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of
Assistant Secretary AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO
Department of Agrarian Reform
1.
b) Attention and Cultivation - leasehold tenant should personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land; whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased;
d) Law governing the relationship - Civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special law (RA 3844 as amended
by RA 6389). (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974)
3.
An overseer of a coconut plantation was not considered a tenant (Zamoras vs. Su,
Jr., 184 SCRA 248 (1990); Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529 (1992).
4.
The owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation
of law. (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 197 (1990).
5.
6.
Successor-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent
are bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural
land (Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 [1992]).
7.
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work on the land
(Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons to
help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).
8.
We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is divested
of his landholding and somebody else is installed to became a new landlord. (Oarde,
et al., vs. CA, et al., 780 SCRA 235 [1997]).
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9.
Tenancy relation was severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm household
ceased from personally working the fishpond (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA
590 (1974).
10.
Since there is no sharing arrangement between the parties, the Court held that
Matienzo is merely an overseer and not a tenant (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA
276 (1981).
11.
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been
established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The tenant has a
right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom for cause as
provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 (1989).
12.
13.
Security of tenure afforded the tenant-lessee is constitutional (Primero vs. CIR, 101
Phil. 675 (1957); Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967) Once a tenant,
always a tenant.
14.
The Supreme Court held that only the tenant-lessee has a right to a homelot and
that members of the immediate family of the tenant are not entitled to a homelot
(Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819 (1997).
The lessor who ejects his tenant without the courts authorization shall be liable for:
a) Fine or imprisonment;
b) Damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or
imprisonment for unauthorized dispossession;
The Supreme Court in upholding its constitutionality held that there is no legal basis
for declaring LOI No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and taking
of property without just compensation grounds. (Zurbano vs. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333
(1989)
18.
In the case of Locsin vs. Valenzuela which was promulgated on 19 February 1991,
the Supreme Court explained the legal effect of land being place under OLT as
vesting ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent case dated 13 September
1991 Vinzons Magana vs. Estrella citing Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo which pre-dated
the Locsin case, the High Tribunal ruled that mere issuance of a certificate of land
transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee.
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19.
20.
Just Compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court, that
the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used
to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
21.
It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section II, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petition for determination of just
compensation has already been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only
means that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken
under the CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusive,
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings
are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For the matter, the law
may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless,
resort to courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of
the legality of administrative action (Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000).
22.
The Supreme Court decided not to apply that 6% increment to the valuation because
the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARADs use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in the
valuation of the private respondents land (following the ruling in the Court of
Appeals case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No. 23168; Rollo, p. 36) (LBP vs.
CA and Jose Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)
23.
The DAR must first resolve the issues raised in a protest/application before the
distribution of covered lands to farmer-beneficiaries may be effected. (Roxas & Co.,
Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17 December, 1999).
24.
The CREATION and JURISDICTION of the DARAB was discussed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995). The Supreme Court held
that:
Section 17 of EO 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform except those following under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law.
Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and
strengthening the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the powers and functions with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. (Also Quismundo
vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609 (1991).
25.
In Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996), complainant filed an
administrative case against the respondent Judge for taking cognizance of the
ILLEGAL DETAINER case filed by their landowner against them notwithstanding
knowledge of previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer
case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of
the complainants containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent
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judge took cognizance of the illegal detainer case. Knowledge of existing agrarian
legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary
degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the
DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law.
However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just
compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57). Jurisdiction over
said matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided
by DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA 885 (1990).
26. DARABs Jurisdiction over Agrarian Disputes was also resolved in Central Mindanao
University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86.
27. Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee (Isidro vs. CA,
228 SCRA 503 (1993).
28. In the case of Vda. de Areiola vs. Camarines Sur Reg. Agricultural School, et al.,
110 SCRA 517 (1960), the Supreme Court explained the phrase by a third party in
Section 21 of RA 1199 (Ejectment; Violation; Jurisdiction. ---all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party - - -) The Supreme
Court held that when no tenancy relationship between the contending parties exist,
the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction, The law governing agricultural
tenancy, RA 1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises
between a landholder and a tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake
jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former, etc.
Necessarily, the law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and
tenant. This does not exist where one is owner or possessor and the other a squatter or
deforciant.
29. Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court (SACs) shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation and all criminal offenses. The Supreme held that any effort to
transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR Adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to
Section 57 of RA 6657 and therefore would be void. (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 758 SCRA 263 (1996).
30. It should be stressed that the motion in Fortich were denied on the ground that the
win-win resolution is void and has no legal effect because the decision approving the
concession has already become final and executory. This is the ratio decidendi or
reason of the decision. The statement that LGUs have authority to convert or
reclassify agricultural lands without DAR approval is merely a dictum or expression of
the individual views of the ponente or writer of the Resolution of August 19, 1997. It
does not embody the Courts determination and is not binding (Fortich, et al., vs.
Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457 (August 19, 1999).
31. Agricultural lands expropriated by LGUs pursuant to the power of eminent domain need
not be subject of DAR conversion clearance prior to change in use. (Province of
Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993)
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32. Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners
landholding does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners
application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. (Roxas
vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, (December 16, 1999)
33. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely
outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership
shall be resolved in a separate proceedings before the appropriate trial court
between the claimants thereof. (Jaime Morta, Sr., et al., vs. Jaime Occidental, et al., G.
R. No. 123417, (June 10, 1999) (Note the Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davide
Jr.,)
34. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program, covers
tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops: and (2) there must
be a system of share crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either of these
requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need
not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and
undisturbed.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of
retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2)
there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the
size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares or it could be
more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares
thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of other
agricultural lands.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised
their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights
under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if
a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had
previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still
entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is
only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657. (Eudosia Daez and/or Her
Heirs presented by Edriano D. Daez, vs. The Hon. C.A. et. al., 325 SCRA 857).
35.
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them
in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt (LBP vs. Severino Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611.
(August 5, 2003)
There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1)
though a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court
MOTU PROPRIO.
36. We hold that our decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of
appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts is a rule of procedure which
affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice
LBPs right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be
dismissed outright in mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof.
It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who
already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the
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issuance of said doctrine. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon, et al., G.R.
No. 143275 (March 20, 2003)(Note: Sec. 60 in relation to Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657).
37. The Supreme Court ruled that if landowners are called to sacrifice in the interest of
land reform, their acceptance of Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural
lands, government lending institutions should share in the sacrifice by accepting
the same Land Bank bonds at their face value (Ramirez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 81)
38. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus seeking to compel respondent
GSIS to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as payment for a pre-existing
obligation (Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281).
39. It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands
involving agrarian reform although such valuation may only be considered preliminary
as the final determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. (Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
40. Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld
the constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for Presidential Decree 27
lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18. R.A. 6657. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
41.
Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 granting the
Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction (administrative proceeding) to
determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction
over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the provisions of Sec. 57,
R.A. 6657 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction (judicial
proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under Republic Act No. 6657.
(Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
42.
It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation
has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. (Philippine Veterans
Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
43. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive"
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are
not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law
may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless,
resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322
SCRA 139).
44. In Vda. De Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and landtenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA
167).
45.
46. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers
under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no
reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under
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at the time the complaints in CAR Cases Nos. 760-802-UP'78 and 806-810-UP'78 were
filed, the RTC of Pangasinan had no jurisdiction over them pursuant to Section 12 (a)
and (b) of P.D. No. 946 which is vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with
original exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted and obligations
imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform
program. However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, took effect, the Courts of Agrarian Relations
were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was
vested in the latter courts. It can thus be seen that at the time Branch 46 of the RTC of
Pangasinan dismissed the agrarian cases on 29 October 1985, Regional Trial Courts
already had jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. The issue that logically crops up then is
whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 automatically conferred upon the aforesaid Branch
46 jurisdiction over the subject agrarian cases considering that these cases were filed
seven (7) years earlier at a time when only the Courts of Agrarian Relations had
exclusive original jurisdiction over them. We rule that it did not, for such a defect is
fatal. Besides, the grant of jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Courts over agrarian
cases was not meant to have any retroactive effect. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
does not provide for such retroactivity. The trial court did not then err in dismissing
the cases. ( Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197).
55.
56.
The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions No. 474 and
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well settled.
More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of
Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado
Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven
hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more
than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families". (Vinzons-Magana vs. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536).
