BUAYA vs POLO

FACTS:
> Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul
and set aside the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case
and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
> Petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to
transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for
and in behalf of the private respondent.
> The petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions
and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the
City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a
shortage in the amount.
> Charged with estafa, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
> It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no
jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly
misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
> Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature
because the fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case involving the same
alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction
complained of is not proper for a criminal action.
> The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the
denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be
questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of this criminal case for estafa?
RULING:
YES. This Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether
or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the
jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal

cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the
findings the court may make after the trial.
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof
took place.
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of
Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be
prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place.
One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party.
The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The
failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused
damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

PALANA vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks
Law".
> Said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
when presented for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.
> He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as charged (sum of P590,000.00).

> Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
trial courts decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the findings of the lower court that the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case, despite the fact that at the time the accused was
arraigned the R.A 7691 Expanding the Jurisdiction of the MTC was already in effect?
RULING:
NO. Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without
merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action15 and not during the arraignment of the
accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on
August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg.
129 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
by the latter.
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos , or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not
more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and
imprisonment17 at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is
P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the
case.18 The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action
because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than
P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the
Metropolitan Trial Court"19 on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of
jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it
is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691
contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or
decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of the RTC
over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the
Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature.

TREAS vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City, was then
mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the
appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee
and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name.
Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt
Margarita.
> Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt prepared
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
> When she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.

When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used
the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the
money.
> Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check, when the check was
deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason
that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands,
appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.
> During arraignment, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty.
Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.
> The RTC of Makati rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa,
also affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the Estafa case?
RULING:
NO. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction .
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC
of Makati City.
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by
the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati
City.
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to
where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was
allegedly committed.
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a
bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered
motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court
by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law
Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000
provides that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred. This fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. This principle echoes
more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his
advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the
charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that
city has no jurisdiction over the case.

UY vs CA
FACTS:
> An appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding the accused
ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340,
inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal
Code.
> Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the
husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. Rosa resigned. The friendly
relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a
partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosa's
lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting
to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business;
however, because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued.

> Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with
the funds contributed by Consolacion evidence by various receipts. But, unfortunately,
the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership
documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her
investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
> Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
> After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but
convicted her of the charges under B.P. Bldg. 22. 5 On appeal, respondent appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law?
RULING:
NO. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction
in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 8 And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22
were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila.
The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different
offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction
each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and
have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrantconviction. For violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are
neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker,
drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Hence, it is
incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of
Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over
the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to
be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense
have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a
restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence
to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the
contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that
petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the
alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in
Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no
proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge
of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for
the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

CAMPANANO, Jr vs DATUIN
FACTS:
> On complaint for Estafa by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its
president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr.,an Information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against respondent.
> After trial, respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71
of Pasig City by Decision of May 3, 1999. Respondents appeal before the Court of
Appeals, and eventually with this Court, was dismissed and the decision became final
and executor.
> Later claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against him was
false, unfounded and malicious in light of newly discovered (by respondent) evidence,
respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, punishable
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City against petitioner.
> Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed respondents complaint for
incriminating innocent person in this wise:
It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City, and the
testimony given by respondent David Campaano, Jr. was also
made in Pasig City, this office has no jurisdiction on the aboveentitled complainant.
> Respondent elevated the case to the DOJ which dismissed the petition.
> The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the resolutions of the DOJ and directed to be
remanded to the City Prosecutors Office of Quezon City for further investigation
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City has jurisdiction
over the case?
RULING:
NO. It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction; and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information.
For purposes of determining the place where the criminal action is to be instituted,

Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides
that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. This is a fundamental principle, the purpose of which is
not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.
The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not allege that the crime charged or
any of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City. The only reference to
Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is where respondent resides.
Respondents complaint-affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since
petitioners Counter-Affidavit to respondents complaint for incriminating innocent person
was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had
acquired jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.
In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear probable
cause of incriminating innocent person under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes [a]ny person who, by any act not
constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the
commission of a crime. The crime known as incriminating innocent person has the
following elements: (1) the offender performs an act; (2) by such act he directly
incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime; and (3) such
act does not constitute perjury.
Article 363 does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution someone
prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court. It refers to the acts of PLANTING
evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecution but tend
directly to cause false prosecutions.

PEOPLE vs TAROY

PEOPLE vs GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

FACTS:

> The public prosecutor charged Alejo Taroy y Tarnate (Taroy) with two counts of rape
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
> Taroy denied raping DES on the occasions mentioned. He averred that the testimony
was a fabrication made upon the prodding of her aunt who disliked him.
> The RTC found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> Taroy challenged the Benguet RTC's jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having
testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in Pucsusan
Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroy's testimony that their
residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the
jurisdictional requirement.
> Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also held that the
prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC.

> Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus filed by the Solicitor General and State
Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal
Case to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District.
> A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay,
Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein.
> Several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the
destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman.
> Charging that the seventeen private respondents herein of arson with homicide,
together with 82 other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or
cause to be burned several residential houses.
> The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order authorizing Judge Mario
Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of
justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179.
> The prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to
the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer
of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons
of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits.
> The respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative
Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest
of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases
involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer
was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of
these cases.
> In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and mandamus,
charging abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases of rape against Taroy?
RULING:
YES. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor
subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law. Thus, for
territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the
proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients took place.
The informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were committed
in the victim and the offender's house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon,
Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject
offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet.
Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad
that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, that RTC's jurisdiction to hear the
case is beyond dispute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an abuse of discretion in the denial of transfer of the
criminal case to another court?

