BEHAVIOUR BASED SAFETY

MEEGE-721

(ELEMENTS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT & SYSTEMS)

List of contents
Unit-I.

Introduction to SHE aspects

Unit-II Regulatory Regieme

26.

35

..

47

Permit to work

Types and Severity of Accidents

Cost of Accidents

Unit-III. Safety Policy, Organization, Monitoring and Reporting

50
Unit-IV. PSM System Audits
Unit-V.

Emergency/Disaster Plans

Unit-VI. First Aid

.
.

Unit-VII. Safety officer role & responsibility

110

104

127
.

. 132

Unit-VIII.Major disasters
PIPER ALPHA
BHOPAL TRAGEDY

Unit-IX. Personnel Risk in Industrial Operations .

.
..

143
150

. 165

Mineral Exploitation

Manufacturing Plant

Material Handling Processes

Chemical Industry

UNIT-I
INTRODUCTION TO SHE ASPECTS

LEADERSHIP
&
COMMITMENT

POLICY

CONTINUOUS
IMPROVEMENT
HSE
PLANS
&
PROCEDURES

MANAGEMENT
REVIEW

CHECKING
&
CORRECTIVE
ACTION

IMPLEMENT
ATION
&
OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION:
Petroleum industry, by its nature is a hazardous industry. Processing,
handling, storage and transportation of large volumes of hazardous
petroleum products and processing chemicals present inherent risks of fires,
explosions,

toxic

releases

and

environmental

pollution

if

adequate

precautions are not taken during the design and operation of petroleum
installations.
The petroleum operations have been constantly developing, upgrading and
improving their design and operating techniques in terms of economy of scale,
high quality products and energy optimization to meet the stiff market
competition.
All this has increased the potential of major risks. Major accidents
like Bhopal , Mexico city ,Seveso , Flexiobro and others in the last
two decades or so have shaken the confidence of general public
about the safety of the people, property and environment. In fact,
some companies have been closed down on account of poor safety
and environmental performance.
After these major disastrous accidents government authorities, human
activist groups and corporate houses in many countries including India have
taken a number of steps to evolve a strategy to avert major mishaps in the
installations which have the potential to cause loss of human life, property
and environmental damage.
No doubt, health, safety and environment issues are very critical in
the petroleum operations in the current scenario.
HSE MODEL AND ITS INTEGRATION WITH BUSINESS:
HSE is an integrated management comprising discipline of occupational,
health and environment and fire protection.
Whatever way you look at these functions, industrial hazards,
unsafe acts and situations are the basic problems to be managed.

When an industrial hazards leads to an immediate or sudden accidents like

an injury, fire, explosion or toxic release. It becomes a safety issues and safety
management comes in the picture. When the hazards have chronic
health

effects

like

stress,

musco-skeltal

disorders

and

other

industrial diseases, it becomes occupational health problems.

On the other hand, when the effect on the unsafe situations is
long term and spread over larger areas beyond the boundary limit it
becomes an environmental problem.
No doubt, HSE efforts of many organizations are driven by statutory
requirements and they do whatever minimum is required to avoid
litigation and fines.
However an efficient and enlightened corporate see HSE in much
broader perspective. For them good HSE performance is an integral
part of efficient and profitable business management. They are
committed to improve their health, safety and environment and fire
protection performance on a continuous basis and on the sustainable
way, i.e. meeting the needs of present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their needs.
The compulsion of integrating HSE functions with business can be well
appreciated by looking in to the cost of an accident/ incident.
Consider the following:

Direct or Indirect costs of major accidents/

incidents:
Injury/ loss of life to self or co-workers
Workman compensation
Cost of injury/ investigation
Loss of property and material
Loss of profits
Punitive sanctions and fines
Closure/ shutdown of the installation
Public litigation
Environmental pollution
Ecological damage
Loss of business
Shareholders wrath
The above does not include the cost of psychological and social
factors associated with major accidents.
Considering all these it is sensible to integrate HSE as an important
management functions like production, maintenance, finance marketing and
human resources etc.

HSE MANAGEMENT FRAME WORK:

As said earlier, many organizations try to meet only the minimum

regulatory requirements. But this is not enough in todays business and
social requirement. Regulations alone can not guarantee the safety of
petroleum installations. Most of the regulatory agencies lay down rules and
regulations, which are the minimum basic requirements for the safe design
and operation of an installation. Sound and safe engineering practices are
equally important but are not adequately addressed in their requirements.
The statutory and law enforcing agencies are generally slow in
updating their rules and requirements to keep pace with the
technological and social changes. Further, many regulatory agencies
do not have adequate infrastructure and manpower to exercise
superintendence and control of industrial safety performance on a
continuous basis. For example, number of safety inspectors, boiler
inspectors and environmental specialist are far less than that would
be required to undertake meaningful inspection visits to a large
number of installations under their jurisdiction. Further the back-log
and training that many factory inspectors have, their visits to factories are
restricted to checking basic amenities like first aid facilities, guards for the
machines, personal protective equipment, potable water and canteen facilities
etc. They probably dont have right training and aptitude for
identifying the many process hazards which are not so obvious.
The regulatory requirements are just very minimum requirements to obtain
license and operate an installation, the petroleum operations which is
hazardous industry. Lot of self regulatory initiatives by the management are
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required to maintain a high level of safety. So the best framework of HSE

management is to comply with the regulatory requirements and have highly
efficient self regulatory system in house.

UNIT 2
REGULATORY REGIEME:
Since petroleum industry is hazardous industry, a number of regulations
have been framed by various statutory/regulatory authorities in the country
to safeguard the interest of workers, public and environment. Sustainable
development and environmental safeguards are important societal issues.
These regulations specify minimum mandatory requirements to be
complied with by the industry. The industry should take these
regulations in the right spirit and be fully committed in their compliance.
These regulations should not be considered contrary to the interest of
business and hindrance to its development.

REGULATORY/ STATUTORY AGENCIES:

Following is the list of various regulatory/statutory agencies having
jurisdiction over the petroleum industry.
Central Pollution Control Board ( CPCB), under the Ministry of
Environment and Forest
Respective State Pollution Control Board, under the Ministry
of Environment and Forest of The State
Chief Inspector of Factories Of The Respective State (CIF),
Under The Ministry Of Labor
Chief Controller Of Explosives (CCE) , Ministry of Heavy
Industry, Dept of Explosives
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 Director General of Civil Aviation ( DGCA) ,under The Ministry

of Civil Aviation, National Air Port Authority Of India
Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC), Under the Association of
Indian Companies
Bhaba Atomic Energy Commission (BARC), Under Ministry of
Atomic Energy
Director General Mines Safety (DGMS), under the Ministry of
Mines
Regional Transport Authority (RTA) under the Ministry of
Surface Transport
Director General Of Dock Safety (DGDS), under The Ministry
of Shipping
International Maritime Organization (IMO), under United
Nations
Oil industry safety directorate (OISD), under the ministry of
petroleum and natural gas

VARIOUS REGULATIONS/ REQUIREMENTS:

The different agencies of listed above framed various regulations under
their purview.

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Needless

to say that over the years, these agencies have played a

significant role in promoting industrial safety and environmental

protection in the hydrocarbon industry. Important regulations are briefly
discussed below.

PETROLEUM ACT , 1934

The statutory requirements of the petroleum are governed by petroleum
Act, 1934 and petroleum Rules. 1976, under the jurisdiction of chief
controller of Explosives. These rules deal with the safety guidelines/
regulations for import, transport, storage, refining blending and testing of
petroleum and its fractions/ hydrocarbons. Under the petroleum Act, the
petroleum products are classified
into :class A having flash point below 23 degree Celsius,
and class-B with flash point between 23 to 65 degree Celsius
and class-C having flash point between 65 degree celsius to 93 degree
Celsius.Petroleum products having flash point
above 93 degrees Celsius are exempted petroleum and do not fall under
the purview of petroleum rules.
The petroleum rules, 1976 detail the procedures and safety norms to be
observed for approval of containers, import, delivery and dispatch,
loading, transport, storage, refining and blending of petroleum and
requirement for storage , refining and blending of petroleum and
requirement for storage and safety distances, testing and maintenance of

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pipelines, electrical apparatus and degree of safety and license/ approval

procedures, under these rules, license is required for.
Import, storage and refueling
Transport by ships/vessels in bulk
Decanting from tank trucks in unlicensed premises
Transport by pipelines
Refining and blending
Fabrication of tank trucks
Manufacture of safety fittings
Construction of tanks
Design of containers

THE INDIAN EXPLOSIVES ACT, 1884

The compressed or liquefied gas filled in containers under pressure are
notified by the Government of India as explosives and brought under the
purview of explosive act., 1884 in 1938. The chief controller of Explosives
administration used for various purposes like mines/ rock blasting,
crackers etc.
THE STATIC AND MOBILE PRESSURE VESSELES, SMPV
(UNFIRED) RULES, 1981
These rules stipulate various safety guidelines for the storage and
transport of compressed and liquefied gases filled in pressure vessels
(exceeding 1000 litres capacity) at a pressure exceeding 1.5 kg/cm2 at 15
degrees Celcius. Under these rules the storage and transport vessel
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should be designed for the specific gas, maximum operating temperature

and working pressure, proper material of construction, capacity shape,
sizes etc. according to IS 2825 or any other approved code. The chief
controller of explosives should approve its design/drawings. The vessel
should be fabricated by an approved fabricator and installed as per the
safety distances stipulated in the rules. the rules call for periodic reexamination/testing of the pressure vessel and its fittings.
THE GAS CYLINDER RULES, 1981
The provisions of these rules pertain to the filling. Storage, handling and
transportation of gas cylinders exceeding pressure of 1.5kg/cm2 at 15
degrees Celsius or 2.5 kg/cm2 at 50 degree Celsius. The rules regulate the
manufacture of cylinders, valves and regulators, marking, stamping and
color coding of cylinders, import of gas cylinders, testing of cylinders and
the procedures for appointing competent person authorized to undertake
the testing and inspection of gas cylinders.

THE FACTORIES ACT, 1948

The provisions of this act contained in different chapters on health, safety
and welfare are administered by the chief inspector of the factories in the
respective state.

13

Each state has its own factories rules. The act was revised in 1987 to
include hazardous chemical factories and some other amendments
brought in the factories rules of many sates in 1995
The factories act make the occupier of a factory fully responsible
for providing and maintaining the plant and the systems of work
that are safe and without any risks to the health and safety of the
workers and general public.
General responsibilities of occupier are listed below.

Declaring safety policy of the organization

Providing the material safety data sheet (MSDS) of each

hazardous chemicals

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PERMIT TO WORK SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION
As said earlier, petroleum operations are hazardous in nature which can lead
to serious accidents or mishaps if proper precautions are not taken. Many a
times serious accidents have occurred because proper precautions
were not taken in preparing and handing over equipment for repair,
inspection or modification. For example, a leaking pipeline was not
completely isolated and made hydrocarbon free. An explosion took place
when a welder tried to weld it. An electrician was working on electrical
switchgear without removing its fuses on the supply line. He got electrocuted
when someone by mistake switched on the supply. There are numerous cases
where people worked without proper isolation of equipment, cutting off
electrical supply, proper personnel protective equipment, etc. Every
petroleum installation must have an approved Permit to Work
System in place. The permit is an official record of safe working
conditions agreed upon by the issuer and acceptor of the permit for
carrying out any maintenance, repair, inspection or modification
work.
TYPES OF PERMITS
Various permits applicable in a petroleum installation are listed below:
Cold Work Permit

Hot Work Permit

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Confined Space Entry/Work Permit

Excavation Permit

Permit to Work on Electrical Equipment

Electrical Isolation/Restoration Permit

Permit for Closure of Roads

Permit for using a Radioactive Source

Permit for Working Over/Under Water

Vehicle/Crane Entry Permit

Permit for Photography

Permit for Isolation of Fire Water System

Mine/Rock Blasting Operations

Depending upon the nature of activities, some or all of the above

permits may be applicable in a petroleum installation

ELEMENTS OF A TYPICAL WORK PERMIT

Every installation should design work permit formats as per its requirement
and nature of activities. OISD and NSC give guidelines for designing work
permit formats. A copy of the same format is given in Appendix-1. Some
important elements of a typical work permit are as below:

Type of permit

Date, time of issue and validity

Description of location where work is to be carried o

Brief description of the work

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Detailed safety precautions to be taken

Name and signatures of person(s) issuing the permit

Name and signature of the person receiving t permit

Authorization by senior management person depending on seriousness of

the hazard

Declaration of completion of job by the receiver with date and time.

PERMIT PROCEDURE
A work permit is generally issued by an operating supervisor called issuer of
the permit to the maintenance supervisor a contractor, called the acceptor
of the permit after ensuring all the necessary precautions. The nature and
location work to be done must be clearly specified in the permit by the issuer,
who should explain and show the same to the accepter

Wetting the area

Providing standby fire fighting equipment/ person

Providing standby rescue team

This is not an exhaustive list and some more precautions may be necessary to
meet special work requirements. Find out what are these before issuing a
permit.

MANAGEMENT OF PLANT CHANGES

33

INTRODUCTION
Over

the

period

of

time

process

changes/modifications to increase capacity,

industry

may

have

several

reduce specific consumption of

raw materials, chemicals catalysts; increase energy efficiency; and bring in

ease of operation and flexibility or improve HSE performance. Many serious
accidents have occurred world over because changes were made in plants,
processes and/or management systems without proper scrutiny and review of
any unforeseen, effects. A classical example is the famous Flixborough
accident in the ICI petrochemical complex in England. It is Imperative
that every petroleum installation must have in place an approved written
procedure for undertaking changes/modifications to avoid any adverse safety
repercussions. This procedure should take into account change, temporary or
permanent, that could affect integrity, reliability, quality, health and safety of
personnel or environment.

DEFINITION OF PLANT CHANGES

The following activities are considered as plant changes
Addition, deletion, alteration and relocation equipment, piping,
instruments, material construction, insulation, cathodic protection
irrespective of its magnitude.
Any change to the supports to equipment, piping fittings or changes to
the structure, which could. Its load carrying capabilities including
changes to platforms, ladders, etc.

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ACCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION

In spite of good systems in place and people taking, precautions while
doing their work, the possibility of, accident can not be ruled out. It is
necessary that each organization should have a good accident
reporting and investigating system in place. Many people, at times,
tend to look at accident investigation as an exercise to collect some facts for
the sole objective of putting blame or hanging someone for his errors and
omissions to set an example. For from this, accident investigation
should be a learning process to prevent accidents and for many
other purposes.
The magnitude of accidents sometimes makes them appear to be beyond
practical solution, but a systematic investigation makes it possible to
identify all the possible circumstances and causes leading to the
accident. Like peeling the onion, it enables us to look at the underlying
causes of an accident, which may not be so obvious. A proper
investigation helps to identify the root cause(s) of an accident
enabling the management to take appropriate corrective action.
Some of the several objectives of an accident investigation are listed
below, the rationale of each being self-explanatory:
.Define the root cause(s) of the accident to take appropriate
corrective measures

Define management errors

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.Satisfy company rules and identify violations of company;

procedures

Satisfy insurance requirements

Prevent further accidents

Define operating errors

Satisfy regulatory requirements

Provide protection against litigation

Comply with workers' compensation rules

The extent of training depends on the target groups. The training received
by the new employees and contractors is called the initial training, which
includes comprehensive classroom and practical training in the various
HSE procedures applicable in the installation. Everybody working in a
petroleum installation must receive at least a basic fire fighting
training before he is assigned any work. Those already working should
also receive periodic HSE refresher training to keep them updated
with any changes or developments. Third parties like truck drivers
carrying products in /out of the installation and various vendors should also be
given minimum HSE training so that they understand the basic safety rules to
be followed in the installation. Similarly, visitors should be given a safety
brief before entry into the installation so that they don't do
something unknowingly that may put themselves or others into
danger. Many good companies issue entry passes/ID cards to those entering
the premises only after they have received the required HSE training.

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METHODOLOGY
HSE training should be a mix of theoretical classroom lectures and
practical training in the use of various fire and safety equipment and
appliances. Extensive use of audio-visual aids is used for effective training.
Care should be taken to select the right language(s) to meet the
requirement of multilingual workforce. Some companies have produced
video films, which are shown to the newcomers, especially contractors, third
parties and visitors to give them basic HSE training with minimum
requirement of faculty. Training through video films can also, to some
extent, minimize the language problem.
To ensure that a candidate has understood the instructions, some validation
is a must. This can be an objective type of test at the end of the session. If a
candidate has not performed satisfactorily in the test, he should go through the
session once again. Records of training and validation should be maintained.
Thorough investigation of an accident is an essential step toward the
prevention of accidental losses of our precious resources including the people,

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property and environment. A good and systematic investigation is therefore an

important HSE management tool.
The fi rst step is to have a proper accident reporting system . In
this direction, every petroleum installation should make a standard procedure
for notification and reporting of any accident to the concerned officials of the
installation and outside agencies. This procedure should list the contact
telephone numbers of key people. In case of any accident, the personnel on duty
should inform the concerned people as per this procedure. These numbers
should be displayed at prominent locations in the installation.
Whenever an accident takes place howsoever small, it must be investigated.
Depending upon the nature of accident, an investigation team should be set up
which should go into all details-plant data, log sheets, strip charts,
historian, interviews with personnel, photographs, videos of effected
area and equipment, etc. If required, external help of a professional
accident investigator can be taken. Effects and consequence models are
available which can be very helpful in the investigation of process type of
accidents. The team should make an honest report so that right decisions can
be taken. Many a times investigations done by internal teams are not
very objective. They tend to blame only the hardware and design of
the facilities. They are not comfortable in bringing out the human
factors and fixing accountability. If we have to learn from an accident and
take proper corrective actions to avoid recurrence, the investigation report
must be frank and unbiased.

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There should be a system to follow up the investigation report.

Management should establish a system to determine and document the
response to each finding of the report to ensure agreed upon actions are
completed in a time frame. The lessons learnt from the accidents should be
disseminated to all the concerned personnel in the complex. In case of
multi Unit Company, the conclusions of the investigation repor t should
go to all the units of the company. In some cases, the information
could also be shared with the industry.
CONTRACTORS' SAFETY
Employers who use contractors to perform work in and around
installations that involve highly hazardous processes and chemicals have
to establish a screening process so that they hire and use only
contractors who accomplish the desired job tasks without compromising
the safety and health of any employee at the installation. For contractors
whose safety performance on the job is not known to the hiring
employer, the employer must obtain necessary references and information
on the safety record of the contractors. In addition, the employer must
ensure that the contractor has the required job skills, knowledge and
certifications (for pressure vessels, welding, etc.). Proper safety training to
contract employees should be imparted.
Maintaining a site injury and illness log for contractors is another
method employers must use to track and maintain current knowledge of
activities involving contract employees working on or adjacent to processes

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covered by PSM. Injury and illness logs of both the employer's employees and
contract employees allow the employer to have full knowledge of process
injury and illness experience. This log contains information useful to
those auditing process safety management compliance and those
involved in incident investigation.
Contract employees must perform their work safely. Considering that
contractors often perform very specialized and potentially hazardous
tasks, such as confined space entry activities, and non-routine repair
activities, their work must be controlled and properly supervised by the
employer's supervisors in addition to contractor's own supervisors.
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY OF EQUIPMENT
Every petroleum installation must review its maintenance programmes and
schedules to see if there are areas where "breakdown" maintenance is used
rather than the more preferable ongoing mechanical integrity
programme. Equipment used to process, store or handle highly hazardous
chemicals has to be designed, constructed, installed, and maintained to
minimize the risk of releases of such chemicals. This requires that a
mechanical integrity programme be in place to ensure the continued
integrity of the plant.
Elements of a mechanical integrity programme include identifying and
categorizing equipment and instrumentation; inspections and tests and
their frequency; maintenance

procedures; training of maintenance

personnel; criteria for acceptable test results; documentation of test and

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inspection results; documentation of manufacturers' recommendations for

maintenance, inspection and spare parts.
It is always better to prepare Preventive Maintenance Schedules
and do weekly-preventive maintenance of the equipments in a phased manner
by making the optimum use of availale resourses.
PRE-START UP SAFETY REVIEW
Safety of a new installation is of special signifi cance. Before starting
up a new installation after completing construction requires a comprehensive
programme of pre-startup audits/ reviews. For new processes/facilities, the
employer will find a PHA helpful in improving the design and construction of
the process from safety, quality and reliability point of view. The safe operation
of the new process is enhanced by making use of the PHA (Public Health
Associated Agencies)recommendations before final installation is completed.
P&IDS(Process & Instrumental Diagrams/ Design) _should be completed, the
operating and safety procedures put in place and the operating staff trained to
run the installation before startup. The completed plant and facilities are
thoroughly checked by a team(s) of plant personnel against P&IDs and
specifications to ensure that the construction has been done according to these
approved drawings and specifications. The initial startup procedures and
normal operating procedures must be fully evaluated as part of pre-startup
review to ensure a safe (transfer of technology)transfer into the normal
operating mode.
QUESTIONS:
What are the limitations of regulatory agencies? How can you make safety
issues effective in your mill?

