EN BANC

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses

ROLDAN A. OCHATE @ Boy of the crime of RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

[G.R. No. 127154. July 30, 2002]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ROLDAN A.
OCHATE alias Boy, accused-appellant.

That, in the afternoon, on or about the 26th day of

September, 1994, in the municipality of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused armed with a scythe,
moved by lewd and unchaste design, did then and there

DECISION

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,

violence and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

one ROWENA ALBISO, 8 year old child, against her will

On automatic review is the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte (Branch
11) dated September 20, 1996 in Criminal Case No. S2504 finding accused Roldan A. Ochate guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00).

and without her consent; that in the pursuance of his evil

motive and to better accomplish his evil purpose the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hack said ROWENA
ALBISO, thereby inflicting upon her injuries on the vital
parts of her body which caused her instantaneous death;
that as a result of the commission of the crime the heirs of
the herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:
a)

The facts of the case:

Around 5:15 in the afternoon of September 26, 1994,
Rowena Albiso and her older brother Roseller were

Indemnity for victims death. .

b)

Loss of earning

capacity . . . . . .

P20,000.00

walking together on their way home from school at

P70,000.00

Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon reaching the

house of the barangay captain, which is about twenty (20)
meters from their school, Rowena stopped and went to the
communal water pump to wash her food container and her
slippers. Roseller went home ahead of her sister.[1] On his
way home, he passed by the hut of accused Roldan Ochate
where he saw the latter in the yard tucking a scythe on
his waist.[2]When Roseller arrived home, their father,
Romulo, asked for the whereabouts of Rowena. Roseller
told Romulo that his sister was not yet home. Romulo
then went to meet Rowena. However, he was unable to
find her. Romulo and Roseller thereafter went to the
house of the accused who is their neighbor but finding no
one there, they proceeded to report the incident to
barangay

councilman

and

Crisanto

Montano. Montano,
[3]

acting
in

barangay
turn,

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Ochate entered a plea of not guilty.
After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide and meted the penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant raises the following Assignment
of Errors:

captain

sought

P50,000.00

the

assistance of some of the men in the barangay in order to

find Rowena. The search was conducted the whole evening

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

of September 26, 1994 to no avail. It was only around

ACCUSED ON ALLEGED INCRIMINATORY

eight oclock the following morning that the group found

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Rowena in a ricefield about fifty meters from Ochates

II

house.[4] She was already dead. The medico-legal officer

who later examined the cadaver reported that the cause of
death was hemorrhagic shock due to deep and penetrating

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING AGAINST

incised wounds in the neck and abdomen.[5] Suspecting

THE ACCUSED VERBAL ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY

that Ochate was the culprit, police officers as well as other

MADE DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IN

members of the barangay went to see Ochate at his house

VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND

but they were not able to find him. It was only on

TO COUNSEL.

September 29, 1994 that a certain Bienvenido Pantallano,

a member of the CAFGU, was able to locate Ochate and

III

he took Ochate in his custody and brought him to the

Chief of Police of Tampilisan.[6]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

On January 9, 1995, an Information for Rape

with Homicide was filed against Ochate, to wit:

OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.[8]

Appellant contends that he knew nothing about the

with homicide. Said circumstances do not lead to a fair

rape and the killing of Rowena Albiso; that around three

and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant, to the

oclock in the afternoon of September 26, 1994, he was at

exclusion of all others, is the person guilty of the offense

his residence, sleeping; that upon waking up at three-

charged. Appellants indifference to the events that

thirty in the same afternoon he went to gather tuba then

happened in their barangay beginning September 26,

proceeded to his copra drier which is approximately 100

1994 up to the time of his arrest on September 29, 1994

meters from his house; that he went back home at four

may lend support to the suspicion of the barangay and

oclock and later went to sleep at six oclock in the

police authorities that he is the author of the crime. But

evening; that he did not notice any unusual incident on

then, mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is

the night of September 26, 1994; that on September 29,

not

1994, he was arrested without warrant for reasons he was

jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt

not aware of; that it was only after he was brought to the

before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or

public market where he was informed that he was the

even property.[21] Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the

suspect in the killing of a certain person, the identity of

right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the

whom he only knew when he was already brought to the

contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption

municipal building.

nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be

sufficient

established

by

to

the

sustain

conviction. [20] Law

prosecution.[22] The

and

constitutional

As to the first assigned error, we agree with

presumption of innocence requires courts to take a more

accused-appellant that the trial court erred in convicting

than casual consideration of every circumstances or

him based on circumstantial evidence. The requisites to

doubt proving the innocence of the accused.[23]

sustain a conviction of an accused based on

circumstantial evidence are: (1) there must be more
than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be
based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of
all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. [9] And
in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence,
there are four basic guidelines: (1) it should be
acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts
must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3)
the facts must exclude every other theory but that
of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a
certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the
judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused is the one who committed the offense. [10]

In his testimony, Crisanto Montano admitted that

accused-appellant was considered a suspect because he
did not join the search for the missing girl. [24] Appellant
testified that he did not participate in the search because
he was busy drying copra.[25] It cannot be contradicted
that such passive reaction is susceptible to different
interpretations. Indeed, it may be construed as an
indication of guilt; but, it may also be interpreted as mere
indifference or even downright insensibility.
Moreover, there was no evidence presented to show
that after Roseller left his sister to wash her food
container and slippers at the communal water pump,
appellant was seen with her. Furthermore, the testimony
of Roseller that he saw appellant along the road on his
way home is not sufficient to support the conclusion that

Prosecution

evidence established

the

following

it was appellant who committed the crime. At best, it is

circumstances: (1) in the afternoon of September 26, 1994,

mere conjecture or speculation which the Court will not

when the victim was last seen alive by her brother

subscribe to.

