communicate via the logical interfaces 4 and 5 to the bay level.

2.4.8 Process Related Station Level functions Use data from more than one bay, or from each whole substation and act on the primary equipment of more than one bay, or on the primary equipment of each whole substation. Examples of such functions are: station wide interlocking, automatic sequencers, and bus bar protection. These functions communicate mainly via logical node 8.

2.4.9 Station HMI The set of computers/workstations and other equipment inside each substation where control, data acquisition, monitoring, configuration of SAS equipment and other SAS functions on a station level takes place.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 2.4.10 Front End Computers/Station Computers The set of computers

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2.4.10 Front End Computers/Station Computers The set of computers where data gets directly transferred between the IEDs (for recording/data acquisition and control functionality), and where interfaces are provided for the Operator's and Engineering Workstations.

2.4.11 Local HMI The set of equipment inside each substation where control, data acquisition, alarms, configuration of SAS equipment, and other SAS functions on a bay level takes place.

2.4.12 Operator Workstation The computer (s),which are contained as part of the Station HMI and where substation control/data acquisition, alarms/events/trends/disturbance records recording/retrieval and other SAS equipment manufacturers recommended functions are displayed and takes place. It is noted that the Operator's Workstations and Engineering Workstation shall be dedicated separate computers with separate dedicated displays, keyboards, and mice.

2.4.13 Engineering Workstation The computer (s) where equipment configurations supported and other SAS equipment manufacturer’s functions related to SAS Engineering is allowed to take place. It is noted that the Operator's Workstation and Engineering Workstation shall be dedicated separate computers with separate dedicated displays, keyboards, and mice.

2.4.14 Control IED An intelligent electronic device that provides for control functions on a bay level. Depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, data acquisition functions may also be provided as part of the Control IED. Also, depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, a Local HMI may be integrated as part of the Control IED, or the Control IED may be separate from the Local HMI. As part of the design of the Control IED, there shall be a requirement for IEC 61850 compatibility. For the purposes of this standard, Control IEDs shall be physically separate devices from Protection IEDs, with dedicated Control IED’s being installed for all voltage levels above the Medium Voltage level, and where related Appendix of the main PTS specifies dedicated Control IED’s at the Medium Voltage Level.

2.4.15 Protection IED An intelligent electronic device that provides for protective relay functions, primarily on a bay level. Depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, the Protection IED may provide for a single protective relay function, or multiple protective relay functions in the same Protection IED unit. Also, depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, additional features/functions of the Protection IED may include status recording functions (such as fault recording and other status recording functions), data acquisition and other features. Also, Protection IED's shall be considered as Protective Relays which are integrated in the SAS and with IEC 61850 connectivity/functionality. For the purposes of this standard, Protection IEDs shall be physically separate devices from Control IEDs, with dedicated

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 Protection IED’s being installed for all voltage levels above

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Protection IED’s being installed for all voltage levels above the Medium Voltage level, and where related Appendix of the main PTS to this standard specifies dedicated Protection IED’s at the Medium Voltage Level.

2.4.16 Combined Control/Protection IED An intelligent electronic device that provides for combined control and protection functions on a bay level. Depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, data acquisition functions may also be provided as part of the Combined Control/Protection IED. Also, depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, the combined Control/Protection IED may provide for a single protective relay function, or multiple protective relay functions in the same combined Control/Protection IED unit. Also, depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, additional features/functions of the combined Control/Protection IED may include status recording functions (such as fault recording and other status recording functions), and other features. Also, combined Control/Protection IED's shall be considered as Protective Relays which are integrated in the SAS and with IEC 61850 connectivity/functionality Also, depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, a Local HMI may be integrated as part of the combined Control/Protection IED, or the combined Control/Protection IED may be separate from the Local HMI. For the purposes of this Standard, combined Control/Protection IED’s shall be provided for all Medium Voltage (34.5 kV and below) applications, unless separate dedicated Control IED’s, and separate dedicated Protection IED’s are specified for some or all of the Medium Voltage applications in the main PTS.

2.4.17 Station Bus The medium through which communications takes place among the station level subsystems such as Operator’s Workstation, Engineering Workstation, Front End Computers, Printers etc. Station bus shall be fully compliant with IEC 62439-3 (PRP1).

2.4.18 Inter-Bay Bus:

The medium through which communications takes place between the bay- level IEDs and the station HMI interface and which protection, control and data acquisition/monitoring signals for the SAS pass through. The Inter-Bay Bus shall be fully compliant with IEC 61850 for all voltage levels of the substation, and also will be fully compliant with IEC-62439-3 PRP1 for all voltage levels of the substation.

2.4.19 Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram A panel, which is installed on a bay level which provides for local indication of switchgear status, limited alarm indication, other sets of limited readings, and local switchgear control (on an emergency basis upon failure of a Control IED and/or local HMI.

2.4.20 Time Synchronization System: A redundant set of GPS receivers which provide for time synchronization data to all equipment contained as part of the SAS within each substation.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 2.4.21 Communications Gateway A set of redundant equipment which

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2.4.21 Communications Gateway A set of redundant equipment which will provide for communications interfacing between the SAS and equipment outside of each substation, and which will also provide for required protocol conversions as needed for the SAS to communicate with Master Station equipment outside each substation.

2.4.22 SCADA Master Station(s) The station(s) (outside of each substation) where remote control and remote data acquisition functions are performed for each substation. For purposes of the SAS, interfacing between the station SAS and the SCADA Master Station(s) will be through the Communications Gateways.

2.4.23 SOE Master Station The station (outside of each substation) where SOE (Sequence of Events) information which eventually gets routed to. For purposes of the SAS, interfacing between the station SAS and the SOE Master Station will be through Communications Gateways.

2.4.24 PTS Project Technical Specification, which is the same as the Scope of Work and Technical Specifications (SOW/TS).

Additional Definitions Relating to IEC 61850 For additional definitions relating to IEC 61850, refer to the latest revision of IEC TS 61850-2.

3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN

3.1 General System Design

3.1.1

The Substation Automation System (SAS) shall be suitable for operation, monitoring, and maintenance of each complete substation including future extensions which are identified in this entire standard document. The offered products shall be suitable for efficient and reliable operation under the environmental conditions specified in Section 14.

3.1.1

The systems shall be: State-of-the art based on IEC61850 for operation under electrical conditions present in high-voltage substations, follow the latest engineering practice & ensure long term compatibility requirements, continuity of equipment supply and the safety of the operating staff.

3.1.2

The offered SAS shall support remote control and monitoring from remote SCADA Master Stations via Communications Gateways.

3.1.3

The offered SAS shall provide for SOE (Sequence of Events) points support and overall SOE functions, with SOE monitoring information forwarded to both the Station HMI and the external SOE Master Station (which is located outside of the substation) through the Communications Gateways.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 3.1.4 The offered SAS shall provide for Protective Relay

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3.1.4 The offered SAS shall provide for Protective Relay functions, (through bay- level Protection IEDs) for each substation.

3.1.5 The offered SAS shall provide for the substation’s interlocking functions, both through hard-wired interlocks in the substation as well as a system of software/GOOSE interlocks.

3.1.6 The offered SAS shall provide for other miscellaneous functions related to substation control, data acquisition, protection and other functions as described elsewhere in this Standard and the related Main PTS and other Appendices to the Main PTS.

3.1.7 The system shall be designed such that personnel with little background knowledge in microprocessor-based technology are able to operate the system easily after having received some basic training. Installation/Maintenance/Operating Manuals/ documentation describing the features and functions of the system shall be provided. Necessary 'HELP' files shall be built into the HMI and database software. Also, the Operator Interface (through the Engineering Workstation and Operator's Workstation) shall be intuitive such that operating personnel shall be able to operate the system easily after having received basic training on the SAS.

3.1.8 Cubicles shall incorporate the control, monitoring and protection functions specified, self-monitoring, signaling and testing facilities, measuring as well as memory functions, event recording and disturbance recording. The basic control functions are to be derived from a modular standardized and type- tested software library.

3.1.9 Maintenance, modification or extension of components may not cause a shut- down of the whole SAS. Self-monitoring of single components, modules and communication shall be incorporated to increase the availability and the reliability of the equipment and minimize maintenance. In the cases of modification or extension of components, if a shutdown of the SAS is required, features, functions and configurations shall be provided to keep the shutdown time of all or part of the SAS to an absolute minimum.

3.1.10 Preference will be given to suppliers who are in a position to provide protection and control devices and other devices freely adaptable to the required application functionality.

3.1.11 The SAS shall be expandable as and when required at the Bay, Station and Process levels.

3.1.12 As part of the general system design of the SAS, alarm features shall be included which shall forward alarms to the SCADA Master Station(s) (as well as the SAS Central Alarm Unit and/or substation Annunciator system which will be included as part of the SAS) if the SAS determines that any component of the SAS is not operating properly (with such components including the station HMI, local HMI, IEDs, Communications Gateways,

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 inter-bay bus, Ethernet switches, GPS receivers and other

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inter-bay bus, Ethernet switches, GPS receivers and other components of the SAS). For further details refer to Section 14.26 as well as latest revision of TES-P-119.27 for SCADA points list and 38-TMSS-05 for Alarms list. It should be noted that these are minimum requirements and the complete lists to be provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER which will be subject to review and acceptance.

3.1.13 Generally, part or all of the SAS will be installed inside the substation building, which will be air conditioned. However in some cases, where outdoor switchyards are used (refer main PTS) all bay-level unit hardware (such as Bay Control IEDs and Bay Oriented Local Control Panels with Mimic Operation) which need to be co-located with the outdoor switchgear shall be designed and constructed to meet and fully operate without failure in the outdoor environmental conditions in Saudi Arabia at the substation's location. Refer to latest revision of standard 01-TMSS-01 (Outdoor Environmental Conditions) for further details. However in the case of SAS equipment located inside the substation building, the SAS equipment shall be operational during both normal indoor conditions, and emergency indoor conditions for a minimum 12 hour period where there is no heating/air conditioning inside the substation building (for this matter, refer section 14. of this standard for further detail on these requirements).

3.2 System Architecture

3.2.1 For safety and availability reasons the Substation Automation System shall be based on a decentralized architecture and on a concept of bay-oriented distributed intelligence.

3.2.2 Functions shall be decentralized, object-oriented and located as close as possible to the process.

3.2.3 The main process information of the station shall be stored in distributed databases.

3.2.4 The proposed SAS layout shall be structured in three levels, i.e. a Station, a Bay and a Process level.

3.2.5 The Station level shall provide all the station level functions related to monitoring, control and protection. It shall consist of the station level subsystems such as operator’s workstations, engineering workstation, front end computers, printers, etc. interconnected via the Station Bus. At bay level the IEDs shall provide all bay level functions regarding control, monitoring and protection, inputs for status indication and outputs for commands. The inter-bay bus shall provide the interconnection between the bay level IEDs and other bay level IED’s, the bay level IED’s and SAS front end computers/Communications Gateways, and between SAS front end computers and SAS Communications Gateways. The IEDs should be directly connected to the switchgear without any need for additional interposition or transducers. It shall be the responsibility of the SAS Manufacturer/SOLUTION PROVIDER to determine the proper layout for

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 the SAS and the independent from each other and

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the SAS and the independent from each other and its functioning shall not be affected by any fault occurring in any of the other bay control units of the station. The only exception to this section will be for GOOSE interlocks, where GOOSE interlocking information from one bay control unit to other bay control units and in the event of the failure of the bay control unit (Control IED) GOOSE interlocks may not be functional.

3.2.6 The communication buses shall be realized using fiber-optic cables and substation hardened Ethernet switches thereby guaranteeing disturbance free

communication. To maximize the physical protection of the fiber optic cables, the fiber optic cables shall be run in GI Conduit pipes or other means

acceptable to the National Grid Saudi Arabia

Furthermore for the redundant

schemes using Fiber Optic cables, routing of Fiber Optics cables shall be such that "collapsed ring" schemes and routing of the redundant schemes in the

same routing media shall be avoided.

3.2.7 The communication buses (both station communications bus and inter-bay communications bus) shall be designed in dual redundant fault-tolerant rings at all voltage levels. For the links between individual bay IEDs to Ethernet switches a "star" scheme shall be used. It shall be such that failure of one set of fibers shall not affect the normal operation of the SAS. However failure of any fibers shall be alarmed in SAS. Additionally, fiber optics cable connection shall provide sufficient fibers for the actual connection plus 20% of overall fibers provided (along with the required fiber optics termination/connectors) to support ease of replacement in event of failures of individual working fibers.

