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A) MERCADO VS CA
G.R. No. L-44001 June 10, 1988
PAZ MERCADO, CAROLINA S. CHICO, LUCIANA
CABRERA,
JOAQUIN
IGNACIO,
ELMER
FLORES,
AVELINA
C.
NUCOM,
et
al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO PUNO,
LOLITA C. BULAONG, FLORENTINO AGULTO, SEVERINO
SALAYSAY, SUSANA BERNARDINO, et al., respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The question presented by this appeal is whether or not the
special civil action of certiorari may be properly resorted to
by a party aggrieved by a judgment of a Regional Trial Court
(or Court of First Instance)which became final because not
appealed within the reglementary period to bring about
its reversal on the ground that the Court had applied the
wrong provision of the Civil Code, and had rendered
summary judgment at the instance of the defendants
without receiving evidence on the issue of damages
allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs, thereby denying them
due process.
The private respondents, hereafter simply referred to as
the Bulaong Group, had for many years been individual
lessees of stalls in the public market of Baliuag, Bulacan;
from 1956 to 1972, to be more precise. The market was
destroyed by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of the
Bulaong Group constructed new stalls therein at their
The
summary
judgment
rendered
by
respondent Judge, being a final adjudication
on the merits of the said cases, could have
been appealed by the petitioners. In point of
fact, petitioners did attempt to perfect an
appeal from said judgment, but the attempt
proved futile because their notice of appeal,
appeal bond and motion for extension of time
file record on appeal were filed beyond the
reglementary period. The record discloses
and conceding that they are, the damages are much lower
than that awarded by the respondent Judge." 7 According to
them, since the matter of damages was clearly a
controverted fact, the Court had absolutely no jurisdiction to
determine it on mere affidavits.
There can be no debate about the proposition that under the
law, the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction not only over
the persons of the parties but also over the subject matter
of the actions at bar. The parties composing the Mercado
Group cannot dispute this; they recognized the Court's
competence when they filed their answers to the complaints
without questioning the Court's jurisdiction of the subjectmatter; indeed neither at that time nor at any other time
thereafter did any one of them ever raise the question.
Now, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost by any error in
the exercise thereof that might subsequently be committed
by the court. Where there is jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case
is but an exercise of that jurisdiction . 8 And when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while engaged
in that exercise does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercise when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This,
of course, can not be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. 9 Moreover, any error that
the Court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
being merely an error of judgment, is reviewable only by
appeal, not by the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition. 10
The petitioners do not dispute the propriety of the rendition
of a summary judgment by the Court a quo, a remedy that
B) BALLATAN VS MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and
CHONG
CHY
LING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI
CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE
and JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 32472 entitled "Eden Ballatan., et. al., plaintiffsappellees v. Gonzalo Go and Winston Go, appellants and
third-party plaintiffs-appellants v. Li Ching Yao, et. al., thirdparty defendants." 1
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42)
square meters of residential land belonging to petitioners.
The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at
Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village,
Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square meters in
area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan
and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. 2 Lots Nos.
25 and 26, with an area of 415 and 313 square meters
respectively, are registered in the name of respondent
Gonzalo Go, Sr. 3 On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son
of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot
for
plaintiffs'
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed
the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA
but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose
Quedding. Instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish
their improvements on the subject land, the appellate court
ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li
Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for
that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to
be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose Quedding
to pay respondents Go attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his
erroneous survey. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as the dismissal of the third-party
complaint against Araneta Institute of
Agriculture is concerned but modified in all
other aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered
to pay plaintiffs-appellees the reasonable
value of the forty-two (42) square meters of
their lot at the time of its taking;
Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew
that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's
adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon
him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof. 26
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith.
Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance
with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, 27 or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the building, planting
C) SARMIENTO V AGANA
G.R. No. L-57288 April 30, 1984
LEONILA SARMINETO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, District Judge, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District,
Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, and SPOUSES ERNESTO
VALENTINO and REBECCA LORENZOVALENTINO,respondents.
Mercedes M. Respicio for petitioner.
Romulo R. Bobadilla for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979
Decision rendered by the then Court of First Instance of
Pasay City. The Decision was one made on memoranda,
pursuant to the provisions of RA 6031, and it modified, on
October 17, 1977, a judgment of the then Municipal Court of
Paranaque, Rizal, in an Ejectment suit instituted by herein
petitioner Leonila SARMIENTO against private respondents,
the spouses ERNESTO Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo. For
the facts, therefore, we have to look to the evidence
presented by the parties at the original level.
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the
latter's mother had told him the couple could build a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms., being Lot D of a
D) TECHNOGAS V CA
G.R. No. 108894 February 10, 1997
TECNOGAS
PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH
DIVISION) and EDUARDO UY, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in
Paraaque, Metro Manila. It was discovered in a survey, that
a portion of a building of petitioner, which was presumably
constructed by its predecessor-in-interest, encroached on a
portion of the lot owned by private respondent. What are the
rights and obligations of the parties? Is petitioner considered
a builder in bad faith because, as held by respondent Court,
he is "presumed to know the metes and bounds of his
property as described in his certificate of title"? Does
petitioner succeed into the good faith or bad faith of his
predecessor-in-interest which presumably constructed the
building?
