Title

Author(s)

Proxy humanitarianism : Hong Kong's Vietnamese refugee

crisis, 1975-79

Yuen, Hong-kiu;

Citation

Issued Date

URL

Rights

2014

http://hdl.handle.net/10722/210188

Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License

Abstract of thesis entitled

Proxy Humanitarianism: Hong Kongs Vietnamese Refugee

Crisis, 1975-79
Submitted by

Yuen, Hong Kiu

for the degree of Master of Philosophy
at The University of Hong Kong
in August 2014

Set against the backdrop of the Cold War and the declining British Empire, this thesis
explores how the Hong Kong government handled the Vietnamese refugee crisis of the
1970s. The Vietnamese refugee influx started after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and
temporarily stopped after the Geneva Conference on Indochinese refugees in 1979.
Drawing extensively upon recently declassified files from the National Archives in
London and the National Archives in Maryland, the thesis discusses several important
themes, for example, international concerns about human rights during the Cold War
era, interpretations of humanitarianism, and Hong Kongs autonomy in the age of
decolonization. It argues that Britain exerted its international influence by forcing Hong
Kong to be a first asylum for refugees. Hong Kong played an important role in
demonstrating Britains contribution to resolving the refugee crisis. The colony served as
a place for Britains proxy humanitarianism. This thesis shows that international
expectations of human rights conflicted with local politics in Hong Kong. Unlike
studies that stress Hong Kongs increasing autonomy, this thesis shows that the colonial

authorities played a passive role in the refugee crisis, and the British government still
had the final say on Hong Kongs refugee policy.
This thesis comprises three chapters. The first chapter investigates the case of two
freighters that rescued Vietnamese refugees in 1975 and 1976. The Danish-registered
Clara Maersk arrived in Hong Kong on 30 April 1975, marking the beginning of the
refugee crisis. As the British and Hong Kong governments were uncertain about the
scale of the influx and had different expectations about Britains contribution to ending
the refugee problem, the Clara Maersk incident triggered heated debates. The incident
demonstrates how Britains domestic affairs led to the British governments reluctant
assistance to Hong Kong. The Burmese-registered Ava that arrived in Hong Kong on 6
July 1976 with ninety-eight refugees reveals the unclear responsibility for shipwrecked
refugees rescued by foreign vessels. The Ava incident shows how Hong Kongs refugee
influx was treated as an American problem. The U.S. government saw Hong Kongs
regional role of strengthening Southeast Asian countries involvement in Americas
refugee program. The second chapter investigates the second wave of Vietnamese
refugees. The deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1978 led to an exodus of ethnic
Chinese from Vietnam. The Vietnamese government officially permitted the ethnic
Chinese to leave in return for payment. This chapter examines the pre-arranged vessels
that transported refugees to other countries under collaboration with the Vietnamese
authorities. The final chapter focuses on how the British government relieved Hong
Kongs refugee burden as cheaply as possible. On the one hand, the British government
wanted to show its contribution to resolving the refugee crisis by maintaining Hong
Kongs humanitarian policy. On the other hand, it did not want to take the Vietnamese
refugees because of Britains own immigration problems. By initiating an international
conference on Indochinese refugees, the British government internationalized the
refugee problem and minimized its responsibility for the crisis.

Proxy Humanitarianism:
Hong Kongs Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, 1975-79
by

Yuen, Hong Kiu

B.A. L.U.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Master of Philosophy
at The University of Hong Kong.
August 2014

Declaration
I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgment is
made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report
submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other
qualification.

Signed..
Yuen Hong Kiu

Acknowledgements
There are many people I would like to thank for their support in these two years.
First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to my primary supervisor Professor
John Carroll, who offered professional advice and encouragement throughout the
writing of this thesis. Under his supervision, I learned the determination and
meticulousness required of a professional historian. Without him, this thesis would
have more mistakes than the present one does. I am also very grateful to my
co-supervisor Dr. David Pomfret for commenting on the draft of the thesis. Thanks
also to the two examiners of my thesis, Dr. John Wong and Professor Glen Peterson.
My gratitude also goes to the Department of History of Lingnan University. I
truly appreciate Dr. Mark Hampton for inviting me to his thesis-writers meeting.
Professor Richard Davis and Dr. James Fichter (now at the University of Hong Kong)
were very supportive and recommended me to pursue my postgraduate studies at the
University of Hong Kong when I was an undergraduate at Lingnan.
I am thankful to my extremely nice colleagues and friends in the Department of
History. Zardas Lee was very helpful and generous in reading the first chapter of this
thesis. Aurelio Insisa, Carol Tsang, Chi Chi Huang, Federico Pachetti, Maurits
Meerwijk, Phoebe Tang, and Vivian Kong have provided invaluable insights for my
research.
Finally, special thanks are due to my family and my girlfriend Queenie, who
offered unlimited support and love throughout my postgraduate studies at the
University of Hong Kong.

ii

Table of Contents
Declaration
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents

i
ii
iii

Introduction

Chapter 1
The First Wave of Refugees

12

Chapter 2
The Second Wave: The Pre-Arranged Vessels

46

Chapter 3
The Second Wave: Political and Humanitarian Realities

68

Conclusion

89

Timeline

99

Bibliography

100

iii

Introduction
Perhaps the most famous Vietnamese phrase in Hong Kong is Bt u T Nay,
which literally means from now on and was frequently broadcast on Radio
Television Hong Kong (RTHK) Radio One, one of the most popular radio channels,
in 1988. The Hong Kong government also broadcast the announcement through a
special short wave frequency which would directly reach Vietnam.1 The phrase
comes from the first four words of a Vietnamese announcement about Hong Kongs
screening policy towards Vietnamese refugees:
From now on, those boat people from Vietnam who seek enter Hong Kong due to
economic reasons will be considered illegal immigrants. As illegal immigrants, they
will not have the chance to settle in third country, and they will be detained until
repatriated to Vietnam.2

By broadcasting Hong Kongs new policy on the radio, the government wanted to
warn the Vietnamese that they would face detention and repatriation if they came to
Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, a Vietnamese announcement on the local radio
channel caught Hong Kong peoples attention, and the phrase was often repeated in
movies and television programs. The announcement became so popular that Hong
Kong people even transliterated the Vietnamese phrase into Cantonese: .
This announcement can be traced back to the Hong Kong governments
decision on 15 June 1988 that new Vietnamese arrivals would be subject to screening
conducted by the Immigration Department. Vietnamese who qualified for refugee
status would remain in the detention center for resettlement. Those who were
considered non-refugees would be repatriated to Vietnam.3 As the screening
procedures were controversial, and the policy involved involuntary repatriation, the

South China Morning Post, 2 October 1988.

Quoted in Yuk-Wah Chan, Revisiting the Vietnamese Refugee Era, in Yuk-Wah Chan, ed., The
Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora: Revisiting the Boat People (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8.
3 Janelle Diller, In Search of Asylum: Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong (Washington, D.C.: Indochinese
Resource Action Center, 1988), 2.
1
1
2

policy was widely criticized for being inhumane to the Vietnamese.4 Besides, on 2
July 1982, Hong Kongs closed-camp policy led to criticism of violating human rights.
Unlike those already in Hong Kong, the new Vietnamese arrivals were detained in
closed resettlement centers. They were allowed out only if they chose to leave Hong
Kong.5 But there was no criticism of Hong Kongs refugee policy in the 1970s.
Governor Murray MacLehose later agreed that Hong Kong did not subject to any
criticism on the refugee issues during his governorship.6 Whether voluntary or not,
the Hong Kong government maintained its humanitarian policy of accepting all
Vietnamese arrivals throughout the 1970s.
This thesis is a study of Hong Kongs policy towards Vietnamese refugees. The
refugee crisis began in 1975 and lasted twenty-five years, but the crisis in the 1980s
and the 1990s has received more attention from scholars. Previous studies have
focused on the refugees themselves, for example, their life in Vietnam and the
reasons that motivated them to leave.7 Scholars have studied living conditions within
the refugee camps and refugee adaption in Hong Kong.8 Some have investigated the

On the criticism of Hong Kongs screening policy, see Michael Chugani and Simon Macklin, US
Pressure Groups Want to See Camps, South China Morning Post, 17 August 1988; Screened from
Freedom, South China Morning Post, 4 June 1989; Michael Chugani, Take Detention to Court:
Lawyers Group, South China Morning Post, 11 June 1989; James Freeman and Nguyen Dinh Huu,
Voices from the Camps: Vietnamese Children Seeking Asylum (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989),
87-137; Diller, In Search, 18-33, 56-62; Peter Hansen, Thanh Loc Hong Kongs Refugee Screening
System: Experiences from Working for the Refugee Communities, in Chan, Chinese/Vietnamese, 85-98.
5 On the criticism of the closed-camp policy, see Roy Edmonds, Horror of Closed Camps, South
China Morning Post, 2 January 1983; Closed Camps Not the Answer, South China Morning Post, 7 July
1983; A Staff Reporter, Waiting in Refugee Camps Brings Mental Disorders, South China Morning
Post, 23 August 1983; Kristen Hughes, Closed Camps: Vietnamese Refugee Policy in Hong Kong,
PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985, 211-25.
6 Sir Murray MacLehose, interview by Dr. Steve Tsang, 13 and 26 April 1989; 12, 13, 14, and 29
March 1991, Transcript of Interviews with the Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE,KCMG, KCVO,
DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62), Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82),461,
the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; electronic version accessed from the Fairbank Center for
Chinese Studies Special Collection, Harvard University Library.
7 Ramses Amer, The Boat People Crisis of 1978-79 and the Hong Kong Experience Examined
Through the Ethnic Chinese Dimension, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 40-47; Ronald Skeldon,
Hong Kong's Response to the Indochinese Influx, 1975-93, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 534 (July 1994): 91-105.
8 Daniel Tsang, Visions of Resistance and Survival from Hong Kong Detention Camps, in Chan,
The Chinese/Vietnamese, 99-115; Diller, In Search, 9-62; Freeman, Voices; Joe Thomas, Ethnocide: A
Cultural Narrative of Refugee Detention in Hong Kong (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Joyce Sau-Han, Chang,
2
4

ethnic Chinese exodus from Vietnam to China and Hong Kong.9 Others have
examined how Vietnamese refugees were portrayed in the Hong Kong media and
how public attitudes towards Vietnamese refugees led to the shift of government
policies.10 Some scholars are interested in Hong Kongs refugee policies in the 1980s,
for example, the effectiveness and the influence of the closed-camp policy and the
screening policy.11 There are also journalistic accounts of Hong Kongs Vietnamese
refugee crisis.12
My thesis commences in 1975, after the fall of Saigon on 30 April, and ends in
1979, after the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
conference on Indochinese refugees on 21 July. The thesis is neither a study of
refugees themselves nor an evaluation of refugee policies in the 1980s, but a study of
Hong Kongs involuntary proxy humanitarianism in the international dynamics. As
the thesis will show, Hong Kong played an important role in demonstrating Britains
contribution to resolving the refugee crisis.
This thesis enhances our understanding of Hong Kongs autonomy. Robert
Bickers argues that the Hong Kong government in the nineteenth century was largely

Brenda Ku, Lum Bik, and Betty Ann Maheu, eds., They Sojourned in Our Land: The Vietnamese in Hong
Kong (Hong Kong: Social Work Services Division, Caritas-Hong Kong, 2003); Ravi Lulla,De Facto
Local Integration: A Case Study of Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, PhD dissertation,
University of Hong Kong, 2007; Ocean W.K. Chan, Vietnamese Youth and their Adaptation in
Hong Kong, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 76-84; Yuk-Wah Chan and Terence C.T. Shum, The
Vietnamese Minority: Boat People Settlement in Hong Kong, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 65-75.
9 Ramses Amer, The Boat People, 36-51; Tana Li, In Search of History of the Chinese in South
Vietnam, 1945-75, in Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 52-61; Tom Lam, The Exodus of Hoa Refugees
from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China's Refugee Settlement Strategies, Journal of
Refugee Studies 13.4 (2000): 374-90.
10 Kwok-Bun Chan, Hong Kongs Response to the Vietnamese Refugees: A Study in
Humanitarianism, Ambivalence and Hostility, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 18.1 (1990),
94-110; Sophia Suk-Mun Law, Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong: Visual Image and Stories, in
Chan, The Chinese/Vietnamese, 116-29.
11 Diller, In Search, 64-119; Hughes, Closed Camps; Oxfam, Vietnamese Refugee: Whose Responsibility?
(Hong Kong: Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, 1990); Thomas,
Ethnocide.
12 Barry Wain, The Refused: The Agony of the Indochina Refugees (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981);
Bruce Grant, The Boat People: An Age of Investigation with Bruce Grant (New York: Penguin Books,
1979); Keith St. Cartmail, Exodus Indochina (Auckland: Heinemann, 1983); Robinson Courtland, Terms
of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1998).
3

autonomous, as Hong Kong could evade the British governments undesirable orders
by delaying or hindering implementation.13 David Faure, Leo Goodstadt, and
Norman Miners have examined the tensions between Hong Kong and Britain over
commercial and domestic policies. They argue that the colony was relatively
autonomous after the Second World War.14 Gavin Ure argues that the Hong Kong
governments autonomy in implementing domestic reforms from 1918 to 1958
depended on whether the issues were in the British governments political interests.
The Hong Kong government was autonomous in implementing policy once the
British government indicated the direction.15 Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui have
investigated the Hong Kong governments autonomy under the MacLehose era from
1971 to 1982. They argue that the Hong Kong government was able to implement
social reforms at its own pace.16 Chi-Kwan Mark argues that after the 1967 riots, the
Hong Kong government enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy, and decolonization
was manifested in the mentality of British politicians and officials and in the
changing relationship between the home government and the colonial authorities.17
My thesis challenges the degree of Hong Kongs autonomy. By analyzing
recently declassified governmental records, it shows that Hong Kong lacked
autonomy in handling the influx of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s. The Hong
Robert Bickers, Loose Ties that Bound: British Empire, Colonial Authority and Hong Kong, in
Ray Yep, ed., Negotiating Autonomy in Greater China: Hong Kong and Its Sovereign Before and After 1997
(Copenhagen: Nordic Institute for Asian Studies Press, 2013), 29-54.
14
David Faure, Colonialism and the Hong Kong Mentality (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, Hong
Kong University Press, 2003), 69-85; Leo Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest
and Private Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 50-70; Norman
Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998), 214-22.
15 Gavin Ure, Autonomy and the Origins of Hong Kong's Low-cost Housing and Permanent
Squatter Resettlement Programmes, in Yep, Negotiating Autonomy, 76-77; Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics,
and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
2012), 7-8, 28-43, 159-61, 188.
16 Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui, Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social
Reforms, in Yep, Negotiating Autonomy, 136-38.
17 Chi-Kwan Mark, Lack of Means or Loss of Will? The United Kingdom and the Decolonization
of Hong Kong, 1957-1967, The International History Review 31. 1 (December 2009): 46; On the 1967
riots, see Ray Yep, The 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: The Domestic and Diplomatic Fronts of the
Governor, in Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, eds., May Days in Hong Kong: Riots and Emergency in 1967
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 21-36.
4
13

Kong government failed to resist the British governments orders to accept the
refugees.
Through studying the Vietnamese refugee crisis, this thesis enhances our
understanding of humanitarianism. According to the mission statement of the oldest
major humanitarian organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), it is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively
humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict
and other situation of violence and to provide them with assistance.18 In short, the
ICRCs definition of humanitarianism is to help those who are in need with
maximum effort. By examining the humanitarian operations carried out by non-state
actors such as the ICRC and the UNHCR, scholars have focused on how
humanitarianism operates in different circumstances and the consequences of
humanitarian intervention. For example, Fiona Terry has demonstrated how
humanitarian aid can lead to even more harmful results, Janice Stein has discussed
the accountability of humanitarianism, and Michael Barnett and Jack Synder have
examined strategies adopted by humanitarian organizations.19 Scholars have also
been interested in the interconnection between politics and humanitarianism.
Although humanitarian organizations often claim to be impartial, neutral, and
apolitical, politics always influence the ways humanitarian action is carried out.20 As
Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss argue, it is neither possible nor desirable to
separate humanitarianism from politics.21
The Mandate and Mission of the ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross-ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/index.jsp; accessed on 16 June 2014.
19 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2002); Janice Stein, Humanitarian Organizations: Accountable - Why, to Whom, for What and
How?, in Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, eds., Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008): 124-42; Michael Barnett and Jack Synder, The Grand
Strategies of Humanitarianism, in Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question, 143-71.
20 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2011).
21 Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (London:
5
18

While these studies focus on non-state actors, my thesis pays more attention to
how state actors such as Britain and Hong Kong perceived and implemented
humanitarianism. My thesis also contributes to the debates on implementing
humanitarianism. Barnett has summarized a few questions that are frequently
discussed in the field, for example, the ethics and universality of humanitarianism.22
These debates emerged in the Hong Kong refugee crisis. For instance, given the
desperate situation of the Indochinese refugees, the Hong Kong government was in
a dilemma of continuing its policy of accepting refugees when this humanitarian
policy encouraged a further outflow of refugees. The governments policy became
even more ambivalent when first-asylum countries such as Malaysia and Thailand
pushed the refugees back to sea, and more refugees changed their destination to
Hong Kong. As reflected in the local press, Hong Kong people opposed accepting
more refugees and wanted the government to adopt tougher measures to deter them.
The thesis demonstrates how humanitarianism was challenged by Hong Kongs
domestic affairs. As it shows, the British government instructed the Hong Kong
government to accept the refugees on humanitarian grounds despite opposition from
the Hong Kong people and the colonial authorities.
My thesis also demonstrates how state actors used the language of
humanitarianism to achieve their political agenda. During the refugee crisis the U.S.
government wanted to attain its humanitarian goal by pushing Hong Kong to
follow the international practice advocated by the UNHCR. Thus the Hong Kong
case could strengthen Southeast Asian countries involvement in the refugee
problem.23 Throughout the 1970s crisis, the British government also frequently used
Routledge, 2011), 11.
22 Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested, 112-14, 124-27.
23 Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to American Consul (Hong Kong), Central Foreign
Policy Files, 1973-1977, (CFPF, 73-77), Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of
Sate (Electronic Telegram), Access to Archival Databases, The U.S. National Archives and Records
6

the term humanitarian grounds to justify its instructions to the Hong Kong
government. As Didier Fassin argues, moral sentiments have become an essential
force in contemporary politics: they nourish its discourses and legitimize its
practices.24
A study of Hong Kongs Vietnamese refugee crisis also contributes to the
recent interest in human rights concerns during the Cold War, especially the so-called
Second Cold War. In recent years, the role of human rights during the Cold War
has received more attention from historians, especially during the 1970s.25 For
example, scholars have investigated how the U.S. government incorporated human
rights into foreign policy.26 Some have examined the diplomatic influence of the
human rights movement on specific places, for example, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia,
and South Africa.27 Hong Kongs refugee crisis provides another useful case study of
how international concerns about human rights in the 1970s influenced other
countries. My thesis shows how international expectations of human rights
conflicted with local politics. Hong Kongs refugee crisis thus helps to de-center

Administration, 21 July 1976.

24 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2012), 1.
25 Samuel Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal: The 1970s as a Turning Point in Human Rights
History, in Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013): 2.
26 For examples of human rights influence in the U.S. foreign policy, see Barbara Keys, Congress,
Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy, Diplomatic History 34.5 (November 2010):
823-51; Barbara Keys and Roland Burke, Human Rights, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra
Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 486-502;
David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The
Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, Diplomatic History 28.1 (January 2004): 113-43;
Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, Journal of American
History 86.3 (1999): 1231-50; Rosemary Foote, The Cold War and Human Rights, in Melvyn P.
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 445-65.
27 Brad Simpson, Human Rights Are Like Coca-Cola: Contested Human Rights Discourses in
Suhartos Indonesia, 1968-1980, in Eckel and Moyn, Breakthrough,186-203; Jan Eckel, Under a
Magnifying Glass: The International Human Rights Campaign Against Chile in the Seventies, in
Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 321-41; Simon Stevens, Why South Africa?: The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in
Britain in the Long 1970s, in Eckel and Moyn, Breakthrough, 204-25; William Schmidli, The Fate of
Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2013).
7

the Cold War. As Fabio Lanza and Jadwiga Mooney argue, we can gain insight by
focusing on state policies and on the roles of... organized actors, on people and
groups whose activities were related to but not directly dependent on Cold War state
policies at the highest levels.28 The thesis also makes linkages among international
concerns about human rights and Hong Kongs refugee crisis. In short, it contributes
to the global synthesis of the Cold War.
My thesis also sheds light on British history in the 1970s. In 1962, Dean
Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, declared that: Great Britain has lost an Empire,
and has not yet found a role.29 Acheson was wrong: notwithstanding its declining
power, Britain certainly had a role. Matthew Grant has concisely summarized
Britains role during the Cold War: To pursue national interests wherever they might
be found. The increasing sense of powerlessness of global prominence slipping
away led to British politicians placing prestige high on the list of national
priorities. Maintaining British power, pursuing prestige was a way of battling against
the fear of decline.30 Britain suffered from economic decline and immigration
problems after 1945.31 Historians argue that, because of Britains diminishing power,
the government sustained its imperial strategy and international influence in an
affordable way and drew support from its allies. Despite its economic decline after
the Second World War, Britain fulfilled its obligations and commitment around the

Jadwiga Mooney and Fabio Lanza, Introduction: De-Centering Cold War History, in Jadwiga
Mooney and Fabio Lanza, eds., De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change (London, 2013),
3.
29 Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson and the Special Relationship: The West Point Speech of
December 1962, The Historical Journal 33.3 (September 1990): 599.
30 Matthew Grant, Introduction: The Cold War and British National Interest, in Matthew Grant, ed.,
The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975 (New York: Continuum,
2009), 1, 3.
31 On Britain domestic affairs after the Second World War, see Alec Cairncross, The British Economy
since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); David Childs, Britain since 1939: Progress and Decline (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2002); Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen
Lane, 2012); Jim Tomlinson, The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain (Harlow: Longman,
2000).
8
28

world by collaborating with Europe, the U.S., and the United Nations.32
As the thesis shows, Hong Kong served as a place to fulfill Britains
humanitarian obligation. Compared to British decolonization and foreign affairs such
as the political unrest in Iran and Rhodesia, the Vietnamese refugee exodus was less
important to the British government. But Britain had to show its contribution to
resolving the refugee crisis in order to maintain its international influence. As the
British government expressed its political calculation about the refugee crisis, it was
important not only that we ourselves contribute, but also that we be seen to do so,
especially by the Americans.33
My thesis demonstrates how a global refugee crisis led to conflicts within
various British bureaucracies. As John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner argue, because of
the growing dependence between society and the outside world, it becomes difficult
to disentangle international and domestic policies. They term this as intermestic
policy.34 As shown in the thesis, the refugee policy was a mixture of foreign and
domestic policies. It increased the number of actors in the policy-making process
and led to conflicts between different departments which stood for their interests.
The refugee crisis became even more complicated when it involved not only the
British government, but also the Hong Kong government.

