ALVAREZ v IAC (YANES)

185 SCRA 8
FERNAN; May 7, 1990

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS
- Two parcels of land were registered in the names of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes,
under an Original Certificate of Title.
- Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title. Santiago then sold
the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. The lots were sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez.
- The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella,
Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the
ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of the produce
of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the share or money
equivalent due the heirs be delivered to them, and damages.
- During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
- The CFI ordered Alvarez to reconvey and deliver the possession of the lots to the
Yaneses. However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to
one of the lots, as it had been subdivided into two and that that they were "in the
name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that the lot
could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of
execution."
- The Yaneses filed a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a
declaration of nullity of the TCTs issued to Rosendo Alvarez. The court required
Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering the lots, which order was
later nullified by the court in view of a manifestation filed by Siason.
- the lower court found Siason as a buyer in good faith, and ordered the heirs of
Alvarez to pay the Yaneses the actual value of the lots, plus damages. The IAC
affirmed except as to damages.
- Petitioners contend, among others, that the liability arising from the sale of the
lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the
late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

ISSUE

WON the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his
estate, after his death.

HELD
NO.
- It overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate
children and heirs. Under our law, the general rule is that a party's contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
- The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
- Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.: The binding effect of contracts upon
the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court
that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before
the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever
payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the
shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
- The general rule (above) is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization"
of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has
characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those
rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
- Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the
legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present
claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved is of no
moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the
mass of their father's hereditary estate, and hereditary assets are always liable in

their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.It must, however, be made
clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA
(their father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL
BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO
GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.

MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in
Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the
motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the
aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of
First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but
before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to
amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their
amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel
for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution
by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after
the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person
cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing
the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the
dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for

deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but
the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for
the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and
17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead
cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up
to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena
took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This
means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena
was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If
thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party
who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give
the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena
died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The
respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is
a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From
the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of
his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot
be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to
the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to
the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their
being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena,
therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No.
856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the
respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the
deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased,
within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In

the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained
of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7
Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an
action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after
her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But
what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the
deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This
should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad
litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family.
But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the
children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error
because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be
appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent
Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of
the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856
and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the
motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside
and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor
children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a
qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The
amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum

payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,
[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of
the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again,
Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in
favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement[5] for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6]
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of
Iloilo City. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez
Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is,
two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the
FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union
Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for
sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint
was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer[13] and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was
not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to
the petitioner under the joint agreement.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered
by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the
RTC decision reads:
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court. It further held that the
partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be
had until after the will has been probated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the joint agreement was valid.

HELD: No, the joint agreement is invalid.

The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in
the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs
assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires
it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibaez, left a holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision
which reads as follows:
(e)
All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such
tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and
effect.
Uson vs. Del Rosario
1.
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5)
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed
by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion,
Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age,
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
2.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir
except his widow Maria Uson.
3.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his
common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus
depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

4.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,
1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public
document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in
consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of
alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that
may be left by her husband upon his death
The court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as
to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
Issue:
1.

Whether or not Maria Uson has a right over the parcels of land.

Yes. Maria Uson being the lawful wife of the decedent Faustino Nebreda acquired
rights of inheritance over the parcels of land in dispute at the moment of death of
Faustino.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the
lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property
that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation
they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
2.
Whether or not the illegitimate children of Del Rosario have acquired
successional rights under the New Civil Code
No. The rule that new declared rights under the new statute may be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation applies only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin

No. The rule Article "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it
shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto
may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided
said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the
same origin."
Here, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the

deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of

Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA
(their father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL
BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO
GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.

MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in
Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the
motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the
aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of
First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but
before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to
amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their
amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel
for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution
by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after
the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person
cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing
the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the
dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for

deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but
the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for
the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and
17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead
cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up
to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena
took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This
means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena
was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If
thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party
who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give
the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena
died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The
respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is
a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From
the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of
his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot
be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to
the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to
the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their
being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena,
therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No.
856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the
respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the
deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased,
within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In

the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained
of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7
Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an
action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after
her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But
what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the
deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This
should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad
litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family.
But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the
children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error
because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be
appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent
Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of
the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856
and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the
motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside
and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor
children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a
qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.