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Criminal Procedure

ABBARIAO v BELTRAN 468 SCRA 421 PANGANIBAN; August 31, 2005


NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court FACTS - This stemmed from an a
dministrative case filed by Abbariao against Judge Beltran. Beltran was charged
with gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust judgment. - Abarr
iao was the former branch manager of Country Bankers Assurance Corporation. In Oc
tober 1992, Joseph Abraham procured 2 insurance policies from him and issued a p
ost-dated check to serve as pasyment. But the cheque was subsequently dishonored
. - Informations were filed before before Judge Beltran for estafa and violation
of BP 22. Petitioners Claim - Petitioner claims that Beltrans ruling that there w
as no valid insurance contract with Abraham was erroneous and that he had no jur
isdiction over the case in the first place. Respondents Comments - Beltran claims
that there was no valid insurance contract between Abbariao and Abraham because
the insurance policy form of Abraham was disapproved. - He also claims he has j
urisdiction over the case because the accused was arraigned in his court and the
prosecutor failed to withdraw the case. ISSUE 1. WON the judge is guilty of ren
dering unjust judgment 2. WON Beltrans ruling showed gross ignorance of the law i
n terms of assuming jurisdiction over the case HELD 1. NO, the judge must be abs
olved from this charge. Ratio The acts of judges pertaining to their judicial fu
nctions are not subject to disciplinary power, unless such acts are commited wit
h fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. In the absence of proof to the con
trary, an erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good fa
ith. 2. YES. Beltran had no authority to rule over the case. Ratio A court can o
nly take cognizance of a case that falls within its jurisdiction. Reasoning - Ap
ril 15, 1994 is the date of effectivity of RA 7691. RA 7691 expanded the jurisdi
ction of the first-level courts by providing that first-level courts shall have
jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the offense is punishable with impriso
nment not exceeding 6 years, regardless of the amount of the fine. - January 30,
1995 was the date the information was filed. The case had to do with the violat
ion of BP 22 which is penalized by an imprisonment of not less than 30 days but
not more than one year. Thus when the information was filed, RA 7691 was already
in effect. - During the tenure of the former presiding judge, the issue of juri
sdiction over the case was already pending resolution. He also displayed
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indecisiveness by relying on the public prosecutors assurance that his court had
acquired jurisdiction. - Aside from this instance, there were two other occasion
s when Beltran was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law (in De
Austria v. Beltran and Andres v. Beltran). DISPOSITION Judge Beltran was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for which he is fined P20,000 as recommende
d by the OCA and is warned that a repetition of the same act would merit a grave
r penalty.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondent erred when s
he conducted the preliminary investigation of the subject criminal complaint eve
n after the Municipality of Ligao, Albay had been converted into a city. The OCA
recommended that: (1) the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter; and (2) the respondent be reprimanded, directed to concentrate her time
and effort on performing her judicial tasks and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. - A motion for recons
ideration was filed by respondent on October 1, 2003. This time, respondent clai
med that what she conducted on November 29, 2001 was a preliminary examination t
o determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the s
pouses. Respondent also claimed that the criminal complaint was governed by Sec.
9, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the rule governing case
s that did not require preliminary investigation. Since the amount involved in t
he estafa case was P12,000, no preliminary investigation was required. ISSUES 1.
WON respondent judge had the authority to conduct preliminary investigation 2.
WON respondent judge is guilty of misconduct in office 3. WON preliminary invest

igation was not required for the estafa case 4. WON warrant of arrest was valid
HELD 1. NO - Although judges of inferior courts are authorized to conduct prelim
inary investigation of all crimes within their jurisdiction, the task is essenti
ally an executive function. As far back as Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, we
already held that: [w]hile we sustain the power of the x x x courts to conduct p
reliminary examination, pursuant to Our Constitutional power of administrative s
upervision over all courts, as a matter of policy, we enjoin x x x judge[s] x x
x to concentrate on hearing and deciding before their courts. x x x [Judges] sho
uld not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation o
f criminal complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or provinc
ial or city fiscal, who in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecut
or to conduct such preliminary examination and investigation. - City judges then
were clearly authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and examination. B
ut even then, we also held that the provisions of Rule 112 granting city judges
the authority to conduct preliminary investigation did not apply to judges of ci
ties the charters of which authorized the city fiscal only to conduct preliminar
y investigation of criminal complaints. - This ruling was, in fact, integrated i
nto the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Sec. 1, Rule 110, criminal ac
tions in chartered cities are instituted by filing the complaint only with the C
ity Prosecutor. The rule implies that the task of conducting preliminary investi
gation in these cities is now lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor. Con
sequently, inferior court judges of cities whose charters authorize only the fis
cal to conduct preliminary investigation are no longer allowed to perform this f
unction.
RIBAYA v JUDGE BINAMIRA-PARCIA AM No. MTJ-04-1547 CORNEJO; April 15, 2005
NATURE Administrative case against Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Ligao City, Albay relative to Criminal Case No. 8
617 (People v. Sps. Ribaya) FACTS - Asst Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Vega, in hi
s personal capacity, filed before the MTCC, Ligao City a criminal complaint for
estafa against the Spes Ribaya on November 29, 2001. The spouses, after receivin
g P12,000 from Vega, allegedly misappropriated the amount to the latters prejudic
e. The preliminary investigation was then conducted by respondent judge. - Compl
ainant, the daughter of the accused spouses, observed several irregularities in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. The spouses then filed a motion to quash and sought the nullification of
subsequent orders. They alleged that the MTCC had no jurisdiction and authority t
o conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by an offended party
directly with the court. The authority to conduct a preliminary investigation wa
s vested solely on the Office of the City Prosecutor. - While waiting for the re
solution of their motion to quash, the spouses did not post bail. On April 10, 2
002 Corazon Ribaya was apprehended by arresting officers in the public market by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge. - The complainant fil
ed this administrative case against Judge Parcia. The motions basically question
ed respondents authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. - In her answer,
respondent judge claimed that complainant was not a party in Criminal Case No.
8617. Respondent explained that she conducted the preliminary investigation of t
he criminal complaint against the spouses because the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
the Office of the City Prosecutor was too busy to do so. - To support her claim
, respondent attached the affidavit of OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez of the then n
ewly-created Ligao City. Vasquez stated that the City Prosecutors Office was stil
l undergoing reorganization when the subject criminal complaint was filed. It ha
d neither enough manpower nor office space in the Hall of Justice. Positions had
not yet been filled. His workload as Asst Provincial Prosecutor and OIC City Pr
osecutor was so heavy that time constraints did not permit him to conduct prelim
inary investigations. Thus, it was the respondent judge who conducted the prelim
inary investigation.
Criminal Procedure

- The Municipality of Ligao was converted into a city by RA 9008 which took effe
ct on Feb 21, 2001. This law, also known as the charter of the City of Ligao, pr
ovides in Sec. 50 that: (a) There shall be established in the city a prosecution
service to be headed by a city prosecutor and such number of assistant prosecut
ors as may be necessary, who shall be organizationally part of the DOJ (b) The Ci
ty Prosecutor shall handle the criminal prosecution in the MTC in the city as we
ll as in the RTC for criminal cases originating in the territory of the city, an
d shall render to or for the city such services as are required by law, ordinanc
e or regulation of the DOJ - Clearly, respondent judge had no more authority to c
onduct a preliminary investigation of the subject criminal complaint. The office
r authorized to conduct preliminary investigations in the then newly-created Cit
y of Ligao was its City Prosecutor. At that time, the duty devolved upon OIC Cit
y Prosecutor Vasquez, despite the administrative difficulties he was encounterin
g. 2. YES - We noticed the contradiction between her answer and her motion for r
econsideration as to what she actually conducted on November 29, 2001. In her an
swer, she justified her authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. In her
motion for reconsideration of the OCAs resolution, however, she declared that sh
e conducted a preliminary examination to justify the issuance of a warrant of ar
rest -There appear just too many intriguing uncertainties surrounding the filing
of the estafa case. We therefore direct our attention to respondent judges failu
re to erase our doubts over how she administers justice in her jurisdiction. - R
espondent judge must be reminded that she should do honor to her position not on
ly by rendering just, correct and impartial decisions but doing so in a manner f
ree from any suspicion as to their fairness and impartiality, and as to her inte
grity. A spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision re
ndered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times m
aintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. - Considering all this, res
pondent judge committed simple misconduct in office. Misconduct in office has a
well-defined meaning. It refers to misconduct that affects the judges performance
of her duties and not just her character as a private individual. To constitute
an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. 3. YES Respondent correctly observed that it was not needed in the estafa case. The max
imum penalty for the crime allegedly committed there (6 months and 1 day to 4 ye
ars and 2 months) did not meet the minimum penalty (at least 4 years, 2 months a
nd 1 day) required to make a preliminary investigation part of the spouses right
to due process. 4. YES - As long as the constitutional mandate was complied with
, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon a finding of probable cause per
sonally by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the compl
ainant and the witnesses he may produce, the warrant of arrest was valid. - Resp
ondent judge examined the complainant Pedro Vega on the day the complaint was fi
led and she was satisfied that probable cause existed. The warrant of arrest she
issued against the spouses Ribaya was,
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therefore, justified and no violation of their constitutional rights occurred. D
ISPOSITION Respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia is hereby found guilty of sim
ple misconduct and a fine of P11,000 is imposed on her. She is hereby directed t
o devote her time and effort exclusively to discharging her judicial functions.
She is furthermore warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will meri
t a more severe penalty.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
that it stated no cause of action. Such analysis demonstrated that they understo
od its contents. DISPOSITION Denied for lack of merit.
TUMANG
NATURE
iled a
al was

v BAUTISTA 136 SCRA 682 ABAD-SANTOS; May 31 1985


Petition to review and annul orders of RTC Laguna FACTS - Emilio Javier f
sakdal against Enrique Tumang and his daughter Georgia Tumang. - The sakd
written in Tagalog and was unaccompanied by an English translation. - The

Tumangs prayed that Javier be ordered to file a copy of the complaint as transl
ated in English, and a copy of the criminal complaint and Decision of acquittal
in the unjust vexation case mentioned in Javiers complaint. - TC ruled on Oct. 21
1982 that the complaint written in Pilipino, which is an official language, is
proper and is admitted. TC also ruled that it is not absolutely necessary that c
opies of the complaint and criminal case be attached as annexes. Javier should h
ave, however, at least stated the docket number as well as name of the court and
branch number. - The Tumangs failed to answer the sakdal and were declared in d
efault. They sought to reconsider, not only the order of default but also the or
der admitting the complaint in Pilipino. - TC set aside its order of default tha
t refused to reconsider its order of October 21, 1982. - The Tumangs filed a mot
ion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint did not state a cause of action and
that the venue was improperly laid. TC denied the motion on both grounds. ISSUE
WON the sakdal should have been in English and not Tagalog HELD YES - In the pon
entes lecture, Writing Decisions, he said in part: What language should the judge us
e? The constitution says that until otherwise provided by law, English and Pilip
ino shall be the official languages! (Art. XV, Sec. 3, Par 3.) If we are to be g
uided by this provision then either English of Pilipino can be used. But in fact
English is almost exclusively used and with good reason. For Pilipino is still
a gestating language. The constitution says so. It directs that the Batasang Pamb
ansa shall take steps towards the development and formal adoption of a common na
tional language to be known as Pilipino. - However, petitioner cannot now raise t
his question before the Supreme Court, As they have tacitly submitted to the TCs
ruling that the sakdal did not have to be translated in English; they analyzed t
he sakdal in arguing
POTOT v PEOPLE 383 SCRA 449 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; June 26, 2002
NATURE Review on certiorari on a decision of RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar FAC
TS - Dec.12,1999: Potot was charged with homicide before the RTC for assaulting
and stabbing a certain Rodolfo Dapulag with a knife, thereby causing his death.
- Feb.1, 2000: Upon arraignment, Potot pleaded guilty and invoked the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. He was later convicted
of homicide w/ the above stated mitigating circumstances. - Feb.3, 2000: Potot
filed a manifestation with motion informing the TC that he is not appealing from
the Decision and praying that a commitment order be issued so he could immediat
ely serve his sentence. - Feb.11, 2000: Private complainant Rosalie Dapulag (wif
e of the victim), with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed a motion f
or reconsideration/retrial praying that the decision be set aside and that the c
ase be heard again because of certain irregularities committed before and during
the trial. She alleged that there were 2 other men involved in the commission o
f the crime and that the eyewitness deliberately withheld the information upon s
olicitation by a certain Mayor Dapulag and upon the eyewitnesses own belief that
such inclusion would complicate the case and make it more difficult. - Petitione
r opposed this motion, asserting that the decision can no longer be modified or
set aside because it became final when he formally waived his right to appeal. May 3, 2000: The trial court granted Rosalie Dapulags motion, set aside its prev
ious Decision as well as ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and filin
g of the corresponding charge. - Petitioner filed a MFR, contending that the tri
al court has no jurisdiction to issue the Feb.1 order as the Decision had become
final, and that the said order would place him in double jeopardy. - May 26, 20
00: The trial court denied the MFR for the reason that the State is not bound by
the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not a
ttach. - Petitioner now assails the May 3rd and May 26 orders with the Sol.Gen.
agreeing that the challenged orders should be set aside and that the Feb. 1 Deci
sion should be reinstated. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court, upon motion by a priva
te complainant, can set aside a previous judgment of conviction and remand the r
ecords of a case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of
the evidence and the filing of the corresponding charge 2. WON the manifestatio
n by the accused that he is not appealing from the trial courts Decision render t

