DULAY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No.

108017 April 3, 1995)

Liability of company for criminal act done deliberately
while on duty
FACTS: In 1988, an altercation between Benigno
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big
Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a
result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the
deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed an action for
actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages against Benigno Torzuela and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., and/or Superguard
Security Corp., as employers, for negligence having
failed to exercise diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision and control of its employee.
SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Also, it
argued that Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties and was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo).
It also filed a motion praying that it be
excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant
Torzuela is not one of its employees.
However, petitioners opposed both motions,
stating that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180 ..Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or an industry.
RTC ruled in favour of Superguard. It held that
the complaint did not state facts necessary or
sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does
not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in
shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in
the performance of his duties. It also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from,
quasi-delict. CA affirmed.
Dulay insists that Torzuela' s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil

Code. Petitioners further contend that under Article

2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the
selection or supervision of their employees.
ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard can be
held liable as employers for the criminal act of
Torzuela
HELD: YES! It would show that petitioners are
invoking their right to recover damages against the
private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for
the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting
and killing Napoleon Dulay.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
There is no justification for limiting the scope of Art.
2176 to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence
but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it
was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to
dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed
to make allegations of attendant negligence
attributable to private respondents.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
GARCIA, vs. THE HONORABLE MARIANO M.
FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL (G.R. No. L-35095 August
31, 1973)
FACTS:
Petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the
Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife,
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of
said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned
and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and
driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-

trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the

purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of
government hospitals, hospital administrative officers,
and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at
Zamboanga City.

produce civil liability arising from a crime under the

Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and
the party seeking recovery is free to choose which
remedy to enforce. CFI ruled in favour of Mactan.

At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was

negotiating a slight curve on the national highway
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by
the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant,
Pedro Tumala. As a result, petitioners sustained
various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization.

ISSUE: W/N the action is based on quasi-delict

Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and

passenger bus were at the time of the accident
driving their respective vehicles at a reckless, grossly
negligent and and without due regard to the safety of
the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners filed
with CFI Misamis Occidental an action for damages
against the private respondents, owners and drivers of
the PU car and the passenger bus.
Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson admitted
the contract of carriage with petitioners but
alleged that the accident was due to the
negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus
driver, therefore, said private respondents could not
be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
It said that when the driver of the PU car, saw
the oncoming passenger bus coming from the opposite
direction he had to stop the PU car in order to
give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of
such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the
PU car, thus causing the accident.
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the petitioners had no cause of action; and that the
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver,
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger
bus with maximum care and prudence.
Mactan: argued that the petitioners had no
cause of action because respondent Pedro Tumala was
already charged with "double serious and less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and
that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no
civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless
the criminal case has been finally adjudicated; that Art.
33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art.
33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the
driver.
Petitioners: Action for damages was
instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the
respondents under Art. 100 of RPC but for their civil
liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 21762194, as the same negligent act causing damages may

HELD: YES! The essential averments for a quasidelictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of
the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties.
The violation of traffic rules that the driver
drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless manner in
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not
detract from the nature and character of the
action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. Certainly
excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence.
Thus, the same negligent act (both in criminal
and civil actions filed) causing damages may produce a
civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code.
Andamo vs IAC (G.R. No. 74761 November 6,
1990)
Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of
respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners'
crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction. As a result
there was an institution of a criminal action against
officers and directors of herein respondent corporation
and subsequently a civil action for damages. Due to
lack of jurisdiction, the civil case was dismissed due to
the criminal case remaining unresolved following the
provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising
from the same offense may be instituted separately,
but after the criminal action has been commenced the

civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has

been rendered in the criminal action."
Issue: WON a corporation, which has built through its
agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances
within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage
to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal case?
Held: Yes. The civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
TAYLOR vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND
LIGHT COMPANY (G.R. No. L-4977 March 22,
1910)

the neighborhood of the place where the company

dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small
pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin
wires by means of which it may be discharged by the
use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys
picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of
which each took end, and carried them home.
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian,
less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home.
The boys then made a series of experiments with the
caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric
light socket - no result. Break the cap with a stone
failed. Opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding
that it was filled with a yellowish substance and they
got matches. David held the cap while Manuel applied
a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed,
causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie,
who when the boys proposed putting a match to the
contents of the cap, became frightened and started to
run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had
his hand burned and wounded. David was struck in the
face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye
and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor,
by his father, his nearest relative.
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the elements of quasidelict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable;
LAWS INVOLVED:

FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation

engaged in the operation of a street railway and an
electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power
plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in
the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the
Isla del Provisor.
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor,
15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and
having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics
with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for
the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine.
After leaving the power house where they had asked
for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by

contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault
or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the

mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or

enterprise are equally liable for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed
or on account of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall

cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for
the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not
have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not
have been placed in a safe and proper place.
RULING: Under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in
an action such as that under consideration, in order to
establish his right to a recovery, must establish by
competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between
the negligence and the damage.
The plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the
defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case
could be held liable for injuries which would not have
resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's
premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co.
vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case now before us,
they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of
negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made
by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have
forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for
purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did
not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without
regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its
operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine
was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its
depot building, at which the people of the village, old
and young, would often assemble. It knew that children

were in the habit of frequenting that locality and

playing around the shaft house in the immediate
vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the
safety of these children would have suggested that
they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath
the surface of which was concealed (except when
snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals
into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned
to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad
company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff,
a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the
vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it
owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no
obligation to make provisions.
Loadmaster v. Glodel (GR No. 179446, January
10, 2011)
R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy in favor of
Columbia to insure the shipment of bundles of electric
copper cathodes against All Risks. The cargoes were
shipped and arrived on the same date. Columbia
engaged the services of Glodel for the release and
withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel,
in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the
use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to
Columbias
warehouses/plants
in
Bulacan
and
Valenzuela City.
(Columbia Glodel Loadmaster)
The goods were loaded on board 12 trucks owned by
Loadmasters. 6 truckloads of copper cathodes were to
be delivered to Bulacan, while the other 6 were
destined for Valenzuela City. Of the 6 trucks en route to
Bulacan only 5 reached the destination. Later on, the
said truck was recovered but without the copper
cathodes. Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim
for insurance indemnity. R&B Insurance paid Columbia.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for
damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel. RTC
rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages
and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages
and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance.
ISSUE: Who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is
liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of
the indemnity it paid Columbia?
HELD: Premises considered, the Court is of the view
that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and
severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the
subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil
Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the
contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee
Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid
defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation
with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay

for the damage done. Such fault or

negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while
in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck
driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or
robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters
should be made answerable for the damages caused
by its employees who acted within the scope of their
assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
warehouse.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage
or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection
(culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando)
of its employees.To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by its employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee.n this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Padilla vs CA (G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984)

law and in fact. The couple (Vergaras) has been paying

rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore,
farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se
which could be summarily abated.
CFI DECISION: Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael
Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion,
and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to
pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided
for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings. The others not included are hereby
ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for
their criminal participation in the crime charged.
Petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioners contention:

trial court's finding of grave coercion was not

supported by the evidence

the town mayor had the power to order the

clearance of market premises and the removal
of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances
pursuant to which the market stall was a
nuisance per se

the lower court erred in finding that the

demolition of the complainants' stall was a
violation of the very directive of the petitioner
Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two
(72) hours to vacate the market premises

question the imposition of imprisonment and

fine

FACTS:
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA,
YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO
ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA,
JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON",
JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO
DOES were accused of the crime of GRAVE COERCION,
committed as follows:
On the morning of February 8th, Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said
Memorandum No. 32 of MayorPadilla, and upon seeing
that Antonio Vergara had not up to that time complied
with the order to vacate, Chief of Police Galdones and
some members of his police force, went to the market
and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the
stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around,
and after having first inventoried the goods and
merchandise found therein, they had them brought to
the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice
served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the
goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter
refused to do so. It is not disputed that the accused
demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense
that they did so in order to abate what they considered
a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in

CA DECISION: appellants are acquitted on ground of

reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to complainants the amount of
P9,600.00, as actual damages.
Motion for reconsideration contending:

acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to

criminal liability results in the extinction of
their civil liability.

CA DENIED MOTION on the ground: appellants'

acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether
the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts
that no unlawful act was committed; as their
taking the law into their hands, destroying

complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence

on record established that complainants suffered
actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is
correct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them
from the criminal charge.
HELD:

GRAVE COERCION vs MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted

not because they did not commit the acts stated in the
charge against them. There is no dispute over the
forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with
axes and other instruments, and the carting away of
the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when
they properly constituted some other offense such
as threat or malicious mischief. For a complaint to
prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence
must be employed against the person, not
against property as what happened in the case at
bar. The crime of grave coercion has not been proved
in accordance with law.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they

nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered
by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the
stall and loss of some of their properties. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 Rules of Court). In the instant
case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely,
the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties
contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the
accused. And since there is no showing that the
complainants have reserved or waived their right
to institute a separate civil action, the civil
aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rules of Court).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal
in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex
delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. The civil liability which is also extinguished upon
acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from
the act as a crime.

