ARTICLE VII 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1 EXECUTIVE POWER
Constitutional power granted to the President to enforce laws
Includes rule-making power: implementation and enforcement of laws passed
PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries. It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the
appropriation. Executive function under the said fund involves implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law.
WEBB v. DE LEON The prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department, whose principal
power and reasonability is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. Determining probable cause
executive in character

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS The powers of the president are not limited to those enumerated in the
constitution: residual powers
Right to return found in the UN declaration of Human Rights, International covenant on human rights,
but not absolute: subject to national interests, public policy and welfare, health, etc.
general power to faithfully execute the laws

express powers of the president those enumerated in the constitution

residual powers anything not expressly provided in the Constitution, ARTICLE VI

LAUREL v. GARCIA Power to enter into contracts except for property under public dominion
DJUMANTAN v. DOMINGO Right of every state to regulate the entry of persons into their country:
deportation part of executive power
PONTEJOS v. OMB State witness will not be charged with criminal prosecution.
US v. NIXON General claim of executive privilege is not absolute nor unqualified; in a situation when a
persons right is made subject of a criminal proceeding, then production of evidence is essential to uphold
the constitutional rights of the accused.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE Presidential communication privilege
Elements:
1.
Protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power
2.
Must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President of the President
himself
3.

Remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need.

SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR President may waive immunity from suit. The only person who can invoke
immunity is the president himself.

HARLOW v. FITZGERALD Qualified Immunity or good faith immunity may be use by an official. A
official would be qualifiedly immune if he (1) does not know that the action taken in his sphere of
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the victim. (2) did not act with malicious intent. Govt
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shieled from civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable person would
have known.
CLINTON v. JONES The President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from damages
liability predicated on official acts. Some public servants are granted immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts so as to enable them to perform their designated functions
effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability. The societal interest in
providing such public officials with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at
large as an acceptable justification for official immunity. The point of immunity for such officials is to
forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated
function in a principled fashion. However, as much as some public officials including the President, may
be granted immunity, it does not apply to unofficial conduct. Immunities are grounded in the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed.
GLORIA v. CA Immunity from suit for the president, not for cabinet members.
ESTRADA v. DISIERTO Though incumbent presidents are immune from suit DURING their tenure, this
immunity does not extend BEYOND their tenure. Additionally, the charges filed against Erap are criminal
in nature, and the SC cannot wrap him in post-tenure immunity from liability. It would then circumvent
the general application of laws to him.
DAVID v. ARROYO The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constituion or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but
he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by IMPEACHMENT.
CONSTANTINO v. CUISIA The President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold
office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's
bosom confidence", and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction of the
President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality
is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by
Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be,
the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority".

SECTION 4: ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VP

ANSON-ROA v. ARROYO GMA was not elected: she assumed presidency after resignation of Estrada.
Thus, there is no bar from running for presidency as she is not covered by the phrase: run for any
reelection.
BRILLANTES v. COMELEC Canvassing of votes for President and VP is the tack of Congress. It cannot
be undertaken by the Comelec, even in the disguise of being unofficial.
PIMENTEL v. JOINT COMMITTEE The canvassing of votes of the president and vp by the congress is
not one of its legislative functions. Thus, it is not covered by the end of the session of Congress, unlike its
legislative funcstions, which end along with the adjournment of its sessions.
LOPEZ v. SENATE The constitution provides that Congress has the power to promulgate its rules
concerning the canvassing of votes for the presidency and VP.
SECTION 7: START OF TERM AS OF NOON JUNE 30
PRESIDENT FAILS TO QUALIFY
PRES.

VP

BOTH

VP acts
No
Senate
as Pres. succession Pres,/Speaker
of HoR
(until one
qualifies)
acting pres.

NOT CHOSEN

DEATH/DISABILITY

PRES.

VP

BOTH

PRES.

VP as
acting
Pres.

No
succession

Senate
Pres. Or
Speaker of
HoR

VP as
Pres.

VP

BOTH

Pres. Nominates
Senate
VP from members Pres./Speaker
of Congress upon
of HoR
confirmation by
majority vote of all
members of both
houses

TECSON v. LIM The election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by SECTION 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
SECTION 7-8: FILLING IN VACANCY IN THE PRESIDENCY
ESTRADA v. DISIERTO Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It
can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.
SECTION 8: MIDTERM PAST JUNE 30

DEATH, DISABILITY; REMOVAL, RESIGNATION

Pres.
VP is Pres.