3.2.8 To increase system performance and availability the cable routing/communication buses requirement shall be as follows:

a. The inter-bay busses shall be independent and redundant at each voltage level.

b. Inter-bay buses shall be independent of each other for each voltage level, as shown in the conceptual diagram, “Substation Automation System Diagram (Conceptual)”, Drawing Fig 07-01. The detailed requirements related to the required common interconnections at the different levels shall be designed by the Manufacturer/Solution provider .

3.2.9 The Station bus shall be fully redundant. At station level, the entire station shall be controlled and supervised from the station HMI. It shall be possible to control and monitor the bay from the bay level equipment in the event that the communication link fails. The station wide interlocking shall also be available when the station computer, IED(s), communications link, or other component of the SAS fails. To support station wide interlocking upon failure of the station computer, IED(s), communications link, or other component, there shall be hard wired interconnection both within a bay and between the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 required bays for keeping the interlocking intact. For the

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required bays for keeping the interlocking intact. For the substation's interlocking requirements, manufacturer/SOLUTION PROVIDER shall meet the latest revision requirements of 32-TMSS-01 for metal clad switchgear (11kV, 13.8kV, 33kV or 34.5kV), 32-TMSS-02 for SF6 GIS (69kV through 380kV) and 32-TMSS-03 for metal clad gas insulated medium voltage switchgear (11kV, 13.8kV, 33kV OR 34.5kV).

3.2.10 To provide highest reliability the station HMI and the Communications Gateways shall work completely independent, i.e. the process data can be retrieved directly from the bay level devices. Additionally the Communications Gateway, Station HMI, communication buses (inter-bay bus and station bus), GPS Receiver (which are part of the Time Synchronization System) and Front End / Station Computer Unit, Firewalls and other related hardware shall be built and configured fully redundant to ensure full functionality and avoid single point of failure.

3.2.11 Clear control priorities shall prevent the initiation of operation of a single switch at the same time from more than one of the available control levels, i.e. SCADA Master Station(s), station level, bay level or apparatus level. To ensure that clear control priorities exist, a hierarchy scheme between the various control levels shall exist.

3.2.12 The priority shall always be on the lowest enabled control level. The station level contains the station-oriented functions, which cannot be realized at bay level, e.g. alarm list or event list related to the entire substation's SAS and Communications Gateway required for the communication with remote control centers.

3.2.13 Dedicated master clock (GPS Receivers which are part of the Time Synchronization System) for the synchronization of the entire system shall be provided. This master clock should be independent of all station computer equipment and of the Communication Gateway and should synchronize all devices via the communication buses

3.3 Ethernet Topology

The following described criteria’s have to be fulfilled concerning the Ethernet switches and the topology.

3.3.1 Ethernet Switches

a. The proposed Ethernet (LAN) Switches shall be modular, industrially hardened, fully manageable and specifically designed to build Ethernet networks for mission critical, real-time control applications in utility substation environments.

b. These hardened requirements include. (but may not be limited to) temperature, EMC and power supply (DC from the station battery) which are suitable to be installed in the substation operating at the voltage

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 levels of the substation (indicated in Section 1 of

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

levels of the substation (indicated in Section 1 of this Standard, are included in this specification.

c. The proposed LAN switches shall be equipped with dual DC (125 VDC) power supplies.

d. The switches shall support priority tagging and open standards for ring management.

e. External switches are required as they have the advantage that there is no interruption or reconfiguration of the Ethernet ring if one or several bay devices are taken out of service.

f. Ethernet switches for inter-bay buses shall have 100Base-FX technology (fiber optic-100MBPS) for inter connection of all IEDs (control, protection and combined protection/control IEDs) with EHV/HV and

MV inter bay buses (PRP1- Bay LAN) and have Gigabit Ethernet

1000Mbps to connect Ethernet switches inside each ring EHV/HV and

MV inter-bay buses (PRP1-Bay LANs) and each ring of station buses

(PRP1-Station LANs) provided by SOLUTION PROVIDER. There shall be consistency throughput for all inter-bay signals being provided from the IEDs located throughout the substation and shall be consistent with IEC 61850 requirements.

g. Security Features:

Should provide multilevel security/user passwords to prevent unauthorized users from altering the switch configuration.

SNMPv3 encrypted authentication and access security

Support

management

authentication/Centralized

password

(RADIUS)

IEEE 802.1q VLANs to segregate and secure network traffic

Port based Network access control (IEEE 802.1x)

Secure Shell (SSH)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption.

h. Management Features:

Support enhanced traffic management, monitoring, and analysis, through Embedded Remote Monitoring (RMON) software agent supporting at least four RMON groups (history, statistics, alarms, and events).

based

Telnet,

management interfaces.

CLI,

LAN

Switch

Vendor

GUI,

and

Web

Support for SNMP v3 interface to deliver comprehensive in-band management.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 3.3.2 System Architecture The system architecture shall be based

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

3.3.2 System Architecture

The system architecture shall be based on completely distributed approach also concerning the connection of any device to the system. Meaning any device protection as well as control and station level devices shall be directly connected to the Ethernet backbone.

3.3.3 Redundant Networks

a. To ensure maximum performance and availability the network shall

b. For the inter-bay bus level of the SAS which contains the Ethernet Switch connections for the Control IEDs, the Protection IEDs, the SAS Front End Computers, and Communications Gateways, as a minimum, redundant LAN configuration shall be provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER at all voltage levels, with separate redundant networks provided for the IEDs at each voltage level.

c. The separate redundant networks at all voltage levels shall be provided where the redundant inter-bay bus is interconnected with the redundant station bus.

d. Refer to Section 14 of this Standard for further redundancy implementation requirements which is to be implemented by the SOLUTION PROVIDER .

e. The Bid proposal shall fully describe the proposed networks scheme. This shall be supported by detailed network block/schematic diagrams.

4.0 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 General SAS Functionality

4.1.1 Control Scheme Hierarchy

a. A scheme with a predetermined hierarchy shall be provided for the operation of the high-voltage apparatus. As such, the high voltage apparatus within the station shall be operated from different places (from the lowest level to the highest level):

Bay-oriented

(Mimic)

Local

Control

Panel

with

Mimic

Diagram

Control IED

Combined Control/Protection IED

Station HMI

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0  Power Control Center (PCC/SCADA Master Station/LDC): b. In

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

Power Control Center (PCC/SCADA Master Station/LDC):

b. In the scheme shown above, operation of a specific piece of high voltage apparatus shall be allowed to be performed by only one operation at a time. To insure this, double operation interlocking shall be employed. Double operation interlocking shall be employed as part of the hard-wired interlocking scheme, as well as the Software/GOOSE interlocking scheme resident in the Control IED’s and the combined Control/Protection IED’s.

4.1.2 Control Scheme-Select-before Operate

For safety and security reasons the command execution is always to be given in two stages, with the first stage being the selection of the object that is to be controlled, and the second stage being the operation (execution) of the object being selected. This select before operate scheme shall be applicable for the Control IED level, the combined Control/Protection IED level, and the Station HMI level Also, depending on the SAS Equipment Manufacturers design, and National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements/standards, either a direct select before operatescheme, a direct “operate” scheme, or a modified “two handed select-before-operatescheme may be applicable for emergency operation through the Bay Oriented Local Control Panels with Mimic.

4.1.3 Self Supervision

The entire SAS shall be designed with continuous self-supervision features of the entire SAS installation, with self-diagnostic features for the SAS to specifically pinpoint trouble/mal-operation areas of the SAS. Generally, the self-diagnostic features will be built into the Station HMI, with displays available for these diagnostics on the Operator's Workstation and/or Engineering Workstation.

4.1.4 User Configuration

a. The monitoring, controlling and configuration of all input and output logical signals and binary inputs and relay outputs for all built-in functions and signals shall be possible both locally and remotely.

b. It shall also be possible to interconnect the built-in functions using additional logics (AND-gates, OR-gates and timers) as well as to configure additional functions such as over-current, over-voltage, etc.(multi-activation of these additional functions should be possible).

4.1.5 Division of Functional Requirements

a. The functional requirements shall be divided into two areas which are shown in the two paragraphs below.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 b. The Bay level functions shall comprise of operations

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

b. The Bay level functions shall comprise of operations within one bay only, with the bay comprising of one circuit breaker, associated disconnectors (isolation switches), earthing (grounding switches) and associated instrument transformers (PTs and CTs).

c. System Level functions which look at the SAS and the substation as a whole.

4.1.6 Direct Connection between PTs/CTs to SAS IEDs for Analog inputs

Analogue inputs for voltage transformers (PTs/VTs) and current transformers (CTs) measurements shall be connected directly to the voltage transformers (PTs/VTs) and the current transformers (CTs) without intermediate transducers. The values of active power (W), reactive power (VAR), frequency (Hz), and the rms values for voltage (U) and current (I) shall be calculated on the Control IEDs, combined Control/Protection IEDs and Protection IEDs. All readings on all SAS equipment shall be direct on all displays, taking into account the scaling factors for each device (CTs and PT/VTs).

4.2 Bay Level Functions

4.2.1 In a decentralized architecture the functionality shall be as close to the process as possible.

4.2.2 In this respect, the following functions shall be allocated at bay level:

a. Bay control functions including data acquisition/data collection functionality in Bay Control IED's .and combined Control/Protection IED’s

b. Bay protection functions including data acquisition/data collection functionality in Bay Protection IED's. and combined Control/Protection IED’s

c. Data collection functionality.

4.2.3 Bay control functions

a.

Overview

Basic functions

Control mode selection(Local/Off/Emergency/Remote)

Select-before-execute principle

Command supervision:

o Interlocking and blocking

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 o Double command  Autoreclosing (may be considered as

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

o Double command

Autoreclosing (may be considered as either a control function or protection function, depending on National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements)

Synchrocheck, voltage selection (may be considered as either a control function or protection function, depending on National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements)

Interruption of drive latching in case runtime is exceeded

Monitoring pole discrepancy and trip function, if applicable

Transformer

power

tap

changer

control

raise/lower

(for

transformer bays)

Operation

counters

for

circuit

breakers

and

pumps,

if

applicable

Hydraulic

pump

control

and

runtime

supervision,

if

applicable

Pump start cascading, if applicable

Anti pumping of circuit breaker (open/close)

Operating pressure supervision through digital contacts only

Display of interlocking and blocking

Breaker position indication on a three phase basis with indication showing pole discrepancy conditions/alarms where pole discrepancy between the phases is detected/indicated

Alarm annunciation

Measurement display

Local HMI (local guided, emergency mode)

Interface to the station level

Data storage for at least 200 events

Run Time Command cancellation

Extension possibilities with additional I/O's inside the unit, installation of additional units and/or via fiber optic communication and process bus

Additional functions, if any, specified in Main PTS/SCADA & Protection Appendices.

Advanced functions

Disturbance recording with capabilities for all analogue and binary values

Extension possibilities with additional I/O's inside the unit or via fiber-optic inter-bay communications and process bus

b. Control Mode Selection

As soon as the operator receives the operation access at bay level the operation is normally performed via the local HMI. During normal operation the local HMI is guided and allows the safe operation of all switching devices via the bay control IED or the combined control/protection IED.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 ● It will be ensured that Protection features for

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

It will be ensured that Protection features for the station (through the Protection IED's or the combined control/protection IED used for the station protection function) shall be functioning irrespective of the Control Mode.

In the event that the bay control IED or a combined control/protection IED fails, the operator shall have access to the essential bay switchgear via a separate bay-oriented local control panel with mimic diagram for High Voltage switchgear, or via the Low Voltage Compartment for Medium Voltage switchgear. This is an emergency function.

i.

OFF Mode

It is not possible to operate any object, neither locally nor remotely.

ii

EMERGENCY Mode

A. The position indication shall be directly from the primary equipment bay switchgear being controlled.

B. On the bay-oriented local control panel with mimic diagram, for the “two handed” operate principle, the device selection push button and either the ON or OFF push button has to be pushed simultaneously in order to close or open the primary equipment bay switchgear. For the “single handed” operate principle, as indicated in latest revision of 32-TMSS-02 each device will have its own “OFF” or “ON’ push button to press, and the operator will not be required to use two hands to operate a device. Control operation from other places (e.g. from REMOTE or LOCAL) shall not be possible in this operating mode.

iii.