57. It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion but not the discretion
itself. The writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion but not the
discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but not specific action where
the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion. (Sharp International
Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299).
58. Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for
more than two (2) years fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Agrarian Relations. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567).
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The DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it
involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by
the school to be necessary for its purposes.
There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute in the implementation of the CARP.
An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial
rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture. ( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).
63. Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 deemed repealed by Section 17
Executive Order No. 229.- The above quoted provision should be deemed to have
repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then
Courts of Agrarian Relations with the original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and
questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the
Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.
(Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609).
64. The Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the
DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to
assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).
65. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts,"
which are Regional trial Courts designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within
each province-to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
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landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.
(Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).
66. The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold contract is an issue
which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the Regional Trial Courts to resolve. (Ibid.)
67. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the
parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
(Ibid.)
68. The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except on the
aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over which regular courts
have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885).
69. Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever between
the parties that could bring a controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has no jurisdiction. (Heirs of
the Late Herman Rey Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293).
70. The CARETAKER of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and,
hence, a tenant. (Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88).
71. The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation.
(COCOMA vs. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
72. There are no squatters in Agricultural lands. Squatters are only found in URBAN
COMMUNITIES, not in RURAL AREAS. (On Presidential Decree No. 772- Illegal
Squatting) (People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663).
73. It bears noting that the Decision, which prescribed for Rule 42 as the correct mode of
appeal from the decisions of the SAC, was promulgated by this Court only on 10
September 2002, while the Resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said case
giving it a prospective application was promulgated on 20 March 2003. Respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 July 1998 via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. Though appeal under said rule is not the proper mode of appeal,
said erroneous course of action cannot be blamed on respondent. It was of the belief
that such recourse was the appropriate manner to questioned the decisions of the SAC.
In Land Bank v. De Leon, we held:
On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting
Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting
decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed
for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation
and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the
mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner
to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Thus, while the rule is that the appropriate mode of appeal from the decisions of
the SAC is through petition for review under Rule 42, the same rule is inapplicable in the
instant case. The Resolution categorically stated that said ruling shall apply only to those
cases appealed after 20 March 2003 (Fernando Gabatin, et al., vs. LBP, G.R. No.
148223, November 25 2004)
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74. The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determination of just
compensation absent respondent Land Banks participation. Logically, it follows that
respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of just
compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program.
Assuming arguendo that respondent is not an indispensable party but only a
necessary party as is being imposed upon us by the petitioners, we find the argument of
the petitioners that only indispensable can appeal to be incorrect.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court that prohibit a party in an action before the
lower court to make an appeal merely on the ground that he is not an indispensable
party. The Rules of Court does not distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable
party or not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement is that the persons appealing
must have a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must be aggrieved
or prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved or prejudiced when
his interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the lawsuit, is injuriously affected
by the judgment, order or decree. The fact that a person is made a party to a case
before the lower court, and eventually be made liable if the judgment be against him,
necessarily entitles him to exercise his right to appeal. To prohibit such party to appeal
is nothing less than an outright violation of the rules on fair play.
75. The Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. In BPI v. Court of Appeal, 402 SCRA 449 this Court explained:
. . . . . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other
parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete
justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action or will
simply avoid multiple litigation. (Ibid)
76. In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, this Court even went on to say
that without the Land Bank, there would be no amount to be established by the
government for the payment of just compensation, thus:
As may be gleaned very clearly from EO 229, the LBP is an
essential part of the government sector with regard to the payment of
compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the instrumentality that is
charged with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of agrarian
reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the government
machinery that fixes and determines the amount compensable to the
landowner. Were LBP to be excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive,
function of establishing the compensable amount, there would be no
amount to be established by the government as required in Section 6
of EO 229 (emphasis. supplied). (Ibid)
77. We must stress, at the outset, that the taking of private lands under the agrarian
reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a number
of cases, we have stated that in computing the just compensation for expropriating
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking not at the time of
the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration. This being do,
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then in determining the value of the land for the payment of just compensation, the
time of taking should be the basis. In the instant case, since the dispute over the
valuation of the land depends on the rate of the GSP used in the equation, it
necessarily follows that the GSP should be pegged at the time of the taking of the
properties.
