Joint 8th IEEE HFPP / 13th HPRCT

Regulatory Approach on Human Factors

Engineering of Main Control Room Modernization:
A Case of Kori-1 Nuclear Power Plant in Korea
Dhong Hoon Lee, Dai Il Kim, Choong Huei Chung
Dept. Instrumentation & Control
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety.
Daejeon, Korea
{dhlee,k144kdi,k148jch}@kins.re.kr
ity, and reliability, and (4) to enhance operator performance
and reliability [1].
In the case of Korea nuclear power industry, several NPPs
have plan for plant modernization. Among these, Kori 1
NPP was designed and built by thirty years ago and problems were foreseen with difficulty of abstaining spare parts,
increased maintenance cost, and lack of competence related
the operation with the old HSIs. Furthermore, operational
experiences had identified strong needs for improvement
and modification of the control room. According to these
backgrounds, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company
(KHNP) is designing the new control room of Kori-1, including remote shutdown room and safety parameter display
system (SPDS). Figure 1 shows overall scene of MCR of
Kori-1 NPP at present.
For this plant modification, Korea Institute of Nuclear
Safety (KINS) is responsible for reviewing the safety of
control room and other-related activities. Therefore, KINS
will review the safety analysis report (SAR) in the perspectives on Human Factors Engineering (HFE) of Kori-1
NPP submitted for attaining plant modification permit.
In this regard, the objective of this paper is to present the
regulatory approch on reviewing the control room modernization process, Kori-1 NPP of Korea. The review activities
and HFE issues based on KINS Safety Regulatory Guide
(SRG) and NUREG-0711 are presented in this paper.

AbstractThe objective of this paper is to present the regulatory activities and issues on reviewing the control room modernization process, Kori 1 nuclear power plant of Korea. The
staff of Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety will review the safety
analysis report for attaining plant modification permit in the
perspectives on Human Factors Engineering of Kori-1 NPP,
based on current regulatory requirements and guidelines. The
HFE review will be focused if the modification of the main
control room affects the roles and tasks of operators and is
potentially significant to plants overall safety. The focus of
review activities and issues are presented in this paper. And,
the implications of the overall results are discussed.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Several nuclear power plants (NPPs) are starting instrumentation and control (I&C) modernization programs to
address obsolescence issues and the need to improve plant
performance while maintaining high level safety. As integral part of I&C modernization program, the control room
(e.g. main control room (MCR), remote shutdown room, etc)
and other human-system interfaces (HSIs) are also being
modernized [2]. Also, US Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) states that there are many reasons for the modernization activities, including; (1) to address obsolescence and
lack of spare parts, (2) to meet the need for equipment replacement due to high maintenance cost or lack of vendor
support, (3) to improve plant performance, HSIs functional-

Figure 1. Figure 1. MCR of Kori-1 nuclear power plant

1-4244-0306-5/07/$20.00 2007 IEEE.

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Joint 8th IEEE HFPP / 13th HPRCT

II.

design team is performing various HFE activities to decrease

the potential negative effects due to the introduction of the
new control room such as decreasing of human performance,
increasing the human error, etc. The HFE-related activities
and plans include the following, based on KINS SRGs and
NUREG-0711:

DESIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW CONTROL

ROOM

Compared with the old main control room, one of the

main differences of the new control room is the computerbased workstations reflecting the modern computer technology. In the new control room, operators will work with a
combination of analog and digital displays for monitoring
plant variables, including workstations of Plant Monitoring
System (PMS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),
and advanced alarm system. Main control boards of new
control room consist of three sections: engineering safety
feature control board, reactor control board, and turbine control board. Among these, the reactor control board includes
two visual display units (VDUs) such as one for SPDS, and
another for advanced alarm display. And, the turbine control includes a total of ten VDUs, which consist of one operator support display, three system displays, and three information (for displaying the trend and various plant parameter data) display, and so on. Operator consoles consist
of three workstations such as workstation of reactor operator,
turbine operator, and electric operator. Figure 2 illustrates
concept design of the new MCR.
The design process of the new control room is specified
according to standards and guidelines (e.g. KINS Safety
Regulatory Guidelines (SRG), NUREG-0711 etc). The utility, KHNP, developed a detailed plan for design and development of the new control room. According to the plan, the

HFE program management plan

Operating experience review plan
Functional requirement analysis and allocation plan
Task analysis plan
Staffing plan
Human reliability analysis plan
Human-system interface design plan
HFE standards, guidelines, and bases
Human-system interface design guidelines
Procedure development plan
Training program plan
HFE verification and validation plan

III.

