Phronesis 52 (2007) 403-425

www.brill.nl/phro

Book Notes*
Neoplatonism

Peter Adamson
Kings College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK
peter.adamson@kcl.ac.uk

This time I begin before Neoplatonism proper with a book on Hellenistic

philosophy by the Phronesis Hellenistic Book Notes author, Christopher
Gill.1 This lengthy study pursues four ambitious projects. First, chapters 1-3
survey some central themes in Stoicism and Epicureanism in order to
establish G.s main thesis: that the Stoics and Epicureans shared a view of
the self as a structured whole, and that they took this view to be Socratic.
The psychological holism in question here is coupled with physicalist
accounts of the soul, so that in fact G. often speaks of psychophysical
holism. G. further associates this with what he calls the rich naturalism
of the Stoics and Epicureans, meaning that they see physics, ethics and
logic as mutually reinforcing and even fused (160-1, 186, 194). The
Socratic holism of both schools manifests itself, for example, in the view
that all human action is rational in the sense of proceeding on the basis
of a belief. G. contrasts this holism to core-centred and part-based
views, as found in Plato and Aristotle. On the core-centered view, only one
aspect or part of the soul is my true self , and virtue consists in the
domination of this part over the others. G. concedes however that more
holistic remarks can be found in both Plato and Aristotle, especially in the
Timaeus and Republic bks. 8-9. The second section of the book focuses on
two narrower issues in Stoicism: the Stoic reception of the aforementioned
resources in Plato for supporting holism (ch.5) and the Stoic theory of the
*) Book Notes discuss books on ancient philosophy that are sent to the journal for review.
1)
C. Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), pp. xxii+522. 84 ISBN 0 19 815268 X.
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007

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passions (ch.4). G. agrees with Teun Tieleman that Galen and Plutarch
distorted Chrysippus theory of the passions by forcing it into a partbased psychology. Even Posidonius, despite his emphasis on aective
motions, adhered to the holistic view, because these motions do not represent a distinct part of the soul in which emotion is seated. The use of
Tieleman in this chapter is a good example of G.s appealing strategy of
following and building on the work of other scholars. In fact chapters 1-3
can protably be read as an overview of recent scholarship on Hellenistic
ethics. In chapter 6, G. turns to a third project: extending the claims of an
earlier book in which he held that the subjectivist notion of self is foreign
to classical Greek thought.2 Here he argues that the same is true of the
Hellenistic period. In this section G. adopts a more critical stance towards
other scholars, arguing for instance against A.A. Long and Charles Kahn
regarding Epictetan prohairesis, and Gail Fine regarding subjectivism in
skepticism and the Cyrenaics. The last chapter takes up a fourth project:
tracing the inuence of all these ideas in Hellenistic literature. In sum, G.s
argument is wide-ranging and ambitious. Some may nd it too uncompromising, and want to insist that there are core-centered elements
within Stoicism, Epicureanism or both.3 But I was more troubled by a nagging thought that what G. presents as sides of a dichotomy holistic vs.
part-based would better be described as two poles of a continuum. As
G. himself suggests, there are tendencies towards both poles in Plato and
Aristotle, suggesting that their views are to be located somewhere in
between, even as they supplied ammunition for authors with views at
either extreme. Still, I was largely convinced, and suspect that G.s framework will provide an important basis for future studies of Hellenistic
thought.
Also devoted largely to philosophy before Plotinus is George Karamanoliss Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? 4 K. devotes chapters to Antiochus,
Plutarch, Numenius, Atticus, and Ammonius Saccas, and their diering
attitudes towards Aristotle. He demonstrates that there was no orthodox
middle Platonist attitude towards Aristotle. Even detractors views var2)

See C. Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
3)
Compare the recent study by R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).
4)
G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to
Porphyry (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 419. 53. ISBN 0 19 926456 2.

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ied: Atticus was hostile to Aristotle, Numenius merely indierent (128).

K. is especially subtle on Antiochus and Plutarch. Rejecting the reductive
idea of Antiochus as simply eclectic, he argues that Antiochus main concerns were ethical. He accepted the Stoic view that a robust ethics requires
a robust epistemology, and believed that Platonism could best provide this,
by explaining how humans could achieve total certainty (see e.g. 59, 71).
Antiochus could thus forgive Aristotles rejection of Platonic Forms: the
main thing was that Aristotles immanent forms provide a sucient basis
for certain knowledge (63). Plutarch, by contrast, was more interested in
metaphysics. He began a tradition of seeing Aristotle as basically Platonic,
though often misunderstood by later Peripatetics. The chapter on Ammonius Saccas is necessarily more speculative, and takes more or less at face
value evidence in Photius to the eect that Ammonius was unusually
unencumbered by school allegiances: devoted only to philosophical truth
wherever it could be found. After a brief look at Plotinus, the book reaches
its climax in a long chapter on Porphyry. Not all the material here will be
new to scholars (the section on the Categories for instance is fairly familiar),
but some of it will, particularly a text from Porphyrys commentary on
Ptolemys Harmonics about the underlying agreement of Plato and Aristotle regarding pitch. More generally, K. does three important things: he
rejects evidence supposedly showing that Porphyry was ever heavily critical
of Aristotle; he sets out Porphyrys philosophy as a systematic whole (the
chapter is a good general overview of Porphyry, despite the focus on his
attitude towards Aristotle); and he shows the relevance of earlier Platonism
for understanding both Plotinus and Porphyry. For instance, K. traces the
roots of Neoplatonist doctrines on the eternity of the cosmos and the soul
as purely intellective these issues serve as leitmotifs for the study as a
whole. This excellent book shows how a fundamental aspect of Neoplatonism and especially Porphyrys philosophy the claim that Aristotle and
Plato were in harmony grew out of the earlier Platonist context. In this
respect it should be read alongside Zambons recent study of Porphyry,
reviewed in my 2006 book notes.