For examples of Britain foreign policies after 1945, see Anne Deighton, Britain and the Cold War,
1945-1955,in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol.
I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 112-32; Ashley Jackson, Empire and Beyond: The
Pursuit of Overseas National Interests in the Late Twentieth Century, The English Historical Review
122.499 (December 2007): 1350-66; Helen Parr, Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC:
Finding a Role in British Foreign Policy, 1964-67, Contemporary British History 20.3 (August 2006):
403-21; Klaus Larres, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1990, in Immerman and Goedds, Oxford,
141-57; Simon Smith, Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956-71,
Contemporary British History 21.1 (February 2007): 1-23.
33 Restricted Draft Letter from Evan Luard to Dr. Shirley Summerskill (Parliamentary
Under-Secretary, Home Office), FCO 40/995, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese
Boat People, 2 March 1978.
34 John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 6.
9
32

Lastly, the thesis seeks to answer the question: What did Vietnamese refugees
mean to Hong Kong people, the Hong Kong government, and the British
government? Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan argue that humanitarian concerns are
often difficult to separate from political agendas, and are far from being neutral or
impartial. They term this as calculated kindness.35 Despite the British
governments claim of the domestic constraints for not accepting Vietnamese
refugees, it accepted refugees from Chile, South Asia, and Uganda. Political choices
were made by the British government as to which refugees from certain regimes were
more desirable. It is interesting to see that the Hong Kong government, as the
political documents show, justified its different policies towards Vietnamese refugees
and Chinese illegal immigrants by emphasizing racial differences. Similar to Hong
Kong peoples attitudes today towards immigrants from mainland China, Hong Kong
people in the 1970s did not want the Vietnamese to come because of the deprivation
of social welfare and the economic competition that they believed would result.
Despite the Vietnamese refugees status, Hong Kong people often compared and
contrasted the different government policies towards Vietnamese refugees and
Chinese illegal immigrants.
The thesis comprises three chapters in chronological order. Based on archival
materials from the National Archives in London and the National Archives in
Maryland, newspapers in the Hong Kong Public Records Office and the University
of Hong Kong library, the thesis shows how Britain exerted its international
influence by using Hong Kong to show its contribution to solving the refugee crisis.
Hong Kong served as a place for Britains proxy humanitarianism. The first chapter
investigates the case of two freighters that rescued Vietnamese Refugees in 1975 and

Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to
the Present (New York : Free Press, 1986), xiii-xviii, 209-19.
10
35

1976. It starts with the Danish-registered Clara Maersk that arrived in Hong Kong
with over 3,700 Vietnamese refugees on 4 May 1975, four days after Saigon fell to
the Viet Cong government. The Clara Maersk incident marked the beginning of the
first wave of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. As the British and Hong Kong
governments were uncertain about the scale of the influx and had different
expectations about Britains contribution to ending the refugee problem, the incident
triggered heated debates between both governments and even within the British
government. The incident demonstrates the British political agendas for determining
which refugees were more desirable to receive and how bureaucratic conflicts led to
the British reluctant assistance to Hong Kong. The Burmese-registered Ava that
arrived in Hong Kong on 6 July 1976 with ninety-eight refugees reveals the unclear
responsibility for shipwrecked refugees rescued by foreign vessels. Still, the Hong
Kong government was forced to accept the refugees under pressure from the British
and American governments. But Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and
Singapore had successfully rejected Vietnamese refugees before. Thus this chapter
seeks to answer the question: Why Hong Kong? The Ava incident shows how Hong
Kongs refugee influx was treated as an American problem. The U.S. government saw
Hong Kongs regional role of strengthening Southeast Asian countries involvement
in Americas refugee program. Because it was a British colony, the Americans
considered Hong Kong the easiest place to pressure in the region.36
Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated in 1978, leading to an exodus of ethnic
Chinese from Vietnam. The Vietnamese government officially permitted the ethnic
Chinese to leave in return for payment. The second chapter examines the organized
vessels that transported refugees to other countries under collaboration with the
On the U.S. governments view on Hong Kongs role in the refugee crisis, see Telegram from
American Consul (Hong Kong) to Secretary of State (Washington), American Embassy (London),
American Embassy (Rangoon), U.S. Mission Geneva, CFPF, 73-77, 24 July 1976.
11
36

Vietnamese authorities.37 This was the second wave of refugees. The pre-arranged
vessel Huey Fong docked outside Hong Kong waters with 3,300 refugees on 23
December 1978. The Huey Fong incident shows how the Hong Kong government had
no autonomy in refusing the refugees entry. The British government also made its
humanitarian decision without taking the political implications for Hong Kong into
account. Although the Hong Kong authorities established the principle of first port
of call as the normal practice to Vietnamese arrivals after the Ava incident in 1976,
the British government responded to the UNHCRs appeal by breaking Hong Kongs
normal practice. Hong Kong paved its way for the future refugee crisis when it failed
to refuse the Huey Fong from entering.
The final chapter focuses on how the British government relieved Hong Kongs
refugee burden as cheaply as possible. By the end of 1979, Vietnamese arrivals
continued to increase and reached almost 70,000.38 For the Hong Kong government,
the colony had reached its maximum capacity for absorbing more refugees. The
government also felt that it was penalized for maintaining the humanitarian policy of
accepting Vietnamese refugees when countries that took the hard line had more
rapid refugee resettlement rates. The newly elected Conservative government in
Britain saw the political need to relieve Hong Kongs burden, but was unwilling to
accept the refugees. On the one hand, the British government wanted to show its
contribution to resolving the refugee crisis by maintaining Hong Kongs
humanitarian policy. On the other hand, it considered Vietnamese refugees less
desirable to settle in Britain. The result was the UNHCR conference on Indochinese
refugees on 21 July 1979. By internationalizing the refugee problem through the
The word organized was adopted by the Hong Kong Security Branch after the Huey Fong entered
Hong Kong in January 1979; see Report on the Arrival of the M.V. Huey Fong in Hong Kong,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Nations (Political) Department, Series 58 (FCO 58), FCO
58/1747, Vietnamese refugees on the MS Huey Fong, Hong Kong, 23 February 1979.
38 Security Branch: Refugee Division, Monthly Statistical Report (Arrivals and Departures), Fact
Sheet: Vietnamese Migrants in Hong Kong at February 1997 (Hong Kong: Government Secretariat, 1997).
12
37

conference, the British government minimized its responsibility for the refugee crisis.

13

Chapter One
The First Wave of Refugees
The U.K. reaction was that their own ability to take in to resettle, was limited. The
U.K. is not traditionally a host country; its a rather over-filled country as it is. But
within that limitation I think they were helpful, yes, directly, they were active in
encouraging other host countries to help.
Hong Kongs reputation in the world had steadily increased over a long period of time
and it was very important that this increased respect shouldnt become tarnished. These
refugees, so-called, were a highly emotive subjective which the international media
focused on. Certainly brutal treatment of them would not have been in Hong Kongs
wider interests.
- Murray MacLehose, Governor of Hong Kong (1971-1982)1

In 1991, Governor Murray MacLehose recollected the British governments attitudes

towards the Hong Kong governments predicament during the Vietnamese refugee
crisis in an interview with historian Steve Tsang. MacLehose, however, did not tell
the whole story. He did not mention the lack of financial relief from Britain. The
British assistance was not as helpful as he claimed. Pressure from the British and
American governments were the more important reasons why the Hong Kong
government did not treat the refugees brutally.
On 4 May 1975, the Danish freighter Clara Maersk arrived in Hong Kong with
approximately 3,000 Vietnamese refugees.2 This marked the beginning of an influx
of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. Their responses to the first wave of refugees
reveal how the British and Hong Kong governments viewed the Vietnamese in the
beginning. Using the cases of two freighters, the Clara Maersk and the Ava, this
Sir Murray MacLehose, interview by Dr. Steve Tsang, 13 and 26 April 1989; 12, 13, 14, and 29
March 1991, Transcript of Interviews with the Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE,KCMG, KCVO,
DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62), Governor of Hong Kong
(1971-82),464-65, 462, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; electronic version accessed from
the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies Special Collection, Harvard University Library.
2 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 3 May 1975; Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hong Kong Department, Series 40 (FCO
40), the National Archives, London, FCO 40/651, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong
Kong into Other Countries, 5 May 1975.
1

14

chapter explores the tensions between Hong Kong and Britain in handling the influx
of Vietnamese refugees. The Clara Maersk incident reflected the British governments
ambivalent attitudes towards the Vietnamese refugees. Britain saw its humanitarian
obligations for the refugees, but was unwilling to contribute to the refugee crisis
because of its own worsening domestic situation. This led to different expectations
from the British and Hong Kong governments. The Ava incident shows the regional
role that Hong Kong played in the U.S. governments effort to internationalize the
refugee problem and establish a consistent policy towards the refugees. The
Americans considered Hong Kong as a breakthrough to strengthen the Southeast
Asian countries involvement in solving the refugee problem. Within the context of
Britains domestic situation and its diminishing international power in the 1970s, this
chapter argues that the British government saw Hong Kong as a place to show the
U.S. government its contributions to resolving the refugee crisis.

The Clara Maersk and the First Wave of Refugees

To the Hong Kong government, humanitarianism was not an absolute principle in
the Vietnamese refugee crisis. On 5 April 1975, before the fall of Saigon, the British
and Hong Kong governments had reached a consensus that it would be difficult on
humanitarian grounds to refuse admission if the Vietnamese refugees made their
way to Hong Kong after Saigon fell. The Hong Kong government had two concerns.
First, it would be difficult for Hong Kong people to understand why the Vietnamese
refugees were allowed to stay, while Chinese illegal immigrants, who usually had
some family connections with the Hong Kong people, were repatriated to mainland
China. Second, the government worried that it might be in a situation where those
refused entry to the United States would be left stranded in Hong Kong to add an
unwelcome burden to the limited resources. Colonial Secretary Denys Roberts
15

stated clearly Hong Kongs position: It may be easier to get public support later (if
necessary) for restrictive measures, if Hong Kong had been seen to be doing its bit
to help the genuine refugees in the initial stages.3
The Hong Kong government and the local press were ambivalent about letting
the Vietnamese refugees land when the Clara Maersk docked at Hong Kong with
3,750 refugees on 4 May.4 On the one hand, they knew that it was impossible to
refuse entry. On the other hand, they were uncertain how long the refugees would
stay in Hong Kong, a city with limited resources and an increasing population. A
senior government official expressed his concern in an interview with the South China
Morning Post: On humanitarian grounds, we just cant turn the refugees away. But
how long can we look after them?5 Editorials in Chinese newspapers agreed. The
Sing Tao Daily thanked the captain of the Clara Maersk for rescuing the Vietnamese
boatpeople. But it also emphasized Hong Kongs increasing population and
suggested that the government should endeavor to find other countries to resettle
the refugees.6 The Kung Sheung Daily News agreed that respecting human rights was a
British tradition. Although Hong Kong did not have enough resources for the
refugees to stay permanently, the government should assist them on moral grounds.7
The colonial government was conscious of the potential risk of upsetting Hong
Kong people because of the more generous policy towards Vietnamese refugees
compared to Chinese illegal immigrants and thus emphasized the difference between
Vietnamese and Chinese. Four days after the Clara Maersk arrived, the Sing Tao Daily,
Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/651, 5 April 1975.
4 When the Clara Maersk landed at Hong Kong on 4 May, the Hong Kong government noted that
there were approximately 4,500 refugees on board, but newspapers later reported that there were
3,750. Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/651, 5 May 1975; Kung Sheung Daily News , 7 May 1975; South China Morning
Post, 7 May 1975; Wah Kiu Yat Po , 13 May 1975.
5 South China Morning Post, 4 May 1975, 1.
6 Sing Tao Daily , 7 May 1975. 2.
7 Kung Sheung Daily News, 7 May 1975, 2.
3

16

one of the colonys largest newspapers, commented that although the Chinese
refugees and the Vietnamese refugees were the same in nature, Chinese refugees
were repatriated while Vietnamese refugees were permitted to stay. It also
emphasized the contributions of Chinese refugees to Hong Kong.8 In response, the
Hong Kong government explained the difference between Vietnamese refugees and
Chinese illegal immigrants in an interview with the South China Morning Post:
Comparisons cannot be made between the situation facing war refugees from
Vietnam and that of illegal immigrants sent back to China. The Vietnamese
refugees were a special situation where humanitarian assistance had to be
considered. There was no war and no persecution in China, and the large number
of mainland Chinese who visited Hong Kong with legal travel documents each year
showed the free movement situation.9

Debating Britains Assistance to Hong Kong

John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner suggest three types of U.S. governments foreign
policies: crisis, non-crisis security, and intermestic policies. Intermestic policy is a
combination of international and domestic policies. For intermestic policy, the
increased bargaining in the policy-making process leads to tensions between different
departments that stand for their own interests.10 Refugee policy is intermestic
policy, as it influences foreign interests and the domestic situation. The same
observation fits the British governments refugee policy. Because of the inseparable
nature of the intermestic policy, within the executive arena, tensions arose between
different departments that stood for their own interests.

Sing Tao Daily, 8 May 1975.

South China Morning Post, 16 May 1975.
10 John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 6, 18-22.
8
9

17

Different expectations about the level and form of British assistance to Hong
Kong put pressure on relations between London and Hong Kong. The debate also
reveals the British governments political agendas for determining what kinds of
refugees were more desirable to accept. To the Hong Kong government, the
reluctance of the British government to provide financial relief and resettlement
places discouraged other countries from helping the colony. It was difficult to seek
assistance from potential host countries when Britain was reluctant to contribute.
Although the British government saw its humanitarian obligations to the refugee
crisis, it provided limited financial relief and resettlement places because of its own
worsening domestic economy and immigration problems. These different
expectations and conflicts led to heated exchanges and debates between London and
Hong Kong.
Financial relief to Hong Kong became an acrimonious debate when the
Ministry of Overseas Development (MOD) deemed the Hong Kong government
unqualified to receive financial assistance from the British government. On 15 April
1975, the FCO and the MOD had discussed the financial contribution to Hong
Kong when they predicted that the Vietnamese would come. Laurence OKeeffe,
head of an FCO sub-branch, suggested that if substantial numbers of Vietnamese
refugees came to Hong Kong, the British government should help relieve Hong
Kongs financial strain.11 The MOD, however, disagreed: the FCO must exclude any
thought that we should volunteer an offer to the Hong Kong government. As the
MOD explained to OKeeffe, Hong Kong is among the richest of the developing
territories and not normally regarded as a suitable recipient of aid funds.12
Confidential Letter from P.L. O'Keeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Pearson (Ministry of Overseas Development), FCO 40/651, 15 April
1975.
12 Confidential Letter from C.R.A. Rae to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/651, 21 April 1975.
11

18

To Governor MacLehose, the lack of financial aid from Britain made refugee
resettlement in Hong Kong more difficult. He was unsatisfied with the limited
financial relief provided by Britain. If there was not enough financial support,
potential host countries would have to make up the rest of the relief and would
decrease their refugee intakes. Besides, local newspapers might make unkind
comparisons if the relief was small.13 The MOD revised its policy towards Hong
Kong after the Clara Maersk arrived, but the financial support was still limited. On 29
May 1975, the MOD decided to contribute 20,000, which was only two percent of
Britains financial relief for humanitarian purposes in Vietnam and Cambodia. The
MOD did not want to contribute more than the total costs, but it promised to
reconsider the financial assistance if the refugees stayed longer.14
Opinion about the 20,000 of financial relief to Hong Kong was divided within
the British government, but domestic problems such as the European Communities
membership referendum stopped the debate. Like the Hong Kong government, the
FCO thought that the financial relief was inadequate, but it gave two reasons why the
Hong Kong government should not ask for an increase at this stage. The first was
that MOD Minister Judith Hart was working on the European Communities
membership referendum, and the FCO did not want to distract her. The FCO also
worried that other countries might notice the British inadequate financial support if
the debate continued. This might encourage other countries to provide financial
relief instead of resettlement places.15

Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/652, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries,
26 May 1975.
14 Confidential Letter from Ministry of Overseas Development to Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary,
Aid to Refugees from Vietnam, FCO 40/653, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong
Kong into Other Countries, 29 May 1975.
15 Personal note from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong), FCO 40/653, 3 June 1975.
13

19

The MOD and the Hong Kong government were unsatisfied with the financial
relief. The MOD insisted that Hong Kong be financially responsible for the
Vietnamese refugees after approving extra 50,000 relief for the refugees in Hong
Kong on 24 June 1975. The MOD was clear that the 50,000 was the last financial
assistance to the colony. Thereafter, the Vietnamese refugees would be like the
refugees from Red China, the responsibility of the Government of Hong Kong.16
The MOD was also unwilling to settle the payment, which annoyed the Hong Kong
government. On 6 August, two months after the MOD had promised the 20,000 in
relief, Assistant Political Adviser Charles Drace-Francis complained that the Hong
Kong government had not yet received any payment: All we have received so far is a
typically astringent Treasury letter to [Financial Secretary] Haddon-Cave, informing
him that he will have to produce detailed evidence that he has not embezzled the
money and you can imagine what sort of reaction that has provoked!
Drace-Francis wanted the Treasury to investigate the problem soon, thus he could
silence or at least quieten some of the cynics.17

Resettlement
The resettlement of Vietnamese refugees shows the British governments political
preferences for what kinds of refugees it wanted to take. United Nations High
Commissioner (UNHCR) scholars Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan argue that the
U.S. governments refugee policy after 1945 was determined by ideology. It preferred

Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Williams (Ministry of Overseas Development), Resettlement of
Vietnamese Refugees at Present in Hong Kong, 16 June 1975; Letter from D. Williams to Mr. King
(Minister), FCO 40/653, 24 June 1975.
17 Confidential Letter from C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Hong Kong) to P. L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and
Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Vietnamese Refugees, FCO 40/653,
6 August 1975.
16

20

to accept refugees from left-wing regimes rather than those from right-wing ones.18
As the chapter will show, however, the British governments preferences for
accepting refugees were contrary to the wishes of the U.S. government.
The American government awaited the British governments response to the
Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong, which led to unsatisfactory responses towards
refugee resettlement from other countries in the first week. When Saigon fell on 30
April, the U.S. sent those Vietnamese with American connections to Guam to await
resettlement. Although the Hong Kong government hoped that the refugees could
be sent shortly to Guam, the U.S. government rejected Hong Kongs request, as
refugees had already strained the resources there. The Americans also argued that the
refugees in Guam were different from those on the Clara Maersk. Those in Guam
had been rescued by a planned and monitored operation in Saigon, whereas the
refugees on the Clara Maersk took the initiative to flee from Vietnam and were picked
up by a Danish freighter.19 Countries such as West Germany, Australia, New Zealand,
Denmark, and Sweden all deferred their decisions on resettling the refugees in Hong
Kong.20
Nor was Britain willing to take the Vietnamese refugees, which explains why
other countries deferred their decisions. On 7 May, MacLehose asked the British
government to take the first step towards accepting the refugees because of the
unfavorable responses from other countries and the potential adverse opinion from
Hong Kong people. He believed that if people saw the British governments effort to
resettle the refugees, they would believe that Britain was endeavoring to solve the

Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness : Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to
the Present (New York : The Free Press, 1986), 209-19.
19 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/651, 5 May 1975.
20 Attached Notes on Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe
(Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Male, Lord
Goronwy-Roberts, FCO 40/651, 15 May 1975.
18

21

problem. Thus, it would be easier for people to accept the fact that Chinese illegal
immigrants were repatriated yet Vietnamese refugees could stay.21 The Home Office
(HO), however, was unwilling to commit more, except those 100 refugees who were
already agreed to consider.22 Still, even these 100 offers were not met by the end of
1975.23
Despite the unsatisfactory responses in the first week, more refugees were soon
resettled in other countries as time went on. By 4 June, a month after the Clara
Maersk disembarked, the U.S. had conditionally approved 1,141 boatpeople for entry;
Canada offered 300 resettlement places; France processed 400 boatpeople, 111 of
whom were sent to France.24 Denmark, as the registered country of the Clara Maersk,
agreed to take 100 refugees.25 By the end of 1975, only 161 refugees remained in the
camps in Hong Kong. Over 3,434 refugees were sent to Australia, Canada, France,
and the U.S.26 All in all, the resettlement process of the boatpeople on the Clara
Maersk was quite successful.
Still, tensions arose between the British and Hong Kong governments. On 6
August 1975, as Britain continued to hesitate, Assistant Political Adviser Charles
Drace-Francis pressured the British government by predicting that other countries
might question what Britain has done to help Hong Kong. He told the FCO that
the Chinese unofficial members had made a sarcastic comment about the British
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/652, 7 May 1975.
22 Confidential Telegram from James Callaghan (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Kingston,
FCO 40/652, 6 May 1975.
23 Copy of the Letter from N.V. Morley-Fletcher (General Secretary, the British Council for Aid to
Refugees) to D.W. Berry (Migration and Visa Department, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office),
FCO 40/654, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries, 25
November 1975.
24 Confidential Letter from Alan Donald (Hong Kong) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian
Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/653, 4 June 1975.
25 Unclassified Telegram from Andrew Stark (Copenhagen) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/652, 22 May 1975.
26 Copy of Letter from Mr. J.M. Rowlands (Director of Immigration, Hong Kong), Agenda of the
Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees to Robin Jandren (Hong Kong
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, 19 November 1975.
21

22

government at a recent Executive Council meeting, as Britain had not accepted any
Vietnamese refugees so far. What in fact, Drace-Francis asked, is the Home
Office doing about the applications? He worried that anti-Whitehall feeling would
emerge. The uncertain future of the Vietnamese refugees had already led to several
administration problems in the camps. Any arrangement which could send the
refugees to Britain would keep the refugees happy.27
The Hong Kong governments discontent was manifested in the Legislative
Council, and the government used the local press to show its discontent. At the
Legislative Council meeting on 13 August, Dr. Sze-Yuen Chung, the leading Chinese
unofficial member, asked Acting Colonial Secretary Michael Clinton how many
Vietnamese refugees the British government had agreed to take so far. Clinton
replied that the United Kingdom Government has not given any indication that
they will accept any.28 In order to balance the answer, Clinton mentioned the
70,000 financial relief given by Britain.29 But Clintons response was unconvincing.
One day after the Legislative Council meeting, the Standard suggested that the
financial assistance was a substitute for the resettlement places: Britain has shown
no indication so far that it will take any of the Vietnamese refugees. Instead,
Britain had donated $770,000.30 The Hong Kong government was aware of the
adverse press report. Clinton reminded the FCO that it would be a pity if there
would be negative feeling towards Britain simply for the sake of 75 odd entry visas
to the UK. If Britain could take some of the refugees in Hong Kong, it would help

