Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom, petitioners, vs.

Court of
Appeals, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla, respondents Case Digest
(349 SCRA 483)

complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed

This petition for review seeks for reversal of the decision dated October

Hence, this petition for review.

a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, dated

ISSUES:

November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on

the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and

FACTS:

decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?

On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in

RULING:

favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling,

Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title

Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public

Certificate in his name.

Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily
and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose

On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores

public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into

Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that

the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands.

petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land.

Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree. Thus,

Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead

reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola

patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the

was in error.

OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola,
who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9,

DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of

1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their

decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the

On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for

respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided,

the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with

particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT

the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they

and then TCT later, its decision prevails.

are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from
one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty
years. After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on
November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their

Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July 2002)

predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court

ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the
name of the petitioners.

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the

tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the

DENR dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of

leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental

Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed fraud

and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed

and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground

for the revocation and cancellation of its title.

foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development

On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject
land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of
Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to
defeat private respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law;
that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and

Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of

the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to

with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the

be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of

the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of

alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands

Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was

verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December
2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in

the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The
592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a
joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to tran sfer to
Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient
that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may

a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private
land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

FACTS:
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land
situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his greatgrandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon
Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from
their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment
& Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural

names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by

Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

VERNON T. REYES,

Petitioner,

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
-

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of

G.R. No. 141924

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

versus -

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
January 23, 2007

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

property of the public dominion begin to run.

DECISION

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under
the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property

may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under o rdinary

Certiorari [1] assailing the Decision [2] dated October 21, 1999 and

acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial

property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and
with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least
thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on

Resolution[3] dated February 15, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CV No. 57156, entitled Vernon T. Reyes, applicant-appellee, versus
Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-appellant.

On February 5, 1996, Vernon T. Reyes, herein petitioner, filed with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 an application for
confirmation and registration of his imperfect title over a parcel of land
located in Silang, Cavite containing an area of 43, 514 square meters.

their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis

to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioner alleged inter alia in his application that on December 24, 1992,

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for

registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or

favor.

disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer

intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The

On April 4, 1997, after hearing, the trial court rendered its

classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of

the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.

he and the other grandchildren of the late Eusebio Vicente executed a

Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein the land was adjudicated in his

Judgment [4] approving petitioners application.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines interposed an appeal to the

Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated October 21, 1999, the appellate
court reversed the RTC Judgment and dismissed petitioners application

FIRST DIVISION

for registration. The court also denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration in a Resolution dated February 15, 2000.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners bare assertions of possession and occupation by his

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he

predecessors-in-interest since 1943[6] are general statements which are

failed to present incontrovertible evidence to prove that he has been in

mere

possession of the land in question for the length of time required by law.

Respondent Republic, on the other hand, maintains that petitioner failed

to satisfy the requisite quantum of evidence in support of his application.

Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended

(Public Land Act), and Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, require that the
applicants must prove that the land is alienable and disposable public
land; and that they or through their predecessors in interest, have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and o ccupation
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Accordingly, applicants for confirmation and registration of imperfect

title must prove: (a) that the land forms part of the alienable lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under
a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or
since June 12, 1945. [5]
The Court of Appeals found that while the subject property is
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, however,
petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner had been in possession of the
land since December 24, 1992 when it was adjudicated to him by virtue
of an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his grandfather, Eusebio
Vicente. He filed his application in 1996. Clearly, he was in possession of
the land for only four years. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his
possession to that of his late grandparents. However, he did not present
witnesses to substantiate his claim that they had possessed the land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Obviously, these are findings of fact.

We defer to the appellate courts findings of fact since they are

supported by the record.

conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. [7]

It is doctrinally settled that a person who seeks confirmation of

an imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. [8] Unfortunately, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV
57156. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

FLORENTINO CENIZA, SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAO
CENIZA, ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO
BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, EMMA ADOLFO, JERRY ADOLFO,
GLENN ADOLFO, GINA ADOLFO, LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA
ADOLFO, EVELYN ADOLFO, in her own behalf and as
guardian of the minors HUBERT and AMIEL ADOLFO, and
ELNITA ADOLFO in her own behalf and as guardian of
minors DAVID and PRESTINE MAY ADOLFO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision [1] dated
September 28, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728,
affirming the decision[2] in LRC Case No. N-46 of the Regional Trial Court
in Mandaue City, Branch XXVIII, which declared private respondents as
the owners entitled to the registration of the lots in question.
The antecedent facts of the case are as f ollows:
Apolinar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948 of Lot No. 1104,
located at Cabancalan, Mandaue City, under Tax Declaration No. 01686.
When he died, his heirs took possession of the property and in 1960
partitioned the same through a deed of extrajudicial partition. Apolinars
children, namely, Santiago, Estanislao, Florencia, Manuela, Mercedes and
Florentino, all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of the property. His
grandchildren, namely, the siblings Remedios Adolfo, Melecio Ceniza,
and Constancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, while Apolinars other
grandchildren, namely, the siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza,
Lilia Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share.
Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased the shares of his
sisters Manuela and Mercedes and the share pertaining to the siblings