TORTS

'There is the civil liability arising from the act as

a crime and the liability arising from the same
act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types
of civil liability may be enforced against the accused,
However, the offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless
imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of
the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature and,
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not
based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides
that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. It merely emphasizes that a civil
action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.
The petitioners contention that it the claim for
damages should be filed separately or in a separate
civil action is not correct. The Civil Code provision does
not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed
but there is no statement that such separate filing is
the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages.
A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish
the criminal liability. It does not, however,
extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear
showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Cruz vs CA (G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997)

Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are

not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a
good result. They are not insurers against mishaps or
unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable
for honest mistakes of judgment.
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of
a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest terms
is the type of claim which a victim has available to
him or her to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional which has caused bodily
harm. In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are
most often brought as a civil action for damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and in some
instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code with which the civil action
for damages is impliedly instituted.
FACTS:
On March 22, 1991, Rowena Umali De Ocampo,
accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic
and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San
Pablo, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at
around 4:30 in the afternoon. Prior to March 22, Lydia
was examined by the petitioner Dr. Niniveth Cruz who
found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for
a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena
and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of
March 22 as the latter was to be operated on the next
day at 1 in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she
noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and
the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor
with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena
tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation. The following day, before her mother was
wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the
petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The
petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the
petitioner told her that she must be operated on as
scheduled.
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband,
her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating
room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were
waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which
Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour
had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to
ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A"
blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same
was brought by the attendant into the operating room.
After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed
them that the operation was finished. Thirty minutes
after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a
stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the
other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with
petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood
available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to

Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was

attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and
Rowena's husband together with the driver of the
accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to
get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen
as soon as it arrived. But at around 10 in the evening
she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her
transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could
be connected to a respirator and further examined. The
transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital was without
the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives
present who found out about the intended transfer only
when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San
Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives
then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital,
she was wheeled into the operating room and the
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because
there was blood oozing from the abdominal
incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr.
Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District
Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was
already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he
could do to help save the patient. While the petitioner
was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus,
on March 24, 1991, at 3 in the morning, Lydia Umali
was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states
"shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
antecedent cause.
Heirs of the deceased sought redress for the
petitioner's alleged imprudence and negligence in
treating the deceased thereby causing her death. The
petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the
attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the
deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence
and negligence resulting to homicide.
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina
Ercillo pleaded not guilty.
MTCC DECISION: The court finds the accused Dra.
Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra.
Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the
death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore
guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2
months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with
costs.
Basis of MTCC for conviction:

the clinic was untidy

lack of provision like blood and oxygen to

prepare for any contingency that might happen
during the operation

the fact that the patient was brought to the

San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation
indicates that there was something wrong in
the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the
operation

no showing that before the operation, accused

Dra. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary
clearance or any typing of the blood of the
patient
it was said in medical parlance that the "the
abdomen of the person is a temple of
surprises" because you do not know the whole
thing the moment it was open and surgeon
must be prepared for any eventuality thereof
the patient chart which is a public document
was not presented because it is only there that
we could determine the condition of the patient
before the surgery
the sister of the deceased wished to postpone
the operation but the patient was prevailed
upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery
the court finds that Lydia Umali died because of
the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon
Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood
during the operation of the deceased for
evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill

All these conclusively show that the petitioner had

not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances
before going into the first surgery, which was not
emergency in nature, but was elective or prescheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no
prepared blood, properly typed and cross-matched,
and no sufficient oxygen supply.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to RTC.
RTC DECISION: Affirmed in toto the decision of
the MTCC.
Petition for review with the Court of Appeals but was
denied.
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner's conviction with modification that she is
further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali
P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from
an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the
evidence on record.
HELD:
The Court, however, holds differently and finds the
foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard
of care observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time
of treatment or the present state of medical science.
In the case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred
L. Pascasio, et al., the Court stated that : in accepting a
case, a doctor in effect represents that, he will employ
such training, care and skill in the treatment of
his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least
the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition
under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect
of medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of
the profession but also that the physician's
conduct in the treatment and care falls below
such standard.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of
this case is the absence of any expert testimony on
the matter of the standard of care employed by other
physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar
operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses, Dr.
Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as
to the possible cause of death but did not venture to
illuminate the court on the matter of the

standard of care that petitioner should have

exercised.
Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of
expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert
opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert
testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of
care employed by other physicians in good standing
when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a
physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is
an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he
takes the necessary precaution and employs the best
of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients,
unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This
presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion
which is lacking in the case at bar.
Granting the basis of the MTCC for conviction it does
indicate, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent
in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no
cogent proof exists that any of these
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus,
the absence of the fourth element of reckless
imprudence: that the injury to the person or property
was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well
as a causal connection of such breach and the
resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay
v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc., case:
In order that there may be a recovery
for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the "injury for which
recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the
wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes." In
other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. For,
"negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action
unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of ." And "the
proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury,