Roseller, appellant was seen near his house located along

the road where the victim and Roseller pass on their way
home;[11] (2) the road passing through accused-appellants
house is the only path coming from the school going to the
house of the victims family; [12] (3) appellant was the only
person seen by Roseller on his way home; [13] (4) appellant,
who was alone at that time, appeared to Roseller as if he
was waiting for somebody;[14] (5) upon waking up in the
morning of September 27, 1994 and noticing that people
in their barangay were gathering and looking for
somebody, appellant did not bother to inquire about the
reason for such activity;[15] (6) he did not participate in the
search for the missing girl;[16] (7) the victims cadaver was
found about 50 meters from appellants hut; [17] (8) when he
was informed by his wife that the victims cadaver was
found near their house, he showed no surprise and he did
nothing;[18] (9) on two occasions, when he was informed by
the police that someone was killed in their barangay and
that he is a suspect in the killing, he did not bother to ask
who the victim was.[19]
After a careful review of the entire evidence
presented, we find that a combination of the foregoing
circumstances is insufficient to convict appellant of rape

Jurisprudence

instructs

that

where

the

circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two

inferences,

one

of

which

is

consistent

with

the

presumption of innocence while the other may be

compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit
the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to support
a judgment of conviction.[26]
Doubtless, accused-appellants defenses of alibi and
denial are weak. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle in
criminal law that a finding of guilt must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions own evidence and not on the
weakness or absence of evidence for the defense. [27] In the
present case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the second assignment of error, we agree with
appellant that his confessions to Bienvenido Pantallano,
Dr. Henry Cawley, and before the barangay captain may
not be used in evidence against him as they are in

violation of his constitutional right to remain silent and to

God-fearing human being abhors. The assault on the child

counsel while under custodial investigation.

is tragic and we condemn in the strongest possible terms

the beastly act committed against her. However, we must

Custodial investigation, as defined in Miranda vs.

uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in

Arizona[28] is any questioning initiated by law enforcement

favor of the accused-appellant when the evidence at hand

officers after a person has been taken into custody or

falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

[34]

significant way.

sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant

Here, the prosecution failed to present evidence

beyond reasonable doubt.

Pantallano and Cawley are law enforcement officers,
WHEREFORE,

the former being a CAFGU member and the latter, an

NBI

officer.

With

respect

to

Pantallano,

the

decision

under

automatic

accused-

review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-

appellants confession was made when the former was

appellant Roldan A. Ochate alias Boy is hereby

pointing his gun at the latter;[29] thus, effectively depriving

ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The

accused-appellant of his freedom of action. On the other

Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause

hand, accused-appellants confession to Dr. Cawley was

the immediate release of accused-appellant unless he is

made when the former is already under detention. [30] Both

being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this

Pantallano and Cawley elicited questions that prompted

Court of the date of his release, or the ground for his

accused-appellant to confess his guilt in the absence of a

continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of

counsel and without being informed of his constitutional

herein decision.

rights. Hence, it is clear that his confessions are

inadmissible in evidence having been obtained in violation

SO ORDERED.

of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987

Constitution, to wit:

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, and Corona, JJ., concur.

commission of an offense shall have the right to be

informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own

Republic of the Philippines

choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,

SUPREME COURT

he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be

Manila

waived except in the presence of counsel.

x x x
(3)

xxx

SECOND DIVISION

xxx

Any confession or admission obtained in violation of

this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence

G.R. No. 101808 July 3, 1992

against him.
x x x

xxx

x x x.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

Likewise, appellants admission of guilt before the

RAMON BOLANOS, accused-appellant.

barangay captain is inadmissible in evidence. Montano

testified that at the time he heard appellant admit that he
committed the crime because he was possessed by the
devil, it was actually in response to the query of the
barangay captain as to why he committed the crime
charged. The question and answer transpired in the
presence of the chief of police. Appellant had already been
singled out as a suspect, arrested, taken into custody and
was being investigated by the police.[31] While it is true
that the barangay captain is not a police officer or a law
enforcement agent, it is clear from the records that he
asked his question in the course of police interrogation
without the accused-appellant being informed of his
rights under the constitution.[32] In People vs. Morada,
[33]

this Court held that the confession made by the

accused-appellant to the barangay captain is inadmissible

because it appeared that the conversation between the two
was part of the then ongoing police investigation.
The rape and killing of eight-year old Rowena Albiso
is beyond question, a dastardly act that every sensible and

PARAS, J.:
This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case No.
1831-M-90, for "Murder", wherein the accused-appellant,
Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the Crime of
Murder and the Court hereby imposed
upon the accused Ramon Bolanos the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life
imprisonment) and to pay the heirs of
the victim P50,000.00 With Costs.
SO ORDERED. (Judgment, p. 6)

The antecedent facts and circumstances, follow:

victim Oscar Pagdalian. (Judgment, p.

6)

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the

testimonies of Patrolmen Marcelo J. Fidelino and

A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by

Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP),

the Solicitor General's Office, dated April 2, 1992, with

Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito

the position that the lower court erred in admitting in

Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and

evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while

documentary exhibits. The testimonial evidence were

on board the police patrol jeep. Said office even postulated

after the fact narration of events based on the report

that: "(A)ssuming that it was given, it was done in

regarding the death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian which

violation of appellant's Constitutional right to be

was communicated to the Police Station where the two (2)

informed, to remain silent and to have a counsel of his

policemen who responded to the incident are assigned and

choice, while already under police custody."

subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution.

(Manifestation, p. 4)

(Appellant's Brief, p. 2)
Being already under custodial investigation while on
Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao

board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police

testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime of

Station where formal investigation may have been

the Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival

conducted, appellant should have been informed of his

they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an

Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the

improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then

1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:

inquired about the circumstances of the incident and were

informed that the deceased was with two (2) companions,

(1) Any person under investigation for

on the previous night, one of whom was the accused who

the commission of an offense shall

had a drinking spree with the deceased and another

have the right to remain silent and to

companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the

have competent and independent

following morning, June 23, 1990. (Ibid., p. 3)

preferably of his own choice. If the

person cannot afford the service of

The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco

counsel, he must be provided with one.