In the instant case, the said taking of the properties was deemed effected on 21
October 1972, when the petitioners were deprived of ownership over their lands in
favor of qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to E.O. No. 228 and by the virtue of P.D.
No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of palay at that time was at P35. Prescinding from
the foregoing discussion, the GSP should be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP at
the time of the taking of the subject property . (Ibid)
78. Petitioners are not rendered disadvantage by the computation inasmuch as they are
entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded
annually pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply
explained by this Court:
The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for
unearned interests. Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for
rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such
amounts were deposited in a bank, they would have earned a
compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the PARAD used
the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35.00 or P31.00)
could be multiplied by (1.06) to determine the value of the land plus the
addition 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972.
79. Petitioners reliance on Land Bank v. Court of Appeals where we ordered Land
Bank to pay the just compensation based on the GSP at the time the PARAD
rendered the decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not well taken. In that
case, PARAD, in its decision, used the GSP at the time of payment, in determining
the land value. When the decision became final and executory, Land Bank,
however, refused to pay the landowner arguing that the PARADs valuation was null
and void for want of jurisdiction. We rules therein that the PARAD has the authority
to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform. Thus, the
decision of the PARAD was binding on Land Bank. Land Bank was estopped from
questioning the land valuation made by PARAD because it participated in the
valuation proceedings and did not appeal the said decision. Hence, Land Bank was
compelled to pay the land value based on the GSP at the time of payment. (Ibid)
80. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from
judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
Measured against this standard, the reason proferred by Land Banks
counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for
reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.
Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion
for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks
volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute
excusable negligence. (LBP vs. Hon. Elis G.C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May
16, 2005).
81. Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but
a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it,
much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The trial court
therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it
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cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment. (Ibid)
82. At any rate, in the Philippines Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, We declare
that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second
refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction
is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for
the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject
to challenged before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
83. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not
at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President,
Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding
did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with
PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in
Paris v. Alfeche. (Ibid)
84. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation on the guideline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the
just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just condensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
85. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even through they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in
nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted
it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matter. (DAR vs.
Roberto J. Cuenca and Hon. Alfonso B. Combong, Jr., et al. G.R. N. 154112,
September 23, 2004).
86. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by
respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case
of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a
controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies, even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in
character, as in this case. (Ibid)
87. Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows
that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the
assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as
a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory
provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and
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38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA
6657, which reads:
Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.(Ibid)
88. It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be received by the Supreme
Court in an appeal by certiorari. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals (which are ordinary accorded great respect) is when these are based on
speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial
evidence. (Samahan ng Magsasaka San Jose represented by Dominador
Maglalang vs. Marietta Valisno, et al., G.R. No. 158314 June 3, 2004).
89. The relevant laws governing the minors redemption in 1973 are the general Civil
Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1327 of
the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
Article 1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent is viodable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by the minors in
1973 was merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab initio, as petitions
argue.
Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered into by the
minors would require that: (1) the plaintiffs must have an interest in the contract;
and (2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the party responsible for the
defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides in part that [t]he action for the
annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of
those with whom they contracted. The action to annul the minors redemption in
1973, therefore, was one that could only have been initiated by the minors
themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved parties in whom the law itself vests the
right to file suit. This action was never initiated by the minors. We thus quote
with approval the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals:
Respondent contend that the redemption made by the petitioners
was simulated, calculated to avoid the effects of agrarian reform
considering that at the time of redemption the latter were still minors and
could not have recourse, in their own right, to pay the price thereof.
We are persuaded. While it is true that a transaction entered into
by a party who is incapable of consent is viodable, however such
transaction is valid until annulled. The redemption made by the four
petitioners has never been annulled, thus, it is valid. (Ibid)
90. As owner in their own right of the questioned properties, RedemptionerGrandchildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. This right
of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification
by the balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the
doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an justice against the
landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to
leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which
would be a pointless process.
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91. On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending
on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of
a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the
administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (DAR vs. APEX Investment and Financing Corporation; G.R. No.
149422, April 10, 2003).
92. In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrieved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests
(after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process.
Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued
forever, the landowners has to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their
petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved
their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for
petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously,
petitioner might continue to alienate respondents lots during the pendency of its
protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the
circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Ibid)
93. In Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are
required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to
preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the
BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant
to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition
sent to the landowner under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage
and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct
cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the
requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the
CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention
limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 373-374 [1989]. But where to carry out
such regulations, the owners are deprived of land they own in excess
of the maximum area allowed there is also a taking under the power of
eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farm beneficiary (id.). The Bill of
Rights provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without de process of law (Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution). The CARL was not intended to take away property
without due process of law (Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245, 253 [1996]). The exercise of the power
of eminent domain requires that due process be observe in taking of
private property. (Ibid)
94. In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the
Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latters old address.
Petitioner explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those
notices upon respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment
and Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that
personal service could not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner
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caused the service of the notices via registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of
R.A. 6657, On this point, petitioner claimed that the notices were sent not only by
registered mail but also by personal delivery and that there was actual receipt by
respondent as shown by the signature appearing at the bottom left-hand corner of
petitioners copies of the notices. But petitioner could not identify the name of
respondents representative who allegedly received the notices. In fact, petitioner
admitted that the signature thereon is illegible, It is thus safe to conclude that
respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition proceedings, Clearly,
respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is elementary
that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of the
claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. (Ibid)
95. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands. Section 3 defines agricultural land, as land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. (Ibid)
96. In dismissing outright the petition for certiorari, the CA reasoned that since it
(petitioner LBP) was assailing the writ of execution issued by respondent Provincial
Adjudicator, then its recourse was to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:
Sec. 1 Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among there agencies are the . .
. . Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657. . .
Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, however, Rule 43 does not
apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because the same is not a final
order within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Court fairly recently
explained, a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to
carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or a judgment.
It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.
As such an order or execution is generally not appealable. (LBP vs. Hon.
Pepito Planta and Faustino Tabla, G.R. No. 152324 April 29, 2005.
97. On the other hand certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in part,
that the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination
and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be
brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice hereof. In relation to this provision, Section
16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribed that any party who does not agree with the
decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the
court for final determination of just compensation. (Ibid)
98. Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between the
period to file certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days from
receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Section 4 of
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judgment, order or
resolution). The Courts holds that Section 54 of RA No. 6657 prevails since it is
a substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or cases
pertaining to the application, implementation enforcement of interpretation of
agrarian reform laws.
However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is
extendible, but such extension shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
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99. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion for extension on the grounds that the petition which petitioner
intended to file is not the proper remedy. . .
Petitioners contention is well-taken. The Court of Appeals was rather hasty
in concluding that the petitioner was going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the
basis of petitioners allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It
should have reserved judgment on the mater until it had actually received the
petition especially considering that petitioners motion for extension was filed
well within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. (Ibid)
Supreme Court citing De Dios vs. CA, 274 SCRA 520)
100. Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or
procedural imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and
rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding. (Paulina Diaz, et al., vs. Carlos Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345,
March 19, 2004)
101. The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of
the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation
patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations,
Section 12(g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of
Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of
emancipation patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such
cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure.
Aside from ordering the cancellation of emancipation patents, the DARAB
may order reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to agrarian reform
beneficiaries, forfeiture of amortization, ejectment of beneficiaries, reallocation
of the land to qualified beneficiaries, perpetual disqualification to become agrarian
reform beneficiaries, reimbursement of amortization payment and value of
improvement, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of
emancipation patents. (Liberty Ayo-Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato, G.R. No.
155181, April 15, 2005).
102. Only questions of law, however, can be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact by the CA are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so
if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of the DARAB, an
administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized
jurisdiction. This Court is not thus duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, subject to certain
exceptions. (Ibid)
103. Petitioner furthermore argues that the amortization payments she made to the Land
Bank in the amount of P9,825.80 should not have been forfeited in favor of
respondent. On this score, the Court finds for petitioner. While the DARAB has
jurisdiction to Order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficiary,
forfeiture should be made in favor of the government and not to the reallocatee
of the landholding. (Ibid)
104. In Monsanto v. Zerna, (G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001) it was held that for
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it
would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to it: (1) the parties are
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the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
In the case a bar, the element that the parties must be the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement
depends, is absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of
ownership of both parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No.