and without which the result would not

have occurred."
The findings of all three expert doctors do not preclude
the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and
consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting
defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when
massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery
leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs.
This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert
testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict
petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's
death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert
witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or
negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was
caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has
engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her
acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia
Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice
and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of
an accused to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly
liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a
conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required to establish civil liability.
For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to
render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the
reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner
carried out her duties.
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages,
and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, vs. ELVIN CHAN AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 157547
February 23, 2011)
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon
(Simon) with a violation of BP 22.
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000,
respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in
Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a

writ
of
preliminary
attachment,
which
was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. On August 17,
2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages, on the ground of litis pendentia.
While the instant case is civil in nature and character
as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, the basis of the
instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal
complaint against defendant arising from a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence
of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon
presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land
Bank Check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount
of P336,000.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages, stating that there is an
effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil
case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of
damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no
private prosecutor during the presentation of
prosecution evidence.
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted
Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,
because in both civil and criminal cases, the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts, are identical.
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied. Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of
Chans complaint.
Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition
for review, challenging the propriety of the dismissal of
his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and
malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a
manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment
and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the
civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia
based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA overturning the RTC. On
March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its
decision on the assessment that the civil case was an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the
ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v.
Velez stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling,
and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the

Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a

simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding
the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal
Procedure.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2
011/gr_157547_2011.html - fnt15
In
his
comment,http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb20
11/gr_157547_2011.html - fnt16 Chan counters that
the petition for review should be denied because the
petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his
cause of action, being based on fraud, was an
independent civil action; and that the appearance of a
private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude
the filing of his separate civil action.
ISSUE: WoN Chans civil action to recover the amount
of the unfunded check was an independent civil action.
HELD: NO! There is no independent civil action to
recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). Chans separate civil
action to recover the amount of the check involved in
the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be
independently maintained under both Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the
allegations of fraud and deceit.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law
so provides, indemnification of the offended party may
be had on account of the damage, loss or injury
directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act
of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced
to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of a crime. Every crime gives
rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of
the guilty party, and also to civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses.
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be
denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive
the payment of money for which the worthless check
was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is
entitled to recompense.Surely, it could not have been
the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the
offender. However, there is no independent civil action
to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even
if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor

is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply

that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
or arise from, procedural laws.
Circular No. 57-97 of this Court specifically states that
the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It
also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases,
but because of the inclusion of the civil action in
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the
complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors
actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily
no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by
the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then,
the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and
criminal cases. We have previously observed that a
separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the
amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to
be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and would further delay the final disposition of
the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in
the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil
Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case
at bar.
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt
to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or
may institute an independent action based on fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, as DMPI
Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of
BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to
prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons
delineated
in Hyatt
Industrial
Manufacturing
Corporation, supra.

JOSE CANGCO, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO. (G.R.

No. L-12191 October 14, 1918)
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage
of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the
province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by
train to the company's office in the city of Manila where
he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company,
which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains
free of charge.
As the train slowed down another passenger, named
Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the
point where the platform begins to rise from the level
of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little
farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but
one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His
body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn
under the moving car, where his right arm was badly
crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the
plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward
possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a
dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted
dimly by a single light located some distance away,
objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern especially to a person
emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on
the platform was that it was customary season for
harvesting these melons and a large lot had been
brought to the station for the shipment to the market.
They were contained in numerous sacks which has
been piled on the platform in a row one upon another.
The injuries which he had received were very serious.
His arm was amputated. The result of this operation
was unsatisfactory, and a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated
higher up near the shoulder.
He filed a case in Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila to recover damages of the defendant company,
founding his action upon the negligence of the
servants and employees of the defendant in placing
the sacks of melons upon the platform.
CFI: although negligence was attributable to the
defendant, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed
to use due caution in alighting from the coach
ISSUE: (1) WoN Cangco is guilty of contributory
negligence

(2) WoN the railroad company is liable for the

damages incurred to Cangco
HELD: (1) NO! Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory
negligence. The test by which to determine whether
the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that
of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered
whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex
and condition of the passenger, would have acted as
the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed
by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not
the care which may or should be used by the prudent
man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to
avoid injury."
In determining the question of contributory negligence
in performing such act that is to say, whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age,
sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: 1) The company's
platform was constructed upon a level higher than that
of the roadbed and the surrounding ground thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. 2) the
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood; and 3) The place was perfectly familiar to
the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of
the train at this station.
(2) YES! It is important to note that the foundation of
the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the
damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all,
from the breach of that contract by reason of the
failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from
that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code,
which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due
care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
or to use the technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
The negligence of the defendant's servants does not
constitute a defense to an action for damages for
breach of contract. The contract of defendant to
transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the
duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means
of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and
immediate, and its non-performance could not be
excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable
to defendant's servants. As the defendant was bound

by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its

passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the
plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another. True it is
that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
creates a presumption that he has been negligent in
the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due
care and diligence in this respect.
In case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally,
and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and
employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause
damages which amount to the breach of a
contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the
master's negligence in their selection or control, and
proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in
this regard does not relieve the master of his liability
for the breach of his contract.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this
character and those which arise from contract, rests
upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence. But when the facts averred show
a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit
of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or
refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach
of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on
the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents.
Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, if
the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence,
no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury,
the damages should be apportioned.