he judgment final
Criminal Procedure
3. WON the trial court err in granting private complainants motion for reconsider
ation/retrial 4. WON the assailed orders violate petitioners constitutional right
against double jeopardy HELD 1. NO Ratio Only the accused may ask for a modific
ation or setting aside of a judgment of conviction which he must do before the s
aid judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Reasoning - Sec. 7
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: Sec.
7. Modification of judgment - A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the a
ccused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is per
fected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final afte
r the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has bee
n partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in wr
iting his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. - It is thus clear that
only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of c
onviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before
he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways
: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of autom
atic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b) when he has partia
lly or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to ap
peal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he appl
ies for probation. When a judgment becomes final, the trial court which rendered
the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it. 2
. YES Ratio The waiver by the accused of his right to appeal from a judgment of
conviction has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterabl
e. Reasoning - It is an undisputed fact that after the promulgation of the judgm
ent of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right
to appeal therefrom. His intention not to appeal is further indicated by his pra
yer in the same manifestation for the immediate issuance of a commitment order s
o he could serve his sentence. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgmen
t to become final and unalterable. Thus, it was beyond the authority of the tria
l court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting aside its Feb.3, 2000 Decision
which had attained finality. 3. YES Ratio When the MFR of the judgment of convi
ction is not initiated by the accused or at the instance of the trial court with
the consent of the accused, the same should be denied outright. Reasoning - Sec
. 1 Rule 121 of the same Rules provides: Sec.1. New trial or reconsideration At
any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion
of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, gran
t a new trial or reconsideration.
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- Since the MFR of the judgment of conviction was not initiated by the accused o
r at the instance of the trial court with his consent, the same should have been
denied outright as being violative of the above provision. At any rate, the rec
ords do not show any irregularity in the preliminary investigation of the case b
efore the Provincial Prosecutors Office. 4. YES Ratio The right against double je
opardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which h
e has previously been acquitted or convicted. Reasoning - To invoke the defense
of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid compla
int or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accu
sed has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or th
e case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
. - These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was cha
rged with homicide under a valid information before the trial court which has ju
risdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the ba
sis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. A
s petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be
prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes

or is necessarily included in the first offense charged. DISPOSITION The petiti


on is granted. The assailed orders dated May 3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issued by
the trial court are set aside. Its decision dated Feb. 1, 2000 is reinstated.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
Noting petitioners opposition to the private prosecutors entry of appearance, the
RTC held that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives t
he civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3) insti
tutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the offend
ed party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the
filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC all
owed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the proceedings. ISSUE WO
N a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the procee
dings of the above-entitled estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the atta
ched civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is a
lso subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases HELD YES. Settled is the rule tha
t the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct crimi
nal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rule
s of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in eac
h of these two penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liab
ility arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal
case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action
. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, i
t authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a singl
e set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. Reasoning - Petitioner
theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pendi
ng before the MTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corres
ponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the RTC.
She hinges her theory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of Rules
of Court. - Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in th
e prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the
nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability ar
ises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the
offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waiv
e the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do s
o or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the pr
ivate complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becom
es the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to
the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from interveni
ng in the estafa suit. True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give
rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and another for violation of
BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil li
ability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury. - crimin
al liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the c
ivil action. - Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act is
suing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed institute
d with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution.
RODRIGUEZ v PONFERRADA 465 SCRA 338 PANGANIBAN; July 29, 2005
NATURE Petition for Certiorari seeking to reverse the July 27, 2002 Order of the
RTC of Quezon City: WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private prosecutor shall be a
llowed upon payment of the legal fees for these estafa cases pending before this
Court. FACTS - Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of
Quezon City Prosecutors Office issued her Resolution: there being PROBABLE CAUSE
to charge respondent for ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by P
D 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is respectfully recommende
d that the attached Information be approved and filed in Court. - As a consequenc

e thereof, separate informations were separately filed against herein [p]etition


er before proper [c]ourts, for Estafa and [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
- petitioner through counsel filed in open court before the [p]ublic [r]esponden
t an Opposition to the Formal Entry of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor - The [
p]ublic [r]espondent court during the said hearing noted the Formal Entry of App
earance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as [p]rivate [p]rosecutor as well as the Oppos
ition filed thereto by herein [p]etitioner. - Ruling of the Trial Court
Criminal Procedure
On Election of Remedies - In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the
choice by a party to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights,
where several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been ge
nerally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the
assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other
. In its more restricted and technical sense, the election of remedies is the ado
ption of one of two or more coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a res
ort to the others. - no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits
is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes - it was not the intent of t
he special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds
to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and v
iolation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other. There is no identi
ty of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in
the other. The offenses charged in the informations are perfectly distinct from
each other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fac
t - In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended p
arties without any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power
to promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall not dim
inish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private complainants intervention in
the prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of her inte
rests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mand
ated by the Constitution. DISPOSITION Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed ord
er AFFIRMED
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- On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of Justice Hon Catalino Macaraig Jr, res
olving the petition for review, reversed the resolution of the Office of the Pro
vincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the in
formation filed against the accused. The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dis
miss for insufficiency of evidence on April 10, 1978. On November 24 1978, The J
udge denied the motion and set the arraignment - The accused filed a petition fo
r certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with petition for the issuance of prelim
inary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. On Janua
ry 23 1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA against the threatened act
of arraignment of the accused. However, in a decision of October 25 1979, the CA
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of Jan 23,1979. The mot
ion for reconsideration of the accused was denied in a resolution. ISSUE WON the
trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provinci
al Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was ele
vated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment a
nd trial on the merits HELD YES Ratio Once an information is filed in court, the
courts prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the cas
e. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determi
ne whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case
had already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel sho
uld be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration o
f the Court. DISPOSITION Petition dismissed
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October 14, 1974. -

On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Ca
marines Norte an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No
. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft. - In a le
tter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of
Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal d
ated August 26, 1974 and October 14, 1974. - On November 6, 1974, the Chief Stat
e Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal to elevate entire records PFO Case 57
7 against Garrido et al.The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner
in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among
other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed aga
inst private respondents for which reason the request for review has become a mo
ot question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge
for attempted theft. - On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after review
ing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fis
cal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal
of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1
975. - A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provin
cial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima
facie evidence against private respondents and set the case for trial on Februa
ry 25, 1976. - Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court s ruling
but in an Order dated February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was l
ikewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23, 1976. - Thereafter, Fis
cal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and re
spondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal s Offic
e of Camarines Norte. - On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Moti
on to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial co
urt in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested th
at he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to a
ppear therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus. - In this action, petitioner p
rays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus "commanding respondent fiscal or a
ny other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead to
prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Nor
te" There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed
to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file t
he information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court
of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the informatio
n, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so (People v
s. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already been filed in court
, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dism
iss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further p
roceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court"
(U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, sup
ra).
CRESPO v MOGUL 151 SCRA 462 GANCAYCO; June 30, 1987
NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena C
ity (petitioner prays that respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforci
ng his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trail of petitioner, ordering
respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petit
ioner as purely civil.) FACTS - Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed an inform
ation for estafa against Mario Crespo in Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arrai
gnment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal f
or the filing of the information. The presiding judge (leodegario Mogul) denied
the motion through his order. - The accused filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction. In an order (Aug 1
7 1977), the CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of t

he accused until further orders from the Court - On May 15 1978, a decision was
made by the CA granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enfo
rcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Dept of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
STA. ROSA MINING v ZABALA 153 SCRA 367 BIDIN; August 31, 1987
NATURE Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 o
f the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminat
ed. FACTS - On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft
of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining proper
ty at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido
and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, the
n headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. - The case was assigned to third
Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after con
ducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommendi
ng that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents
on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fis
cal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolutio
n but
Criminal Procedure
ISSUE WON the fiscal can be compelled to prosecute the case after his motion to
dismiss has been denied HELD YES - This court is of the view that the writ praye
d for should issue. Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fi
scal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable th
e court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the a
ccused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the
prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the
criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rul
e 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings will be null and void
(People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361). - "In the trial of criminal cases, it is the
duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is
an outrage to the sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Co
urt, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting officer is t
he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty
where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to go
vern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculia
r and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is t
hat guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer" (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556
). - Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case
exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, re
fuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the cr
iminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he
can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the pres
entation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his di
rection and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 3
7 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to
discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let
the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by
both parties. - The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing
the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismis
sal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is de
nied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to pr
osecute the case. It is the court where the case is filed and not the fiscal tha
t has full control of it. - In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal m
ay be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the

action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed
in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
" DISPOSITION petition is hereby Granted Public respondent or any other person w
ho may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered
to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.
a2010 page 5
PEREZ v HAGONOY 327 SCRA 588 DE LEON; March 9, 2000
NATURE: Review on Certiorari FACTS - Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.
owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Offi
cer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina
Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers. - For the period start
ing August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Compan
y, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audi
t of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more
or less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were
recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks w
hich were in the possession of the depositors. The audit also revealed that to c
over-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop
s subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a particular savings acc
ount went below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor.This pr
ompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against
the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan a
nd Brigida Mangahas. Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafte
r "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petit
ioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification
of commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the corresponding inform
ation against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The
charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed. - Pe
rez filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the di
smissal of the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved
for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the compl
aint against Susan Jordan. - The prosecutor granted private respondent s motion
for reconsideration.8 Hence, on April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru f
alsification of commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner, Albert
o Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan, - On September 23,
1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696,
series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information
against herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private r
espondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Ju
stice, which motion, however, was denied with finality by the latter.Pursuant to
the said resolution, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the d
ismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended i
nformation excluding petitioner as one of the accused which motion was granted b
y the RTC. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the pet
itioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion was denied
by the RTC after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, h
ad no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges agains
t the petitioner.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
ISSUES 1. WON Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor s motion to dismi
ss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter 2. WON the priv
ate respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal persona
lity to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges agains
t herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor HELD 1. YES, Judge M
asadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor s motion
to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of th

e recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reasoning - As aptly observed by t


he Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of
the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised positi
on of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty b
ound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of J
ustice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere ru
bber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.. 2. YES Ratio While it
is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proce
edings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offend
ed party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his
own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. Reasoning - In the c
ase of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,we held that: "In a special civil action fo
r certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to la
ck of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parti
es are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant
has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civi
l action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdict
ional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the n
ame of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name
of the said complainant." - Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court
of Appeals allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action f
or certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dism
iss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. It follows, there
fore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil actio
n for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move f
or a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal cha
rges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action
will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
Criminal Procedure
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
a2010 page 6
TAN, JR v GALLARDO 73 SCRA 308 ANTONIO; October 5, 1976
NATURE Original action for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Solicitor General
Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor
Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents. Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castr
o & Associate as private prosecutors. - petitioners seek the annulment of respon
dent Judge s Orders in the Criminal Case People of the Philippines v Jorge Tan,
Jr, Cesar Tan, Teofanis Bondoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido and Librado S
ode for frustrated murder and Double Murder of the son and uncle of Mayor Inigo
Larazzabal. - Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentences to death penalty
allegedly after meeting with Mayor Larazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia
such as whisky and wine according to the court stenographer. - Jan 14, 1976 - S
olGen, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the
petition. They are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the renditio
n of respondent Judge s decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial
were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice therefore, they interpose no o
bjection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition o
f a new decision by another trial judge." - Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors s
ubmitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the responde
nt Judge and objected to the remand of this case. - Feb 12, 1976, the petitioner
s moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" o
f the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standi
ng in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without an
y personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal - private pro

secutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take
part in the proceedings, and to adapt a position in contravention to that of th
e Solicitor General. ISSUES 1. WON private prosecutors have the right to interve
ne independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with
that of the latter 2. WON respondent Judge should be disqualified from further
proceeding with the criminal cases HELD 1. NO Ratio Private prosecutors cannot i
ntervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Soli
citor General. Reasoning - Participation of the private prosecution in the insta
nt case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus:
"to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and
pleadings
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and
to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecut
ors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken
by the Solicitor General. - Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sover
eignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State sho
uld direct and control the prosecution. > Suarez v Platon: the prosecuting offic
er " is the representative not of, an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its oblig
ation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall he done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim o
f which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute wit
h earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard b
lows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrai
n from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." > People v Esquivel: that
there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the cou
rt the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attentio
n, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence
, to the end that the court s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innoc
ent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is
the prosecution s prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementioned objectives that the prose
cution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of
the prosecuting officer. - Role of the private prosecutors is to represent the
offended party with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil li
ability arising from the offense. This civil action is deemed instituted with th
e criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil a
ction or reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended party may inter
vene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offense
s which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party The o
nly exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil actio
n or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the c
ase, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is dee
med to have lost his interest in its prosecution. in any event, whether an offen
ded party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention m
ust always be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official."
> Herrero v Diaz: "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is author
ized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions
of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by comp
laint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of t
he Fiscal." - the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that
of the promotor fiscal because, as the promotor fiscal alone is authorized to r
epresent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the
prosecution of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretio
nary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty
to commence it or not or to refrain from prosecuting it or not, depending upon

whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient


PEOPLE v BUBAN GR No. 166895 VELASCO, JR; January 24, 2007
NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS - Romeo Buban is accused of rapi
ng his then 12 year old daughter 5 times, on separate occasions. The medical exa
mination of the girl reveals that she was indeed raped. - Although the girls swor
n statement mentioned five occasions of rape, the Complaint mentioned only the 5
th incident. The charges of rape committed on other occasions were not supported
with the required complaints in accordance with Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. - RTC found the accused guilty (sentence: death pe
nalty plus moral damages, civil indemnity, exemplary damages) but only with rega
rd the 5th incident only. The other 4 charges were dismissed for lack of legal b
asis to convict. The dispositive portion of the RTCs decision was not specific as
to which charge it found the accused guilty, but the body of the decision impli
es the dismissal of the other 4 charges, thus it can be deduced that the convict
ion pertains to the 5th incident only. CA affirmed. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred in fi
nding the accused guilty despite the alleged insufficiency of evidence 2. WON th
e accused may be convicted for the other counts of rape, where the complaint men
tions only one instance of rape HELD 1. NO Ratio there is no error in the apprec
iation of evidence by the court. Reasoning - the argument of the accused that th
e testimony of the girl is not reliable for inconsistencies is untenable. People
v. Antonio: Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness ref
erring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of
the crime, do not impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that th
e witness is not coached or rehearsed. 2. As can be gleamed from the case, the c
omplaint should contain all instances of the crime charged. The other 4 counts o
f rape were dismissed because the complaint did not specify the same, and only m
entioned the last instance of rape, despite the inclusion of the other 4 in the
sworn statement of the girl. The prosecution did not question anymore the dismis
sal of the other 4 counts, so the court did not discuss it further. DISPOSITION
judgment affirmed with modification. Sentence changed to reclusion perpatua (pur
suant to RA 9346, abolishing the death penalty) and higher damages.
Criminal Procedure
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, except
when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of th
e offended party s intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding.
Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks t
he competent Court of First Instance in which the case is pending for the dismis
sal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person
injured by the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that
the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not
entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of
a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his
right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal s right of control
, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petition of the pr
omoter fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an
order overrruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively t
o the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Order
s, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal
from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upo
n petition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended p
arty of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the p
rovisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58. - from the n
ature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charge
d does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
prosecution of the offense. - Solicitor General represents the People of the Ph
ilippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Ap
peals or in this Court. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the

Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: SECTION
1. Function and Organization, (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall repr
esent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. * * * The office of the Solicitor General sh
all constitute the law office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge du
ties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific po
wers and functions: (a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Co
urt of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its off
icers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribun
als in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is the party. (k) Act and represent the
Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in an
y matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require. It is evident, therefore, that since
the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People
of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to tha
t of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that
of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the
direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions o
f law and the settled rules on the matter. 2. It is already moot because the jud
ge is no longer in the judicial service
a2010 page 7
DISPOSITION SC grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the trial cour
t in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners motion for new trial an
d to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- The Court also ruled that the death penalty is not applicable in this case as
the prosecution was not able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged mi
nority of the victim. It cited its previous rulings to this effect.
PEOPLE v DELA CERNA 390 SCRA 538 CORONA ; October 9, 2002
NATURE Automatic review of decision of Cebu City RTC FACTS - Ernesto dela Cuesta
was charged on May 16, 1997 with raping his minor daughter, Irene, seven times
over a period of eight years beginning 1989 when the victim was seven years old.
- The victim testified in open court about the incidents of rape. However, prio
r to the rendering of judgment, the victim, on July 3, 1998, filed an affidavit
of desistance stating among others that she was no longer interested in pursuing
the case and that she had already forgiven her father. - The SC noted that the
rape incidents in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, The An
ti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. Under this statute,
the crime of rape was classified as a crime against person. It should be further
noted that the law at the time the crimes were committed treated rape as a priv
ate crime covered by Article 344 of the RPC. As provided for in the said article
, offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, the offender has been expressly pard
oned by the above named persons. - The trial court found the defendant guilty an
d sentenced him to the supreme penalty of death. - In his appeal, the offender c
laimed that he should no have been found guilty considering that the affidavit o
f desistance created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. ISSUE WON the trial cou
rt erred in convicting the defendant HELD NO - The affidavit did not in fact con
tain any retraction on the claim of rape. Hence the guilty verdict was proper co
nsidering that the testimony of the victim was considered by the trial court as
credible and believable. There was as such no reasonable doubt to speak of. - Ev
en using the old statute which considered rape as a private crime and the forgiv
eness of the victim or the parents, grandparents, or guardian as extinguishing t
he crime, the Supreme court held that the pardon or forgiveness must be prior to

the institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed the contr
ol of the prosecution is removed from the offended partys hand and any change of
heart by the victim will not affect the states right to vindicate the atrocities
committed against itself.
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ 384 SCRA 375 DAVIDE; July 11, 2002
FACTS - Upon a complaint signed by JONALYN with the assistance of her aunt Carme
lita Borja, two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecut
or before the RTC of Malolos charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz with rape. BIENVENIDO
entered a plea of not guilty. - When JONALYN was presented as its first witness
, the prosecution sought to obtain from the trial court an order for the conduct
of a psychiatric examination to determine her mental and psychological capabili
ty to testify in court. Trial court allowed the prosecutor to conduct direct exa
mination on JONALYN so that if in its perception she would appear to be sufferin
g from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could be permitted to ask leading quest
ions. Noticing that JONALYN had difficulty in expressing herself, the trial cour
t decided to suspend the proceedings to give the prosecution sufficient time to
confer with her. - Trial court allowed the prosecution to put on the witness sta
nd a Medical Officer of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tuazon testif
ied that she found that JONALYN was suffering from a moderate level of mental re
tardation and that although chronologically the latter was already 20 years of a
ge, she had the mental age of an 8-year-old child under the Wechsler Adult Intell
igence Scale. - The trial court issued an order allowing leading questions to be
propounded to JONALYN. Thus, JONALYN took the witness stand. She declared in op
en court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice. She stated that BIENVENIDO placed hims
elf on top of her and inserted his private part into her womanhood. - The defens
e filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. It admitted that it could hav
e moved to quash the information but it did not because the complaint on which t
he information was based was on its face valid, it having been signed by JONALYN
as the offended party. However, the undeniable truth is that JONALYN had no cap
acity to sign the same considering her mental deficiency or abnormality. The def
ense also insisted on assailing the competency of JONALYN as a witness. It claim
ed that JONALYNs testimony, considering her mental state, was coached and rehears
ed. - The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and set the dates for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense. Trial court convicted BIENVENIDO o
f the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitted him in Crimina
l Case No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of evidence. ISSUES 1. WON the complaint
for rape filed was valid 2. WON Jonalyn was competent to testify 3. WON Jonalyn
was credible as a witness 4. WON leading questions should have been allowed to b
e asked to Jonalyn
Criminal Procedure
HELD 1. YES - The pertinent laws existing at the time the crimes were committed
were Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8
353 which took effect on 22 October 1997) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. - The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or act
s of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by th
e offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if
the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the cas
e may be. - Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states
: The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parent
s, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been express
ly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended
party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has
no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the crimi
nal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the
right to initiate the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her p
arents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doin

g so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a min
or fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file t
he same. - A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in cri
mes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family,
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with t
he scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggri
eved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated c
ontroversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the fa
mily. - The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement unde
r the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JO
NALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As sig
ned by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance
of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYNs signature al
one suffices to validate the complaint. - If a minor under the Rules of Court ca
n file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years
of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewis
e file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightf
ully considered filed by a minor. 2. YES - The determination of the competence o
f witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the
witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intell
igence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. - The prose
cution has proved JONALYNs competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding
of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN ha
d the understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of her com
petency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of
an 8-year-old minor.
a2010 page 8
3. YES - The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYNs competency but
also her credibility. Considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricate
d or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. Also, no improper motive was shown
by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against B
IENVENIDO. - Complainant has made herself clear about the sexual molestation she
suffered in the hands of the accused. Plain and simple her testimony may have b
een, unembellished, as it is, with details, yet, it is in its simplicity that it
s credence is enhanced. 4. YES - It is usual and proper for the court to permit
leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; ag
ed and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustom
ed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; feeble-minded; confused and agitated; t
errified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of q
uestions asked; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English or i
mperfectly familiar therewith. - The leading questions were neither conclusions
of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she
merely confirmed as true. DISPOSITION RTC decision finding accused-appellant BIE
NVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the p
enalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-app
ellant is ordered to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduce
d amount of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective
submissions of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur
-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed decision. ISSUES 1. WON the RTC ab
used its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding
that there was conspiracy between and among the accused-appellants 2. WON the R
TC gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdicti
on in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Ho
micide HELD 1. YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are only acco
mplices. 2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed was qualified by abu
se of superiority. While superiority in number would not per se mean superiority

in strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their superiority in strength
certainly out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person att
acked. - Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, manda
tes that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due p
rocess of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be i
nformed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be i
nformed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. - objec
t of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him: First. To furni
sh the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acqui
ttal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third,
to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they ar
e sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United State
s vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied
, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certai
n acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable part
icularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circu
mstance necessary to constitute the crime charged DISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Q
uitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpi
to. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as acc
omplices in the commission of the crime.
PEOPLE v QUITLONG 292 SCRA 360 VITUG ; July 10, 1998
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC FACTS - Calpito was a student from Ba
guio city. One time, he wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some fishba
lls worth P15. When Calpito counted his change, he found out that he only receiv
ed P35 for his P100. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor would
not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The 3 men kept arguing. Moments lat
er, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito got stabbed
and fell to the ground. - The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong and
Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appe
llants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for rein
vestigation alleging that it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim.
The trial court acted favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a motio
n to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits. The information, a
s amended, included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike accused-ap
pellants who were immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus
Mendoza remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded no
t guilty to the crime charged.
ROCO v CONTRERAS 461 SCRA 505 GARCIA; June 28, 2005
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
decision dismissing appeal and resolution denying motion for reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals
Criminal Procedure
FACTS - Domingo Roco, engaged in buying and selling of dressed chicken, purchase
d his supply from private respondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation (Cals) - As p
ayment for his purchase, petitioner drew 5 checks payable to Cals against his acc
ount with PCIB. PCIB dishonored the checks for having been drawn from a closed a
ccount. Cals then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP22 - Before trial
could commence, Roco filed with the BIR a denunciation letter against Cals in th
at it failed to issue commercial invoices. BIR found no prima facie evidence of
tax evasion. - Trial for Rocos violation of BP 22 commenced. After the prosecutio
n rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on account of petit
ioners failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, MTCC rendered a judgment
of conviction against petitioner. - Petitioner went to appeal to the RTC contend

ing that he was deprived of due process. RTC agreed and vacated the MTCC decisio
n. - Pending the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a Request for Iss
uance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deo
campo or Danilo Yap, both of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representa
tives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them certain documents,
records and books of accounts for the years 1993-19991. Prosecution did not obje
ct. - Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting petitioners request
and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas. -Cals counsel ma
nifested that it was improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance
of the requested subpoenas, to which the Roco countered by saying that Judge Del
fins had become final and hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued a
n order allowing the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioners
request for the issuance of subpoenas. They argued that Deocampo had earlier at
tested that the documents, records and books of accounts were already burned, th
ey did not maintain the requested sales ledger and that other documents could no
t be produced because of the recent computerization of records was still in the
process of completion. They also maintained that the documents requested are imm
aterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecut
ed. - In a resolution, the MTCC, thru its Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied peti
tioners request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledge
rs and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the co
urt; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of
the criminal cases. - Judge Contreras similarly denied the MFR. RTC denied due
course to petition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, it
denied
a2010 page 9
MFR. Petitioner went to CA via certiorari. The petition was still dismissed. MFR
was still dismissed. Petitioners claim The denial of the request for the issuanc
e of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum is violative of his cons
titutional rights ISSUE WON the lower courts erred in denying the subpoena reque
sted by Roco HELD Ratio NO. Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court m
ust first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the iss
ue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be re
asonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness
). Reasoning - A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to att
end and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation
conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition
. The first, subpoena ad testificandum, is used to compel a person to testify, w
hile the second, subpoena duces tecum, is used to compel the production of books
, records, things or documents therein specified. - The books and documents that
petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his reque
st with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefo
re, is satisfied in this case. However, in the matter of relevancy of those book
s and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed t
o discharge his burden. - Based on the records below and as correctly pointed ou
t by the CA, petitioner had been issued by Cals with temporary receipts in the fo
rm of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had bee
n validated by the corporation itself. It is clear that the production of the bo
oks and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his def
ense of payment. DISPOSITION the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged d
ecision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners house in Dara
m, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. - On the basis o
f the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary De
tention by the Sandiganbayan. - SC affirmed the conconviction of Daram. Defendan
t filed MFR denied with finality Filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File 2nd MF