Plotinus
Those book notes began with monographs devoted to Enneads I.1 and I.4
(by Aubry and Schniewind, respectively). By chance I have again received
commentaries on these two treatises. Carlo Marzolos treatment of I.1 [53]

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is very dierent from Aubrys.5 Following a translation and revised text, the
bulk of M.s volume is a line-by-line commentary rather than a wideranging monograph. M. thus focuses more on the details of how to take
the Greek (for comparison he frequently cites numerous previous translations), and on parallels or relevant texts from other ancient authors. He
especially emphasizes Alexander of Aphrodisias: not only Alexanders De
anima, but also De mixtione for the question of how soul is mixed with
body. M. also cites extensively from previous secondary literature. The
result is a useful collection of references for readers of I.1, rather than a
sustained philosophical interpretation of I.1. But that is to some extent
found in the more discursive introduction, which situates I.1 relative to
Platos Alcibiades I and other Plotinian treatises especially the immediately previous treatise in chronological order, II.3 [52]. M. also rightly
emphasizes the dialectical structure of I.1, which he compares to a Platonic
dialogue (48). For a philosophical analysis of the psychological issues, the
reader can turn to the preface by Cristina DAncona, who argues persuasively that it is misleading to think of Plotinus simply as a dualist. This
would be to underestimate the extent to which the body depends on soul
to be a body at all; for it is soul that imposes eidos on matter (12).
Kieran McGroartys study of I.4 [46] likewise provides a translation facing the Greek text and a line-by-line commentary.6 The translation is generally ne, despite an occasional habit of following the Greek syntax too
closely, e.g. ch.2, last sentence, and ch.8, rst sentence. (I have a few other
quibbles, for instance the translation in ch.1 of eupatheia as good experience. Plotinus refers even to plants as capable of eupathein, and ch.2 suggests that one can have a pathos without experiencing it.) The main value
of the book lies in the detailed commentary. In contrast to Schniewind,
M. gives us a very otherworldly and uncompromising Plotinus. Whereas
Schniewind sees I.4 as highly structured, with sections tailored to progressively higher levels of attainment, M. sees the treatise as hammering home
a single message: that only union with nous can be constitutive of eudaimonia. Nothing at the empirical level can either contribute to eudaimonia
or detract from it. This stark reading of Plotinus has several problems, not

5)

C. Marzolo, Plotino. Che cos lessere vivente e che cos luomo? I 1[53] (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006), pp. 208. 18. ISBN 88 8492 367 0.
6)
K. McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia. A Commentary on Ennead I.4 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp. xxiii+236. 50. ISBN 0 19 928712 0.

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always fully solved in M.s commentary. For one thing, Plotinus of course
thinks we are all always united with nous thanks to our undescended souls.
Are we not all therefore always happy, whether we know it or not? M.s
reply (147, 171) is that we count as happy only once we have achieved
awareness of this union with intellect. After that, we are puried and
have achieved the rank of a spoudaios, from which we cannot fall (121).
This is rather more puzzling than M. admits. It is hard to see why attaining
conscious awareness of nous is crucial, but maintaining it is not: Plotinus
explicitly denies in I.4 that the impairment of the spoudaios, e.g. by magic
or drugs, aects his eudaimonia. More problematically, M. often seems to
assume that the spoudaios will simply lose interest in the lower world after
having puried himself (e.g. 135: why the spoudaios should bother
with other people is not at all clear to me, though M. is more nuanced at
193-4). More charitable and faithful to the text (especially ch.15) would
be to say that the spoudaios motivation for all levels of virtue is never lost,
even though his eudaimonia would not be impaired if exceptional external
circumstances prevent activity in accordance with practical virtue. Regarding Plotinus likely sources, M. stresses the inuence of Epictetus much
more than other commentators have done (see 56-7, 61). Usually M. is
sure-footed with previous thinkers, though he seems to me to misunderstand Aristotles point that one would not be virtuous if one slept through
life: he infers, unwarrantedly, that Aristotle did not believe the spoudaios
was eudaimn while asleep (139). Finally I note M.s emphasis on the
biographical context of I.4, which was written towards the end of Plotinus
life, during illness. M. thinks this led Plotinus to adopt a more favorable
stance towards suicide (see the appendix on this topic, 205-7).
The volume Studi sullanima in Plotino is divided into two halves.7 The
rst half is devoted to close readings of passages in the Enneads, especially
parts of IV.7 [2] where Plotinus attacks earlier theories of soul. There are
for instance discussions of IV.7.8, on whether the soul is a harmony (this
by the late and great Matthias Baltes, to whom the volume is dedicated);
of IV.7.8.1-23, on materialist, especially Stoic theories of soul; and of
IV.7.85.25-50, in which Plotinus attacks the Aristotelian theory of soul as
entelecheia. A particularly interesting piece in this rst half is by the volumes editor, Chiaradonna. He focuses on Plotinus discussion of Stoic
7)

R. Chiaradonna (ed.), Studi sullanima in Plotino (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), pp. 414.
50. ISBN 88 7088 482 1.

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theories of mixture in IV.7.82, arguing against previous interpreters (especially Drrie) that Plotinus is not here simply following an earlier bit of
Platonist school diatribe. Rather Plotinus method is highly subtle and
dialectical, drawing on Aristotelian premises (the components of a total
mixture remain potentially present) to show that the relation between soul
and body cannot be a Stoic krasis. The second half of the volume mostly
situates aspects of Plotinus psychology relative to earlier and subsequent
authors. For instance there is an interesting discussion by MnnleinRobert of Longinus attack on materialist theories of soul, which like parts
of Plotinus IV.7 is preserved in Eusebius. Zambon contributes one of the
better explanations I have seen of the philosophical motivations behind
the Neoplatonist doctrine of the soul vehicle (ochma) Zambon shows
how these vehicles allowed Neoplatonists to reconcile the Platonist theory of a separate soul with the Aristotelian doctrine that ties soul more
closely to body. The vehicles are also supposed to make it easier to explain
how soul can gradually ascend towards a closer relation to the intelligible
realm. Zambon points out (321) that it is therefore unsurprising that Plotinus, who believed the soul always remains united to nous, dispensed with
vehicles in his system. This leads very nicely into the next piece, Dillons
brief but useful discussion of Iamblichus criticisms of the undescended
soul. Rounding o the volume is a longer study by Catapano, which traces
an argument for the immortality of the soul that the entire soul perceives
pain although only a small part of the body is aected from Carolingian
texts back to numerous works by Augustine, and thence to Plotinus, possibly by way of Porphyry. In all, this volume is well worth the attention of
anyone with an interest in Plotinian psychology, and especially of those
interested in how Plotinus responds to earlier theories of soul.