It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the

train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred. In this particular instance, that the train was
barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it.
Thousands of person alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury
where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions.

2.

PAZ FORES vs. IRENEO MIRANDA

Facts:
Respondent was one of the passengers on a
jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was
descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate
of speed, the driver lost control causing it to swerve
and to hit the bridge wall. Five of the passengers were
injured, including the respondent who suffered a
fracture of the upper right humerus (arm). He was
taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for
treatment, and later was subjected to a series of
operations. The driver was charged with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly. The CFI awarded Petitioner filed an appeal
contending that one day before the accident
happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that
was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman
thus there is no breach of contract of carriage.
Issue:
WON there is a breach of contract.
WON respondent is entitled to moral damages.
Held:
1.

Yes. A transfer contemplated by the law, if

made without the requisite approval of the
Public Service Commission, is not effective and
binding in so far as the responsibility of the
grantee under the franchise in relation to the
public is concerned. The law was designed
primarily for the protection of the public
interest; and until the approval of the public
Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is,
in contemplation of law, still under the service
of the owner or operator standing in the
records of the Commission which the public has
a right to rely upon. It appears that no such
approval was given by the Commission before
the accident occurred. Therefore, petitioner is
still the owner of the vehicle.

No. Moral damages are not recoverable in

damage actions predicted on a breach of the
contract of transportation. Art. 2220 states that
willful injury to property may be a legal ground
for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under circumstances, such damages
are justify due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Mere
carelessness of the carrier's driver does
not per se constitute of justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier;
and in the case at bar there is no other
evidence of such malice to support the award
of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To
award moral damages for breach of contract,
therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice
on the part of the defendant would be to
violate the clear provisions of the law, and
constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A.
LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA,
Facts:
Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was
accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East
Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at . Upon his
request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to
his wife Clarita S. Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her
credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. As a result
of this, the lost card along with the principal card would
appear as a Hot Card or Cancelled Card in the
banks master file. On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered
a despedida lunch for a close friend and another guest
at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis
presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter
who promptly had it verified through a telephone call
to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card
was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill
amounting to P588.13. Feeling embarrassed about
what happen, private respondent Luis Luna, through
counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of
damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the
bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. Still
feeling aggrieved, private respondents filed a
complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC which rendered a
decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a)
P300,000.00
moral
damages;
(b)
P50,000.00
exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's
fees. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue:

WON private respondent is entitled to moral and

exemplary damages.

Held:
No. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the
contract.
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court
should
find
that,
under
the
circumstances, such damages are justly
due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract
where
the
defendant
acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis
supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not
simple, negligence. Concededly, the bank was remiss
in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his
own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the
trial court and the appellate court, however, can
sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of
FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither
could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act
for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
Principles on tort as to that a quasi-delict can be the
cause for breaching a contract that might thereby
permit the application of applicable cannot be applied
in this case. As it can only be applied where the act or
omission complained of would constitute an actionable
tort independently of the contract. Here, private
respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement,
the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be
held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. Given the above premises and the
factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be
just as onerous to sustain the exemplary damages
granted by the courts below.

defendants employee forced plaintiff to vacate the

"first class" seat that he was occupying because here
was a "white man", who had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused. A commotion
ensued, eventually, the plaintiff reluctantly gave his
"first class" seat in the plane.
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced
petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class
for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various
amounts with interest at the legal rate; plus P3,000.00
for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the
amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10

ISSUE:
WON Defendant is entitled to damages?
HELD:
1. Moral damages.
Petitioner claims that to authorize an award for
moral damages there must be an averment of
fraud or bad faith. Based on the facts, the court
was in the opinion that there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth "after he
was already, seated" and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of
its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in
law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
employer, he must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code
says: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing
legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable.

2.

Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155

Plaintiff was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes. The defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the

3.
4.