VP
Pres. Will nominate VPP from
Congress (sec. 9)

Both
Senate Pres./Speaker of HoR as
Pres.

DEATH,
DISABILITY;RESIGNATIO

Acting Pres. (SP/SH

By Law (Congress)

SECTION 11: INCAPACITY OF THE PRESIDENT

ESTRADA v. DISIERTO To be determined by Congress: can be ascertained form their acts of recognition
of GMA.
SECTION 13: PROHIBITIONS
RAFAEL v. EMBROIDERY Ex-officio capacity not entirely different from current duties and functions;
incidental to their office
CLU v. EXEC. SEC. The executive is treated as a class in itself and as such, are given stricter
prohibitions.
DELA CRUZ v. COA Ex-officio capacity no compensation for the executive who acts as such, nor do
their representatives.
BITONIO v. COA AND AMNESTY INTL v. COA Representatives designated by ex-officio members are
not exempted from the law: the designation is an imposition only of additional duties, and does not confer
any legally demandable rights.
DOROMAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN Participation in a contract with the government, though indirect, is still
prohibited: but accused is entitled to investigation and rights conferred by the law.
CIVIL LIBERTIES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY There is a sweeping, all-embracing prohibition imposed
on the President, members of Cabinet, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices must not be construed as applying to
posts occupied by executive officials: (1) without additional compensation; (2) in an ex-officio capacity; (3)
as provided for by law and (4)as required by the primary functions of said officials office. Additional duties
must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the officials primary functions. If the functions
required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent incompatible, or alien to the
primary function, then it would prohibited.
SECTION 14-15: APPOINTMENTS BY ACTING PRESIDENT
IN RE APPOINTMENT OF VALENZUELA There are two kinds of appointments directed against by the
appointment ban in Sec. 15, Art. 7: (1) those made for vote-buying and (2) those made for partisan
politics. Midnight appointments such as the appointments in question are made in consideration of
partisan politics to influence the outcome of the elections. The only appointments that are exempted from
the ban are vacant executive positions that will prejudice public interest.
SECTION 16: NATURE OF APPOINTING POWER
GOVENRMENT v. SPRINGER The legislative branch has no power to appoint. It is only for the executive.
BERMUDEZ v. EXEC. SEC. The president need not wait for his/her subordinates recommendation to
carry out a duty or function vested in his/her office.

PIMENTEL v. ERMITA The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
SECTION 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate
an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not
yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
SARMIENTO v. MISON Except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the COA
by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec 16 Art VII, appointments of other officers are left to the
President without need of confirmation by the COA. It is only in the first sentence where it is clearly stated
that positions enumerated therein require the consent of the COA. The word alone is a mere lapsus.
BAUTISTA v. SALONGA Appointing power solely vests in the President, but once she makes the
appointment, the President loses the power over the position. Its up to the appointed person if she would
accept or not.
QUINTO-DELES v. CA Appointment of sectoral representatives need CA confirmation.
POBRE v. MENDIENTA This provision empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, SECTION 2, which provides that the Commissioner and Associate
Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years, without
reappointment, to start from the time they assume office .
FLORES v. DRILON The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an
exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the
appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing
power.
RUFINO v. ENDRIGA The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances
when the Constitution provides otherwise. Under SECTION 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. These inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint.
Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers. The 1987 Constitution only allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to
appoint only officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
CALDERON v. CARALE The second sentence of Sec 16, Art VII refers to all other officers of the
government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President
may be authorized by law. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Sec 16. The Chairman and Members of the NLRC are NOT among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec 16, whose appointments requires the confirmation by the Commission on App.
TARROSA v. SINGSON Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of SECTION 16 of ARTICLE 7 of the Constitution.