These are the questions raised in the petition for review of
the Decision 1 dated August 28, 1992, in CA-G.R. CV No.
28293 of respondent Court 2 where the disposition reads: 3
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
reversed and set aside and another one
entered
30
E) DEPRA VS DUMLAO
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
Roberto D. Dineros for plaintiff-appellee.
Veil D. Hechanova for defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First
Instance of Iloilo to the then Court of Appeals, which the
latter certified to this instance as involving pure questions of
law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel
of land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870
square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns
an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an
approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on
his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of
thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of
DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972, his mother, Beatriz
F) VIRGILIO VS PATRICIA
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and JOSIE JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs. PATRICIA, INC., respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (dismissing
the petition for review filed by spouses Virgilio and Josie
Jimenez in CA-G.R. SP No. 43185 and giving due course to
the petition for review filed by Patricia, Inc., in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43179), in effect reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and reinstating that of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, is assailed in the instant petition.
Petitioners Virgilio and Josie Jimenez, spouses, are
sublessees of a lot and buildinglocated at 2853 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, owned by respondent Patricia Inc.
(PATRICIA for brevity), a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws. The Jimenez
spouses subleased the property in 1980 from a certain
Purisima Salazar who had been leasing the property from
PATRICIA since 1970.
Sometime in 1995 Purisima Salazar abandoned the
property thus incurring back rentals dating back to January
1992. Hence, by reason of her non-payment of the monthly
rentals, her contract of lease with PATRICIA was terminated.
On 29 March 1995 PATRICIA sent a letter to the Jimenez
spouses informing them of the termination of the lease and
demanding that they vacate the premises within fifteen (15)
April 1995 until they finally vacate the premises; and, (d) to
pay respondent Patricia, Inc., the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED
G) GUZMAN ET AL VS FUENTE ET AL
G.R. No. L-32433
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The dispositive part of the lower court's judgment reads as
follows:
Wherefore, the court hereby orders the defendants to
vacate the premises set forth in the complaint,
restoring them to the plaintiffs herein. For lack of
evidence, no judgment can be rendered against the
defendants Crisanto de la Fuente and Agapita
Payumo to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P697.50
claimed by the latter as damages, from October 1,
1926, to January 15, 1928, nor against the
aforementioned defendants and Taw Pe Chan to pay
the plaintiffs jointly and severally damages in the
amount of P120 per month from January 15, 1928,
until they vacate the premises. The counterclaim and
the cross-complaint filed by the defendants are
hereby dismissed as against the plaintiffs. Without
costs.
H) ALBURU VS VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 3003
January 2, 1907
based upon article 453 of the Civil Code which provides that
"necessary expenditures will be repaid to all persons in
possession (los gastos necesarios se abonan a todo
poseedor)." It may be doubted, however, whether the
"possessor" referred to in this provision can be said to
include one who stands in relation of tenant to his landlord,
for the above-cited article 1554 of the Civil Code, and the
chapter wherein it occurs, seem to provide for such cases;
and in any event we do not think that the filling in and
improvement of a lot can be brought under the head of
necessary expenses (gastos necesarios) as used in this
connection. Manresa in his commentaries upon this article
says that gastos necesarios are no others than those made
for the preservation of the thing upon which they have been
expended.
The contention that the defendant is entitled to the benefits
of the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code can not be
maintained because the right to indemnification secured in
that article is manifestly intended to apply only to a case
where one builds or sows or plants an land in which he
believes himself to have a claim of title and not to lands
wherein one's only interest is that of tenant under a rental
contract; otherwise it would always be in the power of the
tenant to improve his landlord out of his property. The right
of a tenant in regard to improvements (mejoras) is expressly
provided for in article 1573 read in connection with article
487, wherein it is provided that the tenant may make such
improvements, either useful or convenient, as he considers
advantageous, provided he does not alter the form and
substance of the thing rented, but that he will have no right
for indemnification therefor, though he can take away such
improvements if it is possible to do so without injury or
damage to the thing rented.
I)
TUASON VS LUMANLAN
J) PLEASANTVILLE VS CA
PLEASANTVILLE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT
OF
APPEALS,
WILSON
KEE,
C.T.
TORRES
ENTERPRISES,
INC.
and
ELDRED
JARDINICO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the
wrong property erroneously delivered by the owners agent,
a builder in good faith? This is the main issue resolved in
this petition for review on certiorari to reverse the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 11040,
promulgated on August 20, 1987.
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First
Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case (along
with several others) to the Third Division. After due
deliberation and consultation, the Court assigned the writing
of this Decision to the undersignedponente.
The Facts
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land
designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road,
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a
review of the respondent Courts Decision, as follows:
[8]
SO ORDERED.