Exemplary damages - defendant should have

"acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
And this, in addition to moral damages.
Right to attorney's fees is fully established.
The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees.
Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals on

damages - The task of fixing these amounts is

primarily with the trial court.
PHILIPPINE
SCHOOL
OF
BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R.
No. 84698 February 4, 1992)
FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which
caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents
of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila presided over by Judge Regina Ordoez-Benitez,
for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled
in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of
the school's academic community but were elements
from outside the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the
suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably
sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that
academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond
the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled
petitioners' contention and denied their motion to
dismiss.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent
appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the
law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. That it should apply to all kinds
of educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of
the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence
to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on
the merits of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the appellate court
primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is valid.
RULING: agree with the respondent appellate court that
the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly
denied and the complaint should be tried on the
merits, we do not however agree with the premises of
the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
The Supreme Court discussed this doctrine in the
afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and,
more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. In all
such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article
2180) plainly provides that the damage should have

been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he

educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extracontractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract.
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on
the substance of the private respondents' complaint,
the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously,
at this stage, only the trial court can make such a
determination from the evidence still to unfold.
JUAN J. SYQUIA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993)
FACTS:
Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia,
entered in a contract of Deed of Sale and
IntermentOrder with Manila Memorial Park Cemetery
Inc (MMPCI). In the contract, there contained a
provision which stated that the coffin would be placed
in a sealed concrete vault to protect the remains of the
deceased from the elements.
During the preparation for the transfer of Vicentes
remains in the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it
was discovered that there was a hole in the concrete
vault which caused total flooding inside, damaged the
coffin as well as the body of the deceased and covered
the same with filth. Syquia filed a complaint for
recovery of damages arising from breach of contract
and/or quasi-delict against the MMPCI for failure to
deliver a defect-free concrete vault to protect the
remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed
that the boring of the hole was necessary in order to
prevent the vault from floating when water fills the
grave. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding
that there was no quasi-delict because the defendant is
not guilty of any fault or negligence and because there
was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the

present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is guilty
of tort
HELD:Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed. We are more
inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the
negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and
in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the
respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the
petitioners. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the
respondents Court finding that there was no
negligence.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict x x x.
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias
and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered
into a contract entitled Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care on August 27, 1969. That agreement
governed the relations of the parties and defined their
respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there
been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable
not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa
contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, to wit: Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
Calalas vs CA, 332 SCRA 356, 2000
Facts: Calalas jeep was improperly parked with its rear
portion protruding from the board shoulder of the road
(violation of LTTC). Passenger Sunga who was sited on
a wooden stool as an extended seat moved to give way
to another passenger alighting from the inside and in
the process he was bumped by an overtaking truck
owned by Salinas. Sunga sued Calalas for breach of
carriage. Calalas sued Salvas for Tort.
Held: While moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for breach of contract for it is not one of the
items enumerated in Art 2219, NCC, however, the
exception is in the cases of mishap resulting to the
death or injury of passenger under Art 1764 in relation
to Art 2206 (3) NCC and in cases in which the carrier is
guilty of fraud or in bad faith.
In this case the ruling in Calamas vs Salvas is not
binding in the case of Sunga vs Calalas. Res Judicata
does not apply because Sunga is not a party to the tort
case where Salva was found at fault and liable to
Calalas. Thought both cases has the same issue of
negligence, however, each is distinct and separate
from the other. (Breach of contract and tort)
Defense of proximate cause is not available in breach
of contract of carriage: only in tort cases. Neither is the
defense of caso fortuitous where it is attended to by
negligence which in Calalas case were overloading and
parking improrely which are vioation of tle LTTC.
Moral damages cannot be award in the absence of any
injury or factual basis. There must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright,
wounded feelings ad similar injury. (Brent Hospital Inc

vs NLRC, 292 SCRA 304, 98; People vs Aguilar, 349

SCRA 292, 98)
PNB VS. FF CRUZ
Facts: F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.] (hereinafter FFCCI) opened
savings/current or so-called combo account No. 0219830-146 and dollar savings account No. 0219-0502458-6 with Philippine National Bank] (hereinafter PNB)
at its Timog Avenue Branch. Its President Felipe Cruz
(or Felipe) and Secretary-Treasurer Angelita A. Cruz (or
Angelita) were the named signatories for the said
accounts.
The said signatories on separate but coeval dates left
for and returned from the United States of America,
Felipe on March 18, 1995 until June 10, 1995 while
Angelita followed him on March 29, 1995 and returned
ahead on May 9, 1995.
While they were out of the country, applications for
cashiers and managers checks bearing Felipes
signature were presented to and both approved by the
PNB. The first was on March 27, 1995 for
P9,950,000.00 payable to a certain Gene B. Sangalang
and the other one was on April 24, 1995 for
P3,260,500.31 payable to one Paul Bautista. The
amounts of these checks were then debited by the PNB
against the combo account of [FFCCI].
When Angelita returned to the country, she had
occasion to examine the PNB statements of account of
[FFCCI] for the months of February to August 1995 and
she noticed the deductions ofP9,950,000.00 and
P3,260,500.31. Claiming that these were unauthorized
and fraudulently made, [FFCCI] requested PNB to credit
back and restore to its account the value of the checks.
PNB refused, and thus constrained [FFCCI] filed the
instant suit for damages against the PNB and its own
accountant Aurea Caparas (or Caparas).
In its traverse, PNB averred lack of cause of action. It
alleged that it exercised due diligence in handling the
account of [FFCCI]. The applications for managers
check have passed through the standard bank
procedures and it was only after finding no infirmity
that these were given due course. In fact, it was no less
than Caparas, the accountant of [FFCCI], who
confirmed the regularity of the transaction. The delay
of [FFCCI] in picking up and going over the bank
statements was the proximate cause of its selfproclaimed injury. Had [FFCCI] been conscientious in
this regard, the alleged chicanery would have been
detected early on and Caparas effectively prevented
from absconding with its millions. It prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Regional Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court ruled that F.F. Cruz and Company, Inc.
( FFCCI) was guilty of negligence in clothing Aurea
Caparas (Caparas) with authority to make decisions on
and dispositions of its account which paved the way for
the fraudulent transactions perpetrated by Caparas;
that, in practice, FFCCI waived the two-signature
requirement in transactions involving the subject
combo account so much so that Philippine National
Bank (PNB) could not be faulted for honoring the
applications for managers check even if only the