Confidential Letter from C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Hong Kong) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and
Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/653, 6 August 1975.
28 Hong Kong Hansard: Report of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1975 (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1975), 13 August 1975, 998-99.
29 Confidential Letter from M.D.A. Clinton (Acting Colonial Secretary) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong
and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, , 20 August 1975.
30 Hong Kong Standard, 14 August 1975, Attached Press Cutting in Confidential Letter from M.D.A.
Clinton to P.L. OKeeffe, FCO 40/654, 20 August 1975.
27

23

persuade other countries to take the boatpeople.31

Tensions existed not only between Hong Kong and Britain, but also within the
British government. The HO refused to accept the Vietnamese refugees. On the
morning of 12 August, the FCO approached the HO to accept seventy-one
Vietnamese refugees who expressed their preference to live in Britain. The HO
rejected the FCO on the same day, as only two out of seventy-one refugees had ties
or connections in Britain and some of them had not chosen Britain as their first
choice for resettlement. Therefore, the HO needed to consider whether it should
take only some of them.32 Laurence OKeeffe expressed the FCOs helplessness:
Despite repeated prodding the Home Office are still non-committal and cannot
even say when their Ministers will take a decision I am fully aware of the
difficulties which the continuing delay presents for you in Hong Kong; equally, you
will appreciate that it puts us in diplomatic baulk and open to attack eg the Times
article on 12 August.33

The HOs condition for relaxing the policy left the Hong Kong government in
an embarrassing situation to convince other countries to take the refugees. On 29
August, the HO relaxed its policy by asking the FCO to guarantee that if the HO
agreed to take those seventy-one refugees in Hong Kong, the rest would not choose
to go to Britain. Britain was not the place of last resort for the refugees, and there
was not much hope to take more refugees except those who were going to
consider.34 Not surprisingly, the FCO rejected the HOs request to make a guarantee,
as this would discourage other countries from taking the refugees in Hong Kong.
Unless and until the refugees wanting to come here are allowed to do so, we are
effectively unable to assist Hong Kong in any new diplomatic initiative to seek homes

Confidential Letter from M.D.A. Clinton to P.L. OKeeffe, FCO 40/654, 20 August 1975.
Letter from P.L. Taylor (Home Office) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/653, 12 August 1975.
33 Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Assistant Political Adviser, Hong Kong), FCO
40/653, 15 August 1975.
34 Letter from P.L. Taylor (Home Office) to P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/654, 29 August 1975.
31
32

24

(in the United States or elsewhere) for the rest.35 The FCO was clear that no
promise could be made to guarantee that the refugees would not choose Britain. The
Hong Kong government had explained in the Legislative Council that the refugee
influx was not merely a problem for Hong Kong, but an international responsibility.36
The HO, however, thought that Britain had no responsibility for the refugees.
The comparison made by the British press between Britains policies towards
Chilean and Vietnamese refugees showed the British governments political
preferences for accepting refugees. As Loescher and Scanlan argue: Generosity has
been real, but it has also been selective. It has extended no further than politics and
the law have permitted.37 Paul Strauss, a reporter for the Guardian, reported that the
Hong Kong government was irritated to learn the British government had accepted
about 2,000 Chilean refugees who came to Britain because of the political
persecution by the right-wing Chilean government. In the meantime, more than
1,700 Vietnamese refugees who escaped from the Viet Cong regime remained in
Hong Kong, yet the British government had not taken any of them. This article
recalled the same comparison made by Member of Parliament Sir Frederic Bennett
in May 1975. The FCO and the HO were conscious of this news article.38 Seventeen
days after the news article was published, the HO granted permission to 150
Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. Like the financial relief, the HO emphasized
that the admission of these 150 refugees was the final contribution from Britain, and
Restricted Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to P.L. Taylor (Home Office), FCO 40/654, 12 September 1975.
36 Hong Kong Hansard: Report of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong , Session 1975 (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1975), 13 August 1975, 998.
37 Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated, 210.
38 Attached Press Cutting from the Guardian, 16 September 1975, Restricted Letter from R.B. Janvrin
(Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Martin, Mr.
Milton, Mr. OKeeffe, FCO 40/654, 24 September 1975; Bennett, Vietnamese Refugees, 21 May 1975;
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 892 [1975], cols. 409; Bennett, Vietnamese Refugees, 23 May
1975. Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 892 [1975], cols. 694-95; Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an
Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives During the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass,
1999), 289-90.
35

25

the British government would not be responsible for the rest of the refugees in
Hong Kong.39
The limited financial aid has to be understood within the domestic context of
Britain in the 1970s. Britain was in an economic depression throughout the 1970s,
and the unemployment rate rose from 2.8 percent in December 1972 to 5.1 percent
in December 1975. By the end of 1975, the unemployed population was 977,600.40
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1975 was 3 percent lower than 1973. The
current balance of the British government reached the peak deficit of 3200 million
in 1974 and 1500 million in 1975.41 Public spending in 1975 reached 51.5 billion,
consisted of almost 50 percent of the GDP.42 Major domestic industries such as car
manufacturing collapsed in 1975 because of competition from Japan and the U.S.43
Continuing social unrest in Northern Ireland damaged the British governments
credibility.44 Providing financial relief to Hong Kong became an even more sensitive
issue when Britain was struggling with the costly financial contribution to the
European Community in 1975.45
The Admission of British passport-holders from previous imperial subjects
such as Cyprus, India, Kenya, and Uganda created serious immigration problems. For
example, the arrival of 30,000 Ugandan Asian refugees from 1972 to 1973, and
10,000 Cypriot nationals after 1974 caused enormous antipathy towards immigrants
in Britain.46 This explains why the British government only provided limited
Letter from P.L. Taylor (Home Office) to P.L. OKeeffe (Foreign and Commonwealth Office),
FCO 40/654, 3 October 1975.
40 James Denman and Paul McDonald, Unemployment Statistics from 1881 to the Present Day,
Labour Market Trends 104.1 (January 1996): 7, 11.
41 Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 206-9.
42 Christopher Chantrill, Total Public Spending Expenditure-Charts-GDP Debt in 1975,
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/index.php?year=1975; accessed 11 April 2014.
43 Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 2012),
260-63.
44 David Childs, Britain since 1939: Progress and Decline (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 205-6.
45 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987): 307-24.
46 For examples of Britains immigration population and adverse opinions towards immigrants in the
39

26

financial aid and resettlement places, as the government did not want to risk arousing
public anger. The governments decision for taking Chilean rather than Vietnamese
refugees shows its lack of enthusiasm in taking people from Communist regimes.
Almost all the refugees on the Clara Maersk were resettled within a year, and
only fifteen of them remained in Hong Kong by the end of 1976. Among these
fifteen, six were waiting for the U.S. governments permission to resettle in America,
and the other nine were waiting for the Vietnamese authorities approval to return
home.47 After the Clara Maersk incident, the Hong Kong government was aware of
the risk of accepting refugees without any guarantee of resettlement and thus
changed its policy. Vietnamese refugees rescued by foreign vessels were allowed to
land at Hong Kong only if the registered country of the vessel assumed
responsibility for the refugees.48 However, it was still uncertain that what the Hong
Kong government could do if the registered country of the vessel did not provide
any assurance of taking the refugees.

The Ava: The First Wave of Vietnamese Refugees as an American

Problem
The number of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong dropped from 4,000 to only 65

1970s, see Kushner and Knox, Refugees, 265-73; Unclassified Telegram from P. Morgan (United
Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to S.F. Howarth (Washington), FCO
40/1103, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong, 3 July 1979.
47 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/720, Aid from UK for Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, 27 October 1976.
48 For examples of shipwrecked refugees rescued by foreign vessels after the Clara Maersk incident,
see Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 8 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from James Callaghan (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
to Hong Kong, 8 May 1975; Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Male, Mr. Ennals, 9 May 1975; Confidential
Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
40/651, 14 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Frederick Warner (Tokyo) to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/652, 16 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Anthony Crosland
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva,
FCO 40/719, Aid from UK for Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, 14 July 1976.

27

by the end of 1976, less than a year after the Clara Maersk arrived.49 It seemed that
the refugee problem in Hong Kong had been solved. However, the arrival of the Ava,
a Burmese-registered vessel, in 1976 shows how vulnerable the Hong Kong
government was in refusing entry to the refugees. Because of the Ava incident, the
policy of first-scheduled port of call with the UNHCR guarantee of assuming
responsibility for the refugees became the usual practice of the Hong Kong
government in future cases involving Vietnamese refugees rescued by foreign vessels.
On 7 July 1976, the Ava was refused permission to unload ninety-eight refugees
in Hong Kong.50 Thus the ships captain planned to continue on to Japan with the
refugees on board. The Hong Kong government, however, suddenly announced that
the Ava would delay its departure, and soon permitted the refugees to stay. In an
interview with the South China Morning Post on 6 August, Director of Immigration
Martin Rowlands explained that the reason why Hong Kong had originally denied
the boatpeople entry was to arouse the attention of the international community.51
According to the South China Morning Post, the Ava delayed its departure from Hong
Kong because the vessel was waiting for the U.S. governments decision on resettling
the refugees.52 The local press reported that the Hong Kong government granted
the refugees temporary asylum, as the UNHCR had assumed responsibility for
refugee resettlement and accommodation.53
Recently declassified governmental files in the British National Archives,

Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/720, 13 November 1976.
50 According to the governmental records, the total number of the shipwrecked refugees on the Ava
was ninety-eight, while the local press noted that there were ninety-nine on board. Confidential
Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 July 1976;
Confidential Telegram from Terrence OBrien (Rangoon) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/719, 8 July 1976;
Sing Tao Daily, 7 July 1976; South China Morning Post, 7 July 1976; Hong Kong Standard, 7 July 1976.
51 South China Morning Post, 6 August 1976.
52 South China Morning Post, 30 July 1976.
53 Sing Tao Daily, 31 July and 5 August 1976; Kung Sheung Daily News, 2 August 1976; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 4
August 1976; South China Morning Post, 6 August 1976.
49

28

however, tell another story. The Hong Kong government refused entry to the
Vietnamese boatpeople because the Burmese government was unwilling to take any
responsibility for them. Moreover, the Hong Kong government had never been
interested in allowing the refugees to land, even when the UNHCR assumed all
responsibility for the Vietnamese. In fact, pressure from the U.S. government forced
the Hong Kong government to compromise in the case of the Ava.

The Situation in Hong Kong

Different from the previous positive attitudes towards the Vietnamese refugees on
the Clara Maersk in 1975, the local press opinions about refugees changed one year
later. The adverse opinions towards the Hong Kong governments policies over
Chinese illegal immigrants and Vietnamese refugees changed the governments
attitudes towards the Ava. The Cree incident triggered local criticism of these two
different policies. On 28 May 1976, the shipmaster of the Cree, a British vessel,
picked up nineteen refugees on the way from Hong Kong to Singapore, but the
Singaporean government refused entry to the refugees. As a result, the Cree returned
to Hong Kong on 10 June, and the Hong Kong government permitted the refugees
to land on humanitarian grounds.54
The local press considered Vietnamese refugees the same as Chinese illegal
immigrants. The Hong Kong governments benevolence provoked criticism from the
local Chinese press. For example, the Hong Kong Times, Kung Sheung Evening News, and
Sing Tao Daily all criticized the government for repatriating Chinese illegal immigrants,
but allowing the Vietnamese to stay. They insisted that the colonial government
should stop repatriating Chinese refugees.55
Confidential Letter from C.D.S. Drace-Francis (Hong Kong) to R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong and
Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/719, 18 June 1976.
55 Attached Hong Kong Press View 9-15 June 1976, Viet Refugees Treated Better than China
54

29

The FCO was aware of the wider implications of this criticism, especially from
those newspapers deemed pro-Taiwan. The FCO suspected that these criticisms of
the policy were orchestrated by the Free China Relief Association, which was
established in Taiwan.56 Although only thirty-seven Vietnamese refugees remained in
Hong Kong by April, what the Hong Kong government worried about was not the
number of refugees, but the risk of growing criticism from the local population.
This might make the repatriation policy of Chinese illegal immigrants more difficult
to apply.57 The worries about pro-Taiwan forces were not entirely unjustified. After
the Communist Victory in 1949, many Chinese who failed to escape to Taiwan came
to Hong Kong. The Double Tenth Riots in 1956, organized by pro-Taiwan civilians,
demonstrated how influential the pro-Taiwan local Chinese could be.58 Although it
had been twenty years after the riots, a significant number of Hong Kong people still
supported Taiwan. Thus the FCO worried that the different policies towards
Vietnamese refugees and Chinese illegal immigrants might trigger adverse opinions
from local Chinese.

Wider Implications of the Ava Incident

On 6 July 1976, local shipping agents warned the Immigration Department that the
Burmese-registered Ava, which had a regular Rangoon-Hong Kong-Japan-Rangoon
sailing route, would arrive in Hong Kong waters the next day with ninety-eight
Vietnamese refugees who had been rescued at sea. Hong Kong was the Avas

Refugees, Letter from R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to
C.D.S.Drace-Francis (Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong), FCO 40/719, 1 July 1976.
56 Letter from R.B. Janvrin (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to
C.D.S.Drace-Francis (Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong), FCO 40/719, 1 July 1976.
57 Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office) to Mr. Male and Lord Goronwy-Roberts, FCO 40/719, 7 July 1976.
58 On the Double Tenth Riots in 1956, see Carol Jones and Jon Vagg, Criminal Justice in Hong Kong
(Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2007), 293-375; Lawrence, K.K., Ho, Policing Hong Kong, 1842-1969:
Insiders Stories (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2012), 75-99.

30

first-scheduled port of call. Governor MacLehose was clear that the Hong Kong
government would assume no responsibility for these refugees, and requested the
Burmese government and the shipping agents to make suitable arrangements, as the
Hong Kong government usually had with non-British vessels after the Clara Maersk
incident. However, according to the information gathered by the Hong Kong
government, the Burmese government rejected the Hong Kong governments
suggestion and wanted to dispose of the unwanted passengers as quickly as
possible. Since the shipmaster was concerned about his responsibility, the Ava
docked outside Hong Kong waters on 7 July awaiting further instruction from
Burma.59
The Burmese government did not want to bear any responsibility for the
Vietnamese refugees on the Ava. Two days later, the Hong Kong government
suggested airlifting the refugees to Rangoon in cooperation with the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Thereafter, it would
be up to the Burmese government to decide the onward movement of the refugees
or to determine whether they could settle in Burma.60 The Burmese government
appeared not to be interested in accepting the refugees and thus sought help from
the UNHCR. On 12 July, 1976, to facilitate the vessel to dock at Hong Kong, the
UNHCR guaranteed that it would be responsible for the refugees if the refugees
were permitted to disembark at Hong Kong.61 Besides, as reported by colonial
officials, the Burmese government plainly rejected the Hong Kong governments
suggestion by telling the ICEM that it would never allow the Vietnamese to set foot
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 6 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Rangoon, 8 July
1976; Confidential Telegram from Terrence OBrien (Rangoon) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/719, 8 July
1976.
60 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/719, 9 July 1976.
61 Restricted Telegram from United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 12 July 1976.
59

31

in Burma. Because of the rejection by Burma, the Hong Kong government decided
not to issue an immigration clearance to the Ava, and instead declared that the
shipmaster was responsible for removing the refugees. .62 Therefore, the vessel was
unable to unload its cargo in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong government understood the wider implications of the Ava
incident. The government preferred to turn down the UNHCRs request, for
allowing the refugees to land would encourage further attempts by the Vietnamese.63
Colonial Secretary Denys Roberts was unwilling to permit the refugees to stay even
temporarily. He had three main concerns: the potential risk of attracting more
Vietnamese refugees to Hong Kong, the adverse local opinion about the different
policies towards Chinese illegal immigrants and Vietnamese refugees, and the Hong
Kong governments distrust of the UNHCR.
Roberts feared that shipmasters would consider Hong Kong a safe dumping
ground for unloading the rescued refugees, and the UNHCR would use Hong Kong
as a holding centre for resettling refugees from elsewhere. Relaxing the policy
towards the Vietnamese might lead to a refugee-trafficking business carried out by
Hong Kong fishermen. His forecast came partially true in 1978, though this business
was not run by the fishermen. Secondly, Roberts found it even harder to defend the
policy of repatriating Chinese illegal immigrants if he allowed the Vietnamese
refugees to land, as the majority of the refugees were ethnic Vietnamese who did not
speak Cantonese and had no family connections in Hong Kong. Unlike the
Vietnamese refugees, illegal immigrants from Guangdong shared the same language
with the local people and usually had some family connections in Hong Kong. Lastly,

Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/719, 16 July 1976.
63 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/719, 8 July 1976.
62

32

Roberts distrusted the UNHCR. He recalled the UNHCRs failure in persuading the
Vietnamese government to take back the refugees who wished to return home. He
thought that the UNHCR had made little practical contribution in resettling the
refugees in the previous year, and was skeptical whether the UNHCR could find
enough countries to take the refugees within a tolerable time-scale. He also
questioned why the UNHCR did not take responsibility for the refugees to Burma,
yet asked Hong Kong to reconsider its decision.64 The Hong Kong government and
the FCO agreed that Hong Kongs response should be the same as before. For
example, when the American vessel Oregon, a Norwegian vessel, and the Swedish
vessel MS Japan came to Hong Kong with Vietnamese refugees on board in 1975, the
government had also considered the refugees as the registered countries
responsibility.65

Pressure from the Americans

The first wave of Vietnamese refugees took place against the backdrop of U.S.
foreign policy and Anglo-American relations in the 1970s. Human rights became
incorporated into U.S. foreign policy, for example, the anti-Vietnam War campaign
and the human rights campaigns against Argentina and Chile. Scholars argue that
human rights made inroads into the U.S. government policy-making process during
the Cold War.66 As Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann puts it, the U.S. invoked human rights
Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/719, 13 July 1976.
65 On the Hong Kong governments practice on the refugees rescued by foreign vessels in 1975, see
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
8 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from James Callaghan (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to
Hong Kong, 8 May 1975; Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean
Department) to Mr. Male, Mr. Ennals, 9 May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose
(Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/651, 14 May 1975; Confidential
Telegram from Frederick Warner (Tokyo) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/652, 16
May 1975; Confidential Telegram from Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to
United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva, FCO 40/719, 14 July 1976.
66 On examples of the U.S. foreign policy about human rights, see Barbara Keys, Congress,
64

33

as moral and political leverage against individual states and their governments....
Human rights became a central argument for the United States claims to political
hegemony in the world.67 Human rights also played a significant role in the
Vietnamese refugee crisis.
Recent studies highlight the U.S.s political calculations in its human rights
policies. William Schmidli argues for the regional importance of Argentina in the U.S.
effort to strengthen Latin Americas internal security against communism.68 Jan
Eckel asks Why Chile? He argues that the U.S. deliberately chose Chile to pressure
on human rights issues, as the campaigns could only exert pressure on states that
wanted to be considered as internationally democratic. Thus dictatorships such as
Cambodia and North Korea never became the targets for the campaigns. The U.S.
saw Chile as a pariah of the Western camp that exposed the regime to almost
unbridled worldwide criticism in the first place.69
The U.S. government utilized the principle of humanitarianism to share its
burden with other countries, and it took advantage of Hong Kongs humane
attitudes towards the refugees. Why Hong Kong? The U.S. needed a breakthrough in
Southeast Asia in order to establish a consistent practice towards refugees rescued by
foreign vessels. From 1975 to 1976, countries such as Singapore and Thailand
frequently rejected foreign vessels that rescued refugees.70 Hong Kong, however, was
Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy, Diplomatic History, 34.5 (November 2010):
823-51; Barbara Keys and Roland Burke, Human Rights in Richard H. Immerman and Petra
Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 486-502;
Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, Journal of American
History 86.3 (1999): 1231-50; Rosemary Foote, The Cold War and Human Rights, in Melvyn P.
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 445-65; William Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human
Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
67 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Introduction: Genealogies of Human Rights, in Stefan-Ludwig
Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
20-21.
68 Schimidli, The Fate, 6-7.
69 Jan Eckel, Under a Magnifying Glass: The International Human Rights Campaign Against Chile in
the Seventies, in Hoffmann, Human Rights, 326, 338-39.
70 Attached Lists Concerning Boats Containing Vietnamese Who have Arrived at Various Ports in

34

more humane and had no record of refusing any foreign vessels that had refugees on
board to dock.
Recently declassified files in the U.S. National Archives show that the U.S.
influenced Hong Kongs refugee policy. The U.S. saw Hong Kong as a soft option
in the region.71 Governor MacLehose did not deny this. In his 1991 interview, Steve
Tsang asked MacLehose whether the Vietnamese refugee crisis was primarily a
Vietnamese problem and an American problem. Tsang then elaborated by asking
whether the American influence on Hong Kongs export trade led to better treatment
of Vietnamese refugees. MacLehose equivocally replied that it was not in those
specific terms. MacLehose soon turned to the importance of maintaining Hong
Kongs reputation in the world during the crisis.72 Although MacLehose denied that
the U.S. influence on Hong Kongs export trade influenced the refugee policy, he did
not answer whether there was any American pressure on Hong Kongs refugee
problem.
Apart from the Americans political calculations in Hong Kong, the first wave
of refuges needs to be understood within the context of the special relationship
between Britain and the U.S. Anglo-American relations were tense in the 1970s. For
example, Britains refusal to send troops in the Vietnam War strained their relations.
Britains entrance into the European Economic Community in 1973 distanced Britain
from the U.S. Denial to the American governments request to access the British
bases in Cyprus during the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur war in 1973 posed difficulties
for Anglo-American relations. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 revealed that
both the U.S. and Britain had different considerations of international affairs. In June
East Asia, Confidential Letter from J.D.R. Kelly (Deputy Director, Protection Division) to Eric W.
Callway (United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva), FCO 40/720, 26 July 1976.
71 The term soft option was adopted by the Hong Kong Security Branch after the first pre-arranged
vessel arrived in Hong Kong with 3,300 refugees in 1979; see Chapter Two footnote 1.
72 MacLehose, Transcript of Interviews, 462.

