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Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking longterm as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the
anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic
tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from
Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter
has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic
neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital
was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region . Because of this, President
Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia
encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard
for
international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized
by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American
sentiment.
The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over
thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports
from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American,
meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons
and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.
Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout
the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the
power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base
of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new
Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that
Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have
consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales.
Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin
America is still searching for its identity.
[*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying
combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the U nited States
last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly contextdependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any
overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the
fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales
of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without
In order to
effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its
image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's
leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between
the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today
cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working
with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up
legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on
Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen
its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us
for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5
When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size,
function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability . Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given
China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all
around the world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested
a tremendous amount of soft power in Latin America , where it is now the continent's third largest
trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. n115 American disinterest in Latin America
has convinced many countries to adopt a "Pacific view," whereby China steps in to
fill the gap left by America's absence. n116
After signing a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest export market.
China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. n117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin
America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at
$ 140 billion. n118 Even despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next
five years.
China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global
political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese
officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010.
n119
China also timed the release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with
President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts
China's presence in Cuba is rather significant: after Venezuela, China is Cuba's second-largest trading
partner with $ 2.3 billion worth of goods exchanged. n121 In fact, China purchases over 400,000 tons of Cuban sugar, as well as half
its annual output of nickel, which is Cuba's top export. n122 In 2008, on a visit to Cuba, Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to not
only defer for ten years some of Cuba's debt payments, but also to invest $ 80 million in the island's health industry. n123 Moreover,
as long as Taiwan is a [*225] thorny issue for U.S.-Sino relations, China will have a stake in Cuba. China is neurotic about the
functional American presence in Taiwan and has made its intentions for the island known to everyone; the only thing standing
between Beijing's re-appropriation of Taipei is Washington. An increased Chinese presence in Cuba
might be a strategic move by Beijing to later leverage their presence on the island
for a change in America's Taiwan policy.
In the unlikely event of hostile engagement with the United States, China has an incentive to develop
technological capabilities in Cuba, which can be used in tandem with cyber and
communications warfare against Washington. Development of such capabilities
may already be happening. China has a huge presence at Lourdes, a former Soviet espionage base just outside of
Havana, where in 2004 Hu Jintao visited and confirmed that most of the technology housed there, including almost all of the
computers, came from China. n124 Another former Soviet base in Bejucal may now also house both Cuban and Chinese intelligence
analysts. n125 But China's leadership is pragmatic, not ideological, which begs the question: what is China getting in return for all
this assistance? If China is cooperating with Cuban intelligence to spy on the United
House and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Service, 2/29,
l/n)
And this is not just a criminal problem; it is also a national security problem. This is because our nation's critical
infrastructures -- and by that I mean those services that are vital to our economy and to our
national security, such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and government operations -- are
now all dependent on computer technology for their very operations. And that
dependence makes them vulnerable to an attack which , if successful, could deny service
on a very broad scale. The same basic types of cyber attacks that therefore have
become attractive to criminals are also attractive to foreign intelligence services ,
who seek new ways to obtain sensitive government or proprietary information, and also to terrorists and hostile
foreign nations, who are bent on attacking U.S. interests.
Defense, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,
Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and
Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external
conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the
security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national
levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996)
work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the
rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one preeminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain
redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising
power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles
combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he
suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on
a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic
view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult
to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be
inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and
external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are
strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce
the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an
increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration
with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied
connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention.
The plan leads to broader cooperation and influence in the region and
globally
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
[*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin
America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be
overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import
than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less
effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high
return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of
the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to
cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the
most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region.
These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship
would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be
pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty
years.
Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more
serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the
threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war,
face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a
massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new
and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare
scenarios from materializing.
There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it
will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To
address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs,
the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its
heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader.
Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new
energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are
suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its
ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to
reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.
leaders and experts from the US and Latin America, Remaking the Relationship: The United
States and Latin America, April, Online:
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions. Because of
this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other
countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests . Brazil has the broadest
international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over
such issues as Irans nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20
(Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile
already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico
Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the
almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that
have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cubas president. Now, the opportunity
to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities,
and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have
been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the
agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions,
clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely
with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from
U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy
officials has been overwhelmingly positive .9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama
administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to
attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing much-needed
familiarity and confidence across these communities . The United States and Cuba will
have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in
critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction,
and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas. The Cubans have accumulated experience
and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans high level of competence and strong work ethic. The
Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-
and integration ; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is
consistent with, and may
be central to, that objective . The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical
juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy
infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and
the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security
interests of the United States vis--vis energy. Cubas energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy
projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because
deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lions
Changes in
U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cubas energy sector are a
precondition for international entities to make significant investments , yet this change
share of the financial burden of upgrading Cubas energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly.
relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium.
The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of
upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives,
diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing
regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fiftyyear-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy
development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba. This discussion is
intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba
and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of
possible outcomes is important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.
U.S. was a superpower in the 20th century but won't be in the 21st doesn't hold up so well now. Compare it to a country such as China, which is going to be overwhelmingly dependent on energy imports. The U.S.
is in a much stronger position. I was left puzzled by that formulation of how the world works -- since oil is fungible and can be bought freely by anyone with the money, we have seen a parade of relatively
resource-poor nations carve out significant global economic and geopolitical places for themselves over the decades. Japan for example imports 98 percent of its oil; China imports much of its oil and natural gas,
competition among major powers , increase incentives for local powers to play major
powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to
international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern
history, the
longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S.
leadership . By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics
resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international
systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences .
Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats.
Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation ,
or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict . Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker
powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the U nited States. Either way,
hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival
powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition.
Beijings economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth
aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. Chinas strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around
China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, Chinas expansive territorial claims and provocative statements and actions
following crises in Korea and incidents at sea have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the
United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.
House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Iran's nuclear program, and instead
has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. With
America's image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace
counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain
counterterror concessions. Force is not a long-term solution. Newer, nontraditional security threats such as
disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of
multilateral cooperation that depend on America's ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism
itself cannot be defeated by force alone, a fact that even the White House recognizes. The 2002 National security
Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas against the ideological roots of
terrorism, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells.
Why should the United States care that some criticize its policies and others resent its power? Following U.S. military success in
Afghani- stan, concluding that unilateral might makes right, silencing critics and creating a bandwagon effect among friends, is
tempting. As Charles Krauthammer wrote, "We made it plain that even if no one followed us, we would go it alone. Surprise: others
followed. ... Not because they love us. Not because we have embraced multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated
astonishing military power and the will to de- fend vital American interests, unilaterally if necessary."2 Military power remains the
foundation of U.S. security; successfully applied, it magni- fies U.S. influence. More than ever before, however, the
transnational nature of the problems the United States faces defies unilateral solutions. Globalization is erasing borders that once protected the United States, while empowering its enemies.
Thus, trouble on the far side of the planet, such as economic disaster, outbreak of disease, or
theft of a weapon of mass destruction, can quickly become a plague on the United States'
house. Rogue states, outlaw actors, and religious fanatics use the nation's very strengths-its
openness, advanced technology, and freedom of movement-against it, as demonstrated on
September 11. U.S. lead, ership is essential to meet these threats successfully; now more than
ever, however, so is followership. Whatever response the United States chooses-engagement,
containment, or elimination-requires the help of others.
spheres of influence in much the same way as the United States and the Soviet Union managed a politically bifurcated Europe during
the early part of the Cold War. While superficially appealing because it holds out the prospect of a peaceful
transition to a new international order, power
two reasons. First,
sharing between the United States and China is unlikely to work for
no U.S. administration, regardless of its political complexion, would
voluntarily relinquish power to China, just as China wouldnt if the roles were reversed. Second, Chinas new
great-power status is hardly untrammeled. Nor is it guaranteed to last, for the country faces formidable environmental, resource,
economic and demographic challenges, not to mention a rival United States that shows no sign of
lapsing into terminal decline despite its current economic travails . Sooner than it
thinks, Beijing may have to confront the prospect of a resurgent Washington
determined to reassert its strategic interests.
manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it
first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline . The problem is that many
Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American
exceptionalism with such fervor that they cant discern the world transformation
occurring before their eyes.
in a quiet but
increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around
the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent SinoAmerican rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it
is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the
international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers. Throughout history,
relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasyand often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as
the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel
constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line,
with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth
century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation
that the wars deepest, truest cause was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta. The fact that the
U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since
the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful
nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been
growing most rapidly. America is still number one, but China is fast gaining
ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict
particularly fraught. At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a
nations capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over
what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to
reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far
from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have
what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. As they begin to assert
the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers , they look for ways to
satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing
international order. But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in
failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitlers Germany, an aggressor
may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning
themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant
states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too
eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are
conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition,
when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state,
have so often been marked by war.
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University (Niall, A World without Power,
Foreign Policy )
Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling
differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powersthe United
States, Europe, and Chinaretreating into their own regional spheres of influence .
But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World
War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the international community. Surely
their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an
integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other
civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of
Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The
effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers.
The wealthiest ports of the global economyfrom New York to Rotterdam to
Shanghaiwould become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease,
terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft
carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure.
Meanwhile,
Khalilzad, Rand Corporation 1995 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation.
Losing the Moment? The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end
in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the
global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a
world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would
help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid
another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership
would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Throughout history, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power -Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the
anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international
order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization-is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current
amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling
things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded
the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end
just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is
important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy
within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world.
During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France
and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between
Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia .
This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened,
such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power
wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its
ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted
on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American
worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the
likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests.
Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things
amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the
interests of the United States.
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated
with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations , and they are much
less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons
of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible
because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments .
Theres
an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th
parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. Indias borders with
both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows
pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth.
whom it will bite or when. BC: Can Obama get any more mileage from his perpetually played Im not George W. Bush card or is
that card past its expiration date? Dr. Hanson: Two considerations: 1) Its hard (in addition to being shameless), after a year, for any
president to keep scapegoating a prior administration. 2) I think he will drop the reset/Bush did it throat-clearing soon, as his
polls continue to stay below 50 percent. In other words, it seems to be a losing trope, poll-wise. Americans hate whining and blamegaming. So the apologies and bows dont go over well here at home; one more will be
really toxic, politically speaking. Most are starting to see that our relations with Britain, Italy, Germany, or
France are no better under Obama and probably worse than during the Bush administration.
independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found no evidence to
support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United
States.The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors
the United States and its allies.207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993-2008 Source:
Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001- 2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional Arms
Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest-thumping. China can pose problems
without catching up, compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies, local
knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe Chinas anti-area- denial capabilities are
outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim the Pentagon is developing sophisticated
countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt the strategic
importance of Chinas capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions beyond the reach
of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities, especially in littorals
and low-altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North Vietnamese and Vietcong
units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early warning radar.212 Sixty years
ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yes, weak adversaries can
impose significant costs, but evidence of American vulnerability is not the same as
evidence of American decline. Conclusion Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In
the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close
the gap with the United States. Or China might continue to rise in place steadily
improving its capabilities in absolute terms while stagnating, or even declining,
relative to the United States. The best that can be done is to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends.