Dayao, further indicated that when they apprehend the

These rights cannot be waived except

accused-appellant, they found the firearm of the deceased

in writing and in the presence of

on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated; that

counsel.

they boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on

the police vehicle and brought them to the police station.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,

In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon

intimidation, or any other means

Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased

which vitiate the free will shall be

Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive." (Ibid., p. 4)

used against him. Secret detention

places, solitary, incommunicado, or

During the trial, it was clearly established that the

alleged oral admission of the appellant was given without

other similar forms of detention are

prohibited.

the assistance of counsel as it was made while on board

the police vehicle on their way to the police station. The

(3) Any confession or admission

specific portion of the decision of the court a quo reads as

obtained in violation of this or the

follows:

preceding section shall be inadmissible

in evidence against him.
. . . the police boarded the two, the
accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio
Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded
to the police station of Balagtas,
Bulacan to be investigated, on the way
the accused told the police, after he
was asked by the police if he killed the

(4) The law shall provide for penal and

civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices and their families.
(Emphasis supplied).

victim, that he killed the victim

because the victim was abusive; this

Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution

statement of the accused was

with respect to the manner by which confession can be

considered admissible in evidence

admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the

against him by the Court because it

alleged confession obtained while on board the police

was given freely and before the

vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides

investigation.

appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable

doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse the

The foregoing circumstances clearly

subject judgment under review.

lead to a fair and reasonable

conclusion that the accused Ramon

WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of

Bolanos is guilty of having killed the

the accused-appellant have been violated, the appellant is

ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Jose Magdaraog had three stab wounds in the chest which

injured his lungs, a hack wound in the occipital region,

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur

fracturing the bone, and a stab wound which penetrated

his heart, five serious wounds in all (Exh. A-2).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Bernarda was prostrate on the floor with her teeth

showing. Her waist was slashed. She was naked from the
waist down. The cloth-belt, where she kept her money,

EN BANC

was missing. Also missing were a pig, four chickens, a

mosquito net, three kettles, one frying pan and plates and

G.R. No. L-62871 May 25, 1984

spoons, all valued at P705.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The door of the hut wits destroyed. The belongings were

vs.
FELICITO TAWAT and LEO TAWAT, accused.
FELICITO TAWAT, accused whose death sentence is
under review.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Julian B. San Juan, Jr. for accused.

scattered on the floor. There was a black underwear with

garter belt marked "Armin" and "No. 7" (Exh. D) which
was later proven to have been worn by accused Felicito
Tawat.
Who were the perpetrators of the dastardly misdeeds?
They were Felicito Tawat, 23, and his first cousin, Leo
Tawat, 16. At about three o'clock in the afternoon of the
following day January 23, 1980, they unexpectedly arrived
at the hut of Floro Ogalesco, '"15, an abaca and rattan
stripper, in the remote and isolated forest of Sitio

PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Catanduanes, finding Felicito Tawat and
Leo Tawat guilty of robbery with triple homicide,
sentencing Felicito to death and Leo to an indeterminate
penalty within the range of reclusion temporal and
ordering them to pay solidarily damages of P32,000 to
each set of heirs of the three victims, Bernarda Salvador,
Lito Siao and Jose Magdaraog. (Crim. Case No. 927.) Leo
did not appeal.
In the morning of January 23, 1980, Andrea MagdaraogSiao and her nephew, Luis Magdaraog, who were residing
in the barrio proper of Agban, Baras, Catanduanes, went
to her hut located in Sitio Banog, a mountainous portion
of Agban. They wanted to find out what happened to her
mother, Bernardo da Salvador Magdaraog, 79, and her
two grandchildren who were staying with the old woman.
The horrible and gory sight, which greeted them, beggars
description (Exh. F):
Sprawled on the floor of the humble abode, four by two
and a half meters, were the dead bodies of Bernarda,
Andrea's son Lito Siao, 13, and Luis' brother Jose, 15,
bathed in their own blood (Exh. B).
Bernarda had six stab wounds in the chest, two stab
wounds in the abdomen (one gaping), a hack wound in the
forehead, fractures on the left temple, mandible and ribs
and a hack wound in the lower left leg, severing the bone
with only a thread of skin remaining, or fourteen wounds
in all (Exh. A).
Lito had eight stab, gaping wounds in the chest, which
penetrated his lungs, six stab wounds in the neck, cutting
the carotid arteries, and a hack wound in the head,
fracturing the skull, fifteen wounds in all (Exh. A-1 and A3, p. 202, Record).

Capipian, Barrio Paraiso, San Miguel, Catanduanes,

Felicito, in the presence of Leo, confessed to Ogalesco that
they were taking refuge in his secluded hut because the
night before they had killed at Sitio Banog, Barrio Agban,
Baras an old woman and two boys, one of whom was
Andrea Siao's son.
Felicito recounted that they were drunk. As they passed
Siao's hut, a dog barked. Felicito killed the dog. This
provoked an old woman to shout at Felicito. He stabbed
and killed her. The two boys shouted also. Felicito killed
one while Leo killed the other. They took the dead dog,
chickens, pork and other belongings in the hut and
proceeded to the house of Julio Tawat, father of Leo, in
Barrio Agban, and from there they repaired to Capipian.
that was the story narrated in court by Ogalesco, linking
Felicito and Leo to the robbery with triple homicide
committed on the evening of January 22, 1980.
The accused's confession to Ogalesco is in part
corroborated by the sworn statement of Alejo Tawat,
father of Felicito. Alejo declared that at about eight o'clock
in the morning of January 23, 1980 he and his brother,
Julio (father of Leo), went to their abaca plantation in
Sitio Calabiga. He found Felicito and Leo cooking chickens
in a kettle. He saw a mosquito net in the hut. A pig had
been killed and was about to be cooked. (Nos. 11 and 12,
Exh. C.)
After Felicito and Leo had finished eating, Alejo and Julio
accompanied their sons to the forest of Capipian. Alejo
and Julio left them there and returned to Barrio J. M.
Alberto, Baras.
From his neighbors, Alejo learned that the mother-in-law
of Jovito Siao, his son Lito and his wife's nephew Jose
were killed and that the pig, blanket, mosquito net, kettle

and chickens of Jovito Siao were stolen (Nos. 15-17 and

criminal career. In 1975, he was charged in the Baras

22-23, Exh. C).