MANOLO v. SIZTOZA The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the
ranks in the military are not similar to those in the PNP. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the
PNP, such as respondent police officers in this case, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the CA (see first sentence of the first paragraph of SECTION
16). PNP is not part of the AFP.
SORIANO v. LISTA It is clear from SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987 Constitution that only
appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by
the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning. The enumeration of
appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987
Constitution is exclusive. The clause "officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain" refers to military officers alone.
SECTION 17: POWER OF CONTROL
LACSON-MAGALLANES v. PANO The president is vested with the executive power in the 3 branches of
government. With this power, comes the power to control all of the executive departments. He can
appoint these heads, and dismiss them as he pleases. Having the power to control and direct them, he as
well can confirm, modify or reverse the decisions of these department secretaries.
ANG-ANGCO v. CASTILLO The power of control of the President extends to the power to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the [President] for that of the [subordinate officer]. This may be extended to
the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be
justified that the power to remove is inherent to the power to appoint. The same cannot be done to
officers or employees who belong to the classified service. The procedure laid down in the Civil Service
Act of 1959 must be followed for their removal.
VILLALUZ v. ZALDIVAR Inherent in the power to appoint is the power to remove.
NAMARCO v. ARCA Presidents power of control includes GOCCs as part of the Executive department.
DRILON v. LIM Supervision merely to determine if rules are being followed; control change the rules
and creates new ones, and provide penalties for non-compliance with the rules.
PASEI v. TORRES The Ministry of Labor is under the executive department and the president has the
power of control of its department head (Secretary). It is implicit in the power of control is the power to
review, confirm, modify or reverse acts of Dept heads. In this case, if the Secretary grants a new license,
Marcos can deny or approve of it. Hence, this LOI takes the nature of a presidential issuance which can
be repealed by a later presidential issuance.
DE LEON v. CARPIO Acts of the alter egos of the President are acts of the President himself unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.
All executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under control of President

Presidents power of control over cabinet, who in turn controls bureaus and other offices under their
jurisdiction
As head of executive department, he may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet except when he is
required by the Constitution to act in person or in the exegencies of the situations demand that he act
personally
The NBI is under the Department of Justice and since the Secretary of Justice acts as alter ego of the
President, his orders must be followed by the Director of the NBI.
JOSON v. TORRES Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is
lodged in two authorities: The disciplining authority and the Investigating Authority. The Disciplining
Authority is the President whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority who may act by himself or by and
Investigating committee. The secretary of the DILG, however is not the exclusive investigating authority.
In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the disciplining authority may designate a special Investigating committee.
HUTCHINSON v. SBMA Chartered instirutions are always under the power of control of the President.
PRA v. BUNAG The task of the Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the
compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if the same
complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The role of the Department of
Budget and Management is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed
compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the
policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws.
DOMINGO v. ZAMORA Power of the President to reorganize over: 1) office of the President proper; 2)
offices within the office of the President
ROMULDEZ v. SNDIGANBAYAN The felonious act of public officials and their close relatives are not acts
of the state, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such, but stands on the same footing as any
other offender.
CHAVEZ v. ROMULO Under SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII of the Constitution, he/she is given powers as
the Chief Executive: The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Chief Executive, GMA holds the
steering wheel that controls the course of her government. She lays down the policies in the execution of
her plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinate to implement them. In
short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her
subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. Thus, when GMA directed
Ebdane to suspend the issuance of the PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an
assigned duty. Such act was well within the prerogative of her office.
SECTION 18 COMMANDER IN CHIEF
CALL IN AFP
Prevent / Suppress lawless violence
GROUNDS Invasion
Rebellion

Yes

SUSPEND PRIVILEGE OF WRIT DECLARE MARTIAL

OF HABEAS CORPUS
LAW
?
?

Yes

yes

yes

Yes

yes

yes

Prevent / Suppress lawless violence

PERIOD

Invasion

?
Gen. Rule: 60 days (except if extended or revoked by Congress)

Rebellion
Notice

Congress w/in 48 hours

Revocation

Congress

Yes. The test is w/n the Pres. Acted arbitrarily 7 sufficiently

based on the facts; decide in 60 days

Any Citizen

Judicial Review & Period

Who can question
Courts & legis. Assembly

Open

Open

Open

LANSANG v. GARCIA President has 3 courses of action (in times of national emergency):
To call out Armed Forces
To suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
To place the Philippines (entirely or partly) under martial law
IBP v. ZAMORA The calling out power is placed in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and the power to suspend martial law and the power to suspend the habeas corpus otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification (see
SECTION 18, ARTICLE 7 codal)
The power to call is fully discretionary to the president.
LACSON v. PEREZ The court may review the factual basis for the proclamation declaring the existence of
a state of rebellion.
SANLAKAS v. EXEC. SEC. The President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. None of the petitioners have supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
DAVID v. ARROYO The president may call out the AFP without confirmation from Congress, but may not
exercise emergency powers without congressional enactment.