And what the trends suggest is that Americas economic, technological, and military
lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations , not a
passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will
persist for the foreseeable future .
today appears less puzzling. The United States has already moved beyond the
absolute threshold, making balancing futile. 61 Levy and Thompson raise the important question of why
other states failed to balance against the United States when it was a rising power but not yet a hegemon. 62 Part of the answer lies
in the United States' unusual path to primacy. For decades, the Soviet Union maintained a rough balance with the United States. 63
U.S. primacy resulted from the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. It may be an exaggeration to suggest that the United States
became a hegemon by accident, but the outcome was not planned. 64 The extraordinarily wide gap in
capabilities created by the fall of the Soviet Union left other states with little choice
but to acquiesce. Countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Syria, or even Brazil
and Pakistan, may not like U.S. primacy, but they lack the capabilities to challenge
it. 65 Meanwhile, other countries benefiting from U.S. primacy appear not to be worried
about it. The next section considers hegemonic strategies that can soften opposition.
United States is by far the largest military spender and has actually
United States lead over its
nearest competitor is actually stronger in the security arena than it was in 1988 . The
increased its share of world military spending in the last twenty years. Moreover, the
Soviet Union was the closest rival in 1988, accounting for 18 percent of the world total, whereas China, the country with the second
largest share today, only accounts for 5 percent of the world total. Counting coalitions as potential
balancers, the euro area still accounts for a lower share today than did the Soviet
Union in 1988. The European Union, on the other hand, accounts for a larger share than did the Soviet Union in 1988 .
But the European Unions share does not amount to even half of the United States
share of the world total. Without even throwing the technological sophistication of
American weaponry (or the collective action problems that many states confront when deciding to act in the national
interest) into the balance, it is clear that the United States is peerless in the security
sphere and has strengthened its lead in the last two decades. Because of the
superiority of American military power, and other states dependence on it for
effective action, the United States faces very few constraints in the security arena .
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in point but there are plenty of other examples. As I will also show in chapter 6, there are also
economic advantages associated with this privileged position in the security field. Although some question the utility of armed force,
few will contest that the United States is in a league of its own when it comes to
security affairs. But what about the economic realm? The real test is whether the United States still towers over other
countries economically, and is able to reap economic benefits as a result of its hegemonic position. This is the claim that is likely to
be the most carefully scrutinized.
Council on International Policy and previous foreign editor at The New Republic, Charm
Offensive, pg. 194)
This unpopularity matters. Even without China on the scene, America's declining popularity
decreases Washington's soft power, and potentially makes the United States more likely to
resort to force rather than persuasion to meet American objectives. One recent bipartisan report on
American diplomacy concluded as much, warning that if the "downward spiral [in diplomacy] is not reversed, the prospect of relying
on military force to protect US national interests will increase."34
to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a
number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests,
proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will
have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S.
government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is
a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to
revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would
prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of
the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is
remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type
of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of
the American economic embargo. Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that
the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the
energy sector . For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be
significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the
effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the
Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence,
trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.
to
suggest
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/health-myth.htm
To be sure, there is excellent health care on Cuba just not for ordinary Cubans. Dr.
Jaime Suchlicki of the University of Miamis Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies explains that there is not
just one system, or even two: There are three. The first is for foreigners who come to Cuba
specifically for medical care. This is known as medical tourism. The tourists pay in hard currency, which provides oxygen to the
regime. And the facilities in which they are treated are First World: clean, well supplied,
state-of-the-art.
The foreigners-only facilities do a big business in what you might call vanity treatments: Botox, liposuction, and
breast implants. Remember, too, that there are many separate, or segregated, facilities on Cuba. People speak of
tourism apartheid. For example, there are separate hotels, separate beaches, separate restaurants separate everything. As you
can well imagine, this causes widespread resentment in the general population.
The second health-care system is for Cuban elites the Party, the military, official artists and writers,
and so on. In the Soviet Union, these people were called the nomenklatura. And
The equipment that doctors have to work with is either antiquated or nonexistent.
