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Physics of Life Reviews 11 (2014) 377379
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Comment

Cognitive theory and brain fact: Insights for the future of cognitive
neuroscience
Comment on Toward a computational framework for cognitive
biology: Unifying approaches from cognitive neuroscience and
comparative cognition by W. Tecumseh Fitch
Daniel Bowling
Department of Cognitive Biology, University of Vienna, Althanstrasse 14, 1090, Vienna, Austria
Received 10 July 2014; accepted 11 July 2014
Available online 17 July 2014
Communicated by L. Perlovsky

A central challenge in neuroscience is to understand the relationship between the mechanistic operation of the
nervous system and the psychological phenomena we experience everyday (e.g., perception, memory, attention, emotion, and consciousness). Supported by revolutionary advances in technology, knowledge of neural mechanisms has
grown dramatically over recent decades, but with few exceptions our understanding of how these mechanisms relate
to psychological phenomena remains poor.
In his paper Toward a computational framework for cognitive biology: unifying approaches from cognitive neuroscience and comparative cognition [1], Fitch argues for a framework that he believes will ultimately bridge the
explanatory gap between mechanism and cognition. Trained as a cognitive scientist, but steeped in the details of
biology, Fitch pulls together strands from diverse fields, integrating data and theory from psychology, linguistics,
computer science, animal behavior, evolutionary biology, genetics, cognitive science, and neuroscience. The core of
the resulting framework is comparative and computational, and given the length and breadth of the paper, it is worth
summarizing and emphasizing the key points here:
(1) Cross-species comparisons are critical to identifying the neural underpinnings of specific cognitive capacities.
(2) Formal computational models of cognitive capacities provide insight into what neural mechanisms must accomplish.
If a pair of species can be identified that differs in some specific cognitive capacity but is otherwise similar, then
this pair provides a context for identifying the neural underpinnings of the capacity. Further, if this capacity can be
modeled in computational terms, then we will know something about what the neural underpinnings must be doing
(because formal computational models specify what is required to solve a problem at an abstract level that necessarily
applies to any solution). Of course, the problem in applying this framework comes in satisfying points (1) and (2). Few
DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2014.04.005.
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D. Bowling / Physics of Life Reviews 11 (2014) 377379

(if any) species differ in one way that can easily be separated from other differences, and most cognitive capacities
are hard to model at a formal level because our understanding of them is imprecise and often only metaphorical.
Although these challenges may limit the application of a computational and comparative framework in many
instances, Fitch provides an example of how it can work with his Dendrophilia hypothesis, which states that a fundamental cognitive difference between humans and other animals is our capacity to infer hierarchical relations among
elements in patterned stimuli. In formulating this hypothesis, Fitch uses comparative data from pattern learning studies
to argue that inferring hierarchies (or trees) is particularly well-developed in humans, and anatomical and neuroimaging data to argue for the critical involvement of the inferior frontal gyri (IFG; including Brocas area). Further,
because the capacity to parse hierarchical structure is well-defined in computational theory, he is able to suggest that
activity in the IFG may act like the stack in a pushdown automaton (a computational machine capable of parsing
hierarchical structure).
Fitch goes to considerable lengths to integrate Dendrophilia with core insights from modern neuroscience. On a
global level, he focuses on predictive systems and Bayes theorem, arguing that the brain should be conceived as an
evolved predictive engine, rather than a representational Cartesian theater ([2], see also [3]). This idea is integrated
into Dendrophilia through the examples of language and music, where Fitch argues that the ability to make predictions
about hierarchical relationships is a key component of parsing sentences and perceiving rhythm (see also [4]). On a
cellular level, he focuses on the computational power of single neurons, arguing that this is grossly underestimated in
most neural network models and that the tree-like morphology of (many) neurons is important for understanding the
types of algorithms they can implement. The integration of these ideas with Dendrophilia is less successful however,
because although Fitch suggests that tree structure at the cellular level is somehow related to our dendrophilic tendencies, the relationship is not explored. How can we test the idea that neuronal morphology is related to dendrophilia?
One criticism of dendrophilia concerns the neural relevance of hierarchical processing. While it is clear that some
aspects of nervous systems are hierarchically organized integrating multiple streams of input that originate from
points closer to the sensory periphery this simple notion has had limited success in helping us understand psychological phenomena. For example, in perception research, the promise of early neurophysiology that we could march
up the visual hierarchy from V1, to V2, to V3, etc., all the way to a complete mechanistic description of how vision works remains largely unfulfilled [5]. Likewise, although some evidence has started to accumulate showing that
certain aspects of linguistic and musical processing accord with predictions of hierarchical processing, e.g., [68],
this relatively small amount of evidence is surprising given the theoretical centrality of cognitive trees in these domains. Thus, ideas concerning the central importance of hierarchy in cognitive neuroscience remain tipped towards
the theoretical end of the scale (at least for now).
Finally, while facts about the brain are of obvious importance, this paper makes a convincing argument for the
importance of cognitive theory as well. This point might seem obvious, but to the skeptical neuroscientist, weary of
brain-free ideas about cognition, it is an important one. Cognition may be an ill-defined umbrella term comprised by
many pre-scientific or folk conceptions about the mind, but formal models of specific cognitive capacities that make
testable predictions provide much-needed constraints on how neural data is interpreted.
In conclusion, Fitchs computational and comparative framework offers a concrete approach to studying one of
the deepest problems in science, the explanatory gap between brain and cognition. The success of this framework
will ultimately depend on the extent to which our formal computational models actually inform our interpretation of
neural mechanisms. Fitchs argument that they must do so necessarily may be true in theory, but brains are evolved
and messy, making the practical task of linking their functions to elements in simple computation models exceedingly
difficult and potentially misleading. Nevertheless, I find it exciting that we live in a time when a solid framework for
addressing the gap can be formulated, and I hope that the ideas on offer here will inspire empirical attempts to bridge
the gap using comparative and computational methods.
References
[1] Fitch WT. Toward a computational framework for cognitive biology: unifying approaches from cognitive neuroscience and comparative cognition. Phys Life Rev 2014;11:32964 [in this issue].
[2] Mumford D. On the computational architecture of the neocortex. Biol Cybern 1992;66:24151.
[3] George D, Hawkins J. Towards a mathematical theory of cortical micro-circuits. PLoS Comput Biol 2009;5(10):e1000532.
[4] Fitch WT. Rhythmic cognition in humans and animals: distinguishing meter and pulse perception. Front Syst Neurosci 2013;7:68.
[5] Purves D, Lotto RB. Why we see what we do redux: a wholly empirical theory of vision. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, Inc.; 2011.

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[6] Koelsch S, Rohrmeier M, Torrecuso R, Jentschke S. Processing of hierarchical syntactic structure in music. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
2013;110(38):154438.
[7] Pallier C. Cortical representation of the constituent structure of sentences. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2011;108(6):25227.
[8] Honing H. Without it no music: beat induction as a fundamental musical trait. Ann NY Acad Sci 2012;1252:8591.