R granted ISSUES Procedural WON filing of 2nd MFR is proper Substantive WON the
guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD Procedural YES Rati
o While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited
pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, prov
ided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better ser
ved thereby. Reasoning - The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to fac
ilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effect
ively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, c
ourts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm
that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights,
and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend t
o frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspen
d the rules, or except a particular case from its operation. Substantive NO Rati
o When the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the pr
esumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be g
ranted as a matter of right. For the prosecutions evidence must stand or fall on
its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the ev
idence for the defense. Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is c
oncededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must
be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumpt
ion of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of t
wo or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the pres
umption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption o
f innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a gui
lty man than to convict an innocent man. Reasoning - No sufficient evidence to s
how that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.
It appears that Darma merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
team in his house. DISPOSITION REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
ASTORGA v PEOPLE 437 SCRA 152 YNARES-SANTIAGO.; Aug 20, 2004
FACTS - Three (3) private offended parties who are members of the Regional Speci
al Operations Group (RSOG) of the DENR Tacloban City, together with two (2) memb
ers of Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the
Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible il
legal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats mea
suring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay
Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who
turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between pet
itioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments lat
er, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues,
Sales Journal for the year 1993; Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;
Sales Ledger for the year 1993; Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in
its absence, Accounts Receivable Ledger for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1
998 or 1999); Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 199
7, 1998 and Income Statements as of February 1999; Audited Balance Sheet for the
years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and pBalance Sheet as of February 1999
; and Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
1
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v TULIN RICARZE v CA (PEOPLE, CALTEX) G.R. No. 160451 CALLEJO, SR; Februa
ry 9, 2007
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS - Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by
City Service Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial service
s. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Ma

kati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver
them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltexs customers. - On Novemb
er 6, 1997, Caltex filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Offi
ce of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of com
mercial documents. Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his departmen
t was conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industri
al Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was dis
covered that unknown to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated O
ctober 13, 1997 in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, ha
d been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997, notwithstanding two missing che
cks and two other check forgeries, one of which amounted to P1,790,757.25. All o
f these were never issued by Caltex. - Further investigation revealed that said
savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were d
eposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. - In the meantime, the PCIB c
redited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the City
Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requi
site preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations f
or estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63. - P
etitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charg
es. Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented
its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offi
ces (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence. 7 Petitioner
opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by
the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it
was only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appeara
nce as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and
Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to
appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant i
s Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should
be stricken from the records. - Petitioner further averred that unless the Infor
mations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as acc
used would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no
longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original
a2010 page 10
Informations.8 He insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute
PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy. - PCI
B, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited
the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been su
brogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequen
tly, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court w
ould adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought o
ut on cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB
pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law O
ffice to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Calt
ex - On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the privat
e prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It
however denied petitioners motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO ex
punged from the record. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the
RTC denied on November 14, 2001. - Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari un
der Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for Temporary Restrain
ing Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for the annulment of the RTCs O
rders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. - According to petitioner, damage
or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. The amendment
of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party w
ould prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available before the
amendment, and which would be unavailable if the Informations are amended. Peti
tioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to this
case. - The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the

checks to Caltex, it was subrogated to the latters right against petitioner. It f


urther declared that in offenses against property, the designation of the name o
f the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal
act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. The app
ellate court cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Ho and People v. Reyes
. ISSUE 1. WON petitioners rights are prejudiced with the substitution of the com
plainant 2. WON there was a valid subrogation of rights by Caltex to PCIB 3. WON
charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both Informa
tions failed to name PCIB as true offended party HELD 1. NO - The test as to whe
ther a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the i
nformation as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made
, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to t
he information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information w
hich does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportuni
ty
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substan
ce. - In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complain
t is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of th
e charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner.
The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, an
d all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he
cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution. 2. YES - The Court agre
es with respondent PCIBs comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction bet
ween legal and conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the
rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his rights.
It may either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes p
lace without agreement but by operation of law because of certain acts. Instance
s of legal subrogation are those provided in Article 1302of the Civil Code. Conv
entional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement
of the parties. Thus, petitioners acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation t
o take place because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by
operation of law, and without need of the debtors knowledge. 3. NO - The rules o
n criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was com
mitted or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known
and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a f
ictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Sect
ion 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against pro
perty, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indis
pensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information
can be properly identified. - Legal Basis: Section. 12. Name of the offended pa
rty. The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person a
gainst whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellat
ion or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better
way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. (a) In of
fenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the prope
rty must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offens
e charged. (b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose prop
erty the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court
must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and th
e record (c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to st
ate its name, or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may
be identified, without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that i
t is organized in accordance with law. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is DE
NIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, fo
r further proceedings.

Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v GUEVARRA 179 SCRA 740 PADILLA: December 4, 1989
NATURE Automatic Review FACTS -On or about April 8, 1980, in Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
several armed men namely Jaime Guevarra y Arcega, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentin
o, Baldo de Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi, Chotse Doe alias Bernabe
Sulaybar y Hernandez, and Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak", entered the hous
e of the sps Cruz and robbed them of P3000 and jewelry. Thereafter, Luisito Cruz
was threatened by the men and forced to give the keys to his car by Vergel Bust
amante. The members of the household were then made to enter a room and were tie
d. After the robbery, Priscilla Cruz was forcibly boarded in her own car by 5 of
her kidnappers where she was held at knife and gunpoint. She was then told she
was being held for ransom of P50k but they had to stop in San Rafael Bulucan to
hire a truck because the car broke down. However, she was left at Valenzuela Bul
acan as the men said the kidnapping did not materialize. The five men then boarded
a taxi and the truck driver later took her home. On the same night, Luisito rep
orted the incident which led to the detention of Vergel Bustamante who was posit
ively identified by Priscilla. -Bustamante denied the allegations and interposed
the defense of alibi, claiming to be in Caloocan at the time of the crime. His
defense was rejected considering the proximity of Gapan and Caloocan and since w
itnesses had positively identified him. -After a separate trial for Poncing Aber
gas and Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak," inasmuch as Dan Tolentino, who had
previously entered of plea of "not guilty" could not be served with subpoenas,
and the other accused were reported to have died, judgment was rendered finding
the accused Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" guilty of the crime of Kidnappi
ng and Serious Illegal Detention and sentenced to suffer the death penalty, and
to indemnify the offended party, Mrs. Priscilla Cruz, in the amount of P5,000.00
. The accused Poncing Abergas, upon the other hand, was acquitted of the charge.
Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON TC erred in ordering the amendment of the inf
ormation to include Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak despite lack of proof that
the 2 are 1 and the same person. 2. WON there was no reinvestigation conducted t
o justify the filing of the amended information 3. WON the TC erred in convictin
g Bustamante upon the prosecution witnesses contradictory and improbable testimon
ies and the appellants extra-judicial confession 4. WON the accused can be convic
ted of kidnapping for ransom HELD 1. NO. - The ff circumstances led the RTC judg
e of Nueva Ecija to believe that Vergel Bustamante and Dan Saksak are one and the
same person as the accused is mentioned in each as Vergel Bustamante alias Dan
a2010 page 11
Saksak: A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan; a Return of Service of one subpoen
a; an order issued by the Municipal Court of Gapan finding a prima facie case ag
ainst the accused; and the letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to
the RTC of Nueva Ecija stating Bustamante aka Dan Saksak was detained in the Man
ila City Jail. -In, any case, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on a
ppeal as it is one affecting jurisdiction over the person and should have been r
aised before the trial court in a motion to quash the information. As the accuse
d failed to do so, he is deemed to have waived his objection to the information
and is assumed to be satisfied with its legality. 2. NO - The reinvestigation is
evidenced by the certification of the Fiscal stating that there was reasonable
ground to believe a crime had been committed and that the accused were informed
of the complaint and given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. 3. N
O - The said discrepancies in the testimonies were minor details which could not
destroy the substance of said testimonies. As the highest degree of respect is
accorded to the factual findings of the TC, the issue of the credibility of the
witnesses cannot be raised. Also, the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to support a finding of guilt even without the said extra-judicial co
nfession. 4. NO -No element of ransom exists as no ransom note was presented in
court. Neither was there a demand for money in exchange for Priscillas safe retur
n. Besides, the Amended Information failed to allege that the kidnapping was for

the purpose of extorting a ransom. The rule is that an accused cannot be convic
ted of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information. -Henc
e, Bustamante can only be convicted of kidnapping of a female under Article 267
with the aggravating circumstances of (a) the use of a motor vehicle and (b) the
aid of armed men bringing the penalty up to the maximum. However, due to Articl
e 3 Sec. 19 of the Constitution, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpe
tua. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
ISSUE WON the conviction for robbery with quadruple homicide can be sustained HE
LD NO - Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a compl
aint or information shall show, among others things, the names of the persons ag
ainst whom, or against whose property, the offense was committed, if known. The
complaint in this case therefore properly contained an averment as to the owners
hip of the property; and upon principle, in charging the crime of robbery commit
ted upon the person, the allegation of the owner s name is essential. But of cou
rse if his name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown. - F
rom the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be a
lleged as unknown it should NOT be inferred that the naming of such person, when
known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as
matter of essential description of the crime charged, the complaint must invest
such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name i
s unknown. It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be a
lleged as matter essential to the proper description of the offense. To constitu
te robbery, the property obtained must be that of another, and indictments for s
uch offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the ind
ictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to identify t
he offense. - A complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robb
ery with homicide must necessarily charge each of the component offenses with th
e same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separa
te complaints. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where a complex c
rime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the co
mponent offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere circumsta
nce that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no wa
y affects the principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant
to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that h
e robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violat
ive of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject to th
e criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could no
t be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acqui
ttal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today of the robbery which
is alleged to have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is per
fectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon t
he property of Juana; and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail. - In
the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of co
nformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the pr
operty, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery co
mmitted by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the comp
lex offense of robbery with homicide. HOWEVER, the accused were sentenced by the
Supreme Court for four separate homicides.
US v LAHOYLAHOY and MADANLOG 38 Phil. 330 STREET; July 15, 1918
NATURE Review of a decision of the CFI of Province of Iloilo, sentencing the def
endants Pedro Lahoylahoy and Marcos Madanlog to death upon a complaint charging
the crime of robbery with multiple homicide. FACTS - The information in a prosec
ution for robbery with quadruple homicide charged that the accused criminally an
d by force appropriated certain articles of value, the property of one Roman Est
riba, and on occasion thereof killed the said Roman Estriba and three others. Ho
wever, the proof showed that the money which was the subject of the robbery was
taken from one Juana Seran who was robbed and killed separately from the other t