Proclus and Syrianus

Another collection of papers devoted to a single Neoplatonic author is
Proklos: Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik.8 As the title indicates the volume
is divided into three sections, which in theory deal with Proclus method8)

M. Perkams and R.M. Piccione (eds), Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik (Leiden:
Brill, 2006), pp. 431. 139/$180. ISBN 90 04 15084 6. The papers are all in German or
English.

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ology, psychology, and metaphysics. But in fact these categories are fairly
loose and the volume has pieces on a wide range of topics using a wide
range of approaches. The result is a somewhat uneasy compromise between
a collection of specialist articles and an overview of the main topics of
Proclus philosophy, as a companion-style volume might provide. Thus
some papers deal with issues that are largely familiar to specialists. Still,
they mostly do so in an unusually clear and comprehensive way: I would
especially praise Horns opening piece, which explains what is distinctive
about Proclus brand of Neoplatonism; Opsomers systematic and thorough treatment of irrational souls in Proclus; Abbate on the theological
context of Proclus reading of the Republic; and Roth on the sense in which
the physical cosmos is generated. Other papers have a more argumentative
focus or deal with less familiar topics. For instance van den Burg argues
that the Cratylus commentary was written in preparation for the theological speculations of the Platonic Theology. Two other highlights from the
strong opening section are Martijn on the method of the Timaeus commentary, and Mnnlein-Robert on aporetic commentary (i.e. structuring the commentary by means of aporiai and solutions) in Longinus and
others, and on Proclus rather dismissive assessment of Longinus as a
thinker. In the metaphysics section I especially appreciated Helmigs discussion of enmattered form, which according to Proclus remains undivided even though, by breathing forth, it gives rise to divided qualities
in bodies. Also good is dHoines piece on whether there are Forms of
artefacts, which traces the issue forward from Plato and Aristotle (including On Ideas) to Syrianus and Proclus. I found a piece by Bechtle on the
Athenian Neoplatonists attitude towards mathematics interesting, though
rather tetchy towards other scholars (he chastizes them for importing
modern ideas about mathematics into the ancient context). Similarly I
found the concluding piece by Halfwassen, on the transcendence of the
One, helpful in its discussion of the Platonic sources but unnecessarily
insistent that Plato really did think many of the things Proclus says he
did. The papers often resonate nicely with one another, even across the
three sections. Thus for instance Helmigs paper is interesting to read
alongside discussions of the lower parts of the soul by Opsomer and
Perkams (who emphasizes Proclus original idea that the souls parts are
substantially distinct). Steels discussion of self-constituting entities
connects to other papers in various interesting ways. For instance Roths
treatment of the generation of the cosmos shows why a physical object

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cannot be self-constituting, and Steels well-taken words of warning about

the dierences between Christian and Proclan Neoplatonism (235) resonate nicely with Schfers rather idiosyncratic piece on relations of procession and reversion in Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius. In all, the volume
will be protably consulted by scholars of Proclus, while the less initiated
will gain from it a good understanding of some major issues in Proclus
(though its price will make it less useful in this regard than it might otherwise have been).
Lets now turn back from Proclus to his teacher, Syrianus, about whom
I have two books to discuss. The rst is from the Ancient Commentators
Project (for more volumes from the Project, see further below), and is a
translation by John Dillon and Dominic OMeara of Syrianus commentary on Metaphysics M and N.9 Dillon adds a useful introduction. Syrianus
here adopts a uniquely hostile stance towards Aristotle, who in this part
of the Metaphysics attacks a version of Platonism which identies Forms
with numbers. According to Syrianus, in M and N Aristotle indulges in
controversy rather than exposition (see 184). This point is crucial,
because Syrianus seems to approve of the doctrines presented by Aristotle
in expository contexts. Indeed he argues throughout that Aristotles statements elsewhere commit him to Platonist views. For instance, Aristotle
accepts the causal ecacy of separate forms, as is clear from earlier parts of
the Metaphysics itself (80). So despite initial appearances, Syrianus does not
depart completely from the Neoplatonist thesis that Aristotle and Plato are
in agreement. As for the specic issue of Form and number, Syrianus main
strategy is to dierentiate between divine, intelligible numbers and unitary numbers that are immanent in the lower realm. Only the latter are
quantitative, being made up of units that serve as their matter: these
undierentiated units become number by receiving form from intelligible
causes. Syrianus denies repeatedly that Aristotles puzzles about number
are in any way relevant for divine number. On the other hand he often
concedes that Aristotles puzzles are genuine when applied to unitary number, though puzzles that can be solved (for a good example see 128). One
might wonder how Syrianus can claim that divine numbers and unitary
numbers are in some shared sense numbers, since the former are not even
quantitative. Syrianus never really addresses this issue directly. But it seems
9)

J. Dillon and D. OMeara (trans.), Syrianus: On Aristotle Metaphysics 13-14 (London:

Duckworth, 2006), pp. 240. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3574 3.

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possible to piece together what his answer would be: for instance, both
kinds of numbers possess equality and inequality (103) and some degree of
multiplicity (161). It strikes me that there is room for further work on
Syrianus philosophy of mathematics, which will be facilitated by Dillon
and OMearas clear translation and helpful notes.
Syrianus commentary is also the subject of an important new monograph by Angela Longo, which focuses on the commentary to book .10
L. explores in particular Syrianus treatment of axioms, especially the principle of non-contradiction (hereafter PNC), and the way that Syrianus
accomodates Aristotelian dialectic and rst philosophy within a Neoplatonic system. Regarding the PNC, L. notes a text (in Met. 65.20-24) that
could tempt one to think that Syrianus anticipated Lucasiewiczs distinction between three types of PNC, logical, ontological and psychological.
But L. argues that this is not Syrianus point. Indeed, for Syrianus these
dierent versions of the PNC cannot be disentangled from one another.
Syrianus is, however, unique in the ancient tradition in that he does recognize more than one version of the PNC. For he distinguishes the principle
that two contradictories cannot both be true from the principle that
two contradictories cannot both be false (130). But how do we know, or
defend, the truth of the PNC and other axioms, given that they are indemonstrable? In fact, for Syrianus as for Aristotle, we must grasp the axioms
in a way superior to the way we grasp what is demonstrated (since, famously,
we demonstrate what is less well-known on the basis of what is more
well-known). Syrianus argues that this can only be the case if we take the
axioms directly from nous he argues against the view (which L. calls
hyper-Aristotelian, 193) that the axioms could somehow be taken inductively from sensation. Furthermore, Syrianus argues that Aristotle himself
should be committed on epistemic grounds to a Platonic scheme with
intermediary separate entities the mathematicals, for instance and
above these the pure simple intelligibles (cf. my remarks above on the commentary to M and N). These latter, shows L., are what are properly grasped
in rst philosophy, which is thus able to provide all other sciences with
their foundations. Others have therefore said that Syrianus conates Aristotles rst philosophy with Platonic dialectic, as presented in the Republic. But L. points out that Syrianus in fact recognizes more than one type
10)