LOCAL (BCU) Mode

A. On the HMI the object has first to be selected. In case of a blocking or interlocking conditions the selection will not be possible and an appropriate alarm annunciation shall occur.

B. If a selection is valid the position indication will show the possible direction and the appropriate ON or OFF button shall be pressed in order to close or open the corresponding object.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 C. Control operation from other places (e.g.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

C.

Control

operation

from

other

places

(e.g.

REMOTE)

shall

not

be

possible

in

this

operating mode.

iv. REMOTE-STATION LEVEL mode

Control authority in this mode is given to the next highest level (the Station HMI level) and the installation can be controlled only remotely via the Station HMI. Control operation from lower levels shall not be possible in this operating mode.

v. REMOTE-PCC LEVEL mode

Control authority in this mode is given to the highest level (SCADA Master Station) via the Station HMI and the installation can be controlled only remotely via the PCC (SCADA Master Station/LDC). Control operation

from lower levels shall not be possible in this operating

mode. National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that control

from this mode shall also be available in the event of failure of even the (redundant) Station HMI Front End computers, in which PCC Control and Data Acquisition information will be transmitted and received directly from the Communications Gateways to the applicable Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IED’s through the IEC 61850 Inter-bay bus.

c. Command supervision

Bay/station interlocking and blocking

i. Interlocking facilities have to be installed in the switchgear to prevent damages and accidents in case of false operation.

ii. Within the bay itself, a system of hard-wired interlocks and software/GOOSE interlocking controlled only through the Bay Control IEDs (in conjunction with the Bay Oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic) shall be used. However, upon failure of a bay Control IED(s) and/or combined Control/Protection IED(s) or communications link(s), the hard-wired interlocking shall operate and prevail. The SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposed solution shall describe the bay interlocking scenario in event of switching off or failure of a bay Control SAS component(s) (Control IED(s) or combined Control/Protection IED(s)),or other SAS components.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 iii. Station interlocking systems shall be provided via hardwired

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

iii. Station interlocking systems shall be provided via hardwired or inter-bay bus. However, upon failure of station computer, IED(s), communications link (inter- bay bus), or other component of the SAS, the hardwired station interlock shall operate and prevail. It shall be a simple layout, easy to test and simple to handle when upgrading the station with future bays. The SOLUTION PROVIDER's proposed solution shall describe the station interlocking scenario in event of switching off or failure of a bay Control SAS component(s) (Control IED(s) or combined Control/Protection IED(s)),or other SAS components.

iv. Software/GOOSE "interlock override" functionality shall be available as part of the SAS. However, there shall be methods available to disable such a software/GOOSE bay/station "interlock override” scheme and/or to allow only access to this software/GOOSE "interlock override" scheme by privileged users using strong passwords and other security features.

Double operation interlocking

i. Double operation interlocking prevents the operation of two or more switches at the same time. The double operation interlocking is a part of the station interlocking; it shall preferably be hard-wired, but provisions shall also be made in the SAS design for software (GOOSE) double operation interlocking. It shall be included for all the switches in the station. It should be noted that unless interlocked for some specific purpose (other than for Double Operation Interlocking), there is no need of preventing simultaneous operation of switches located in different bays.

ii. With a hard-wired solution the interlocking is independent from the control authority of the station. If a control IED and/or a combined Control/Protection IED fails, the double operation interlocking does not block the operation of the station. It shall still be controlled from all the control authorities. Refer to above Section i (under double operation interlocking) of this Standard for further details pertaining to the overall requirements for Double Operation Interlocking.

iii. The

proposed

solution

shall

describe

the

double

operation

interlocking

scenario

while

an

IED

of

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 another bay or another component of the SAS is

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

another bay or another component of the SAS is switched off or fails.

Other General Interlocking requirements

i. For software/GOOSE interlocks, schemes which use the Station HMI (or other Front End) Computer equipment to make ANY software/GOOSE interlocking decisions or transfer software/GOOSE interlocking data shall NOT be used Software/GOOSE interlocking scheme shall ONLY utilize the Bay Control IED equipment, the combined Control/Protection IED equipment, and intercommunications (through GOOSE messages) between Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs to support software/GOOSE interlocking requirements.

ii. For the backup “hard wired” interlocking scheme/solution, Solution provider shall consult with National Grid Saudi Arabia during the Base Design stage of the project to determine if there is a need to incorporate “hard-wired interlock bypass/override” in the related SAS design.

iii. For interlocking signals which are required between voltage levels in each substation which will be used for software/GOOSE interlocking, these interlocking signals described in this paragraph shall be transmitted and received between voltage levels in hardwired form and inputted/outputted to the other voltage levels through GGIOs/Digital Inputs/Digital Outputs between the related Control IEDs. This is required to guarantee that separate dedicated IP Subnets can be allocated for each voltage level in each substation.

iv. For the relation between software/GOOSE and backup “hard wired” interlocks, a “series downstream” principle will be used. This “series downstream” principle will first check the conditions of the software/GOOSE interlocks and if the interlocking conditions are satisfied at the software/GOOSE level at the control or combined control/protection IED, then the control signal will then pass to the “hard wired” interlocks, and if it is determined at the “hard wired” interlocking level that the interlocking conditions are satisfied, the control signal will then pass to the related switchgear device.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 v. Finally, the “hard wired” interlock scheme shall be

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

v. Finally, the “hard wired” interlock scheme shall be configured in such a way that, once the National Grid Saudi Arabia obtains enough satisfactory operating experience with the software/GOOSE interlocking scheme, then National Grid Saudi Arabia personnel can later easily disable the “hard wired” interlock scheme and later only rely on software/GOOSE interlocking for the bay/station interlocking functionality.

Synchronism and energizing check

i. The synchronism and energizing check functions shall be bay-oriented and distributed to the bay control and/or protection devices. These features are:

A. voltage,

Adjustable

phase

angle

and

frequency

difference.

B. Energizing for dead line-live bus, live line-dead bus or dead line-dead bus with no synchro-check function.

C. Synchro-check between live line and live bus with synchro-check function.

D. Settings for manual close command and autoreclose command shall be adaptable and adjustable for the operating times of the specific switchgear.

E. Determination of a live line/dead line or a live bus/dead bus shall be provided automatically at the IED level for the particular bays where the IED's are installed by looking at the configuration of related circuit breakers, disconnects (isolators) and earthing (grounding) switches.

F. Furthermore, use of "sampled value" messages from adjacent IED's to transmit analog information from PTs (VTs) (either line or bus PTs (VTs)) shall NOT be accepted for performing synchro-check inside an IED.

G. Depending on National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements as stated in the related Appendix of the main PTS, synchronism and energizing check may be required to be performed by dedicated Synchrocheck Relays/IED’s and NOT Control or combined Control/Protection IED’s

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 ii. Voltage selection A. The voltages relevant for the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

ii. Voltage selection

A. The voltages relevant for the synchro-check functions are dependent on the station topology, i.e. on the positions of the circuit breakers and/or the isolators.

B. The correct voltage for synchronizing and energizing is derived from the auxiliary switches of the circuit breakers, the isolator, and earthing switch and related PTs and shall be selected automatically by the Bay Control IEDs and/or Protection IEDs. The correct voltage selection shall also be dependent on the bay/station one-line scheme (e.g. double bus bar-single breaker, breaker and one-half, double bus, etc.) for each substation to be equipped with SAS.

C. Voltage selection (which is required for synchronism and energizing check as described Section i under Synchronism and energizing check) shall be an integral function of the IED or Synchrocheck Relay, and NOT through external means.

D. Depending on National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements as stated in related Appendix of the main PTS, voltage selection may be required to be performed by dedicated Synchrocheck Relays/IED’s and NOT Control IED’S or combined Control/Protection IED’s

Auto-reclosing and related synchro-check functions

i. These functions can be considered as either control or protection functions.

ii. Depending on the National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements as indicated in related Appendix of the main PTS, autoreclosing and synchro-check (related to auto-reclosing) may be implemented in a general Control IED or combined Control/Protection IED (used for general substation switchgear control) or a dedicated Autoreclosing functional unit (Control IED or combined Control/Protection IED or Autoreclosing/related Synchro-Check built into a

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 Protection IED) integrated into the Protection portion of the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

Protection IED) integrated into the Protection portion of the SAS.

iv.

The autorecloser should be settable for the following modes of operation:

A.

First autoreclosure sequence:

 
 

Three-phase autoreclosure

Single/three-phase autoreclosure

 

Single-phase autoreclosure

 

B.

Further auto-reclosure sequences:

 

No further auto-reclosure sequences

 

Further auto-reclosure sequences (totally 2, 3 or 4 sequences), always three-phase sequences

iv.

It

shall

be

possible

to

perform

all

three-phase

autoreclosure

sequences

with

or

without

synchro-

check.

 

v.

If synchro-check is required for any autoreclosure sequence, refer the sub heading “Synchronism and energizing check” above and its subsections for a description of the synchro-check, and voltage selection functionality

Run Time Command cancellation

If the control action is not completed within a specified time, the command shall get cancelled, and an alarm/event shall be raised at the Station HMI level (which may be reported to the PCC (SCADA Master Station level). For operation of switchgear which involves drive latching the latching shall be interrupted by the Control IED or combined Control/Protection IED and the drive motor power (for the latched device) shall be interrupted also by the Control IED or the combined Control/Protection IED. National Grid Saudi Arabia requires that the Run-Time Command Cancellation functionality and the Command cancellation execution timer be embedded in the Control IED’s and combined Control/Protection IED’s either through the use of dedicated IEC 61850 Logical Nodes, or general timer/logic gates which are incorporated in the IED which can be configured by the user/manufacturer (by software) through the IED configuration process.

Pole discrepancy monitoring/relaying (if applicable)

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 A Pole Discrepancy monitoring function, based on the measurement

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

A Pole Discrepancy monitoring function, based on the

measurement of phase over-currents and current differences between phases as well as on breaker pole status (which is determined by reading the auxiliary contacts on each pole of

the breaker) has to be provided. Also, depending on the SAS

Equipment manufacturer's design, additional Pole Discrepancy Relaying may be included in the SAS as an integrated function. If the additional Pole Discrepancy Relaying is provided as part of the SAS, the Pole Discrepancy Relaying

feature integrated into the SAS shall support Stage I and Stage

II Pole Discrepancy Relaying functions, as well as being able to initiate Pole Discrepancy Trip signals to remote substations via Protection Signaling equipment (PSE), and Communications equipment (PSE and Communications provided by other parts of the project, as applicable). Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS to determine additional information on whether Pole Discrepancy monitoring/relaying will be through separate Pole Discrepancy Relays, or integrated into the functionality of SAS (Note: If main PTS specifies separate dedicated external Pole Discrepancy Relays, there will still be a requirement to monitor Stage I and Stage II Pole Discrepancy from the external Pole Discrepancy Relay(s) through SAS as part of the alarm function of SAS.).

Transformer tap changer control

i.

Voltage regulation for single transformers or parallel transformers with on-load tap-changer shall either be included in the numerical control unit for the power transformer or located in a separate tap changer control device which is associated with the power transformer.

ii

In the event that a separate tap-changer control device is selected, this shall be an integral part of the SAS like any bay oriented Control IED or Protection IED.

iii.

OLTC scheme shall be .accomplished by the Control IED's and/or dedicated Tap Changer IED’s (which have IEC 61850 interfaces) which will be performing the regulation and tap changing function.

iv.

National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that a built-in numerical control unit is preferred instead of a separate tap changer unit. Also, the Transformer tap changer control scheme shall meet latest revision of TES-P- 119.26 for control schemes for each Substation's Equipment.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 d. Interface between Control IEDs and Maintenance Laptop Computer

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

d. Interface between Control IEDs and Maintenance Laptop Computer and also between combined Control/Protection IEDs and Maintenance Laptop Computer:

All IEDs used for the Control functions shall be provided with a serial, Ethernet RJ45 and/or optical front connector for connection to a Maintenance Laptop Computer.

e. Interface between the Control IEDs, the combined Control/Protection IEDs and the inter-bay Bus pertaining to IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3

PRP1:

For IEDs used for dedicated control, and/or combined control/protection, each Control IED and combined Control/Protection IED shall have full interfacing to the inter-bay communications bus only through IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3 PRP 1. Use of Protocol Converters to convert from legacy protocols (e.g. DNP 3.0, MODBUS, IEC-103, etc.) to IEC 61850/IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 will NOT be accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia. REDBOX is not acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to National Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing Fig 07.01 which shows where REDBOX is acceptable.

