DEFENSE OF PROPERTY

damages.

People v. Apolinar

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting
defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person.

Facts:
The accused, armed with a shotgun, was looking
over his land. He noticed a man carrying a bundle
on his shoulder. Believing that the man had stolen
his palay, the accused fired in the air and then at
him, causing his death.
Issue:
WON accused can invoke defense of property
Held:
No. Defense of property is not of such importance
a right to life, and defense of property can be
invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it
is coupled with an attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property.

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389

(1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of
murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer
and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez
shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two
were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard
sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and asked them to
stop destroying his house and asking if they could
talk things over. However, he was ignored and the
construction was continued. Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun.
He also shot Rubia who was running towards the
jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to
the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle
with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the
time of the shooting, the civil case was still
pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of
property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At
time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and
ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given
6 months to remove his house from the land.
Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person
and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty.
Aggravating
circumstances
of
evident
premeditation
offset
by
the
mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and

chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the
part of the victim. However, this aggression was
not done on the person of the victim but rather on
his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts
did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to
Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the
position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the
victim
was
the
original
aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendantappellant although he acted in defense of his
rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if
the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC
enumerates these requisites:

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar,

there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had
given Narvaez 6 months and he should
have left him in peace before time was up,
instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and
putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code
also provides that possession may not be
acquired through force or intimidation;
while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in
his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed

to prevent or repel attack. In the case,
killing was disproportionate to the attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of

person defending himself. Here, there was
no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is
credited with the special mitigating circumstance
of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on
account of provocation by the deceased. Also,
assault was not deliberately chosen with view to

kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was

also no direct evidence of planning or preparation
to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.

People vs. Genosa,

2004

January 15,

Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome

The wife had suffered maltreatment from her
husband for over eight years. She was 8 months
pregnant when, one evening, her husband came
home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting
that his wife "might as well be killed so there will
be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a
drawer where he kept a gun, but was not able to
open the drawer because it was locked. So he got
out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She
was able to hit his arm with a pipe and escape into
another room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering
that her husband had been inflicting on her, and
thinking that he might really kill her and her
unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the gun.
She shot her husband, who was by then asleep on
the bed. She was tried and convicted for parricide,
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20
years and 1 day to 40 years) to death. On appeal,
she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form
of self-defense.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman
who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights.
FACTS:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the
15November1995, attacked and wounded his
husband, which ultimately led to his death.
According to the appellant she did not provoke her
husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. The Appellant
said she was frightened that her husband would
hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to
be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as
she
was
suffering
from
eclampsia
and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely
on
December
1,
1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage
she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards
her that night was because 'he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by

specialists, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted
the killing of her husband, she was then found
guilty
of
Parricide,
with
the
aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.
ISSUES:
Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying
circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be
held liable for the aggravating circumstance
of
treachery?
No, since the existence of Battered woman
syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to
be suffering in the relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered
in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient
time interval between the unlawful aggression of
the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children's bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be
no self-defense. And absence of aggression
does not warrant complete or incomplete
self-defense.
No, There is treachery when one commits any of
the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without
risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably
as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no
place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot
be
appreciated
as
a
qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said
to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not
conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally
chose a specific means of successfully attacking

her husband without any risk to herself from any

retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary,
it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment
when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence
of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the doubt should be resolved in her
favor.
HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there
being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating
circumstance
attending
her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome)
as self defense be appreciated?
Where the brutalized person is already suffering
from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not
required. Incidents of domestic battery usually
have a predictable pattern. To require the battered
person to await an obvious, deadly attack before
she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the
victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication
can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
Considering such circumstances and the existence
of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.