A. Longo, Siriano e i principi della scienza (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), pp. 450. 31.
ISBN 88 7088 451 1.

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of dialectic. For in his system there is also a dialectic inferior to rst philosophy, and limited to the level of discursivity. In an interesting passage
(in Met. 63.21-32, see 257.) Syrianus describes this more Aristotelian
type of dialectic as having some traits in common with sophistry for
example both operate at the level of mere opinion. In all, L.s book
signicantly advances our understanding of Syrianus, and conrms the
subtlety of his stance towards Aristotle. Sometimes Syrianus criticizes him
openly (for instance regarding the question of separate substances), but
sometimes he adopts an Aristotelian framework within his broader Platonist perspective (for instance with the treatment of dialectic and the axioms). Also worth mentioning is Jonathan Barness typically graceful
introduction (in English), which discusses the extent to which later Neoplatonists were interested in logical questions for their own sake.

Late Ancient Logic

I have in fact received a striking number of contributions on logic in
the late ancient tradition. Rick Kennedy deals with dialectic, and in particular the reasonableness of belief based on authority.11 The book is
wide-ranging, beginning with Aristotles Topics and following the tradition
all the way to the 20th century (much of the volume deals with the
18th-19th centuries). K. supplies a useful overview of texts devoted to the
topic of dialectical (or as he says reasonable) belief. He is right to note
the importance of text-books, by authors like Boethius and Cassiodorus,
in the medieval period. But his discussion is to some extent vitiated by a
surprising omission that begins already with Aristotle: the relationship
between dialectic and demonstation (or as K. might put it, between reasonableness and certainty). K. says nothing about the fact that beliefs
grounded in authority are meant to lead us to beliefs grounded in rst
principles. While this is not the only role played by dialectic in Aristotle,
no discussion of this tradition should simply contrast dialectical and philosophical beliefs as if they were antithetical. It is not unconnected to this
that K. misdescribes the attitude of medieval philosophers towards reasonableness, on the assumption that they use either authority or reason.
He says, in a telling remark, that philosophers have naturally tended to
11)

R. Kennedy, A History of Reasonableness: Testimony and Authority in the Art of Thinking

(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004), pp. 277. 50/$75. ISBN 1 58046 152 2.

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explore the power of their own minds rather than social arts of reasonableness (72). Another lapse regards the Stoic theory of assent, which K.
strangely takes to defend a tolerant attitude towards uncertain beliefs (20).
Still, the project envisioned here is a worthwhile one, and K. shows commendable ambition in discussing such a vast historical range of texts.
At the more formal end of historical logic, we have a collection of papers
(mostly previously published) by John N. Martin.12 These papers pursue
a variety of topics, such as a semantics for understanding the Boethian
claim that God knows timelessly. But the dominant theme is that of scalar
predicates. These are adjectives which have an ordering such as cold, cool,
lukewarm, warm, hot. M. is especially interested in the various ways such
predicates may be negated, including hypernegation and privative negation (e.g. not warm can mean both more than warm and less than warm).
He argues that scalar logic sheds light on some distinctive Neoplatonic
claims, especially negations regarding transcendent principles (the via
negativa literally becomes progressive steps of inference in scalar logic,
66). Particularly suggestive is the idea of treating existence itself as a scalar
predicate (see especially ch.3). This approach produces some nice insights.
For instance, the higher something is up the scalar order, the more determinate it is, so that hypernegation in fact makes the rst principles more,
not less, concrete (see 40). However it is unclear whether the book is primarily an eort to understand Neoplatonism (vii). Closer to the mark, I
think, would be that M. gives highly technical formalizations of certain
linguistic structures under the inspiration of Neoplatonic texts.
Rounding o this group of books on late antique logic, two volumes by
Ian Mueller complete the translation of Alexanders commentary on book 1
of the Prior Analytics in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series. The
rst volume, on 1.23-31,13 mostly compares direct categorical syllogisms
to other argument forms, for example hypothetical syllogisms and synthetic syllogisms (which concatenate a string of premises to reach their
conclusion). Alexander agrees with Aristotle that such argument forms add
nothing to the power of standard Aristotelian syllogistic. So Alexander
must claim that Stoic innovations in logic, for instance their treatment
of hypothetical reasoning, can be translated back into Aristotles logical
12)
J.N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004),
pp. 218. 49.95. ISBN 0 7546 0811 5.
13)
I. Mueller (trans.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.23-31 (London: Duckworth, 2006), pp. 192. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3407 0.

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terminology and method. Another key topic is how to discover syllogisms by collecting the consequences and antecedents of both the subject
and predicate in the desired conclusion. As M. points out (22), Aristotles
technique really presupposes that one already knows the way in which [the
subject] and [the predicate] are related to all the other terms. So it is
unsurprising that, in what is perhaps the most eye-catching chapter (ch.31),
Aristotle and Alexander see Platonic division merely as a defective version
of this technique. It explores only the possible consequents of the relevant
term (e.g. rational for human), and gives no way of choosing between them
(for instance if we divide rational from non-rational, one must know by
means other than division that human belongs under the former, not the
latter). Alexander (126) goes so far as to suggest: none of [Aristotles] predecessors knew anything about syllogisms or concerned himself with
them. (Some ancient Platonists held the reverse: that Aristotles logic is
entirely, albeit implicitly, present in Platos dialogues.) The second volume
covers chapters 32-46.14 Major topics here include the substitution of
terms in logical arguments, including Aristotles use of variables (letters) to
stand in for terms; the workings of hypothetical arguments; and a long
nal chapter on negation. Again, Alexander repeatedly criticizes the Stoics.
For instance, regarding substitution of terms, he complains that they stick
closely to the way things are expressed and not to what the expressions
mean(65). Another point of dispute emerges in the last chapter, over the
question of negations applied to non-existing subjects.