4.2.4 Bay protection functions

a. General

For all voltage levels except for the Medium Voltage level, the protection functions shall be independent of the control functions (i.e. the Protection IED will NOT be performing Control IED functions). For the Medium Voltage level, unless specified in the main PTS, both control functions and protection functions for a bay can be provided in one IED (which will be known as a combined Control/Protection IED). Refer to the related Appendix of the main PTS involving Relay and Protection for further details on the functionalities involved, as well as other details.

Furthermore, at the High Voltage level, for trip applications/trip commands, where there is a dedicated Protection IED, the Protection IED shall perform the tripping functions ONLY, and this tripping function shall NOT be passed on to a Control IED (either through hard-wired means and/or through use of GOOSE messages).

The protection functions are an integral part of the Substation Automation System.

All protection functions realized in the IEDs should be based on numerical technology.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 ● All IEDs shall be serial integrated for data

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

All IEDs shall be serial integrated for data sharing and meet the real-time communication requirements for automatic functions. The data presentation and the configuration of the various IEDs shall be compatible with the overall system communication and data exchange requirements.

All IEDs used for the protection functions (Protection IEDs and the combined Control and Protection IEDs) shall also be provided with a serial, Ethernet RJ 45 and/or optical front connector for connection to a Maintenance Laptop Computer.

For IEDs used for dedicated protection and/or combined control/protection, each Protection IED and combined Control/Protection IED shall have full interfacing to the inter- bay communications bus only through IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3 PRP 1. Use of Protocol Converters to convert from legacy protocols (e.g. DNP 3.0, MODBUS, IEC-103, etc.) to IEC 61850/IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 will NOT be accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia. REDBOX is not acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to National Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing Fig 07-01 which shows where REDBOX is acceptable.

This Standard only describes general Protection Requirements, with more specific protection requirements outlined in related portions of the main PTS/standards. Refer to the related Appendix of the main PTS/standards for Protection (Protective Relaying) functions for the IEDs.

b. Self-supervision

Continuous self-supervision function with self-diagnostic possibilities shall be included.

c. Event and disturbance recording function

Each Protection IED and combined Control/Protection IED shall contain an event recorder capable of storing at least 256 time-tagged events. A Protection IED and combined Control/Protection IED shall also provide the user, either locally or remotely, with complete information on the last ten disturbances.

A disturbance recorder with a minimum of 5 seconds recording time for at least 10 disturbances shall provide the user with time-tagged disturbance records.

At least the analogue inputs as well as 16 binary signals must be recorded.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 ● The pre-fault and fault currents and voltages shall

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

The pre-fault and fault currents and voltages shall be recorded for each disturbance and be made available for further evaluation purposes.

d. Local HMI

The local human machine interface (HMI) shall be front- mounted and based on a user-friendly, menu-structured program, and performed with the use of a permanently installed human machine interface unit, type-tested together with the protection terminal.

In addition service values of current and voltages as well as active and reactive power (if voltage measurements included) shall be available. Also the characteristic analogue values related to the activated functions (e.g. impedance in case of distance protection) should be available.

4.2.5 Line protection

a. General

The Protection IED and combined Control/Protection IED devices which incorporate numerical line protection shall be selected for the protection of lines according to specific network configurations and conditions. The scheme must ensure reliable isolation for all kind of faults that might occur on the specific line as per protection requirements stipulated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS/Protective Relay Standard.

Depending on the voltage level and complexity, the following line protection functions may be required:

b. Distance function

Distance function requirements shall be compatible to the relay requirements indicated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS/Protective Relay Standard.

c. Differential function

Differential function requirements shall be compatible to the relay requirements indicated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS/Protective Relay Standard.

d. Earth fault function

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 Earth fault function requirements shall be compatible to the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

Earth fault function requirements shall be compatible to the relay requirements indicated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS/Protective Relay Standard.

e. Fault location

Fault location function requirements shall be compatible to the relay requirements indicated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS.

f. Transformer protection

General

i. The transformer protection shall be suitable for the protection of two- or three-winding transformers, auto-transformers, reactors, and generator-transformer block units, as per protection requirements stipulated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or standard.

ii. The numerical transformer terminal shall be designed to operate correctly over a wide frequency range and to accommodate for system frequency variations and block generator start-ups.

Current differential function

Refer to the Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or Protective Relay Standard for further details.

Other functions

Refer to the Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or Protective Relay Standard for further details.

Breaker failure protection

i. The breaker failure protection shall comprise two time stages. The first stage shall be bay-oriented and shall re-trip the local circuit breaker.

ii. The second stage shall be station-oriented, requiring information from other bays, and shall trip the circuit breakers in adjacent bays.

iii. Refer to the Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or Protective Relay Standard for further details.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 4.3 System/Station level functions 4.3.1 Control a. The different

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

4.3 System/Station level functions

4.3.1 Control

a. The different high-voltage switchgear and medium voltage switchgear within the station shall be operated from different places:

from the remote control centers (SCADA Master Station(s))

from the station level

For High Voltage switchgear from the Control IED(s) in the LCC(s) (in the bays)

For High Voltage switchgear from the Bay-Oriented Local Control Panel(s) with Mimic Diagram

For Medium Voltage switchgear from the Control IED(s)/combined Control/Protection IED(s)

Voltage

For

Medium

Voltage

switchgear

from

the

Low

Compartment(s)

b. Operation shall only possible by one operator at a time.

c. The operation shall depend on the conditions of other functions, such as interlocking, synchrocheck, etc. (see description in chapter “Bay control functions”).

4.3.2 Status supervision

a. The position of each switchgear, e.g. circuit breaker, isolator, earthing switch, transformer tap changer etc., shall be supervised permanently. Every detected change of position shall be immediately visible in the single-line diagram on the station HMI screen, recorded in the event list, and a hard copy printout shall be produced. Alarms shall be initiated in the case of spontaneous position changes.

b. The switchgear positions shall be indicated by two auxiliary switches, normally closed (NC) and normally open (NO), which shall give relevant signals. An alarm shall be initiated if these position indications are inconsistent or if the time required for operating mechanism to change position exceeds a predefined limit.

c. The SAS shall also monitor the status of substation auxiliaries (which

will include, but not be limited to auxiliary relays such as trip current

The status and control of

auxiliaries shall be done through separate one or more Control IEDs and all alarm and analogue values shall be monitored and recorded through the respective Control IEDs. It is noted also by the National Grid Saudi Arabia that monitoring of the status of auxiliaries shall NOT be performed from dedicated Protection IED’s or combined Control/Protection IED’s.

supervision, DC supervision, etc.)

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 4.3.3 Measurements a. The measured values shall be displayed

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

4.3.3 Measurements

a. The measured values shall be displayed locally on the Local HMI contained as part of an IED, Station HMI and in the control center (SCADA Master Station(s)). At the Station HMI level, facilities shall exist to discard abnormal values (through the Station HMI Filtering functions) and when an abnormal value is reached, generate an alarm/event indicating that an abnormal value (s) has been detected.

b. All analogue values shall be updated (both in Local HMIs (contained as part of the IEDs), and Station HMI equipment every 2 seconds, or faster.

c. Threshold limit values shall be selectable for alarm indications.

4.3.4 Event and alarm handling

a. Events and alarms shall be generated either by the switchgear, by the control IEDs, by the protection IEDs, by the combined control/protection IED’s, or by the station level unit.

b. They shall be recorded in an event list in the station HMI. Alarms shall be recorded in a separate alarm list and appear on the screen. All, or a freely selectable group of events and alarms shall also be printed out on an event printer.

c. The alarms and events shall be time-tagged with a time resolution of 1 ms National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that the time tagging of the alarms and events shall be performed at the IED itself only, and NOT through SAS Computer equipment

d. During the Base Design Stage, the Solution provider shall submit the Events and Alarms List (Signals List) for National Grid Saudi Arabia approval, and once approved the Solution provider will use this approved list as a basis for development of his SCD files for SAS.

e. As a minimum, the Signals and Events List shall contain all applicable points as identified in TES-P-119.27 the SOE Points List and the approved Annunciator Alarms List for the Substation. Also, in development of the Events and Alarms List, separate dedicated lists shall be generated for SOE, SCADA, and the Station HMI contained as part of the Substation Automation System for review and approval.

f. Finally as part of the events and alarms handling requirement, when there are cases where IEC 61850 DOES NOT provide for alarms/events as part of the logical node (LN) signals definitions (under IEC 61850) and where these alarms/events signals are required

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 under latest revision of Engineering Standard TES-P-119.27 (for

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

under latest revision of Engineering Standard TES-P-119.27 (for SCADA) the SOE Points List, and the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved Annunciator Alarms List for the Substation, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide suitable auxiliary binary input contacts (and/or binary outputs) as part of each IED design to extend non IEC 61850 alarms/events by hard-wired means to other components of the SAS (which will appear as one of the GGIOs included as part of the SAS Data Acquisition function which will be reported to the Station HMI, the SCADA Master Stations and other equipment).

g. In/Out facility for the protection is isolating trip out put only during maintenance of relays. However during this condition all alarms to remote Master stations shall be isolated in order to avoid receiving any nuisance alarms during maintenance. Facility for isolating alarms shall be provided as part of relays or at the Gateways.

4.3.5 Time Synchronization System

a. A dedicated clock synchronization unit shall set the time within the SAS. Time synchronization of all SAS equipment shall be independent of the station level equipment e.g. station computer or Communications Gateway. Time Synchronization shall be from redundant GPS receivers located on the property of each substation. The time shall then be distributed to the control IEDs, combined Control/Protection IEDs and protection IEDs and other SAS equipment via the communication buses. An accuracy of ±1ms (from the actual time) within the substation (and for ALL SAS components within the substation which require time signals) is required.

b. Hardware/Firmware for the GPS receivers supplied by the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide for a antenna, decoder, other hardware, interfaces with the SAS and Firmware as per the latest IRIG B122 or other National Grid Saudi Arabia approved standard time code format (e.g. SNTP and others).

c. Software for the GPS receivers shall include a software package to implement GPS-based time as per at least IRIG B122 standard time code format (Day of Year and Time update rate of once per second, AM 1 KHz carrier, resolution of + 1 mS, expressed in hh, mm, ss, ddd) or other National Grid Saudi Arabia approved standard time code format and able to synchronize time and date into the SAS, with all components of the SAS receiving consistent time and date information.

d. Upon failure of any GPS receiver in the time synchronization system, the GPS receiver shall transmit an alarm to both the Station HMI equipment in the SAS, and the remote SCADA Master Station(s).

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 e. In the event of failures of both GPS

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

e. In the event of failures of both GPS clock receivers which are beyond the control of the GPS clock receivers (e.g. shutdown of the GPS satellite network, atmospheric conditions blocking reception of GPS signals at the GPS receivers, etc.) there shall be a means of time synchronization by the use of either internal SAS clocking sources (e.g. internal clocks inside the IED(s), etc). or tertiary clocking sources from the respective SCADA Master Station(s). In this respect, during the Base Design Stage, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall state the holdover clocking accuracy of the internal SAS clocking sources, the clocking drift of these internal SAS clocking sources and the maximum allowable time which the SOLUTION PROVIDER feels that the infernal SAS clocking sources will provide accurate (+ 1 ms accuracy from real time) timing. If in the event that based on the SOLUTION PROVIDER provided information, that the internal SAS clocks will NOT provide accurate time information in the event of both GPS receivers failing, the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the Base Design will instruct the SOLUTION PROVIDER to utilize the existing SCADA Master Station(s) Clocks as a tertiary clocking/synchronization source and incorporate this SCADA Master Station(s) clock as a tertiary clocking/synchronization source.

4.3.6 Telecontrol

Remote access to each substation data shall be enabled via the control centers (SCADA Master Stations) upon request. The respective owners in the utility organization may use some or all information related to the conditions of high voltage apparatus.

4.3.7 Station HMI-Presentation and Dialogues and Design

a. General

The operator Station HMI shall provide basic functions for supervision and control within the substation.