municipal court with theft of two

cocks, alimbuyogon andbalawon (Exh. J). He pleaded

Any doubt as to the connection of Felicito with the robbery

guilty. He was sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment (Exh.

with triple homicide was removed by the finding at the

J-2).

scene of the crime of black shorts with belt (Exh. D). Luis
Magdaraog testified that the shorts were worn by Felicito

He was suspected of being implicated in a case of murder

in the morning of January 22, 1980 (the crime was

and frustrated murder committed in December, 1979 in

committed at night) when he gave cigarettes to Felicito

Tigaon, Camarines Sur (Exh. K and HH).

and Leo (4 tsn October 8, 1981). Leo in his sworn

statement confirmed that the shorts belonged to Felicito

As already noted, for another robo con

(No. 32, Exh. G).

homicidio committed on November 30, 1980 (subsequent

to the instant case), he was convicted and the judgment

Felicito relied on an alibi. He testified that he was in

was affirmed in People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62547,

Mercedes, Camarines Norte from 1963 to October 1980.

December 21, 1983,supra, where the death penalty was

This claim is manifestly false because he was only seven

commuted to reclusion perpetua.

years old in 1963. He finished the sixth grade at Barrio

Agban, Baras in 1972 (Exh. I, p. 211, Rollo). His father

The crime in this case may be mitigated by drunkenness

saw him on January 22, 1980 at Barrio J.M. Alberto,

but it was aggravated by dwelling, abuse of

Baras (No. 5, Exh. C; p. 46, Record; 26 tsn Oct. 6, 1982).

superiority,despoblado and disregard of sex and old age in

the case of the 79-year-old woman victim. The second and

The trial court concluded that although there was no

third homicides may be also regarded as an additional

eyewitness testimony to the perpetration of the crime,

aggravating circumstance (People vs. Pedroso, L-32997,

nevertheless, the totality of the circumstantial evidence is

July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 599, 609).

so overwhelming as to prove Felicito's guilt to a moral

certainty.

We agree with the learned trial judge that the guilt of the
accused was established beyond reasonable doubt. The

Felicito was not immediately arrested. He, with Nestor

testimony of Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is

Rojo and Jimmy Tarraya, committed another robbery with

competent evidence.

homicide and frustrated homicide on November 30,

1980 at Barrio Bugao, Bagamanoc, Catanduanes. Felicito

"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging

stabbed to death with a dagger Jovita Lim, a storekeeper,

his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence

while a companion got the loot of P110.

against him" (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). What

Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as

He was convicted and sentenced to death. This court

part of the res gestae.

affirmed the judgment of conviction but commuted the

death penalty to reclusion perpetua (People vs. Tawat,

The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a

G.R. No. 62547, December 21, 1983).

witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify

as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and

In connection with that case, Felicito executed a

understood all of it. An oral confession need not be

confession on January 9, 1981 before the chief of police of

repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its

Bagamanoc, Catanduanes. Incidentally, he stated therein

substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)

that he wanted to get out of Catanduanes because he was

wanted by the police for the killing of three persons in

"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession

Barrio Agban, Baras. he had hidden himself in the hut of

may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies

Ogalesco in Capipian, San Miguel. (Nos. 13 and 18, Exh.

that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers

H-6, p. 163, Record.)

the substance

Counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in

of the conversation or statement made by the accused."

relying on that admission of Felicito in his confession

(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th. Ed., Niblack, sec.

which he later repudiated. He argues that the confession

278, p. 551.)

during custodial interrogation cannot be admissible in

evidence, as held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, G. R. No.

In U.S. vs. Corrales, 28 Phil. 362, a malversation case,

61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.

Jose Corrales, clerk of the Court of First Instance,

received on June 6, 1913 P321.88 from a man named

That admission was only alluded to in passing by the trial

Melliza as payment of the fine and costs imposed on

court. It was not the basis for Felicito's conviction in this

Melizza. Corrales did not issue any receipt but merely

case. His guilt was predicated on his confession to

gave Melliza a copy of the judgment of conviction with a

Ogalesco which was not taken during custodial

note at the bottom: "Multas y costas pagadas".

interrogation. Ogalesco was not a peace officer.

A week later, or on June 13, the auditor examined
While still a teenager, Felicito, who, as already stated,

Corrales' accounts. The sum paid by Melliza was not

finished the elementary course in 1972, embarked on a

turned over to him. On June 14, an information for

misappropriation was filed against Corrales. In the

[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]

afternoon of that day, Corrales went to the auditor's house

and confessed to him that he placed that amount of
P321.88 in the office safe only in the afternoon of June 13
after the auditor's examination.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accusedappellant.

On the witness stand, the accused claimed that the

DECISION

amount .had always been in the drawer for personal funds

in his office safe. This testimony was contradicted by the
auditor who testified on Corrales' confession that he
placed the amount only in the afternoon of June 13.
Corrales' counsel assailed the admissibility of the
auditor's testimony.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision [1] promulgated
on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case

It was held that the auditor's testimony was admissible

and properly taken into consideration by the trial. court.
Judge Graciano P. Gayapa. Jr. acted corrective in
imposing the death penalty. In the annals of criminal law,
no one deserved the death penalty more than Felicito
Tawat. Society must protect itself against a dangerous
criminal like him "by taking his life in retribution for his
offense and as an example and warning to others". "In
these days of rampant criminality, it should have a
salutary effect upon the criminally minded to know that
the courts do not shirk their disagreeable duty to impose
the death penalty in cases where the law so requires"
(People vs. Carillo and Raquenio, 85 Phil. 611; 635).
Justice Montemayor says: "We have no quarrel with the
trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as to the
wisdom or folly of the death penalty Today, there are quite
a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
"However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions" (People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35,43).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with
the slight modification that Felicito Tawat is also ordered
to pay the heirs of Bernarda Magdaraog the value of the
articles taken in the sum of P705. No costs.