Doctors have been known to reuse latex gloves there is no choice. When they travel to the
island, on errands of mercy, American doctors make sure to take as much equipment and as many supplies as they can carry. One
told the Associated Press, The [Cuban] doctors are pretty well trained, but they have nothing to
So deplorable is the state of health care in Cuba that old-fashioned diseases are
back with a vengeance. These include tuberculosis, leprosy, and typhoid fever. And
dengue, another fever, is a particular menace. Indeed, an exiled doctor named Dessy Mendoza Rivero a former political prisoner
and a spectacularly brave man wrote a book called Dengue! La Epidemia Secreta de Fidel Castro.
NOT UNIQUE - Cuban health care is struggling the economy and the
embargo
The Economist 7/14/2012 Cuban Health Care: Under Investigation
http://www.economist.com/node/21558613
Until recently, Cubans were justifiably proud of their health-care system. Life-
expectancy matches that of Americans, who are eight times richer. Infant mortality ties with Canadas as the lowest in the Americas.
Measles jabs have been near-universal for more than 20 years, putting Cuba ahead of many rich countries.
But Cubas crumbling economy has put this system under stress. Though the state still trains
armies of doctors, a third of these are deployed overseas in soft-power missions. Pharmacies
are generally illstocked. In many hospitals patients must provide their own sheets, food and
dressings. Neglect of infrastructure means that almost 10% of the population lacks
access to clean drinking water. The American embargo against the island does not
help: equipment for radiology, mammograms and cancer therapy is hard to
replace, says Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, an American think-tank.
Ral Castro, the president, who this month visited China and Vietnam, is trying to revive the economy by cautiously transferring
chunks of it into private hands. The next step, reported this week, will be to let transport and other service workers form cooperatives, currently restricted to farming. If the health service is to thrive again, this sort of economic
And now health services and education are becoming harder to access and getting worse .
Secondary-school enrolment is below its 1989 peak. There is a surfeit of humanities graduates and a shortage of agronomists and
engineers. Although infant mortality has continued to fall, maternal mortality has
risen. Many drugs are in short supply. Hospital patients sometimes have to bring their
own sheets. There are reports of doctors starting to demand payment. On a weekday morning in a village in the
inappropriately named municipality of La Salud ("health"), south of the capital, this correspondent came across an elderly woman
who had hurt her arm and was whimpering with pain, having found no doctors in attendance at two health clinics.
In 2010, 37,000 Cuban doctors and other health workers were working in 77 countries around the world, mostly in Venezuela but
also in Africa, the Caribbean and Central America. The Cuban government also offers scholarships to 20,000 Latin Americans to
study medicine--all part of its obsessive search for international prestige. But the main reason for the shortage
of medical staff is low salaries. A woman who gave her name as Grisel says she worked as a family doctor for just
$23 a month, but now earns $40 a month in an improvised craft shop in Havana. She has two small children. A pair of children's
shoes costs $13. As a doctor "I faced a choice of buying shoes or eating."
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/health/2012-11/28/c_132004531.htm
HAVANA, Nov. 27 (Xinhua) -- Cuban medical authorities said on Tuesday a 50-year trade embargo
imposed by the United States has severely undermined the country's healthcare
system.
Cuban hospitals suffer restrictions in acquiring imported medical consumables
and medicine, advanced medical technology and latest scientific information, officials
said.
John Rhodes, a patient, told Xinhua that Cuba had made a great effort for the benefit of all its
citizens.
"It provides us free medicine across the country, which is highly expensive around the world," he said, adding "due to the
U.S. embargo, sometimes we do not have all the raw materials and tools to solve certain
problems immediately."
embargo of food and the de facto embargo on medical supplies has wreaked havoc
with the island's model primary health care system. 46
The health sector has already endured millions of dollars in budget cuts and tens of
thousands of layoffs, and it became clear this month that Castro is looking for more ways to save when the newspaper
voice of the Communist Party, Granma, published daily details for two weeks on how much the government spends on everything
from anesthetics and acupuncture to orthodontics and organ transplants.
