ARSENIO E. CABALLERO JR.

CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGESTS

CASE # 1
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, Administrator,
petitioner-appellee, vs ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant
50 Phil. 867
November 01, 1927
(SIMPLE VERSION)
*this is also a case in succession where decedent wants RP law, instead of Turkish
law, to apply, and one of brothers was threatened to be disinherited
FACTS:
Joseph Brimo
-Turkish National
-but had properties in the Philippines
-and executed will in the Philippines, which contained a provision which provided
that the disposition of his properties should be done in accordance with Philippine
laws, and that an heir who opposes such will would be deprived of his share.
-Andre Brimo, his brother, opposed the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator of Joseph's estate on the ground that the will was not in accordance
with the laws of Turkey, thus void for violating Art. 10, NCC:
"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated."
-no proof presented
that the will was not executed in accordance with Turkish laws
of the Turkish laws applicable
HELD: Turkish law should be applied so provision in the will void. Brimo would not
be disinherited, because of the impossibility of the condition imposed upon him.

Court presumed that Turkish laws were the same as RP laws (processual
presumption)
Since under our law, the project partition was valid, it should be upheld.
However, provision of the will with regards application of RP law instead of Turkish
laws is void (but still used RP laws in distributing the estate of the decedent, but
with the excuse that the Court was just presuming Turkish laws to be the same as
RP laws)
(ANOTHER SOURCE)
Facts:
Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of the
deceased Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines and the
testatrix wished that the distribution of his properties and everything in connection
with it be in accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositor-appellant Brimo claimed
that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his opposition were the following:
(1) the approval of said scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition, (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business, and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference
to the Turkish laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a
Turkish citizen who have resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippines.
Held:
Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was applied on the estate of
Joseph Brimo, where it was provided, nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. However, the
oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with
the Turkish laws. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the national law
of the testatrix was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not

being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed; thus, the
approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

CASE # 2
SUNTAY V. SUNTAY
*again, a succession casebut I cannot find the digestmaybe it's under another
subjecthmmm
Jose Suntay
-Filipino Citizen
-resident of the Philippines
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China
-left properties in RP, and a house in China
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd wife and child of 2nd marriage
-2 proceedings:
*intestate proceedings, one of the children of the 1st marriage appointed as
administrator of the estate
*Testate proceedings, by the widow showing a will allegedly executed in 1929 in RP
>denied: loss of will before hearing
>appealed: further proceedings, deposition of witnesses to a will taken : still
dismissed
-Pacific war ensued
-after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino) presented the alleged will of his father in
Chinese Characters executed and signed by him in 1931 and that the same was
filed, recorded and probated in Amoy, China
-presented petition for probate of either the 1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931
will - both DISALLOWED

ISSUE:
WON EITHER OF THE WILL COULD BE PROBATED?
RULING: NONONE COULD BE PROBATED
AS TO THE 1929 PHILIPPINE WILL: not proved by Credible witnesses
-Silvino failed to present 2 credible witnesses to prove the provisions of the lost
1929 will
-CREDIBLE Witnesses: competent witnesses, not rely on hearsay
AS TO THE ALLEGED PROBATED 1931 WILL: was not established
-Rule 78.1: if will probated in another country, if could be allowed, filed and
recorded by proper CFI
-Rule 78.2: copy of will + allowance is filed before CFI, court shall fix time and place
for hearing, and cause notice to be given as in case of original will
-Rule 78.3: if will allowed in RP, court shall issue certificate of allowance, signed by
Judge, attested by the seal of the court, filed and recorded by clerk, and will would
have same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court
-in this case: failed to prove
Municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court
law of China on procedure in probate or allowance of wills in 1931
here, just presented the unverified answers of Consul General of RC (depositions)
which are INADMISSIBLE:
>Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds the Chinese law
an expert of Chinese law on procedure in probate matters
>if admitted, adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and crossexamine witnesses
-plus: proceeding in Amoy, China court were not probate proceedings, but was
conducted for the taking of the testimony of 2 attesting witnesses to the will
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of proof that the municipal district
court of Amoy is a probate court, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those in RP Courts
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices through personal service or service
by publication

-so since no notice of the proceedings before Amoy, China that it was a probate
proceeding, it cannot be deemed as a probate proceeding and is deemed as merely
a deposition or perpetuation of testimony.