REGULATORY ASPECTS FOR THE CONTROL

ROOM MODERNIZATION

KINS establishes a regulatory policy for enhancing human performance, and provides strategic support to encourage excellent manpower to engage in nuclear power fields.
In additions, KINS also devises institutional measures to
incorporate HFE into the design of nuclear installations.

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Figure 2. Figure 2. Concept design of the new MCR

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Joint 8th IEEE HFPP / 13th HPRCT

The details of HFE shall be described in the Preliminary
and Final Safety Analysis Report (PSAR & FSAR), which is
to be filed to obtain Construction Permit (CP) and Operating
License (OL), in accordance with the Atomic Energy Laws.
The principles for HFE are also consistently applied to any
design modification of nuclear installations. KINS conducts
a safety review for the SAR submitted by KHNP, an applicant for CP and OL, and field inspections to verify whether
HFE is properly reflected in the design.
The details of HFE activities for the control room
modification in Kori-1 design will be primarily described in
Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and in several related topical
reports published by the applicant. The HFE criteria used to
review the acceptance of new control room of Kori-1 NPP is
primarily base on the review requirement and guidelines of
KINS. The applicable review requirements and guidelines
can be classified as high-level and specific requirements.

view more comprehensively in the perspectives on the control room modifications [8].
IV.

REGULATORY POSITION TO REVIEW THE

NEW CONTROL ROOM IN KORI-1

NUREG-0800 Section B states the regulatory positions

review of the HFE aspects for the control room modification
as follows [9];
Review of the HFE aspects of HSI Modifications License amendments involving major changes to the HSIs,
such as control room modernization, should be reviewed
using the guidance contained in Section II.A of this chapter
(review of HFE aspects of a new plant). However, since the
extent of such modifications can vary, the staff's review
should be tailored using the additional guidance presented
in this section.
According to this guideline, the regulatory position about
plant modification provides under assumption that corresponding plant applied the HFE program during the construction phase. Therefore, we should consider following
question;
Does Kori-1 NPP apply the systematic HFE program at
that time of construction?
As an answer, Kori-1 has not chapter 18 Human Factors
in their FSAR. That is, Kori-1 didnt apply the HFE program during the construction phase. The plant only had
performed the safety review of a DCRDR(Detailed-Control
Room Design Review) and SPDS as a post-TMI actions in
1990. Therefore, KINS should conduct the safety review of
the new control room in Kori-1 as the same level of CP and
OL licensing process for new design of NPP .
Especially, for, KINS staff would focus the following
points and issues in the perspectives on HFE for the submitted applicants SAR:
1) Scope of HFE program management
As described above, to review the HFE aspects of the control room modifications, KINS should conduct the safety
review as the same level of CP and OL licensing process.
According to KINS SRG, therefore, the area of HFE review
should include the following all areas of HFE program elements; (1) HFE program management, (2) operating experience review (OER), (3) functional requirements analysis &
function allocation, (4) task analysis, (5) staffing, (6) human
reliability analysis (HRA), (7) procedure development, (8)
training program, (9) HSI Design, (10) HFE verification &
validation (V&V), (11) design implementation, & (12) human performance monitoring.
To review the specific HFE aspects of the control room
modification, according to NUREG-0711, the effects of
modifications on human performance should be considered
in HFE program management including (1) the plan of the
installation to minimize disruptions to work and (2) the coordination plan of training and procedure modifications with
the control room modification.

A. High-level requirements
The following high-level safety requirements and criteria
will be applied in the review of the new control room in
Kori-1 NPP:
KINS Safety Principle 3, Consideration of Human
Factors:
KINS General Safety Criteria II-9.2, Human Factors:
KINS General Safety Criteria II-30.2 Control Room
Especially, KINS General Safety Criteria II-9.2 declares
the the application of HFE in the construction phase as follows:
Human Factors associated with the plant workers and
human-machine interface shall be taken into account systematically in the design of nuclear facilities.
B. Specific requirements and guidance
The following regulatory requirements and guidance will
be applied in the review of the new control room in Kori-1
NPP [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]:
KINS SRG 9.10: Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication of Protection System and Safety Related
I&C System
KINS SRG 9.13: Instrumentation for Post Accident
Monitoring
KINS SRG 9.15: Reliability of Control Room Annunciator Systems
KINS SRG 11.4: Habitability of a Control Room
KINS SRG 15.1: HFE program Plan
KINS SRG 15.2: HFE Analysis
KINS SRG 15.3: HFE Design
KINS SRG 15.4: HFE Verification and Validation
The one weakness of KINS SRGs is that the current
guidelines has focused on HFE activities of the new construction of NPPs; that is, the KINS SRG has not some specific points relating to the modification of NPPs. Therefore,
in this regard, the staff will use guidance from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) NUREG-0711 to re-