5198, by virtue of a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private
respondents assert ownership over Lots Nos. 5198-A, 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D
on the basis of an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do
the records show any juridical tie or tenurial relationship between the parties
predecessors-in-interest. The questioned lot it allegedly declared for taxation
purposes in the name of petitioners father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to
have any connection with the private respondents nor with their alleged predecessorin-interest, Caridad Fuentebella. (Rodolfo Arzaga, et al., vs. Salvacion Copias, et
al., G.R. No. 152404, March 28, 2003).
105. In Chico v. Court of Appeals, (348 Phil. 37 1998) also an action for recovery of
possession, the Court was confronted with the same jurisdictional issue. The
petitioner therein claimed ownership over the disputed property pursuant to a final
judgment, while the respondents asserted right to possession by virtue of an
alleged tenancy relationship with one who has no juridical connection with the
petitioners. In holding that it is the trial court and not the DARAB which has
jurisdiction over the case, the Court ruled that the absence of a juridical tie between
the parties or their predecessor-in-interest negates the existence of the element of
tenancy relationship.
106. The basic rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is that the
petitioners action does not involve an agrarian dispute, but one for recovery of
possession, which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trail Courts.
(Ibid)
107. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. The terms agriculture or agricultural activity is
also defined by the same law as follows:
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. (DAR vs. DECS, G.R. No.
158223, April 27, 2004)
108. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted
from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:
xxx
xxx
xxx
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xxx
xxx
xxx
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bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land
theyre tilling. (Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15).
112. Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to accomplish the
noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid and has the force of law. The
rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court
when it stated that The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the
lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on
the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular is meant to remedy the situation
where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor
against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual
obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed circular essentially sought to
accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it
has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. (Ibid)
113. The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816 and
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that
the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until
the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6,
implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease
rental after the value of the land has been determine. (Ibid)
114. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in
implementation of P.D. 27 these must not be read in isolation, but rather, in
conjunction with each other. (Private respondent, however splits hairs, so to
speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the
Circular implement P.D. 816, whereas it is expressed stated in the Circular that it
was issued in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but
rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be
made to the landowner.
After the value of the land has been
determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations
to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly there is no inconsistency
between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each
other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the
agricultural property. (Ibid)
115. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has
been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court. Further, that P.D. 27 does not
suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly
emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited
case of De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and
upheld as part and parcel of the land of the land, viz: There is no doubt then, as
set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree
is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question.
That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has
spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because
of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law.
It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this
basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the
promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the
small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new
Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well
as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any
other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role
assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy
goals. (Ibid)
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116. Eminent Domain; Just compensation; the determination of just compensation under
P.D. No. 27, like in section 16(d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or
conclusive unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation
of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties
may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. The
determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in section 16 (d) of R.A.
6657 or the CARP Law is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the
succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228: x x x In the event of dispute with
the landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary,
the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land
Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its
submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No.
26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances, In the event a party questions in
court the resolution of the dispute the landowners compensation shall still be
processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust
Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5
hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court. Clearly therefrom,
unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property
by the Barrio Committee on Land production and the DAR the parties may bring the
dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a
task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. (LBP vs. CA and Lilia
Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15).
117. Republic Act No. 6657; The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the
CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27 R.A. 6657 covers all public and
private agricultural and including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229;
while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which
provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
specifically states: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to
operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It cannot be
gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way,
P.D.27.And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A 6657
shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under
P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A 6657.
118. We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that matter
is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in
his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance
in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply
because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the
mandate of the law. (Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 616) (cited in Victor G.
Valencia vs. CA, G.R. No. 122363; April 29, 2003)
119. From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee
cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under to Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee,
although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless
expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in
the contract of lease the occupants of the property are merely civil law subleases
whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement.
(Victor Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003).
120. Agrarian Reform ; Presidential Decree No. 27; Homesteads; Parcels of land,
though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are
covered by land reform under Presidential Decree 27. Petitioners contention is
without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation
Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all
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tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a
system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or
not. The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein
does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its
operation. The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum No. 2,
Series of 1978, which states: Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted
to rice and/or corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer.