hree victims.
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v PURISIMA 86 SCRA 542 MUNOZ-PALMA; November 20, 1978
NATURE Petitions for review (26 petitions consolidated) of the decisions of the
Courts of First of Manila and Samar. FACTS -The private respondents were all cha
rged with illegal possession of deadly weapons (one (1) carving knife with a bla
de 1/2 inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-3/
4 inches in the Information filed with J.Purisima; ice pick with an overall leng
th of about 8 1/2 inches in the Information filed with J. Maceren; socyatan in t
he Information filed with J. Polo) in violation of PD 9, Par. 3. Informations we
re filed with respondent judges in their respective courts (2 Branches of CFI, t
hen CFI Samar) but upon motion to quash filed by the several accused, the said j
udges dismissed the Informations on the common ground that the said Informations
did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by PD 90 failed to
state 1 of the 2 essential elements of the crime punished (the carrying outside
of the accused s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtheranc
e or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection,
or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.) - In the 2 cases filed
before the different branches of CFI Manila, the orders of dismissal were given
before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the CFI Samar the
accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In a
ll the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their
immediate release unless held on other charges. -ON PD 9:THIS CASE INVOLVES THE
INTERPRETATION AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE INTENT OF THIS P.D. The pertinent par
agraphs of the said PD is its Whereas clause ("WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, ins
urrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in
the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of fir
earms, explosives and other deadly weapons) and par3 (It is unlawful to carry out
side of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as fan knife, spea
r, dagger, bolo, balisong, barong,
kris, or club, except where such a
rticles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and
while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof s
hall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Mili
tary Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.) -Petitioners Contention: (1) Par 3, P
D 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to the subversive activit
ies; that the act proscribed is essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reaso
ns of public policy; (3) that since it is malum prohibitum, the intention of the
accused who commits it is immaterial; (4) that PD was enacted to eradicate lawl
ess violence which characterized pre-martial law days; and (5) that the real nat
ure of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information
.
a2010 page 12
ISSUE WON the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance
to constitute the offense of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon penalized under P
D 9 HELD NO. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be allege
d in the information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently vali
d charged. Ratio. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the
facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elem
ents of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order. - It is a constit
utional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be i
nformed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Reasoning. The of
fense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one s residence of any b
laded, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement
for a livelihood; and second that the act of carrying the weapon was either in f
urtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrec

tion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. There are other
statutes (SECTION 26 OF ACT NO. 1780, ORDINANCE NO. 3820 OF THE CITY OF MANILA)
which may be charged against the accused for their acts to constitute a crime. I
t is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if co
ncealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned abo
ve. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the
presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act cri
minal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that m
otivation, the act fans within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute
when the circumstances so warrant. -ON SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION: for a co
mplaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia, state the designati
on of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as con
stituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. It is necessary
that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial diff
erence between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on
the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the pen
alty imposed for the offense.(PD 9 punishes the offender with 5-10 yrs imprisonm
ent; Sec26, Act 1780 with a fine of P500 or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 mont
hs or both; Ordinance 3820 with a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment for
not more than 1 month or both). But since it was specified in the Informations
that the accused were charged with violation of Par3, PD 9, it was necessary for
the Court to elucidate the elements of the said PD to differentiate it from oth
er statutes (see above) the rest of the discussion was on the intent of the PD:
to justify their decision that Par3 should be interpreted with the Whereas claus
e. - there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never i
ntended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute i
s fairly susceptable is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous
, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. It is to be presumed
that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppre
ssive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one per
son with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. Penal statutes are t
o be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
-ON OTHER REMEDIES OF THE PEOPLE: Under Rule 117, Sec 7 and Rule 110, Sec 13, In
formation may be amended or ordered by the court to be amended. Or, the People c
ould have filed a complaint either under Sec 26 of Act 1780 or under Manila City
Ordinance 3820 since most of the cases were dismissed prior to arraignment of t
he accused and on a motion to quash. Dispositive. WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Pe
titions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or q
uashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in t
he preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or
Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decr
ee No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinan
ce as the facts may warrant. Without costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v FERNANDEZ 183 SCRA 511 PADILLA; March 22, 1990
NATURE Appeal from CFI Pangasinan decision FACTS - Criminal complaint filed befo
re the CFI alleged that the accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another
, had sexual intercourse with the 15-yr old Rebecca SORIANO, by means of force a
nd intimidation. Assisted by counsel, the accused FERNANDEZ and CONRADO pleaded
not guilty on arraignment and underwent trial. - REBECCA is Teofilo Malongs house
helper. Ater she had just taken a bath and still naked, the two accused, both in
short pants, surreptitiously entered the bathroom and sexually abused her. Fern
andez then got a handful of mud near the bathroom and placed it on her vagina. S
he ran to the upper floor of the house to report the tragic incident to Amelita,
Teofilos daughter. - TEOFILO stated that upon being informed that his housemaid
Rebecca was raped by the accused, they all proceeded to the office of the INP Po

lice Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca physically examine
d in that same afternoon. - In defense, the 2 denied any involvement in the offe
nse, both claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was commi
tted. - CFI decision: Each of the accused MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ and FEDERICO CONR
ADO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape, aggravated by cruel
ty or ignominy. Court sentences each of them to suffer 2 penalties of death. - A
ppeal before SC: The accused filed this appeal to reduce penalty from death to r
eclusion perpetua. However, in light of the 1987 Consti specifically Sec 19(1),
Art III, under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to reclusion per
petua, Fernandez withdrew his appeal. The lone appellant therefore is Conrado wh
o insists on his appeal, notwithstanding the advice of his counsel de officio to
discontinue.
Criminal Procedure
ISSUES 1. WON CFI erred in convicting them for 2 crimes of rape 2. WON CFI erred
in holding that the rape was attended by the aggravating circumstance of cruelt
y or ignominy 3. WON CFI erred in sentencing each to suffer 2 penalties of death
HELD 1. NO Ratio The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty correspon
ding to 2 crimes of rape is proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. In m
ultiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally com
mitted by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each of th
em cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts w
ithout which it would not have been accomplished. Reasoning CFI is accused of vi
olating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused were convict
ed for 2 crimes of rape even when under the criminal complaint against them, the
re is only 1 crime of rape alleged. The rule invoked is Sec 13, Rule 110 of the
ROC which states that there should be only 1 offense charged in a criminal compl
aint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a necessary
knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. (a) BUT
it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is committed, the sam
e constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint; failure of the accus
ed to interpose the objection constitutes waiver. Neither can he claim that he w
as denied information that he was to be tried for two crimes. The acts complaine
d of were stated in ordinary and concise language that any person of common inte
lligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend
himself against. (b) As clearly found by the trial court: Both accused have, obv
iously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime, considering that they en
tered the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at the same time. Accused Fer
nandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her neck, while accuse
d Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body. Then after Fernandez had
raped Rebecca, Conrado raped her. Both fled from the scene of the crime together
and at the same time. 2. NO - Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignom
iny is correct because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The
act of "plastering" mud on the victim s vagina right after she was raped is ade
quately described as "ignominy" (rather than cruelty or ignominy) 3. NO - The orig
inal death sentence was correctly imposed: Art 335 RPC states that when the crim
e of rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perp
etua to death; Art 63 RPC states that when the penalty prescribed is composed of
2 indivisible penalties and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumsta
nce, the greater penalty shall be applied. - However, since the original death p
enalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable under the present Co
nstitution and are reduced to reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant Conr
ado has to be reduced to 2 penalties of reclusion perpetua. But the indemnity he
has to pay to the victim must be increased to P20T in line with prevailing juri
sprudence. Dispositive Appeal has no merit. Decision affirmed.
a2010 page 13
PEOPLE v LUMILAN 323 SCRA 170 DE LEON; June 25, 2000
NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela FAC

TS - Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela, found accused-appellants Leo


n Lumilan and Antonio Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of murder, two (2) counts of frustrated murder, and three (3) counts of attempte
d murder, under an Information charging them and accused Fred Orbiso with the cr
ime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, in violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866. - The evidence of the prosecution reveals t
hat in the early evening of October 12, 1987, Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, E
liong dela Cruz, Jerry Palomo, Simeon Pacano, Benito Alonzo, Nolasco Estrada, Ma
rio Palomo and Romeo Pacho were drinking liquor inside the house of Policarpio P
alomo when it was sprayed with bullets. The successive gunshots emanated from th
e fence about six (6) meters away from where they were drinking, killing Meliton
Asuncion, Modesto Rogue, and Eliong dela Cruz and seriously wounding Jerry Palo
mo, Simeon Pacano, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho. - Upon being a
rraigned, both Lumilan and Garcia entered the plea of not guilty, and during tri
al, they interposed the defense of alibi. - After an assessment of the evidence,
the trial court declared that no proof beyond reasonable doubt was adduced by t
he prosecution to justify the conviction of appellants for Qualified Illegal Pos
session of Firearms Used in Murder. However, the trial court convicted the appel
lants for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder. - Appellants filed a m
otion for reconsideration which was, however, denied - Hence, the instant appeal
. ISSUE WON the appellants may be properly convicted of murder, frustrated murde
r and attempted murder under an Information that charges them with qualified ill
egal possession of firearms used in murder in violation of Section 1 of presiden
tial Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended. HELD YES - At the time the trial court
promulgated its judgment of conviction in September 1990, it had already been si
x (6) months since the Court held in People v. Tac-an that the unlawful possessi
on of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition, whether or not homicide or murder res
ulted from its use, on one hand, and murder or homicide, on the other, are offen
ses different and separate from and independent of, each other. While the former
is punished under a special law, the latter is penalized under the Revised Pena
l Code. Consequently, the prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the o
ther, and double jeopardy will not lie. - Sec. 4. Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an offense other than
that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was
both
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
established by evidence and is included in the offense charged in the Informatio
n. Since murder or homicide neither includes or is necessarily included in quali
fied illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, the trial court
may not validly convict an accused for the former crime under an Information cha
rging the latter offense. Conversely, an accused charged in the Information with
homicide or murder may not be convicted of qualified illegal possession of fire
arms used in murder or homicide, for the latter is not included in the former. Further, a significant change was introduced to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by Repub
lic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, such that now, where an accused uses an unlicensed fire
arm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used
to be the two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal C
ode and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder unde
r P.D. No. 1866. -As amended by R.A. No. 8294, P.D. No. 1866 now mandates that t
he accused will be prosecuted only for the crime of homicide or murder with the
fact of illegal possession of firearms being relegated to a mere special aggrava
ting circumstance. - The Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, violates Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amen
ded by R.A. No. 8294, which obliterated the now obsolete concept of qualified il
legal possession of firearms or illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated
form, i.e., where the penalty for illegal possession is increased to reclusion
perpetua or death by the attendance of homicide or murder. In fact, qualified il
legal possession of firearms, which used to be a distinct offense, no longer exi
sts in our statute books. - Whether considered in the light of our ruling in Tac

-an and its progeny of cases or in the context of the amendments introduced by R
.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866, the Information charging appellants with Qualifie
d Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, is defective, and their convict
ion for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, is irregular. - However,
such defect in the Information and the irregular conviction of appellants, does
not invalidate the criminal proceedings had in the trial court because the appe
llants waived their right to quash the Information, and they effectively defende
d themselves against the charges for murder, frustrated murder and attempted mur
der. - While the Information specifically states that appellants are being accus
ed of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder in vi
olation of P.D. No. 1866, its text is so worded that it describes at least three
(3) crimes: illegal possession of firearms, murder, and attempted/frustrated mu
rder. - The Information is undeniably duplicitous. Sec. 13, Rule 110 of the Revi
sed Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in cases where the law prescribes a single punishment for v
arious offenses. Duplicity or multiplicity of charges is a ground for a motion t
o quash under Sec. 2 (e), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. The accused, h
owever, may choose not to file a motion to quash and be convicted of as many dis
tinct charges as are alleged in the information and proved during the trial. In
the same vein, failure to interpose any objection to the defect in the informati
on constitutes waiver. - In the instant case, appellant did not file any motion
to quash the Information. More significantly, the bulk of the evidence that they
presented during the trial was intended to disprove their complicity in the mur
der, frustrated murder and attempted murder of the victims.
Criminal Procedure
-As such, appellants cannot pretend that the Information did not fully apprise t
hem of the charges against them as to cause them surprise in the event of convic
tion. The appellation of the crime charged as determined by the provincial fisca
l may not exactly correspond to the actual crimes constituted by the criminal ac
ts described in the Information to have been committed by the accused, but what
controls in the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name
of the crime supplied by the provincial fiscal. Since appellants defended thems
elves not only against the offense of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms U
sed in Murder as specified in the Information, but also, and more seriously agai
nst the crimes of Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder as described in
the body of the Information, it cannot be said that their conviction for the la
tter crimes is infirm and invalid ***Appellants in this case were nonetheless ac
quitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of inn
ocence in favor of the appellants was not over-turned by the evidence adduced by
the prosecution. The Court entertained doubts as to the prosecutions witnesses te
stimony that they were able to identify the appellants as the authors of the cri
me considering that it was dark outside, and the only source of light were two k
erosene lamps inside the house. They also took note of the fact that Pacano, one
of the witnesses, only executed his sworn statement more than five months atfer
the incident. Disposition The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, I
sabela is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Leon Lumilan and Anton
io Garcia, are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that their alleged guilt was not p
roven beyond reasonable doubt.
a2010 page 14
petitioner was "working on, or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the
complainant, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 133. Except for the dat
es of commission and the amounts involved, the aforesaid three (3) informations
uniformly stated that said accused were charged with the crime of qualified thef
t, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133, committed as follows: "That on or
about the 14th day of November, 1973 in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abo
ve-named accused, being then laborers working at the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterp

rises, conspiring and confederating together with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who i
s still at large, all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with inte
nt of gain, grave abuse of confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of
the said firm, its President and General Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the f
ollowing, to wit: . . ." - When the informations were amended from Qualified The
ft to Simple theft and deleting from the body of Information the phrase Grave abu
se of confidence, Matilde pleaded GUILTY but the Court imposed the penalty under
PD 133 and not those by Article 309 (3) of the RPC. From this decision, Matilde
sought from the Court a quo a reconsideration contending that in the absence of
any allegation in the body of information alleging specifically all the elements
of the offense defined and penalized under PD. 133, he cannot be conviceted and
penalized under the aforesaid decree. ISSUE WON the information that the accuse
d is charged with the crime of simple theft in relation to PD 133 suffices HELD NO
- The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the judgment,
and directed that another one be rendered. It held that since the objective of P
residential Decree No. 133 is to place a strong deterrent on workers from sabota
ging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, it is essen
tial, to qualify the offense and to justify the imposition of the heavier penalt
y prescribed by said Decree, that the information should aver that the articles
stolen were materials or products which the accused was "working on or using or
producing," and that a statement in the preamble of the information that the acc
used is charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decr
ee No. 133," does not suffice for the purpose envisioned by the constitutional g
uarantee that the accused should be informed of the nature and cause of the accu
sation against him. The Supreme Court said that the appropriate penalty is that
under Article 309 (3) of the RPC-prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods if value of property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6
,000 pesos. But with the mitigating plea of guilty, penalty is in its minimum pe
riod.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
BALITAAN v CFI (DE LOS REYES) 115 SCRA 729. GUERRERO; July 30, 1982
FACTS - Luz Balitaan owns a baby dresses mending shop. Rita de los Reyes is the
manager of her business. - Luz, thru Special Counsel Aguila, filed with the MTC
of Bauan, Batangas an Information charging Rita of the crime of estafa. The info
rmation contains that Rita misappropriated P127.58, through grave abuse of confi
dence, despite of repeated demands of Luz. (See original for exact wording of In
formation.) - During trial at the MTC, Luz testified that Rita delivered the bab
y dresses to Uniware, and for this she (Rita) obtained 3 checks totaling P1,632.
97. A cash voucher evidencing the receipt of said amount was entered into eviden
ce. The lawyer for the defense moved: (1) to strike the testimonies with regard
to the voucher evidence on the ground that said testimonies are at variance with
the allegations in the information, that there is no allegation in the informat
ion whatsoever regarding these checks and this cash voucher; and (2) in the natu
re of an objection to any other question or questions regarding these checks tha
t were allegedly received by the herein accused from the Uniware Incorporated be
cause there is no allegation in the information. The court overruled such object
ions as the lawyer of the complainant told the judge that the evidence was prese
nted to prove that the P127.58 was misappropriated from the P1,632.97. The testi
mony thus continued. [It turns out that Rita told Luz that P127.58 was due a Ces
ar Dalangin for some of the dresses he made. Luz then instructed Rita to encash
the checks and pay Cesar. Rita gave Luz the encashed amount minus the P127.58. T
hree weeks later, when she noticed that many baby dresses were lost, she verifie
d the receipts of the payments. Cesar said he did not make the baby dresses Rita
said he did, and he didnt receive the amount (he didnt even know Rita). Luz then
demanded from Rita the said amount; but Rita kept the money.] - The defense then
filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Batangas against the MTC judge fo
r denying the motions to strike out the testimonies relating to the evidence. CF
I granted the petition and ordered the testimonies stricken out of the record. I

SSUE WON the testimonies are at variance with the allegations in the information
. HELD NO - It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is compose
d must be alleged in the complaint or information. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions an
d the essentials of the specific crimes. The main purpose of requiring the vario
us elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused
to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense.
MATILDE v JABSON 68 SCRA 456 ANTONIO; December 29, 1975.
NATURE Certiorari to nullify the judgment of respondent Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXVI, in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554, imposing upon
the accused Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, for the crime of simple theft, the pe
nalty prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133 (which imposes a heavier penalty
) instead of that imposed by Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
. FACTS - An Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed three informations in Cr
iminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554 against Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, Patr
icio Guiruela y Luna, Ricardo Abener y San Pascual, Edgardo Cape y Atienza, Serv
ando Calpo y Caballero, and Ireneo Belver y Bale. In three criminal cases, respo
ndent court imposed upon petitioner, for the crime of simple theft, the penalty
prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133, instead of that imposed by Article 30
9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that petition
er and his co-accused, being then laborers, conspired and confederated with, and
mutually aided one another, with intent of gain and without knowledge and conse
nt of their employer, in stealing the articles mentioned therein belonging to th
eir employer. Although the preamble of said informations stated that petitioner
was charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree N
o. 133," nowhere was it alleged in the body of said information that the article
s stolen were materials or products which
Criminal Procedure
- Inasmuch as the crime of estafa through misappropriation or with grave abuse o
f confidence is charged, the information must contain these elements: (a) that p
ersonal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or unde
r any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is con
version or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it; (c)
that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (d) th
at there be demand for the return of the property. - The position of the defense
is that the testimonies tend to prove another kind of estafa --- using false pr
etenses or fraudulent acts (Art 315 par 2a RPC)--- and not thru abuse of confide
nce (Art 315 par 1b RPC). The elements of these two are different. Under par 2a,
demand is not necessary and deceit or false representation must be shown. But t
his doesnt mean that proof of deceit is not allowed for par 1b. Abuse of confiden
ce and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confiden
ce will characterize the estafa as the deceit will be merely incidental or, is a
bsorbed by abuse of confidence. - As long as there is a relation of trust and co
nfidence between the complainant and the accused and even though such relationsh
ip has been induced by the accused thru false representations and pretense and w
hich is continued by active deceit without truthfully disclosing the facts to th
e complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence although deceit co
-exists in its commission. - The presence of deceit would not change the whole t
heory of the prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. Dis
positive CFI decision to strike out testimonies is reversed and set aside.
a2010 page 15
complaint of the offended party, Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the c
rime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of January, 19
94 at about 1:00 o clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay Solo, Municip

ality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the ju


risdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there w
illfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, suc
ceeded in having carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her (sic) own daught
er, Neddy Calayca, against her will and consent. "CONTRARY TO and in VIOLATION O
F Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. "C
agayan de Oro City, Philippines, March 6, 1995. (SGD.) ROBERTO S. CASIO "Asst. Pr
ovincial Prosecutor II" - When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the
appellant entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the crime charged. Trial on the mer
its ensued thereafter. - The evidence for the prosecution was anchored mainly on
the testimony of 16-year old Neddy Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that a
t about 1:00 o clock in the morning of January 29, 1994, she was sound asleep in
side their house at Barangay Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental when she was awa
kened by the weight of her father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who was alr
eady on top of her, naked and armed with a bolo. He forcibly undressed her, inse
rted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull motion. Feeling the pain
in her vagina, she resisted his onslaught by kicking and hitting him, telling h
im with bitter tears, "I wish you would die. You are a father without good moral
s." But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he threatened her with
a knife saying, "I will kill you if you will not agree." After the sexual assaul
t, she picked up her clothes, dressed up and was left weeping. She was then 15 y
ears old when this incident happened. 7 - Neddy Calayca first thought of immedia
tely filing a case against appellant but was prevented by his threat to kill her
. She, however, reported her awful experience with the appellant to her relative
s in Mambayaan. She informed them that even before the January 29, 1994 incident
, appellant had sexually abused her many times. Her relatives, who were also afr
aid of appellant, merely advised her to sue him. She immediately went home in So
lo because she feared her father. When she reached home, her eldest sister Betty
Lani Calayca also arrived from Manila. Informed of the rape incident, Lani and
Neddy decided to leave the appellant. The two then traveled to Don Carlos, Bukid
non and worked as servants of the mayor, thinking their father could no longer f
ind them there. However, appellant was able to locate them. While in the house o
f the mayor, appellant harassed them, so Betty Lani had him arrested by the poli
ce. While appellant was in jail, Neddy reported to the police authorities that h
e raped her. The police then took her sworn statement on the rape incident. Ther
eafter, Neddy filed her complaint for rape against the appellant. - Appellant Ar
temio Calaycadid not deny the imputation of her daughter Neddy Calayca that he r
aped her in the early morning of January 29, 1994. All that he testified to was
that he was a widower in 1998 and has six children by his late wife, two of whom
he identified as Neddy, the private complainant, and Betty Lani. He claimed tha
t Neddy was only nine years old when his wife died. The private complainant stay
ed with him
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
together with his five other children, while Betty Lani stayed with his (appella
nt s) brother at San Juan, Misamis Oriental. Betty Lani and Neddy left his house
on August 19, 1993. They took his savings from the proceeds of the sale of his
pig in the amount of P5,000.00. He then looked for his two daughters and found t
hem at Bocboc, Don Carlos, Bukidnon. When he asked them why they took his money,
his two daughters did not say a word, forcing him to slap them. - The defense d
id not present any other witness nor any documentary evidence. A judgment convic
ting the appellant of the crime charged and imposing upon him the penalty of dea
th was rendered by the trial court. ISSUE WON the correct penalty was imposed HE
LD NO - While the Court agrees that the penalty of death should be imposed on hi
m, regrettably this is not in accord with the law and jurisprudence. Although th
e matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned as an error by
the appellant, nevertheless, it is a well-established rule in criminal procedure
that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review a
nd it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be foun
d in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of assignment of erro

rs or not. - The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellant because of t
he presence of the circumstance of minority of the victim (she was only 15 years
old at the time she was raped on January 29, 1994) as well as the relationship
of the offender (father) and the victim (daughter), pursuant to Section 11 of Re
public Act No. 7659 30 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Sect
ion 11 provides, inter alia, that where the victim of the crime of rape is under
18 years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim, the death penalty s
hall be imposed. This is among the seven (7) circumstances enumerated in Section
11 which, as we have held in the recent case of People v. Garcia, 32 are consid
ered special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of ra
pe. - There being no allegation of the minority of the victim in the Information
under which the appellant was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of qualified ra
pe as he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. A
ppellant s conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional right to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. In a crimin
al prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the crime charg
ed must be alleged in the Information. The main purpose of this constitutional r
equirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presu
med to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The failure to allege the fact of minority of the victim in the Information for
rape is fatal and consequently bars the imposition of the death penalty. Having
been informed only of the elements of simple rape, the appellant can be convict
ed only of such crime and be punished accordingly with reclusion perpetua. Dispo
sitive Judgment modified
PEOPLE v CALAYCA 301 SCRA 192 MARTINEZ; January 20, 1999
NATURE Automatic review FACTS - A daughter was again allegedly raped by her own
father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who is now facing a death sentence aft
er having been found guilty of said crime in a Decision 1 dated June 13, 1995, r
endered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cagayan de Oro City in Crimin
al Case No. 95-129. Hence, this automatic review. - A rape charge was initiated
by Neddy Calayca through a sworn complaint with supporting affidavits and docume
nts 3 filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Balingasag, Misamis Orient
al on January 9, 1995. MCTC Judge Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground to prosec
ute the appellant for the crime of rape. This was the same finding of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Misamis Oriental upon examination of the record
s of the preliminary investigation forwarded to it. Consequently, on March 21, 1
995, the corresponding Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court readi
ng as follows: "INFORMATION "The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II,
upon sworn
Criminal Procedure
US v JAVIER DICHAO 27 Phil 421 MORELAND; March 30, 1914
NATURE Appeal From CFI Davaos Decision FACTS - Said CFI sustained a Demurrer to a
n INFORMATION and dismissed the case of rape against Antonio Javier Dichao. - Th
e Information stated that Dichao committed the crime of rape on or about and duri
ng the interval between October 1910, to August 1912 (vague di ba?) in Davao and
that Dichao was, at that period, the legal guardian, being the stepfather, of Is
abel de la Cruz who was under 12 years old when he raped her; that as a result o
f said carnal knowledge Isabel gave birth to a child on August 5, 1912. - The De
murrer alleged that the facts set forth in the Information did not constitute a
public offense and that the criminal complaint did not conform substantially to
prescribed form and that complaint was vague and ambiguous. ISSUE WON CFI commit
ted an error in dismissing the case based upon the Demurrer HELD NO. CFIs decisio
n must be affirmed. Ratio The allegations of an information should, if possible,
be sufficiently explicit and certain as to TIME to inform the defendant of the
date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed. Unless the acc
used is informed of the day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived
of the opportunity to defend himself. Reasoning - While Sec 7 of the Code of Cri