The Station HMI shall be fully redundant and shall provide the functions for supervision and control of the substation. Access to the redundant Front End Computers shall be through the Operator's Workstations and the Engineer's Workstation. However to meet the redundancy requirements a backup workstation (included as part of a Maintenance Laptop Computer) shall be provided with software and firmware fully loaded which can be used to act as either the Operator's Workstation or Engineering Workstation in the event of failure of either the Operator's Workstations or Engineering Workstation contained as part of the SAS.

The operator shall give commands to the switchgear on the screen via mouse clicks.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 ● The Station HMI shall give the operator access

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

The Station HMI shall give the operator access to alarms and events displayed on the screen. Aside from these lists on the

screen, there shall be a printout of alarms or events in an event

log.

● An acoustic alarm which shall be provided in each Operator’s Workstation Console shall indicate abnormalities, and all unacknowledged alarms shall be accessible from any screen selected by the operator. Furthermore, a horn shall be provided as part of the acoustic alarm requirement to alert substation operator personnel who may be elsewhere inside the substation that an alarm has been received in SAS, and that alarm has not been acknowledged. Also, as part of the horn requirement, a horn disable switch shall be employed to allow the substation operator to disable the horn from operating (e.g. disabling the horn may be needed when the substation operator leaves the substation after completing local switching activities).

The following standard pictures shall be available from the Station HMI (and which can be selected by the station operator) as a minimum:

i. Single-line diagram on an overall station level showing the switchgear status and measured values

ii. Single-line diagram on each specific bay level for all bays showing the switchgear status and measured values

iii. Control/blocking dialogues with interlocking and/or blocking information details. As part of the Control dialogue, the control dialogue shall tell the operator whether the device operation is permitted or blocked, and if the device operation is blocked, the reason why the device operation is blocked (e.g. non satisfaction of an interlocking condition, blocking of a breaker due to an SF6 gas Stage II alarm, etc.).

iv. Measurement dialogues

v. Alarm list, station / bay-oriented

vi. Event list, station / bay-oriented

vii. System status

viii. Checking of parameter settings

ix. Interlocking details

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 x. Overall SAS block/schematic display/diagram showing the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

x. Overall SAS block/schematic display/diagram showing the communication buses, Ethernet switches, all the SAS devices (IEDs, computers…) and their interconnections. This overall system block diagram shall provide the status indication for all the SAS devices.

b. HMI design principles

Consistent design principles shall be provided with the HMI concerning labels, colors, dialogues and fonts. Non-valid selections shall be dimmed out, or have another distinguishing feature on the associated display to indicate that there is a non- valid selection taking place.

As a minimum, the object status shall be indicated using different status indicators for:

i. Control mode selection (Local that is through Station HMI)/Supervisory that is through other levels of the hierarchy)

ii. selected object under command

iii. selected on the screen

iv. not updated, obsolete values, not in use or not sampled

v. alarm or faulty state

vi. warning or blocked

vii. update blocked or manually updated

viii. control blocked/interlocking condition present

ix. normal state

c. Process status displays and command procedures

The process status of the substation in terms of actual values of currents, voltages, frequency, active and reactive powers as well as the positions of circuit breakers, isolators and transformer tap changers shall be displayed in the station single-line diagram, as well as on the related bay one-line

diagrams.

In order to ensure a high degree of security against undesired operation, a special "select-before-execute" command procedure shall be provided. After the "selection" of a switch,

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 the operator shall be able to recognize the selected

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

the operator shall be able to recognize the selected device on the screen, and all other switchgear shall be blocked. After the “execution” of the command the operated switching symbol shall flash until the switch has reached its new position.

The operator shall only be in a position to execute a command, if the switch is not blocked and if no interlocking condition is going to be violated. The interlocking statements shall be checked by the interlocking scheme implemented at bay level.

After command execution the operator shall receive a confirmation that the new switching position has been reached or an indication that the switching procedure was unsuccessful with the indication of the reason for non-functioning.

As part of the command procedures hierarchy, if operation of each SAS controlled substation is initiated through the Station HMI, except for one case as defined below, command selection and command execution procedures from the PCC shall be blocked for all devices controlled from the SAS. As a result of this, an appropriate alarm/event indication shall be given to the PCC (Power Control Center) indicating that "Local" control only available, and that remote control (through the PCC) is not possible.

For some National Grid Saudi Arabia substations, blocking of control from the SCADA Master Station(s) of the manual tap changing function of certain transformers shall not be allowed when the Station HMI is placed in the “Local” position. In this case, a software “bypass” feature shall be implemented in the SAS Applications Software package to allow for bypassing of the Station HMI (when the Station HMI is in “Local”) to allow the SCADA Master Station(s) signals to directly pass through to the related IED’s used for Tap Changing control without Station HMI involvement.

d. SAS System supervision display

The SAS shall be comprehensively self-monitored such that faults are immediately indicated to the operator, possibly before they develop into serious situations. Such faults are recorded as a faulty status in a system supervision display.

This display shall cover the status of the entire SAS including IEDs, communication links (inter-bay bus and station bus), Ethernet switches, HMI equipment, Time Synchronization, Communications Gateway equipment, GPS receivers, Firewalls, Inverters/UPS, printers and other SAS equipment.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 e. Event list ● The event list shall contain

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

e. Event list

The event list shall contain events that are important for the control and monitoring of each substation.

The event and associated time for each event (within 1 ms of "real time" for each event) has to be displayed.

The operator shall be able to call up the chronological event list on the monitor at any time for each whole substation or sections of it.

A printout of each display/event list shall be possible on the hard copy printer. Furthermore, sufficient buffering capability shall exist in the Station HMI to store events (for future printing) which are intended to be printed on the hard copy printer in event of a hard copy printer malfunction (e.g. "out of paper", printer off, etc.) or operator commands to disable the hard copy printer.

Similar to alarm list descriptions, the descriptive text character field which is provided for the individual event list description shall support a minimum character length of 60 characters.

The events shall be registered in a chronological event list in which the type of event and its time of occurrence are specified. It shall be possible to store all events in the

computer.

The chronological event list shall contain:

i. Position changes of circuit breakers, isolators and earthing devices

ii. Indication of protective relay operations

iii. Fault signals from the switchgear and entire SAS

iv. Indication when analogue measured values were outside upper and lower limits. Suitable provision shall be made in the system for the final user to define at least two levels of operation on either side of the value or which shall be available as user defined for each measurands.

v. Loss of communication.

Filters for selection of a certain type or group of events shall be available. The filters shall be designed to enable viewing of events grouped per:

i. Date and time

ii. Bay

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 iii. Device iv. Function e.g. trips, protection operations,

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

iii. Device

iv. Function e.g. trips, protection operations, autoreclosures, level where function was performed (e.g bay level through an IED, Station HMI, etc.) etc.

v. Alarm class

f. Alarm list

Faults and errors occurring in the substation shall be listed in an alarm list and shall be immediately transmitted to the control center (SCADA Master Station(s)). The alarm list shall substitute a conventional alarm tableau, and shall constitute an evaluation of all station alarms. It shall contain unacknowledged alarms and persisting faults. The date and time of occurrence shall be indicated.

The alarm list shall consist of a summary display of the present alarm situation. Each alarm shall be reported on one line that contains:

i. the date and time of the alarm

ii. the name of the alarming object (which shall be very specific and clear to enable the operations personnel in easily identifying and locating the alarming device)

iii. a descriptive text

iv. the acknowledgement state

Whenever an alarm condition occurs, the alarm condition must be shown on the alarms list. Alarm shall have first out feature. Trip alarm and non trip alarm shall be clearly distinguished. Alarm description shall be generally per latest revision 38- TMSS-05 or TES-P-119.27 (Note: TES-P-119.27 takes priority in the Alarm Description on the Station HMI). As a minimum, for easier understanding by National Grid Saudi Arabia operations personnel, clearly distinguishable descriptions/display texts shall be provided for the following states of alarms:

i. Unacknowledged and persisting alarms (e.g. one color and flashing)

ii. Acknowledged and persisting alarms (e.g. one color and steady)

iii. Unacknowledged and fleeting alarms (e.g. a second color and flashing)

iv. Acknowledged and cleared alarms (e.g. a third color and steady)

Whenever an operator chooses to also have an audible alarm indication (operator selectable at the site), all unacknowledged alarms shall also have an audible indication. Also, for the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 audible alarm reporting facility when the operator chooses to

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

audible alarm reporting facility when the operator chooses to mute the audible alarm facility, there shall be a clear indication to the SAS that the audible alarm facility is muted.

Filters for selection of a certain type or group of alarms shall be available as for events.

Similar to event list descriptions, the descriptive text character field which is provided for the individual alarm list description shall support a minimum character length of 60 characters.

A printout of each display/alarm list shall be possible on the hard copy printer. Furthermore, sufficient buffering capability shall exist in the Station HMI to store alarms (for future printing) which are intended to be printed on the hard copy printer in event of a hard copy printer malfunction (e.g. "out of paper", printer off, etc.) or operator commands to disable the hard copy printer.

For certain alarms contained as part of the alarm list (e.g. alarms which may also appear as part of the SCADA Points List alarms, SOE indicators, Substation Annunciators, etc.), National Grid Saudi Arabia standard alarm naming conventions for the Station HMI display(s) shall be followed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER.

g. Object picture

When selecting an object such as a circuit breaker or isolator in the single-line diagram, the associated bay picture shall be presented first. In the selected object picture, all attributes like:

type of blocking

authority

local / remote control

PCC(SCADA Master Station(s))/SAS control

errors

etc.,

Shall be displayed.

h. Control dialogues

The operator shall give commands to the system by means of mouse clicks on the single-line diagram. It shall also be possible to use the keyboard for issuance of commands. Data entry is performed with the keyboard.

Dedicated control dialogues for controlling at least the following devices shall be available:

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 i. Breakers, disconnectors and earthing switches ii. Transformer

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

i. Breakers, disconnectors and earthing switches

ii. Transformer tap-changers (when the tap changing functionality is not bypassed at the Station HMI level).

i. User-authority levels

It shall be possible to restrict activation of the process pictures of each object at the Station HMI level(bays, apparatus ) within a certain user authorization group. Each user shall then be given access rights to each group of objects, e.g.:

i. Display only

ii. Normal operation (e.g. open/close apparatus)

iii. Restricted operation

iv. System administrator

For maintenance and engineering purposes of the station HMI, the following authorization levels shall be available:

i. No engineering allowed

ii. Engineering/configuration allowed

iii. Entire system management allowed

The access rights shall be defined by passwords assigned during the log-in procedure. Only the system administrator shall be able to add/remove users and change access rights.

j. Dynamic Busbar Coloring

Busbar transfer for a specific feeder. Dynamic busbar coloring gives the operator a quick overview of the state of the substation and shows at a glance whether any specific part of

the substation e.g. busbar segment is earthed, energized, or de-

energized.

This function helps preventing incorrect switching; especially in emergency situations when often time is of the essence. The

operator has to have a clear, precise and fast system overview, infeed sources and consumers e.g. from the utility grid. With a better overview the operator is able to respond quicker to any

contingency.

4.3.8 Station HMI-Reports

a. The reports shall provide time-related follow-ups of measured analogue values and calculated analogue values and other data collected by the Station HMI. The data displayed shall comprise:

Trend reports:

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 i. Day (mean, peak) ii. Month (mean, peak) iii.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

i. Day (mean, peak)

ii. Month (mean, peak)

iii. Semi-annual (mean, peak)

iv. Year (mean, peak)

Historical reports:

i. Day (at user selected interval, with the minimum capability of a 15 minute resolution per interval)

ii. Week

iii. Month

iv. Year

b. It shall be possible to select displayed values from the database in the process display on-line. Scrolling between e.g. days shall be possible. Unsure values shall be indicated.

c. It shall be possible to select the time period for which the specific data are kept in the memory.

d. Following printouts shall be available from the Station HMI display (on the Operator's or Engineering Workstation or both) which shall be printed on demand:

Daily voltage and frequency curves depicting time on X-axis and the appropriate parameters on the Y-axis. The time duration of the curve is 24 hours.

Weekly trend curves for real and derived analogue values.