No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996,
appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about
September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill,
Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who was caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then
and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant,
cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana
plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from
which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or
derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured
shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the
government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned
and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3
Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde,

SO ORDERED.

Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of

Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed

informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation,
allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung,
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.[3] The prohibited plants were

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Relova and De la Fuente, JJ.,

took no part.

allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector

Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his

Fernando, C.J., votes for the imposition of the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, Accordingly, in the absence of the
necessary ten votes for the death sentence to be validly
imposed, Felicito Tawat is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of

SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest
the cultivator of same.[4]

EN BANC

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following

day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left

for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly

uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his

being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the

hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next

nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at

to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. [18] The police

the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found

team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde.

appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to

On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace

look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and

officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police

saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in

officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because

two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.

of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging

PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited

activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana,

plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that

otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation."[19] At the

they were his.[6] The police uprooted the seven marijuana

police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew

plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.[7]The police took

nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.[20]

[5]

photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.

[8]

Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants,

On cross-examination, appellant declared that there

weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine

were

National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva

his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.

Vizcaya for analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the

[21]

Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon

an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a grudge

microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic

against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were

hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication

found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's.

for

[22]

marijuana.[10] She

next

conducted

chemical

ten

other

houses

around

the

vicinity

of

The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua,

examination, the results of which confirmed her initial

impressions.She found as follows:

The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its

rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of

appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not

uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white

planted in the lot he was cultivating. [23]Tipay presented a

sack with markings.

sketch

he

made,[24] which

showed

the

location

of

marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts

xxx

of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor. According to

Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away

"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the

from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from

above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test

the hut of Carlito Pascua.[25] Tipay admitted on cross-

for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."

examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he

[11]

made the measurements.[26] He further stated that his

The prosecution also presented a certification from

basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

of the seized plants was the information given him by the

that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the

police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the

growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of

location of said plants.[27]

Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated

Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [12] This

Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court

lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was

held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and

acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the

ownership of marijuana plants as follows:

lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued

in his favor.[13]

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants

As

its

sole

witness,

the

defense

presented

punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of

appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M.,

1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death

September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in

by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.

Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose

identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the
latter to "see something."

[14]

"SO ORDERED."[28]

This unknown person then

brought appellant to the place where the marijuana

plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from

Appellant assigns the following errors for our

consideration:

his nipa hut.[15] Five armed policemen were present and

they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was

then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana

growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof,
SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants.[16] Appellant was so nervous and
afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.[17]
The police then took a photo of him standing in
front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7)
MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR
INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The

CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF

policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a

SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE

verification. When they found the said plants, it was too

THE INADMISSIBILITY OF

much to expect them to apply for a search warrant.In view

THE CORPUSDELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF

of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk

THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT

for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason

to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any
search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot

III

was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE

fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep

trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to
protect, hence, no search warrant was required."[30]

OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE

The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that

LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS

WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE

a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a

ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT

judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is

PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.

deemed

[29]

"unreasonable."

Evidence

procured

on

the

occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed

tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree

Simply stated, the issues are:

(1) Was

the

search

and

and
seizure

of

the

marijuana plants in the present case

lawful?

evidence against the accused?

inadmissible

in

evidence

for

evidence shall be

any

purpose

in

any

proceeding.[33]

issued by a judge after personal determination of the

existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the
police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least

(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's

guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's

farm. Their

informant

had

revealed

his

name

to

them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted

(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection

correct?

was pinpointed. From the information in their possession,

they could have convinced a judge that there was probable
cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did

The first and second issues will be jointly discussed

because they are interrelated.
contends

that

not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended

the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six
hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore

there

was

unlawful

search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had
more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second,
that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot
does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on
the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392
US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect
that the protection against unreasonable government
intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that the records clearly show that there was no
search made by the police team, in the first place. The
OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question
were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five
(5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact,
immediately spotted by the police officers when they
reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus,
in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must,
therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under
the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search
and confiscation made by the police team on the finding
that:

be excluded.[32] Such

In the instant case, there was no search warrant

(2) Were the seized plants admissible in

Appellant

should

that the protection against illegal search and seizure is

constitutionally

mandated

and

only

under

specific

instances are searches allowed without warrants. [34] The

mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers
both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness

of

law

enforcers,

regardless

of

the

praiseworthiness of their intentions.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's
contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be
where they are; and
(c) the

evidence

must

be

immediately

apparent; and
(d) plain

view

justified

mere

seizure

evidence without further search.[35]

of

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified

that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant.