35

1976, the sterling crisis in which the Bank of International Settlements and the U.S.
Central Bank offered a 5.3 billion loan to Britain under the harsh condition of
repaying it within six months marked the lowest point of Anglo-American relations
and greatly damaged Britains prestige.73
But the deteriorating Anglo-American relations in the 1970s did not mean that
the British government necessarily decided unfavorably against the U.S. government
in the Ava incident. Despite these tensions, Britain would not alienate the U.S. on
other issues, such as the Ava incident. The British governments compromise on this
incident made more sense when Britain was simultaneously preparing to negotiate
with the International Monetary Fund, an international financial organization in
which the U.S. had the largest voting power, to resolve its sterling crisis.74 The Ava
incident shows that the Anglo-American relationship was still special throughout the
1970s.
On 16 July 1976, after the Hong Kong government rejected the UNHCRs
request to accept the refugees, the UNHCR saw the alternative of letting the Ava go
to Japan, which was the vessels next port of call.75 The FCO found this suggestion
feasible, as the Japanese government had allowed another vessel that had rescued
Vietnamese refugees to disembark with the UNHCRs guarantee of eventual
resettlement. The Japanese authorities would allow the refugees to land if the
UNHCR gave the same assurance.76 Two days after the Japanese governments reply,
For examples of the strained Anglo-American relations in the 1970s, see Alan Dobson,
Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of
Superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995), 139-47; Callaghan, Time, 415-19.
74 Benedict Brogan, The Debt Crisis of 1976 Offers a Vision of the Blood, Sweat and Tears Facing
David Cameron, Telegraph, 22 October 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/benedict-brogan/6410123/The-debt-crisis-of-197
6-offers-a-vision-of-the-blood-sweat-and-tears-facing-David-Cameron.html; accessed 18 February
2014; Callaghan, Time, 413-50.
75 Confidential Telegram from James Bottomley (United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
Geneva) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 15 July 1976.
76 Secret Telegram from Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office,) to Hong Kong,
15 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from Michael Wilford (Tokyo) to Foreign and
73

36

the UNHCR granted full assurances to Japan for the refugees on the Ava.77 The
agents of the Ava and the Burmese consulate general also gave a written assurance to
the Hong Kong government that the vessel would sail to Japan after unloading its
cargo. The Hong Kong government estimated that the Ava would be ready to leave
on 26 July.78
But the Americans disagreed with Hong Kongs policy toward the Ava. The U.S.
government emphasized that the refugee problem must now be dealt with on a
more international basis. The international community could not continuously
refuse the refugees entry until it accumulated enough refusals to get acceptance of
the refugees from the U.S.79 The Americans found that they were single-handedly
tackling the Indochinese refugee problem, and no Southeast Asian countries were
willing to become involved in the crisis.80 The U.S. government informed the British
ambassador that the Ava incident was a test-case for following the correct policy
which could have UNHCR involvement. Sending the refugees to Burma or Japan
was a short-sighted policy. What Hong Kong should do would be to allow the
refugees to land and to cooperate with the UNHCR. As Hong Kong was the first
port of call, it was important to establish a consistent policy. The U.S. government
emphasized that the UNHCR had been more effective since then, because the
UNHCR initially saw the Vietnamese influx as a problem for the U.S.81 The

Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 20 July 1976.

77 Confidential Telegram from James Bottomley (United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
Geneva) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719, 22 July 1976.
78 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/719,
23 July 1976.
79 Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to U.S. Mission Geneva, American Consul (Hong
Kong), American Embassy (Rangoon), The United States, Department of State , Central Foreign
Policy Files, 1973-1977, (CFPF, 73-77), Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of
Sate (Electronic Telegram), Access to Archival Databases, The U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration, July 14 1976.
80 Telegram from American Consul (Hong Kong) to U.S. Mission Geneva, Secretary of State
(Washington), CFPF, 73-77, 16 July 1976.
81 Confidential Telegram from Peter Ramsbotham (Washington) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/719, 16 July 1976.

37

UNHCR should be encouraged rather than discouraged if it is to play an

effective role. Hong Kong should let the UNHCR to tackle the problem.82
The Hong Kong government, however, found the Americans criticism
impractical and even untrue. Colonial Secretary Denys Roberts asked the U.S.
government to give some clearer indication of the practical steps that the U.S.
would take to find permanent homes for the refugees, as so far the Americans had
showed no indication to take the refugees. It was crucial to have a coherent
multi-national policy, as any action taken by the Hong Kong government would be
only a small part. Roberts doubted whether the U.S. government could give any
assurances that other countries would grant permanent resettlement to the refugees.
Hong Kong would continue to refuse the Vietnamese to land without any assurances
about refugee resettlement.83 Robert found it difficult to consider the principle of
first-scheduled port of call to be an international practice when other countries such
as Singapore did not follow it.84
The U.S. government feared that the Hong Kong governments continued
refusal of the Ava would set a bad example for the Southeast Asian countries. The
U.S. put pressure on the British government by emphasizing Britains concerns about
human rights and separating the British governments decision from the Hong Kong
governments. On 21 July 1976, the U.S. government complained to the British
ambassador in Washington that Hong Kongs refusal of the Ava led to disastrous
results, as shipmasters had started ignoring shipwrecked refugees. We cannot
believe the Hong Kong authorities are implementing the instructions of your
government when they refuse 99 Vietnamese refugees. We plead with you to
Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to American Consul (Hong Kong), U.S. Mission
Geneva, American Embassy (London), CFPF, 73-77, 17 July 1976.
83 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/719, 19 July 1976.
84 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/719, 16 July 1976.
82

38

clarify the position of the British government and to set an example for a policy of
first-asylum for shipwrecked refugees.85
The U.S. government saw the Hong Kong case as a breakthrough to convince
countries in the region to be the port of first-asylum. Hong Kong had an important
regional role to strengthen Southeast Asian countries involvement in the refugee
problem. The American consul general in Hong Kong confirmed Hong Kongs role
in the refugee influx: If the British would not cooperate in solving the refugee
problems in this way it was unlikely anyone else in the region would.86 The U.S.
government agreed that the humanitarian goal of establishing an international
practice should take priority over quick solution of resettlement of those aboard
Ava.87 As Southeast Asian governments were following the Ava incident, the U.S.
government believed that Hong Kongs practice would move these countries in the
direction of a more forthcoming policy.88 The U.S. ambassador in Singapore
supported the consul generals view and worried that Hong Kongs continuing refusal
of the refugees would stiffen the already rigid refugee policy of Singapore.89
Not surprisingly, the U.S. government interrupted Hong Kongs plan for urging
the Ava on to Japan in order to establish an international practice in the region. On
23 July, three days before the Avas estimated departure date, the U.S. government
protested against Hong Kongs plan of sending the Ava to Japan. The U.S. found this
plan incomprehensible, and insisted that other countries would use Hong Kongs
case as an excuse to reject the refugees. Although the Japanese government was

Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to American Consul (Hong Kong), CFPF, 73-77,
21 July 1976.
86 Telegram from American Consul (Hong Kong) to Secretary of State (Washington), American
Embassy (London), American Embassy (Rangoon), U.S. Mission Geneva, CFPF, 73-77, 24 July 1976.
87 Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to American Consul (Hong Kong), CFPF, 73-77,
21 July 1976.
88 Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to U.S. Mission Geneva, CFPF, 73-77, 26 July 1976.
89 Telegram from American Embassy (Singapore) to Secretary of State (Washington), CFPF, 73-77,
26 July 1976.
85

39

willing to solve the Ava incident, the Hong Kong government would set a most
unfortunate precedent.90 The Americans worried that Hong Kongs policy would
place the principle of political asylum in jeopardy, since other countries would
follow suit.91 Therefore, the U.S. government asked the FCO to stop the Avas
journey to Japan because there was no assurance that other governments would take
the refugees.92 According to the British ambassador in Washington, the U.S.
government felt extremely disturbed by the Hong Kong governments continued
refusal to permit entry for the refugees. It would be disastrous if the vessel was
turned away by the Hong Kong government, as other shipmasters would turn a
blind eye to the shipwrecked refugees.93
Under pressure from the U.S. government, the FCO eventually instructed the
Hong Kong government to compromise. The FCOs attitudes on the Ava were
softened by the U.S. government. In view of the close American concern about
the Vietnamese refugees, the Hong Kong government should delay the Avas
departure.94 One day after the FCOs instruction to delay departure, the U.S. consul
general in Hong Kong also reported that he gathered the strong impression that
the acting governor was under considerable pressure to relent.95 The FCO finally
reached a consensus that the Hong Kong government should allow the refugees on
the Ava to land for the risk of setting a bad precedent.96 On 26 July, the FCO

Telegram from American Consul (Hong Kong) to Secretary of State (Washington), CFPF, 73-77,
23 July 1976.
91 Telegram from Secretary of State (Washington) to American Consul (Hong Kong), American
Embassy (London), U.S. Mission Geneva, CFPF, 73-77, 23 July 1976.
92 Confidential Telegram from Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office,) to Hong
Kong, FCO 40/719, 23 July 1976.
93 Confidential Telegram from Peter Ramsbotham (Washington) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/719, 23 July 1976.
94 Confidential Telegram from Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office,) to Hong
Kong, FCO 40/719, 23 July 1976.
95 Telegram from American Consul (Hong Kong) to Secretary of State (Washington), American
Embassy (London, American Embassy Rangoon, U.S. Mission Geneva, CFPF, 73-77, 24 July 1976.
96 Confidential Letter from P.L. OKeeffe (Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office) to Mr. Larmour, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, FCO 40/719, 26 July 1976.
90

40

instructed the Hong Kong government to grant permission for the refugees to land.
Because the FCO was impressed by the U.S. governments and the UNHCRs
concerns that other shipmasters might not pick up the refugees at sea in the future if
the Ava was unable to disembark at Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government had a
strong moral obligation to allow the Vietnamese to land.97 As a result, the refugees
finally landed at Hong Kong on 3 August.
In fact, disputes between the Hong Kong government and the U.S. government
continued even after the Ava had disembarked. The U.S. government took the
refugees on the Ava under the Conditional Entry Program (P-7 program). As part of
the requirements of the P-7 program, the Americans asked Hong Kong to provide
two years re-entry rights for the refugees. The Hong Kong government refused the
U.S. governments request by explaining that the refugees were only supposed to stay
in Hong Kong temporarily. To the Hong Kong government, the U.S. had made
inconsistent requests, because the Americans had not mentioned the re-entry rights
before. Notwithstanding Hong Kongs protest, forty-five refugees, who were
supposed to resettle in the U.S. through the P-7 program, would not be allowed to
move to the U.S. without assurances from the Hong Kong government. Under the
threat of not taking the refugees, Hong Kong reluctantly provided re-entry
assurances.98
Confidential Telegram from Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hong
Kong, FCO 40/719, 26 July 1976.
98 On the debates about re-entry rights, see Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong)
to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose
(Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 July 1976; Confidential Telegram from
Anthony Crosland (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/719, 27 July 1976;
Confidential Letter from L.M. Davies (Secretary for Security, Hong Kong) to J.A.B. Stewart (Hong
Kong and Indian Ocean Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 6 September 1976;
Confidential Letter from Charles T. Cross (Consul General of the United States of America Hong
Kong) to C.P. Haddon-Cave (Acting Chief Secretary, Government Secretariat), 2 September 1976;
Letter from the Colonial Secretariat (Hong Kong) to Charles T. Cross (Consul General, American
Consulate, Hong Kong), 3 September 1976; Confidential Letter from J.A.B. Stewart (Hong Kong
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Male, 14 September 1976; Restricted
Telegram from Peter Ramsbotham (Washington) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/720,
1 October 1976.
97

41

Significance of the Ava Incident

The Ava incident demonstrates how Britain used Hong Kong to fulfill its
humanitarian obligations. As the FCO admitted, it was important not only that we
ourselves contribute, but also that we be seen to do so, especially by the Americans.
The Americans had assisted us over the Ugandan Asians, and there may come
another day when we shall want to seek their help with some other refugee problem
where we have a special responsibility.99 The Ava was not the only vessel landed at
Hong Kong because of the American pressure. On 3 May 1978, the
British-registered Sibonga arrived in Bangkok with thirty Vietnamese refugees.100
According to the principle of first-scheduled port of call, the vessel was supposed to
unload the refugees in its first port of call, Bangkok, and then move to Hong Kong.
According to British Ambassador in Bangkok, however, the Thai government was
totally uninterested in landing any refugees. As the refugees were convinced that
the Thai government might repatriate them to Vietnam, they were anxious to
disembark in Hong Kong rather than Thailand. The U.S. government was willing to
take the refugees, but it did not want them to disembark in Bangkok. The Americans
preferred to interview the refugees in Hong Kong because the strained relations
with the Thais in refugee field.101 The Hong Kong government, however, argued
that the convenience of Hong Kong to the Americans is no argument for an
exception to principle of first-scheduled port of call.102 Unlike the Hong Kong
Restricted Draft Letter from Evan Luard to Dr. Shirley Summerskill (Parliamentary
Under-Secretary, Home Office), FCO 40/995, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese
Boat People, 2 March 1978.
100 Restricted Telegram from Peter Tripp (Bangkok) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Governor Hong Kong, FCO 40/996, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat
People, 3 May 1978.
101 Restricted Telegram from Peter Tripp (Bangkok) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Governor Hong Kong, FCO 40/996, 4 May 1978.
102 Restricted Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office,
99

42

governments view, the FCO hoped the Hong Kong government to allow the
refugees to land on humanitarian grounds.103 Thus the Sibonga still came to Hong
Kong with the refugees on 11 May.104
Although the ground rules for dealing with the shipwrecked refugees rescued by
foreign vessels were established after the Ava incident, the rules were not fully
respected by other countries even the UNHCR itself. On 28 July 1976, two days after
the Ava incident, the UNHCR proposed a scheme for future cases. Under this
scheme, the UNHCR could request the country of the vessels first port of call to
offer temporary asylum for the refugees, provided that the UNHCR gave assurances
for refugee maintenance and resettlement.105 Therefore, the principle of
first-scheduled port of call was established as Hong Kongs normal practice for
Vietnamese refugees rescued by foreign vessels.106 This practice, however, could not
be enforced throughout the influx. For example, the Malaysian-registered Bunga
Tanjong arrived in Hong Kong from Japan on 20 October with eleven Vietnamese
refugees. The vessels first port of call was Japan. But the Japanese government
refused to allow the refugees to land because the Malaysian government refused to
make any assurances for resettling them. As requested by the UNHCR, the Hong
Kong government allowed the refugees to stay on humanitarian grounds.107 On 13
November, another vessel, Glorious Country, arrived in Hong Kong from Bangkok

FCO 40/996, 4 May 1978.

103 Restricted Telegram from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong, FCO
40/996, 5 May 1978.
104 Restricted Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/996, 11 May 1978.
105 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Refugees or Displaced
Persons on the High Seas, Confidential Telegram from E.W. Callway (United Kingdom Mission to the
United Nations Geneva) to P. Morgan (United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office), FCO 40/720, 28 July 1976.
106 Report of the Meeting with the Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
Vietnamese Refugees: The UNHCR by A.E. Donald (Political Adviser), FCO 40/720, 10 August
1976.
107 Unclassified Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/720, 20 October 1976.

43

with three refugees. As Thailand had refused the refugees to disembark, the vessel
discharged the refugees in Hong Kong after the UNHCR gave guarantees for
resettling them.108

Conclusion
The Clara Maersk incident shows that the deteriorating domestic economy and the
British governments political agendas for refugee issues made it reluctant to provide
financial aid and resettlement places to Hong Kong in order not to provoke any
possible criticism from the public. This led to different expectations for Britain and
Hong Kong. Apart from disagreement between the Britain and Hong Kong on
refugee resettlement, tensions existed even within the British government. Hong
Kong wanted Britain to take the lead in resettling the refugees. The British
government, however, did not want to increase its burden by resettling the refugees
in Britain. Different from the U.S. governments attitudes towards refugees from
left-wing regimes, apart from those who came from former colonies, the British
government preferred to accept refugees from right-wing regimes. Thus Vietnamese
refugees were less preferred by the British. Hong Kong-Britain relations were
characterized by tensions and mutual concessions
The Ava incident demonstrates how Britain used Hong Kong to show its
contribution to ending the refugee crisis. Hong Kong was subordinated to the
interest of Anglo-American relations. The U.S. considered Hong Kong a
breakthrough to strengthen the Southeast Asian countries involvement in the
refugee problem. As requested by the U.S. government, Britain ordered Hong Kong
to grant permission for the refugees to land. Therefore, the principle of

Unclassified Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/720, 13 November 1976.
108

44

first-scheduled port of call was established as Hong Kongs ground rules for granting
temporary asylum to Vietnamese refugees rescued by foreign vessels. Nevertheless,
the ground rules were never been respected by the U.S. government or the UNHCR.
Vessels that had rescued shipwrecked refugees still came to Hong Kong regardless of
their first port of call.
The scale of the first wave of Vietnamese refugees was small compared to the
second wave, and most were resettled within a short period. As shown in the local
press, the influx of Vietnamese refugees and Chinese illegal immigrants started to be
considered together on the same basis. Nevertheless, adverse opinions about the
Vietnamese refugees did not appear widely in Hong Kong society. Still, the first wave
demonstrates how vulnerable Hong Kong was in the initial stage of the refugee crisis.
With no prior experience in tackling the Vietnamese refugee problem, the
controversies about the responsibility for the Vietnamese complicated the first wave.
There was no consensus on providing asylum and resettlement places to them. As
will be shown in Chapter Two, the Vietnamese influx became even more complicated
when shipmasters engaged in refugee-trafficking in late 1978.

45

Chapter Two
The Second Wave: The Pre-Arranged Vessels
As other Governments in the region are prepared to take stronger action by taking the
law into their hands and towing ships out to sea, in disregard of humanitarian
principles and the Safety of Lives at Sea Convention, Hong Kong is inevitably put in
the position of being regarded as a soft option for vessels like the Huey Fong.1

The Huey Fong was the first vessel engaged in refugee-trafficking that came to Hong
Kong. On 23 December 1978, the vessel arrived in Hong Kong with more than
3,300 Vietnamese refugees.2 The Huey Fong incident marked the beginning of the
massive second wave of Vietnamese refugees into Hong Kong. On 23 February, one
month after the vessel reached Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Security Branch noted
the political implications of the Huey Fong incident. In 1979, three more organized
vessels in collaboration with the Vietnamese government came to Hong Kong with
more than 4,500 Vietnamese refugees.3
The tense Sino-Vietnamese relations led to an exodus of ethnic Chinese from
Vietnam. Sino-Vietnamese relations started deteriorating as early as 1974, but a
dramatic decline occurred in 1977. Scholars have suggested various reasons for the
deteriorating relations: the border disputes between China and Vietnam; Chinas
open support for Cambodias war with Vietnam; disagreement on relations with the
Soviet Union; and the Vietnamese governments reforms that mainly targeted the
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam such as the forced adoption of Vietnamese citizenship
and the confiscation of Chinese property.4 These conflicts led to the fear of war and
Report on the Arrival of the M.V. Huey Fong in Hong Kong, Great Britain, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, United Nations (Political) Department, Series 58 (FCO 58), The National
Archives, London, FCO 58/1747, Vietnamese refugees on the MS Huey Fong, Hong Kong, 23
February 1979.
2 Initially, the shipmaster had estimated that there were about 2,700 refugees on board, but the Hong
Kong government soon revealed that there were more than 3,300. South China Morning Post, 21 January
1979.
3 The word organized was adopted by the Hong Kong Security Branch after the Huey Fong entered
Hong Kong in January 1979; see Report on the Arrival of the M.V. Huey Fong in Hong Kong, FCO
58/1747, 23 February 1979.
4 On the reasons for the deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations, see Pao-Min Chang, Beijing, Hanoi,
1

46

the Vietnamese governments deep-rooted suspicion of ethnic Chinese. It is still

unclear whether the exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam that began in late 1977
was initiated by the Vietnamese government or the Chinese government. China
complained that Vietnam expelled the ethnic Chinese from the provinces bordering
China, while Vietnam argued that it was China who launched a campaign to
encourage the ethnic Chinese to leave.5 All in all, the number of ethnic Chinese who
fled to China from Vietnam reached 160,000 by the end of July 1978.6 In the
meantime, the economic reforms which discriminated primarily against ethnic
Chinese escalated the exodus from the South.7
The socialization of the Vietnamese economy that aimed at eliminating all
bourgeois trading establishments in March 1978 and the closure of the Chinese
border in September led to an increase of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam by
boat. Since Vietnam increasingly suspected the ethnic Chinese and reached no
consensus with China about how to repatriate them, the Vietnamese government
officially permitted the overseas Chinese to leave in return for payment. Meanwhile,
some people in other countries considered the outflow of ethnic Chinese a business
opportunity. Therefore, ship owners cooperated with the Vietnamese government by
picking up the refugees in Vietnam and transporting them to other countries. Apart
from the vessels arranged by ship owners and the Vietnamese government, many
ethnic Chinese left for other countries on their own boats after paying the
and the Overseas Chinese (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 21-27; Ramses Amer, The Ethnic
Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 1991), 29-40.
5 Amer, Ethnic Chinese, 46-50; Chang, Beijing, 30-33; Vietnam Courier, The Hoa in Vietnam Dossier
(Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978), 109-81.
6 Chang, Beijing, 29; Ramses Amer, The Boat People Crisis of 1978-79 and the Hong Kong
Experience Examined Through the Ethnic Chinese Dimension, in Yuk-Wah Chan, ed., The
Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora: Revisiting the Boat People (New York: Routledge, 2011), 39.
7 On the economic reforms, see Amer, Boat People, 40-4; Amer, Ethnic Chinese, 34-40; Barry Wain,
The Indochina Refugee Crisis Foreign Affairs 58. 1 (Fall 1979) 160-79; Chang, Beijing, 23-27, 33-35;
Kwok-Bun Chan, Hong Kong's Response to the Vietnamese Refugees: A Study in Humanitarianism,
Ambivalence and Hostility Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 18.1 (1990): 94-110; Robinson
Courtland, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (London: Zed Books Ltd,
1998), 26-33.