The Commentary Tradition

Staying with the Commentators series, I turn to Catherine Osbornes
translation of the opening sections of Philoponus commentary on the
Physics.15 This includes passages (notably one on whether creation ex nihilo
is possible) that bear on the contrast between this commentary and Philoponus works against the eternity of the world. In her introduction O.
argues that the contrast is not so great as has been supposed: Philoponus
remarks in the commentary are most frequently non-committal, and
14)

I. Mueller (trans.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.32-46 (London: Duckworth, 2006), pp. 165. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3408 9.
15)
C. Osborne (trans.), Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 1.1-3 (London: Duckworth, 2006),
pp. 152. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3409 7.

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when he does take up a position of his own it is often dierent from Aristotles. Furthermore, passages which seem to acknowledge such things as a
heavenly fth element which Philoponus famously rejects in Against
Aristotle can be at least partly explained by the dialectical context, in
other words by saying that Philoponus is here trying to argue from within
Aristotles own position. Other important sections of the commentary
translated here include Philoponus attempt to explain why Aristotle says,
at the beginning of the Physics, that the universal is prior for us; usually he
says that the particular is prior. Philoponus solution invokes the notion of
an indeterminate particular. This intriguing idea could perhaps be
applied in explaining other aspects of Aristotelian epistemology, such as
the initial acquisition of concepts. More than half of the volume deals not
with these methodological issues, though, but rather with the Eleatics.
Philoponus believes that Aristotle has fundamentally misunderstood Parmenides project. The latters identication of being with a simple one is in
fact to be understood as applying only to the intelligible world. (It is
unlikely to be a coincidence that Philoponus introduces this interpretation
just after reaching Aristotles suggestion that, for Parmenides, the one
might be substance alone by itself, with no attributes distinct from the
substance.) Finally, it is worth dwelling on Philoponus allusions to Plato
in this part of the commentary: not only to the passages from the Sophist
where the Stranger discusses Parmenides, but also to the Timaeus. Philoponus in fact groups Timaeus himself in with other Pre-Socratic theorists
regarding the number and nature of the principles of the physical world.
Also important for the question of the worlds eternity, and Neoplatonist interpretations of the Timaeus, is R.J. Hankinsons translation of
Simplicius commentary on De Caelo I.10-12.16 Two things make the volume particularly interesting. First, it gives us a chance to see what commentators made of Aristotles infamous arguments in De Caelo I.12 to the
eect that the eternally existent exists necessarily. Simplicius discussion of
this is detailed and often forbiddingly dense, and readers will be grateful
for the guidance H. provides in his many notes to the text. Second, this
volume includes numerous passages in which Simplicius quotes and criticizes Alexander. Simplicius antipathy to Philoponus (who is not mentioned at all in this part of the commentary) is well-known, but his attitude
16)

R.J. Hankinson (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10-12 (London:

Duckworth, 2006), pp. x+134. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3232 9.

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towards Alexander is also important, and rather more nuanced. While

Simplicius clearly respects Alexander, he is at pains to correct Alexanders
interpretation of the Timaeus. Simplicius of course adopts the orthodox
view that Plato only seems to be committed to the temporal generation of
the world. Furthermore, he claims, Aristotle was well aware of Platos true
doctrine: he cites Aristotles lost epitome of the Timaeus in a not very persuasive attempt to show this (7). Less striking but also important is the fact
that Simplicius has a dierent understanding of the argument of I.12.
Whereas Alexanders interpretation of the argument is quite convoluted,
Simplicius thinks the necessity of the eternal can be easily proven by
invoking the principle of plenitude (see especially 51 and nn. 324, 327).
In fact, Simplicius thinks the doctrine of I.12 to be so obviously true that
he raises the question of why Aristotle went to such lengths to prove it!
Here we may pause to draw a sobering lesson about supposed selfevidence, since most philosophers would now say that this same doctrine
is obviously false.
I have received a further volume of translation from this same commentary, devoted to the end of De Caelo II, by Ian Mueller.17 (These volumes
by Hankinson and Mueller complete the translation of Simplicius commentary on books I-II; Muellers translations of III-IV are forthcoming.)
The highlight of this volume is probably Simplicius commentary on De
Caelo II.12, which includes a wealth of information about ancient planetary theory, especially the views of Eudoxus, Callippus and Sosigenes,
who is quoted at length. Simplicius not only reports these theories, but
also evaluates their success in preserving both the phenomena and Aristotles theory that the heavens move with a simple motion around the center
of the universe (which conicts with the theory of eccentric spheres, 48).
The commentary to II.13-14 meanwhile deals with the question of the
earths location and shape. I was struck by Simplicius brief reections on
what seems to be a use of the principle of sucient reason (at De Caelo
295b29-35). Simplicius remarks that it is perfectly possible for a free agent
to choose between equally desirable objects (uniformity does not prevent
choice, 77). As in the commentary on I.10-12, we see Simplicius sometimes distancing himself from Alexander (e.g. on whether the elements

17)

I. Mueller (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.10-14 (London: Duckworth, 2005), pp. ix+189. 55. ISBN 0 7156 3342 2.