Jesusa,[3] Benjamin and Delfin. Together with his share, Florentino became
the owner of Lot Nos. 1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his name.
Florencias share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B, was purchased by
Mercedes who in turn bartered the same with the share acquired by
Santiago, another private respondent in this case.
A portion of Santiagos property was b ought by his daughter,
Asuncion Ceniza, married to private respondent Atillano Bongo and who
successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.
From the portion purchased by Asuncion Ceniza, another private
respondent, Romeo Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 square meters.
Romeo also acquired a tax declaration in his name. He was the husband
of Felicitas Ceniza, another daughter of Santiago.
The share acquired by Estanislao, another child of Apolinar, was
also a portion of Lot No. 1104-B. He also caused the tax declaration
pertaining to the said lot transferred in his name.
The siblings Remedios Adolfo and Constancia Zanoria, married to
private respondent Pablo Ramos, bought the share of their brother,
Melecio Ceniza. Remedios share, in turn, was transferred to her heirs,
private respondents Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn, Gina, Lorna, Chona,
Evelyn, Hubert, Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, and the heirs of their brother
Leoncio Adolfo, namely, his wife Elenita Adolfo, and children David and
Prestine May Adolfo.
On November 4, 1986, private respondents applied for registration of
their respective titles over the property they inherited from Apolinar
Ceniza, with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General opposed the application on the following grounds:
1. That neither the applicant/s nor their precedessors-in-interest have
been in open continuous exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto
(Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniment/s or title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax
payment/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said
muniment/s of title do/es not appear to be genuine and the tax
declaration/s and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended possession
of applicants to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title
or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicants who have failed to
file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6)
months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No.
892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on
October 25, 1996.
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the Regio nal Trial Court of
Mandaue City granted the application. [4] It held that since the applicants
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years was continuous,
peaceful, adverse, public and to the exclusion of everybody, the same
was in the concept of owners. Since the land was neither encumbered
nor subject to any other application for registration, the trial court
ordered that, upon the finality of its decision, the decrees of registration
should be issued in favor of the applicants.
The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for petitioner Republic
of the Philippines before the Court of Appeals.

In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the ruling in Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals, [5] that before public land could be registered
in the name of a private individual, it must first be established that the
land had been classified alienable and disposable, refers to public lands
and not to those which have acquired the nature of a private property in
view of the continuous possession thereof by its claimants. The Court of
Appeals held:

Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the
property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing
that the lots in question are forestal land, unlike the case of Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701, wherein the Director of Lands
questioned the petition for registration filed by the applicant therein on
the claim that the property applied for registration in his favor was
classified and proven to be forestal land.

In this case, it was sufficiently established by appellees that they have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject lots even before the year 1927, or fifty nine (59) years before the
application was filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6, 1989, p. 711; June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This period more than sufficiently satisfies
the 30 years requirement of the Public Land Act for property to be
considered as private land. Significantly, Section 4, Presidential Decree
No. 1073 provides:

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a

resolution dated October 29, 1996. Traversing petitioners argument that
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, all lands of the public
domain are owned by the State, the Court of Appeals stated that said
provision further states that agricultural lands are excluded from those
lands that may not be alienated. It further ruled:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 4(c), Chapter VIII, of
the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Appellant was thus no longer required to prove that the property in
question is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Clearly, the property no longer forms part of the public domain.
The long and continuous possession thereof by appellees converted said
property to a private one. This finds support in the ruling in Director of
Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:
x x x alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30) years under the Public Land Act, as
amended is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. The above is a reaffirmation of the
principle established in the earlier cases of Cario v. Insular Government,
Suzi v. Razon, and Herico v. Dar, that open exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. x x x In
interpreting the provisions of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, this Court said in Herico v. Dar, x x x when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued.The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the torrens title to be issued upon the strength of the patent.
The Court of Appeals then cited Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court. [6] In that case, this Court ruled that alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period
(30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Moreover, appellant Republics claim that the property in question
remains to be public land under the Constitution, is refuted by this
Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
The Court of Appeals concluded its decision with the following
observations:

In the instant case, among the documents presented by appellees are

Real Estate tax receipts that sufficiently show that the subject land is
mainly utilized for agricultural purposes devoted to the planting of
coconut, corn x x x and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same for
residential purposes x x x.
It is noticeable that appellant failed to present any proof to establish its
claim that the land in question is not alienable. Although on July 10,
1989, the court a quo issued an order directing the Bureau of Forest
Development [BFD] to submit xx within thirty (30) days from its receipt of
[said order] a report on the status of the land xx to determine whether
said land or any portion thereof is within the forest zone xxx (Record, p.
63), the BFD failed to comply. Moreover, appellant never contested
appellees application nor did it may (sic) any manifestation that the land
in question is not alienable. Likewise, the prosecutor representing the
Republic of the Philippines during the trial did not even contest the
classification of the land as stated in the evidence of appellees. Their
belated objection should therefore not prejudice appellees who openly
and in good faith presented all the documents pertinent to their claims.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the period within which a
qualified person may apply for confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title by judicial legalization to December 31, 1987. The filing
of this case in October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under the decree,
this right is available to a person who has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, by himself and
through his predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate that appellees
have proven themselves to have been in possession of the subject land
even prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred in: (1) holding that private respondents have registerable title to
the lots in question, and (2) ordering the registration thereof in their
names. [7]
The issues raised before us are: (a) whether there is a need for
private respondents to establish that the land subject of their application
was alienable and disposable despite proofs showing their possession
thereof for more than 30 years; and (b) whether private respondents were
able to meet the period required by the Public Land Act, as amended.
Petitioner contends that before a public land can be registered in
the name of a private individual, it must be shown first that (a) the land
has been classified alienable and disposable, and (b) the applicant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.
Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to meet the said
requirements. They did not cite any official proclamation or presented
the land classification map covering the subject parcels of land to prove
that they are alienable and disposable public lands. Neither did private
respondents adduce evidence to show that they had been in possession

of the land since June 12, 1945. Although they were able to show
possession by Apolinar, their predecessor-in-interest, since 1948, and
private respondents actual possession beginning in 1960, no proof was
presented to show possession prior to 1948. Consequently, private
respondents are not entitled to have the subject parcels of land
registered in their names.

Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated
December 9, 1980. [17] This is sufficient evidence to show the real character
of the land subject of private respondents application. [18] Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence,[19] which is true in this case. Worth noting also
was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

In their comment, private respondents cite Section 48(b), [8] before

it was amended by PD No. 1073, and Section (50)[9] of the Public Land Act
as the applicable law in this case. They maintain that the land subject of
their application is an agricultural land devoted to corn and other root
crops. Further, they have been in possession of th e land since 1927.
Estanislao Ceniza, one of the children of Apolinar and who was already
ten years old at that time, testified that his father was the one in
possession of the land, appropriating its fruits and paying its realty
taxes. When their father died in 1947, Apolinars chidren took possession
of the land. They also appropriated the fruits and paid realty taxes
therefor. In 1960, Apolinars heirs partitioned the property, declared their
respective shares in their names for tax purposes and paid the realty
taxes.

no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest

the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms
part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in
question are forestal land....[20]

Apart from this, private respondents claim that the land in question
has long been a private one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue de
Cebu, which in turn was recognized as a private land by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu in several decisions dated February 27, 1934, March 27,
1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6, 1937.
Indeed, before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands
of the public domain, the Public Land Act requires that the applicant
must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
in the Public Land Act. Only when these conditions are met may the
possessor of the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. [10]
Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that mere
adverse possession in accordance with law for a period likewise provided
for by law would automatically entitle the possessor to the right to
register public land in his name. The applicant has to establish first the
disposable and alienable character of the public land. Otherwise, all
public lands, regardless of their classification, can be subject of
registration of private titles, as long as the applicant shows that he meets
the required years of possession. Worth noting is the case of Bracewell v.
Court of Appeals,[11] where the applicant had been in possession of the
property since 1908 but it was conclusively shown by the government
that the land was classified as alienable or disposable only on 27 March
1972. The Court said:
x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest
had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by
virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. [12] (Italics supplied)
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; [13] an administrative action; [14] investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; [15] and a legislative act or a statute. [16]
In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic)

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere

possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its
occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome
the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we
are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. [21] Although
there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them. [22]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and
the decision, as well as the resolution, of the Court o f Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.