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 You are supposed to award some work to outside contractor. What will be
your criteria to award that work being a Manager- HSE?

UNIT-

ACCIDENTS
WHAT IS AN ACCIDENT?
An unplanned and unwelcome event which interrupts normal
activity.
Accidents on chemical plants may hazard the process, the personnel or both
.Research on accidents is relevant, therefore, both for accidents which
result in property damage and those which cause personal injury.
An early definition of accidents involving injury at work was proposed by Lord

MacNaughton in the case of Fenton v Thorley & Co in 1903, as follows:

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"Some concrete happening which intervenes or obtrudes itself upon the normal cause of
employment. It has the ordinary everyday meaning of an unlooked-for mishap or an
untoward event which is not expected or designed by the victim." for students of the
NEBOSH National Diploma
This definition refers to a worker suffering a mishap which had a degree of
unexpectedness, but it's too narrow as it's only concerned with accidents that result in
injury, and not all accidents do.
A trawl of some 40 accident definitions found in general, legal, medical , scientific and
health and safety literature suggests the ideal accident definition should include reference
to causes and effects.
Taking the best of the definitions, one that covers all the bases might run as follows:
"An accident is an unexpected, unplanned event, in a sequence of events that occurs
through a combination of causes; it results in physical harm - injury or disease - to
an individual, damage to property, a near miss, a loss or any combination of these
effects."
All accidents should be investigated; not just those that result in injury. Any accident
investigation should focus on the multi-causal accident and not uni-causal injury (where
there is one).

Immediate and underlying causes

It's also important that investigators identify and differentiate between immediate and
underlying (root) causes, possibly by using event tree analysis, a logical system to tie
events to their basic causes.
Immediate causes may be defined as substandard acts or conditions that lead directly to
the accident. These might be removal of a machine guard, employee error, non-use of
personal protective equipment, lack of concentration, stress, fatigue and poor
housekeeping.
Behavioural safety advocates would subdivide these immediate causes into unsafe acts
(88%) and unsafe conditions (10%). The other 2% are the unpreventable (or "acts of
God") according to research in the 1920s by HW Heinrich, the father of behavioural
safety.
Underlying or root causes may be defined as inadequacies in the occupational safety and
health (OSH) management system that allow the immediate causes to arise unchecked,
leading to the accidents.
These may include: unrealistic demands or expectations placed on employees, poor
maintenance, inadequate training or instruction, poor supervision, inadequate selection
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and placement of employees, incomplete risk assessments, unsatisfactory systems of

work, and even poor accident investigations which only highlight one or two immediate
causes.
These underlying causes (sometimes referred to as basic causes) can be grouped loosely
into three interrelated categories:

(lack of) management control factors

personal or job factors
environmental factors.

A thorough accident investigation process should therefore highlight all accident causes usually between 10 and 20 for each accident - and then provide the basis to develop
control measures designed to eliminate both immediate and underlying causes, resulting
in a continual improvement in the OSH management system. Remember, every negative
needs a positive and every cause needs a control.
Organisations should ask themselves the following questions about their accident
investigation processes:

Do we currently investigate all accidents?

Do we meet the RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations) requirements?
Do we need to review our internal accident investigation and reporting procedures
Do we have adequate accident investigation/reporting documentation?
Do we have enough, competent, responsible persons appointed and trained to
investigate accidents?

The HSE's HSG 245 workbook presents a four-step investigation process:

Step 1: gather the information

Step 2: analyse the information
Step 3: identify risk control measures
Step 4: implement the action plan.

The investigation process

To gather the information (Step 1), the investigators need to ask a series of questions
which aim to tease out all the facts/contributory causes (immediate and underlying) of the
accident (see box left).
They should then analyse the information (Step 2) to establish the facts and chronology
of the events - immediate and underlying - that led to the accident.

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The analysis should be specific and unbiased and should identify the sequence of
events/conditions and the combination of causes, using event tree analysis to map out all
the causes in a chronological, logical and linked way.
Specifically, the analysis should clearly establish what happened and why. The
investigative team, ideally three-strong, should identify whether human error or
procedural violations have been contributory factors. It should also identify what other
factors contributed to the accident, whether they are job-related, organisational or linked
to plant and equipment.
It's sometimes difficult to pin down the people issues because of the fear of blame
apportionment and/or fault-finding. It's highly unlikely that a supervisor, charged to
investigate an accident on their patch, will come up with "lack of supervision" as one of
the contributory causes. Hence the need for a team of three investigators.
Once you have found all the causal factors and explored all the branches of the event tree
to their ends, then, and only then, can the investigative team get into control mode.
Never discount facts or possible causes that don't fit easily into the picture or the event
tree. These red herrings may be signs of another branch of the event tree that the
investigation has yet to follow. It's usually best to use the term "event tree" rather than
"fault tree" as the latter has definite negative connotations, which have no place in
positive accident investigations.

Control measures
In control mode (Step 3) your team should effectively identify all risk control measures
that were missing, inadequate or misused. They should compare activities, conditions and
practices as they actually were in the run-up to the accident with what should have been
in place according to current best practice, agreed systems of work, legal requirements,
codes of practice, guidance and standards.
The team should identify those extra measures that are required to eliminate all
immediate and underlying causes by providing meaningful recommendations which can
be properly implemented to prevent a recurrence, and hence continually improve the
OSH management system.
Particular questions which may help here include:

What risk control systems (RCSs) and workplace precautions (WPs) are needed?
Do similar risks exist elsewhere? If so, what and where?
Have similar accidents happened before? If so, what and where?

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Step 4 - the action plan and its implementation - is the final step in the accident
investigation process. This step should provide a clear action plan with SMARTT
objectives (ones that are specific, measurable, agreed, realistic, time-bound and trackable)
to deal effectively with all the immediate and underlying causes of the accident. It should
include lessons that have been learnt which may be applied to prevent other accidents of
a similar type/nature.
It should also provide feedback to people involved at all levels in the organisation to
ensure the findings and action plan recommendations are correct, realistic and fully
address all the issues. This plan should include feeding the findings back into a prompt
review of the existing risk assessment, as any accident is an indicator that a review may
well be overdue.
The team should also ensure that the results of the investigation are shown to all
concerned, with the emphasis firmly on the resulting action plan, timescales,
responsibilities and accountabilities, and how the plan will be implemented and its
progress chased and monitored.
The risk control action plan should establish which RCSs and WPs should be
implemented in the immediate, short or medium term. The team should also note which
risk assessments and systems of work need to be reviewed, updated and publicised, and
whether the accident details and the resultant findings and recommendations have been
recorded and analysed from both a numerical and causal viewpoint (that is, reactive
monitoring).
They should also flag up whether there are any common causes or trends which suggest
the need for further, deeper and detailed investigation. Finally, they should put a figure on
the overall cost of the accident - both insured and uninsured - and also cost the associated
control measures.
Using the four-step process to investigate all accidents from a causal viewpoint will
certainly improve overall OSH performance in the workplace. Cursory investigations
where the only control measure cited is "employee told to take more care" must be
despatched to the health and safety history books in favour of the much more scientific
approach outlined above. They certainly have no place in the NEBOSH Diploma
syllabus.

Need to know
Questions to ask in an accident investigation include the following:

Where and when did the accident happen?

46

Who was injured/suffered ill health?

What was damaged?
Who was involved?
How did the accident happen?
What activities were being carried out at the time?
What did witnesses see, hear, smell, feel, taste?
Was there anything unusual or different about the working conditions?
Were there adequate safe systems of work and did people stick to them?
Was the activity being properly supervised/managed?
What were the outcomes of the accident - injury, disease, damage, death, near
miss, loss?
What was the cause of any injury?
What were the immediate and underlying causes of the accident?
What does the relevant risk assessment say?
Was the risk known? If yes, why was it not controlled? If no, why not?
Did the work organisation (or lack of it) impact on the accident?
Was maintenance and cleaning adequate?
Were the people involved suitable and competent?
Did the workplace layout influence the accident?
Did the nature, shape or form of the materials influence the accident?
Did the work equipment influence the accident? Was it difficult/awkward to use?
Had the people involved received adequate information, instruction and training?
Was this clearly documented?
Was adequate safety equipment provided and used correctly?
What other conditions influenced the accident?

This is an article in the Know-How Series prepared on behalf of the National

Examination Board in Occupational Safety and Health (NEBOSH) by Lawrence Bamber,
BSc, DIS, CFIOSH, FIRM, MASSE

Accident research as a discipline tends to concern itself primarily with

those accidents in which people are involved. It is primarily concerned,
therefore, with injury to personnel. But it does involve the study of the total
accident situation. Often it is a matter of chance whether this situation
hazards the process or the peop1e. Clearly accident research is closely

47

related to work in other fields such as human factors and, in particular,

human error.
Accounts of accident research include Occupational Accident Research
(Kjcllcn, 1984), Information Processing and Human-Machine Interaction
Rasmussen, 1986), Individual Behavior in the Control of Danger (A.R.
Hale and Glendon, 1987) and Hunan Error (Reason, 1990).
classic papers in tile field are given with commentary in the collection
Accident Research, Methods and Approaches (Haddon, Suchman and Klcin,
1964).
Much work on the subject is concerned with areas which are not of prime
interest here, such as accidents to children, accidents in tile home and
traffic accidents.
In addition to work on personal accidents, it is convenient to deal here
briefly with some principal research programmes oil, and test sites for,
major hazards.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The development of accident research has shown that here are a number
of serious pitfalls in the investigation of accidents. There is a tendency for a
particular to be studied as a possible cause of accidents and there is
frequently a bias in favor of this feature. Often no information is given
on any work with a control group.
DEFINITION OF ACCIDENTS

48

The question of what actually constitutes an accident is, worth at least brief
consideration. It has been considered by Suchnian (1961), who distinguishes
three defining; characteristics:
1. Degree of expectedness,
2. Degree of avoid ability and
3. Degree of intention.
An event is more likely to be classed as in accident if it is unexpected,
unavoidable and unintended.
Other secondary characteristics are
1. Degree of warning,
2. Duration of Occurrence,
3. Degree of negligence and
4. Degree of misjudgment.
Classification of an event as an accident is more probable if it gives
little warning and happens quickly and if there is a large element of
negligence and misjudgment.
It is suggested, however, by Suchman that as knowledge increases an
event is more likely to be described in knits of its causal factors and less
likely to be classed as an accident
ACCIDENT:
An undesired event that results in harm to people, property, the
environment, or corporate reputation.
INCIDENT:

49

An undesired event that, under slightly different circumstances,

could have resulted in harm to people, property, the environment or
corporate reputation.
NEAR MISS:
An unsafe act or condition which could have led to an undesired
event.
HAZARD:
A condition or practice that has the potential for resulting in accidental loss;
in other words, anything which has the potential to harm people, the
environment, property, or Nikos corporate reputation.
LOSS:

Avoidable waste of any resource

Unintended harm or damage that results from sub-standard acts,

practices and/or substandard conditions;

Includes injuries, illnesses, property damage, performance interruption,

quality degradation, environmental damage, loss of reputation and profit
reduction.

RISK:

Product of probability or chance of loss and consequence or severity.

Risk Evaluation:
Assessment of:

the potential severity of loss (consequences of a loss);

frequency that a loss occurs (based on historical, statistical data)

frequency of exposure to hazard(s);

50

CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS
Much work on accidents is concerned with accident statistics. these
statistics are based on all accident classification of some kind. Accident
classifi cations are therefore quite important. Unless a classification
contains a particular category which is of interest is no means of
retrieving information on it.
There are a number of standard accident classifications, these include
the classification used by the HSE in its annual Health and Safety
Statistics, published in the employment gazette used in the International
Labour offi ce.Relevant Standards are the American National Standard
Institute (ANSI)
Three basic types of accidents
1. MINOR ACCIDENTS:
Such as paper cuts to fingers or dropping a box of materials
2. MAJOR ACCIDENTS:
More serious accidents that cause injury or damage to equipment or property
such as a forklift dropping a load or someone falling off a ladder.
If the injured person remains absent for 48 hours or more due to injury
at work-place, the accident is called as a reportable or lost-time accident.
As per Statutory Requirements, such accidents are to be reported to
Government Authorities in a prescribed format.

51

According to Section 3 of the Workmens Compensation Act,1923 the

liability of the employer to pay compensation is limited to the provisions of
the act. The accident must have arisen out of and in the course of
employment and the injury must have resulted in the workmans death or
permanent or temporary, total or partial disablement for a period
exceeding 3 days (72 hours)
The Employer IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION , in respect of an
injury (not resulting in death) IF:
(I)

At the time of accident, the workman was under the influence of

drinks or drugs.

(II)

The willful disobedience of the workmen to an order or a rule

framed for the purpose of securing the safety of the workman.

(III) The willful removal of any safety device which he knew to have
been provided for the safety of the workman.
(IV)

However, if the workman dies on account of injuries arising out of

and in the course of employment, the employer will have to pay
compensation, in spite of above exceptions.

ACCIDENTS THAT OCCUR OVER AN EXTENDED TIME FRAME:

Such as hearing loss or an illness resulting from exposure to chemicals
Accidents have two things in common
They all have outcomes from the accident
They all have contributory factors that cause the accident
OUTCOMES OF ACCIDENTS
a. Negative aspects

52

Death & injury

Disease

Damage to equipment & property

Litigation costs

Lost productivity

b. Positive aspects

Accident investigation

Change to safety programs

Causes of Accidents
Accidents are caused mainly by:* Human error

- 88%

* Mechanical failures - 10%

* Other factors

- 02%

Majority of the accidents are caused by:

a) The things that people do or fail to do i.e. their acts or omissions.
b) Unsafe working conditions.
- Accidents involving electricity are very serious.
- About 1 in 30 of all electrical accidents are fatal
-Compared with about 1 in 600 of other types of accidents.
In the manufacturing industry, the major causes of accidents resulting in
personal injury can be grouped as follows:
1. Handling goods and materials

- 27 %

2. Machinery

- 17 %

3. Persons falling from a height

- 15 %

53

4. Persons stepping on or striking

against objects

-10 %

5. Falling objects

-08 %

6. Transport

-08 %

7. Hand tools

-08 %

8. Miscellaneous

- 07 %

OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

1. Environmental

Noise

Vapors, fumes, dust

Light

Heat

Critters

2. Design

Workplace layout

Design of tools & equipment

3. Systems & procedures

Lack of systems & procedures

Inappropriate systems & procedures

4. Human behavior

Common to all accidents

Not limited to the person involved in the accident

54

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
The primary function is to determine causes of accidents & to prevent its
recurrence. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the background of an
accident more carefully in order to determine why unsafe conditions were
created or unsafe acts performed.
The factors emerged during such an examination may include :(1) * Proper selection of workers:

Educational / technical knowledge,

Medical fitness history in relation to the proposed employment,

Practical ability / experience.

(2) * Training:
To ensure

Adequate knowledge of hazards,

Safe working techniques & documentation systems.

(3)Supervision: to ensure that there is adequate supervision by properly

trained & qualified persons.
o Correct and safe working practices are observed.
o Systems of work to ensure safe working :
o Work- Permit systems.
o Safe working practices.
o Measures necessary to control hazards.
If any of these factors are missing from the background then an accident is
inevitable.
THE AIM OF THE INVESTIGATION

55

Absolve individuals or management

Satisfy insurance requirements

Defend a position for legal argument

Or, to assign blame

The key result should be to prevent a recurrence of the same accident

The main aim of accident research is to understand accidents so that they
can be prevented. The attempt to understand an accident is often is
equated with a search for its cause.
The concept of the cause of an accident, however, has become somewhat
discredited. In accident investigation an administrative requirement to
report a single cause usually does not do justice to the complexity of the
situation. In accident research there has been much crit icism of work
which isolates and overemphasizes a particular factor.
It is more acceptable, therefore, to regard an accident as arising from a
particular combination of factors rather hit from a single cause. there is
thus a tendency to consider relationships between variables rather than
causes.
WHO SHOULD INVESTIGATE?
Dependent on severity of the accident
INVESTIGATION TEAM

Individuals involved

Supervisor

Safety supervisor

Upper management

56

Outside consultants

INVESTIGATION STRATEGY

Gather information & establish facts

Isolate essential contributory factors

Determine corrective actions

Implement corrective actions

Fact gathering

Be impartial & objective

Compile procedures & rules for the area

Gather maintenance records on equipment

involved

Isolate accident scene

Photos & diagrams

Do not discard or destroy anything

Fact gathering (continued)

Time is of the essence

Obtain information

Injured

Witnesses

Supervisors

Other personnel

Interviews (separately)

What were you doing?

How do you think the accident occurred?

57

How were you trained for the job?

What is the safe procedure for this job?

Obtain facts not opinions

Make it clear the object of the investigation is to

avoid recurrence, not to apportion blame

Evaluates all factors concerned

Isolate essential contributory factors

Isolates the key factor(s) by asking the following question....
Would the accident have happened if this particular factor was not
present?
Determine corrective actions
INVESTIGATION TEAM

Interprets & draws conclusion

Distinction between intermediate & underlying causes

Interprets & draws conclusion

Distinction between intermediate & underlying causes

Recommendations based on key contributory factors and underlying

causes

Recommendations based on key contributory factors and underlying

causes

Recommendation(s) must be communicated clearly

Strict time table established

Follow up conducted

BENEFITS OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

58

Preventing recurrence

Identifying out-molded procedures

Improvements to work environment

Increased productivity

Improvement of operational & safety procedures

Raises safety awareness level

When an organization reacts swiftly and positively to accidents and

injuries, its actions reaffirm its commitment to the safety and well-being of
its employees

COST OF ACCIDENTS
A) DIRECT COST
The cost of accidents remains unacceptably high both in human and in
financial terms.

Time lost by absent sum from work due to injury &

Sickness is more than strikes or other industrial disputes.

The cost of an accident can be measured in both financial & human terms. An
accident, which is apparently minor, can have a major impact on both the
company & the victim, when all related factors are considered.

1)HUMAN ASPECTS COSTS TO THE VICTIM INCLUDE :* Mental strain.

* Suffering.
59

* Loss of earnings.
* Extra expenditure.
* Possibility of a continuing disability.
* Incapacity for some kinds of work.
* Loss of leisure activities.
* Effect on family, friends and colleagues.
2) FINANCIAL ASPECTS COSTS TO THE COMPANY INCLUDE :* Loss of skilled and experienced workers.
* Loss of production.
* Loss of profit from injured workers.
* Expense of re-training injured worker or a replacement.
* Time lost by the effect on other workers.
* Increased insurance premiums.
3)COSTS TO THE NATION INCLUDES :
* The burden on welfare benefits and other social services
provided by government.
* The expense / burden on medical or health services and
facilities.
INDIRECT COST
(1)Cost borne by injured person and his family
* The amount spent during his recovery period at home for entertaining and
receiving guests.
*The amount spent by relatives or friends for their doodwill visits.

60

*The loss of wages/earnings suffered by family members to take care of

injured.
(2)Cost borne by management or employer
*The cost of time lost by injured employee.
*wages paid to the injured person ,other than compensation till he returns to
work.
*Over-time paid to other employees to make-up the production loss.
*Cost of time-lost by other employees for:
Assisting the injured/out of curiosity or sympathy/discussing work-related
matters linked with injured person and his equipment.
*Making alternate arrangement for continuation of production.
*Selection/training of new employee for replacement.
*taking care of formalities as required by statutory obligation.
* investigating the accident.
*Loss of profit due to idle-machinery and reduced productivity of the
employee.
Expenditure under direct costs is far less than indirect costs. Study
reveals that, only one fifth of the total losses are apparent ,while major
portion of losses are hidden.
REASONS OF ACCIDENTS
There are many reasons of accidents. Some of the common reasons are :* Lack of knowledge.
* Careless attitudes.
* Horseplay.

61

* Working without authority.

* Lack of ability.
* Poor tools and equipment.
* Taking short cuts.
Any and all of these reasons have been the cause of many serious accidents.
Analysis of the accident will often reveal that one or more of these factors
were present in an accident.
RESPONSIBILITY OF MANAGEMENT
Therefore, the management of a company have a responsibility both moral
and legal to ensure:

A safe place to work. This will include safe means of access and
egress during normal daily work routine as well as in emergencies.

Safe plant and equipment including the maintenance of it.

Safe systems of work, including safe working practices and

work permits for hazardous jobs.

A safe working environment and adequate arrangements for

employee welfare. This responsibility encompasses many factors
including lighting, heating, ventilation, fume and dust extraction,
housekeeping, seating, drinking water, sanitary facilities etc.

Safe methods for storing, handling and transportation of goods

and substances.

Provision of such information, instruction, training and supervision

as necessary to ensure efficient and safe working, compliance with
statutory legislation and company rules.

62

Consultation with employees, or their representatives, with a

view

to

making

and

maintaining

adequate

and

effective

arrangements for health, safety and welfare.