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have soul, 29-30), quoting lost works of Aristotle (from On Prayer to show
that Aristotle may have believed that god transcends intellect, 26), and
above all seeking to harmonize Plato with Aristotle, by claiming that Aristotle takes issue only with the surface meaning of the Timaeus and other
dialogues (e.g. at 56-8).
The growth of interest in ancient commentaries makes Reading Plato in
Antiquity a timely publication.18 Unsurprisingly Proclus looms large in this
volume, but the coverage starts much earlier with papers by Tarrant and
Dillon, on the Old Academy and Middle Platonists respectively. Dillon
makes a self-consciously modest case for the originality of Middle Platonic
readings of Plato, concentrating largely on the Timaeus. Tarrant argues,
persuasively to my mind, for an early linking of the idea of common
notions (ennoiai) with the theory of recollection. Two more papers, on
Apuleius and Galen, ll out the period before Plotinus. Finamores paper
is a useful survey of Apuleius Platonic metaphysical views, while Rocca
concentrates on Galens use of the Phaedrus. The bulk of the volume,
though, concerns Neoplatonism, especially Plotinus and Proclus. This
focus on Plotinus and Proclus is not surprising but is slightly regrettable.
For instance there are no contributions devoted specially to Olympiodorus,
though he does gure alongside other Platonists in some articles. The
pieces vary in degree of detail and specialization. Some papers provide
useful overviews of major aspects of the tradition: for instance Brisson on
the types of virtue, Phillips on evil in Plotinus (a familiar enough topic,
but with an unusual stress on the Platonic texts behind Plotinus view),
and at the end of the volume a survey of the reception of Proclus (often
mediated by the Pseudo-Dionysius) in Byzantium. Others argue for very
specic interpretive points. One that stood out for me was Martijns piece
on Proclus understanding of the statement that the Timaeus cosmogony is
a likely story (eiks mythos). She argues that for Proclus eiks would have
had largely a positive signicance, i.e. tting or probable. He accommodates any pejorative connotation by saying that the Timaeus account
is tailored to the imagistic nature of human cognition and the physical
cosmos itself. This interpretation of the Timaeus as devoted specically
to physics is also well explored here by Cleary. Though all the pieces are

18)

H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly (eds), Reading Plato in Antiquity (London: Duckworth,

2006), pp. ix+268. 50. ISBN 0715634550.

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well-presented, I found a few less convincing. For instance I think that van
den Bergs thesis of the centrality of theurgy in Proclan puricatory theory
is not really troubled by the considerations presented by Baltzly, even if
Baltzly is right to say that the removal of false belief through rational
inquiry is a necessary condition of such purication. Might not this simply
be an earlier stage in the same process? I also wonder whether the local
concerns of Proclus Alcibiades commentary, which dominates Baltzlys
discussion, skew Proclus view to some extent. Sumis piece consists of a
detailed reading of Enneads VI.2.22 on the production of species out of
the megista gn; dogmatic assertion tends to take the place of argument in
this oering. The Neoplatonism section is rounded o by a nice contrast
between Sorabji, who discusses how Neoplatonists dealt with conicts
between Plato and Aristotle, and Gerson, who endorses the Neoplatonic
thesis that Plato and Aristotle are much more in harmony than is generally
thought today. Thanks to the greater detail of his examples, Sorabjis article
is the more persuasive; very little of what Gerson says about Plato and
Aristotle is uncontroversial, and he has no space to argue eectively for his
claims here.19 On a more general note, I was struck by the fact that the
Phaedrus is the most prominent dialogue in the volume apart from the
Timaeus. (Buckley contributes a good, albeit somewhat speculative, piece
arguing that the Phaedrus is used by Proclus to structure his assessment of
previous Platonist authors.) This is one of several salutary general points to
emerge from the volume as a whole regarding ancient perceptions of Plato,
and which aspects of his corpus they emphasized. To judge from the contributions here epistemological issues, and hence dialogues like the Theaetetus and doctrines like recollection, seem to dominate the Platonist
tradition before Plotinus. This impression would be even stronger had the
volume included a study of the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus.
Other dialogues, especially those we now think of as early Socratic dialogues, are all but absent. It is telling that the volumes index locorum
has no entries at all for such works as the Euthyphro or Apology to say
nothing of the Charmides or Laches while only Tarrants piece on the
earliest ancient readers needs to mention the Meno. This is one way in
which the ancients view of Plato was very dierent from our own.

19)

But for a more elaborate defense see L.P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

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Latin Philosophy
Simon Harrisons Augustines Way Into the Will provides a careful reading of
one of Augustines most philosophically interesting and oft-studied works:
On Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio, hereafter LA).20 LA is standardly read in the light of Augustines dispute with the Pelagians, who held
that it is within our own power to be good. Parts of LA have seemed to
many including the Pelagians themselves to fall short of Augustines
mature insistence on the absolute need for grace to rectify the will. Modern scholars often take the early parts of the work (or at least book 1) more
or less faithfully to report discussions Augustine had at Rome, and to present views that are unusually close to Pelagianism. Augustine himself tells
us that books 2 and 3 were completed later, after his move to Hippo (see
18). Despite this H. urges us to read LA as a unied work with a single
theological and philosophical outlook. Against Peter Browns idea that
book 1 is more optimistic than book 3, H. suggests that the three books
of LA have an increasing level of complexity, which accounts for the more
nuanced (and hence more apparently pessimistic) passages in book 3. He
also argues that, since the Renaissance, a close tie between the text and the
Rome discussions has been imposed by identifying the interlocutor of LA
as Evodius. But in fact, argues H. (ch.3), the original published version
of LA almost certainly would have had no clues as to the identity of the
interlocutors, and Evodius name is never mentioned in LA itself. This is a
nice point, but it does little if anything to undermine the idea that the
early sections of LA are based closely on actual discussions at Rome, albeit
perhaps not exclusively with Evodius. The larger claim could then stand,
that the content and context of LA book 1 are very dierent from books 2
and especially 3. This leads me to another unusual feature of H.s interpretation: unlike most philosophically-oriented readers of LA, he places
relatively little emphasis on book 3. His key text is rather I.12, in which
Augustine convinces Evodius to take his possession of a will as a necessary
starting-point of the discussion, rather than its conclusion. H. convincingly
places this in the context of cogito-like arguments in Augustine, and
shows that elsewhere our certainty that we will is closely allied to our certainty that we are alive (74). H. thus reads LA as having an epistemological

20)

S. Harrison, Augustines Way into the Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
pp. 191. 45. ISBN 0 19 826984 6.