signature of Felipe Cruz appeared thereon; and that

FFCCI was negligent in not immediately informing PNB
of the fraud.
On the other hand, the trial court found that PNB was,
likewise, negligent in not calling or personally verifying
from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the
subject withdrawals considering that they were in huge
amounts. For this reason, PNB had the last clear
chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from FFCCIs
combo account. Thus, PNB should bear the whole loss.
Court of Appeals Ruling
On January 31, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision affirming with modification the Decision of the
trial court,
The appellate court ruled that PNB was negligent in not
properly verifying the genuineness of the signatures
appearing on the two applications for managers check
as evidenced by the lack of the signature of the bank
verifier thereon. Had this procedure been followed, the
forgery would have been detected.
Nonetheless, the appellate court found FFCCI guilty of
contributory negligence because it clothed its
accountant/bookkeeper Caparas with apparent
authority to transact business with PNB. In addition,
FFCCI failed to timely examine its monthly statement
of account and report the discrepancy to PNB within a
reasonable period of time to prevent or recover the
loss. FFCCIs contributory negligence, thus, mitigated
the banks liability. Pursuant to the rulings in Philippine
Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals and The
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the appellate court allocated the damages on
a 60-40 ratio with the bigger share to be borne by PNB.
On August 17, 2006, FFCCI filed its petition for review
on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 173278
On March 7, 2007, the Court issued a Resolution
denying said petition. On June 13, 2007, the Court
issued another Resolution denying FFCCIs motion for
reconsideration. In denying the aforesaid petition, the
Court ruled that FFCCI essentially raises questions of
fact which are, as a rule, not reviewable under a Rule
45 petition; that FFCCI failed to show that its case fell
within the established exceptions to this rule; and that
FFCCI was guilty of contributory negligence. Thus, the
appellate court correctly mitigated PNBs liability.
On July 13, 2006, PNB filed its petition for review on
certiorari which is the subject matter of this case.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred
when it found PNB guilty of negligence?
HELD: PNB is guilty of negligence.
Preliminarily, in G.R. No. 173278, we resolved with
finality that FFCCI is guilty of contributory negligence,
thus, making it partly liable for the loss (i.e., as to 40%
thereof) arising from the unauthorized withdrawal of
P13,210,500.31 from its combo account. The case
before us is, thus, limited to PNBs alleged negligence in
the subject transactions which the appellate court

found to be the proximate cause of the loss, thus,

making it liable for the greater part of the loss (i.e., as
to 60% thereof) pursuant to our rulings in Philippine
Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals and The
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.[
PNB contends that it was not negligent in verifying the
genuineness of the signatures appearing on the subject
applications for managers check. It claims that it
followed the standard operating procedure in the
verification process and that four bank officers
examined the signatures and found the same to be
similar with those found in the signature cards of
FFCCIs authorized signatories on file with the bank.
PNB raises factual issues which are generally not
proper for review under a Rule 45 petition. While there
are exceptions to this rule, we find none applicable to
the present case. As correctly found by the appellate
court, PNB failed to make the proper verification
because the applications for the managers check do
not bear the signature of the bank verifier.
It posits that the testimonies of Geronimo Gallego, then
the branch manager of PNB Timog Branch, and Stella
San Diego (San Diego), then branch cashier, suffice to
establish that the signature verification process was
duly followed.
First, oral testimony is not as reliable as documentary
evidence. Second, PNBs own witness, San Diego,
testified that in the verification process, the principal
duty to determine the genuineness of the signature
devolved upon the account analyst.[ However, PNB did
not present the account analyst to explain his or her
failure to sign the box for signature and balance
verification of the subject applications for managers
check, thus, casting doubt as to whether he or she did
indeed verify the signatures thereon. Third, we cannot
fault the appellate court for not giving weight to the
testimonies of Gallego and San Diego considering that
the latter are naturally interested in exculpating
themselves from any liability arising from the failure to
detect the forgeries in the subject transactions. Fourth,
Gallego admitted that PNBs employees received
training on detecting forgeries from the National
Bureau of Investigation. However, Emmanuel Guzman,
then NBI senior document examiner, testified, as an
expert witness, that the forged signatures in the
subject applications for managers check contained
noticeable and significant differences from the genuine
signatures of FFCCIs authorized signatories and that
the forgeries should have been detected or observed
by a trained signature verifier of any bank.
The court found no reversible error in the findings of
the appellate court that PNB was negligent in the
handling of FFCCIs combo account, specifically, with
respect to PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in the
subject applications for managers check which could
have prevented the loss. As we have often ruled, the
banking business is impressed with public trust. A
higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative
to the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary
business enterprise. Thus, the degree of responsibility,
care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and
employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers

and employees in other enterprises. In the case at bar,

PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence
required by the circumstances to prevent the fraud.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals and
The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, where the banks negligence is the proximate
cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of
contributory negligence, we allocated the damages
between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio.
We apply the same ruling in this case considering that,
as shown above, PNBs negligence is the proximate
cause of the loss while the issue as to FFCCIs
contributory negligence has been settled with finality
in G.R. No. 173278. Thus, the appellate court properly
adjudged PNB to bear the greater part of the loss
consistent with these rulings.
OCEAN BUILDER VS. SPS. CUBACUB
Facts: Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as
maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean
Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan
City.
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken
pox. He was advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao),
the general manager, to rest for three days which he
did at the companys barracks where he lives free of
charge.
Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores
of manning the gate of the company premises and
even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the
afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio
Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in
Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of
Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and
ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the
nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers including Silangga, they brought
Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital , a
primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from
the office of the company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the
hospital. He was then confined, with Narding, his coworker keeping watch over him.
The next day, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding
that they needed to talk to Bladimirs parents, hence,
on Silanggas request, their co-workers June Matias and
Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac.
In the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995,
Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with
their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the
Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the
Quezon City General Hospital where he was placed in
the intensive care unit and died the following day.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded
Bladimirs immediate cause of death as cardiorespiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as
pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate
issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as
cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure,
septicemia and chicken pox.

Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on

August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court
at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners,
alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which
resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition
leading to his death.
By Decision of April 14, 1997, Branch 66 of the Tarlac
RTC at Capas dismissed the complaint, holding that
Hao was not negligent. It ruled that Hao was not under
any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary
hospitals, and assuming that Bladimir died of chicken
pox aggravated by pneumonia or some other
complications due to lack of adequate facilities at the
hospital, the same cannot be attributed to Hao.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June
22, 2001, reversed the trial courts decision, holding
that by Haos failure to bring Bladimir to a betterequipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor
Code. It went on to state that Hao should have
foreseen that Bladimir, an adult, could suffer
complications from chicken pox and, had he been
brought to hospitals like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical
Center, Philippine General Hospital and the like,
Bladimir could have been saved.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution of November 26, 2001, hence this petition.
Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence
more than what the law requires, hence, they are not
liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hao is guilty of negligence?
HELD: No, Hao is not guilty of negligence. At the onset,
the Court notes that the present case is one for
damages based on torts, the employer-employee
relationship being merely incidental. To successfully
prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements
must be present, (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and
proximate causation.
The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it
was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate
medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of
the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of
any employer to provide all the necessary assistance
to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and
dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick
employee in case of emergency.
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten
what the phrase adequate and immediate medical
attendance means in relation to an emergency. It
would thus appear that the determination of what it
means is left to the employer, except when a full-time
registered nurse or physician are available on-site as
required, also under the Labor Code, specifically Art.
157 which provides:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services.
It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his
employees in any locality with free medical and dental
attendance and facilities consisting of:

(a)
The services of a full-time registered nurse
when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but
not more than two hundred (200) except when the
employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in
which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall
be provided for the protection of workers, where no
registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor
and Employment shall provide by appropriate
regulations, the services that shall be required where
the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50)
and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous
workplaces for purposes of this Article;
(b)
The services of a full-time registered nurse, a
part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency
clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two
hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300);
and
(c)
The services of a full-time physician, dentist
and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental
clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one
bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees
when the number of employees exceeds three hundred
(300). (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the

company premises are hazardous. Neither is there any
allegation on the number of employees the company
has.
If Haos testimony would be believed, the company had
only seven regular employees and 20 contractual

employees still short of the minimum 50 workers that

an establishment must have for it to be required to
have a full-time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions
taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill
amounted to the necessary assistance to ensure
adequate and immediate medical attendance to
Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records,
petitioner Haos advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a
3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest
hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical
attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to
provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to
have a medical background. He may not be thus
expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be
brought to a hospital with better facilities than the
Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling.
the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as
the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir.
Proximate cause is that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which,
the result would not have occurred. An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to
act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case
that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the act or omission