Printouts of the maximum and minimum values and frequency of occurrence and duration of maximum and minimum values for each analogue parameter for each circuit in 24 hour period

Provision shall be made for logging information about breaker status, including number of operations along with the current value at the time of interruption (opening of the breaker) within the allocated period set by the user, along with date and time indications

Equipment operation details shift-wise and during 24 hours

Printout on adjustable time period as well as demand for MW, MVAR, Current, Voltage on each bus (as applicable), feeder, and transformer, as well as Tap Positions, temperature, as well as status of all pumps for switchgear, and fans for transformers

Printout and display on adjustable time period as well as on demand system frequency and average frequency

The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide representative sample of printouts and reports which will be available with the SAS supplied by the SOLUTION PROVIDER.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 ● For printouts related to monthly, semi-annual and yearly

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For printouts related to monthly, semi-annual and yearly reports, mean values and peak values shall be available at the intervals selectable by the user.

4.3.9 Station HMI-Trend display (historical data)

a. It shall be possible to illustrate all types of process data as trends - input and output data, binary and analogue data.

b. The trends shall be displayed in graphical form as column or curve diagrams with a maximum of 10 trends per screen. Adjustable time span and scaling ranges (with adjustments easily settable by the user) must be provided.

c. It shall be possible to change the type of value logging (direct, mean, sum, or difference) on-line in the window.

d. It shall also be possible to change the update intervals on-line in the picture as well as the selection of threshold values for alarming purposes.

4.3.10 Automatic disturbance file transfer

All recorded data from the IEDs with integrated disturbance recorder as well as dedicated disturbance recording systems (e.g. stand-alone TFR/DFR equipment supplied by other portions of this contract) shall be automatically uploaded (event triggered once per day) initially to the Station HMI computer equipment, and eventually to the Engineering Workstation with data stored on hard disk of the Engineering Workstation. In performance of the automatic disturbance file transfer function, the IED's (with integrated disturbance recorder function) and dedicated disturbance recording systems shall have sufficient buffering capability to store all disturbance records for a minimum 48 hour period without the possibility of buffer overwrites, and loss of data. This is required due to the possibility of loss of communications links between the IEDs, dedicated disturbance recording systems and the Station HMI computer equipment. National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that Automatic Disturbance File Transfer shall be available for ALL IED’s which will have disturbance records which have to be transferred by this feature irrespective of the IED manufacturer.

4.3.11 Disturbance analysis and evaluation

a. The substation's monitoring system which will be incorporated into the SAS shall provide all relevant information for faultfinding, analysis, and troubleshooting. Suitable and user-friendly fault evaluation software shall be included in the scope of supply, providing

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 short fault summaries and automatic printouts of the fault

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

short fault summaries and automatic printouts of the fault history and fault location.

b. The workstation contained as part of the Station HMI which is used for disturbance analysis and evaluation shall have all necessary software, including software used by ALL IED’s from various SAS manufacturers which generates disturbance records, to evaluate the required information for proper fault analysis.

c. Disturbance/fault analysis software tools and data formats shall use common electric utility industry formats used by the National Grid Saudi Arabia (e.g.-COMTRADE), and shall avoid using manufacturer specific proprietary formats.

d. The protection engineer may also have his own PC-based system which will be located outside each substation (and not provided under this contract) which will also be used to evaluate all the required information for proper fault analysis, independent of the Power Control Center. However, connectivity facilities shall be provided by the SAS in the substation to allow connection between the external Protection Engineering workstation (not provided under this contract) and the disturbance archive facilities provided as part of the SAS Station HMI/Engineering Workstation.

4.3.12 IED parameter setting

It shall be possible to access all Protection IEDs, Control IEDs, and combined Control/Protection IEDs for reading the parameters (settings) for the Protection IEDs, Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs and writing (configuring) the parameters (settings) for the Protection IEDs, Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IED’s from the following:

a. Station

HMI/Engineering

Workstation-read/write

privileges

for

parameters

b. Local HMI-read privileges only for parameters

 

Computer

located

in

c. Computer outside each Substation (e.g. a Protection Engineering of the National Grid

Saudi

Arabia)-read

privileges only for parameters

d. Maintenance Laptop Computer which plugs into the IED Serial and/or Optical Port-read privileges with emergency write privileges for parameters

The setting of parameters or the activation of parameter sets shall only be allowed after entering a password at the appropriate User Authority Level.

4.3.13 Automatic sequences

a. The available automatic sequences shall be listed and described, (e.g. sequences related to the transfer of power through bus couplers,

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 changes from bus 1 to bus 2, activation/deactivation of

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changes from bus 1 to bus 2, activation/deactivation of feeders/transformers, etc.) The automatic sequence can be initiated by the operator. It should be noted that the operator can activate the customer pre-defined switching sequence by giving a single command only. The sequence control function performs a series of single control commands step-by-step. Each command is supervised and checked by the usual interlocking functions implemented by the associated bay controller (Control IED(s) and combined Control/Protection IED(s)) and other devices, i.e. the blocking criteria, synchrocheck, interlocking logic, etc. Thus the procedure is identical to manual single step commands and therefore ensures the same degree of secure operation.

b. There shall also be provision in the software to write custom Automatic sequences by the user. In this way, it would be possible for the user to have specific switching operations, for example: load shedding on selected feeders under certain conditions. For the user requirement for writing custom Automatic sequences, the SAS shall be designed with Automatic Sequence development tools which can be easily understood by typical substation operators, and dispatchers.

4.3.14 Load shedding

a. If load shedding is required, the criteria for the shedding and the criteria for the choice of the feeders to be shed should be described.

b. The choice of feeders to be shed shall be shown at station level and shall be modified either locally (at the SAS installation) or remotely

c. The load shedding functionality shall be realized by combining frequency functions at bay level, priority settings downloaded from the station level to the bay as well as other operational requirements as it pertains to load shedding (e.g. instructions remotely issued from SCADA Master Station(s) to shed load through the opening of breaker(s) at the substation).

4.3.15 Power system monitoring

a. It is envisaged that monitoring shall be applied not only to specific and individual sections of the substation but also to a complete substation monitoring system. This Power System Monitoring approach shall become an integral part of the Substation Automation System (SAS) and the results shall support the accomplishment of a greater benefit from using a value-based system to select monitoring appropriate for the specific circumstances and based on sound engineering and economic judgment.

b. One important aspect is that the wealth of data available from numerical protection IED’s/relays, combined Control/Protection IED’s, and Control IED’s shall be used for monitoring the condition

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of circuit breakers, transformers, tap changers etc. by means of a cost- effective data sharing approach.

c. This system monitoring should be the first step in creating a comprehensive power system monitoring scheme, collecting information from the substation.

d. With respect to the Power System Monitoring requirements specified in Sections 4.3.15.a to c above power system monitoring of the SAS shall only be limited to the substation(s) itself where the SAS is installed.

4.3.16 Station SCADA functions

a. As part of the SAS design for the substation, there shall be the full ability to provide normal SCADA functions for the substation, which include data acquisition, control, and monitoring for the station. This will be accomplished through an interconnection between the SCADA Master Station(s) through the Communications Gateways and other SAS equipment which in turn will send the control and/or data acquisition signals through the SAS to the IEDs inside the substation for further action and vice versa.

b. For the station SCADA functions, the SAS shall emulate the functional features of RTU Standard based on latest revision of 38-

TMSS-03

c. Given that the SAS will now replace the SCADA RTU with IEDs and the local/station HMI, the overall SAS will serve the SCADA function for the station(s) where SAS will be implemented. In this respect, the SCADA points list requirement as indicated in latest revision of TES- 119.27 shall be implemented as part of the SAS SCADA functions for each substation.

d. Additionally, as part of the Station SCADA function, the upload/download of the SCADA data and control signals from the SAS to the Power Control Center (SCADA Master Station(s)) shall be in accordance with both IEC-101 and IEC-104 communications protocols between SCADA Master Station equipment (located at the Power Control Center-SCADA Master Stations) and the Communications Gateway equipment provided by the SAS (and as such, the Communications Gateways included in SAS shall be equipped with the required interfaces for both IEC-101 and IEC-104 as described later in this Standard. The selection of which protocol will be finally used (either IEC 101 or IEC 104 or both) for communications between the SCADA Master Station(s) and the Communications Gateways used in the SAS will be provided by the

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National Grid Saudi Arabia at the time of final commissioning of the substation(s) covered by the PTS.

4.3.17 Station SOE functions

a. Provide and install a new Sequence of Events Recording System as part of each substation's SAS that satisfy the SOE Signal requirements of each substation.

b. For the substation SAS involved under this project, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall do the following:

Implement the SOE point requirements of the involved station in accordance with the SOE Signal Requirements.

Prepare SOE Input signal interface drawings and I/O Tabulation sheets consisting of I/O point assignments which will be contained as part of the station HMI interface, and the corresponding IEDs for each substation.

Submit the I/O Tabulation Sheets as a hard copy and as a soft copy in a CD (soft copy shall be readable by the version of Adobe Acrobat Reader used by the National Grid Saudi Arabia).

Perform FAT (Factory Acceptance Tests) and SAT (Pre- commissioning and commissioning) of the SOE functions for each substation.

c. For the station SOE functions, the SAS shall emulate the functional features of SOE standard based on latest revision of 38-TMSS-04

d. SOE Points List shall be based on the requirements of main PTS/SOE point lost standard.

4.3.18 Station protection functions

a. General

Station protection functions are protection functions that normally cannot be directly allocated to a particular bay. This concerns essentially the busbar and breaker failure protection schemes.

All protection functions realized at the station level should be based on numerical technology and have a decentralized architecture (with bay units connected to a central unit). Remote access shall be made via the central unit. In any case it

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should be possible to install the station protection scheme in a decentralized or centralized arrangement.

SOLUTION PROVIDER shall also refer to other portions of this Standard as well as related Appendix of the main PTS for additional specific requirements for Protection which will also be applicable for station protection functions.

b. Self-supervision

Continuous self-supervision function with self-diagnostic possibilities shall be included.

c. User configuration

It shall be possible to monitor, control and configure all logical input and output signals and binary inputs and relay outputs for all built-in functions and signals.

d. Event and disturbance recording function:

As part of the decentralized station-oriented protection scheme, the bay units should contain an event recorder able to store at least 100 time-tagged events.

Also at the bay level a disturbance recorder with a minimum of 5 seconds recording time for at least 10 disturbances shall provide the user with time-tagged disturbance records. At least the analogue inputs connected to the bay unit, as well as 16 binary signals must be recorded.

The phasors of the pre-fault, fault and post-fault signals shall be recorded for each disturbance and be made available for further evaluation purposes.

e. Local HMI

The local human machine interface (HMI) shall be front- mounted and based on a user-friendly, menu-structured program, and performed with the use of a permanently installed human machine interface unit. This is valid for the central unit. For the bay units it is only valid in case of a decentralized arrangement.

In addition, service values of the connected analogue inputs shall be available.

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f. Busbar protection

A fully numerical scheme busbar protection system shall be provided.

Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS or protection standards for further details on the Busbar protection that shall be provided.

Furthermore, relating to the interfacing between Busbar protection and the SAS, the interfacing shall be fully compliant with IEC 61850 and IEC62439-3 PRP 1 and with this interfacing, the use of protocol converters (e.g. from IEC-103 to IEC 61850) will NOT be allowed. REDBOX is not acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to National Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing Fig. 07-01 which shows where REDBOX is acceptable.

The Station HMI (Human Machine Interface) should graphically display the busbar configuration with a dynamic (permanently up-to-date) busbar image.

All the measured and set parameters as well as signal and tripping commands shall be possible to be visualized in the Local HMI.

In order to meet the modern substation's system requirements, communication facilities between the numerical busbar protection system and other components of the substation's SAS shall be provided.

The operation of the numerical busbar protection system shall be controlled either locally or remotely. Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS/standards for further details on these control requirements.

The SAS Station HMI Engineering Workstation shall be primarily used for parameter settings related to the numerical busbar protection system. Readings related to the parameter settings shall be available at the Local HMI, the SAS Station HMI Engineering Workstation, the Maintenance Laptop Computers, and also, where connected to the external Protection Engineering Workstation (external Protection Engineering Workstation provided by others). Parameter settings and readings shall be possible with an easy to use and easy to understand user interface and shall also be possible without the knowledge of programming by using a menu/GUI driven program.

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Disturbances in the SAS Station HMI, or any other component of the SAS which is outside the numerical busbar protection scheme shall not influence the protection.