47

government.8
The changing nature of the Vietnamese refugee crisis created a new dilemma
for the Hong Kong government. On 3 July 1978, two Taiwanese fishing junks arrived
in Hong Kong with 135 refugees. Investigations by the Marine Police showed that
the junks were not equipped to carry the refugees to Taiwan, which was supposed to
be the first port of call. Thus the refugees were allowed to land at Hong Kong
temporarily.9 The arrival of these 135 refugees turned out to be a complicated story.
Two days later, the refugees claimed that they had paid gold to the Vietnamese
security forces in order to leave. The masters of the fishing junks also claimed that
they were ordered by the Vietnamese forces to take the refugees to Hong Kong after
being detained for twenty-seven days. The Hong Kong government, however, could
not prove these allegations.10 The first case of an organized vessel, the Southern Cross,
appeared in Indonesia in September with 1,252 Vietnamese refugees. But the
refugees were accepted by the Indonesian government, which believed the
shipmasters explanation for how the refugees had been rescued. The
refugee-trafficking business was revealed only after the Hai Hong arrived in Malaysia
on 9 November with approximately 2,500 Vietnamese refugees.11 Because of Hong
Kongs close distance to Vietnam, not surprisingly, the pre-arranged freighter Huey
Fong arrived outside Hong Kong waters on 23 December 1978.
The previous chapter demonstrated how Britains domestic affairs and the U.S.
governments pressure led to tensions between the British and Hong Kong
governments. This chapter investigates how the Hong Kong government reacted to

Amer, Boat People, 30-40; Amer, Ethnic Chinese, 81-89; Chang, Beijing, 50-54.
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hong Kong Department, Series 40 (FCO 40), FCO
40/996, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 4 July 1978.
10 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/996, 5 July 1978.
11 Courtland, Terms of Refuge, 28-30.
8
9

48

the refugees who had paid the Vietnamese government in return for leaving. The
second wave of refugees challenged the Hong Kong governments previous practice
on dealing with the first wave. Although it was pragmatic in accepting Vietnamese
refugees domestically, the British government wanted the Hong Kong government to
pursue its ideal humanitarianism by providing temporary asylum to them. This
chapter focuses on how the British government and the Hong Kong government
deliberated its policies towards Vietnamese refugees carried by the organized vessels.
It also focuses on how the colonial officials calculated the effectiveness of the
policies towards the Vietnamese refugees on the human, individual level. It shows
that the Hong Kong governments attitudes towards the Vietnamese refugees were
not as humane as it claimed. The chapter argues that Britain forced Hong Kong to
accept the refugees carried by pre-arranged vessels. The British government
responded to the United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) request
without considering its political implications for Hong Kong. Hong Kong paved the
way for the crisis after the first organized vessel landed in January 1979. The chapter
shows that the Hong Kong government lacked autonomy in responding to the
organized vessels from Vietnam.

The Hai Hong: The First Confirmed Refugee-Trafficking Case

The arrival of the Hai Hong on 9 November 1978 exposed the refugee-trafficking
business carried out by the Vietnamese government. As early as 24 October, the
Hong Kong government was told that the shipmaster of this Panamanian-registered
vessel would illegally carry around 1,500 Vietnamese refugees to Hong Kong on 26
October.12 More details about the vessel were soon revealed. It had left Singapore
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/997, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 24 October
1978.
12

49

for Hong Kong on 15 October. Because of bad weather and engine troubles, the Hai
Hong finally landed at Malaysia on 9 November with 2,500 refugees, a much higher
number than the Hong Kong government realized. Three-quarters of the refugees
on board were ethnic Chinese.13 This was suspicious. A normal journey from
Singapore to Hong Kong took only eight days, while the Hai Hong had taken more
than two weeks to reach Malaysia from Singapore.14 Apart from the abnormal
schedule, the shipmaster inconsistently explained to the Malaysian government and
the UNHCR how he had met the Vietnamese refugees. Having encountered another
suspicious case before and after further investigations, the UNHCR and the
Southeast Asian governments believed that the shipmaster was running a
refugee-trafficking business in collaboration with the Vietnamese government. An
anonymous official believed that the Hai Hong incident offered the most concrete
confirmation that the Vietnamese government had openly assisted the ethnic
Chinese to leave.15 The Hai Hong incident confirmed the changing nature of the
refugee crisis and indicated that a second wave of Vietnamese refugees was
forthcoming.
Governor Murray MacLehose understood how destructive the new trend of
Vietnamese refugees could be to Hong Kong, especially after he was told that
another pre-arranged vessel with about 1,500 refugees might reach Hong Kong from
Vietnam in early November. He was sure that Hong Kong would face a very
difficult situation if this happened. To MacLehose, the first case of the organized
vessel in Hong Kong would be a test case, as other pre-arranged vessels would

Bruce Grant, The Boat People: An Age of Investigation with Bruce Grant (New York: Penguin Books,
1979), 121.
14 Barry Wain, The Refused: The Agony of the Indochina Refugees (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981),
24-25.
15 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/997, 10 November 1978.
13

50

follow suit.16 Knowing that the massive outflow of ethnic Chinese refugees could
not be handled by Hong Kong itself, MacLehose consulted the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) on this new phenomenon and asked how other
Southeast Asian countries intended to respond.
The FCO was not interested in taking any ethnic Chinese refugees and gave no
practical suggestions to the Hong Kong government. As shown in Chapter One,
although the British government was unwilling to take the refugees during the first
wave in 1975, the FCO was clear that it would be difficult to refuse admission on
humanitarian grounds.17 New Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs David Owen felt differently. The youngest Foreign Secretary in British history,
Owen was pragmatic in foreign policy and robust in protecting Britains interests.18
He told MacLehose that the FCO had no easy answers for the problem. The FCO
was also unwilling to intervene with the Vietnamese to stop the exodus. Still,
Owen found the UNHCR conference on Indochinese refugees on 11 and 12
December 1978 a useful opportunity for serious discussion. Ignoring the different
nature of the second wave of refugees, Owen reminded MacLehose that the key
importance was to apply the policy of the first-scheduled port of call which was
followed by the Hong Kong government since 1976.19 Owens justification for why
the FCO should not initiate any consultation with the Southeast Asian countries

Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/997, 8 November 1978.
17 Confidential Telegram from Denys Roberts (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/651, Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into Other Countries, 5 April
1975.
18 David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Penguin, 1992), 265-66.
19 Confidential Telegram from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Murray
MacLehose (Hong Kong), FCO 40/997, 9 November 1978; On the policy of first-scheduled port of
call, see Chapter One and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on
Refugees or Displaced Persons on the High Seas, Confidential Telegram from E.W. Callway (United
Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva) to P. Morgan (United Nations Department, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office), 28 July 1976; Report of the Meeting with the Representative of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, Vietnamese Refugees: The UNHCR by A.E. Donald (Political
Adviser), FCO 40/720, Aid from UK for Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, 10 August 1976.
16

51

explains his coolness towards the refugees: it could provide the occasion for them
to press us to take more refugees.20 Britains foreign affairs in 1978 also help explain
its lack of enthusiasm about the Vietnamese refugees. The Angolan Civil War,
political unrest in Iran, and nuclear strategic issues between Europe and the U.S.
distracted the FCOs attention from other foreign affairs.21 As Owen recalled:
Neither China nor Hong Kong were dominant issues during my period in office.22
Governor MacLehose was unsatisfied with the FCOs instruction about
maintaining the principle of first-scheduled port of call towards the organized
vessels. He reminded the FCO that the potential host countries were being criticized
for not providing sufficient practical expression to their humanitarian ideals. To
MacLehose, it was impossible to confirm how the Hong Kong government should
respond to the pre-arranged vessels in advance. The refugees could land at Hong
Kong only with the guarantee of resettlement from other countries. He did not want
Hong Kong to be penalized for being more humane than other first-asylum
countries because its practice reflected the British governments humanitarian
concerns.23
Although Owen considered the UNHCR conference on Indochinese refugees
important for working out possible solutions for the new trend, the FCO did not
initiate any measure at the conference. It merely offered 500 resettlement places to
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand respectively. The reason why Britain had no
initiatives at the conference took place against the backdrop of the domestic pressure
within Britain. The FCO was conscious of its limited ability to take the refugees
before the conference, since it had to give priority to British passport-holders from
Confidential Telegram from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Murray
MacLehose (Hong Kong), FCO 40/997, 16 November 1978.
21 Owen, Time, 369-75, 379-82, 386-402.
22 Owen, Time, 405.
23 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/997, 6 December 1978.
20

52

East African countries, such as Uganda.24 Admission of 70,000 immigrants every

year limited Britains capacity to absorb the Vietnamese, and the FCO claimed that
the 1,500 resettlement places were the maximum that it could get from the Home
Office (HO).25
Despite its lack of enthusiasm for taking Vietnamese refugees, the British
government was under pressure from Parliament to accept 1,500 refugees. As 1979
was an election year, it is not surprising that the government did not want to provide
any opportunity that would be attacked by its opponents. On 15 December 1978,
three days after the UNHCR conference, Conservative Party Member of Parliament
(MP) Richard Luce argued that Britain was in a special position because of the
immigration problems and believed that Britain could help in other ways instead
of accepting the refugees.26 Another MP, Ronald Bell, strongly resisted any
suggestion that a substantial number of refugees should be resettled in Britain. The
diversifying population not only destroyed national identity but had also turned
Britain into a human ant-heap. He hoped that British interests would be carefully
borne in mind.27 This explains why the FCO planned not to take a leading role at
the conference.28 The FCO spokesman plainly expressed its attitudes towards the
refugees in Hong Kong at the conference: Britain did not have an automatic
commitment to take them.29 In fact, the FCO saw the 1,500 resettlement places

Confidential Brief of the UNHCR Consultations on Indo-Chinese Refugees Geneva 11-12

December, 1978, FCO 40/998, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 8
December 1978.
25 Confidential Telegram from Evan Luard to Secretary of State, FCO 40/997, 6 December 1978.
26 Luce, Vietnamese Refugees, 15 December 1978. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 960
[1978], cols. 1225-26.
27 Bell, Vietnamese Refugees, 15 December 1978. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 960
[1978], cols. 1221-22, 1224.
28 Confidential Brief of the UNHCR Consultations on Indo-Chinese Refugees Geneva 11-12
December, 1978, FCO 40/998, 8 December 1978.
29 Telegram from Centroform London to Hong Kong and General Department (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/998, 12 December 1978.
24

53

merely as a number to live up to the High Commissioners appeal.30

Unlike the first wave of refugees, the British government regarded the second
wave as Chinas responsibility. Initially, the FCO considered Vietnamese refugees as
Americas responsibility because of the Vietnam War. As argued in Chapter One, the
FCO saw the political advantages of relieving the Americans burden even in a
modest way.31 The British and Hong Kong governments interpreted the second
wave within the context of deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations. Governor
MacLehose and the Executive Council members noticed that the worsening
Sino-Vietnamese relations had led to an exodus of ethnic Chinese to China. The
Bank of Chinas request for moving the Vietnamese purchasing mission from the
bank further indicated the deteriorating relations.32 The embassies in Hanoi and
Peking also drew similar conclusions from their discussions with the Vietnamese
prime minister and the New China News Agency.33 The perception of the Chinese
government being responsible for the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam also existed within
Parliament. MP Ronald Bell argued that the refugees whom we are considering are
overwhelmingly Chinese. He questioned the FCO: Why should they not go to
China? . China, either on its own or in concert with Russia, has the ultimate
responsibility.34 Thus one of the FCOs main objectives was to persuade China to

Boat Refugees from Vietnam , Confidential Letter from M.K.O. Simpson-Orlebar (United
Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Weir, FCO 40/997, 28 November
1978.
31 Restricted Draft Letter from Evan Luard to Dr. Shirley Summerskill (Parliamentary
Under-Secretary, Home Office), FCO 40/995, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese
Boat People, 2 March 1978.
32 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office), 22 May 1978; Confidential Telegram from Iain Orr (Hong Kong) to J. Thompson (Hong
Kong and General Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 2 June 1978; Note for
Executive Council: Vietnamese Refugees, FCO 40/996, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong:
Vietnamese Boat People, 28 July 1978.
33 Confidential Telegram from John Margetson (Hanoi) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 25
May 1978; Confidential Telegram from Davies (Peking) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
40/996, 31 May 1978.
34 Bell, Vietnamese Refugees, 15 December 1978, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 960
[1978], cols. 1223.
30

54

take more Vietnamese refugees at the UNHCR conference. The FCO thought that it
should explore the willingness of the Chinese to accept a significant proportion of
the ethnic Chinese refugees.35
Even so, the FCO was aware of the political implications for Sino-British
relations and China-Hong Kong relations.36 Therefore, although the FCO believed
that China was responsible for the second wave, it instructed the British
representatives to look at the question of asking the Chinese to do more instead
of initiating the question.37 However, no country had mentioned the responsibility
of China at the conference. Britain had not mentioned Chinas role in the second
wave of refugees, even in the background note that was distributed to the delegates
at the meeting. In fact, China was not even represented at the conference.38
Although the Hai Hong finally docked at Malaysia instead of Hong Kong, this
incident shows the British governments attitudes towards the second wave of
refugees. In response to the FCOs statement that Britain had no automatic
commitment to take the refugees, MacLehose could only unconvincingly explain it
to the others: This is not incompatible with HMGs acceptance of special
responsibility for such refugees.39 The British government and the Hong Kong
government failed to reach consensus on how to deal with the organized vessels.
Confidential Telegram from Evan Luard to Secretary of State, FCO 40/997, 6 December 1978.
Restricted Telegram from Patrick Morgan (United Nations Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Allen (Far Eastern Department), FCO 40/997, 20 November 1978.
37 Letter from J.S. Wall to Evan Luard (Parliamentary Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office), FCO 40/997, 8 December 1978.
38 On the issues discussed at the conference, see Restricted Telegram from Patrick Morgan (United
Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Stimson, 11 December 1978;
Attached Background Note: Indo-Chinese Refugees, Confidential Letter from M.K.O.
Simpson-Orlebar (United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Parliamentary
Unit, 12 December 1978; Telegram from Centroform London to Hong Kong and General
Department (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 12 December 1978; Attached Background Note by
the United Kingdom, Geneva 11 December 1978: Refugees and Displaced Person in Hong Kong,
Telegram from D.R. Snoxell (United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva) to Iain Orr
(Assistant Political Adviser, Hong Kong), FCO 40/998, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong:
Vietnamese Boat People, 13 December 1978.
39 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/998, 13 December 1978.
35
36

55

When the organized vessel Huey Fong came to Hong Kong in December, it became a
serious challenge to the Hong Kong governments existing policy towards the
refugees.

The Huey Fong: The First Refugee-Trafficking Case in Hong

Kong
On 18 December 1978, the Marine Department received a message from the
shipmaster of the Panamanian-registered Huey Fong that he had picked up around
2,000 refugees off the coast of Vietnam on 17 December, and requested the Hong
Kong governments permission for entry in three to four days.40 The use of
quotation marks for the words picked up and refugees in the telegram shows
that the Hong Kong government was doubtful about the story told by the shipmaster.
More information was available the next day: 2,700 refugees were on board including
1,000 children and 720 elderlies. Bangkok was the vessels last port of call, and
Kaohsiung was its first. Thus the Hong Kong government refused the Huey Fong
entry, and suggested that the vessel should proceed to the nearest ports such as
Manila or Singapore for assistance.41 But the shipmaster ignored the Hong Kong
governments refusal and decided to reach Hong Kong because of the bad physical
conditions of the refugees and the shortage of food and water.42 The shipmasters
justifications were contradictory. Since Hong Kong was not the nearest port, why did
the shipmaster plan to head to Hong Kong if he needed assistance? Disregarding the
warnings, the Huey Fong reached Hong Kong waters, and was intercepted by the
Royal Navy. The ship finally anchored at the south of Po Toi Island on 23
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, Vietnamese refugees on the MS Huey Fong, Hong Kong, 18 December 1978.
41 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 19 December 1978.
42 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 22 December 1978.
40

56

December.43
Since Britain and Taiwan had no formal diplomatic relationship, the Hong
Kong government indirectly approached Taiwan, the vessels first port of call, via the
U.S. Consulate-General in Taipei by transferring the telegrams to the FCO. The
shipmaster was unwilling to continue his journey, and claimed that the refugees
would kill him and the crew if they attempted to go to Taiwan. Governor
MacLehose understood that Hong Kong was helpless to stop the vessel if the
shipmaster sailed regardless of the warnings. He believed that the chance of
persuading the shipmaster to sail to Taiwan unconditionally was minimal.44
Therefore, all MacLehose could do was to get an assurance of accepting the refugees
from the Taiwan government.45
To encourage Taiwan, the Hong Kong government offered a compromise of
allowing all three hundred ethnic Vietnamese to stay in Hong Kong. To MacLehose,
the ethnic Chinese refugees might be accepted by Taiwan, as the Taiwan
governments policy was to provide temporary shelter to the ethnically Chinese
refugees who were picked up by foreign vessels with first-scheduled port as Taiwan.
Nevertheless, MacLehose asked the FCO not to expose this compromise to the
Taiwanese until there was a reply from the Taiwan authorities.46
Even though the Hong Kong government offered a compromise, its autonomy
largely depended on whether the issue was in the interest of the British government.
MacLehose later agreed in an interview that the Hong Kong government acted as
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 23 December 1978.
44 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 23 December 1978.
45 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 25 December 1978; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, FCO 58/1457, 26 December 1978.
46 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 23 December 1978; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, FCO 58/1457, 23 December 1978.
43

57

an independent actor and took on the responsibility on its own instead of just
acting as the U.K. Governments agents in the crisis.47 On 5 January 1979, a FCO
spokesman also stated that whether the refugees on the Huey Fong were allowed to
land was purely a matter for the Hong Kong authorities.48 However, Hong Kong
was not as autonomous as MacLehose and the FCO claimed. The British
government did not instruct MacLehose what to do during the Huey Fong incident
but simply rejected what he had suggested. Thus the British government guaranteed
that the Hong Kong government would adopt no undesired policy. As Gavin Ure
argues, Hong Kongs autonomy of domestic reforms from 1918 to 1958 depended
on whether the issues were in the political interest of Britain. Once the British
government indicated the direction, the Hong Kong government was autonomous in
the implementation of the policy.49 A similar conclusion can also be drawn from the
Huey Fong incident. The example of the Hong Kong governments policies towards
the Huey Fong demonstrates how Hong Kongs autonomy was influenced by Britain.
The Hong Kong governments attitudes towards the Vietnamese refugees were
not as humane as MacLehose claimed. The governments humane attitudes were
contingent rather than predetermined. He recalled why the government accepted the
refugees on humanitarian grounds in an interview with historian Steve Tsang:
If people arrive, what on earth could you do? Could you turn them away? How did
you set about turning them away? In practice, what did you do? A police boat could
go out and say: Go away. If they knocked the bottom out of the boat and it sank,
are you going to leave them to drown? There really was no alternative to taking
them in it was felt that in practice there was no alternative but to allow them to
Sir Murray MacLehose, interview by Dr. Steve Tsang, 13 and 26 April 1989; 12, 13, 14, and 29
March 1991, Transcript of Interviews with the Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE,KCMG, KCVO,
DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62), Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82),
469, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; electronic version accessed from the Fairbank Center
for Chinese Studies Special Collection, Harvard University Library.
48 South China Morning Post, 5 January 1979.
49 Gavin Ure, Autonomy and the Origins of Hong Kong's Low-cost Housing and Permanent
Squatter Resettlement Programmes, in Ray Yep, ed., Negotiating Autonomy in Greater China: Hong Kong
and Its Sovereign Before and After 1997 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute for Asian Studies Press, 2013),
76-77; Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics, and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58 (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 7-8, 28-43, 159-61, 188.
47

58

land and give them shelter the sort of option that existed in Singapore of driving
boat people away did not exist in H.K.50

In July 1979, MacLehose spoke at the UNHCR conference: We have turned none
away. I can claim with pride that we have carried out our obligations to the full.51
True, the Hong Kong government did not push those Vietnamese refugees who
came to Hong Kong on small boats back to sea. But MacLehose had suggested the
use of force to push the Huey Fong. His suggestion was turned down only because
the Ministry of Defence (MOD) rejected the use of the Royal Navy. One day after
the FCO contacted the American Consulate-General in Taipei, MacLehose
recommended four alternative measures to push the shipmaster to move. The first
was assigning a Royal Navy ship to accompany the Huey Fong in order to make sure
the vessel continued its journey, and to provide life-saving equipment. The second
was carrying the refugees and the shipmaster to Taiwan by the Royal Navy ship. The
third was sending the British army to the Huey Fong which would make sure the vessel
sailed to Taiwan, whether or not requested by the master. The last solution was
towing the vessel about fifty miles by a civilian tug, and the army would be on board
to secure the tow. Among these suggestions, MacLehose deemed the first the
weakest form of pressure, while the second option would create the political
problem of whether the Royal Navy ship could land at a Taiwanese port. He was
aware that the third and the fourth options were outside the Hong Kong
governments and the Royal Navys legal powers. Even so, the British Protectorate of
Brunei had successfully towed the Tung An, another organized vessel, on 23
December 1978. Therefore, MacLehose consulted the MOD to carry out the same
practice.52
MacLehose, Transcript of Interviews, 461-62.
Telegram from United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations Geneva (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/1105, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong:
Vietnamese Boat People, 21 July 1979.
52 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
50
51

59

Although the British government was unwilling to take the Vietnamese refugees,
it did not want the Hong Kong government to be considered cold-hearted. The
Hong Kong government was put in a passive position by the MODs reply, and the
MOD appeared to be unfamiliar with the situation of Hong Kong. The MOD
explained that the Royal Navy was outside its jurisdiction to board the Huey Fong on
the high seas. Thus, except for the first option, the others were ruled out. Moreover,
the navy ship could only work within Hong Kong territorial waters even though the
MOD allowed the Royal Navy ship to escort the Huey Fong.53 But the fact was that
the Huey Fong had docked outside Hong Kong waters. More important, the MOD did
not explain why the Brunei government could tow the ship in cooperation with the
Brunei Shell Petroleum Company, a British corporation.54 As a result, the Hong
Kong government was forbidden to adopt any proactive approach to this incident.
Since the MOD disapproved of the tow, and Taiwan appeared to be
uninterested in taking the refugees, the Hong Kong government was prepared that
the Huey Fong might land eventually.55 Nevertheless, it made further efforts to
persuade the Taiwan government to take the refugees, and to figure out any measures
that could deter future cases. MacLehose wanted to push the Taiwan government to
give a positive answer, or at least a complete negative. He asked the FCO to
emphasize the importance of the first-scheduled port principle to the American
Consulate-General in Taipei. The Americans should make this point forcefully to

Office, FCO 58/1457, 24 December 1978.

53 Confidential Telegram from Ministry of Defence United Kingdom to Captain in Charge Hong
Kong Ministry of Defence United Kingdom Navy, FCO 58/1457, 24 December 1978.
54 Restricted Telegram from Arthur Watson (Brunei) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23
December 1978; Restricted Telegram from Arthur Watson (Brunei) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1458, Vietnamese refugees on the MV Tung An, 24 December 1978.
55 Confidential Telegram from Ministry of Defence United Kingdom to Captain in Charge Hong
Kong Ministry of Defence United Kingdom Navy, 24 December 1979; Confidential Telegram from
Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 58/1457, 28
December 1978.