[36]

he was asked who planted them. It made the following

observation:

Hence, there

was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the

"It may be true that the admission to the police by the

search of appellant's premises. Note further that the

accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made

police

in the absence of any independent and competent

team

was

dispatched

to

appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the

counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police

prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"

verification; under custodial investigation. His admission

applies only where the police officer is not searching for

is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of

evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes

the constitutional fiat that admission given during

across an incriminating object.

custodial investigation is not admissible if given without

[37]

Clearly, their discovery

of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note

any counsel."[42]

the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the

area, they first had to "look around the area" before they

Appellant now argues that his admission of

could spot the illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized

ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be

marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a

used against him for being violative of his right to counsel

"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana

during the police investigation.Hence, it was error for the

plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye

trial court to have relied upon said admission of

and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be

ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted

made to apply.

by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was

meant to elicit information on the ownership of the

Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that

marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the

just because the marijuana plants were found in an

investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and

unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection

independent counsel should have assisted him, when the

afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by

police sought information from him regarding the

agents of the State. The right against unreasonable

ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the

searches

of

presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be

one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and

and

seizures

made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of

other possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the right of

ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his

personal

constitutional right to counsel during investigation.

security"[40] of

the

is

the

immunity

individual. As

appellant

correctly points out, what is sought to be protected

against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not

The

Office

of

the

Solicitor

General

believes

places.[41] To conclude otherwise would not only mean

otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet

swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the

under custodial investigation when he admitted to the

absurd logic that for a person to be immune against

police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to

unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his

home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The
Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street
as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.

competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not

yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any
false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him
indicates that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by police officers was not

We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue,

sufficiently rebutted.

that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during

an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue,
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants
as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants
cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be
used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and
relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.

around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to

appellant's

marijuana

plants

under investigation for the commission of an offense shall

have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and
(3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
[43]

An investigation begins when it is no longer a general

inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a

suspect,

We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves

prove

The Constitution plainly declares that any person

guilt. Having

declared

inadmissible

in

the

evidence

seized
against

appellant, we must now address the question of whether

the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to
convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise
relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect
that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when

i.e.,

when

the

police

investigator

starts

interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in

connection with an alleged offense.[44] The moment the
police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a person suspected of having committed
an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.[45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a
tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well
as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. While the police

operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said

offense charged. These were the seized marijuana plants,

information,

issued

and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of

instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana

ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other

cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant

than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented

in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as

to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier

a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a

discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have

general inquiry.[46]

admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to

the

police

chief

had

likewise

have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said

Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did

evidence is doubly tainted.

not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana

so we just asked him and I think there is no need to

First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana

inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are

plants

just asking him..."[47] In trying to elicit information from

constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and

appellant, the police was already investigating appellant

seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for

as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial

having been conducted without the requisite judicial

investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not

warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly

yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning

establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has

warrant.There was no showing of such urgency or

been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his

necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate

freedom of action in any significant way." [48] As a suspect,

seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To

two armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his

reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to

inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other

prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the

armed policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to arrest

constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the

him.

inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an

[50]

From these circumstances, we may infer that

appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of

were

obtained

in

violation

of

appellant's

unlawful search and seizure.

action in a significant way, even before the actual

arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police

Second,

the

confession

of

ownership

of

the

made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the

marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the

marijuana plants.

police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also

violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession

Moreover,

extrajudicial

was made without the assistance of competent and

confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a

independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus,

confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following

said confession cannot be used to convict appellant

requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be

without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement

made with the assistance of competent and independent

that a suspect in a criminal investigation must have the

counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in

services of competent and independent counsel during

writing.

such investigation.

[51]

we

find

appellant's

The records show that the admission by

appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal

admission allegedly made by an accused during the

In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial

investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the

evidence as

time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation

ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove

is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to

appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional

counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.

competence.

[52]

to

appellant's

voluntary

confession

of

Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth",

if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a

The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal

valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is

prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of

until the contrary is proved..."[59] To justify the conviction

coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that

[53]

quantum

of

evidence

sufficient

to

overcome

the

It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that

constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution

before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the

must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw

prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable

strength from the weakness of the evidence for the

doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is

accused.[60] Absent the required degree of proof of an

the author thereof.

The evidence arrayed against the

accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.[61] In this

accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,

case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the

competent.

crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional

Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.

infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any

Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a

purpose in any proceeding."[62] Nor can the confession

character that the court or judge is bound to receive it,

obtained during the uncounselled investigation be used

that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."[58]

against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence

[55]

it

must

[54]

likewise

be

credible

and

[56]
[57]

against him.[63] Without these proffered but proscribed

In the instant case, the trial court relied on two

materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining

pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the

evidence did not even approximate the quantum of

evidence

necessary

to

warrant

appellant's

conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his

favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that
he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are
declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence
failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that
is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."[64]
WHEREFORE, the

decision

promulgated

on

February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of

Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death
penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered

RELEASED

immediately

from

confinement

unless held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan,

Mendoza,

Panganiban,

Purisima,

Pardo,

Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129211. October 2, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. WILFREDO RODRIGUEZ Y CULO and
LARRY ARTELLERO Y RICO, accused,
[1]

LARRY ARTELLERO Y RICO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated November 13, 1995
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29,[2] in
Criminal Case No. 91-99526, convicting appellant and his
co-accused of the crime of murder, sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, ordering them to
pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, and
to pay the costs.
Appellant Larry Artellero was employed as a
cement mixer and helper of co-accused Wilfredo
Rodriguez, a mason in the construction of the upper floors
of the Far East Bank and Trust Company, Blumentritt
Branch, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Both were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank
security guard, Ramon Matias y Ibay. The trial court
found both guilty of murder. Both appealed. However,
Rodriguez
withdrew
his
appeal
for
financial
reasons. Although only Artellero is the appellant now, in
view of the circumstances obtaining in this case, we are
compelled to review Rodriguezs conviction as well.
The facts of the case are as follows:

On October 11, 1991, early in the morning, at the

Far East Bank and Trust Company branch office in Rizal
Avenue cor. Batangas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, a messenger
discovered the lifeless body of Matias, inside the bank
premises. The body was hogtied with a nylon cord, and
bore 32 stab wounds. The chairs and tables inside the
bank were in disarray. The banks emergency exit vault
bore chisel marks. At around 6:00 A.M., SPO3 Mendoza
and two other officers of the Western Police District
arrived after receiving a report on the incident. They
interviewed the bank janitor, a Mr. Cawagdan, and the
other security guard, Dionisio Vargas. Then they ordered
the transfer of the body of Matias to the morgue. The
police found a bloodstained scissors mate inside a podium
located near the main entrance of the bank. The head
guard of the banks security agency (Leopard) also
reported that three .38 cal. revolvers and five 12 gauge
shotguns were missing from the guard rostrum.[3]
At around 4:00 P.M., SPO3 Jamoralin and four
other
WPD
policemen
conducted
a
follow-up
investigation. They learned from Vargas that there was an
on-going construction on the upper floors of the bank, and
that appellant and his co-accused had access to the bank
after office hours. SPO3 Jamoralin asked Vargas to
accompany them to the barracks of the construction
workers where they saw appellant at the ground floor of
the construction site. On the third floor, they saw the coaccused,
Rodriguez,
packing
his
personal
belongings. When asked why he was packing, Rodriguez
replied that he had nothing more to do (at the site).
SPO3 Jamoralin and the other police officers saw a pair of
worn-out maong pants on appellants bed, which had
reddish stains on the right leg. The police also saw
reddish stains on accuseds shirt. Rodriguez explained
that he had a wound on his neck. However, when the
police examined his neck, they found no wound.The police
then arrested Rodriguez and appellant and brought them
to the police station for interrogation. The police took the
maong and t-shirt and had them examined by the
Chemistry Section of National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).[4]
On October 15, 1991, Rodriguez executed a sworn
statement confessing that he and appellant together with
one Rading Mendoza, and two other men whose names he
did not know, killed Matias. Rodriguez was assisted by
Atty. Procopio Lao III, of the Public Attorneys Office.
On October 18, 1991, appellant and Rodriguez were
charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under
the following Information:[5]
That on or about October 11, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of
RAMON MATIAS, a security guard on duty at Far East
Bank and Trust Company, by then and there stabbing the
latter several times with a bladed instrument, hitting him
on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon
the said RAMON MATIAS mortal stab wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death; that
once the said RAMON MATIAS was attacked, assaulted
and/or killed in the manner above-described, the said
accused, with intent of gain, take, rob and carry away
three (3) pieces of caliber .38 revolvers and five (5) pieces
of 12 gauge shotguns, all valued not less than P5.00;
belonging to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, to
the damage and prejudice of the said bank in the
aforesaid amount of P5.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to Law.
Upon arraignment on November 22, 1991, appellant
and Rodriguez entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
[6]

During trial, the prosecution presented the

following witnesses: (1) SPO3 Jaime D. Mendoza, (2)
SPO3 Rodolfo A. Jamoralin, Jr., both of the Crimes
against Persons Division of the WPD, (3) Atty. Procopio
Lao III of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and (4)
Carolyn Y. Custodio, Supervisor of the Chemistry District
of the NBI.

WHEREFORE, the accused Larry Artellero Y Rico and

Wilfredo Rodriguez Y Culo are hereby found guilty of the
crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code and each of them are (sic)
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 by each of
them to the heirs of the victim Ramon Matias Y Ibay and
to pay the costs.
The charge of Robbery with Homicide is dismissed it
being not the proper charge. The accused are acquitted
from the charge of Robbery for insufficiency of evidence.

Custodio testified that the reddish stains on

Rodriguezs pants and shirt were positive for type O
human blood, which was also the blood type of Rodriguez.

SO ORDERED.

[7]

[17]

The testimony of Dr. Dario L. Gajardo, Chief and

Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, was
dispensed with upon admission of the defense of the
authenticity of the Necropsy Report,[8] which stated that
the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds
in the body.[9]
The prosecution likewise offered in evidence the
photograph of the body of the victim when it was found,
the nylon cord used to tie him, the Sworn Statement of
security guard Dionisio Vargas, the Certification issued by
the Leopard Agency as to the missing firearms, the sworn
statement of Rodriguez, the Progress Report of SPO3
Jamoralin, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, the
Letter-Request of Chief Inspector Jose Pring addressed to
the Director of the NBI, the NBI Laboratory Report No.
B-91-1613, the maong pants and shirt, and the PNP
Medico-Legal Report.[10]
After presentation of the prosecutions evidence,
appellant filed a Demurrer to the Evidence [11]on the
grounds that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
hearsay. Upon the Opposition[12] of the public prosecutor,
the trial court denied the demurrer for lack of merit.[13]
The evidence for the defense consists of the
testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Evangelo U.
Javellano, Jr., Bank Manager of the FEBTC, Blumentritt
branch, who testified that bank policy prohibits the
guards from allowing persons into the bank after office
hours, except for official visitors coming from higher
ranks,[14] (2) appellant, and (3) Rodriguez.
On the stand, both Rodriguez and appellant
admitted that they were provincemates from Masbate and
co-workers in the construction site. They slept inside the
building on the night before the incident but denied any
participation in killing. They claimed that they learned of
the killing only on October 11, 1991, at around 7:00 A.M.,
when they saw many people milling around the
area.Rodriguez claimed that on the night of October 11,
1991, he was mauled by policemen to confess to the
crime. Appellant, on his part, testified that the policemen
merely placed him outside the room where Rodriguez was
being interrogated, and that the police did not take any
statement from him. Appellant also denied owning the
maong pants which the police said were taken from his
bed.[15]
After due trial, the trial court rendered a
decision[16] finding appellant and Rodriguez guilty of
murder, instead of robbery with homicide, disposing thus:

Only appellant pursued his appeal. In his brief,

he contends that the trial court erred in:
I. ... GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF COACCUSED, WILFREDO RODRIGUEZ, ALLEGED
CO-CONSPIRATOR, IN PROVING CONSPIRACY
AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW
PROBABILITY OF PARTICIPATION OF LARRY
ARTILLERO AS CO-CONSPIRATOR.
II. ... HOLDING THAT THE MAONG PANTS
STAINED WITH HUMAN BLOOD TYPE O IS
THAT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT, AND AS PART
OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF GUILT
OR PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME.
III. ... HOLDING THAT THE FACT OF WORKING
AND SLEEPING TOGETHER WITH COACCUSED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS, AS PART OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO FINGER
POINT GUILT TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV. ... RENDERING DECISION MORE SERIOUS
THAN CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.