CASE # 3
CIR v Fisher
(SIMPLE VERSION)
FACTS:
WATLTER STEVENSON
-born in RP
-but parents both Brit
-married to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson (also British) in 1909
-instituted his wife as sole heiress
-initially field inheritance and estate tax returns covering the whole estate but later
filed an amended return (made it smaller)
-CIR: assessed taxable net deduction: used Article 124, NCC: property relation of
spouses determined by national law (law of England)
And English law does not recognize legal partnerships between husband and wife,
all properties acquired during marriage belong to husband exclusively
BOTTOMLINE: assess estate tax based on the whole property of Walter (which would
have been just 1/2 if based on RP law)
CTA: apply RP Law - no proof of English law, no prenuptual agreement: so applying
laws of RP, contracting parties presumed to have adopted the system f conjugal
partnership as to properties acquired during the marriage
ISSUE:
WON RP law should be applied?

RULING: Presume that English law is the same as RP laws = only asses
estate and inheritance tax on 1/2 of the estate.
1

When stevensons married during 1909, old civil code still applies.

Old civil code

New civil code

Nationality theory of determining property relation

of spouses where one is a foreigner, no prenuptual
agreement: follow husband's nationality

Same

Limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land

Includes marriages
celebrated in RP
and aborad

but both only applies to mixed marriages. Here, both spouses are Brits!
1

Manresa said English law (the law of the husband's nationality) should be
used.

But no proof of English law presented by CIR. So apply processual

presumption, presume English law = RP laws

(ANOTHER SOURCE)
FACTS:

Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents, married in

Manila to another British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where he
and his wife moved to.

In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and
personal properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines (Mines).

Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate
filed an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure
the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.

In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the
spouses Fisher.

Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming

ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the
Mines shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence,
warranting a refund from what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He
then filed in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.


CFI ruled that (a) the share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net
estate of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of
Walter is exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
ISSUE: W/N the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock
RULING: No.

Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does
not exempt any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident

with properties, there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an
inheritance tax.

But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also,
although the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant
exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a
disadvantage. This is not what the legislators intended.

SPECIFICALLY:

Section122 of the NIRC provides that No tax shall be collected under this
Title in respect of intangible personal property
o
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or
o
(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at
the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of
every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law
provides that intangible personal property is exempt from tax if the decedent at the
time of his death was a resident of a territory or another State of the United States
or of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or death
tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.
(a)
Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect
to intangible personal property of residents of this State, or
(b)
Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal
property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of

every character if the Territory or other State of the United States or foreign state or
country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United
States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent."

CASE # 4
SPOUSES ZALAMEA VS. CA
SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
(SIMPLE VERSION)
ZALAMEA V. CA
(case of bumping off, WON overbooking is allowed in US)
-Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila agent
of Tans World Airlines Inc. - 2 on 75% discount, and one full-fare. All tickets
confirmed in Manila and re-confirmed in NY
-Probably in NY, the 3 were wait-listed as their seats were already taken. As Mr.
Zalamea was holding the full-fare ticket, he was allowed to board the plane and Mrs.
Zalamea and their daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to Manila from
other airlines
-Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based on breach of contract of carriage
before RTC Makati
-RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD (MORAL DAMAGES) + Atty's fees
-CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking being an accepted practice in US Airlines
so no fraud nor bad faith on the part of TransWorld Airlines
ISSUE: WON MD should have been awarded for BF(BAD FAITH) on part of
TransWorld Airlines?
RULING: YES.
Overbooking = BAD FAITH
US law allowing overbooking never proved. Just presented statement of Ms.
Gwendolyn Lather (customer service agent) in her deposition wherein she said that

OVERBOOKING WAS ALLOWED based on the Code of Federal Regulations fo the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
-what is required to be able to prove foreign law:
*official publication
*copy of the written law attested by the officers having the legal custody of the
record, or his deputy + certificate that such officer has custody + seal of the office
of the officer who made the certification
>who can make the certification:
secretary of an embassy or legation
consul general
consul
vice consul
consular agent
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
-here, none presented to prove contents of the Code of Federal Regulations for the
Civil Aeronautics Board
-so CA erred in finding that overbooking is allowed under US laws
Even if there is such US law existing allowing overbooking, it's irrelevant!
-lex loci contractus applies: tickets sold, issued in RP so RP law applicable
Overbooking = BF
-where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive
some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. For
the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages
-even if overbooking allowed, TWA still guilty for not informing its passengers
beforehand