A written statement with respect to the health, safety and welfare

of the employees is produced, published and revised as often as
necessary. Such a statement should be brought to the notice of the
employees, kept up to date and monitored for its effectiveness. It
should contain details of the procedures which will put the policy
into effect and define individual responsibilities for safety

QUESTIONS:
What is accident? Elaborate the causes of an accident in
the industry.

What is the cost of accident with reference to the

industry?

Highlight

investigations.

the

importance

of

accident

Chances of accidents in an oil industry are very high.

Explain about an accident & cost analysis for the
industry.

63

UNIT-III

64

SAFETY POLICY, ORGANIZATION, MONITORING AND

REPORTING

INTRODUCTION:
The scope and limitations of various regulations on health, safety and
environment have been discussed in the previous unit. As said already,
regulations alone are not enough to maintain a very high level of safety in
petroleum and allied industries, which have many inherent hazards. In order
to prevent major accidents and mishaps and to win confidence of general
public, management leadership and commitment is very essential. Even
for implementing and compliance of regulatory measures, a committed
leadership is necessary. This can be achieved by establishing an effective and
efficient Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Management System. This
unit covers the planning, organizing, implementing and controlling functions
and outlines the policy, systems and procedures of an effective HSE
management in a typical petroleum installation.

HSE MANAGEMENT PROFILE

There are certain characteristics of an integrated HSE management system
that should be in place to ensure that the system functions most efficiently
and effectively. These characteristics are sufficiently generic to apply to any
type of petroleum installation-whether an offshore or onshore oil/ gas
exploration and production facility, a refinery or a petrochemical complex,
bulk or retail marketing outlet, etc. Not all characteristics or features may be

65

needed in every installation; however, these have particular value as a profile

of the principal requirements of an effective HSE management system that
can be adopted to suit the particular needs of the installation. Some
important features of an effective and efficient HSE management system are
discussed below.

HSE POLICY
Every organization must have a written policy on health, safety and
environment signed by the Head of the organization with date. The copies of
this policy should be displayed at prominent places in the organization so
that everybody is familiar with its contents/intentions. Some organizations
ensure that every employee receives a copy of its HSE policy. HSE policy
spells out the values, beliefs and commitment of the organization towards
health, safety of its employees, community and at the macro level of the
nation. HSE policy of a large petroleum company is given below as a typical
example, which can be suitably modified to meet specific requirements.
Health and safety of personnel and protection of environment overrides all
production targets in our organization

Production and HSE are complementary to each other

Safety and environment protection is everybody's business in the

organization

All statutory requirements must be complied with at all times

66

All personnel must use approved safe working procedures

without making any risky short cuts

All personnel-own or contractors-must be given relevant training before

assigning them work

All plants, facilities and work procedures/ systems must be audited
periodically by in-house teams as well as external agencies
Plant and ambient environment as well as various effluents must be
monitored continuously to maintain a clean and safe environment in and
around the plants
A very high standard of house keeping must be maintained at all places of
work-plants, offices and facilities
Every employee must be subjected to a pre-employment, periodic and
any specific medical check-up for early identification and treatment
of any occupational health hazard
All employees must keep abreast with the latest codes, standards and
practices on health, safety and environment
All types of

accidents, however small, must be investigated and followed

up. The lessons learnt from these accidents should be disseminated to all
levels of workforce
No modifications in plant, facilities or procedures will be done without
proper scrutiny and approval by an authorized person(s)No contractor will be
engaged without ascertaining his safety performance/record

Non-compliance of this policy will attract severe disciplinary actions.

HSE ORGANIZATION
67

In order for the HSE management of an organization to be efficient and

effective, it is important that the Chief of HSE should report to the Head of
the organization. HSE should be an advisory function reporting to the top
management and the various line managers should be directly responsible for
Health, Safety and Environment activities pertaining to their respective
departments. If HSE Chief occupies a junior position in the organizational
hierarchy, he cannot work without fear or clash of interest with other
functional managers. He should have authority and important say in the
decision making process. Even some regulatory agencies also recommend
HSE Chief reporting directly to the Head of the organization.

HSE Chief

should be a qualified engineer with long experience in various

functions. He should have a team of qualified professionals to advise
on safety, occupational health, fire protection and environment. The
number of professionals in HSE will depend on the size and diversity of the
organization, but it is recommended to have a leaner set-up. HSE
organization should be fully integrated with various safety and health
committees.
CUSTODIANSHIP/OWNERSHIP
Health, Safety and Environmental management is a teamwork. Every
member of the team contributes in maintaining a high level of safety in his
area of work. In order to manage HSE effectively in a petroleum installation
or complex which is usually a large entity it is important and desirable to
demarcate each area of the installation/complex and assign the
ownership/custodianship to a senior member of the concerned area. These

68

areas are commonly called safety districts. A big petroleum complex may
have 10-15 safety districts. These districts should be shown on the layout
drawing of the complex with all the boundaries clearly identified and marked.
The objective of safety districts is to decentralize the HSE responsibility to
the functional owner/ custodian of the area who is fully responsible and
accountable for all management functions in his district with specific
reference to control/management of health, safety and environment. HSE
department acts as a catalyst.

PLANS AND PROCEDURES

Plans and procedures is the heart of a good HSE management system. They
are the basis of setting up an effective and efficient management system. A
large number of industrial accidents and mishaps have occurred all over the
world due to human errors and the main cause of these errors has been the
lack of written procedures and/or non-compliance of the same. In some cases,
courts have penalized the organizations because victims of the accident did
not have written procedures to be followed by them.
It is essential that well-written and approved operating and safety procedures
of all important activities/functions performed in any petroleum installation
are in place and the same are strictly followed. No short cuts to these
procedures should be allowed. The various HSE related procedures should be
developed broadly based on Process Safety Management System, PSM, which
is a well-known framework of HSE management all over the world. All these
procedures should be compiled in the form of an HSE manual-many times

69

called the HSE bible. The various procedures documented should address the
following main elements of PSM:
1
2.

Process Technology Information

Process Hazard Analysis

Operating Procedures

Work Permit System

Management of Change

Training and Validation

Contractor Safety

Incident Investigation and Communication

Safety and Environment Auditing

10

Quality Assurance

11

Mechanical Integrity

12

Pre Start-up Safety Reviews

13

Emergency Planning and Response

14.

Trade Secrets

Following is a broad list of typical procedures on health, safety, and fire

protection and environment functions applicable for most petroleum
operations. The procedures relevant to a particular installation should be
identified and documented clearly in simple language so that everybody
working in the installation understands these. These procedures should also
be accessible to all concerned. The procedures should be revised and updated
periodically to reflect changes that might have taken place over time.

Safety Related Procedures

70

Basic safety rules for employees, contractors and visitors

Safe work permit system

Mechanical isolation

Pre-start up safety review

Entering and working in confined spaces

Working at height

Safe scaffolding and ladders

Safe evacuation

Safe handling of hazardous substances

Safe handling of hydrogen sulfide, chlorine, ammonia etc.

Safe uses of hoses

Contactor safety

Ionization radiation safety

Traffic safety inside and outside the installation

safe use of cranes, hoists and other mechanical devices

Safety in manual handling of material

Accident/ incident reporting and investigation

Selection and safe use of personnel protective equipment

Safe transportation of hazardous materials by road, water and rail

Management of plant changes and procedures

Safety audits

Personnel movement and transportation by road, cranes, basket, boats

and helicopters

Grinding, welding and cutting

71

Safety signages labeling and posters

On-site emergency and disaster management.

ENVIRONMENT RELATED PROCEDURES

Air Pollution Control and Monitoring
Effluent Monitoring
Industrial Wastes Management
Biodegradable and Office Wastes Management
Fugitive Emission Monitoring
Ground Water Monitoring

Environment Inspection and Audit

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH RELATED PROCEDURES

Health Care System
Medical Management of Obnoxious Substances
Hygiene and Sanitation
First-aid

Health Risk Assessment

Pre-employment and Regular Medical Checks

Wellness and Fitness Programme for Employees and Families

Emergency Medical Care

Basic Safety Rules for Employees, Contractors and Visitors

Safe Work Permit System

Mechanical Isolation

Pre Start-up Safety Review

Entering and Working in Confined Spaces

72

Working at Height

Safe Scaffolding and Ladders

Safe Excavation

Safe Handling of Hazardous Substances

Safe Handling of Hydrogen Sulfide, Chlorine, Ammonia, etc.

Safe Use of Hoses

Contractor Safety

Ionization Radiation Safety

Traffic Safety Inside and Outside the Installation

Safe Use of Cranes, Hoists and other Mechanical Devices

Safety in Manual Handling of Material

Accident /Incident Reporting and Investigation

Selection and Safe Use of Personal Protective Equipment, PPE

FIRE PROTECTION RELATED PROCEDURES

Fire Services Organization and Job Specifications

Fire and Emergency Turnouts

Rescue Operations

Mutual Aid Scheme

Inspection and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems

Emergency Drills and Fire Training

Safe Use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus and

Other Life Saving Devices
73

BASIC SAFETY RULES

Because of inherent hazards in a petroleum installation, it is absolutely
necessary that all employees, contractors, 1 visitors, vendors and other third
parties must be fully aware of some basic safety requirements to be followed
inside the 'A installation. Management should document these basic rules/
requirements and anybody entering the premises must be made familiar with
the same. This document should address following items related to the
health, safety and environment aspects of the installation:
Access/entry to the premises

Restriction on naked lights, sparks, use of cameras and mobile phones

Prohibition of smoking, alcohol and drugs

Traffic control

Use of Personnel Protective Equipment, PPE

Safe Work Permit System

Accident/Incident reporting

Maintaining good house keeping standard

Basic colour -codes of piping/equipment, etc.

Safety Signage's, Labelling and Posters.

Electrical safety

Access/Entry to the premises

Hazards of flammable products and chemicals

Emergency alarms and communication and what to do in such
situations

Some general dos and don'ts

Other specific rules

74

BASIC RULES FOR VISITORS

As a bare minimum requirement, every visitor to the premises must be
given a safety briefing before giving him an entry pass. As an illustration, a
safety briefing developed by petroleum refinery is given below. Every
installation should make a similar briefing relevant to its operations and
local conditions.
ACCESS /ENTRY TO THE PREMISES

Visitors should report to security gate for entry pass

Every person must display a valid identification badge issued

by the security

Visitor should visit the designated area only for which he has
obtained the entry pass

He should be accompanied by a company employee

It is forbidden to take children inside the premises

TOBACCO /ALCOHOL RESTRICTIONS

The entire.-refinery is a tobacco free zone

Tobacco in any form-cigarettes, biddies, gutka, etc., is prohibited

Use of alcohol and drugs is prohibited

REGULATIONS ON NAKED LIGHTS AND SPARKS

Matchboxes, lighters, flashlights and cameras are not allowed inside

the premises

Only intrinsically safe mobile phones are allow inside

No shoes with nails in the soles to be worn inside premises

75

Use of 100% nylon or synthetic clothes inside the premises is prohibited

TRAFFIC RULES

Vehicles should have valid access pass to enter the premises

All vehicles entering hazardous areas should have spark arrestor and a

unit entry permit

Maximum speed limit inside the premises is 30 km/hr

Park the vehicle at designated places

Overtaking is prohibited

In case of an emergency alarm, stop the vehicle and take to the side of

the road and wait for clearance

GENERAL

Visitor shall be responsible for his own safety

Photography inside is prohibited

Never go to the site in case of any fire or other emergency

Visitor is not allowed to touch any equipment/ interfere with the plant

activities
All persons must wear safety helmets and safe shoes in process areas.
Requirement of any other personal protective equipment will be advised by
plant personnel

Use following telephone nos. in case required: Fire l00, Security 101,

Medical 102

76

QUESTIONS

Describe, in detail, safety related procedures and safety related

rules with reference to down stream oil industry.
HSE policy is an essential part of any oil & gas
installation. Highlights the importance of HSE policy and
organization.

Process Safety Management

& Safety Culture

An Overview

Process Safety

Blend of engineering and management

skills
* focused on preventing catastrophic accidents,
* particularly explosions, fires, and toxic releases,
* associated with the use of chemicals and
petroleum products.

history

Process Safety was born on the banks of

the Brandywine River in the early days of
the 19th century at the E. I. du Pont
black powder works.
Recognizing that even a small incident
could precipitate considerable damage and
loss of life, du Pont directed the works to
be built and operated under very specific
77

safety conditions.
history
Process Safety evolved as industry progressed
through the 19th and 20th centuries, but really
emerged as a industry-wide discipline following
the major industrial accident at Union Carbide,
Bhopal, India, in which a catastrophic release of
methyl isocyanate killed more than 3,000 people.

In the twenty years since Bhopal:

process safety has gained corporate importance,
process safety expertise has extended into the
general
skill set of chemical and petroleum engineers and
operators, and
many industry-wide guidelines for process safety
have been developed.

What is Process Safety Management ?

The proactive and systematic

identification,
evaluation, and
mitigation or prevention of chemical releases
that could occur as a result of
failures in process, procedures, or equipment.

Process Safety Management (PSM)

Integral part of OSHA Occupational Safety
and Health Standards since 1992
Known formally as: Process Safety
Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119)
PSM applies to most industrial processes
containing 10,000+ pounds of hazardous
78

material

The 14 Components of PSM?

1. Process Safety
Information
2. Employee Involvement
3. Process Hazard Analysis
4. Operating Procedures
5. Training
6. Contractors
7. Pre-Startup Safety
Review
8. Mechanical Integrity
9. Hot Work
10. Management of Change
79

11. Incident Investigation

12. Emergency Planning and
Response
13. Compliance Audits
14. Trade Secrets
HUMAN

ELEMENTS

OF

PROCESS

SAFETY

MANAGEMENT:

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

What is Process Safety Management ?

The proactive and systematic
identification,

evaluation, and
107

 mitigation or prevention of chemical releases

that could occur as a result of
failures in process, procedures, or equipment.

Process Safety Management (PSM)

Integral part of OSHA Occupational Safety

and Health Standards since 1992
Known formally as: Process Safety
Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119)
PSM applies to most industrial processes
containing 10,000+ pounds of hazardous
material

The 14 Components of PSM?

1. Process Safety
Information
2. Employee Involvement
3. Process Hazard Analysis
4. Operating Procedures
5. Training
6. Contractors
7. Pre-Startup Safety
Review
8. Mechanical Integrity
9. Hot Work
10. Management of Change
11. Incident Investigation
12. Emergency Planning and
Response
13. Compliance Audits
14. Trade Secrets

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

UNIT-IV

PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION
Process Safety Management is a regulation, promulgated by the
U.S. OSHA, intended to prevent a disaster like the 1984 Bhopal
Disaster. "Unexpected releases of toxic, reactive, or flammable liquids and
gases in processes involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported
for many years. Incidents continue to occur in various industries that use
highly hazardous chemicals which may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or
explosive, or may exhibit a combination of these properties. Regardless of the
industry that uses these highly hazardous chemicals, there is a potential for
an accidental release any time they are not properly controlled. This, in turn,
creates the possibility of disaster. To help assure safe and healthful
workplaces, OSHA has issued the Process Safety Management of
Highly Hazardous Chemicals regulations.
Just

as

Process

safety

is

line

management,

responsibility, the same can be said of risk management. To be able to

manage this risk a coordinated program needs to be established that will
assists the line manager in his duties. This program, process safety
management, includes the following:
1.Process documentation
2.Operating Procedure

117

 3.Training
4.Incidents Investigation
5.Hazard Identification
6.Risk Assessment
7.Preventive Maintenance
8.Management of Change
9.Safety Reviews
(1)The first thing the manager must do is to establish an organization
to coordinate the activities of the program.(2) This organization must prepare
standards defining the local program. (3)The content, as determined by the
organization, must be based on the special characteristics of the process
including complexity, batch or continuous, and process condition.
1.PROCESS DOCUMENTATION
Requirements to consider for the process documentation section
include:
(i)Process Transmittal
(ii)Engineering Calculation
(iii)Flow Sheets
(iv)P and IDs
(v)HAZOPS
(vi)ORRs
(vii)Reaction grids

118

Usually these items are generated at some point during the evolution
of a process but often are not stored in an organized way so that when they
are needed they are not available.
(i)The process transmittal is the information generated in the
research and process development. The chemistry, side reaction,
corrosion testing, process development, and reaction kinetics all are part of a
process transmittal.
(ii)Engineering calculation

includes reactor sizing, agitation

requirements, line sizing, heat transfer area, and other design criteria.
(iii)Flow sheets and(iv) P& IDs are the engineering diagrams
generated by the design engineers. Part of the program must be to keep
these drawing up-to-date.
(v)HAZOPs are the hazard identification reviews made during
the design phase and subsequently on approximately three year intervals.
The

updating

of

the drawing

is

important

to

conducting

comprehensive HAZOP.
(vi)An ORR is an operational readiness Reviews which is the last
look at a process before start-up. Orr type reviews should also be
done at regular intervals during the life of the process to again
assure that the process is being run correctly.
(vii)Reaction grids are a matrix of all the chemicals used in the
process and their interaction. They are developed as part of the HAZOP to
answer the question of changing errors.

119

These items, along with data generated from other parts of the
program, make up the process documentation file that must be
maintained to assure a safe chemical process.
2.OPERATING PROCEDURES
Comprehensive written procedures serve as the basis for effective
training and as a resource for the operator. They must be kept current
or their usefulness is diminished. Procedures should be written for any job,
routine or infrequent, which requires specific skills or knowledge, which, if
not followed, could result in an hazard. Procedures should be explicit and
continuous- that is, the operator response should be specified for each
perceived condition or combination of conditions.
Specifically, the following steps should be covered:
Safety and health consideration
Start up
Normal operations
Normal shutdown
Abnormal operations
Emergency shutdown
And should include :
Simplified process flow sheets
Process description defining the operation and indicating
flows, temperature, and pressure
Description of abnormal or emergency condition including
operator responses and recovery steps

120

 Pre start-up activities including checklist to assure readiness

Start up sequences
Shutdown procedures, both normal and emergency
Post shutdown activities including storage of materials in
equipment and clean-out methods
description of critical equipment such as pressure relief
devices, interlocks, and alarms, with the activation level of each
Sampling

procedures

including

sampling

methodology,

analytical procedures, and sampling schedules

Maintenance preparation and inspection activities including
relevant checklists to assure completeness
MSDS sheets for all raw materials, finished products, and
isolated intermediates
Personal protective equipment(PPEs) requirements
Symptoms of and first aid treatment for chemical exposures
Utility failure procedures
A method for upgrading operating procedures should be
developed as part of the management of change. Otherwise they should
be reviewed at least every two years to assure that current practices
are reflected.
3.TRAINING PROGRAMME
A formal training program must be developed to assure safe
operation. All personal involved, including management and engineers
should participate in the training program.
121

Included in the program are the following:

A

written

job

description

which

details

the

duties,

responsibilities, education, experience, and qualifications of each

position.
Methods to determine whether an operator has developed the
ability to perform the duties of the job.
A schedule for completing each segment of the program.
Documentation of the training.
Qualification and validation of instructors.
The training should contain, as a minimum, the following elements.

Site orientation including rules, practices, and safety and

emergency procedures.

Classroom training which includes unit specific safety

procedures,

operating

procedure,

MSDSs,

safe

material

handling practices, unit hazards, and emergency procedures

relating to process fires, explosions, or leaks.
On the job training including equipment familiarization; data
collection and recording; and process start-up, operation, control,
and shutdown.
Annual refresher training that includes review of MSDSs,
incidents, procedural and equipment changes, and safety
procedures.

122

4.INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
All incidents which resulted in or could have resulted in a release of
toxic or flammable materials should be investigated by a trained investigation
team as soon as possible after the incident. Additionally, all relief device
release should be investigated.
The incident should be investigated timely to reduce the possibility
that information or evidence will be destroyed, altered, or forgotten during
clean-up or mitigation efforts.
The incident report must be prepared for each incident and shall
include;
Location
Date and time
Investigation team member
Equipment involved
Quantity of chemicals released
Employees involved
Comprehensive description of the incident
Consequences of the release
Incident facts
Cause of the incident, basic and contributory, direct or indirect
Corrective actions to prevent recurrence
Implementation schedule for corrective actions including those
responsible for completion

123

Follow up should be done systematically to assure that all

recommendations are addressed. Distribution of the report should include all
other plants that have similar operations and should be reviewed with all
personal involved both operation and maintenance.
Incident

investigations

should

become

part

of

the

process

documentation file.

5.HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Identification, evaluation and control of hazards in processes
are essential to loss prevention and require a comprehensive
knowledge of the chemical and physical aspects of the unit being
studied. Unrecognized hazards have been created in existing process by
changes in process conditions, operating practices, or equipment; inadequate
knowledge of reactions; or behavior of materials of construction.
An accurate assessment of the potential of each identified hazard
will assure that releases of hazardous materials and the resulting injuries
and property loss will be minimized. Sound engineering knowledge must be
applied to formulate corrective measures.
These hazard identification activities can be accomplished by trained
plant personal working with outside specialists where required. It is their
responsibility to study the P&IDs or the production unit thoroughly,
identifying all the potential hazards, and recommending changes or reviews
to eliminate or control the identified hazards.