It's part of a wider media campaign that seems geared to discourage frivolous use of medical services, to explain or blunt fears of a
drop-off in care and to remind Cubans to be grateful that health care is still free despite persistent economic woes. But it's also
raising the eyebrows of outside analysts, who predict further cuts or significant changes to what has been
the ideal in decaying facilities where paint peels from the walls. Patients often bring their own
bed sheets, electric fans, food and water for hospital stays.
politics.co.uk/issue9/hanna/
However, challenges remain. Healthcare may be free and available for all Cuban citizens but
medication is not. Pharmacies are often very poorly stocked and rationing of
supplies is minimal. 13 There are claims that hospitals are often in poor conditions and
doctors have to bring in their own supplies and equipment to allow them to treat
their patients. 10 Despite the production of medical supplies and technology , it seems
very little of this actually remains in Cuba. Every year Cuba exports huge amounts
of medical aid, mostly to other Latin American countries for purely financial returns. 22 For example, Venezuela provides
much-needed oil to Cuba and in exchange receives Cuban doctors and medical supplies. 14
Cubas dual economy has a lot to do with why such disparity exists. Medication and
System http://surfky.com/index.php/communities/303-lexington-fayette-county/29814-ukdelegation-visits-cuba-learns-about-its-healthcare-system
Many of the problems with Cubas health care system are associated with the
American embargo, Berres said. This prevents them from having access to the latest
pharmaceutical and technological advances, so many of their facilities are very
basic.
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/amnesty.cuba.health/
LONDON, England (CNN) -- The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is endangering the health of
millions by limiting Cubans' access to medicines and medical technology, human rights
group Amnesty International alleged Wednesday.
An Amnesty report examines the effects of the sanctions, which have been in place since 1962. Amnesty International SecretaryGeneral Irene Khan called the U.S. embargo immoral and said it should be lifted.
"It's preventing millions of Cubans from benefiting from vital medicines and medical equipment essential for their health," Khan
said.
The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the
U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad.
Amnesty also called on President Obama to not renew the Trading with the Enemy Act, which is due for renewal on September 14.
The Act has been reviewed by U.S. presidents on an annual basis since 1978. Amnesty said that while not renewing the Act would not
in itself end the embargo against Cuba, it would send a clear message that the U.S. is adopting a new policy toward Cuba.
In April this year President Obama lifted restrictions that had prevented U.S. citizens from visiting relatives in Cuba, and sending
them remittances.
A U.S. State Department spokeswoman would not comment on the report because she hadn't read it. However, she said, "The
president believes it makes strategic sense to hold on to some inducements we can use in dealing with a Cuban government if it
shows any signs of seeking a normalized relationship with us and begins to respect basic human rights."
The Amnesty report also cites United Nations data that says Cuba's inability to import nutritional products for schools, hospitals and
day care centers is contributing to a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia. In 2007, the condition affected 37.5 percent of Cuba's
children under three years old, according to UNICEF.
Cuba can import these products from other countries, but there are major shipping costs and logistical challenges to contend with.
Gail Reed is international director of MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), a non-profit organization that
encourages cooperation among U.S., Cuban and global health communities.
She told CNN, "In general, the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare . Over the past
decades, I would say the people most affected have been cancer and HIV-AIDS patients."
She also said the embargo affects the way doctors think about the future. "Doctors in Cuba always worry that
The only problem with offering more humanitarian aid to Cuba is that it seemingly contradicts current U.S. policy, which aims to
isolate and destabilize the regime through economic sanctions. The perception in Cuba is that the United
States is responsible for the chronic humanitarian crisis that has afflicted the
island since 1989. n78 While any increase in humanitarian assistance will no doubt
be viewed as a positive step in the right direction, it will still have to be reconciled
with an enduring hostile relationship between both countries . On the one hand, humanitarian
assistance is the very type of soft power engagement that might help thaw relations between Washington and Havana. However, on
the other hand, since so much of America's humanitarian soft power resources lie
outside of government in the private sector and civil society, n79 any increase in
humanitarian assistance might also require a proportional loosening of the trade
and travel restrictions - at least, as applied to humanitarian organizations.[*215]