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point at its core: my will is inalienably present to me, and absolutely

certain and undeniable (127). However this does not necessarily mean
that, as the Pelagians claimed, Augustine is committed to the idea that the
power to be good is equally inalienable; for the will in question here is prior
to and distinct from any capacity to act well or badly (125). I wonder,
though, whether the mature Augustine could think that there was any sort
of will as untrammeled by sin as the will of LA 1 seems to be. Here it
would have helped had H. said how this will-prior-to-action relates to
the will-involved-in-action. This might have led him to a deeper discussion
of the threat of necessity in book 3 and, perhaps, to the admission that
book 3 does take up the issues of freedom and evil from a signicantly
dierent (and not just more advanced) perspective than books 1 and 2. On
the other hand, I was persuaded by H.s point that in LA Augustine moves
gradually from an ordinary language use of terms like voluntas towards a
more technical use. This is just one respect in which H.s strategy of reading LA on its own terms, and not through the lens of later developments,
has great merit.
Mark Vesseys collection of articles in the Variorum series is not really
aimed at a philosophical readership, but rather pursues the notion of late
antique literature.21 Still, V.s attention in several articles to delineating a
late antique period has implications for the history of philosophy. Often
by means of reviews or overviews of other scholarly works, V. argues persuasively against a radical break between antique and medieval literary
practice. Particularly noteworthy is ch.11, on Peter Browns contribution
to the notion of the late antique. This and several other pieces in the
middle of the volume would be of most potential interest to readers of
Phronesis, since they focus on Augustine. Though Augustine is here treated
more in a literary than a philosophical fashion, I was interested by V.s
informative discussion of the immediate reception of Augustines teaching
on free will (ch.7). Ch.5 is also of some philosophical interest: it deals with
Augustines epistemology and doctrine of textual exegesis (how does learning from revealed Scripture relate to our learning from God as the inner
teacher?), and with Jeromes inuence on these elements of Augustines
thought.

21)

M. Vessey, Latin Christian Writers in Late Antiquity and their Texts (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2005), pp. xii+338. 60. ISBN 0 86078 981 0.

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Arabic Philosophy
I have received several volumes that make important contributions to our
knowledge of the reception of Greek philosophy in Arabic. Particularly
fundamental is of course the form in which Aristotle reached the Arabic
world. So the publication of a long-delayed translation of the Arabic Nicomachean Ethics is very much to be welcomed.22 The translation and introduction are substantially those of the late D.M. Dunlop. The editors of the
present volume have re-edited the text of the unique manuscript, which
was discovered in two pieces in Fez earlier this century. Their edition supplants the 1979 edition of Badawi. The Arabic translation, which apparently was the one used by such philosophers as al-Farabi and Averroes, is
interestingly dierent from the Greek text, especially in its inclusion of
the so-called seventh book, a summary-paraphrase of Aristotles treatment of the virtues. But the other ten books in the Arabic version (of
which book 6 is mostly missing) constitute a competent translation of the
Ethics, probably executed by Ishaq b. Hunayn. Ishaqs Greek Vorlage will
have been slightly earlier than any of our Greek manuscripts, although
Dunlop does not see the Arabic as suggesting signicant emendations. His
lengthy introduction is an invaluable (though on a few points somewhat
outdated) overview of the Ethics in the Arabic tradition, and the relationship of this translation to other Arabic works based on Aristotles ethical
thought. These include the Alexandrian summaries, which are preserved
in Latin and in quotations in some Arabic sources. Dunlop argues that this
text (like the seventh book) goes back to a Greek original, possibly by
Nicholas of Damascus.
Also important for the Arabic reception of Aristotle is a magisterial three
volume study by Maroun Aouad, one of the worlds leading scholars of
Averroes, devoted to the latters Middle Commentary on Aristotles Rhetoric.23 A.s treatment of this commentary is exhaustive, not to say exhausting: it consists of three thick volumes, which includes not only a new
edition, with French translation and commentary, but also numerous
22)

A. Akasoy and A. Fidora (eds),The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics (Leiden:
Brill, 2005), pp. xvi+624. 210, $284. ISBN 90 03 13647 4.
23)
Averros (Ibn Rushd), Commentaire moyen la Rhtorique dAristote ed. and trans. M.
Aouad (Paris: Vrin, 2002), pp. x+501 (vol.1: General Introduction); pp.353 (vol. 2: Edition and Translation); pp. vi+450 (vol. 3: Commentary to the Commentary). 98. ISBN
2 7116 1610 X.

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indices and thematic overviews of the commentary in the rst volume. As

a middle commentary, Averroes work consists of an elaborated paraphrase of the Rhetoric. This is in contrast to long commentaries which
comment at length on the source text in lemmas, and short commentaries which simply epitomize the text (there is also an extant Short Commentary on the Rhetoric by Averroes). This format allows Averroes to make
good on his view that rhetoric must be suited to the society in which it is
practiced, by giving many examples drawn from Islamic society. When
discussing the use of rhythm in rhetorical speech, for instance, Averroes
gives examples drawn from prosody, grammar, Arabic literature, the secretarial arts, the Koran, hadith, and Arabic poetry (cf. vol.1, 174). Of particular interest are remarks showing how Averroes integrated his expertise
in Islamic law (he was a chief qadi, or judge, in Cordoba) into his reading
of the Rhetoric. I would note Averroes development of the theme of written vs. unwritten laws; the latter may with some caution be described as
natural laws, and are discussed well by A. at vol.1, 120. Also noteworthy are Averroes views on how rhetoric is integrated into Aristotles logical
corpus; he and other Arabic authors follow the Greek tradition that the
Rhetoric and Poetics belong to the Organon. Again, A.s super-commentary
and thematic summaries give the reader plenty of context and analysis of
this and other aspects of Averroes Commentary. A. has certainly produced
the denitive study of this commentary. It should be consulted by anyone
doing work on Averroes and anyone with an interest in the reception of
Aristotles Rhetoric.
I conclude by surveying two collections of essays with broad historical
range. The rst is a special issue of Mlanges de lUniversit Saint-Joseph,24
devoted to the Greek Strand in Islamic Political Thought and constituting the proceedings of a conference held in Princeton in 2003. In fact, only
two-thirds of the 21 papers are devoted to the core topic of the Islamic
reception of Greek political philosophy, with articles at the beginning on
Greek philosophy and at the end on Byzantium and the Latin medieval
tradition. Several of the articles discuss imperfect regimes, as classied in
both Platos Republic and Aristotles Politics. Al-Farabi, who unsurprisingly
is the pivotal gure in the volume as a whole, was particularly interested
in this topic and drew especially on the Republics presentation of the
24)

E. Gannag, P. Crone et al. (eds), Mlanges de lUniversit Saint-Joseph 57 (Beirut: Dar

el-Machreq, 2004).