124

An organized approach is essential to effective and efficient

process hazard reviews. The HAZOP, qualitative fault tree ,event-tree,
or failure modes and effects methodology all meet this systematic
requirement.
A written report of the hazard identification should be issued. Included
should be:
Participants
Methodology
List of documents such as P&ID numbers and issue
Summary of the findings
Recommendations for further study
Follow up should be done until all items of concern are addressed
through periodic starts reports.
All hazard identification reports, status reports, and documentation
should become part of the process documentation file.
All process should be reviewed every two to four years based on the
hazards of the process.

6.RISK ASSESMENT
A risk assessment should be conducted whenever a potential release
can result in a toxic or flammable release that can affect the neighbors.
A risk assessment consists of:
An estimate of the potential release quantity

125

 A quantitative evaluation of the frequency of the event

A dispersion model of the release
Consequence analysis of the effects of the toxic or flammable release
both on-site and off site.
The consequences should be evaluated based on the
frequency to determine if the risk is acceptable. If is not
acceptable, then recommendation must be made to decrease the
frequency or the consequences. The consequences may be
lowered by reducing the amount released, the resulting
dispersion, or by mitigation methods. The frequency can be affected
by redundant equipment or by increasing reliability.
Risk assessment should be performed by trained, experienced personal.
Again, a follow-up system to report the status of recommendations is
needed.
The risk assessment, recommendation, and status reports shall be part
of the process documentation.

7.PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
A comprehensive preventive maintenance program is a necessary part
of a total process safety management system. The program should include;
Identification of all equipment requiring preventive maintenance.
Schedules for the inspections of vessels. These schedules should be
based on corrosion rates calculated from inspection history.
Proof-testing of critical equipment such as pressure relief devices,
interlocks, fire pumps, emergency generators, and alarms. Test

126

methods, completion checklists, and inspection intervals are

required for this program.
Quality control procedures to ensure that fasteners, valves, and
replacement parts meet quality specification.
Any documentation of the PM program shall be part of the process
documentation file.

8.MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
A procedure for handling changes of process or equipment should be
developed. Included in the procedure should be:
An adequate review by all concerned personnel
Documentation of the technical basis for the change
Authorization by appropriate management
Communication of the changes and training personal in the details
and consequences of the change.
Updating of drawings and operating procedures
For temporary changes a system should be developed to track these
changes and, to then, revert to the original condition. If made permanent, the
management of change should be used.
All changes should become part of the process documentation file.
9.SAFETY REVIEWS
Two types of reviews should be part of a Process safety Management
Program. The first is the operational readiness review (ORR) which is
conducted on all new processes. Recommendations resulting from the

127

ORR must be addressed by plant management before the introduction of

chemicals.
The second type, operating plant survey (OPS) is conducted on
existing processes. The OPS includes:
Comparisons of the process documentation file to verify that plant
practices match the information.
A review of current operations versus company, regulatory, or
accepted industry practices.
All reviews also become part of the documentation file.
These are the nine elements of a comprehensive Process safety
Management Program that will provide a system to ensure an operation that
will be safe and efficient.

128

HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT

Statistics show that the root cause of many major accidents and mishaps
all over the world is human error. And the main cause of human errors
has been the lack of written procedures and/or non-compliance of
the same. New plant facilities get normalized over a period after
meeting the initial challenges of commissioning and stabilization.
Thereafter

people

tend

to

start

relaxing

and

the

systems

procedures/facilities are not followed as in the earlier times. Many a times

systems/procedures are not followed and hardware is not maintained,
inspected and tested as intended. Sometimes they are bypassed
because

of

negligence,

over-confidence

and

complacency.

Various health, safety and environment programmes including their

129

management systems require thorough auditing to exercise proper

control and ensure that the systems are working effectively. Such audits
are conducted periodically on the systems, procedures and operational
aspects

to

ensure

that

desired

level

of

health,

safety

and

environmental standards are maintained as per the requirements

of company policy and statutory requirements. A brief discussion on
the objectives, methodology and procedures of conducting such
audits is given below as guidelines based on which each organisation
should develop its own audit programme.
OBJECTIVES OF AUDITS
Major objectives of audits are:
Ensure that all statutory requirements are met fully.

Ensure that set procedures are complete, up to date and

compliant with applicable standards, codes,

company

policies, good engineering and process safety practices.

Ensure that the management systems in place are effective.
procedures can be strengthened.
Identify oppor tunities where the systems and
Ensure that set procedures are complete, up to date and compliant
with applicable standards, codes, company policies, good engineering
and process safety practices.

Ensure that the management systems in place are effective.

Identify opportunities where the systems and procedure can be
strengthened

TYPES OF AUDITS
130

HSE audits are broadly categorized as internal audits or external audits.

INTERNAL AUDITS
Internal audits can be periodic detailed audits of one or more
plants/facilities
disciplinary

of

team

an

installation

drawn

from

conducted

various

by

departments

multiof

the

installation. In a company having more than one site, inter-site

audits by combined teams drawn from various sites can also be a
good method of conducting internal audits. An internal audit may
take 3-4 days by a team of 4-5 professionals from different
disciplines. The audit team reviews the systems, procedures and
facilities for complete and updated documentation and their
compliance. Each plant/facility of an installation should be audited
every two to three years.
Besides detail or comprehensive internal audits, there are mini audits. A
mini safety audit is of short duration (typically 2-3 hours) conducted by a
two-men team using checklists to ensure the compliance of a particular
procedure at a time. Such audits are done more frequently to cover
various procedures relevant to the installation. This is a very useful and
quick method of finding the weaknesses/ deficiencies in the system.

Another type of internal audits is called BSC audits. These are self-audits
based on British Safety Council's standard

checklists. Each

plant/department maintains these checklists for various systems pertaining

to its activities.

131

EXTERNAL AUDITS
The external audits are done by outside or third parties approved by
statutory authorities to meet the requirements under various statuary
rules and regulations.
In leading companies, external audits are done not only to meet
statutory requirements but also to bring in a fresh approach and
additional objectivity through a third eye. It must be understood that
external audits are supplementary to the internal audits.
External audits are generally not global covering the entire
premises/installation. Some typical external audit agencies approved by
various statutory, authorities include
OISD

British Safety Council (5-star audit)

National Environmental Engineering Research' Institute,

NEERI
Central Labor Research Institute, CRI

Loss Prevention Association, LPA

National Safety Council, NSC

Engineers India Limited, EIL

Lloyds Register of Shipping

Det Norske Veritas

Comet Consultancy Services

Netal Chromatographs

KLG/TNO

SGS India Limited

Others as approved from case to case

132

METHODOLOGY OF AUDITS
Though each external audit agency might have its own methodology
and approach to conduct an audit, a common methodology for conducting
internal audits is given below
COMPOSITION/SELECTION OF AUDIT TEAM
The team for a comprehensive internal audit comprise member each
from operation, engineering/maintenance technical services/technology,
HSE and any other specific discipline if required. The chief of the
installation through an office order nominates the team.
The Chief of HSE nominates the team for a mini audit in consultation
with individual departments. The team comprises of two membersone from the area/department to be audited and the other from HSE.
The programme of such audits is published by HSE through procedures
audit schedule published by him every month.
CONDUCTING THE AUDIT
To start with, the team gets organized and holds a kick-off meeting to
discuss the plan of action. They try to collect all relevant data of the
area/plant/department they are going to audit. The team visits the area
and talks to various personnel there to get feedback about their
plant/area. The team checks the various systems/procedures and records.
133

The safety aspects of the plant are checked using checklists. These
checklists could be standard lists made as part of a written audit
procedure and supplemented by specific checklists made for special
systems/equipment by each team before starting the audit. Checklists are
very useful as they save a lot of time and also to ensure that all
aspects or sub-systems have been looked into and not missed
inadvertently.
In case of mini audits, the two-man team goes to the area where audit is
to be done. The team ensures the compliance of the procedure under audit
by using a standard checklist made for the particular procedure. They
check the level of compliance to each checklist item by talking to the plant
personnel and seeing the situation in the field and rate the item on a 1-5
scale (1 is least compliant, 5 full compliance). The overall compliance
level is indicated in percentage.
AUDIT REPORT
After completing an audit, the team prepares a draft report which is
presented to the custodian/ manager of the area and his team. After
discussion, the final report with action plan for implementing the agreed
recommendations is issued by the leader of the audit team to the
concerned action parties with copies to top management team.
In case of mini audits, the audited checklist is itself the report. This is
issued to the concerned custodian/manager of the area immediately on
the same day after the audit is done.
FOLLOW-UP

134

The eff ectiveness of the audit lies in the degree of implementation of

the agreed recommendation. Therefore it is essential to monitor the
implementation programme HSE plays a pivotal role in monitoring the
recommendation; of various audits and presenting the implementation
statutory to the top management. Record of an audit report is
maintained with the custodian and HSE till all the recommendations
agreed to be implemented are liquidated

QUESTIONS:
Safety audit is an important study for most of the
hazardous industries. Describe different types of safety
audit conducted for oil & gas industry.

UNIT-V

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

INTRODUCTION
Disasters are major accidents which cause wide spread disruption
of human and commercial activities. Normally, common accidents are
absorbed by the community, but disasters are major accidents and
community cannot absorb them with their own resources. Most of the
disasters, natural or technological (man made) have sudden onset and
give very short notice or no time to prevent the occurrence. Disasters

135

may cause loss of human life, injuries and long term disablement of
people working in the organization and local community around the
industrial area. Normally, loss of lives, total or partial disability have more
impact on the community than damage to the properties. Damage to the
property has a long term social impact like loss of revenue, employment
and rebuilding cost and lead to sever economic constraints.
The likelihood of disaster need be foreseen, as the past experiences
indicate. Therefore, if disasters are foreseeable, the mitigating efforts can
be planned in advance. Paramount in importance should be given to
protect human life and environment, in such planning.
In spite of a petroleum installation following sound design, engineering and
management practices, the possibility of a major accident or disaster
cannot be ruled out. The threat of a major fire, explosion, toxic release or
natural disasters involving employees, property, public and environment
is always there. When an emergency situation like this develops, it
is necessary that a concise and well-written emergency plan should be
in place in every petroleum installation which can be put into action
without loss of any time. Most of the emergency situations can be controlled
by careful evaluation of the anticipated possible events and evolving a
plan to meet such situations and organize suitable drills or rehearsals for
effective implementation at the time of emergency.
DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY:
The type of emergency primarily considered here is the major emergency
which may be defined one which has the potential to cause serious danger to
persons and /or damage to property and which tends to cause disruption inside
and /or outside the site and may require the use of outside resources.
Emergency is a general term implying hazardous situation both inside
and outside the factory premises. Thus the emergencies termed "on-site"

136

when it confines itself within the factory even though it may require
external help and "off-site" when emergency extends beyond its
premises. It is to be understood here, that if an emergency occurs inside
the plant and could not be controlled, it may lead to an off - site emergency.
EMERGENCY PLANNING:
A major emergency in a works is one which has the potential to cause serious
injury or loss of life.

May cause serious disruptions both inside or outside the works

A major emergency can develop due to failure of operating and containment

systems or due to natural disasters like cyclones, earthquakes, floods,
lightning, etc. In case of natural disasters, not much can be done to avoid their
occurrences, but a good disaster/emergency plan can minimize the
casualties and damages by well conceived evacuation, rehabilitation and
clean-up programmes.
ACTIVITIES THAT CAN REDUCE THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS:

Good Design

Good Operation

Good Maintenance

Good Inspection

BASICS OF MAJOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

A major emergency plan also called On-site Emergency Plan or a Disaster
Management Plan is a master plan containing the emergency response,

137

responsibilities of key members, communication means and response

strategies to control a range of major incidents. The word "disaster"
refers to those emergency situations where the number of casualties is very
large like in natural calamities. However, the term is used quite broadly for
any major emergency. This plan is drafted after a careful analysis and
assessment of various risks associated with the installations. Various
risk assessment techniques and methodologies are helpful in preparing a
good and realistic disaster management plan. The plan should also follow the
provisions of Section 41-B of the Factories Act, 1948 and the guidelines from
the Chief Inspector of Factories of the state. OISD also gives guidelines for
developing an emergency plan. Elements of an effective emergency plan are
given in this unit.
The civic authorities of the area usually prepare disaster plans for
emergency situations outside the premises. The management of the
installation should give full cooperation to the civic authorities in
preparing what is called as Off-site Emergency Plan. This is of
importance

especially

in

case

of

emergencies

arising

during

transportation of petroleum and other hazardous products from/to an

installation.
OBJECTIVES OF EMERGENCY PLAN
The overall objectives of a major emergency management plan are
summarized as below:
To localize the emergency and if possible eliminate it or to minimize the effect
of accident on people and property.

138


To contain and control emergency incidents.
To prevent loss of life and minimize the risk of bodily injuries to
employees and neighboring population.

To minimize damage to company installation and public property.

To minimize impact on environment.

To provide maximum possible safety to the emergency response

personnel.

To inform employees, public, and authorities about the risks assessed,

safeguards provided and role of the organization.

To dovetail properly with the off-site plan of the local authorities.

To seek help from the company's corporate office, sister companies and
outside agencies.

EMERGENCY/DISASTER SCENARIOS
Every

petroleum

installation

should

identify

the

possible

major

emergency situations for which a disaster plan has to be made. A list of

probable emergency scenarios applicable to petroleum installations is given
below:

Fire

Explosion

Toxic Release

Blow-out

Drowning

Oil spill on water

Oil spill on land

Cyclone/Storm
139

Earthquake

Flood

Air raid

Product/Transport emergency

CATEGORIZATION OF EMERGENCIES
As a general practice, emergency situations are categorized into three levels
depending upon their magnitude and consequences. These levels are:
LEVEL-1
The emergency situation arising in any section of one particular
plant/area which is minor in nature and can be controlled within the affected
section itself with the help of in-house shift staff. Such an emergency does
not have the potential to cause serious injuries or damage to property,
environment and the domino effect to other sections of the installation.
LEVEL-2
The emergency situation arising in one or more plants/areas which has the
potential to cause serious injuries, property loss and/or environmental
damage in the installation. Such an emergency situation always warrants to
mobilize all the resources available in-house and /or outside to mitigate the
emergency. The impact of this level of emergency is however, within the
installation.
LEVEL-3
If level-2 emergency by virtue of its consequences can spread and affect the
nearby community outside the premises, it is termed as level-3 emergency.
ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING

140

a. FORMULATION OF PLAN AND EMERGENCY SERVICES:

They are site specific, they should include the following elements.
Assessment of nature of extend of hazard or accidents.
Formulation of plan and lioson with outside authorities.
Procedures

Raising the alarm

Communication both within and outside works

Appointment of key personnel

Works incidents controller

Works main controller

EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM

Action on-site

Action off-site

ELEMENTS OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

A good and effective emergency or disaster plan should have the following
elements:

Emergency Organisation with responsibilities of key members

Key Members and their contact numbers
Emergency Control centre

A brief explanation of these elements is given below which can be helpful in

preparing disaster plan of any petroleum installation.

141

b. ALARM AND COMMUNICATION MECHANISM:

Communication is a crucial factor any employee should be able to raise
the emergency alarms so that action can be taken immediately.
C. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL
The site or works incident controller responsibilities include.

To assess the situation

To invite emergency procedure

To divert rescue and firefighting control fire brigade

activities.

To search for casualties to arrange evacuation of nonessential persons

To set up communication with emergency control centre

To ensure the responsibilities of site main controller until

he arrives, the site main controller often chosen from
senior management has the responsibility of diverting
from emergency control centre. After retiring the incident
controller for overall control.

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY MEMBERS

142

Management of a major emergency in an installation requires a wellcoordinated team with a senior member of the installation acting as
head of the emergency team. He is called the Chief Emergency
Commander. An organ gram of the emergency management team
showing the reporting of various key members should be made. The
responsibilities of each key member should be clearly written and
made known to the member. The members should be made familiar
with their roles by regular drills/rehearsals as explained later on.
KEY MEMBERS AND THEIR CONTACT NUMBERS
A key member for coordinating each of the following functions of an
emergency should be identified:

Operations

Security

Medical

Rescue/Evacuation

Human Resources

Emergency Maintenance and Repairs vii. Emergency Materials

Technical and Engineering Services

Transportation

Public Relations

A list showing the contact telephone numbers of all the key members
should be made which should be regularly updated to incorporate any
changes. This list should be available to each member to be kept handy
in his wallet.

143

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

An emergency control centre in a safe place in the installation
should be identified. This centre should be equipped with necessary
communication

equipment-telephones, walkie-talkies, VHS radio

sets, mobile phones, etc. and essential documents of the installation.

The chief emergency commander and most of the emergency team
members will operate from this centre.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION
A reliable system of informing the various people in the installation
should be in place. This can be a siren or an alarm system, which is
audible in the whole installation. VHS radio can be used to
communicate the emergency situation to civic authorities and other
outside agencies, which need to be informed of the emergency.

Alternate locations for housing the evacuees should be identified. A safe

assembly point should be identified for each plant/area in the installation
where people not required during the emergency will assemble from where
they can be easily taken out to alternate locations. This aspect of the
emergency plan is very critical during natural disasters when a large-scale
evacuation/rescue is called for.

END OF EMERGENCY
The plan should identify the arrangements for declaring the end of
emergency. There should be a proper siren/ alarm to be given under the
direction of the Chief Em ergen cy Com m a nder t o decl a re the end
of emergency.

EMERGENCY RESOURCES
144

The plan should include lists of important consultants/ agencies from

whom additional help could be obtained in case required during
emergency situations. Lists of important suppliers and vendors of
medicines, safety equipment, fire fighting equipment and materials,
pollution control equipment and consumables, etc. should also be
included. All the information on emergency resources should be
nicely compiled in the annexure to the emergency plan.

MOCK DRILLS.
The emergency plan should be rehearsed regularly by conducting mock
drills to keep the emergency team members refreshed with their roles
during an emergency. Based on the weaknesses or shortcomings
observed during the mock drills, the emergency plan should be updated.
As required by the statutory authorities, mock drill of a major on-site
emergency

plan

should

be

conducted

at

least

once

every

year.

Organization may opt for more frequent drills.

MUTUAL AID
Some times the internal resources of an organization may not be
adequate to handle a major emergency situation. In such situations,
external help can be sought from the neighboring units and
government agencies. A written ag reement should be made
with the neighboring organizations in the area to help each other
with additional resources in case of any emergency situation arising in
their installations. The contact numbers for all these organizations should be

145

available with each organization. Regular mock drills should be

conducted to check the response of the mutual-aid members.
Tariff advisory committee (TAC) allows certain rebates in the insurance
premiums to those organizations which are members of the local Mutual
aid schemes.
Some industrial areas like Vadodra; Mumbai, Ankleshwar etc. have
very eff ective mutual aid schemes. Member industries in each of
these areas have pooled their resources to set up a round the clock
emergency/disaster management control room in the area, which
coordinates the mutual aid efforts of various agencies involved.
Besides rendering mutual aid to each other in case of on-site emergencies,
these control rooms have also helped in many off site emergencies like road
accidents involving vehicles carrying hazardous goods, gas leaks, etc.

EMERGENCY INVENTORIES
It is necessary for every petroleum installation to maintain a minimum
inventory of various emergency consumables and equipment for fire fighting,
medical, pollution control and safety. A list of these inventories should be
a part of the emergency plan. Regular physical check of stock levels of these
inventories should be done against this list and immediate action
should be taken to replenish them if required.
In spite of all the precautions and safe procedures followed, the chance
of an emergency arising in a petroleum operation can not be ruled out.

146

Therefore a good written emergency/disaster management plan should

be in place.
QUESTIONS:
What is disaster management plan? Describe categories of
emergency with elements of a major emergency management
plan.

What is disaster management plan? Write in detail about

DMP.

UNIT-VI

FIRST AID:

147

First aid may be defined as skilled assistance to the victim in case of

accidents or sudden illness. The person who renders skilled assistance is
called the First Aider.
First aid is primarily a temporary measure to arrest the worsening of victims
condition till arrival of a doctor. This first aid is no substitute for treatment
by a qualified doctor, which must be sought at once.
it is very important that one should get immediate treatment for every injury,
regardless how small you think it is.
Many cases has been reported where a small unimportant injury, splinter
wound or puncture wound, quickly led to infection, threatening the health
and limb of the employee. Even the smallest scratch is large enough for the
dangerous germs to enter, and in large bruises or deep cuts , germs comes in
by the millions. Immediate examination and treatment is necessary for every
injury.
The health and safety (First Aid) Regulations 1981 require from the owner of
the plant to provide adequate and appropriate equipment, facilities and
personnel to enable first aid to be given to the employees. If they are injured
or become ill at work.
What is adequate and appropriate will depend on the circumstances in the
workplace and in general first aid needs are:
THE MINIMUM FIRST AID PROVISIONS ON ANY WORK SITE ARE:
A suitably stocked first aid box
An appointed person to take charge of first aid arrangements

148

It is important to remember that accidents can happen at any time . First aid
provision needs to be available at all times people are at work,
Many small firms will need to make the minimum first-aid provision.
However, there are factors which might take greater provision necessary. The
following checklist covers the point you should consider.
GENERAL CONTENTS OF FIRST AID BOX:
There is no standard list of items to put in a first aid box. It depends on what
you assess the needs are. However, as a guide, and where there is no special
risk in the workplace , a minimum stock of first aid box should contain:
1. A leaflet giving general guidance on first-aid eg HSE leaflet, basic
advice on first-aid at work.
2. 20 individually wrapped sterile adhesive dressings
3. Two sterile eye pads
4. Four individually wrapped triangular bandages.
INSTRUCTIONS TO FIRST AIDER:
1. Gather information as to how the accidents or illness came about.
2. Look for signs such as swelling, bleeding and immobility etc.
3. Looks out whether victims feels nausea, cold, pain etc.
4. Pay special attention to severe bleeding , failure of breathing and
shock.
5. Arrange for speedy removal of victim to proper medical care.
DOS & DONT OF FIRST AID:

Do the first thing first quickly, quietly and calmly

Stop severe bleeding if any

149

Administer artificial respirators if required and continue it till doctor

arrives.