60

the Taiwan government.56 Besides, on 28 December 1978, the Hong Kong

government suggested to detain the refugees in a detention center for three to four
years before resettlement if they landed at Hong Kong.57 MacLehose implied to
leave the Huey Fong at sea briefly, as he believed that the sooner the Hong Kong
government charged the shipmaster, the better it could deter other organized
vessels.58 He also wanted to demonstrate that the refugees on the Huey Fong were not
treated as ordinary refugees who could immediately wait for resettlement under the
UNHCR coordination.59
Governor MacLehose overestimated the effectiveness of detention and
prosecution. His measures proved to be useless after the Hong Kong government
told the shipmaster on 18 January that it would not prevent the Huey Fong from
entering Hong Kong waters. The arrival of the organized vessels Skyluck, Sen On, and
Ha Lung with more than 4,500 Vietnamese refugees in 1979 shows that detention
before resettlement and prosecution failed to deter further similar cases.60 The
Skyluck, which came to Hong Kong in February 1979, was detained at sea for more
than 150 days.61 This made evident that the initial detention at sea was not enough.
Although MacLehose explained that the reason why the Skyluck could not land was
the shortage of accommodation for 2,600 refugees, limited accommodation could
not fully explain why the Skyluck had been detained for five months.62 By July,
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 29 December 1978.
57 Letter from Neil Paterson to Mr. Simpson-Orlebar, FCO 58/1457, 28 December 1978.
58 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/1088, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 11 January
1979.
59 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/1087, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 5 January
1979.
60 South China Morning Post, 8 February 1979; Kung Sheung Daily News , 22 April 1979; Wah
Kiu Yat Po , 27 May 1979.
61 South China Morning Post, 1 July 1979.
62 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 9 February 1979; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign
56

61

Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong had increased to more than 60,000 since the
Skyluck anchored outside Hong Kong.63 Besides, how much of a deterrent could the
prosecution be when the shipmaster of the Huey Fong dared to misrepresent the
Hong Kong government by telling Taiwan that the refugees would be accepted if the
Taiwan government refused to accept them?64
Another organized vessel the Tung An further complicated the situation. On 21
December 1978, the Tung An arrived in Brunei waters with approximately 2,000
refugees, and was rejected from landing by the police force. The Brunei government
towed the Tung An the next day after learning that the vessel was seaworthy.65 The
vessel finally anchored at Manila Bay on 27 December, and the Philippine
government allowed it to stay for ten days in order to wait for resettlement
arrangement. Refugees on board who were not accepted by other countries would
proceed to the Tung Ans first port of call: Hong Kong.66 To the FCO, if the
refugees from the Tung An and the Huey Fong were permitted to stay in Hong Kong
temporarily, there was very little doubt that the other similar vessels would follow.
The Hong Kong government was faced by a classic dilemma.67
The FCOs decisions to take the refugees from the Tung An in Manila
unilaterally abolished Hong Kongs policy towards Vietnamese refugees picked up by
foreign vessels: the principle of first-scheduled port of call. This decision was
and Commonwealth Office, FCO 58/1769, Vietnamese refugees on the 'Skyluck', Hong Kong, 29 June
1979.
63 Confidential Telegram from Jack Cater (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
40/1110, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 12 December 1979.
64 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 28 December 1978.
65 Restricted Telegram from Arthur Watson (Brunei) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO58/1458, 23 December 1978.
66 Confidential Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28
December 1978, FCO 58/1458; Telegram from Manila to Governor Hong Kong, 2 January 1979;
Confidential Telegram from Peter Tripp (Bangkok) to Governor Hong Kong, FCO 58/1748,
Vietnamese refugees on the MV Tung An, 3 January 1979.
67 Vietnamese Refugees: Huey Fong and Tung An, Copy of Manuscript Submission from R.J.T.
MacLaren (Hong Kong and General Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Private
Secretary, FCO 58/1458, 27 December 1978.

62

inconsistent with the FCOs suggestion to the Hong Kong government in November
1978 that applying the principle of first port of call was of key importance.68
Because of the UNHCRs request, the Australian and the U.S. governments
considered accepting several refugees on board. Since the vessel would reach Hong
Kong if no satisfactory response of resettlement was made, the UNHCR
commissioner asked the British government to take the refugees from the Tung An.
On 4 January 1979, Britain agreed to consider applications for resettlement.69 It
hoped that the Philippine government would allow the vessel to stay.70 The British
governments favorable reply has to be put against the backdrop of its diminishing
power. As John Kent argues, the declining British Empire could only be a world
force as part of some wider organisation of international cooperation.... To some
extent this was to provide rationale for the commitment to the United Nations.71
Besides, Britain had only agreed to consider the refugees on the Tung An. This
favorable reply was certainly in Britains interests.
The UNHCR, as an organization aimed at refugee protection, wanted to help
the refugees as soon as possible. However, whether this decision was in Hong Kongs
interest remained doubtful. As the British ambassador in Manila, William Bentley,
commented on the UNHCRs request: This may not of course, be wholly
disinterested advice.72 On the one hand, the FCO wanted to prevent the Huey Fong
and the Tung An from coming to Hong Kong at the same time. On the other hand,
Confidential Telegram from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Murray
MacLehose (Hong Kong), FCO 40/997, 9 November 1978.
69 Restricted Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2
January 1979; Confidential Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 4 January 1979; Restricted Telegram from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
to Manila, FCO 58/1748, 4 January 1979.
70 Confidential Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
58/1748, 4 January 1979.
71 John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49 (Leicester: Leicester
University Press, 1993), 1.
72 Confidential Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
58/1748, 4 January 1979.
68

63

the FCO gave up defending the Hong Kong governments principle of first port of
call. In fact, another option was moving the Tung An from Manila to Hong Kong,
and towing the Huey Fong, but Britain had rejected the option of towing the Huey Fong
when Governor MacLehose suggested it on 24 December 1978.73
The FCOs attitudes towards the Huey Fong were manifested in the Tung An
incident, and this put Hong Kong in a more difficult situation. On 5 January 1979,
when the Huey Fong was still docked at Poi Toi Island, Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs David Owen had already told Bentley that the Huey Fong
would probably have to be landed eventually.74 Abandoning the principle of
first-scheduled port of call soon proved to be unwise. Four days later, Bentley told
the FCO that he would keep calm for the fear of becoming broiled in arguments
about first port of call principle by the Philippine government.75 The Philippine
government appeared to be unsympathetic to the Hong Kong governments decision
of allowing the refugees on the Huey Fong to land despite not being the first port of
call. According to the British ambassador in Manila, the Philippine governments
view on Hong Kong was: more fool them.76 Although the Philippines did not tow
the Tung An in the end, Hong Kong was put in an ambivalent position of following
the principle.
It became a mutual concession between the British government and the Hong
Kong government when MacLehose understood that the Huey Fong would land. This
mutual concession reflected the British governments distaste for taking Vietnamese
refugees. To relieve Hong Kongs burden, the FCO planned to ask the HO to
Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1457, 24 December 1978.
74 Restricted Telegram from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Manila, FCO
58/1748, 5 January 1979.
75 Confidential Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
58/1748, 9 January 1979.
76 Confidential Telegram from William Bentley (Manila) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
58/1748, 1 February 1979.
73

64

increase the resettlement places for Hong Kong which the FCO had promised in
early December 1978.77 Thus, on 5 January 1979, MacLehose specified to the FCO
that they should take at least 1,000 refugees instead of 500 in order to encourage
other countries to provide assistance; the FCO approved this request ten days later.78
It should be noted that by 28 December 1978 Malaysia and Thailand had a higher
Indochinese refugee population than Hong Kong. The refugee population in
Malaysia and Thailand was around 40,000 and 130,000 compared with 4,000 in Hong
Kong (excluding the refugees on the Huey Fong), but the extra 500 consisted of 250
each from Malaysia and Thailand.79 These 1,000 resettlement places from Britain,
however, were held up by the Hong Kong government in February 1979, as the
refugees did not want to live in Britain.80

Conclusion
After twenty-seven days detention outside Hong Kong waters, the Huey Fong finally
entered Hong Kong on 19 January 1979. The Hong Kong government carried out
investigations and interviews with the shipmaster and the refugees.81 Gold worth 1.5
million Hong Kong dollars was found on board by the police force.82 In early

Confidential Telegram from Evan Luard to Secretary of State, 6 December 1978, FCO 40/997;
Confidential Telegram from W.E. Quantrill (Hong Kong and General Department) to Mr. Stratton,
FCO 58/1457, 29 December 1978.
78 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 58/1746, Vietnamese Refugees on the MS Huey Fong, Hong Kong, 5 January 1979;
Confidential Telegram from David Owen to Governor Hong Kong, FCO 40/1087, 10 January 1979.
79 Confidential Letter from David Owen (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Home Secretary,
FCO 40/1088, 6 December 1978; Confidential Telegram from David Owen to Governor Hong Kong,
FCO 40/1087, 10 January 1979.
80 Letter from M.E. Head (Home Office) to M.K.O. Simpson-Orlebar (United Nations Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 2 February 1979; Confidential Telegram from Murray
MacLehose to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, Racial Disadvantage (RDI Symbol
Series) Files, Series 376 (HO 376), HO 376/198, Vietnamese Refugees: Discussions between Home
Office, Other Government Departments and Aid Agencies Relating to the Terms and Conditions for
the Admission of Refugees from Vietnam, 6 February 1979.
81 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 19 January 1979; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, FCO 58/1746, 19 January 1979.
82 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
77

65

February, the Hong Kong government charged the shipmaster and the crews of the
Huey Fong with carrying excess passengers, defrauding the officers of Hong Kong,
and making false statements and representations to enter Hong Kong with
passengers who had no right to land.83
Although the Huey Fong incident was over, this was not the end of the refugee
crisis. The organized vessels Skyluck, Sen On, and Ha Lung arrived in Hong Kong with
more than 4,500 Vietnamese refugees in 1979.84 As argued in Chapter One, the
British government considered the first wave as the responsibility of the Americans
because of the Vietnam War and saw the political advantages of relieving the
Americans burden. Unlike the first wave, Britain interpreted the second wave within
the context of deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations. The British government
continued to lack enthusiasm for accepting Vietnamese, but it wanted the Hong
Kong government to contribute by providing temporary asylum. The Hong Kong
government lacked autonomy over the Huey Fong incident and did not have as much
autonomy as Governor MacLehose and the British government officials claimed.
Nor was the Hong Kong government as humane as MacLehose stated, for he had
suggested the use of force in the Huey Fong incident.
Apart from the organized vessels, refugees who came on their own small boats
posed an even more serious threat to Hong Kong. These refugees will be the focus
of Chapter Three. On humanitarian grounds, the Hong Kong government provided
temporary asylum to those came on small boats. Not surprisingly, Hong Kongs
policy attracted even more Vietnamese refugees. They considered Hong Kong as an
easiest option, since the Hong Kong government not only treated the refugees who
Office, FCO 58/1747, 24 January 1979.
83 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 6 February 1979; Report on the Arrival of the M.V. Huey Fong in Hong Kong, FCO 58/1747;
South China Morning Post, 13 February and 23 February 1979.
84 South China Morning Post, 8 February 1979; Kung Sheung Daily News, 22 April 1979; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 27
May 1979.

66

came on their own boats generously, but also those carried by pre-arranged vessels.
As will be shown in Chapter Three, the Hong Kong government and local people
soon found it impossible to accept more.
The British government responded to the UNHCRs appeal without
considering the consequences for Hong Kong. The FCOs decisions on the Huey Fong
and the Tung An contributed to the collapse of the principle of first port of call.
Accepting the refugees carried by the Huey Fong on humanitarian grounds despite not
being the first-scheduled port of call was largely the result of Britains intervention.
On the individual level, after being prevented by the British government from towing
the Huey Fong, MacLehoses attempt to detain the vessel for four weeks proved to be
ineffective to deter further cases. Hong Kong was inevitably put in the position of
being regarded as a soft option for vessels like the Huey Fong.85

85

Report on the Arrival of the M.V. Huey Fong in Hong Kong, FCO 58/1747, 23 February 1979.

67

Chapter Three
The Second Wave:
Political and Humanitarian Realities
Conservatives have excellent credentials to speak about human rights. By our efforts, and
with precious little help from self-styled liberals, we were largely responsible for securing
liberty for a substantial share of the world's population and defending it for most of the rest.
- Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister (1979-1990)1
The Home Secretary [William Whitelaw] said that his own correspondence indicated a shift
of opinion in favour of accepting more refugees. The Prime Minister [Margaret Thatcher]
said that in her view all those who wrote letters in this sense should be invited to accept one
into their homes. The Prime Minister asked whether a new influx of Vietnamese refugees
could be resettled? It might be a matter simply of shifting them from one warehouse in
Hong Kong to another in the UK.
- Note for the Record, Vietnamese Refugees, 19792

Although Margaret Thatcher emphasized Britains responsibility for securing human

rights around the world, recently declassified documents show that she was
unsympathetic to the desperate Vietnamese refugees. Thatchers inconsistent view
reflects Britains international role during the Cold War era. As historian Matthew
Grant argues: To extend or maintain British influence and prestige around the
globe. Britain had the military and political requirements of a major world power,
but lacked the wherewithal to pay for them. Power was to be upheld and projected,
and influence and prestige maintained and extended, but in affordable ways.3
Since the number of Vietnamese refugees continued to increase in the second
half of 1979, local views in Hong Kong started changing. As mentioned in Chapter
One, public opinion tended to allow the refugees to land on humanitarian grounds in
the beginning, and the refugees were resettled within a short period. However, local
Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 249.
Note for the Record, Vietnamese Refugees, Great Britain, Prime Ministers Office, Series 19 (PREM
19), the National Archives, London, PREM 19/130, Vietnam: Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong;
Resettlement in UK; part 2, 9 July 1979.
3 Matthew Grant, Introduction: The Cold War and British National Interest, in Matthew Grant, ed.,
The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975 (New York: Continuum,
2009), 1, 4.
1
2

68

opinion generally changed when more refugees were left stranded in Hong Kong. As
shown in Chapter One, the local press started to consider Vietnamese refugees and
Chinese illegal immigrants on the same basis. Still, this sentiment did not generally
appear in newspapers. Starting in 1979, criticism of the Hong Kong governments
policy of allowing Vietnamese refugees to land while repatriating Chinese illegal
immigrants increased. Although the pre-arranged vessels brought more than 5,000
refugees to Hong Kong, those who came to Hong Kong on their own boats posed a
much more serious problem. From February to July, the number doubled every
month. By 8 May, it had increased from 4,739 to 14,276 and comprised almost sixty
percent of the Vietnamese refugee population of Hong Kong.4 Meanwhile, refugee
resettlement was carried out slowly: by May, fewer than 3,000 refugees had left Hong
Kong.
As in Chapters One and Two, the British government still hesitated to help
Hong Kongs refugee problem, and this put pressure on their relations. For example,
the Malaysian government proposed to build an island processing center for
Indochinese refugees in February 1979 because of the massive outflow of refugees.
First-asylum countries, including Hong Kong, generally supported the proposal, but
Britain did not. Britain worried that it might be accused of hypocrisy if it did not
accept any refugees while supporting the proposal.5 Annoyed by the Hong Kong
governments request of supporting the establishment of an island processing center,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was sarcastic towards the Hong Kong
Restricted Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Hong Kong Department Series 40 (FCO 40), FCO 40/1092, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong:
Vietnamese Boat People, 27 February 1979; Telegram from Jack Cater (Hong Kong) to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/1093, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat
People, 3 April 1979; Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/1095, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat
People, 11 May 1979.
5 An Island Processing Centre for Indo-Chinese Refugees?, Confidential Letter from M.K.O.
Simpson-Orlebar (United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Mr. Leahy,
FCO 40/1091, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 13 February 1979.
4

69

government: Indeed one might ask the Governor, if he is so enthusiastic about the
scheme, if he would contribute one of Hong Kongs uninhabited islands provided
the UNHCR paid for necessary accommodation.6
Chapters One and Two show that the British government avoided taking
responsibility for the refugees in Hong Kong. This chapter focuses on how the
British government was forced to relieve Hong Kongs refugee crisis when Hong
Kong people and their government thought that Hong Kong had reached its
maximum capacity to absorb more, as Britain saw the political need to maintain
Hong Kongs humanitarian policy. The newly elected Conservative government
inherited the previous governments lack of enthusiasm about the Vietnamese
refugees. On the one hand, the British government wanted to show its contribution
to resolving the refugee crisis by preserving Hong Kongs first-asylum status. On the
other hand, it was unwilling to take the refugees in Hong Kong, and this discouraged
the Hong Kong government to ask for assistance from other countries. Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher brought more pragmatic attitudes into the government.
The British government even abolished its humanitarian policy towards the refugees.
This chapter argues that the British government relieved Hong Kongs refugee
burden at the lowest cost and wanted to show its contribution to resolving the
refugee crisis by continuing Hong Kongs humanitarian policy of accepting refugees.
The chapter shows Hong Kongs dilemma of fulfilling local societys and
international communitys expectations of refugee policy. The Hong Kong
government found the humanitarian policy useless to gain better response from host
countries. Humanitarianism attracted even more refugees to come. The Hong Kong
government was under pressure from the local people to adopt a tougher policy to

An Island Processing Centre for Indo-Chinese Refugees, Confidential Letter from Evan Luard to
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, FCO 40/1091, 15 February 1979.
6

70

deter the refugees. Hong Kong as a place for Britains proxy humanitarianism led to
tensions between them. The chapter also demonstrates how the British government
maintained the Hong Kong government humanitarian policy of accepting the
refugees as cheaply as possible. By initiating the Geneva conference on Indochinese
refugees in July 1979, Britain internationalized the refugee crisis in order to relieve
Hong Kongs burden.

Hong Kong: Humanitarianism as a Penalty

The increasing number of refugees led to local criticism. By 1 May 1979, 24,512
refugees were in Hong Kong, and this number more than doubled to 59,131 by 1
July.7 By the end of the Geneva conference on Indochinese refugees on 21 July, it
increased to 63,958. The scale of the exodus in 1979 was almost six times the refugee
population from 1975 to 1978, which only had 11,544.8 As Chapter One has shown,
local people worried that the refugees might be left stranded in Hong Kong, but they
were generally sympathetic to the refugees. In her visual history of the Vietnamese
boatpeople, Sophia Law asserts that local communities started changing their
humane attitudes when more refugees came to Hong Kong in 1979.9
This change needs to be analyzed beyond the numbers. It is difficult to tease
out a more nuanced view of public attitudes towards the refugees, as it was a
combination of dissatisfaction about the Hong Kong governments policy, the fear
of economic competition, and everyday conflicts. Conflicts between Vietnamese
Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
40/1095, 11 May 1979; Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/1103, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat
People, 3 July 1979.
8 Security Branch: Refugee Division, Boat Refugees Arrivals and Resettlement, Fact Sheet: Boat
Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong, Refugee Population as at 1st August 1982: 12,007 (Hong Kong:
Government Secretariat, 1982).
9 Sophia Suk-Mun Law, Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong: Visual Images and Stories,, in
Yuk-Wah Chan, ed., The Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora: Revisiting the Boat People (New York: Routledge,
2011), 117-18, 120-22.
7

71

refugees and local people emerged. Local newspapers such as the Hong Kong Daily
News, Kung Sheung Daily News, South China Morning Post, and Wah Kiu Yat Po criticized
the Hong Kong government for spending HK$130,000 in public funds on
Vietnamese refugees every day.10 Different sectors of the society expressed their
discontent about how increasing arrivals exhausted resources. For example, the Civic
Association, Family Planning Association, Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups,
and some scholars thought that the refugee crisis would affect Hong Kongs
population policy, and lower living standards.11 According to local newspapers,
Vietnamese refugees also posed serious threat to local peoples employment
opportunity, as they usually received lower salaries.12 The political cartoons below
show that the Vietnamese refugee crisis became one of the social issues in Hong
Kong. The caption on the left says that many burdens were placed on Hong Kong.
In the cartoon, the baggage Vietnamese refugees was considered one of the
burdens. In the cartoon on the right, a man is scrambling a bowl of rice with two
men who wear coolie hats. The message of the cartoon is clear: Vietnamese refugees
took the bread out of Hong Kong peoples mouths.
Not surprisingly, voices asking the Hong Kong government to adopt a tougher
policy towards the Vietnamese refugees appeared in the press. Editorials, Legislative
Council members, and scholars suggested tougher measures to stop the inflow of
refugees.13 Street interviews conducted by the Hong Kong Federation of Students
Hong Kong Daily News , 12 May 1979, in Hong Kong Record Series (HKRS), Hong Kong
Public Records Office, 70-8-3846, Refugees-Vietnamese Refugees (Apr-May, 1979)-N; Wah Kiu Yat Po
, 30 May and 5 June 1979; South China Morning Post, 31 May 1979; Kung Sheung Daily News
, 7 June and 16 June 1979.
11 Kung Sheung Daily News, 21 June 1979; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 24 May and 9 June 1979; Hong Kong
Commercial Daily , 10 June 1979, in HKRS 70-8-3846; Kung Sheung Daily News, 29 June 1979.
12 Ta Kung Pao 10 June 1979; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 20 June and 8 July 1979; Kung Sheung Daily News,
7 July 1979.
13 Tin Tin Daily News , 24 May 1979; South China Morning Post, 29 May 1979; Hong Kong
Economic Journal , 30 May 1979; Ming Pao , 30 May 1979, in HKRS 70-8-3846; The GIST, 30
May 1979 to 5 June 1979; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 9 June 1979; Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 10 June 1979, in
10

72

on 8 June indicated that over seventy-five percent of the interviewees thought that
the increasing number of Vietnamese refugees seriously affected Hong Kong.14

Kung Sheung Daily News

Kung Sheung Daily News

26 May 1979

07 July 1979

The expanding refugee population put Hong Kong in a dilemma of fulfilling

the expectations of local society and the international community. Unlike Southeast
Asian countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, Hong Kong stuck to its humane
policy. It provided temporary asylum to the refugees who came on their own boats
or those rescued by vessels that had Hong Kong as their first port of call.15 The
Hong Kong government was aware of the tradeoff between humanitarianism and
public support. On 14 March 1979, Political Adviser David Wilson complained to
the FCO that he did not like the way the situation was developing. The Hong Kong
government was under pressure to take stronger action, as the refugee influx
showed no signs of diminishing, and the international effort of resettling refugees
could not keep pace with the growth of the problem. The refugee problem was the
governments major concern. The Hong Kong government wondered if the
HKRS 70-8-3847, Refugees-Vietnamese Refugees (June, 1979)-N; Kung Sheung Daily News, 16 June and
29 June 1979.
14 Wah Kiu Yat Po, 8 June 1979.
15 Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, Vietnamese Refugees: The Facts, FCO 40/1101, Refugees
from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, no date.