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Joint 8th IEEE HFPP / 13th HPRCT

B. Scope of OER
According to KINS SRG and NUREG-0711, the scope of
OER should include the predecessor plant and systems, recognized industry HFE issues, related HSI technology, and
operator interviews. To perform the more comprehensively
for the control room modification, OER should focus to attain information relevant to HSIs, procedures, or training
that is being modified.

this regard, the applicant should confirm the criteria satisfaction of integrated system validation in the implementation
plan such as; validation test beds, validation team, scenario
definition and development, performance measurement
characteristics, selection, and criteria, test design, data
analysis and interpretation, etc.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Kori-1 has not chapter 18 Human Factors in their FSAR

and didnt apply the systematic HFE program during the
construction and operation phase. Therefore, KINS should
conduct the safety review of the new control room in Kori-1
as the same level of CP and OL licensing process. In the
review, the acceptance decisions for HFE activities are determined by the criteria of KINS SRGs, however, the current
SRGs has not some specific points relating to the modification of NPPs. Therefore, the staff will use guidance from
the U.S. NRC NUREG-0711 Rev. 02 to review more comprehensively.
In this paper, we provide some important regulatory positions for the representative HFE programs, that is, review
scope of HFE program management, operating experiences,
task analysis, human reliability analysis, and HFE verification and validation. The applicant should consider these
positions as the basis of the modification process of the control room. Furthermore, the HFE programs for the submitted SAR will be acceptable and satisfied when the applicant
successfully addresses the HFE activity issues.

C. Scope of task analysis

As described above, Kori-1 didnt apply the HFE program
during the construction and operation phase. Therefore, the
applicant should conduct task analysis for selected representative and important tasks from all areas of operations, maintenance, test, inspection, and surveillance. Especially, the
identification of the difference of the design characteristics
should be considered between the existing and the modified
HSIs.
D. Scope of HRA
The most important review point in HRA, according to
NUREG-0711, is that when modifying the HSIs, procedures,
and training by the design of the new control room, the
scope of HRA should consider personnel actions resulting
from the modifications. Therefore, the applicant should
confirm the following aspects of HRA; (1) the original HRA
assumptions are valid even if the design modification be
conducted, (2) the human error types and mechanism in the
existing HRA are still valid, (3) the human error probabilities by operators and maintenance personnel are considered
in terms of the modified human actions resulting from the
modifications.

REFERENCES
[1]

E. Scope of HFE V&V

As described earlier, Kori-1 didnt apply the HFE program during the construction phase; that is, the applicant has
not an experience relating to HFE V&V activities for the
existing HSIs. The applicant only performed DCRDR as a
post TMI action. Therefore, the applicant should conduct
HFE V&V with respect to the general criteria of KINS SRG
and NUREG-0711 including following activities; operational condition sampling, design verification, integrated
system validation, and human engineering discrepancy resolution. Among these, the KINS staff would focus on the
review of integrated system validation because this activity
is the process guarantying the safe operation of the plant. In

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

Electric Power Research Institute, Human Factors Guidance for

Control room and Digital Human-System Interface Design and
Modification, TR-1008122, (2004).
Joseph Naser, Control Room and HIS Modernization Guidance,
Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June, pp31.-35, (2005).
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), Safety Regulatory Guide
(SRG) 9.13: Instrumentation for Post Accident Monitoring, (1996).
KINS, SRG 15.1: Human Factors Engineering Program Plan,
(1996).
KINS, SRG 15.2: Human Factors Engineering Analysis, (1996).
KINS, SRG 15.3: Human Factors Engineering Design, (1996).
KINS, SRG 15.4: Human Factors Engineering Verification and
Validation, (1996).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Human Factors
Engineering Program Review Model, NUREG-0711, 1994.
NRC, Standard Review Plan Chapter 18. Human Factors
engineering, NUREG-0800, (2004).

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