Treat for shock

Boost up the morals of victims

Avoid crowding around victims

Unless required dont remove clothes

Dont try to achieve too much

Dont soak victim to wake him up.

Unless victim complains of cold , dont rap with blanket or coat.

REPORT ALL INJURIES TO YOUR SUPERVISOR:

As with getting medical attention for all injuries, it is equally important
that you report all injuries to your supervisor. It is critical that the
employer check into the causes of every job-related injury, regardless how
minor, how it happened. There may unsafe procedures or unsafe
equipment that should be corrected.
FIRST AID FOR SPECIFIC ACCIDENT OR ILLNESS:
TREATMENT FOR SHOCK:
1. Keep patient warm
2. Keep head lower than feet
3. Cover with blankets or coat
4. Give hot coffee or hot tea
TREATMENT FOR SUNSTROKE:
Measure temperature with a clinical thermometer

150

If the temperature is high put the naked victim into a tub of cold water or
gave full bath or apply wet sponge over his body
If there is a rise in temperature apply ice bag or clothes wing in cold
water.

TREATMENT FOR ORDINARY WOUNDS:

1. Prevent touching of wound
2. Dont apply ordinary water since it may contain infectious germs
3. Dont use strong antiseptics like dichloride or mercury on carbolic acid
4. Cover the wound with several layers of sterile gauze and bondage
firmly but not tightly
5. Call the doctor as early as possible.
TREATMENT FOR ACID AND ALKALI BURNS:
1. Wash off copious amount of clean water
2. Place several layers of clean water over burn. Saturate with 5% tannic
acid if available and apply bandages
3. For serious burns on body remove all clothing carefully and treat it.
4. If there are signs of collapse keep the victim warm and give sips of
warm coffee or warm tea , if not unconscious.

151

TREATMENT FOR GAS POISIONING:

1. In all cases of gas poisoning , call the doctor at once.
2. Remove victim to fresh air if possible
3. Put the victim on a bed in a comfortable position that he is quite &
conscious.
4. In case of unconscious victim is having difficulty in breathing,
administer artificial respiration at once.
FIRST AID FOR POISONS:
These are a few instructions in case of poisoning.
Administer 4 or more glasses of an emetic (salt & Luke warm water or
soapy warm water)
NOTE: do not induce vomiting if poison is corrosive

152

FIRST AID FOR POISONS:

1. Induce the vomiting by putting the finger down the victims throat.
2. Administer the antidote if you know the exact cause.
3. After emptying the stomach and cleaning it give a soothing drink such
as milk or water.
4. In case the patient is weak and faints he should lie down without
pillow and should drink coffee or tea. He may use smelling salt
5. Induce the vomiting by putting the finger down the victims throat.
6. Administer the antidote if you know the exact cause.
7. After emptying the stomach and cleaning it give a soothing drink such
as milk or water.
8. In case the patient is weak and faints he should lie down without
pillow and should drink coffee or tea. He may use smelling salt
FOLLOW

THESE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR

UNCONSCIOUS

PATIENTS:

Dont feed anything into the mouth

Dont cause vomiting

Keep patients in lying position on left side and keep head low

Remove chewing gum, tobacco or other foreign objects from mouth

If patients is not breathing, place in prone position and apply artificial

respiration

Keep patients warm

If breathing is shallow or skin, lips Cass finger, if nail beds are blue
give oxygen with CO2 or commercial oxygen.

153

If poison is unknown give the universal antidote but only after the
patients regains consciousness.

ARTIFICIAL BREATHING:
If breathing is stopped artificial respiration should be applied immediately
to restore the normal breathing and prevent death- by means of artificial
respirator, if breathing is re-established.
First of all clear the passage by pinching for a movement and clearing it by
handkerchief. Remove foreign object if any .
METHODS OF ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION:
1. SCHAFFERS PRONE PRESSURE METHOD:
This method is recommended for fractures and draining causes lay the
patient on his belly. Kneeling over the patients back and placing the palms
on the victims. This portion of the back with fingers spreading on the side
and the two thrums parallel to the spin and almost touching each other.
With arms held straight, leaning forward, pressure is applied on the body
of the victim for about three seconds.
Pressure is reduced gradually and original position is taken back for
about two seconds.
Procedure is repeated for 12-15 times, till the patient starts breathing.
This methods of respiration expands the lungs of the victim so as to help
him to start normal breathing. Patience is required by the helper.
2. SILVESTERS METHODS:
This method is applied when the patient has got burns injuries on the
chest or on the front side so that he can not be laid on his chest down.

154

The victim is first laid on his back with a pillow or a rolled coat under his
shoulders.
His clothes are loosened.
His arms are grasped above the wrists and drawn first upward and then
taken over his head until they are horizontal.
The patients are then brought down to the chest and the pressure is
applied in the downward direction by kneeling over victim's head.
The cycle is repeated after about two seconds.
NIELSONS ARM LEFT BACK-PRESSURE METHOD:
The subject lies prone with both arms folded and hands resting, one on the
other, under his head. The arms are grasped above the elbow and lifted
until firm resistance is met. This induces active inspiration. Then they are
let down and pressure is applied on the back to cause active expiration.
The movements in this method follow the following sequence.
POSITION-I.:
The victim is placed face down and his arms folded with one palm on the
other head resting on a cheek over the palms . Kneel on both the knees at
victims head. The hand is placed on the victims back beyond the line of
armpits, with fingers spread outwards and downwards, thumbs just
touching each other.
POSITION-II
Keeping arms straight, the helper gently rocks forward until they are
vertical thus steadily pressing the victims back.
POSITION-III

155

Synchronizing the above movements, the helper rocks backward releasing

from use, and sliding his arms downwards along the victims arms and
grasps his upper arm just above.
POSITION-IV
As the helper rocks back, the victims arms are gently raised and pulled
towards him, until tension is felt in his shoulders. This expands the
victims chest and results in respiration to complete the cycle, the victims
arm are lowered and hand is moved up to initial position.

MOUTH TO MOUTH METHOD:

The patient is laid on his back with his head is slightly sloping down, a
pillow or rolled coat placed under his shoulders. The head is tilted so that
the lower jaw is higher than the upper jaw. The patients mouth is opened
after a deep breath; the helper places his mouth over the victims mouth
making air tight contact. Patients nose is pinched and patients mouth is
blown till his chest rises. The helpers mouth is removed for the victims to
exhale. The first 8-10 breaths are as rapid and thereafter rate is slowed
down to 12-15 times a minute.

156

ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATOR:
Artificial respirator consists of a rubber balloon, a special valve and mouth
piece tubing. The mouth piece is cupped on the patients mouth for the
artificial respiration. During inhaling balloon is defatted into patients
mouth, upon release, the balloon gets inflated from atmospheric air
entering via the valve. The process is continued till the normal breathing
is restored.

EXTERNAL CARDIAC MASSAGE:

If the patients pulse is not felt, heart beat has stopped; in such a case
external cardiac massage is applied.

The injured person is laid on his back on a firm surface and knelled at
his side.

The heel of one hand is placed on the lower half of the persons
sternum.

157

Other hand is placed on the top of the first hand and downward
pressure is exerted till the bones dip by 1.5 inches.
Then the pressure is released. This cycle is repeated 60 times.

FRACTURE
A fracture is an injury that disrupts bone tissue. A stress fracture is a break
in
a bone, usually small, that develops because of repeated or prolonged forces
against the bone.

Alternative Names:
Bone - broken; Broken bone; Stress fracture

Symptoms:

A visibly out-of-place or misshapen limb or joint.

Limitation or unwillingness to move a limb.

Swelling.

Intense pain.

Bruising.

158

Numbness and tingling.

DO NOT move a victim with any suspected spine injury.

DO NOT attempt to straighten a misshapen bone or joint or to

Do Not:

change its position unless circulation appears hampered.

DO NOT test a misshapen bone or joint for loss of function.

DO NOT give the victim anything by mouth.

First Aid:
1. Check the victim's airway, breathing, and circulation. If necessary,
begin rescue breathing, CPR, or bleeding control. Keep the victim still
and provide assurance.
2. Examine the victim closely for other injuries. If the skin is broken by a
fractured bone, don't breathe on the wound or probe it. If possible,
lightly rinse to remove visible dirt or other contamination, but do not
vigorously scrub or flush the wound. Cover with sterile dressings before
immobilizing the injury.
3. Make sure to pad the affected area, to prevent a pressure sore.
4. Immobilize the area both above and below the injured bone. Ice packs
may be applied to ease pain and swelling.
5. Check the circulation of the affected area after immobilizing-press
firmly over skin that is beyond the fracture site.
6. If circulation appears inadequate (pale or blue skin, numbness or
tingling, loss of pulse), try to realign the limb into a normal resting
position. This can be tested with voluntary movement. It should be

159

done as soon as possible (within three hours of injury) to reduce

swelling, pain, and damage to the tissues from lack of blood.
7. Make an effort to prevent shock. Lay the victim flat, elevate the feet
about 12 inches above the head, and cover the victim with a coat or
blanket. However, do not move the victim if a head, neck, or back injury
is suspected.
8. Call immediately for emergency medical assistance!
UNIVERSAL ANTIDOTE:
Universal antidote is a glass of water a heaping teaspoon full of two parts
of activated charcoal, one part of magnesium oxide, one part of fullers
earth and one part of tannic acid, if any body is not able to prepare an
antidote, give an emetic to induce vomiting.
To prevent collapse or shock keep the victim warm , quite and lying
position with head low. If there is consciousness give strong tea, or coffee.
Give smelling salts or aromatic sprits of ammonia may be inhaled.
TREATMENT FOR SPECIFIC POISONS:
ALKOLLOID POISONS:
Observe general instructions for poisons, use universal antidote.
CARBON-DISULPHIDE:
Give a mixture of 93% O2 and 7% CO2 or oxygen. In case of breathing,
failure use artificial respiration.
BENZENE:
If swallowed, follow general instructions for poisoning, if inhale
administered oxygen.

160

METHYL CHLORIDE:
Administer O2, use artificial respirants . For skin contact use cold water.
Dont use distilled grease.
SULPHUR-DIOXIDE:
Administer oxygen. In case of breathing failure use artificial respiration.
WHEN TO CALL FIRST AIDER

Any life threatening or injury situation

If you are light headed and think you may lose consciousness

Alone in the facility and seriously injured

When someone is injured seriously

Any time there is an injury or when someone may need First Aid or
CPR

Any time someone is feeling ill or needs to use the First Aid room

If you notice any type of irregular behavior in your co-worker

If any non trained employee changes behavior dramatically

GET HELP AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BE AWARE OF YOUR

OWN CONDITION
1. Are you dizzy ?
2. Light headed?
3. Chilled and sweating?
4. Shortness of breath ?
5. Pain in center of chest spreading to neck, shoulder or arms?
6. Something gets caught in your throat
7. Sudden weakness/numbness of the face

161

8. Loss of speech / trouble talking or understanding speech

9. Sudden severe headache
10. Are you diabetic? eating or checking you blood sugar?
11. Are you allergic to certain things / been stung by a bee before?
QUESTIONS:

What do you mean by First Aid? Describe common contents of a

first aid box.

What do you mean by Universal Antidote?

UNIT-VII

THE ROLE OF SAFETY OFFICER

The common roles of safety officer are :
SPECIFIC HEALTH AND SAFETY ROLES:
(a) HR Health and Safety Advisory Services , Staff of HR Health and Safety
Advisory Services develop policy, advise managers, health and safety
committees, staff and labour on workplace health and safety matters, audit
health and safety performance, provide training courses and coordinate
health and safety programs for installation as a whole.

162

(b) Workplace Health and Safety Officers (WHSO's) and Workplace Health
and Safety Representatives (WHSR's)
It is recommended that managers nominate at least one Workplace Health
and Safety Officer (WHSO) and encourage the election of at least one
Workplace Health and Safety Representative (WHSR) in their area of
authority.
Workplace Health and Safety Officers (WHSOs) are nominated by
management to advise managers and anyone who supervises others on
aspects of the Workplace Health and Safety Act (coupled with local
knowledge) on a day-to-day basis. These persons are not health and safety
specialists and the role is generally secondary to their usual job.
The statutory function of a WHSO is to

describe the overall state of health and safety for a section

conduct regular inspections of the work area

report hazards or unsafe practices

establish educational programs

investigate or assist with investigation of accidents, illnesses and

injuries

report such events to HR Health and Safety Advisory Services

assist with the annual review/audit of health and safety management

Help an inspector in the course of their work.

Workplace Health and Safety Representatives (WHSRs) are elected by coworkers to act as their representative in health and safety matters. WHSRs
are entitled to

163

inspect their work area weekly or as negotiated with the employer

be advised of work caused injuries, illnesses or dangerous events

be present at worker interviews if asked by a worker

review circumstances of injuries, illnesses and events and make

recommendations

be consulted on changes proposed to workplace, plant or substances

that may affect health and safety

help in health and safety issue resolution

be advised when an inspector is at the workplace (WHSR area)

report health and safety issues to WHSO or employer

seek co-operation in remedying the issue or report to an inspector

report previous issues/hazards unsatisfactorily completed.

WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMITTEES:

Workplace health and safety committees are identified by the Workplace
Health and Safety Act as the preferred mechanism for facilitating
consultation between management and staff with the aim of preventing
injuries and illnesses. Workplace health and safety committees should seek to

encourage and maintain at the workplace an active interest in health

and safety

consider measures for training and educating persons at the workplace

about health and safety issues including documented local safety
inductions

164

tell workers about the formulation, review and distribution (in

appropriate languages) of standards, rules and procedures about
health and safety

review circumstances surrounding work injuries, work caused illnesses

and dangerous events referred to the committee for review having
regard to the legal definitions of those terms .

tell the employer of the review results and make recommendations

arising out of the review help in the resolution of issues about
workplace health and safety.

SAFETY OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES

COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES
The following responsibilities

Provides guidance on industrial safety compliance and technical subjects

Coordinates or provides training on occupational health and safety

requirements

Requests information and clarification on regulatory requirements from

EH&S

Assists EH&S in evaluating program effectiveness

Assists in responding to any regulatory actions or investigations

Communicates department manager/chair and MSO on Industrial safety

and injury/illness prevention efforts and activities

Participates in the development of the Department Emergency

Operations Plan (DEOP)

165

Provide equipment, materials and protective devices, and shall maintain

them in good condition .

Ensure the measures and procedures prescribed are carried out in the

workplace.
Provide information, instruction, and supervision to employees to protect

their health or their safety.

Ensure that when appointing supervisors, they are competent with

respect to their responsibilities.

Afford assistance and co-operation to the Occupational Health and

Safety Committee or any of its members in discharging their

responsibilities .
Provide the Occupational Health and Safety Committee with the results

of reports prepared respecting occupational health and safety.

Advise workers of the results of occupational health and safety reports.

Safeguard workers from undue exposure to biological, chemical or

physical agents as prescribed .
Provide workers with written instructions as to the measures and

procedures to be taken for the protection of employees.

Carry out training programs for employees, supervisors and committee

members as may be prescribed .

Beside this the other responsibilities are

Receive assignment, notification, reporting location, reporting time,

and travel instructions from your home agency.

166

Upon arrival at the incident, check in at designated check-in locations.

Check-in locations may be found at: Incident Command Post, Base or
Camps,

Staging

Areas,

Division

Supervisors

(for

direct

line

assignments).

Agency representatives from assisting or cooperating agencies report

to .

All radio communications to Incident Communications Center will be

addressed: "(Incident Name) Communications".

Use clear text and in all radio transmissions.

Receive briefing from immediate supervisor.

Acquire work materials.

Organize, assign, and brief subordinates.

Ensure continuity using in/out briefings

Respond to demobilization orders

SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES

The Safety Officer is responsible for monitoring and assessing

hazardous and unsafe situations and developing measures to assure
personnel safety.

The Safety Officer will correct unsafe acts or conditions through the
regular line of authority, although the Safety Officer may exercise
emergency authority to prevent or stop unsafe acts when immediate
action is required.

167

The Safety Officer maintains awareness of active and developing

situations.

The Safety Officer ensures the Site Safety and Health Plan is prepared
and implemented.

The Safety Officer ensures there are safety messages in each Incident
Action Plan.

Only one Safety Officer will be assigned for each incident, including
incidents operating under Unified Command and multi-jurisdiction
incidents. The Safety Officer may have assistants, as necessary, and
the assistants may also represent assisting agencies or jurisdictions.

During initial response, document the hazard analysis process, hazard

identification, exposure assessment and controls.

Participate in planning meetings to identify any health and safety

concerns inherent in the operations daily work plan.

Review the Incident Action Plan for safety implications.

Exercise emergency authority to prevent or stop unsafe acts.

Investigate accidents that have occurred within incident areas.

Ensure preparation and implementation of Site Safety and Health

Plan (SSHP)

Assign assistants and manage the incident safety organization.

SAFETY
Review and approve the Medical Plan

Maintain Unit/Activity Log.

Site
Characterization
&Monitoring
Team:

Assistant Safety Officer

Site Safety Plan

Site Safety
Enforcement
Team:

Team:

Team:

Team:

Team:

168

Site Security

FUNCTIONS OF THE SAFETY STAFF

Site Safety Officer Assistant:

Provide assistance to the Safety Officer. Ensure all Safety functions

continue when the Safety Officer is attending meetings.

Site Safety Plan

Draft initial emergency response site safety plan. Ensure copies get
distributed as soon as possible to staging areas and field personnel.

Receive

reports

from

Site

Safety

Enforcement

Assistant

and

incorporate changes into the site safety plan.

Ensure site safety plan is completed in time to be incorporated into

Incident Action Plan.

All personnel shall review site safety plan prior to commencement of

operations.

Review Medical Plan and forward to the Safety Officer for signature.

169

Review Incident Action Plan.

Ensure plan provisions are in

compliance with 29 CFR 1910.120. Review HAZWOPER Compliance

Checklist to ensure requirements met.
Site Safety Enforcement:

Enforce site safety plan on scene.

Use site safety enforcement log and ensure completion in time for
updating new site safety plan for next operational period.

Terminate all imminently dangerous operations immediately. For other

non-time critical safety hazards contact the Safety Officer for termination
guidance.

Attend morning field safety briefings at Staging Areas and assembly

points to ensure site safety plan was covered.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF TOP MANAGEMENT

Keep informed of the health and safety needs of employees under their
authority;

Initiate necessary preventive measures to control health and safety

hazards associated with activities under their authority;

Incorporate preventive measures in all functions and activities in which

there may be some incident or accident with health-related consequences;

Ensure that their supervisory personnel are aware of their health and
safety responsibilities and that they provide proper information and
instructions to individuals under their supervision;

Provide safety training opportunities for all their personnel;

170

RESPONSIBILITIES

OF

SUPERVISORS

AND

PRINCIPAL

INVESTIGATORS
Supervisors and principal investigators or anyone who has charge of a
workplace or authority over other employees must show due diligence in the
application of health and safety measures in general; in particular they must
also:

Keep informed of the health and safety regulations applicable to the

employees under their authority;

Initiate necessary preventive measures to control health and safety

hazards associated with activities under their authority;

Incorporate preventive measures in all functions and activities in

which there may be some incident or accident with health-related
consequences;

Ensure that employees under their authority work in the manner and
with the protective devices, measures and procedures .

Ensure that employees under their authority use or wear the

equipment, protective devices or clothing required,

RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEES
The responsibility for health and safety lies with all industry personnel in
the performance of their duties. In addition, the following particular
requirements must be adhered to by all Industry employees:

Work in compliance with the provisions of the OH&S Act and all health
and safety procedures and instructions;

171

Use or wear the equipment, protective devices or clothing that the

University requires to be used or worn and report to their supervisors
the absence of or defect in any equipment or protective device of which
they are aware and which may endanger themselves or other
employees;

Report to the appropriate supervisory staff all known health and safety
hazards or any violation of the OH&S Act or its regulations;

Not use or operate any equipment, machine, device or thing or work in

a manner that endangers themselves or other employees and not
remove or make ineffective any protective device required by the
regulation or by the industry, without providing an adequate
temporary protective device; when the need for removing the protective
device has ceased, the original protective device shall be reinstalled
immediately;

Not engage in any prank, contest, feat of strength, unnecessary

running or rough and boisterous conduct or otherwise endanger their
co-workers or themselves;

Report accidents and incidents according to sections concerned

sections.