Pre-engineering for future configurations should be possible

g. Breaker failure protection

A fully numerical based breaker failure protection system shall be provided.

Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS or Protection Standards for further details on the Breaker Failure protection that shall be provided.

Depending on the requirements of related Appendix of the main PTS/standards, and other National Grid Saudi Arabia engineering and operational requirements, the Breaker Failure Protection may or may not be combined with the numerical Busbar Protection system.

Furthermore, relating to the interfacing between Breaker Failure protection and the SAS, the interfacing shall be fully compliant with IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 and with this interfacing, the use of protocol converters (e.g. from IEC- 103 to IEC 61850) will NOT be allowed. REDBOX is not acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to National Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing Fig. 07-01 which shows where REDBOX is acceptable.

All the measured and set parameters as well as signal and tripping commands shall be possible to be visualized in the Local HMI contained as part of the numerical Breaker Failure Protection system.

In order to meet the modern substation's system requirements, communication facilities between the Numerical Breaker Failure protection system and other components of the substation's SAS shall be provided.

The operation of the Numerical Breaker Failure Protection System shall be controlled either locally or remotely. Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS/standards for further details on these control requirements.

The SAS Station HMI Engineering Workstation shall be primarily used for parameter settings related to the Numerical Breaker Failure Protection System. Readings related to the

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 parameter settings shall be available at the Local HMI,

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parameter settings shall be available at the Local HMI, the SAS Station HMI, Engineering Workstation, the Maintenance Laptop Computers, and also when connected to the external Protection Engineering Workstation (external Protection

Parameter

Engineering Workstation provided by others)

settings and readings shall be possible with an easy to use and easy to understand user interface and shall also be possible without the knowledge of programming by using a menu/GUI driven program.

Disturbances in the SAS Station HMI or any other component of the SAS which is outside the Numerical Breaker Failure Protection Scheme shall not influence the protection.

Pre-engineering for future configurations should be possible.

5.0 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Message Performance

5.1.1 The given (message) performance times are referring to the total transfer time t that includes the IED's internal processing time as defined in IEC 61850 as well as the transmission time used over the communications network (inter- bay bus, switches, etc.). Different requirements concerning performance for messages apply depending on the application. Referring to the IEC 61850 standard part 5, one can distinguish the different performance classes for the various applications (e.g. control and protection, metering and power quality, etc.) which must be adhered to by the SOLUTION PROVIDER in the message performance requirements for the overall design of the SAS.

5.1.2 As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's proposal, and as well as during the Base Design Stage of the Project, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide message performance estimates (in terms of the total transfer time t referenced in Section 5 of this Standard for the different performance classes for the various applications. As part of the providing of these message performance estimates, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall identify any weaknesses in the SAS which may impact on the message performance requirements based on IEC 61850.

5.2 System Performance

5.2.1 It is expected that a SAS during its lifetime will have to face different situations concerning the number of events appearing in each substation and the resulting load on the SAS communication network.

5.2.2 During the normal load situation only occasional alarms and events are occurring at the substation with analog reporting as load demand changes.

5.2.3 The updating times on the operator station under normal and calm conditions in the substation shall be as follows:

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Function

Typical values

Exchange of display (first reaction)

< 1 s

Presentation of a binary change in the process display

< 0.5 s

Presentation of an analogue change in the process display < 1 s

< 0.5 s < 1.5 s

From order to process output

From order to updating the display

5.2.4 In terms of the overall SAS design, the most important issue when planning each substation's communication are a proper assignment of freely allocable logical nodes to physical devices and the arrangement of the communication network itself to minimize point-to-point communication requirements.

5.2.5 Combining data objects into object oriented of multi-command messages should be planned by the SOLUTION PROVIDER in a suitable way which can result in a noticeable reduction in the total traffic.

5.2.6 When defining the actual network and stacks, the SOLUTION PROVIDER

is encouraged to combine data objects in such a way that the traffic is

minimized.

5.2.7 To verify system performance requirements, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall perform a preliminary study involving a LAN simulation to measure/predict expected system performance of the SAS communications system (including inter-bay bus, station bus, switches and other elements of the SAS communications system) for the following conditions:

a. Normal (Typical) operating requirements

b. Expected emergency and abnormal loads on each substation

c. Other times when the SOLUTION PROVIDER may expect a system performance degradation due to actions performed by the SAS in the substation, such as excessive protection signaling, abnormal receipt of alarms, performance of updates as well as other factors

5.2.8 For the LAN simulation study, for all cases, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall state the assumptions used and the conditions stated in his study, any weak points which may be apparent in the LAN communications system (e.g. inter-bay bus, switches, station bus, etc.) as well as methods which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will use to minimize LAN traffic on the system (to avoid LAN bottlenecks).

5.2.9 Also, for the LAN simulation study, this shall be performed during the base design stage of the project

6.0 RELIABILITY AND SYSTEM DESIGN

6.1 Reliability Aspects

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6.1.1 The SAS shall be designed to satisfy the very high demands for reliability and availability concerning:

a. solid mechanical and electrical design

b. protection against electrical interference (EMI)

c. high-quality components and boards

d. modular, well-tested hardware

e. thoroughly developed and tested modular software

f. easy-to-understand programming language for application programming

g. detailed graphical documentation, IEC 61131-3, of the application software

h. built-in supervision and diagnostic functions

i. after-sales service

j. security

experience of security requirements

process know-how

select-before-execute at operation

k. process status representation as double indications

l. distributed solution

m. independent units connected to the local area network

n. back-up functions

o. panel design appropriate to any harsh electrical environment and ambient conditions

p. panel grounding immune to transient ground potential rise

q. The SAS must provide a high MTBF (mean time between failures) and a low MTTR (mean time to repair) rate, the values to be indicated by the SOLUTION PROVIDER during the Base Design Stage of the Project.

r. The availability calculation for the substation's 'substation control' functionality shall include the following cases:

local bay control with full functionality (interlocking and synchrocheck)

substation control

control by PCC (SCADA Master Station(s))

For the availability calculation, travel time of maintenance personnel to and from the site shall be disregarded, and shall assume that all repair/replacement spares are on-site. However, the availability calculation shall take into account the MTTR (Mean Time to Repair) figures of the SAS component with the estimated highest repair/replacement time.

The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall indicate the guidelines utilized for availability calculations.

s. For the 'substation control’ functionality, the availability must reach at least 99.995% over the expected 20 year lifetime of the SAS. The SAS shall be designed in order to provide this availability. Also as part of

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Bid Proposal the SOLUTION PROVIDER

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the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Bid Proposal the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall state the expected availability of the ‘substation control’ functionality’ performed by the SAS and for what duration, and also under what conditions and assumptions (e.g. conditions and assumptions pertaining to MTBF and MTTR of individual components of the SAS, environmental conditions which the SAS is operating under, etc.) which the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's expected availability (of the ‘substation control’ functionality performed by the SAS) is based on. National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that the expected availability figures developed for the ‘substation control’ functionality are considered only preliminary (since not is all known about the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved final design of the SAS at the bid stage), and that the SOLUTION PROVIDER will be required to develop final availability calculations for the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved SAS installation(s) during the later design stages of the project.

t. The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall clearly define how the offered architecture meets the availability requirements as part of his Bid Proposal and the later Base Design Proposal, As such, as part of this definition, a system block diagram shall therefore be submitted.

6.2 General Design Requirements

6.2.1 In order to meet the requirements of this specification, the design of the SAS is within the manufacturer’s/SOLUTION PROVIDER's responsibility but subject to approval by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.

6.2.2 As a minimum, the following important requirements should be guaranteed in any case:

a. Distributed architecture that allows the placement of bay equipment in a kiosk and the station equipment in a central building

b. The IEDs at bay level like the Protection IEDs, Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IED’s are directly connected to the inter- bay bus.

c. In the case of Main1 Main 2 protection schemes, the two protection terminals (Protection IED’s and combined Control/Protection IED’s) have to be of different hardware and software, and where indicated in related Appendix of the main PTS/standards, from different manufacturers.

d. The station-oriented protection schemes should have a decentralized architecture and shall meet the requirements of related Appendix of the main PTS/protection standards.

e. Re-closing and associated synchro-check functions can be considered as control functions, unless otherwise specified that these (reclosing

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 and associated synchro-check) functions are protection functions as

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and associated synchro-check) functions are protection functions as indicated in related Appendix of the main PTS/Protection Standards.

f. A separate Control IED unit or combined Control/Protection IED unit has to be associated to each circuit breaker. The minimum number of control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IED’s shall be considered accordingly for each substation. For the control function for High Voltage switchgear, only dedicated Control IEDs will be utilized and provided. For the control function for Medium Voltage switchgear, combined Control/Protection IED’s will be utilized and provided, unless the related Appendix of the main PTS requires the use of dedicated Control IED’s (for Control), and dedicated Protection IED’s (for Protection) for certain (or possibly all) items of Medium Voltage switchgear.

g. The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present the internal and external layout of the different cubicles, as well as the locations within each Substation of these cubicles during the Base Design stage of the Project.

6.2.3 Bay-oriented arrangements

For each type of bay (line, transformer, coupler, and other bays) the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present the principal arrangement of the cubicles: type of hardware units and associated functions.

6.2.4 Station-oriented arrangements

The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present a detailed schematic diagram and the drawings of the station level and the optical connections.

6.2.5 Other Protection Scheme requirements

The protection scheme is an integral part of the SAS, and the protection relays (Protection IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs) shall therefore be connected to the inter-bay bus in order to provide unrestricted access to all data and information stored in the relays (Protection IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs), and for monitoring protection parameters remotely.

7.0 IEC61850 AND IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 COMMUNICATION PROFILE

7.1 Introduction Related to IEC 61850

7.1.1 The definition of the IEC61850 communication profile shall assure that the offered solution complies with the minimum requirements requested in the standard and also shall ensure that the offered architecture can be realized with the proposed products and their implemented services.

7.1.2 For interoperability, not only data have to be standardized but also the access to these data called services. The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall include in

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his Proposal a filled out interoperability list of each typical device provided in the offered system to determine compliance with IEC 61850 requirements. Some of the relevant areas to be covered by the profile with regard to IEC 61850 are:

a. Communication Services

Abstract Communications Services (ACSI) (7-2)

b. Data Modeling

Common Data Classes (7-3)

Logical Nodes (7-4)

The data modeling is not specifically listed but the supplier shall comply fully with the logical nodes described in the standard for the devices where they are required. As a minimum all the mandatory data of the used logical nodes must be supported.

7.2 Typical Architecture and Required Communication Services Related to IEC 61850

The SAS architecture shall be based on a completely distributed approach. To support the distributed approach as a minimum the below given communication services between the particular system devices have to be supported:

7.2.1 Time synchronization: SNTP or IRIG-B

7.2.2 IEC GOOSE: Interlocks, other IED-IED-communication

7.2.3 Sampled Values

7.2.4 File transfer FTP or IEC61850/MMS

7.2.5 Reporting: Buffered reports

7.2.6 Commands: Control model Select-before-operate with Enhanced Security for primary equipment, Simple direct control for LED reset and the like

7.3 Profile/Requirements relating to IEC 62439-3 PRP 1

The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall include in his Bid Proposal a filled out interoperability list of each applicable device provided in the offered system to determine compliance with IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 requirements. Some of the relevant areas to be covered by the profile with regard to IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 will include the following:

7.3.1 Confirmation that all IED’s supplied shall provide a IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 DAN (Double Attached Node) connection to redundant ring inter-bay busses.

7.3.2 On the Station HMI and Communications Gateway ends, the plan/proposal to interconnect redundant ring inter-bay busses supporting IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 traffic to the Station HMI and Communications Gateway computers, and whether the Station HMI/Communications Gateway computers will have interfaces which will fully support IEC 62439-3 PRP 1.

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7.3.3 Transit times of IEC 61850 signals through IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 equipment (e.g. SAN’S, DAN’S, Redboxes, etc.).

7.3.4 Confirmation that the Ethernet switches proposed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER can carry the IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 Ethernet packets which will be sent and received by the end devices on the IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 Links.

7.3.5 Other information which the SOLUTION PROVIDER deems relevant to the evaluation of his proposal.

8.0

CONFIGURATION TOOLS /SERVICE AND SUPPORT SYSTEM

8.1 Depending on the Equipment Manufacturers design, the configuration of the Front End Computers shall be made either at the Engineering Workstation, or Operator Workstations in the Windows environment. The various functionalities shall be customized by easy-to-use interactive configuration tools. The configuration shall include the visual presentation of the object, adaptations needed in the process database, and adaptations of the communication configuration data.