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imperfect regimes. So did Averroes, as we see in a paper here by Aouad.

(Islamic political philosophy is unusual in that it is inuenced as much
by Plato as by Aristotle. This is true of no other area of philosophy in Arabic, since relatively little was known of Plato in this tradition apart from
versions of the Republic and Laws.)25 The volume includes four papers
on al-Farabi, with one by Crone specically on the topic of imperfect
regimes. Two others, by Gannag and Lahoud, make use of a fruitful suggestion which seems to have originated with Fritz Zimmermann, that
al-Farabis treatment of religion as a politically useful substitute for philosophy parallels his treatment of grammar as a culturally specic substitute for logic. But the most provocative paper on al-Farabi, indeed in the
volume as a whole, is that of Gutas. He argues that the Arabic word madan,
though it does render the Greek politikos, does not mean what the English
word political means. Rather, it means strictly pertaining to a city
(261). Because for al-Farabi, the ideal city is ruled by someone with a
perfected theoretical intellect, it follows that for him political philosophy
is subordinated to theoretical philosophy. This strikes me as quite right
though I think Gutas underestimates the relevance of the Greek Neoplatonist tradition for this intellectualist approach to practical philosophy.26
A similar impression of the dependence of Islamic political philosophy
on Greek metaphysics and epistemology, rather than on concrete political
proposals from Greek texts, is also given by two pieces on the religious
grounding of political authority in the Shiite tradition (Walker and
Baoni). Some of the best papers, it should be mentioned, consist of
scholarly textual criticism rather than discussion of these broader themes.
I would particularly single out van Bladels impressive piece about the
pseudo-Aristotelian Secret of Secrets. This is one of two learned pieces
on Persian inuences in Arabic texts (the other is Zakeris). A real virtue of
this volume is that it unusually devotes considerable space to both the
Persian and Syriac traditions, alongside the better-known Greek and Arabic ones.

25)

See further F. Rosenthal, On the Knowledge of Platos Philosophy in the Islamic

World, Islamic Culture 14 (1940), 387-422. An exception is Galens paraphrase of the
Timaeus, which was translated into Arabic.
26)
At 278 n.41 Gutas criticizes a recent volume which in fact lends signicant support and
context for his own thesis: D. OMeara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late
Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

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My second historical miscellany is a Festschrift for Denis OBrien.27 It

covers the same broad range of topics as OBriens own research, and then
some: its purview stretches from the Pre-Socratics to the Arabic and
Hebrew philosophical traditions. But the center of gravity is Plato and
Neoplatonism. The volume begins with a charming apologia pro vita sua by
OBrien (worth reading if only for the wry remarks about French academic
culture) and a short tribute to OBriens scholarship by Dillon. The rst
pieces are on the Pre-Socratics: Frere contributes a good study of the idea
that God is spherical, and encourages us to take this quite literally in the
case of, for instance, Xenophanes. Brancacci deals with a parallel between
the musical thinker Damon and Platos Republic. Plato is the focus of the
next seven papers. The quality is uniformly high in this section, but I
would single out three pieces in particular. First, Khn uses the Theaetetus
refutation of Protagoras to help explain why the Form of the Good might
be epistemically crucial in the Republic; his key insight is that the ascription of goodness inevitably requires an assertion of reality as opposed to
appearance. Second, McCabes witty piece on the Euthydemus draws some
deep lessons about reading Plato from some unpromising-looking sophisms in that dialogue. Third, Rowe discusses several passages in Plato that
uphold metempsychosis. His idea is twofold: that we should take these
passages fairly seriously and not just write them o as mythic, but also
that the importance of metempsychosis is that we are already becoming
bestial in our current incarnation if we live in the sort of way that will
doom us to a (literally) bestial next life. The Neoplatonism section features
several insightful pieces briefer than a typical journal article. OMearas
elegant formal analysis of a Plotinian argument for the necessity of evil is a
genuinely helpful addition to the extensive literature on this topic. Dillon
surveys the way that Empedocles cosmic cycle (a favorite topic of Denis
OBrien) was seen in the Platonist tradition. Particularly interesting here is
the idea that a non-literal reading of this cycle may have developed alongside non-literal readings of the Timaeus, which of course emerge very early
in Platonist circles. And Gersh collects passages where Plotinus uses metaphors drawn from music. The payo here emerges on the last page: Plotinus seems to reach for musical comparisons most often when describing
the logos of the cosmos, and not higher orders of reality. Another brief
27)
J. Dillon and M. Dixsaut, Agonistes: Essays in Honour of Denis OBrien (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2005), pp. lxviii+289. 60. ISBN 0754653528.

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piece by Smith usefully presents some Neoplatonist ethical material from

the 10th-11th century Muslim author Miskawayh. (Here I did have a reservation: Smith tends to assume that this material recapitulates a Greek
source or sources. Certainly Miskawayh is not the most original thinker,
but neither does he refrain from reworking and going well beyond his
sources. A good example is his use of Plotinian materials in the less-studied
Fawz al-asghar.) Steel presents an overview of ancient judgments (often by
rhetoricians) on Platos style, before discussing Proclus defense of the
style used in the Parmenides. The modern reader may be surprised to learn
that this dialogues style is in fact exquisite. For one thing, its simplicity
corresponds to the simplicity of its subject, namely the divine. For another,
the spare style shows that Plato is using a direct dialectical method to
discuss the divine, as opposed e.g. to a mythic or oracular method. Steel
ends with criticisms of other scholars: he argues that Gersh underestimates
the extent to which Proclus sees this dialectical style as capable of standing
on its own, while Sara Rappe is chastized for denying that Proclus reads the
Parmenides as anything but pure rational argument. This critical attitude
towards other scholarship is of course not out of place in a volume dedicated to Denis OBrien. Hopefully my summary has conveyed something
of the richness of the Festschrift, though I have not even mentioned a provocative piece by Goulet (who makes a clever, and to me attractive, suggestion about the notorious textual problem in Diogenes Laertius regarding
the (in?)corporeality of the Stoics principles), the articles on Augustine, or
the translation of some pseudo-Empedocles from Hebrew, which form the
conclusion to the volume.

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