Two Arguments Against Physicalism

"Physicalism (also known as Materialistic Monism . . . is the philosophical position that

everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties, and that the only
existing substance is physical. Therefore, it argues, the mind is a purely physical construct, and
will eventually be explained entirely by physical theory, as it continues to evolve." ~
PhilosophyBasics.Com
1) Presupposing consciousness, evolutionary biology and
neurophysiology may account (more or less adequately) for
changing states of mind by correlating them with changes in
physical structure and processes. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
imagine, in principle, how they might explain the advent of
consciousness, per se. For if (for billions of years) we imagine
electro-chemical processes taking place in the dark, there is
simply no reason to think that such processes should ever
become illuminated -- no reason to think that, at some point,
there should suddenly be something that it is like (on the
inside) to be one of those processes (cf. What is it like to be a
bat?, by Thomas Nagel).
2) But even if we assume, per chance, the advent of this or that
emergent state of consciousness, there is no reason to speak of
such a state as being selected for (in evolutionary terms) unless
it is not ultimately reducible to the material substrate on top of
which it appears. Genes are material Brain-states are
material Natural selection as ordinarily understood operates
materially So unless we are willing to grant that, at some point,
conscious minds began to contribute something over and above
their material substrate, there is no reason to say that
consciousness, qua consciousness, is selected for.
If, however, we want to say that consciousness, as such, does indeed contribute something over
and above its material substrate--that the physical structures associated with sentience,
perception, or discursive thought are selected for with a view to a qualitative contribution to life
that somehow flows through them (and not just for their quantitative features, as such), we are at
that point leaving a strict physicalism behind in favor of what I would call an emergent
dualism or mind/body interactionism. If on the other hand, there is no such contribution, then
it is simpler to think of some rudimentary consciousness (or interiority) as being present
from the beginning, in any and all material forms (cf. Spinoza or Teilhard de Chardin). But if
that is the case, reality is not (and has never been) merely physical.
An alternative would be to argue for the primacy of consciousness (as do, for example, Peter
Russell and Bernardo Kastrup), but either way, the mystery of consciousness endures and would
seem to remain irreducible.... [More]

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