TRAINING

The Industry must ensure that workplace-specific and mandatory

training is provided to employees to conduct their activities safely.

Employees are required to attend mandatory training sessions related

to their work environment.

172

Units where health-and-safety-related training has been provided will

maintain up-to-date data bases regarding the training provided
(centrally or locally).

WORKPLACE

HAZARDOUS

MATERIALS

INFORMATION

SYSTEM (WHMIS)
o All employees exposed to or likely to be exposed to, a hazardous
material or to a hazardous physical agent must receive and
participate in instruction and training regarding the use,
storage, handling and disposal of these materials.
o Top management is responsible for ensuring that all legally
required systems and procedures are in place with respect to
WHMIS. In particular, they must ensure that material safety
data sheets are available and up-to-date, for consultation by all
employees exposed to or likely to be exposed to hazardous
materials or who must handle such materials that all hazardous
materials in the workplace are identified in the prescribed
manner.
o If material safety data sheets are accessible on a computer
terminal at a workplace, top management and principal
investigators shall take all reasonable steps necessary to keep
the terminal in working order give a worker a copy of the
material safety data sheet upon request; and teach committee
members and employees who work with or close to hazardous

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materials how to retrieve the material safety data sheet on the

computer terminal.
o Employees who are exposed to or likely to be exposed to, a
hazardous material or agent

have the responsibility of

consulting material safety data sheets for these materials.

REPORTING

AND

INVESTIGATION

OF

INCIDENTS

AND

ACCIDENTS

The supervisor must advise Protection Services immediately after a

serious or critical injury or fatality, or after accidents and incidents
involving chemicals, biological or radioactive substances and physical
agents, including accidental spills and emissions both inside and
outside the workplace. The Occupational Health and Safety Officer
must notify the Ministry of Labor immediately after a critical injury or
a fatality and must send a written report to the Ministry of Labor
within 48 hours or its occurrence.

All accidents, fires, and other potentially serious incidents (e.g. spills,
emissions) must be entered on an Accident, Incident or Occupational
Disease Report, and the supervisor must submit the report to the
Occupational Health, Disability and Leave Sector within 24 hours of
the occurrence.

Responsibility for investigating and for taking appropriate actions

against recurrences lies primarily with the dean or director concerned.
The Occupational Health and Safety Committee may assist when
necessary and will make appropriate recommendations for corrective

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actions to the dean or director involved. In cases of critical injury or

death, the Occupational Health and Safety Committee may investigate
and inspect the workplace where the accident occurred. This must be
done according to the industry Investigation Guidelines Following a
Work-related Accident or Incident.

QUESTIONS:

What is the role of safety officer?

What are the common responsibilities of safety officer

What are the different functions of safety staff

Define responsibilities of employer

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UNIT-VIII
CASE STUDIES

1. PIPER ALPHA
Introduction:
The Piper Alpha Oil Platform was owned by a consortium consisting of
Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) ltd, Texaco Britain ltd, International
Thomson plc and Texaco Petroleum Ltd and was operated by occidental.
The Piper Alpha Platform was located in the piper field some 110 miles
north-east of Aberdeen. The piper platform separated the fluid produced by
the wells into oil, gas and condensate .the oil was pumped by the pipeline to
the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkneys ,the condensate being injected back
into the oil for transport to shore .The gas was transmitted by pipeline to the

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manifold

compression

platform

MCP-01

(manifold

compression

platform),where it joined the major gas pipeline from the Frigg field to St
Fergus.
There were two other platforms connected to Piper Alpha. Oil from the
Claymore Platform, also operated by the Occidental was piped to join the
Piper oil line at the Claymore. Claymore was short of gas and was therefore
connected to Piper Alpha by a gas pipeline so that it could import Piper gas.
Oil from Tartan was piped to Claymore and then to Flottta and gas from
Tartan was piped to Piper and then to MCP-01.
The production deck level consisted of four modules A-D.A module was
wellhead, B module the oil separation module, C module the gas compression
module and D Module the power generation and utilities module.
There were fire walls between A and B Modules, between B and C
modules, and between C and D modules (the A/B,B/C, and C/D firewalls
respectively); these firewalls were not designed to resist blast.
At 10 pm on 6 July 1988 an explosion occurred in the gas compression module
of the Piper Alpha oil production platform in the North Sea. A large pool fire
took hold in the adjacent oil separation module, and a massive plume of black
smoke enveloped the platform at and above the production deck, including the
accommodation. The pool fire extended to the deck below, where after 20 min
it burned through a gas riser from the pipeline connection between the Piper
and Tartan platforms .The gas from the riser burned as a huge jet flame
.Most of those on board were trapped in the accommodation .The lifeboats
were inaccessible due to the smoke .Some 62 men escaped, mainly by

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climbing down knotted ropes or by jumping from a height, but 167 died, the
majority in the quarters. The Piper Alpha explosion and fire was the worst
accident which has occurred on an offshore platform.
Following the disaster a public inquiry was set up under the public
inquiries regulations 1974 presided over by Lord Cullen to establish the
circumstances of the disaster and its cause and to make recommendations to
avoid similar accidents in the future.
The inquirys the public inquiry into the piper alpha disaster
(the Piper Alpha Report or Cullen Report) (Cullen 1990) is the most
comprehensive inquiry conducted in the UK into an offshore platform
disaster, onshore or offshore.
The Piper Alpha inquiry has been of crucial importance in the
development of the offshore safety regime in the UK sector of the north sea.
The Piper Alpha inquiry not only discharged the function of an inquiry into
the specific disaster but made recommendations for changes to the offshore
safety regime which were accepted by the government.
Platform systems included the electrical supply system, the fire and gas
detection system, the fire water deluge system, the emergency shut down
system, the communications system and the evacuation and escape system.
Electrical power was supplied by two main generators which normally
ran off the gas supply but could be fired by diesel-fired emergency generator
and also a drilling generator and an emergency drilling generator. In
addition, there were uninterrupted power supplies for emergency services.

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The main production areas were equipped with a fire and gas detection
system.

179

PROCESS
The fluid from the wellhead, containing oil, gas, condensate and water passed
through the wellhead Christmas tree to the two separators where the gas was
separated from the oil and water. The oil was then pumped into the main oil
line .The gas was then compressed in the three centrifugal compressors to
675 psi, with some gas being taken off at this point as fuel for the mail
generators, and then boosted in the first stage of two reciprocating
compressors to 1465 psi .Condensate was removed and the gas was further
compressed in the second stage of the reciprocating compressor to 1735 psi.
The gas then went three ways:
1. To serve as lift gas at the wells.
2. To MCP-01 as export gas.
3. To flare.
The condensate was removed in 2 ways:
1. In the first method (phase 2) gas passed from reciprocating compressor
to gas conversion module (GCM) where it was dried.
2. In the second method (phase 1) the gas was passed through a flash
drum so that condensate was knocked off by Joule-Thomson effect. This
was done before GCM came into use.
The condensate injection pump was used to inject condensate into the
main oil line. There was normally one condensate injection pump line
operating and one on standby. Each condensate injection pump was
protected from overpressure on the delivery side by a single pressure

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safety valve (PSV).the PSV was on a separate relief line rather than on
the delivery line itself.
In accordance with the standard practices Methanol was injected into
the process at various points to prevent formation of hydrates which
would tend to cause blockage.

EVENTS PRIOR TO EXPLOSION

On 6th July there was a major work programme on the Platform. The extra
accommodation for the workforce was provided on the THAROS, a large
floating fire fighting vessel anchored near the platform.
The GCM was out of service on that day, so the
plant operation had reverted to phase 1 mode so the gas was relatively wet.
The resulting increased potential for the hydrate formation was recognized by
the management onshore,. The increased methanol injection rates were
calculated and communicated to the platform together with suggestions for
configuration of methanol pumps. The methanol injection rate was some 12
time greater than the phase 2 operation.
However there was an interruption of the methanol supply to the most critical
point between 4:00 and 8:00 pm that evening.
There were 2 condensate injection pump A and pump B. The operating
condensate injection pump was B pump. The A pump was down for
maintenance. There were three maintenance jobs to be done on this pump.
1. A full 24 month preventive maintenance (PM).

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2. Repair of the pump coupling.

3. Recertification of the pressure safety valve, PSV.
In order to carry out the 24 month PM ,the pump had been isolated by
closing the gas operated valves (GOVs) on the suction and the delivery
lines but slip plates had not been inserted.
Work on the coupling, which was suffering from a vibration problem,
would not involve breaking into the pump. With the pump in this state,
with the GOVs closed but without slip plate isolation, access was given to
remove PSV for testing. It was taken off in the morning of July 6 by a two
man team from the specialist contractor SCORE UK LTD. They were
unable to resolve the PSV that evening. The supervisor in this team came
back to the control room some time before 6:00pm to suspend Permit to
Work (PTW) and the team then went off duty intending to put the PSV
back the next day.
At about 4.50 pm on that day, just at shift change over, the maintenance
status of the pump underwent a change .The maintenance Superintendent
decided that the 24 month PM would not be carried out and that work on
the pump should be restricted to the repair of the pump coupling.
About 9:50 pm on that evening B pump tripped out. The Lead Production
Operator and phase 1 Operator tried to restart it but without success. the
loss of this pump meant that with A pump also down condensate would be
back in the flash drum and within some 30 min would force a shut down of
the gas plant. There was a possibility that if the gas supply to the main
generator was lost and if the changeover to the alternate diesel failed, the

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wells would also have to be shut down. It would then be necessary to

undertake a black start.
The Lead Operator in consultation with lead
maintenance hand decided to start pump A. the lead operator signed the
Permit for A pump so that it could be electrically de-isolated and restated
there was no doubt that the lead operator wanted to start the pump A.
About 9:55 pm the signals for the tripping of 2 compressors came up. Then
the third compressor tripped. Before the control room could take any
action three low gas alarms and a high gas alarm went up. The operators
had his hand out to control the alarm when he was blown across the room
by explosion.
EXPLOSION , ESCALATION AND RESCUE.
The initial explosion occurred at 10:00 pm .it destroyed most of the
firewalls and blew across the rooms. The explosion was followed almost
immediately by a large fireball and also large oil pool fire. The large oil
pool fire gave rise to massive smoke plume which enveloped the platform.
Majority of the personnel on the platform were in the accommodation. The
escape routes from the module to the lifeboats were impassable .The fire
water drench system did not operate. There was only a trickle of water
from the sprinkler heads.
The explosion disabled the mail communications system which was
centered on piper. The emergency procedure was for personnel to report to
their lifeboat, but in practice most evacuations would be by helicopter and
personnel would be directed from the lifeboat to the dining area on the

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upper deck and then to the heli -deck. Personnel found the escape route to
the lifeboat blocked and waited in the dining area. The OIM(Offshore
Installations Manager) told them that a Mayday (an international radio
signal by ship /plane which are in danger) signal had been sent to effect
the evacuation .In fact the heli -deck was inaccessible to helicopters.
By 12:15 am on 7th July the north end of the platform had
disappeared/by morning only A module, the wellhead, remained standing.

QUESTIONS:
1. Discuss reasons of piper alpha accidents.
2. What are your learning as safety officer from this accedents
3. Write the consequences of Piper Alpha accident. What
is your learning from the accident as a safety officer?

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2.THE BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

The Bhopal pesticide plant ,where took place this fatal accident was built in
1970's and was owned and operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL),
an Indian company in which Union Carbide Corporation of US held just over
half of the stock. Indian financial institutions and thousands of private
investors in India held the rest of the stock. Union Carbide India Limited
(UCIL) was established in 1934, when Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)
became one of the first U.S. companies to invest in India
Between 1977 and 1984, UCIL, located within a crowded working class
neighborhood
Government

in

Bhopal,

under

license

from

the

Madhya

Pradesh

produced pesticides for use in India to help the countrys

agricultural sector increase its productivity and contribute more significantly

to meeting the food needs of one of the world's most heavily populated
regions. Methyl isocyanate (MIC) was produced at the Bhopal plant by

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reacting monomethylamine and phosgene in the plant's MIC production unit.

The refined MIC was then transferred to a separate MIC storage area where
it was stored in two horizontal, mounded, 15,000-gallon, and stainless-steel
tanks. A third storage tank was kept empty for emergencies and for offspecification material waiting reprocessing. The MIC was used to make
SEVIN carbaryl and several other carbamate pesticides. The MIC was
processed into SEVIN carbaryl pesticide in the SEVIN unit. The MIC was
transferred in one-ton batches to a charge pot in the SEVIN unit using
nitrogen pressure. A nitrogen pressure of at least 14 psig in the MIC storage
tank was necessary to move the material from the storage area to the SEVIN
unit charge pot at a reasonable rate. From there, each batch would be reacted
with alpha-naphthol to make SEVIN carbaryl.below is presented the reaction
producing carbaryl.

THE DISASTER
On the early morning of the 3rd December 1984, water inadvertently entered
the MIC storage tank, where over 40 metric tons of MIC was being stored.
The addition of water to the tank caused a runaway chemical reaction,
resulting in a rapid rise in pressure and temperature. The heat generated by
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the reaction, the presence of higher than normal concentrations of

chloroform, and the presence of an iron catalyst , produced by the corrosion of
the stainless steel tank wall, resulted in a reaction of such momentum, that
gases formed could not be contained by safety systems. As a result, MIC and
other reaction products, in liquid and vapor form, escaped from the plant into
the surrounding areas.
AFTER EFFECTS
LIFE AND PROPERTY
The heavier-than-air MIC gas mixture when released into the air rolled along
the ground through the surrounding streets and spread around. The
transportation system in the city collapsed and many people were trampled
trying to escape. There was no warning for people surrounding the plant as
the emergency sirens had been switched off. The effect on the people living in
the shanty settlements just over the fence was immediate and devastating.
Many died in their beds, others staggered from their homes, blinded and
choking, to die in the street. Many more died later after reaching hospitals
and emergency aid centers.
The majority of deaths and serious injuries were related to pulmonary edema,
but the gas caused a wide variety of other ailments. Signs and symptoms of
methyl isocyanate exposure normally include cough, dyspnea, chest pain,
lacrimation, eyelid edema, and unconsciousness. These effects might progress
over the next 24 to 72 hours to include acute lung injury, cardiac arrest, and
death.

187

Information on the exact chemical mixture was never provided by the

company, but blood and viscera of some victims showed cherry-red color
characteristic in acute cyanide poisoning. A series of studies made five years
later showed that many of the survivors still suffered from one or several of
the following ailments: partial or complete blindness, persistent respiratory
problems, gastrointestinal disorders, impaired immune systems, post
traumatic stress disorders, and menstrual problems in women. A rise in
spontaneous abortions, stillbirths, and offspring with genetic defects was also
noted.

According to the state government of Madhya Pradesh, approximately 3,800

people died initially and several thousand other individuals experienced
permanent or partial disabilities.
Greenpeace cites 20,000 total deaths as its conservative estimate till date
from the harmful effects.
According to the Bhopal Medical Appeal, around 500,000 people were exposed
to the leaking chemicals. Approximately 20,000, to this date, are believed to
have died as a result; on average, roughly one person dies every day from the
effects. Over 120,000 continue to suffer from the effects of the disaster, such
as

breathing

difficulties,

cancer,

serious

birth-defects,

blindness,

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gynecological complications and other related problems. It is believed that

50,000 people are unable to work because of their debilitating ailments.
Union Carbide, on their Bhopal Information Center website, maintain that
approximately 3,800 died, while 40 people have permanent disabilities and
2,800 have partial disabilities.
The International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, however, claim that these
figures are derived from an affidavit submitted to the Indian Supreme Court
on 12th July 1990. This affidavit was apparently based on only roughly 15% of
medical evaluations; the Indian Supreme Court would hear, in 1991, that
495,000 people had been classified as injured (22,000 permanently disabled,
3,000 seriously, and another 8,500 temporarily disabled). Even today,
according to the campaign, evaluation continues: 15,000 death claims and
more than 560,000 injury claims have so far been granted. The campaign also
suggest that official figures only tell part of the story, as many injury and
death claims have been denied arbitrarily. It is also difficult to demarcate
which deaths can be attributed to the incident directly.
The Indian Council for Medical Research reported that, in 1988 alone,
approximately 2,500 extra deaths had occurred in places affected by the
disaster
The factory was closed down after the accident.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
Besides the huge loss of human life and property, a BBC investigation
conducted in November 2004 confirmed that contamination is present in
drinking water, as well as in the abandoned chemical factory site and the

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former chemical dumping grounds of the factory thus creating environmental

pollution also.
Lack of political willpower has led to a stalemate on the issue of cleaning up
the plant and its environs of hundreds of tonnes of toxic waste, which has
been left untouched. Environmentalists have warned that the waste is a
potential minefield in the heart of the city, and the resulting contamination
may lead to decades of slow poisoning, and diseases affecting the nervous
system, liver and kidneys in humans. Studies have shown that the rates of
cancer and other ailments have already moved higher in the region since the
event.
In 2002, an inquiry found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5
trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing womens breast
milk. Well water and groundwater tests conducted in the surrounding areas
in 1999 showed mercury levels to be at 20,000 and 6 million times higher
than expected levels; heavy metals and organochlorines were present in the
soil. Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also
discovered, as well as trichloroethene, known to impair fetal development, at
50 times above safety limits specified by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
Some areas are reportedly so polluted that anyone entering the area for more
than ten minutes is likely to lose consciousness. Rainfall causes run-off,
polluting local wells and boreholes, and the results of tests undertaken on
behalf of the BBC by accredited water analysis laboratories in the United
Kingdom reveal pollution levels in borehole water 500 times the legal

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maximum in that country. Statistical surveys of local residents, with a control

population in a similarly poor area away from the plant, are reported to
reveal higher levels of various diseases around the plant. Carbide states that
after the incident, UCIL began clean-up work at the site under the direction
of Indian central and state government authorities, which was continued
after 1994 by the successor to UCIL, Eveready Industries, until 1998, when it
was placed under the authority of the Madhya Pradesh Government. Critics
of the clean-up undertaken by Carbide, such as the International Campaign
for Justice in Bhopal, claim that several internal studies by the corporation,
which evidenced severe contamination, were not made public; the Indian
authorities were also refused access. The successor, Eveready Industries,
abruptly relinquished the site lease to one department of the State
Government while being supervised by another department on an extensive
clean up programme. Environmental problems resulting from lack of a proper
clean-up persist today also. The Madhya Pradesh authorities have announced
that they will pursue both Dow and Eveready to conduct the clean-up as
joint efforts.
Infact the International Campaign view Carbides sale of UCIL in 1994 as a strategy to
escape the Indian courts, who threatened Carbides assets due to their non-appearance in
the criminal case. The successor, Eveready Industries India, Limited (EIIL), ended its 99
year lease in 1998 and turned over control of the site to the state government of the
Madhya Pradesh. Currently, the Madhya Pradesh Government is trying to legally force
Dow and EIIL to finance clean-up operations.
INVESTIGATION
Shortly after the gas release, Union Carbide launched an intensive effort to
identify the cause.
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An initial investigation by Union Carbide experts showed that a large volume

of water had apparently been introduced into the MIC tank and caused a
chemical reaction that forced the chemical release valve to open and allowed
the gas to leak. A committee of experts, working on behalf of the Indian
government, conducted its own investigation and reached the same
conclusion.
An independent investigation by the engineering consulting firm Arthur D.
Little determined that the water could only have been deliberately introduced
into the tank, since safety systems were in place and operational that would
have prevented water from entering the tank by accident.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNION CARBIDE

COST-CUTTING MEASURES
In the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen: the factory was
making a loss and overproducing MIC that was not being sold, leading to a
series of cost-cutting measures from around 1982 onwards.
As a long-term cause of the catastrophe, authorities had tried and failed to
persuade Carbide to build the plant away from densely populated areas.
Carbide explained their refusal on the expense such a move would incur.

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Union Carbide previously produced their pesticide, Sevin (the commercial

name of Carbaryl), without MIC but, after 1979, began using MIC because it
was cheaper. Other manufacturers, such as Bayer, made Sevin without MIC,
although this caused greater expenses.

The recent discovery of

documents, obtained through discovery in the course of a lawsuit

against Union Carbide, for environmental contamination before a
New York Federal District Court, revealed that Carbide had exported
"untested, unproven technology" to the Indian plant.
WORK CONDITIONS
Attempts to reduce expenses affected the factorys employees and their
conditions:

Kurzman argues that cuts meant less stringent quality control and
thus looser safety rules. A pipe leaked? Dont replace it, employees said
they were told MIC workers needed more training? They could do
with less. Promotions were halted, seriously affecting employee morale
and driving some of the most skilled elsewhere.

Workers were forced to use English manuals, despite the fact that only
a few had a grasp of the language.

