Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1637 July 6, 1976
IN RE: ATTY. RUFILLO D. BUCANA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:
Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories,
Dumangas, Iloilo, dated February 26, 1976, respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. Bucana
was required by this Court in its Resolution of March 23, 1976, to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having notarized
on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an Agreement executed by the spouses
Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses agreed
therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and
waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the afore-mentioned
Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of
them to remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law
because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation, admitting that he notarized the
afore-mentioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public
policy", but in mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by his
clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero without his previous knowledge; that when said document was
presented to him for signature after it was signed by the parties, he vehemently refused to
sign it and informed the parties that the document was immoral; that he placed the said
document on his table among his files and more than a week later, he asked his clerk
where the document was for the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he found that
the same was notarized by him as per his file copies in the office; that he dispatched his
clerk to get the copy from the parties, but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found
in their respective residences; that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in view
of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as
his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of respondent
were corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his clerk, Lucia D.
Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated April 20, 1976. 1
There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law, morals and
good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in

its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of
society without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. 2
The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and
the wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with
another man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party
to commit bigamy. 3 This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a
crime. A notary public, by virtue of the nature of his office, is required to exercise his
duties with due care and with due regard to the provisions of existing law.
As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, 4 "it is for the notary to
inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal
enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of
law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held
responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as
a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court
even to the extent of disbarment."
In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency, claiming that the notarization
of the questioned document was due to his negligence. We find, however, that the
aforementioned document could not have been notarized if the respondent had only
exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his duties as notary public.
WHEREFORE, We hold that respondent Rufillo D. Bucana is guilty of malpractice and is
hereby suspended from the office of not try public for a period of six (6) months, with the
admonition that a repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
July 14, 2012 Leave a comment
Silverio v. Republic
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name
Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate
in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is
a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration.
Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the
name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is
habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the
change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not
prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex
on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
July 14, 2012 Leave a comment
Republic v. Cagandahan
September 12, 2008 (G.R. No. 166676)

PARTIES:
petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan
FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan,
Laguna; such that, her name be changed to Jeff and her gender to male.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name
Jennifer Cagandahan. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both
male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy,
small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.

ISSUE:
WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.
HELD:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views
that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant
biological support for considering him as a male.

Weigel vs Sempio-Diy, G.R. No. L-53703

Posted by kaye lee on 7:07 PM
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Weigel vs Sempio-Diy
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva
Weigel on the ground that the latter has existing marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion.
Lilia claimed that prior marriage was null and void because she and Eduardo were forced
to enter said marital union. She likewise alleged that Eduardo was married to someone
else.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karl's marriage with Lilia is void.
RULING:

Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on Lilia's
prior marriage for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before
she can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.

Beso vs Daguman Case Digest

Zenaida S. Beso v. Judge Juan Daguman
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211
January 28, 2000
Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged
Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of
negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar.
In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the marriage of the complainant had to
be solemnized in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta.
Margarita, Samar because : 1) physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in
Sta. Margarita; 2) complainant said she had to fly abroad that same day; 3) that for the
parties to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or
sponsors; 4) if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out
of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate
another publication of notice; 5) if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled
marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad.
Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area
of jurisdiction. Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the
Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s]
or at a place other than his sala, and the circumstances of this case do not fall in any of
these exceptions.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to
register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such duty is entrusted upon
him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and
to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days

after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. xxx"
Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the
cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events. The records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a
system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible
for the proper discharge of his official functions.

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136. August 1,

2007
FACTS:
Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committe on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a Noli Eala for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Mr. Guevarra alleged that his wife Irene Moje have been maintaining an
illicit affair with Atty. Eala during their marriage, and presented certain facts proving
such allegation. These includes a social card, the preparation of which was admitted by
the respondent and their (Atty. Eala and Ms. Moje) living together in a house which was a
few blocks aways from the church where Ms. Moje had exchange marital vows with the
complainant. Also alleged and proven was the fact that the respondent was the father of
the complainant's daughter. The complainant further went on saying that Atty. Eala and
his wife have been openly flaunting their adulterous relationship.
For Mr. Guevarra, respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution
and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainant's wife, Atty. Eala was charged to have mocked the institution of
marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Committee on Bar Discipline found the charge
against sufficiently proven and recommended that Atty. Eala be disbarred for violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of
Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit. The complainant
then went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Where or not Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct
and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath"?
RULING:
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab
initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ARANES VS OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to
inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived
of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner
HELD:
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he

allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Court held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy,
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional
area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers
away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers
that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone
else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge
and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from
his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first

wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.1[1] With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.2[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have
not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.3[3] The
affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the
marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law
is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent

spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which
has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse
is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be
void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article
41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul
or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of
his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held
outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the
point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either
Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party,
Gemma del Rosario.4[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."

Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.5[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to
a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled
and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.6[6] It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.7[7] Otherwise, the
system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes
in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance
of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a
six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in
a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby

SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and
FERNANDO SY, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44144, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the
spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then
22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who
were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988,
and from then on, lived with his father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No.
7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for
more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership.[8] Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains
and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and
bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her

and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away
from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from
their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her
husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he
thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of
her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate
issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated
her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision[12] dated April 26, 1990,
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to
20 days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision[13] dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of
property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led
to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the
following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing
to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital
act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her
husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.[15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision[16] dated December 9,
1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not
constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In
the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of
petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the
quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential
requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of
their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital
problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their

marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in
accordance with law and the evidence on record.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated November 21, 1996.[20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973,
NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO
MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE
GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY
NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE
ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE
TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE
POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240
SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,[23] in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not
ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said
that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very
reason for their existence would be defeated.[24] Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be
subject to cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the
validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts
are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to
existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial.[26] The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15,
1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
private respondent's answer admitting it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination,[28] as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November
15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's
and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on
record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner
did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of
the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude
that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the
birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration
of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents
are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.[33]
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer
detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May
21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R.
No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent. Ncmmis

DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient"
to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.
[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated
the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of

marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This
is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12]
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only
issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality

and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse
to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already

been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered
as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never
be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action
or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages
as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under

ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26]
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia BorjaManzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him
on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children
were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member
of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that
since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families
and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that
on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that
had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting
another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and
sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,
[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic
legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.
2
3
4
5
6
7