mPro provides that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the p
recise time of commission need not be stated in a complaint or information, but
the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the filing ther
eof, - this DOES NOT MEAN that the prosecuting officer may be careless in fixing t
he date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that h
e may make the allegation indefinite as to amount to the same thing. - Where the
exact date cannot be fixed, or where the prosecuting officer is NOT thoroughly
satisfied that he can prove a precise date, he should allege in the information
that the crime was committed ON or ABOUT a DATE NAMED. - Under such an allegatio
n he is not required to prove any precise date but may prove any date which is N
OT SO REMOTE as to surprise and prejudice the defendant. - In case of SURPRISE,
the Court may allow an amendment of the information as to time and an adjournmen
t to the accused, if necessary to meet the amendment. - SC then cited cases: US
v De Castro~ While it is not necessary, unless time is a material ingredient of t
he offense, that the precise time of the commission of the offense should be sta
ted, still the act should be alleged to have been committed at some time before
the filing of the complaint.
a2010 page 16
US v. Enriquez- question of time as alleged in the information was discussed in
an incidental way for the purpose of determining whether it of itself or in conn
ection with the other allegations sufficiently identified the transaction which
constituted estafa so as to notify the defendant of the transaction referred to;
Time is not a matl ingredient in the crime of estafa. US v. Cardona- question of
time was raised in the demurrer (on appeal) as to the variance bet the date of
the crime in the info and that proved on the trial; Court here said that time be
ing not an ingredient of the theft of a carabao, it did not have to be proved as
laid. - The question whether the allegations of the info are sufficiently defin
ite as to time and the question which arises on a variance between the allegatio
ns and the proof are different in nature and legal effect, and are decided on di
fferent principles. - In this case, the statement of the time when the crime was
committed is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his d
efense, and that indefiniteness is not cured by setting out the date when a chil
d was born as a result of such crime. - Sec 7 Rules of CrimPros purpose is to per
mit the allegation of a date of the commission of a crime as NEAR to the ACTUAL
date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit and when that has
been done, any date proved which does not surprise and substantially prejudice
the defense. - It does not authorize the total omission of a date or such an ind
efinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing. - SC: th
e variance bet the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the info an
d that as proved on trial DOES NO warrant necessarily the acquittal of the accus
ed. IF such variance occurs and it is shown that the defendant is surprised ther
eby, and that, by reason of that surprise, he is unable to defend himself proper
ly, the court may in the exercise of sound discretion based on ALL circumstances
, order the information amended so as to set forth the correct date and may gran
t an adjournment for such a length of time as will enable the defendant to prepa
re himself to meet the variance in date which was the cause of his surprise. Dis
positive Decision affirmed.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
investigated, but accused didnt want investigation to continue because accdg to h
im, this was their own problem. - Internal and external exam of victim showed sh
e had previous sexual intercourse. - Molero denied the charge, saying he couldnt
have done it because he was already committed in the provincial jail that time.
He also denied the sworn statement he made, saying hes illiterate. He said he was
not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel; that he was not ass
isted by counsel during investigation. - Moleros alibi was readily refuted. - Tri
al court found Molero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. - A double jeopard
y issue arose because there were two complaints filed: - filed March 22, 1977: r
ape was committed Feb 13, 1976 - filed March 30, 1978: rape was committed Feb 5,

1976 - Molero was arraigned under the first complaint, he pleaded not guilty. D
uring trial, the provincial fiscal filed motion for leave to amend the complaint
. This was granted. Thus, the new complaint. - Molero filed motion to quash 2nd
criminal complaint on ground of double jeopardy. This was denied. ISSUES 1. WON
Molero was under double jeopardy 2. WON Molero committed the rape HELD 1. NO - S
ection 9, Rule 117 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: Conviction or acquittal
of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecut
ion for the offense charged - Here, the case was not terminated because the dispo
sitive portion of the order expressly directed the Provincial Fiscal and/or pros
ecuting fiscal to file a new complaint and/or information. - The case was dismis
sed for no other reason except to correct the date of the crime. - This dismissa
l did not amount to an acquittal. - There was no need for trial court to have us
ed such procedure. It should just have denied motion for reconsideration of the
order granting the prosecutions motion for leave to amend the complaint. After ar
raignment and where appellant pleaded not guilty, is it still proper to amend da
te of commission of crime? Applying Sections 10 and 13 of Rule 110 of Revised Ru
les of Court, amendment sought by prosecution should have been granted. The prec
ise time is not an essential element of rape. The amendment was only a matter of
form and did not prejudice the rights of the appellant. 2. YES - Molero argues
that if a crime was committed by him at all, it was qualified seduction. - SC di
dnt agree. Appellant was shown to have employed force and intimidation against da
ughter. Also, he had moral ascendancy and influence over the victim. The victim
is illiterate and unschooled, and Molero threatened her with a bolo and rendered
her practically helpless.
PEOPLE v MOLERO 144 SCRA 397 GUTIERREZ JR.; September 24, 1986
NATURE Appeal from decision of CFI FACTS - Molero was charged with rape by daugh
ter in complaint filed in CFI Negros Oriental. Molero told daughter to go with h
im to the river to catch shrimps and fish. She was barely 17. She was hugged fr
behind by Molero and she fell to the ground. He unsheathed his bolo. He succeede
d in having sexual intercourse and warned her not to tell anyone. - The mother l
earned of the incident and told daughter to keep quiet for the moment; they were
secretive of their plan to report because Molero is a fierce man. - Mother and
daughter went to Station Commander. They were advised to report to the PC Headqu
arters. At the PC Headquarters, complaint was
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v LUALHATI 171 SCRA 277, 283 GRINO-AQUINO; March 16, 1989
NATURE Petition for review of the Decision of the Trial court FACTS - Complainan
t Josephine Dimaunahan was born on January 7, 1967 - In 1970, her mother separat
ed from her father and started to live with appellant Vicente Lualhati without t
he benefit of marriage. She likewise lived with appellant who supported her, too
k care of her studies and treated her like his own daughter. - Sometime in June,
1978, while complainant s mother was at work, appellant and complainant were al
one in the house. Appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant. It appeared
that even prior to June, 1978, appellant had already several sexual relations w
ith complainant - Upon arraignment on, the accused pleaded not guilty - The defe
nse filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint charged more than
one offense, namely: That on or about the month of June, 1978, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto, ... the accused Vicente Lualhati wilfully, unlawfu
lly and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Josephine M. Dimaun
ahan ... - Fiscal alleged that the accused was being tried on the Information whi
ch charged only one offense committed "in or about the month of June 1978." - Tr
ial judge denied motion to dismiss. - The accused filed another Motion to Dismis
s, alleging that he had been pardoned by the offended party, her mother and gran
dmother. Attached, to the Motion to Dismiss was the joint affidavit of desistanc
e signed by the offended party, her mother and grandmother - -The offended party
executed and filed an affidavit alleging that her father abandoned her at the a
ge of two years and three months, without providing for her support and studies,

and that the same were provided by her mother and grandmother who, on the same
date, executed a joint affidavit to the same effect - The Prosecuting Fiscal fil
ed an Addendum to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. He alleged that the e
xpress pardon given the accused was invalid for the offended party did not have
"a will of her own," being merely eleven years old when the crime was committed;
that the father of the offended party, executed an affidavit objecting to the p
ardon given to the accused; and that, as the father, he still possessed the "pat
ria potestas" over the offended party in spite of his having abandoned her. - Tr
ial court denied the motion to dismiss on account of the insistence of the victi
m s father to prosecute the accused, absent judicial pronouncement depriving him
of parental authority over the offended party, a child below twelve years old.
- Accused filed Motion to Quash, which was denied by the trial court - Trial cou
rt convicted the accused of rape, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. ISSUES 1. WON there was a valid complaint against the appellant
a2010 page 17
2. WON the pardon given to him by the offended party, her mother, and grandmothe
r extinguished his criminal liability, in spite of the objection of the victim s
father. HELD 1. YES Ratio Discrepancies between the accusation and the complain
t as to time of occurrence of the carnal copulations in rape do not affect any e
ssential right of the accused, where the acts occurred within the period of time
alleged in both writings and the difference noted in other respects was of a fo
rmal, rather than a substantial, character. Reasoning - Appellant contends that
the complaint is void because it charges at least three crimes of rape, namely:
(1) that which was committed "on or about the month of June, 1978;" (2) that whi
ch was committed "sometime prior to said period;" and (3) that which was committ
ed "subsequent thereto." - Argument has no merit. Attached to Josephine s compla
int was her sworn statement wherein, she categorically affirmed that Vicente abu
sed her before the start of classes in June 1978. That affidavit, which may be c
onsidered part of the complaint required by law, cures any ambiguity in the comp
laint regarding the number of offenses committed by the accused. - Furthermore,
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided: Sec. 10. Time of the c
ommission of the offense.-It is not necessary to state in the complaint or infor
mation the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been com
mitted at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committe
d as the information or complaint will permit. 2. NO Ratio Art. 344(3) of the Re
vised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts
of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her pa
rents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been exp
ressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not proh
ibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender
after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said ca
use. The only act that riding to Article 344 extinguishes the penal action and t
he penalty that may have been imposed, is the marriage between the offender and
the offended party. Reasoning - The rationale of the law on the prosecution of p
rivate crimes is simple: The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved
woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated contro
versies in court the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring in the family.
However, when, as in the case at bar, the pardon is given after the filing of t
he complaint in court, it comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence from pu
blic notice. Dispositive Decision of trial court affirmed
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
PEOPLE v RAZONABLE 330 SCRA 562 PUNO; April 12, 2000
NATURE - Appeal from a decision by the RTC of Camarines Norte, dated May 3, 1996
, finding appellant Benjamin Razonable guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping
his daughter, Maria Fe Razonable, and sentencing him to suffer the penalties of
3 reclusion perpetua and to pay the amount of P200,000 as moral damages. FACTS Razonable was charged in 3 separate Informations with the crime of rape, which

are identically worded, as follows: "That sometime in the year 1987, at Purok I,
Brgy. IV, Mantagbac, Municipality of Daet, Province of Camarines Norte, and wit
hin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then a
nd there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own d
aughter MARIA FE H. RAZONABLE, against the latter s will and by means of force a
nd intimidation, to her damage and prejudice. "The crime was committed with the
aggravating circumstances of relationship, the accused is the father of the offe
nded party and that said offense was committed in their own dwelling and the off
ended party not having given provocation for it." Razonable pleaded not guilty a
nd his case was tried on the merits. - Although Maria Fe was raped on 3 consecut
ive days in the middle of June 1987, she was able to disclose the dastardly acts
of her father to her elder sister only in February of 1993 because her conscien
ce would not allow her any peace of mind. She also feared recurrence of the best
ial acts. Her father often drank with friends inside their house and she was war
y that appellant might give her to his friends. Thus, accompanied by her sister
Ana Marie, complainant went to the police station and filed a complaint. Then th
ey proceeded to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital where she was examined.
Based on the medical certificate, she had, at the time of examination, incomplet
ely healed hymenal lacerations at 5, 6, 7, and 9 o clock positions. ISSUE 1. WON
the RTC erred in not considering the information insufficient to support a judg
ment of conviction for its failure to state the precise date of the alleged comm
ission of the offense, it being an essential element of the crime charged 2. WON
the lower court erred in finding that the guilt of Razonable of the three count
s of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD 1. NO Ratio The rationale
of the rule (Section 11, Rule 110 of the ROC) is to inform the accused of the n
ature and cause of the accusation against him. To claim this substantive right p
rotected by no less than the Bill of Rights, the accused is duty bound to follow
our procedural rules which were laid down to assure an orderly administration o
f justice.
Criminal Procedure
Reasoning - Firstly, it behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective i
nformation, on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescrib
ed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion for bill of particula
rs. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have wai
ved the defect in said information. The only defects in an information that are
not deemed waived are where no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the o
ffense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and double jeopardy. Coroll
arily, we have ruled that objections as to matters of form or substance in the i
nformation cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Razonable did not raise
either in a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars the defect in th
e Information regarding the indefiniteness of the allegation on the date of the
commission of the offense. - Secondly, during the trial, the defense never objec
ted to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove that the offense
was committed in the middle of June 1987. It has not been shown that Razonable
was taken by surprise with the testimony of Maria Fe that she was raped in the m
iddle of June 1987, and hence could not properly defend himself. On the contrary
, he was able to give an alibi as to his whereabouts at that particular time. In
fine, he cannot pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vag
ueness of the allegation in the information as to when the crimes were committed
. 2. NO Reasoning Appellant claims that his guilt has not been proven beyond rea
sonable doubt on the following grounds: (1) the identity of the perpetrator has
not been established with certitude since the room was dark and it has not been
shown that it was properly illuminated; (2) it was unnatural for Maria Fe to rem
ain in their house if it was true that she was threatened and intimidated; and (
3) there was an unreasonable delay in the filing of the complaint which rendered
the rape charges doubtful. - It is highly inconceivable that Maria Fe would not
recognize her own father with whom she has been living alone for a long time. I
t is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see