By 1984, only six of the original twelve operators were still

working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel
was also cut in half.

No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and

instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the
previous and required one-hour readings.

193

Workers made complaints about the cuts through their union but were
ignored. One employee was sacked after going on a 15-day hunger
strike. 70% of the plants employees were fined before the disaster for
refusing to deviate from the proper safety regulations under pressure
from management.

In the words of the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal,

poorly trained personnel, rapid turnover, leaking valves, shoddy
gauges and inadequate water spray protection were all identified as
representing a higher potential for a serious incident or more serious
consequences if an incident should occur.

EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY REGULATIONS

Cost-cutting

initiatives

affected

the

quality

of

equipment

and

the

effectiveness of safety regulations:

It emerged in 1999, during civil action suits in India, that, unlike

Union Carbide plants in the USA, its Indian subsidiary plants were
not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to
cope with incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing
local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and
manufactured at Bhopal.

The MIC tanks alarms had not worked for 4 years.

The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for 5
months before the disaster. The gas scrubber therefore did not attempt
to clean escaping gases with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which
may have brought the concentration down to a safe level. Even if the

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scrubber had been working, according to Weir, investigations in the

aftermath of the disaster discovered that the maximum pressure it
could handle was only one-quarter of that which was present in the
accident. Furthermore, the flare tower itself was improperly designed
and could only hold one-quarter of the volume of gas that was leaked in
1984.

To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system, designed to inhibit

the volatilization of MIC, had been left idle the MIC was kept at 20
degrees Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual, and some
of the coolant was being used elsewhere.

Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being
cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks via faulty valves were not
installed. Their installation had been omitted from the cleaning
checklist.

Water sprays designed to knock down gas leaks was poorly designed
set to 13 metres and below, they could not spray high enough to reduce
the concentration of escaping gas.

The MIC tank had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other
tanks had been used for that week, rather than repairing the broken
one, which was left to stew. The build-up in temperature and
pressure is believed to have affected the explosion and its intensity.

According to Lepowski, virtually every relevant safety instrument

was either in short supply, malfunctioning or designed improperly,

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and internal documents show that the company knew this prior to the
disaster, but did nothing about it.
AFTERMATH OF THE EXPLOSION
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion:

Though the audible external alarm was activated to warn the residents
of Bhopal, it was quickly silenced to avoid causing panic among the
residents. Thus, many continued to sleep, unaware of the unfolding
drama, and those that had woken assumed any problem had been
sorted out.

Doctors and hospitals were not informed of proper treatment methods

for MIC gas inhalation. They were told to simply give cough medicine
and eye-drops to their patients.

PREVIOUS WARNINGS AND ACCIDENTS

A series of prior warnings and MIC-related accidents had been ignored:

Reports issued months before the incident by scientists within the

Union Carbide corporation warned of the possibility of an accident
almost identical to that which occurred in Bhopal. The reports were
ignored and never made it to senior staff.

Union Carbide was warned by American experts who visited the plant
after 1981 of the potential of a runaway reaction in the MIC storage
tank; local Indian authorities warned the company of problems on
several occasions from 1979 onwards. Again, these warnings were not
heeded.

196

11 of the 30 major hazards documented in a 1982 review occurred in

the MIC and phosgene units.

From 1981, inhalation accidents were reported at the factory. Five

workers were hospitalised in 1982 after a leak of MIC.

A previous leak of MIC had affected local communities outside the

plant[10].

The International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal suggests that leaks

were so frequent that the safety siren was turned off.

UNION CARBIDES DEFENSE

These claims given by the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal and
others are countered by Union Carbide. It denies allegations against it on its
website dedicated to the tragedy. The corporation believe that the accident
was the result of sabotage, claiming that safety systems were in place and
operative. It also stresses that it did all it could to alleviate humanitarian
suffering following the disaster.
The corporation denies the claim that the valves on the tank were
malfunctioning, claiming that documented evidence gathered after the
incident showed that the valve close to the plant's water-washing operation
was closed and leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety systems in place and
operational would have prevented water from entering the tank by
accident.
Carbide states that the safety concerns identified in 1982 were all allayed
before 1984 and none of them had anything to do with the incident.

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The company admits that the safety systems in place could not have
prevented a chemical reaction of this magnitude from causing a leak.
According to Carbide, in designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical
reaction of this magnitude was not factored in because the tank's gas
storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of
water from being inadvertently introduced into the system and process
safety systems in place and operational would have prevented water from
entering the tank by accident. Instead, they believe that employee sabotage
not faulty design or operation was the cause of the tragedy.
INVESTIGATION OUTCOME
THE WATER WASH THEORY
According to this story, an MIC operator was told to wash a section of a sub
header of the relief valve vent header ("RVVH") in the MIC manufacturing
unit. Because he failed to insert a slip-blind, as called for by plant standard
operating procedures, the water supposedly backed up into the header and
eventually found its way into the process vent header ("PVH") through a
tubing connection near the tanks. It then was supposed to have flowed into
the MIC storage tank, located more than 400 feet by pipeline from the initial
point of entry.
This to a layman, appeared an apparently plausible, easily understood
explanation of the water source, which did not require any detailed knowledge
of the plant process or layout. It also was a theory that had popular appeal
because it focused on a simple, minor human inadvertence which caused a
great

tragedy

--

"for-want-of-a-horseshoe-nail-the-kingdom-was-lost"

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explanation. It was readily accepted by those eager to believe the incident had
been caused by improper operating practices at a purportedly shoddy
chemical plant in a Third World country. The water washing theory was also
publicly embraced by the Indian Government.
THE DIRECT-ENTRY AND SABOTAGE THEORY
Another investigation shows, with virtual certainty that the Bhopal incident
was
Caused by the entry of water to the tank through a hose that had been
connected directly to the tank. The following sequence of events occurred. At
10:20 p.m. on the night of the incident, the pressure in Tank 610 was at 2
psig. This is significant because no water could have entered prior to that
point; otherwise a reaction would have begun, and the resulting pressure rise
would have been noticed. At 10:45 p.m., the shift change occurred. During
this period, on a cold winter night, the MIC storage area would be completely
deserted. It is believed that it was at this point -- during the shift change -that a disgruntled operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the
readily available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, with the intention of
contaminating and spoiling the tank's contents. It was well known among the
plant's operators that water and MIC should not be mixed. He unscrewed the
local pressure indicator, which can be easily accomplished by hand, and
connected the hose to the tank. The water and MIC reaction initiated the
formation of carbon dioxide which, together with MIC vapors, was carried
through the header system and out of the stack of the vent gas scrubber by

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about 11:30 to 11:45 p.m. It was these vapors that were sensed by workers in
the area downwind as the earlier minor MIC leaks.
Investigations suggest that only an employee with the appropriate skills and
knowledge of the site could have tampered with the tank. An independent
investigation by the engineering consulting firm Arthur D. Little determined
that the water could only have been introduced into the tank deliberately as
in designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude
was not factored in for two reasons:
1. The tanks gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such
a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the
system; and
2. Process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented
water from entering the tank by accident. The system design did not,
however, account for the deliberate introduction of a large volume of water by
an employee.
RESPONSE
In the wake of the release, Union Carbide Corporation provided immediate
and continuing aid to the victims and set up a process to resolve their
claims.
In the days, months and years following the disaster, Union Carbide took
the following actions to provide continuing aid:

Immediately provided approximately $2 million in aid to the Prime

Ministers Relief Fund

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Immediately and continuously provided medical equipment and

supplies Sent an international team of medical experts to Bhopal to
provide expertise and assistance;

Funded the attendance by Indian medical experts at special meetings

on research and treatment for victims;

Provided a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish

a vocational-technical center in Bhopal, which was constructed and
opened, but was later closed and leveled by the government

Offered an initial $10 million to build a hospital in Bhopal; the offer

was declined;

Provided an additional $5 million to the Indian Red Cross;

Established an independent charitable trust for a Bhopal hospital and

provided initial funding of approximately $20 million. The hospital was
begun in October 1995 and was opened in 2001. The hospital caters for
the treatment of heart, lung and eye problems.

The company stresses the immediate action taken after the disaster and their continued
commitment to helping the victims.

THE SETTLEMENT
During the 1980's, as Union Carbide continued to provide interim relief funds
and work with the Bhopal community on medical and economic aid, legal
actions proceeded in both the U.S. and India. The courts ultimately decided
that the proper country for legal proceedings was India and matters were
consolidated there and proceeded before the Supreme Court of India.
In May 1989, Union Carbide and Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL)
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entered into a $470 million legal settlement with the Government of India,
which represented all claimants in the case. The settlement was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of India, which described it as just, equitable and
reasonable, and settled all claims arising out of the incident. Ten days after
the decision, Union Carbide and UCIL made full payment of the $470 million
to the Indian government.
In its opinion, the Court said that compensation levels under the settlement
were far greater than would normally be payable under Indian law. Pursuant
to the settlement, the Government of India assumed responsibility for
disbursing funds from the settlement and providing medical coverage to
citizens of Bhopal in the event of future illnesses.
In July 2004, fifteen years after reaching settlement, the Supreme Court of
India ordered the Government of India to release all additional settlement
funds to the victims. News reports indicate that there was approximately
$327 million in the fund as a result of earned interest from money remaining
after all claims had been paid. In April 2005, the Supreme Court of India
granted a request from the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims and
extended to April 30, 2006, the distribution of the rest of the settlement funds
by the Welfare Commission. News reports now indicate that approximately
$390 million remains in the settlement fund as a result of earned interest.
In September 2006, Indian media reported the registrar in the office of
Welfare Commission said that all cases of initial compensation claims by
victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedyand revision petitions had been

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cleared; no case was pending. If the media report was accurate, this could
mean that all the settlement money has finally been distributed.
QUESTIONS:

Describe services of events of Bhopal Gas Tragedy?

What is your learning as safety officer from this accidents ?

UNIT-IX

PERSONNEL RISK IN INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS

MINERAL EXPLORATION

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Mining is the act of extracting ores, coal etc from the earth. Mining on an
industrial

scale can

causes

environmental

damages,

resulting

from

exploration, and even after mines are closed.

Mining operation are carried out two methods:

Open Cast Mining: minerals are excavated on the open ground.

Under Ground Mining: Tunnels and access shafts are excavated

underground to dig the minerals.

THE INDIAN MINERAL SECTOR:

INTRODUCTION:
India produces as many as 84 minerals comprising 4 fuels, 11 metallic, 49
non metallic industrial and 20 minor minerals. Their aggregates production
in 1999 2000 was about 55 million tones, contributed by over 3,100 mines
producing coal, lignite, lime stone, iron ore, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc etc.
More than 80% of the mineral production comes from open cast mines.
History of Indias Mineral Sector:
Large scale production of various minerals was created in the public sector.

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CURRENT STATUS OF MINING INDUSTRY IN INDIA:

The recoverable reserves status of some important minerals are given below
Table: Recoverable reserves of mineral / ore in India (1970 and 1995).

Table: Mineral reserves in India.

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Table: Production of some selected minerals in India (by mineral groups)

INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY IN MINERAL EXPLORATION:

The most accidents occur during traveling, manual handling or drilling, and
frequently are caused by slipping and falling.

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Fatal accidents in Australia have involved fixed wing air craft and helicopter
crashes, head stroke, vehicles overtaking, and people being caught by rotating
rods on drilling rigs.
Another facility involved a hydrofluoric acid spill.
WAYS TO REDUCE ACCIDENTS:

By ensuring that all employees are competently trained to do their

work.

Identifying hazards in the job.

Assessing the risks from the hazards.

Managing the risk.

POLICY AND COMMITMENT TO SAFETY AND HEALTH:

A SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY SHOULD:

Be in written and be signed and dated by the chief executive.

Clearly state the organizations safety and health objective.

Declare managements commitment and determination to achieve

those objectives.

Be clearly understandable.

Be available to all employees.

Be implemented at all levels.

Be reviewed periodically.

MANAGEMENT CAN SHOW ITS COMMITMENT TO SAFETY AND

HEALTH BY:

Providing adequate financial and human resources to cover safety and

health needs.

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Providing adequate training to carry out work safely.

Developing and adopting safety management systems.

Involving all employees in safety issues relevant to their work.

Introducing safety committees and tool box meetings.

Empowering employees to take the necessary action to improve safety.

Providing feedback to safety requests.

Reviewing policies and procedures as required.

Employees will be committed to a safety and health ethos only if they believe,
and are shown, that the company itself is committed. They must be able to
see that improvements in safety are being made and that policies are
implemented in the field.
CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF RISK:
Risk is effectively managed when all persons individually and as part of the
work group and organization take action to keep the risk to an acceptable
level. In Particular, this means following risk management procedures and
practices that are appropriate for the work being carried out.
RISK MANAGEMENT IS THE SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF
POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES TO:

Identify, analyze and assess risk.

Avoid or remove unacceptable risk.

Monitor levels of risk and the adverse consequences of retained

residual risk.

Investigate and analyze causes of accidents and high potential

incidents to prevent their recurrence.

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Review effectiveness of risk control measures.

Take appropriate corrective and preventive action.

If there is an unacceptable level of risk to persons, they must be evacuated to

a safe location and action must be taken to reduce the risk to an acceptable
level.
WHEN HAZARDS ARE IDENTIFIED AND RISKS ANALYZED, THE
STANDARD HIERARCHY OF HAZARD CONTROLS SHOULD BE
ADOPTED, AS FOLLOWS:

Elimination of the hazard.

Substitution with a lesser hazard.

Separation of persons from the hazard.

Engineering controls.

Administrative controls.

Use of personal protective equipment (PPE).

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF MINING:

The exploratory phase generally causes the least impact, but during drilling
holes to determine the existence of deposits involve transporting heavy
equipments and building roads, such activities can disturb the local habitat
and increase access to remote areas of forest.
The operational phases have the following list of adverse impacts of mining
on forest and environment.

Open pit mining, generates enormous quantities of waste, compared

to any other methods.

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The water interacts with the wastes to generate contaminated fluids

that can pollute solids, rivers and ground water.
o The fluids can be highly acidic and metal laden or highly
alkaline and they contain various forms of cyanide, depending
on the waste source.
o Acid mine drainage can occur when water and air come into
contact with geologic materials containing iron sulphide, as in
abundance waste piles.
o Erosion and sedimentation is another environmental issue for
mine sites. In the mining process, large quantities of sediments
are transported by water erosion, and eventually settle at down
stream.

Dust generated from mining activity can cause air pollution.

o In human being it causes respiratory trouble.
o In plants and trees it causes asphyxia.
o Gasses and toxic vapors are released; sulphur dioxide is
responsible for acid rain.
o Carbon dioxide and methane are two of the main green house
gases causes climate change, this are released due to burning of
fossil fuels.
o The dust also contains toxic heavy metals such as arsenic, lead
and other.
o The dust can deposit in surface water causing sedimentation
and turbidity problem.

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Noise is another major problem from mining operations.

o The sounds of the machinery used in mining and the blasting
create condition that may become unbearable for the local
population and the forest wildlife.

The large disturbance caused by mining disrupts environments.

o Aquatic habitats (i.e. lakes, ponds, streams, rivers).
o Terrestrial habitats (i.e. deserts, grasslands, forests).
o Wetlands.

Effects hydrology by large consumption or release of water.

Effects topography.

Release of particulates and chemicals can all have indirect impacts on

various habitats.

Table: Mineral production, waste generation and land affected in 1999

2000.

SOCIAL DAMAGES OF MINING:

Agricultural land is destroyed turning farmers to laborers in mines,

which become unemployed after the mine is exhausted.

Appropriation of the land belonging to the local communities.

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Impacts on health.

Alteration of social relationships.

Social disintegration.

Radical and abrupt changes in regional cultures.

Displacement of other present and / or further local economic activities.

REMEDY MEASURE TO PROTECT ENVIRONMENT:

Illegal mining should be stopped.

Environmental Impact Assessment should be made as per standards

and political or corrupt decisions should be curbed.

Waste land management should be carried out by using the land by

construction of buildings, rods, rails etc, other than agricultural
activities.

QUESTIONS:
What are the different ways to reduce the accidents in
mining sector ?
What are the social damages of mining ?

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PERSONNEL RISK IN :
MATERIAL HANDLING PROCESS:
INTRODUCTION:

Manual materials handling (MMH) is a component of many jobs and

activities undertaken in life. Typically it involves lifting, lowering,
pushing, pulling, and carrying objects by hand.

Manual materials handling permeates all aspects of life on and off the
job.

The one thing all these tasks have in common is the potential to result in
some adverse health effect, from simple cuts, bruises, and sore muscles to
more serious conditions related to low back pain (LBP).

HAZARDS:
The hazards associated with improper material handling are associated with:

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Struck by a load

Losing control of a load,

Physically overexerting oneself,

Exceeding equipments capacity.

Such accidents can lead to:

Small Injuries (e.g., abrasions-Scraping of skin, Cut of skin, etc.)

Major Injuries (e.g., Fall of object on Head, Press of Hand/Leg under

Heavy Wt. and broken bones)

musculoskeletal disorders, chronic low back

Loss of life

CONTROLS MEASURES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST INJURY:

1. WORK PLANNING:
The injuries significantly increase when:

Lifting or moving of bulky, heavy objects that cannot be held close to

the body.

Repetitive lifts of lighter objects over long periods of time.

Task without required assistance or because of inadequate worker

training, poor judgment, poor selection, improper use or maintenance
of equipment.

Therefore, supervisors and workers should perform an appropriate analysis

to determine the proper technique or lifting device required for all materialhandling activities. As part of the analysis, consider whether a worker is able
to carry out the materials-handling task in question, even with assistance. In
addition, consider the following other factors:

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CONTAINER CHARACTERISTICS:

Weight, length, width, height, and depth.

Center of gravity (i.e., weight distribution within container).

Handles, texture, and grasp point.

Stability (particularly in the case of liquids and bulky items).

WORKPLACE CONFIGURATION:

Height of lifts.

Carrying distance and direction changes.

Obstacles (e.g., stairs and slopes).

Traction on working surfaces (i.e., observe whether surfaces are

slippery, smooth, or rough).

TASK CHARACTERISTICS:

Forward reach.

Duration, frequency, and pace.

Temperature, lighting, and humidity.

Work organization (e.g., teamwork, time pressure, and the availability

of help).

MECHANICAL LIFTING DEVICES:

Weight demand and equipment limitations (i.e., load limit).

Accessibility requirements.

Worker experience.

Maintenance status.

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2. WORKERS TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION:

Workers should be properly trained and physically capable for any work
assignment that involves the lifting of heavy objects or the repetitive lifting of
lighter objects over long periods.
TRAINING:
Workers shall be properly trained in correct lifting techniques and in the use
of powered and mechanical material-handling equipment, such as lifts,
hoists, powered industrial trucks and cranes.
PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION:
Workers need to be physically qualified to perform tasks requiring lifting of
heavy objects, repetitive lifting of modest-weight objects, or lifting of lighter
objects outside of a normal work routine, (e.g., moving office supplies and
furniture).
3. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTS:
A work supervisor shall evaluate job assignments to determine the need for
safety-toed shoes, gloves, and other types of personal protective equipment
(PPE).
Back belts may help reduce the risk of injury when properly used in
combination with a back care training program, ongoing evaluations of lifting
and material-handling techniques, and continuous supervision.
4. PRECAUTIONS FOR SAFELY LIFTING AND HANDLING
MATERIALS:

Never attempt to lift objects that are too heavy or bulky to handle
safely.

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Never overestimate your ability to perform a task.

Whenever possible, push rather than pull loads:

Pushing uses the strong leg muscles, whereas pulling uses the easily
strained back muscles.

When occasional lifts of compact loads [<70 kg (154 lb)] are required, observe
the following precautions:

Loads should be handled no more than 18 cm (7 in.) in front of the body

as measured from the ankles. The heavier a load, the more closely to
the body the load should be held.

Very low lifts [25 cm (10 in.) or less from the floor] are not desirable
because of the difficulty of maintaining balance when squatting to lift.

Medium lifts [75-135 cm (30-54 in.) from the floor] are more desirable
because more strength is available in the lower part of this height
range.

High lifts [135-188 cm (54-75 in.) from the floor] are not recommended,
except when the item to lift weighs less than 5 kg (11 lb).

Muscle fatigue can potentially occur where lifting is required more than once
every 2-5 min. Therefore, the weight for repetitive lifts should be less than
that for occasional lifts. If the lifting rate exceeds six lifts per minute, lifting
should be limited to 20 min or less to allow for muscle recovery. Moving
objects by sliding, rather than lifting, is recommended for repetitive handling
tasks.
5. SAFE LIFTING PRACTICES:

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The following are recommended safe practices for lifting and moving heavy
objects:

Provide good handholds on an object to be carried.

Firmly grip an object to be carried.

Use carts and handling aids to support an object's weight.

Try to minimize the distance that an object is moved.

Carry a load close to your body and at a proper height from the floor.

When standing,
Avoid lifting an item to a height greater than 50 cm (20 in.) or lowering
an item to a height less than 20 cm (8 in.).