Unquestionably, petitioners parcels of land, though obtained by homestead patents
under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27. (Florencia
Paris vs. Dionisio A. Alfeche, et al., 364 SCRA 110).
121. The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute it is premised on
the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or
will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. Clearly, the right to retain an
area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the
landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it
upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is
present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted;
thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally retain any portion
of her landholdings. (Ibid)
122. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for as long as they continue to cultivate them.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain
the original homesteads only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That
parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt
them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the
original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands
from land reform coverage. (Ibid)
123. Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land
they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest,
within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the court held
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform: It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers
as of October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion
of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged
member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however,
that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably
to the constitutional requirement. (Ibid)
124. Executive Order 228; Evidently, the law recognizes that the lands exact value,
or the just compensation to be given the landowner cannot just be assumed
it must be determined with certainly before the land titles are transferred
although Executive Order 228, provides that the total lease rentals paid for the
lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does
not sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered
as equivalent to just compensation for the land. Presidential Decree 27 and
subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights acquired by
tenant-farmers under PD 27, provides in detail the computation to be used in arriving
at the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes
that their exact value, or the just compensation to be given to the landowner,
cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainly before the land titled
are transferred. Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the
lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not
sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent
to just compensation for the land. The provision significantly designates the lease
rentals as advance not full payment. The determination of the exact value of the
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126. The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of
the DARAB Rules of Procedures, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the
LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such case, they must relate
to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have
been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation
of agrarian laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants
or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB. (Heirs of
Julian dela Cruz, et. al., vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, represented by Benedicto
V. Cruz., G.R. 162890; November 22, 2005)
127. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agricultural, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing , or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and condition of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operation and
beneficiaries, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental (G.R. 123417, 10 June 1999, 308 SCRA 167), this
Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship (4)
that the purposes of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. (ibid)
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134. Is it settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duly, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely pressed,
it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Erlinda C. Pefianco v. Ma. Luisa
C. Moral, 379 Phil. 468 (2000). (Ibid).
135. Petitioners filing of an answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it
now raises. As we have said time and again, the active participation of a party in a
case pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount to
a recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts or
bodys jurisdiction. (Alcantara vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land [problems,
361 SCRA 664, 669 [2001]). (Lapanday Agricultural & Devt. Corp. vs. Maximo
Estita, et al., G.R. NO. 162109, January 21, 2005).
136. Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government are
invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To quote from our decision
in Torres vs. Ventura, as reiterated in Corpus vs. Sps. Grospe. (333 SCRA 425,
436 [2000]
x x x As such [the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights
to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself.
Those rights over the particular property were granted by the
government to him and no other.
To ensure his continued
possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under
the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the
government or by hereditary succession to his successors.
(Ibid)
137. The court finds that the December 22, 1994 Order of Execution issued by the DAR
Regional Director suffers from jurisdiction and procedural defects as it directed
the relocation of petitioners without first conducting a hearing or survey to determine
the portion of the subject property excluded from the CARP.
A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to
be executed, and the execution is void if it is excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must
conform strictly with every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. (ExBataan Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 320 Phil. 517 (1995). It may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the
judgment sought to be executed (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, et al., 383 Phil. 229
(2000). Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the
judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity (Buan v. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 424 (1994). (Ernesto Ingles, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 125202, January 31, 2006).
138. Petitioners contention that the authority to issue the Order of Execution is vested
with the DARAB and not with the DAR Regional Director is likewise correct.
A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for supporting the field units and
supervising program implementation of the Department within the region. The
function of the DAR Regional Office includes [implementing] laws, policies, plans,
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rules and regulations of the Department in the regional area. A similar function is
delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order No. 129-A. Thus, the
functions of the DAR Regional Director are purely administrative, that it , to put into
operation agrarian laws and fill out the details necessary for their implementation,
and not adjudicatory.
On the other hand, when a dispute arises between parties affected by the
operation of agrarian laws, the controversy should be settled in a adversarial
proceeding before the DARAB, the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR (Section 50, R.A.
No. 6657; Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. the DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agricultural
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). A function
becomes judicial or quasi judicial in nature when the exercise thereof involves the
determination of rights and obligations of the parties. (Ibid).