73

British government had formulated any diplomatic measure to help Hong Kong.16
Three days later, Governor Murray MacLehose clearly highlighted Hong Kongs
difficult situation to the British government. He reported to the FCO that the
unofficial members of the Executive Council had expressed their frustration about
Hong Kongs generous attitudes towards the refugees, especially in contrast with
Singapores success in refusing the refugees entry. Council members suggested that
the government should act roughly in order to regain public confidence. To
MacLehose, Hong Kong was on a tightrope. Public support required the Hong
Kong government to adopt more deterring and stiffer measures towards the refugees.
International goodwill, however, required decent and humane treatment. He found
the latter crucial, but it was difficult to reconcile the public. Although the Hong
Kong government promised to treat the refugees generously, host countries should
resettle the refugees more quickly. MacLehose could foresee that the increasing
resentment would take an ugly form.17
The Hong Kong governments humanitarian policy of accepting refugees did
not lead to better response from host countries; rather, it was the reverse. The
governments policy was to provide temporary asylum for all refugees who came to
Hong Kong on their own boats or those picked up by foreign vessels that had Hong
Kong as their first port of call.18 Unlike Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand stopped providing temporary asylum to boat refugees. According to the
information collected by the FCO and from newspaper reports, the Malaysian forces
even shot at the refugees in order to prevent them from landing.19 The Hong Kong

Confidential Telegram from David Wilson (Hong Kong) to M.K.O. Simpson-Orlebar (United
Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/1093, 14 March 1979.
17 Letter from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Lord Goronwy-Roberts (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office),FCO 40/1093, 19 March 1979.
18 Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong, Vietnamese Refugees: The Facts, PREM 19/130, no date.
19 Attitude of South East Asian Countries towards Indo-Chinese Refugees, Vietnamese Refugees:
The Facts, PREM 19/130, no date; Two Nations Bar More Landings, Daily Telegraph, 13 June 1979,
16

74

government worried that Southeast Asian countries hard line would increase the
inflow of refugees to Hong Kong.20 By late June 1979, 9,300 Vietnamese refugees
were in Thailand, over 59,000 in Hong Kong, and 74,000 in Malaysia. Hong Kong
also had the highest annual refugee arrivals in 1979. But inhumane policies led to
more satisfactory refugee resettlement. In Malaysia, 50 percent of the arrivals in 1979
moved to other countries, and 42 percent departed from Thailand. But only 8.5
percent left from Hong Kong.21 Moreover, 24 percent of the refugees in Hong
Kong were under the UNHCRs direct care, which was much lower than Thailands
100 percent.22
The U.S. governments attitudes towards Hong Kongs refugee problem show
that the Hong Kong government received no reward from maintaining its
humanitarian policy. As argued in Chapter One, during the first wave of Vietnamese
refugees the U.S. government considered Hong Kong a breakthrough to strengthen
the Southeast Asian countries involvement in resolving the refugee problem. The
Americans used Hong Kong to pressure the British during the second wave. By
restricting the resettlement places to Hong Kong, America forced Britain to become
more involved in the refugee resettlement program. On 27 June 1979, Hong Kong
Chief Secretary Jack Cater reported that the U.S. government would take 8,000
Vietnamese refugees in Malaysia from June to July, and 6,200 in Thailand. Only 1,100
in Hong Kong would be accepted by the U.S. He was extremely disappointed that
America rewarded Malaysias inhumane policy with more resettlement places.23 Two
in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Nations (Political) Department, Series 58 (FCO 58),
FCO 58/1752, Vietnamese Boat Refugees: General; Wah Kiu Yat Po, 16 June 1979.
20 Confidential Telegram from Jack Cater (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO
40/1100, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 13 June 1979.
21 Restricted Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/1104, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 13 July 1979.
22 Attitude of South East Asian Countries towards Indo-Chinese Refugees, Vietnamese Refugees:
The Facts, PREM 19/130, no date; Telegram from Goring-Morris (Bangkok) to Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and Hong Kong, FCO 40/1104, 13 July 1979.
23 Confidential Telegram from Jack Cater (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO

75

days later, in a meeting with the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, MacLehose
complained that the U.S. discriminated against Hong Kong. Malaysias and Thailands
hard line was rewarded with extra resettlement places. The U.S. rewarded barbarous
behaviour yet penalized Hong Kongs humanitarianism. The U.S. government
admitted that Britains contribution to Hong Kong was undoubtedly a factor for
America to apportion the quota. Although it was unfair to put pressure on Britain
with the U.S. refugee resettlement program in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong
government had to recognize the political realities.24
The Hong Kong government found itself being penalized by its humanitarian
policy of accepting the refugees because of the unsatisfactory response from
resettlement countries, and the British government was conscious that Hong Kong
could not continue the policy in the absence of effective refugee resettlement.
Chapter one shows that the Hong Kong government was unsatisfied with the British
governments limited assistance to the refugee problem in 1975. The dissatisfaction
continued in 1979. Besides, the Hong Kong government was disappointed with the
consequence of following the policy suggested by Britain. Financial Secretary Philip
Haddon-Cave complained that Britain had persuaded Hong Kong to be passive
receivers, and to treat the refugee humanely. Thus the colony could have more
satisfactory response from resettlement countries. But Hong Kong did not get any
fair offer of resettlement places, and turned out to be a magnet for Vietnamese
refugees.25 In a meeting with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva
on 25 June 1979, Governor MacLehose grumbled at the UNHCR that Hong Kongs
40/1102, 27 June 1979.
24 Record of Meeting: Ambassador Clarks Call at Government House on 29th June 1979 at 1215 p.m.,
Refugees from Vietnam, Recorded by Political Advisers Office, Hong Kong, FCO 40/1103, 3 July
1979.
25 Record of Conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and
the Hong Kong Financial Secretary Held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 4:00 pm on 31
May 1979, FCO 40/1098, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 31 May
1979.

76

humane policy was unique among the first-asylum countries, yet he was under
criticism for not tackling the problem in an Asian way. The patience of Hong
Kong people and the government might snap as inhumanity was rewarded with
more rapid refugee resettlement rates.26 The FCO was aware that support for
pushing the refugees back to sea was increasing in Hong Kong. People there
regarded the British response as reluctant and niggardly. More important, Britain
would be subject to international criticism if the Hong Kong government eventually
adopted tougher policies towards the refugees. There must be effective measures to
lighten Hong Kongs burden.27

A New Broom Sweeps Clean: The Thatcher Era

The Conservative Partys victory in May 1979 brought a more ambitious foreign
strategy to Britain. Margaret Thatcher, known for her strong personality, became
prime minister on 3 May. The famous speech that gave Thatcher the tag of Iron
Lady on 19 January 1976 tells us more about her ambition and character:
We have abundant experience and expertise in this country in the art of diplomacy
in its broadest sense. It should be used, within Europe, in the efforts to achieve
effective foreign policy initiatives. The message of the Conservative Party is that
Britain has an important role to play on the world stage. Well, we in the
Conservative Party believe that Britain is still great. In the meantime, the
Conservative Party has the vital task of shaking the British public out of a long
sleep.28

Thatcher found the Western concepts of human rights and liberty vital to revive
British prestige. In a speech to a Conservative rally on 19 April 1979, she said:
Our constant insistent commitment to the fundamental liberties which alone allow
the human spirit to grow and which alone allow a free nation to be governed with
tolerance, decency and compassion. Our vitality comes not from our possessions
Record of a Meeting Between Sir Murray MacLehose, Governor of Hong Kong and Mr. Poul
Hartling, UN High Commissioner For Refugees at UN Headquarters, Geneva, on 25 June 1979, FCO
40/1102, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 27 June 1979.
27 Confidential Letter from Hugh Cortazzi to the Private Secretary and the Permanent Under
Secretary, FCO 40/1098, 3 June 1979.
28 Margaret Thatcher, Speech at Kensington Town Hall ("Britain Awake") (The Iron Lady) (speech,
Chelsea, London, 20 January 1976), Margaret Thatcher Foundation,
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102939; accessed 27 May 2014.
26

77

but from our unquenchable belief in freedom. This is our heritage and our
destiny. For that heritage and for that destiny we Conservatives have always stood.
Let us not forsake it now.29

Despite Thatchers ambition, she was pragmatic enough to realize that the
adverse economic conditions did not fully allow Britain to fulfill its humanitarian
ideal. We expect our Governments to be honest, high-minded and humane. But
idealism is not enough. Translating ideals into practice nearly always costs money.30
The British government was in a deficit of about 500 million in 1979.31 Thus
Thatcher wanted to exert the British influence in an affordable way. She dared to
reverse Britains humanitarian policy towards Vietnamese refugees. Seeing the
increasing number of refugees rescued by British vessels, she avoided taking
responsibility for the refugees. At home we were still experiencing all the social and
economic pressures of past mass immigration and consequently this was something
we were most reluctant to agree.32 The Thatcher government pursued its national
interest and maintained the British prestige at the lowest cost.

The Sibonga: Changing Humanitarian Policy

On 21 May 1979, the shipmaster of the British-registered Sibonga informed the Hong
Kong government that he had picked up 900 refugees at sea. The vessel would arrive
in Hong Kong, its first port of call, two days later. Because of the British
governments usual practice towards the British vessels that had rescued refugees, the
Hong Kong government asked the British government for an assurance of accepting

Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Conservative Rally in Birmingham (speech, Birmingham, 19 April

1979), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104026; accessed
27 May 2014.
30 Margaret Thatcher, We Cannot Prosper with Dud Cheques, Daily Express, 1 May 1979,
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104056; accessed 30 May 2014.
31 Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 208-9.
32 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 66.
29

78

the refugees.33 Similar to the refugees on the Huey Fong mentioned in Chapter Two,
interviews with those on the Sibonga showed that they had paid the Vietnamese
government in order to leave.34 However, according to the logbook of the Sibonga
and the information provided by Bank Line, the vessels company, the Hong Kong
government learned that the rescue was genuine.35 On the morning of 24 May, the
vessel was docked at the remote Po Toi Island for further investigations.36
The British government approved Hong Kongs request quickly and treated the
Sibonga incident in the same way as before. On 21 May, the same day of the
shipmasters report, the FCO reached a consensus that it had a clear obligation to
help Hong Kong, as Hong Kong people knew that the British government would
certainly accept the refugees if the Sibongas first port of call was another country,
such as Singapore.37 Senior officials in the Home Office (HO) also saw no problem
with admitting the refugees rescued by the British vessel.38 Because the HO feared
that Hong Kong and other countries might accuse Britain of being hypocritical by
urging others to take the refugees in Hong Kong but not accepting those rescued by
a British-registered ship.39 But another incident of refugees rescued by British
vessels delayed the British governments plan for the Sibonga. One day after the HOs
favorable reply, Bank Line reported to the FCO that the British-registered Roachbank
had rescued 290 shipwrecked refugees at sea. Taiwan was the vessels first port of

Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/1095, 21 May 1979.
34 Secret Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
FCO 40/1096, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 24 May 1979.
35 Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, FCO 40/1095, 22 May 1979; Confidential Telegram from Murray MacLehose (Hong Kong) to
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/1096, 24 May 1979.
36 Kung Sheung Daily News, 24 May 1979.
37 Confidential Letter from R.J.T. McLaren to D.F. Murray, FCO 40/1095, 21 May 1979.
38 Confidential Letter from D.F. Murray to R.J.T. McLaren, FCO 40/1095, 22 May 1979.
39 Background Note: Vietnamese Refugees on the M.V. Sibonga. Immigration Aspects, PREM 19/129,
Vietnam: Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong; Resettlement in UK; part 1, no date.
33

79

call.40 On 28 May, four days after the Sibongas arrival, the British government
decided to assume responsibility for the refugees on the Sibonga. But the government
stressed that this was not a general commitment about similar cases in future, and
would consider every case independently.41
In previous years, the British government had assumed responsibility for the
refugees rescued by British vessels. In 1978, the British-registered Avon Forest and
Wellpark arrived in Taiwan with 386 refugees. Britain agreed to accept those who
could not be resettled in any countries within three months.42 The newly elected
British government maintained an open-ended commitment to the refugees
rescued by British-registered ships before the influx of refugees rescued by British
vessels began in late May. On 3 May 1979, the FCO made the same guarantee to
accept 33 refugees rescued by the British-registered Britannia Team.43 International
conventions did not obligate Britain to accept the refugees, but only required the
shipmasters to save people shipwrecked at sea. Still, allowing the refugees to settle in
the ships registered country was a widely recognized humanitarian practice by
western countries such as France, Germany, and the U.S.44
The Sibonga incident demonstrates how the newly elected British government
avoided taking responsibility when more Vietnamese were rescued by British vessels.
The Sibonga and the Roachbank rescued about 1,200 refugees, and the FCO indicated
that a few more British vessels had picked up refugees at sea. Thus Thatcher did not
Confidential Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong,
FCO 40/1096, 23 May 1979.
41 Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong, FCO
40/1096, 28 May 1979.
42 Telegram from T.R. Peters (Immigration Department, Hong Kong) to P.J. Williamson (Hong Kong
and General Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/1093, 6 March 1979; Draft
Letter from Lord Carrington to Tony Benn, FCO 40/1094, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong:
Vietnamese Boat People, 30 April 1979.
43 Confidential Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Jakarta, FCO
40/1095, 11 May 1979.
44 Refugees Found at Sea, Confidential Letter from J.S. Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to
Bryan Cartledge, 29 May 1979; Vietnamese Refugees, Confidential Letter from J.S. Wall (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Bryan Cartledge, PREM 19/129, 30 May 1979.
40

80

want to make the Sibonga incident an open-ended commitment for the refugees,
and the incident was only a single act of mercy.45 As shown in Chapter One, in
1975 the British government was divided over whether the financial relief to Hong
Kong refugee influx was enough. Like the previous government, opinion about
taking responsibility for the refugees rescued by British vessels was divided within the
newly elected Conservative government at a meeting for the Vietnamese refugee
problem. As John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner argue, In domestic policy making,
participants can often differentiate between the winners and the losers. In foreign
policy making, on the other hand, the entire nation is usually seen as either winning
or losing.46 Thus conflicts arose within the British government when it discussed
its refugee policy, as the refugee problem was a combination of international and
domestic policies. Unlike the foreign and home secretaries, who felt that Britain had
to assume responsibility for the refugees on the Roachbank because of the similar
guarantee given to the Sibonga, Thatcher drew a line between these two cases. The
Roachbanks first port of call was Taiwan, a non-British territory, while the Sibongas
was Hong Kong. The Roachbank should not become a magnet for other British
vessels that had non-British territories as their first port of call. Britain should find
an effective sticking point. She stressed that the British government should
pressure the Taiwan government to accept the refugees on the Roachbank on
humanitarian grounds. But the foreign secretary believed that it would be difficult to
convince Taiwan if Britain refused to assume responsibility for the refugees. After
several debates in the meeting, a compromise was reached: the British government
would eventually bear responsibility for the Roachbank, but Britain would assume no

Note from Map to Prime Minister, PREM 19/129, 28 May 1979.

John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 15.
45
46

81

more responsibility for the refugees picked up by British vessels.47

A prime minister with strong personality, Thatcher made the final call in her
government. She was clear that she did not want to accept the refugees rescued by
British vessels. The FCO, however, predicted that abandoning this humanitarian
practice would be condemned by the UNHCR. Besides, it would weaken Britains
ability to persuade other countries to take the refugees, jeopardize Britains liberal
historical record and human rights position, and worsen Britain-Hong Kong
relations.48 Still, Thatcher refused to accept refugees rescued by British vessels after
the Roachbank case. Representatives of the British shipping industry, and the Bank
Line expressed their concerns about Britain not bearing any responsibility for the
refugees. They worried about the economic loss if those vessels that rescued
refugees were rejected from unloading cargoes because of no guarantee of
resettlement from Britain.49 But Thatcher remained firm: a solution has to be
sought on an international basis rather than for the United Kingdom alone.50
The British government successfully refused to bear responsibility for the
refugees in another case. On 6 June, the British-registered Norse Viking was heading
to Osaka with forty refugees, and the Japanese government asked for a guarantee to
accept those who could not be resettled in any countries. Since Thatcher, the foreign
secretary and the home secretary reached a consensus that Britain would not bear
any responsibility for refugees picked up by British vessels after the Roachbank
incident, the British government refused the request, and asked the Japanese

On the details of the meeting, see To Discuss the Problem of Vietnamese Refugees, Note of a
Meeting at 10 Downing Street on 29 May 1979 at 1445, PREM 19/129, 29 May 1979.
48 Vietnamese Refugees, Confidential Letter from J.S. Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to
Bryan Cartledge, PREM 19/129, 30 May 1979.
49 Letter from David Ropner (General Council of British Shipping) to Margaret Thatcher, 29 May
1979; Letter from Lord Inverforth (The Bank Line Limited) to Margaret Thatcher, PREM 19/129, 30
May 1979.
50 Draft of a Letter for the Prime Ministers Signature from Margaret Thatcher to Lord Inverforth
(The Bank Line Limited, PREM 19/129, 1 June 1979.
47

82

government to admit the refugees without any guarantee.51 Japan compromised eight
days later by asking Britain to give most sympathetic consideration to the refugees
who wanted to move to Britain.52 On 18 June, Thatcher approved the request.53
Humanitarianism was never under Thatchers consideration, and she was
unsympathetic to Vietnamese. On 2 June 1979, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington
expressed his main concern about the health situation of the children on the
Roachbank. According to the note of the meeting, Thatcher said she was most
concerned about the reaction of British public opinion towards taking the
Vietnamese refugees and that it would be important not to appear as if we were a
soft touch.54 Ignoring the dangerous situation of the refugees on the Roachbank,
Thatcher agreed to commit responsibility for them only if the FCO could guarantee
that it could avoid committing responsibility for other British vessels that picked up
shipwrecked refugees.55 Thatcher could not accept the distinction between
immigrants and refugees. She found it invalid to compare Britains records of
receiving refugees with other countries, since Britain had accepted almost two million
immigrants who had full British citizenship. She claimed that there would be riots in
the streets if the Government had to put refugees into council houses.56 But
according to British newspaper clippings collected by the FCO, adverse opinion
about resettling Vietnamese refugees in Britain did not generally appear in major
newspapers such as the Daily Express, Guardian, Morning Star, Observer, and Telegraph.
On the contrary, some editorials and news articles supported the British government
Restricted Telegram from Michael Wilford to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, PREM 19/129,
6 June 1979.
52 Confidential Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Tokyo),
PREM 19/129, 14 June 1979.
53 Confidential Letter from Bryan Cartledge to J.S. Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), PREM
19/130, 18 June 1979.
54 Note for the Record, Vietnamese Refugees The Roach Bank, PREM 19/129, 2 June 1979.
55 Roachbank Refugees, Telegram from Mike Pattison to Bryan Cartledge, PREM 19/129, 10 June
1979.
56 Note for the Record, Vietnamese Refugees, PREM 19/129, 14 June 1979.
51

83

to fulfill its humanitarian responsibilities.57 The Telegraph asked: Can we keep our
conscience clear and face the rest of the free world with a demand or support?58

The UNHCR Conference on Indochinese Refugees

On 31 May 1979, Margaret Thatcher called the Geneva conference on Indochinese
refugees under the UNHCR auspices, on the grounds that the the international
community must now be brought to a proper realisation of its responsibilities.59 As
shown in Chapter Two, Britain planned not to initiate any suggestion about refugee
resettlement at the UNHCR conference in 1978. Unlike its attitudes at the previous
conference, the British government wanted to reach a resettlement goal of the
Indochinese refugees among potential host countries, and to relieve refugee
pressures on the first-asylum countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand.60
By gathering international support, it hoped to encourage more countries to take the
refugees, and to exert pressure on Vietnam to stop exporting them.61
Thatchers strong opinion of taking Vietnamese refugees to Britain explains
why the British government had to relieve Hong Kongs burden. As Thatcher did not
want to show contribution to resolving the refugee crisis by taking the refugees to
Britain, she wanted to continue Hong Kongs humanitarian policy. The concept of
calculated kindness suggested by Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan applies to

Adrift, Sunday Telegraph, 27 May 1979; Patrick Clancy, Maggie Gives Boat People Safe Haven,
Daily Express, 29 May 1979; The Sibonga Finds a Port of Welcome, Guardian, 29 May 1979; Daily
Express Opinion: People in Open Boats, Daily Express, 1 June 1979; Morning Star Reporter, Britain
Has Responsibility, Morning Star, 1 June 1979; Letters to the Editor: Humanity on the High Sea,
The Telegraph, 5 June 1979; Mark Dowdney, SOS for Boat People, Daily Mirror, 5 June 1979 in FCO
58/1752.
58 Adrift, Sunday Telegraph, 27 May 1979, in FCO 58/1752.
59 Message from Prime Minister to United Nations Secretary-General, Restricted Telegram from Lord
Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
New York, PREM 19/129, 31 May 1979.
60 Confidential Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to United
Kingdom Mission to the United Nations New York, PREM 19/129, 4 June 1979.
61 Prime Ministers Message to the President, Confidential Telegram from Lord Carrington
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Washington, PREM 19/130, 18 June 1979.
57

84

Thatchers attitudes towards Vietnamese.62 She made political choices as to what

kind of refugees or immigrants were more desirable. On 9 July, twelve days before
the UNHCR conference, Thatcher had an informal meeting with the foreign and
home secretaries to discuss Britains approach to the crisis. Since Britain initiated the
international conference, the home secretary found it necessary to accept more
Vietnamese refugees in order to ensure a good start for the conference. His own
correspondence also indicates that a shift of opinion in favour of accepting more
refugees. But Thatcher was sarcastic: All those who wrote letters in this sense
should be invited to accept one into their homes. It was quite wrong that refugees
were given council housing by the British government, whereas white citizens were
not. Despite the humanitarian and the political needs of admitting the Vietnamese
refugees, she preferred accepting refugees from Hungary, Poland, and Rhodesia, as
they were easier to assimilate into the British society.63
The British wanted to get rid of the refugee problem by internationalizing it
through the UNHCR conference. Although the British government called for a
conference, it was unwilling to initiate any contribution in the beginning. On 6 June
1979, six days after Thatcher called the conference, the UNHCR wondered whether
Britain was determined to tackle the refugee crisis: If some governments were
prepared to discuss resettlement figures with the aim of arriving at a total of about
quarter of a million, would the UK be part of that? The FCO equivocally replied
that it was hard to answer without knowing what other countries would do.64 The
UNHCR representative found it impossible to consult other countries when Britain

Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness : Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to
the Present (New York : The Free Press, 1986), 209-19.
63 On the full record of the meeting, see Note for the Record, Vietnamese Refugees, PREM 19/130,
9 July 1979.
64 Record of a Meeting Between Mr Murray, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and Mr Heidler,
UNHCR Representative in the UK, Held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 4.30 PM on 6
June, PREM 19/129, 7 June 1979.
62