Push or pull objects whenever possible, rather than lifting or lowering

objects.

Position storage materials on racks or shelves in ways that make

handling easier (e.g., Place the heaviest objects at elbow height).

Keep your torso in a neutral, upright position whenever possible when

lifting a heavy Load. The neutral position is 0-15. An angle greater than 15
is considered high risk.

Do not twist or bend while lifting or handling a heavy load.

Do not using jerking motions to move a load.

Provide elbow support for long reaches.

Warm up before starting a strenuous task after a less-strenuous task

(e.g., changing From sitting to performing a rapid, dynamic task).

Avoid lowering materials that need to be later lifted.

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Plan movements of material in direct paths (i.e., do not zigzag or

backtrack).

Avoid using stairs when handling heavy objects. As a general rule, if

the use of stairs is unavoidable, keep one hand free to grasp the rail quickly
to prevent falling.

Use an adjustable/tilt able table or a reach extender to reduce forward

bending or Extended reaches.

Use a step stool or low platform to reduce back hyperextension.

Use roller bearings or roller conveyors to reduce twisting.

6. PRE-LIFT INSPECTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS:

Contact your area ES&H Team industrial safety engineer or the Health
Services Department representative for assistance with, or information on,
the following:

Material-handling task hazard analyses.

Lifting techniques.

Mechanical aids.

Methods for determining general weight-limit guidelines.

A worker's ability to perform a task.

BEFORE LIFTING A HEAVY OBJECT:

Inspect the load for sharp edges, slivers, and wet or greasy spots.

Wear gloves (and, if necessary, a long-sleeved shirt) when lifting or

handling objects with sharp or splintered edges. To ensure a good grip on the

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object, make sure the gloves are free of oil, grease, or other slippery
materials.

Inspect the route over which the load is to be carried. The route should

be free of obstruction or spills that could cause tripping or slipping.

Consider the distance over which the load is to be carried. Gripping

power may weaken over long distances.

Size up the load, and make a preliminary lift to be sure the load is

within your capacity. If the load is beyond your capability, get help or use a
mechanical lifting device.
7. TECHNIQUES FOR MOVING AND LIFTING MATERIAL:
In addition to following the precautions, use the techniques given below when
moving or lifting heavy materials.

Two-Hand Squat Lift

Assisted One-Hand Lift

Team Lifts

8. PACKING AND CRATING:

Personnel in the Shipping Department typically pack and crate materials for
offsite shipment. The Shipping Department shall be consulted for guidance
regarding material-handling and transportation safety requirements.
9. MECHANICAL LIFTING DEVICES:
Mechanical lifting devices (rather than manual effort) should be used to lift
and move objects whenever practical. Workers are always encouraged to use
mechanical equipment to lift heavy or bulky objects. Various types of
mechanical lifting devices are described below.

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Hand Trucks

Dollies

Wheelbarrows

Pallet Jacks

Crowbars

10. POWERED LIFTING DEVICES:

Powered mechanical devices shall be used for lifting and moving objects that
are too heavy or bulky for safe manual handling. However, only workers who
are properly trained and qualified are permitted to operate such equipment.
Heavy objects that require special handling or rigging shall be moved only by
qualified riggers or under the guidance of workers specifically trained for such
tasks. The Hazards Control Department conducts training programs and
licenses workers who demonstrate the ability to operate powered industrial
trucks (e.g., fork trucks), cranes, and hoists in a safe manner.
All materials that are loaded onto trucks for over-the-road use shall be firmly
secured to the truck using rope, nylon strap, chain, or other suitable
equipment to prevent shifting during transit.
MAINTENANCE:
All mechanical lifting and moving devices shall be inspected periodically and
repaired as necessary. Under no circumstances shall defective equipment be
used. All lifting equipment shall list its rated load capacity, which operators
shall not exceed. As a safety precaution, check for faulty or defective parts
before lifting a load that is near the load capacity of the equipment.
11. RESPONSIBILITIES:

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"General Worker Responsibilities and Integrated Safety Management," in the

ES&H Manual. Specific responsibilities for work involving heavy lifting and
powered industrial trucks are listed under each title below.
11.1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS:
The purpose of administrative controls is to limit the duration of personal
exposure to the risk factors associated with MMH tasks. Administrative
controls can take many forms, among them are:
Job rotation (rotating the exposed population into less physically
demanding jobs, or jobs that do not tax the same muscle groups as the job
of concern)
Job enlargement or enrichment (providing added task variety, adding
less taxing aspects to the job, and sharing tasks among several muscle
groups)
Increasing the number of people performing the job (thereby spreading
the exposure to a wider population, but reducing individual exposure
duration)
Training in safe handling techniques
Worker selection and placement
11.2 SUPERVISORS:

Evaluate job assignments, and consider ways to redesign tasks to

reduce or eliminate material-handling hazards.

Determine the proper technique or lifting device required and the

necessary PPE for material-handling activities.

Enforce the use of safe lifting techniques.

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Ensure that:

Workers know how to manually move objects in a safe manner.

Workers who routinely lift heavy objects are evaluated by the

Health Services Department prior to initial work assignment.

Only trained and licensed personnel operate powered industrial

trucks, cranes, or hoists.

Ensure that large or heavy objects are moved mechanically and that

material-handling equipment is kept in good mechanical condition.

11.3 JOB DESIGN:
Jobs should be designed to avoid overtaxing the worker physiologically. Heavy
work should be alternated with light work. Wherever possible, work place
should be governed by the person performing the job, rather than by the
supervisor, other employees, or equipment demands. Self-pacing of a job is
almost always preferable to having a work pace imposed on the worker.
In physically demanding jobs, rest breaks become all the more important.
Sometimes short work periods with short rest periods result in better
physiological recovery and lower stress levels than long work periods with
long rest periods. This is a good general principle for scheduling work and
rest to maximize recovery and minimize stress in jobs that require physical
stamina. Job designers need to remember that male or female, young or old,
fit or unfit will probably perform the job at some point in time.
11.4 WORKERS:

Never lift or move objects that exceed your physical limitations.

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Observe all established safety requirements, and exercise good

judgment when lifting or moving heavy objects.

Use appropriate mechanical devices when handling materials.

Obtain and maintain the required licenses to operate cranes, hoists,

and powered industrial trucks.

11.5 HAZARDS CONTROL DEPARTMENT:

Assist supervisors and workers with material-handling issues

Provide formal and informal training courses.

11.6 HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT:

Evaluate a worker's physical ability to perform work that requires

heavy or repetitive lifting.

Issue work restrictions, as necessary.

Provide ergonomic assessments of complex work situations. Ergonomic

assessment includes assisting workers in returning to work after injuryrelated leave or restricted duty.

Conduct formal and informal training.

QUESTIONS:
Describe in brief personnel risk in material handling ?
Highlight precautions for safely lifting & handling materials?
What are different control measures for protection against
injury?

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PERSONNEL RISK IN MANUFACTURING PLANT

INTRODUCTION:
Cement manufacturing process consists principally of grinding and
blending in a definite proportion, a material containing calcium oxide (such
as limestone, chalk, marl) with a siliceous material (such as clay, shale, sand)
along with certain additives or corrective materials (such as bauxite, laterite
iron ore) and when burning the mixture at high temperatures in a kiln. The
resulting clinker is cooled and then ground with gypsum & fly ash to produce
the finished products.
A. MINING UNIT: limestone is extracted through mining and then
limestone is transported by dumper's to stationary crushing plant. Limestone

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is crushed in a mobile crusher and crushed limestone is transported to the

plant.
B. CRUSHING UNIT:
Crushing is done by means of impact crushers. The purpose of
crushing is to prepare the material for grinding in raw mill
C. STACKER UNIT:
The crushed limestone is stacked in a multi layer fashion in two preblending
stock piles. The quality of material is made uniform during reclaiming. The
reclaiming is done by a bridge type scraper reclaimer and the reclaimed
limestone is transported to the raw mill hopper by belt conveyors.
After testing the CaCO3 content in the raw material, the materials are
divided in 3 grades namely1. High Grade
2. Normal Grade
3. Low Grade
D.

RAW MILL UNIT:

The conveyor belt carrying from the raw material passes through a

magnet to remove any iron particles present in the raw material. The raw
material feeding belt is connected to the gravel gate of raw mill so that hot air
used for drying the material should not escape through the feed point. The
material are ground in a raw mill having vertical rollers.
E. PRE-CALCINATION UNIT:
The raw meal is extracted from the CB silo and fed to the top of the
four stage pre-heater with the help of an air lift pump. The feed rate is
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accurately controlled by the 'POLDOS' system. As raw meal flows downward

from first stage to fourth stage it comes in contact with rising and
progressively hotter gases from kiln and the raw meal gets heated from
ambient temperature to about 860C by utilising the sensitive heat of kiln
waste gases.
During the pre-calcination, limestone (CaCO 3) gets converted to lime
(CaO) as per the following reaction.
CaCO3 + Heat = CaO + CO2
As this reaction is highly endothermic, the heat is supplied for
supporting the calcination reaction by firing controlled quantity of pulverised
coal in pre-calciner.
F. KILN UNIT :
From the precalciner the precalcined raw meal enters the kiln. The
kiln is rotary type and has a capacity of 3000 MT/day. The kiln is fired with
controlled quantity of finely ground coal and maintained at a temperature of
1300 to 1400 0C at the firing end. Chemical reactions take place and material
melts to small pebbles (upto 25 mm) called clinker.
G. CLINKER-COOLER UNIT:
From the kiln the hot clinker flows to the reciprocating grate cooler,
where it is effectively cooled to about 80 0C by cross current contact with
cooling air blown by ten cooling air fans. Hot clinker falls on cooler plates
and is transported from one plate to another by the reciprocating movement
of plates.. Beneath these plates the cooling air fans are fixed to cool the

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clinker. The air which gets heated up during clinker cooling is put back in
the kiln and precalciner as secondary and tertiary air for coal combustion.
H. COAL HANDLING UNIT:
Coal received from collieries by trucks is unloaded in the coal yard for
obtaining a uniform quality of coal. It is transferred to the coal stockpiles
where it is stacked and then the coal is crushed in the coal crusher and
transported to raw coal hopper having a capacity of 300 MT in the coal mill
plant by belt conveyors.
I. CEMENT MILL UNIT:
The clinker is extracted with the help of vibro-feeders installed below
the clinker stock-pile

and transported to the cement mill hopper by belt

conveyors. Gypsum and Pozzolona are also stored in cement mill hoppers.
These materials are taken from the hopper in proportionate quantity with
the help of weigh feeders and fed to the cement mills by belt conveyors. Each
cement mill is a double compartment, horizontal ball mill filled with grinding
media. The clinker which is ground with gypsum to a very fine powder to
yield a good quality of cement. Gypsum is added to the clinker while grinding
to the extent of 4 to 6% for dealing the commencement of the setting time.
The fined ground cement from ball mill is removed continuously by carrying
air and separated in high efficiency ESP. The cement collected in ESP is
transported by air slide and air lift, pump and stored in four cement silos .
J. PACKING UNIT:
The cement is taken from the cement silos and transported to the packing
plant with the help of air slides and bucket elevators. The cement is fed to

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the automatic rotary packing machines through rotary screens.

Each

packing machines packs 50 kg of cement in jute/HDPE bags. The filled

bags are transported to trucks loading points with the help of belt
conveyors and loaded into the trucks with the help of shuttle and lifting
conveyors.
COMMON PERSONNEL RISK IN MANUFACTURING PLANT
Hazards in work place need to be eliminated, minimized or effectively
controlled. Following are some of the common methods of eliminating,
minimizing, controlling hazards:

Interlocks and trips.

Guards,

Infra-red sensors with trip mechanism,

Two handed operation to prevent entry of hand in the

hazard zone, Use of handled tools like chisels etc.,

Use of PPE.

Following are some of the common hazards and means adopted

for controlling them:
MECHANICAL HAZARDS
I. Trips: Pipelines crossing passages are a trip hazard. Such trip
hazards of low lying ground level pipe crossings of small size piping
need to be covered with a ramp with zebra markings. Higher level and
bigger size piping need to be provided with step crossing.
II. HEAD BUMPERS: Any obstacle at the head height (less than 6 feet) in
the passage, stairway is a head bump hazard. Such head bumps need

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to

be

either

removed or

prominent

caution board with

yellow

background and black letters to be put up. Further it is very useful to

provide thick sponge padding on the head bump to absorb any impact
of a head bumping on the obstacle.
III. OBSTACLE ACROSS PASSAGES: THERE SHALL BE NO
PROTRUDING obstacles across any passage. All such protruding
obstacles must be removed.
IV. TOE GUARDS AND FIRST ' RAILING FOR PLATFORMS AND
STAIRS' LANDINGS: All platforms and stairs' landings are required to
have toe guards to prevent the foot slipping out of the platform. All
first railings of platforms must be low enough to prevent leg slipping
out of the platform.
V. MACHINE GUARDING: MACHINE GUARDS SHOULD BE
SUCH THAT EVEN a small fi nger should not be able to penetrate
inside. All machine guards to be fixed properly after maintenance.
VI. VERTICAL LADDERS: All vertical ladders to have cat-rings for
protection.
VII. HAMMER AND CHISEL HAZARD: A frequent cause of workshop
activity involves hand and finger injuries due to use of chisel and
hammer for cutting gaskets and sheets. Use of chisel with handle
eliminates this hazard.
VIII. IN-RUNNING NIPS CUTTER MOVEMENTS: These are the
oldest of hazards and still persisting, Nip guards are useful. There are
advanced systems where starting the machine requires both hand

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operation so that no hand enters the in-running nip of moving cutter.

There are also infra red sensor trips, that trip the machine when a
hand enters the hazard zone. All machine operations should be free of
in-running nip/cutter hazard.
CORROSION HAZARDS
(I) PREVENTING CORROSION OF STRUCTURES, LADDERS,
AND RAILINGS ETC: Use of GI structures and piping prevents corrosion
without any painting. For other MS-Structures use of effective sand
blasting and 5-coats of Zinc primer has proved very effective and is now
used widely.
ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
(i) EFFECTIVE

EARTHING:

All electrical equipments to have earthing,

(ii) SEALING OF CABLE ENTRY POINTS: All cable entry points in

flame proof areas need to be sealed by electrical water proofing
compound,
(iii USE ELECTRICAL DUTY TOOLS AND PPE: Only approved ISI
marked electrical duty tools and PPE to be used.
STATIC CHARGE HAZARD
Static charge is the most ubiquitous hazard in flameproof areas. Prevention of
static charge hazard in chemical industries is one of the most
challenging tasks.
AIR EMISSIONS SOURCES
SOURCE

EMISSION

Raw material crushing, grinding----PARTICULATES

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Kiln

operation

and

cooling-----------PARTICULATES,

CO,SO2,NOx,HC
Product grinding and packaging----PARTICULATES
COMMON AIR POLLUTANTS AND THEIR EFFECTS:
1. SUSPENDED PARTICULATE MATTER:
Atmospheric particulate matter is defined to be any dispersed matter,
solid or liquid smaller than 500um. Under various conditions of their
generation, they are also called by other names such as dust, fume ,
smoke and mist. The common diseases caused by the these
particulates are : bronchitis, bronchopneumonia and asthma.
SULPHUR DIOXIDE:
Sulphur dioxide when released in the atmosphere can also convert to
SO3, which leads to production of sulphuric acid. When SO3 is inhaled
it is likely to be absorbed in moist passages of respiratory tract. When
it is entrained in an aerosol, however it may reach to deeper into lungs.
NITROGEN OXIDE
Almost all NOx emissions are in the form of NO, which has no, known
adverse health effects in the concentrations found in the atmosphere,
which in turn may give rise to secondary pollutants, which are
injurious. NO2 may also lead to formation of HNO3, which is washed
out of the atmosphere as acid rain.

CARBON MONOXIDE:
Most of the CO emissions are from transportation sector. Peek
concentrations occur at street level in busy urban centers particularly
when there is no atmospheric mixing as it happens during winter
season. Carbon monoxide interferes with bloods ability to carry
oxygen. It also causes headache and dizziness.
LEAD:

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Lead released from motor vehicle exhaust may affect human

populations by direct inhalations, in which case people living nearest to
highways are at greatest risk. Lead can be ingested also after it is
deposited on the foodstuffs. it may also cause behavioral changes,
learning disabilities and permanent brain damage.
QUESTIONS:
What type of risk involved in a manufacturing plant?

What are different sources of emissions in a cement

manufacturing plant ?

What are health effects due to presence of different

pollutant in a manufacturing plant?

PERSONNEL RISK IN CHEMICAL PLANT

INTRODUCTION
233

The chemical industry is intimately connected with all the basic needs of
society such as food, clothing, housing and health. Its development and
performance depend on several factors directly connected with demographic
dynamics of the country and national policies. For example, the adverse
implications of monsoon failure on agricultural production and, in turn, on the
demand

for

fertilizers

and

pesticides;

or the role of drugs and

pharmaceuticals in providing health care needs to a growing population. The

petrochemical sector which caters to clothing and polymeric consumer
products depends on regular and adequate feedstock availability
which, in turn, is determined by the hydrocarbon resources and government
policies. Notwithstanding these factors, the chemical industry is poised for
an impressive

growth,

aided by a

strong scientific

and industrial

infrastructure, manpower resources and favorable government policies. 5. New

industry initiatives encouraged by government policies and incentives are
generating a vast range of industrial development programmes. Balanced
dispersal of chemical industries is an important consideration not only for
distributing the opportunities but also to avoid overcrowding which would place
unduly heavy strain on social infrastructure and associated facilities.
Problems connected with environmental pollution call for care in the selection
of environmentally acceptable options for mass production of chemical
products. Compared to the situation during the initial phases of its
development, the chemical industry is now increasingly responsive to the
hazards of pollution and is willing to bestow more care in the selection of
process technologies as well as plant sites. The infrastructure corporations of

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various State Governments and Union Territories have also started

planning for functional industrial estates exclusively meant for highly
polluting chemical Industries. The concept of preliminary treatment
at the individual unit level and a well-conceived collection system followed by
combined treatment and disposal of effl uents is gradually getting
accepted in industrial area planning. However, keeping in view the
heterogeneous nature of chemical industry which consists of tiny, small,
medium and large scale sectors, there is need for developing appropriate
strategies for treating effluents and gaseous emissions so that damage to
environment is minimal.
GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR CHEMICAL PLANT SAFETY
Chemical and petrochemical manufacturing activities involving hazardous
chemicals have the potential to give rise to serious injury or damage
beyond the vicinity of the manufacturing area. Some indicative data on
accidents and losses are shown in Annexure I. Practical guidelines are needed
for the protection of the health and safety of plant personnel and population
living outside the concerned manufacturing plant boundary as well as the
protection of the environment. The chemical and petrochemical plants
employing dangerous, explosive, flammable and toxic substances have therefore,
to convince the environmental protection agencies and the Government that
major accident hazards have been recognized and measures have been taken to
prevent accidents and to control and minimize the consequences of those that
do occur. Recent chemical disasters - particularly Seveso, Mexico and Bhopal
- have increased public awareness of potential hazards to the community. This

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has brought a greater urgency to undertake scientific safety assessment of the

existing chemical plant installations.
RISKS IN CHEMICAL PLANT
The types of risks in chemical and petrochemical manufacture can be broadly
classified as under:

Runaway reactions, explosion, fire or such disaster in a plant

handling or producing dangerous to inflammable or toxic substances:

Design faults leading to accidental mixing of chemicals

and

consequent hazards;
Storage of large quantities of dangerous substances vulnerable to
decomposition, explosion or toxic emissions caused by variations in
temperature, pressure or ingress of foreign substances:
Contamination of products intended for human or animal
consumption by toxic products or substances in the same plant;
Accidents during transportation;
Improper waste disposal practices resulting in serious environmental
pollution.
Accidents due to human failure;
The Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Ministry of' Industry,
Government of India, has been concerned about these risk aspects with
particular reference to industrial manufacture of chemicals, pesticides, drugs
and petrochemicals. The following points have been. Identified as crucial for
the safety of these plants:

Hazard identification

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Location of an installation in relation to its subsequent additions and

expansions

Assessment of likely damage

For new chemical plants, safety will have to feature very prominently in
surroundings; process technology selection and implementation. From purely
Technological consideration, safety has clearly a higher priority than economics,
but from techno-economic considerations, safety and economics can be made
compatible by adequate attention to design. By using the concept of inherent or
intrinsic safety, new plants can be so designed that they use relatively safer
raw materials and intermediates or use the hazardous chemicals at
milder operating conditions. Inherently safe design requires the approach of
risk assessment. This is an area wherein expertise available within the
country is very limited and there is urgent, need to develop this capability.

To undertake the inspection and survey of the

hazardous chemicals, petrochemicals and drug
units.

To make specifi c recommendations to control the

hazards in the plants and suggest measures required to
improve the overall safety.

To prepare a check list of items requiring periodical

inspection in such plants.

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QUESTIONS:

What are common risks in a chemical industry?

What is the concern of Government for chemical plant

safety?

238