RULING:
YES. We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the
Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such
power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon
the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly
depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities
of the accused or civil party. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit
Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First
Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed
therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases
to the circuit courts.
The very terms of Administrative Order by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by
the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the
impropriety of imperatively directing transfer of specified cases.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order
of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon
the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents
herein should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District
because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives
would be endangered. Where they can be free from tension and terrorism. The fear thus
expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the
circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show
that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora
Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified
and at large.
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who
had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila,
renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside
of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of
truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made,
because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who
commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is
committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took place.

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of
cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice,
so demands.
That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the
hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and
justice.

PEOPLE vs PILOTIN
FACTS:
> Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the
New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas from
municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he is charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions.
> As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be
confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political
enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity.
> Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the
trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer of the venue of the trial is valid?
RULING:
YES. Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to
"order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is
involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place
where his life would be imperiled.

Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for
transfer of venue

ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of venue is justified?

We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely
the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal
Case No. 3949 to another court and appear to be the most convenient arrangement.
The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing defendant
Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing.

MONDIGUING vs ABAD
FACTS:
> Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of
double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in the Court of First Instance of
Ifugao Province. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was
wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the
accused in that case have not been arraigned.
> Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to transfer the venue of the case
to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair and
impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First
Instance of that province is a protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former
Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify
for fear of harassment and reprisals. Their lives and the lives of their witnesses and
lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms
spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing
factions.
> The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but he
invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the case may be
transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao.
> Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness or
truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue and prayed that the petition be
dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of
the People of the Philippines. He said that the crime charged was not "committed
personally against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the governor
is one of the victims mentioned in the information.

RULING:
YES. The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified.
A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or
flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and
effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in
the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime".
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It "possesses
inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending
in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the
same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over
the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice"
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and
considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he
should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio.

PEOPLE vs SOLA
FACTS:
> Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of
First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile
deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo
Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.
> Armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common
graves containing the 7 bodies.
> The PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate
complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, et al.

> After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other
evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued
an order for their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove
that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to
post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and
Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released
from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed
the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch
in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be
jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in
Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused
remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats
made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the
remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.
> On the very next day, Court issued the following resolution on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of venue is justified?
RULING:
YES. In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to
trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts
have been established." Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the
Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its
above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are
fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to
testify or testimony falsely to save their lives.
It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to
some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has
on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must
ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of
venue.

[A.M. No. 10-1-06-RTC : January 12, 2010]

RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF TRIAL VENUE OF CRIMINAL CASE
NO. SA-198, PEOPLE V. DATA ANDAL AMPATUAN, SR., ET AL. FOR
REBELLION FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF COTABATO
CITY TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY.
FACTS:
> Acting Secretary of DOJ requesting for transfer of venue of Criminal Case of Data
Andal Ampatuan, Sr., et al.," for rebellion from the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
> The events occurring in the aftermath of the Maguindanao Massacre reinforce the
notion that the Philippines is now the most dangerous place for journalists.
> This is considered by media organizations as a flagship case because of the interest it
has generated in the local and international press due to the perceived clout of the
suspects who belong to very influential and powerful political clans that virtually rule
Maguindanao as its fiefdom.
> Witnesses remain reluctant to fully disclose what they know if the case will be tried in
the very heart of the accused's territory.
> Fortun opposing the request for change of venue arguing that it will be practical and
protective of the accused's right to due process if venue be maintained in Mindanao for
accessibility to the courts and convenience to those charged. He thus requests that
venue be maintained in Cotabato City or any other appropriate place in Mindanao, such
as Davao City or General Santos City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a justifiable reason for the change of venue of the trial?
RULING:
YES. Paragraph 4, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the
Court may order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The purpose of the provision is to ferret out the truth from the opposing claims of the
parties in a controversy by means of a fair and impartial inquiry. Consequently, where
there are serious and weighty reasons present that would prevent the court of original
jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial, this Court has been mandated to

order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice. [1] Among the reasons
sufficient to justify a change of venue is the reluctance of witnesses to testify-out of fear
for their personal security. Corrolarily, a hostile sentiment against the accused at the
place of the trial, giving rise to the possibility that his life could be placed in clanger, is
sufficient and justifiable cause to order a change of venue of the trial.

VALDEPEAS vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeas from a decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of
abduction with consent.
> Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint, duly subscribed and sworn to by
both, charging petitioner Maximino Valdepeas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester
Ulsano. After due preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by
Valdepeas, the justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and
forwarded the complaint to the court of first instance of Cagayan in which the
corresponding information for forcible abduction with rape was filed. In due course, said
court of first instance rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged and
sentencing him accordingly
> On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the court
of first instance, convicted him of abduction with consent.
> A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner contesting the
finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the effect that complainant was below 18 years
of age at the time of the occurrence.
> After a retrial, the court of first instance rendered another decision, reiterating said
finding of the Court of Appeals.
> Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by
either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, and that, accordingly, the lower
court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent
and had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or nor the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the
trial court for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused?

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RULING:
NO. We find no merit in this pretense. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused
is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to
the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not
been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Within the period of six (6) years that had transpired until the Court of Appeals, rendered
its last decision, had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts
over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might
have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the
Court's jurisdiction. What is more, his behavior and every single one of the steps taken
by him before said courts particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not
merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority thereof over his person.

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