85

could not even answer whether it would be involved in the refugee program if an
agreed plan for the problem was reached at the conference.65 By 1 June, 230,000
Indochinese refugees had been accepted by the U.S., 51,500 by France, 21,000 by
Australia, and 15,500 by Canada. Even Hong Kong allowed 14,300 to stay
permanently. Britain, however, accepted only 4,497 refugees of which more than
2,400 had not yet arrived.66 Despite its low refugee acceptance rates, Britain still
awaited other countries decisions.
Although the British government was hesitant, it knew that Hong Kongs
burden could be relieved through the conference only if it accepted some refugees.
On 14 June 1979, the UNHCR asked the British and Hong Kong governments each
to take 10,000 refugees in the next twelve months.67 The FCO found it urgent to
make a sizeable contribution to the conference. Otherwise, Britain would lose all
credibility as the initiator. The FCO considered Hong Kong its main concern at the
conference and knew that unless America took more refugees from Hong Kong, no
country would help. Since the U.S. was clear that it would offer more resettlement
places for Hong Kong only if Britain offered more, the FCO saw this as a vital
argument to make the resettlement figure as near as possible to the UNHCRs
suggestion of 10,000 places.68 A month after the UNHCRs request, the British
government approved the request of accepting 10,000 refugees.69
Still, the British government relieved Hong Kongs burden at the lowest
possible cost. Although Britain approved the UNHCRs request, it planned to accept
Special Conference on Vietnamese Refugees, Confidential Letter from D.F. Murray to South East
Asian Department (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), FCO 40/1100, 8 June 1979.
66 Indo-Chinese Refugees: Acceptance for Resettlement, Vietnamese Refugees: The Facts, FCO
40/1103, no date.
67 UNHCR Consultations Preliminary to a Conference, Vietnamese Refugees: The Facts, PREM
19/130, no date.
68 Vietnamese Refugees, Draft Letter from Lord Privy Seal to Lord Carrington, FCO 40/1103, 3 July
1979.
69 Confidential Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Suva, FCO
40/1104, 10 July 1979.
65

86

those 10,000 in three years rather than in one year. Governor MacLehose disagreed
with the schedule, as this meant Britain would take only about 3,000 refugees a year.
Thus it might fail to encourage other counties, especially the U.S., to take more
refugees from Hong Kong.70 MacLehose tried to compromise by suggesting that
Britain take 500 refugees per month in the first few months. The British government
could reconsider the admission rate once the U.S. refugee resettlement program was
in full swing.71 The Home Secretary agreed that Britain should set off at a good
spanking pace.72 Although the British government agreed to offer 10,000
resettlement places, its decision did not contradict its unsympathetic attitudes
towards the refugees. As the Home Secretary explained in 1981, it may not amount
to the full 10,000 anyway because the numbers remaining who would like to come to
the U.K. are probably now small and some of those selected are dropping out.73
Still, Britains decision of taking 10,000 refugees turned out to be successful in
encouraging other countries. On 12 July 1979, two days after Britain approved the
request, the U.S. announced that it would take 4,500 refugees from Hong Kong from
July to September.74

Conclusion
The Vietnamese refugee crisis created two dilemmas for the Hong Kong government.
First, should the government fulfill the international communitys expectation by

Vietnamese Refugees: New UK Quota, Confidential Letter from M.J.T. McLaren (Hong Kong and
General Department) to D.F. Murray, 11 July 1979; Telegram from Lord Carrington (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Hong Kong, FCO 40/1104, 14 July 1979.
71 Note of a Meeting Held on Tuesday, 17 July 1979, Recorded by J.A. Chilcot (Principal Private
Secretary, Private Office), FCO 40/1104, 18 July 1979.
72 Vietnamese Refugees: Meeting with the Home Secretary, Confidential Letter from J.S. Wall to D.F.
Murray, FCO 40/1104, 17 July 1979.
73 Letter from William Whitelaw (Home Secretary) to Prime Minister, Prem 19/604, Vietnam:
Vietnamese Refugees; Resettlement in the UK; Part 3, 28 February 1981.
74 Vietnamese Refugees: Record of Briefing Meeting for Minister of State, 1430 HRS, Tuesday 17
July 1979 in K196, Recorded by South East Asian Department, FCO 40/1104, 18 July 1979.
70

87

accepting more refugees regardless of adverse local opinion? On the one hand, the
Hong Kong government found humanitarianism crucial to maintain. On the other
hand, the government found it difficult to continue this humanitarian policy without
considering its ability to accept more refugees. Humanitarianism is not an absolute
principle. Second, should more resettlement places be assigned to countries that
adopted tougher policies? Hong Kongs humanitarian policy did not help get a better
response from resettlement countries, while countries that adopted tougher policies
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand received more attention from resettlement
countries. Hong Kongs generous policy even attracted more refugees to come.
To maintain the status quo of Hong Kongs humanitarianism, the British
government relieved Hong Kongs burden at the lowest cost by internationalizing the
refugee problem at the UNHCR conference. Similar to the previous British
government, the newly elected Conservative government used Hong Kong to show
its contribution to resolving the refugee crisis. Although Margaret Thatcher found it
important to fulfill Britains humanitarian obligations and initiated the conference,
she was pragmatic about the cost of humanitarianism. Compared to white citizens
from places such as Hungary, Poland, and Rhodesia, Vietnamese were less desirable
in her eyes. She abolished the international practice of bearing responsibility for the
shipwrecked Vietnamese refugees rescued by British vessels. Her pragmatic mentality
was also manifested in the way that she avoided taking refugees to Britain.
Throughout the Vietnamese refugee crisis, Britain used Hong Kong a place to fulfill
its proxy humanitarianism. Hong Kong played an important role of showing Britains
contribution to resolving the refugee crisis.

88

Conclusion
Despite recognizing Britains negative influence on Hong Kongs refugee crisis, many
people today simply attribute the crisis to Britains decision at the UNHCR
conference in 1979 instead of considering the bigger picture of Britains foreign
policy in the 1970s. In fact, the UNHCR conference in 1979 turned out to be quite
successful. Subject to Britains and the UNHCRs appeal, the Australian government
announced an extra 5,000 resettlement places in the next twelve months, and the U.S.
government provided another 7,000 places per month.1 Hong Kongs refugee
population started to decrease after the conference. By the end of 1979, 50,609
refugees were in Hong Kong, and this number decreased to 21,657 in 1980. However,
the mass media in Hong Kong today, scholars, and a former Legislative Council
member have created a discourse of blaming Britains decision at the UNHCR
conference for the refugee crisis. Scholar Joe Thomas claims that the Hong Kong
governments declaration of port of first-asylum in 1979 was an open invitation to
Vietnamese refugees.2 In her dissertation, Teresa Hau asserts that the British
government declared Hong Kong as a port of first-asylum at the conference, and the
influx of refugees continued thereafter.3 The documentaries Common Sense (),
Hong Kong History Decode (), and the local newspaper Headline Daily
claim that the British decision of declaring Hong Kong as a port of first-asylum at
the conference led to further influx of refugees.4 Former Legislative Council

Cabinet Meeting 5 July, Speaking Note: Vietnamese Refugees, Great Britain, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Hong Kong Department, Series 40 (FCO 40), the National Archives, London,
FCO 40/1103, Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong: Vietnamese Boat People, 5 July 1979.
2 Joe Thomas, Ethnocide: A Cultural Narrative of Refugee Detention in Hong Kong (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2000), 1.
3 Teresa Hau, An Analysis of the Vietnamese Refugee Policy in Hong Kong, Masters dissertation,
University of Hong Kong, 1996, 1-2.
4 Dengdai Liming [Waiting for the Dawn], Common Sense , directed by Chen
Zhixuan , Pan Dapei , Wu Wanxian (Hong Kong: Radio Television Hong
Kong, 12 December 1994); Nanmin xigang [Refugees Raid Hong Kong], Hong Kong
History Decode , directed by Pan Huinuo (Hong Kong: Asia Television Limited,
1

89

Member Rita Fan Hsu Lai Tai, who was very concerned about the Vietnamese
refugee crisis in the 1980s, asserts that Hong Kong fell into the black hole of
refugee problems, as Britain declared Hong Kong as an asylum port after the
conference.5 In short, they have created a story of Britains declaration of Hong
Kong as a port of first-asylum at the conference leading to an influx of refugees.
These claims are invalid, and Hong Kongs refugee problem was relieved after
the conference. At the table below shows, fewer refugees arrived in Hong Kong in
the decade after the conference. One may argue that the reduction of refugee arrivals
in the early 1980s was due to the closed-camp policy adopted by the Hong Kong
government. Vietnamese arrivals who entered Hong Kong after 1 July 1982 were
detained in closed resettlement centers unless they chose to leave from Hong Kong.
But Kristen Hughes has shown that the drop in refugee arrivals was not the result of
the new policy, as there was a general decrease in Vietnamese arrivals among the
first-asylum countries.6 The number of refugees decreased every year until 1987,
almost ten years after the conference. The number increased again in 1987 because
of the deteriorating economic and political situation in Vietnam.7 Besides, according
to the recently declassified Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) files, whether
Hong Kong should be declared as a port of first-asylum at the conference had never
been discussed between the British government and the Hong Kong government. As
in Chapter Three, the Hong Kong government provided temporary asylum to the

20 August 2007); Yuenan chuanmin wenti: qiyuan : [The Vietnamese

Boatpeople Problem: Origins], Hong Kong Headline Daily,
http://news.stheadline.com/figure/index_r.asp?id=60#1; accessed 27 May 2014.
5
Rita Fan Hsu Lai-Tai , Yuenan nanmin: (1) Xianggangren de emeng : ()
[Vietnamese Refugees: (1) Hong Kong Peoples Nightmare], 27 May 2004,
http://www.npcfan.hk/notesDetails.htm?id=19; accessed 27 May 2014.
6 Kristen Hughes, Closed Camps: Vietnamese Refugee Policy in Hong Kong, PhD dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley, 1985, 211, 264-65.
7 Sophia Suk-Mun Law, Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong: Visual Images and Stories, in
Yuk-Wah Chan, ed., The Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora: Revisiting the Boat people (New York: Routledge,
2011), 124.

90

refugees who came on their own boats. Hong Kong was already a first-asylum port
before the conference. Chapter Two has shown that Hong Kong was considered as a
soft option by the refugees when the Hong Kong government allowed the first
organized vessel to land. The conference in 1979 did not lead to the refugee crisis,
and the influx did stop temporarily thereafter.8 As Former Governor David Wilson
said, in 1989 Vietnamese refugees came back to haunt me.9

Year

Arrivals

Number in HK at
end of month

1979 (1 January to 21 July,

63,958

4,790

1979 (total)

68,748

50,609

1980

6,788

21,657

1981

8,470

12,960

1982

7,836

12,627

1983

3,651

12,766

1984

2,230

11,892

before the conference)

1979 (22 July to 31
December)

The term soft option was adopted by the Hong Kong Security Branch after the pre-arranged
vessel Huey Fong arrived in Hong Kong with 3,300 refugees in 1979; see Chapter Two footnote 1.
9 Lord Wilson of Tillyorn , 19 September 2003, Transcript of Interview with Lord Wilson of
Tillyorn, 49, Churchill College Archives, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme,
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Wilson.pdf; accessed 27 May 2014.
8

91

1985

1,112

9,443

1986

2,059

8,011

1987

3,395

9,537

1988

18,328

25,673

Table 1: Vietnamese Refugee Arrivals in Hong Kong, 1979 to 1988

Sources: Security Branch: Refugee Division, Boat Refugees Arrivals and Resettlement, Fact Sheet:
Boat Refugees from Vietnam in Hong Kong, Refugee Population as at 1st December 1982: 12,787 (Hong Kong:
Government Secretariat, 1982); Security Branch: Refugee Division, Monthly Statistical Report
(Arrivals and Departures), Fact Sheet: Vietnamese Migrants in Hong Kong at February 1997 (Hong Kong:
Government Secretariat, 1997).

Hans J. Morgenthau summed up the dilemma for executing foreign policy by a

democratic government:
A democratic government must accomplish two tasks: On the one hand, it must
pursue policies which maximize the chances for success; on the other hand, it
must secure the approval of its people for these foreign policies. The
necessity to perform these tasks simultaneously faces a democratic government
with a dilemma; for the conditions under which popular support can be
obtained for a foreign policy are not necessarily identical with the conditions
under which such a policy can be successfully pursued. A popular policy is not
necessarily a good one.10
For the British government, the Vietnamese refugee crisis became a more
complicated foreign policy issue, when the crisis involved not only the British
government and the British people, but also the Hong Kong government and the
Hong Kong people.
Although the refugee crisis stopped temporarily, it is crucial to ask how and why
the Hong Kong governments refugee policy was shaped by the British government
and by international concerns about human rights in the 1970s. The complexity of
the refugee crisis led to different considerations between the British government and
the Hong Kong government. It is hard to define whether Hong Kongs Vietnamese
refugee crisis was a foreign policy issue or a domestic one. As Governor Murray
10

Han J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1969), 150-51

92

MacLehose said in an interview:

It was a domestic issue because the people were there and had to be somehow
or other looked after. To get resettlement places, this was a matter for the
U.N. and for pledges by individual governments the U.K. approached the
governments and asked them to be more forthcoming.... so it was international.11

Whether refugee resettlement turned out to be satisfactory is not the point in the
above quotation; rather, the point is the difficulty of distinguishing the refugee crisis
between a domestic affair and a foreign affair. Because of the ambiguous nature of
the refugee crisis, the British and Hong Kong authorities had different concerns and
even conflicts. To be sure, the British government wanted to achieve its national
interest in the refugee exodus by making a significant contribution, for example,
using Hong Kong as a temporary asylum. But the Hong Kong government was
concerned about the consequences for its governance if too many refugees stayed in
Hong Kong, and that influx might trigger adverse opinion from local people.
One may argue that the Hong Kong governments unsympathetic attitudes
towards the Vietnamese refugees contradicted the colonys traditional concerns about
human rights issues, such as mui-tsai (female bondservants) and refugees from
mainland China in the 1950s. Hong Kong, however, has never been a humanitarian
state. The mui-tsai debate was not triggered by the Hong Kong government, but
anti-slavery organizations and people in Britain.12 Nor did the Hong Kong
government want to accept the Chinese refugees in the 1950s. Governor Alexander
Grantham adjusted the governments policy to integrate the refugees into the
community only when he realized that they would not return to China.13 Thus
Sir Murray MacLehose, interview by Dr. Steve Tsang, 13 and 26 April 1989; 12, 13, 14, and 29
March 1991, Transcript of Interviews with the Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE,KCMG, KCVO,
DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62), Governor of Hong Kong
(1971-82),465-66, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; electronic version accessed from the
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies Special Collection, Harvard University Library.
12 On the mui-tsai debate, see John M. Carroll, A National Custom: Debating Female Servitude in
Late Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong, Modern Asian Studies 43.6 (March 2009): 1463-93; Susan
Pedersen, The Maternalist Moment in British Colonial Policy: The Controversy over 'Child Slavery'
in Hong Kong 1917-1941, Past & Present 171 (May 2001): 161-202.
13 On the Chinese refugees, see Glen Peterson, To Be or Not to Be a Refugee: The International
11

93

humanitarian concerns were never the first priority for the Hong Kong government.
When it came to social stability and humanitarian needs, the Hong Kong government
deemed the former more important, as in the mui-tsai debate, the Chinese refugee
influx, and the Vietnamese refugee crisis.

Britains Diminishing World Power

In a 1982 speech at Cheltenham Racecourse after the Falkland Wars, Margaret
Thatcher proudly declared:
There were those who had their secret fears that it was true: that Britain
was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the
world. What has indeed happened it that now once again Britain is not
prepared to be pushed around. We have ceased to be a nation in retreat.14

Britain had struggled against retreat since 1945. It suffered from decolonization
and economic decline and after the Second World War.15 The post-war British
government had exerted international influence in an affordable way.16 The political
interests and economic difficulties had to be considered in Hong Kongs refugee
crisis. Compared to the government deficit and foreign affairs such as British
decolonization and political unrest in Iran in the 1970s, the Vietnamese refugee was
less important to Britain. The British government had a political agenda for
determining what kind of immigrants or refugees was more desirable. As shown in
Chapters One and Three, despite claiming the lack of capacity for taking the

Politics of the Hong Kong Refugee Crisis, 194955, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
36.2 (June 2008): 171-95.
14 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham (speech, Cheltenham
Racecourse, 3 July 1982), Margaret Thatcher Foundation,
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=104989; accessed 17 June
2014.
15 On Britains economy and British decolonization after 1945, see Alec Cairncross, The British
Economy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Ronald Hyam, Britains Declining Empire: The Road to
Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Wm. Roger Louis, The
Dissolution of the British Empire, in Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History of
the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 329-56;
Wm. Roger Louis, The Dissolution of the British Empire in the Era of Vietnam, The American
Historical Review 107.1 (February 2002): 1-25.
16 On Britains role in the world after 1945, see Matthew Grant, Introduction: The Cold War and
British National Interest, in Matthew Grant, ed., The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy
and the Bomb, 1945-1975 (New York: Continuum, 2009), 1-13.

94

Vietnamese, the British government took the Chileans, who came from a right-wing
regime, and immigrants from its former colonies. Still, as this thesis shows, the
British government had to show its contribution to resolving the refugee crisis in
order to maintain its international influence. Thus the British government wanted to
use Hong Kong as place for its proxy humanitarianism. To maintain the Hong Kong
governments policy of accepting Vietnamese refugees, the British government
relieved Hong Kongs burden at the lowest cost and minimized its responsibility for
Hong Kong throughout the refugee crisis. Despite the success of the UNHCR
Conference, it should be noted that the British government called the conference for
the sake of continuing Hong Kongs humanitarian policy of accepting refugees.
Hong Kong was forced by Britain to be a temporary asylum for Vietnamese
boatpeople.

Influence of International Pressure on Hong Kong

International concerns about the Vietnamese refugees shaped Hong Kongs refugee
policy. As Chapter One shows, the U.S. government understood the regional role that
Hong Kong played in the U.S. effort in strengthening Southeast Asian countries
involvement in the refugee problem. To the Americans, Hong Kong, as a British
colony, was a soft option to convince countries in the region to be the port of
first-asylum. The British government also wanted to be seen to contribute to the
refugee influx by the U.S. government, since the U.S. helped Britain in other refugee
problems, such as the Uganda Asian refugees. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also influenced Hong Kongs refugee policy.
The British government responded to the UNHCRs appeal to consider accepting
the refugees on the pre-arranged vessel Tung An at the cost of breaking Hong Kongs
usual practice toward Vietnamese refugees.
95

It is interesting to see how state actors used humanitarianism to justify their

political agendas, and how the implementation of humanitarian policy varied over
time. During the Vietnamese refugee crisis, the American and British governments
pressured the Hong Kong government to accept the refugees on humanitarian
grounds and suggested that the international practice was to collaborate with the
UHHCR. But Britain and America implemented the humanitarian policy differently
in the recent Yazidi refugee crisis. By August 2014, 50,000 displaced Yazidi refugees
were trapped on the mountain in northern Iraq after escaping from the persecution
by Islamic extremists. Although the UNHCR declared its highest emergency level for
the Yazidi refugees in Iraq, the U.S. government refused to carry out the evacuation
by airlifting the refugees because it believed that the Yazidi crisis was over and very
few refugees still remained in the area. Despite providing humanitarian assistance
such as food and water to the Yazidis, countries such as Britain, Germany, and
France also refused to carry out the evacuation.17

Hong Kongs Autonomy in the 1970s

As mentioned earlier, MacLehose once explained in an interview that the refugee
crisis was a combination of domestic affairs and foreign policy. When the interviewer
insisted that there must have been a distinction between domestic affairs and foreign
policy, as Hong Kong would have no jurisdiction if it was a foreign policy matter,
MacLehose replied:
I dont know about jurisdiction but H.K. certainly was very active. I mean not
only looked after the people on the ground, but it actively pursued other
On the Yazidi refugee crisis, see Karen Deyoung and Craig Whitlock, Rescue Mission for Yazidis
on Iraqs Mount Sinjar Appears Unnecessary, Pentagon Says, Washington Post, 14 August 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2014/08/13/5fdd3358-2301-11e4-86ca-6f
03cbd15c1a_story.html; accessed 23 August 2014; Rod Nordland, Despite U.S. Claims, Yazidis Say
Crisis Is Not Over, New York Times, 14 August 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/world/middleeast/iraq-yazidis-obama-sinjar-crisis.html;
accessed 23 August 2014.
17

96

governments to persuade them to take refugees in. Then there were the Consuls
General in Hong Kong, we were pressurizing them to do what they could. So the
foreign policy aspect came in like that. But nobody said: This is foreign policy so
you, Hong Kong, keep out of it. It didnt work like that at all; rather the reverse.18

MacLehose also agreed that Hong Kong acted as an independent actor instead of
just acting as the U.K. Governments agents in Hong Kong.19 Even though the
Hong Kong government was actively involved in refugee resettlement, MacLehose
did not mention the governments autonomy in refugee reception. Unlike current
studies about Hong Kongs increasing autonomy, this thesis shows that the colonial
authorities played a passive role in the refugee crisis, and the British government still
had the final say on Hong Kongs refugee policy. As this thesis shows, the Hong
Kong government was instructed by the British government to accept the refugees
despite opposition from the Hong Kong people and the colonial authorities.
Hong Kong peoples attitudes toward immigrants have always been
characterized by everyday conflicts and the threat of deprived social resources. Hong
Kong people today complain that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(SAR) government fails to refuse immigrants from Mainland China, as the
government lacks autonomy in the One-Way Permit Scheme. News about the
conflicts between mainland Chinese and Hong Kong people is frequently reported in
the local press, for example, the lack of living space, competition for social welfare,
and everyday conflicts. Similar conflicts emerged during the Vietnamese refugee crisis.
According to the letter to the editor section, criticism of the Vietnamese refugees
appeared frequently, for instance, about the huge expenditure on Vietnamese
refugees, the lack of living space for Hong Kong citizens while providing
accommodation to refugees, competition for employment opportunities and social
welfare, and violent conflicts between local people and Vietnamese. Hong Kong

18
19

MacLehose, Transcript of Interviews, 466-67.

MacLehose, Transcript of Interviews, 469.

97

people also urged the government to stop accepting more Vietnamese refugees.20 We
should remember that the Hong Kong government always lacked autonomy in
refusing newcomers. The metropole made the final call.

For the examples of criticism, see the news clippings collected in Leonard Davis, Hong Kong and the
Asylum Seekers from Vietnam (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 95, 98-99, 112-13,125-27, 140-43.
20

98

Timeline

30 April
1975
Fall of
Saigon.

4 May
1975
Danish
vessel
Clara
Maersk
arrives in
Hong
Kong.

6 July 1976
Burmese
vessel Ava
arrives in
Hong
Kong.

21
December
1978
Organized
vessel Tung
An arrives
in the
Philippine.

99

23
December
1978
Organized
vessel
Huey Fong
arrives in
Hong
Kong.

3 May
1979
Margaret
Thatcher
becomes
prime
minister.

24 May
1979
British
vessel
Sibonga
arrives in
Hong
Kong.

21 July
1979
UNHCR
Conference
on
Indochinese
Refugees.

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1979-1997.
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Thatcher, Margaret. Speech at Kensington Town Hall ("Britain Awake") (The Iron
Lady). Speech, Chelsea, London, 20 January 1976. Margaret Thatcher
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