8.2 Portable Maintenance Laptop Computers (which plug into the IED serial, Ethernet RJ 45, and/or Optical Port) as a service unit shall be provided for on-site review of settings, and emergency on-site modifications of the Control IED and Protection IED devices. This service unit shall be used for documentation, IED Parameter readings/settings (IED Parameter settings on an emergency basis only), testing and commissioning, etc.

8.3 The service & support system shall be used for the following purposes:

8.3.1 System configuration

8.3.2 System testing

8.3.3 Help functions

8.3.4 Program documentation

8.3.5 Down and uploading of programs

8.3.6 System commissioning

8.3.7 Data base management

8.3.8 Changing peripheral parameters

8.4 The service & support system shall be able to monitor data in the operating substation's control system and to present changing variables on the display screen in graphic representation.

9.0

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Compliance with standards

9.1.1 For design and type testing of the protection and control equipment as well as other equipment associated with the SAS as well as overall implementation of the SAS, the following standards, protocols, and industry practices shall be applicable:

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a. General

IEC 60255: Electrical relays

IEC 60038: IEC Standard voltages

IEC 60068: Environmental testing

IEC 60664: Insulation coordination for equipment within low- voltage systems

Communications networks and systems in

IEC

61850:

substations

b. Suitability for substation environment:

IEEE 1613: IEEE Standard Environmental and Testing Requirements for Communications Networking Devices in Electric Power Substations

IEEE C37.90.2: IEEE Trial-Use Standard Withstand Capability of Relay Systems to Radiated Electromagnetic Interference from Transceivers

IEEE C37.90.1: IEEE Standard Surge Withstand Capability Test for Protective Relays and Relay Systems

IEC 60068-2-30 Ed 3.0 (2005-08), Environmental Testing

IEC 60255-5 Ed 2.0 Electrical Relays - Part 5: Insulation coordination for measuring relays and protection equipment - Requirements and tests

IEC 60255-21-1 Ed 1.0 (1988-09), Electrical Relays Part 21:

Vibration, shock, bump and seismic test on measuring relays and protection equipment-Section One: Vibration tests (sinusoidal)

IEC 60255-21-2 Ed 1.0 (1988-09), Electrical Relays Part 21:

Vibration, shock, bump and seismic test on measuring relays and protection equipment-Section Two: Shock and Bump tests (sinusoidal)

c. CE-marking

EN 50081-2 Emissivity (Industry)

EN 50082-2 Immunity (Industry)

d. Cyber Security

IEC 62443-2-1, Ed 1.0 Industrial communication networks- Network and system security- Part 2-1 Establishing an industrial automation and control system security

NERC CIP North American Electric Reliability Council- Critical Infrastructure Protection

IETF RFC-2196, Site Security Handbook

IETF RFC-3093 Firewall Enhancement Protocol

IEEE 1686-2007 IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities

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ANSI/ISA-99 Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems

NIST SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy

NIST SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS),

NIST SP 800-82

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

Security

NIST SP 800-147 BIOS Protection Guidelines

NIST SP 800-40 Version 2.0 Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program

NIST SP 800-123 Guide to General Server Security

NIST SP 800-53, Rev 3 Information Security

US DHS Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems

US DHS Improving Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security with Defense-in-depth Strategies

US DHS Recommended Practice for Securing Control System Modems

IEC TS 62351-Parts 1 to 8 & 10, Data and Communications Security

e. Ethernet Switch Standards

IEEE 802.3

10BASE-T specification

IEEE 802.3u

100BASE-TX, 100BASE-FX specification

IEEE 802.3ab

1000BASE-TX specification

IEEE 802.3z

1000BASE-LX specification

IEEE 802.3x

Flow Control

IEEE 802.3ad

Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) for creation of Ether channels with other LACP compliant devices

IEEE 802.1d

Spanning Tree Protocol support for redundant Backbone connections and loop-free network with improved fault tolerance

IEEE 802.1w

Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP)

IEEE 802.1p

Specification for traffic prioritization.

IEEE 802.1q

Specification for VLAN tagging.

IEEE 802.1x

Specification to allow for dynamic, port-based security providing user authentication

IEEE 1613

Standard for Networking Devices in Electrical Power Substations which specifies electrical immunity, temperature ratings and other environmental requirements

IEC 61850-3

Communication Network and Systems in

IEC 61850-5

Substations Part 3-General Requirements Communication Network and Systems in Substations -Part5 Communication requirements for functions and Device models

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0  IETF RFC 768  IETF RFC 783 

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

IETF RFC 768

IETF RFC 783

IETF RFC 791

IETF RFC 792

IETF RFC 793

IETF RFC 826

IETF RFC 854

IETF RFC 894

User Datagram Protocol (UDP)

Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)

Internet Protocol (IP)

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)

Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

Telnet Protocol Specification

Standard for transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networks

IETF RFC 1112

Internet

Group

Management

Protocol

(IGMPv1)

IETF RFC 2236

Internet

Group

Management

Protocol

(IGMPv2)

IETF RFC 1519

IETF RFC 2030

IETF RFC 1541

IETF RFC 2284

IETF RFC 2475

IETF RFC 2865

Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR)

Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTPv4)

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)

PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

An architecture for Differentiated Services

Remote Authentication Dial-In User Services (RADIUS)

f. Other National Grid Saudi Arabia Standards

Latest revision of the following National Grid Saudi Arabia standard to be followed

TCS-P-105

Commissioning Tests and Checks of Power Transmission Network Equipment

TES-P-103.05

Uninterruptible Power System

TES-P-119.26

Control Schemes for Substation Equipment

TES-P-119.27

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

TES-P-119.30

Auxiliary Power Systems (AC/DC)

01-TMSS-01

General Requirements for All Equipment/Materials

31-TMSS-01

Relay and Control Panels

32-TMSS-01

Metal clad Switchgear 11kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV or 34.5 kV

32-TMSS-02

SF6 Gas Insulated Switchgear69 kV through 380 kV (but with exceptions noted in other parts of related Appendix to the main PTS)

32-TMSS-03

Metal clad Gas Insulated Medium Voltage Switchgear 11kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV or 34.5 kV

38-TMSS-03

Remote Terminal Unit

38-TMSS-04

Sequence of Events Recorder System

38-TMSS-05

Annunciator Systems

46-TMSS-03

UPS 5kVA through 100kVA, if applicable

Additional National Grid Saudi Arabia standards (not included above) which are referenced in main PTS document

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 9.2 Vendor’s/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's experience and Proposal

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

9.2 Vendor’s/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's experience and Proposal for the SAS

9.2.1 Only National Grid Saudi Arabia approved manufacturers of control and protection systems for electricity transmission and distribution applications will be accepted. Preferred manufacturers will be those who have experience in deliveries of the full scope of station automation systems (SAS) and services. This experience has to be substantiated by means of reference installations having been in service under similar environmental conditions for at least 2 years.

9.2.2 For single equipment a field experience of at least 2 years is requested.

9.2.3 In order to assess the vendor’s/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's experience with the enquiry, as well for the National Grid Saudi Arabia to evaluate the vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's for the SAS, during the bidding stage of the Project, the vendor/SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit a Bid Proposal for the SAS. As part of the vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Proposal, the vendor/SOLUTION PROVIDER is required to present the following:

Technical design specification and description of the SAS

Catalogues and brochures of the equipment and devices offered

Reference list

Interoperability List referenced in Section 7 of this Standard.

Clause-by-Clause compliance statement (including any SOLUTION PROVIDER deviations/exceptions) to this Standard the related Appendix involving Protective Relay equipment and the portions of the main SOW/TS (PTS) pertaining to Substation Automation Systems (SAS)

Listing of equipment manufacturer's recommended operating spare parts for two years operation of the SAS, and a compliance statement to related Appendix of the main PTS as it relates to SAS Spare Parts.

Listing of equipment manufacturer's recommended special tools, test equipment and software which is needed to operate and maintain the SAS

Proposed Software Upgrade and Software Maintenance Agreement

Vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS preliminary training plan and proposal for SAS Training identified in related Appendix of the main PTS

Statement of the Preliminary Expected Availability for the “Substation Control’ functionality of the SAS

Definition on how the offered SAS Architecture meets the Availability requirements

SAS Block/Schematic Diagram

Identification of each critical non-redundant SAS equipment item

MTBF Figures for each critical non-redundant SAS equipment item

SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposal for supply of AC Power to SAS equipment requiring the supply of AC Power-See Section 14 of this Standard for SOLUTION PROVIDER required documents

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0  Vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposed redundant

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

Vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposed redundant networks scheme for the SAS, which is identified in Section 3 of this Standard, including the proposed communications architecture showing all communications/WAN interconnection details

General SAS architecture details

Narrative of Bay Interlocking, Station Interlocking and Double Operation Interlocking scenario, as well as a narrative of the interrelationships between the software/GOOSE interlocking scheme and the hard-wired interlocking scheme.

Dual ACTIVE Communications Port Scheme for all IEDs and confirmation of compliance to IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 for the dual ACTIVE Communications Port Scheme for all IED’s

SOLUTION PROVIDER ’s proposal for SAS Solution provider (s)/SAS Solution provider (s), as well as main Substation SOLUTION PROVIDER details pertaining to his SAS Subcontracting Plan.

Any other information which the National Grid Saudi Arabia may require the vendor/SOLUTION PROVIDER to provide during the Bidding Phase of the Project pertaining to the SAS

Preliminary Outage estimate required as part of a SAS Upgrade/Reconfiguration (See Section 14 of this Standard for further details)

Data Schedule as applicable (for SAS equipment such as UPS, RTU, etc.)

Preliminary list of materials

10. PROJECT EXECUTION

During the project execution phase the following activities have to be considered:

Engineering FAT Site installation SAT/Commissioning

10.1

Engineering

10.1.1 During the engineering phase the following milestones are very important and have to be agreed upon between the SOLUTION PROVIDER and the National Grid Saudi Arabia:

a. Complete single-line diagram, including position of the different objects (CTs, PTs, isolators, etc).

b. Acceptance of: event list, alarm list, the main pictures displayed at station level & used in the single-line diagram etc.

c. Acceptance of: the lists of events and alarms (including their names) with the indication of the particular signal to be sent (station event list, remote signal list, etc).

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0 d. Cubicle layout. e. Backup database entries pertaining to

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0

d. Cubicle layout.

e. Backup database entries pertaining to the SCL (Substation Configuration Language) used to program each IED object.

10.1.2 Refer to other clauses of Section 10 also for additional documentation to be submitted during the various phases of the Project.

10.2 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)

10.2.1 The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit a test specification for the factory acceptance test (FAT) of the Substation Automation System for approval by the National Grid Saudi Arabia as part of the base design engineering package for the project. This will include (but may not be limited to) a listing of the tests, FAT System Configuration diagrams showing all equipment which will be included as part of the FAT testing (with the FAT System Configuration diagrams also showing a one-line diagram for the simulated switchgear for the simulated bays/diameters which will be used for the testing), test procedures and test forms/reports, which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will perform for the SAS components as part of the FAT. For all SAS equipment,

applicable type test certificates shall be submitted, and if required by National Grid Saudi Arabia, copies of the applicable type test reports shall be

submitted.

10.2.2 The manufacturing phase of the SAS shall be concluded by the factory acceptance test (FAT). The purpose is to ensure that the SOLUTION PROVIDER has interpreted the specified requirements correctly and that the FAT includes checking to the degree required by the user. The general philosophy shall be to deliver a system to site only after it has been thoroughly tested and its specified performance has been verified, as far as site conditions can be simulated in a test lab. If the FAT comprises only a certain portion of the system for practical reasons, it has to be assured that this test configuration contains at least one unit of each and every type of equipment incorporated in the delivered system.

10.2.3 National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that authorization for release of shipment of the SAS shall be provided only when the ALL the following conditions are met:

SOLUTION PROVIDER has provided ALL Type Test Reports for SAS equipment which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will provide as part of the SAS, and that these Type Test Reports have been accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia through one (1) third party SAS FAT Witnessing Inspector, and five (5) National Grid Saudi Arabia witnessing engineers.

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0  National Grid Saudi Arabia has approved the SOLUTION

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0