(ANOTHER SOURCE)
FACTS:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines,
Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the
wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had
already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait
list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those
holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers.
Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to
board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets
were denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could
not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American
Airlines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages
based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court
ruled in favor of petitioners . CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a
damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is
fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a
common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically
allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no
fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines. Thus
petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and Examplary
damages.
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary
of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of
the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent courts finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus
which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be
applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum
and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were
sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine
law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,
entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were
refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a
ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract
of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on
that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for
breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took
the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being
refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award
of moral damages.
For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount
to self-interest or enrichment.
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed
tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated
stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such
eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy
of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of
substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition
of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers.
It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent
TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so

inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold
on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently,
respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their
contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners rights makes
respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by
respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable
for exemplary damages, as well.
In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a
flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the
unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight
from New York to Los Angeles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED.

CASE # 5
BOARD OF COMMISIONERS (CID) V. DELA ROSA
FACTS:
-deportation proceedings where initiated against WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, with CID
alleging that he failed to prove the legality of the marriages of his Filipino
grandfather (Santiago) to his grandma as well as the marriage of his Father
(Francisco) to his mom, both of which were celebrated in China (his grandma and
mom were Chinese citizens).
-no evidence to prove that under Chinese law (which was not also proved), the
marriages were valid.
-as no evidence that William Gatchalian was born in a valid marriage(ie born outside
marriage), he is deemed to have followed the citizenship of his mom (CHINESE) same thing with his dad!
ISSUE:
WON William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen?
RULING: NO.
Apply processual presumption: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on particular subject are presumed to be the same as RP laws
-here, no proof of Chinese laws applicable, so use RP laws

Why no evidence presented:

*granddad's marriage certificate was allegedly destroyed or lost during the
Japanese occupation, and Citizenship Investigation Bureau just listened to his
testimony.
*Francisco was also just required to give testimonies before Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth, and relationship to each
other
-the said testimonies are ADMISSIBLE as statements or declarations regarding
family tradition or reputation in matters of pedigree (in accordance with the NCC,
FC and ROC)
Philippine law: Lex loci celebrationis
-all marriages performed outside RP in accordance with the laws in force in the
country were performed and valid there shall also be valid in this country
-all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family
-he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our laws bear the burden of
proof to present the foreign law
MARRIAGE OF GRANDPA AND PAPA VALID: CID failed to prove that it was invalid in
accordance with Chinese laws
-since the rule is that a legitimate child follows the citizenship of is father, his father
is a Filipino citizen as the marriage of his grandpa with grandma is valid. As his
father's marriage to his mother is also valid, William Gatchalian is also a legitimate
child, thus would follow citizenship of dad, thus Filipino

(FROM ANOTHER SOURCE)

Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian,
then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter
and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino
citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of
commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such
included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special
inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of
Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the
arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the
29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed
marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who
are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.

CASE # 6
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION (PIA) V. OPLE
FACTS:
PIA
-foreign corporation licensed to do business in RP
-hired IN THE PHILIPPINES 2 FILIPINAs as stewardess, the contract containing
provisions
...that they have a right to terminate the services of the Filipinas upon notice and
...that the agreements shall be construed under and by laws of Pakistan and ONLY
THE COURT OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN shall have jurisdiction to consider any matter
arising out of or under the agreement
-instead of the 3year contract, the 2 stewardess were terminated 1y4m before the
expiration of their contract

-2 Filipina employees filed a COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND NONPAYMENT

OF COMPANY BENEFITS AND BONUSES vs. PIA before Ministry of Labor and
Employment
-as defense, PIA invoked the provisions of its contract (that Pakistani law should
apply, and that the case should have been filed before Karachi courts)
ISSUE:
WON the contract provisions should be followed (i.e. WON Pakistani law
should apply and the case brought before Pakistani Courts)?
RULING: NO
PIA cannot invoke Par10 (venue and applicable law) of its contract to prevent
application of labor laws and regulations of the Philippines because
*the EER is a relationship affected w/ public interest
*In accordance with Art17.3: RP Labor laws cannot be rendered illusory by parties
agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship
PIA cannot invoke that Karachi court is the sole venue for the dispute: court used
place of significant contacts approach
*contract executed in RP
*contract was between Philippine citizens and a corporation licensed to do business
in the Philippines (therefore a Resident Company)
*though the Filipina stewardesses were assigned in the Middle East and Europe,
they were based in the Philippines in between assignments
-Par10 cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law
PIA did not invoke the Pakistani law applicable: so presume as same as Philippine
law (applied Processual Presumption)