Instead of filing an Appellees Brief, the Office of the

Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu
of Appellees Brief[18] contending that:
(1) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED WILFREDO
RODRIGUEZ AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED,
APPELLANT LARRY ARTELLERO.
(2) ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT
THAT ACCUSED RODRIGUEZS
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION IS ADMISSIBLE
AGAINST APPELLANT ARTELLERO, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
The OSG points out that the prosecution failed to
prove the existence of a conspiracy between appellant and
Rodriguez independent of the extrajudicial confession of
the latter. The fact that Rodriguez and appellant have
been working in the construction site for six months prior
to the incident is insufficient to make a finding of
conspiracy. Further, the fact that type O blood stains were
found on appellants maong pants and Rodriguezs t-shirt
has no probative value since appellant denied owning the
maong pants, and more importantly, the victims blood
type was not examined, hence there was no point of
comparison. Lastly, the OSG contends that the trial court

erred in convicting appellant of murder considering that

the Information failed to allege the circumstances
qualifying the killing to murder.
The resolution of the issue regarding the guilt of
appellant, in our view, hinges on whether the extrajudicial
confession of accused Rodriguez is admissible not only
against him but also against appellant. We find that
Rodriguezs confession is constitutionally flawed so that it
could not be used as evidence against them at all.
The four fundamental requisites for the
admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be
in writing.[19]
We find the second requisite lacking. Prosecution
witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and
appellant were arrested and brought to the police station
at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991. [20] The records
show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was
taken down by Pat. David D. Tuazon at 2:00 P.M. of
October 15, 1991.[21] Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that
the police investigators called him at around 2:00 P.M. of
October 15, 1991, and that he conferred with the accused
for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the
extrajudicial confession.[22] Evidently, Rodriguez and
appellant were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the
PAO was called only on the fourth day of detention when
accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under
the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant
were arrested and brought to the police station, they were
already under custodial investigation.
In the case of People v. Bolanos,[23] we held that an
accused who is on board the police vehicle on the way to
the police station is already under custodial investigation,
and should therefore be accorded his rights under the
Constitution. In this case, the teaching of Bolanos clearly
went unheeded.
The rights of persons under custodial investigation
is enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution which provides:

appellant were arrested by the police in the afternoon of

October 11, 1991, they were already the suspects in the
slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias, and should
have been afforded the rights guaranteed by Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the right
to counsel. The records do not show that Rodriguez and
appellant, at the time of their arrest in the afternoon of
October 11, 1991, were informed of the wellknown Miranda rights. Worse, they were not provided
with competent and independent counsel during the
custodial investigation prior to the execution of the
extrajudicial confession.
In People v. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we
declared as inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of
accused where the interrogation started at 9:00 A.M. and
his lawyer arrived only at 11:00 A.M.. Jurisprudence is
clear that an accused under custodial investigation
must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the
very start thereof.[25] In this case, Rodriguez and appellant
were in the hands of the police for about four days without
the assistance of counsel. In People v. Compil,[26] we held
that:
The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by
the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus
in People v. de Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said that
admissions obtained during custodial investigation
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to
writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still
flawed under the Constitution.
So flagrant a violation of the constitutional right to
counsel of the accused cannot be countenanced. In People
v. Olivarez, Jr.,[27] we explained that:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under

custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice
of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. What is
sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very
mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to
prosecute and thereafter convict him. These
constitutional guarantees have been made available to
protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if
not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any

other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

Moreover, so stringent is this requirement that even

if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible
in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion, or even if
it had been voluntarily given.[28]

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of

this or section 17 hereof (right against self-incrimination)
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violation of this section as well as compensation for the
rehabilitation of victims of tortures or similar practices,
and their families.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial
stage when the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular person as a suspect. [24] When Rodriguez and

Since the extrajudicial confession executed by

Rodriguez was given in violation of the safeguards in Art.
III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution, we hold that
Rodriguezs confession is totally inadmissible, and it was
error for the trial court to use it in convicting Rodriguez
and appellant.
Insofar as Rodriguez is concerned, the trial court
relied on his extrajudicial confession in convicting
him. Aside from said extrajudicial confession, however,
there is a dearth of evidence on record, whether direct or
circumstantial, linking Rodriguez to the commission of
the crime.

As to appellant, the trial court convicted him on the

basis of two pieces of circumstantial evidence which show
conspiracy: (1) the extrajudicial confession of accused
implicating him as one of the perpetrators and (2) the fact
that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant
was found positive of type O blood. The former being
inadmissible and the latter being of no probative value
since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not
taken for purposes of comparison, there remains nothing
to support appellants conviction.

withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons.

[30]
However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court provides that [a]n appeal taken by one or more [of]
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is
favorable and applicable to the latter. As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence,
appellants acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to
Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,

even granting arguendo that the extrajudicial confession
of accused was admissible, Section 33 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that such confession is only
admissible against the confessant. In order to be
admissible against his co-accused, Section 30 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court require there must be independent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove
conspiracy. In this case, however, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy.

convicting appellant LARRY ARTELLERO y RICO and

co-accused WILFREDO RODRIGUEZ y CULO is hereby
REVERSED. Appellant and Rodriguez are ACQUITTED
of the crime of murder and ordered immediately released
from prison, unless held for another lawful cause. The
Director of Prisons is directed to inform this Court of his
compliance, within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision. No costs.

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the

present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties.[29] The records show that Rodriguez had

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.