the appearance of their assailant and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create a la
sting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. The impression
becomes more profound where the malefactor is the victim s own father. - The fa
ct that Maria Fe continued to live with Razonable will not likewise crumple her
credibility. At the time of the incident, she was a simple, nave and hapless chil
d of twelve years. She was living by her lonesome self with her father, entirely
dependent on him for all her needs. Her mother was in Isabela and her nearest s
ibling lived in another town. It could hardly be expected that such a child of t
ender age would know what to do and where to go under the circumstances. It is n
ot proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experien
ces by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature person
s. - The delay in the filing of the cases does not necessarily impair the credib
ility of the victim. Experience teaches us that many victims of rape never compl
ain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bea
r the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the
offender s making good on his threats.
a2010 page 18
Dispositive Considering that the acts were committed prior to the effectivity of
RA 7659, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
each of the three cases. However, consistent with recent rulings, the amount of
P50,000 for each count of rape should be awarded by way of moral damages, and h
ence the award given by the trial court should be reduced to P150,000. Likewise,
current case law dictates that the victim shall be entitled to civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape. - Decision of the RTC AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
found that two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, n
amely: employing or taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditat
ion, one of which qualified the killing to murder. ISSUES 1. WON the Court a quo
erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended information without ar
raignment 2. WON the Court a quo erred in holding that appellants acted with evi
dent premeditation and abuse o of superior strength, and in qualifying the crime
committed as aggravated murder 3. WON whether or not there is conspiracy betwee
n the two accused in the commission of the crime 4. WON the Court erred in disco
unting Caseys defense that he acted in legitimate self-defense HELD 1. NO Reasoni
ng - The lack of arraignment under the amended information is objected to by acc
used-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of
his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be
a violation of such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters
of substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information
refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of
murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against accused-appellant Ca
sey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superi
or strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating circumsta
nce is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as
accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of substance as it
is not prejudicial to his rights. - The test as to whether a defendant is prejud
iced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense un
der the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendmen
t is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applic
able to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurispr
udence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after
the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of
the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could c
all for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause su
rprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had eac
h been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accuse

d and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 2. YES Reasoning - Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an extraj
udicial sworn statement that he met accused-appellant Ricardo Felix and another
person named Rudy in Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day. However, there is n
o showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to plan the killing of the vi
ctim. In fact, the following questions and answers in the said sworn statement s
how that there was no preconceived design to kill the victim.
ALMEDA v VILLALUZ PEOPLE v CASEY and FELIX 103 SCRA 21 GUERRERO; February 24, 19
81
NATURE Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court imposing u
pon Casey and Felix the capital c\punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. FA
CTS - On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information
for Murder against accused-appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging: That o
n or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, provinc
e of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix al
ias "Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at
large, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually he
lping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and tre
achery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said fire
arm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wound
s which directly caused his death. - In June, 1968, upon arraignment, Casey plea
ded not guilty to the crime charged in the said complaint. - September, 1968, ac
cused appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly,
an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as
an accused, stating: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the munic
ipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then ar
med with a knife, together with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad"
who was then armed with a firearm, and the two of them conspiring and confederat
ing together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, e
vident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, di
d, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting
upon the latter fatal wounds which directly - The court a quo rendered the afor
ementioned judgment of conviction. It
Criminal Procedure
- There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by
the offender or when he had previously prepared the means which he had considere
d adequate to carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means suitable f
or carrying it into execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider and a
ccept the final consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan. 16 It ha
s also been held that to appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation,
it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time when the offender deter
mined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the culprit ha
s clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the det
ermination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desir
ed to hearken to its warning. - From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in s
aid sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was not a preconceived p
lan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep thought. It was just a sponta
neous decision reached when the victim started to run away upon being approached
by accused-appellant Ricardo Felix. - There are indeed two accused-appellants i
n this case charged with the murder of not one victim but superiority in number
does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that
the aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their super

iority in strength." 3. YES Reasoning - Although there is no direct showing that


the accused had conspired together, but their acts and the attendant circumstan
ces disclose that common motive that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-pr
incipal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. - Ricardo Felix s overt acts consist in i
nstigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Jo
seph Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the latter inflicted the fa
tal wounds on the deceased. From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-app
ellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that Ricardo Felix was the moving f
actor of the evil act perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it was
Joseph Casey who inflicted the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victi
m, he did so out of his perverted sense of friendship or companionship with Rica
rdo Felix. 4. YES Reasoning - claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testim
ony of the eyewitness, Mercedes Palomo. - The fact that the victim sustained fou
r stab wounds while the accused complained merely of abrasions on his back indic
ates the falsity of the claim. Dispositive the judgment of the trial court under
automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants Joseph Casey and Ri
cardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide wi
thout any attending circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal
in its medium period. But applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the a
ccused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, a
s minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The accused are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfre
do Valdez
a2010 page 19
in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS jointly and severally, and to pay the cos
ts.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
to determine whether the sought amendment in the information would constitute a
change of substance affecting the rights of the accused or merely of form. - Flo
rentino Alcantara, originally a co-accused but discharged as a prosecution witne
ss, testified that the offense was committed in 1964. The defense refused to cro
ss-examine witness Alcantara, asked respondent Court to strike off the testimony
of Alcantara because it referred to an offense not mentioned in the information
, and asked for a ruling by respondent Court on the prosecution s verbal motion
to amend the information. - Respondent Judge required the prosecution and the de
fense to submit memoranda. The contested order of July 22, 1970, denying the pro
secution s verbal motion to amend information on the ground that said amendment
would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused was issued. ISSUE WON the
respondent Court abused its discretion when it refused an amendment to the infor
mation to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense from "August
1969" to "August 1964", on the ground it would constitute an impairment of the s
ubstantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD NO Rati
o While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an of
fense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, thi
s Court stated that this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be carel
ess about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date alt
ogether, or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the sa
me thing. The prosecution is given the chance to allege an approximation of time
of the commission of the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it
does not mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given a
pproximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused. Reasoning - The per
iod of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of tim
e that one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from t
hat committed by the co-defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947.
Under this impression the accused, who came to Court prepared to face a charge
of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly cau
ght by sudden surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a simi

lar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it
violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the trial of the spec
ific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselv
es. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an offense of which they were not char
ged. (People v Opemia) Dispositive WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated July 1
0, 1970 and September 14, 1970, by respondent Judge are hereby AFFIRMED, the pre
liminary injunction issued on September 24, 1970 dissolved, and this petition DI
SMISSED for lack of merit. Without costs. Voting Fernandez,* Abad Santos and De
Castro, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE v REYES 108 SCRA 203 CONCEPCION, JR; October 23, 1981
NATURE Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction on the ord
er dated July 10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the C
ircuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in Criminal Case
No. CCC-IV-170-NE, "People v Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner s verb
al motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the yea
r "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year "1964 ". FACTS
- Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed against priv
ate respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, as Criminal Case No. 6799, i
n the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, pertinent portion as follows: Th
at in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality of San Jose, province of Nu
eva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused Narciso Mananing being the driver of complainant Maria Ignac
io- Francisco, Florentino Alcantara, repair shop owner where the truck hereinaft
er described was found and recovered, Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabul
ary soldier stationed at Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all conspiring together,
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry a
way one (1) Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559, with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with
Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, to the damage and prejudice of the owner, Ma
ria IgnacioFrancisco in the amount of P23,000.00, value of said vehicle. - On No
vember 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City, (converted into city)
Nueva Ecija, filed an information (Crim. Case No. CCC-IV-170) with the responden
t Court, charging private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, with q
ualified theft. This time the information contained Aug. 1969 instead of Aug. 1964 i
n the previous information and alleged grave abuse of confidence and that accuse
d dismantled the vehicle. - On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Es
trella was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment, respond
entJudge required his clerk to read the information to Francisco Estrella. From
January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the scheduled trial
of the case, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. - On May 21,
1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally mov
ed that it be allowed to amend the information so as to change the date of the c
ommission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964." Private respondent
Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready to defend himself from
an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969", vigorously objected to the ver
bal motion. - Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution s motion t
o amend, and instead, required the prosecution to present its first witness,
Criminal Procedure
SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur]
I concur, but I believe this decision cannot bar another prosecution of private
respondent under another information charging theft committed in 1964.
a2010 page 20
pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge against him so as to file
another charge for murder will place him thereby in double jeopardy. Aquino conc
ur: - respondent Judge relied on Dimalibot vs. Salcedo - The Dimalibot case is d
ifferent from the instant case. The plea in the Dimalibot case was made during t
he preliminary investigation to a complaint for homicide filed in the justice of

the peace court. That is not the plea contemplated in Section 9, Rule 117 of th
e Rules of Court. The plea in the instant case was made to an information filed
in the Court of First Instance.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- CA granted petition. The motion for reconsideration by herein petitioners to t
he foregoing decision of the CA was denied for lack of merit. ISSUE WON the CA e
rred in granting the petition of (Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco) HELD YES - First
and foremost, the trial Judge should have allowed the amendment in Criminal Cas
es Nos. 4747 and 4748 considering that the amendments sought were only formal. The amendments of Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 would not have prejudiced R
uiz whose participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. - But
the fact that the trial court erred in denying the motion of the prosecution to
amend the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 was no bar to the f
iling of the new informations. The allegation in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 96
74 filed against Padilla and Ongchenco that the two conspired and confederated w
ith Ruiz merely describe the fact that the latter was already charged with the s
ame offense. It is incorrect to say that the allegations of conspiracy include R
uiz as a defendant in the said case. Thus, he cannot file a motion to quash the
same. Dispositive Decision and resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE. Decisions of
lower court allowing retention of the allegation of conspiracy and the reference
to Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 in the informations filed in Criminal Case
s Nos. 9673 and 9674 are SUSTAINED.
DIONALDO v DACUYCUY 108 SCRA 736 ABAD SANTOS; October 30, 1981
NATURE Petition to nullify orders of respondent judge FACTS -Petitioner Rolando
Dionaldo stands charged with the crime of homicide. After he entered a plea of n
ot guilty, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information, at
taching thereto an amended information charging the accused with murder qualifie
d by treachery and evident premeditation-a more serious offense. -No explanation
was given in the motion for alleging evident premeditation but as to the allega
tion of treachery it was explained that, "the affidavit of the complaining witne
ss indicates that the attack was sudden and it was only after they sustained the
wounds consequent to the treacherous attack that they were forced to fight back
to repel further aggression." It can thus be seen that all along this claimed c
ircumstance was known to the prosecution but it was not alleged. -Counsel for th
e accused opposed the motion to amend the information but the respondent judge g
ranted the motion ISSUE WON an information for the crime of homicide can be amen
ded so as to charge the crime of murder after the accused had entered a plea of
not guilty HELD NO. - The provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110
, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court - The petitioner invokes the first paragraph, wh
ereas the respondent relies on the second. - To amend the information so as to c
hange the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder afte
r the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed
by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change fro
m homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very s
erious consequences. - Can the amendment be justified under the second paragraph
? The answer is, No. For the provision speaks not of amendment but of dismissal
of the information. in other words the provision contemplates the filing of a su
bstitute, not an amended information - Can not the information for homicide agai
nst the petitioner be dismissed since no judgment has yet been rendered and anot
her information for murder be filed? The answer, again, is, No. For the petition
er having
PEOPLE v CA (RUIZ) 121 SCRA 733 RELOVA: April 28, 1983
NATURE Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decisio
n and resolution of the CA FACTS - As a result of a shooting incident, two infor
mations for frustrated homicide were filed against Sixto Ruiz in the Court of Fi
rst Instance of Rizal. - In Criminal Case No. 4747, Ernesto Bello was named as t
he victim, while in Criminal Case No 4748, Rogelio Bello was the complainant. -

Upon arraignment, Sixto Ruiz pleaded not guilty to the two informations. - A rei
nvestigation of these two cases was made in the Dept. of Justice, following whic
h State Prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to amend the informations o
n the ground that the evidence disclosed a prima facie case against Luis Padilla
and Magsikap Ongchenco who acted in conspiracy with Ruiz. - Ruiz filed his oppo
sition to the motion. - The trial Judge denied the motion to amend the informati
on saying that allowance of the amendment alleging conspiracy would be amending
the manner of committing the crime and thereby would constitute substantial amen
dment. - As a consequence, State Prosecutor filed two new informations for frust
rated homicide against Luis Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco (Criminal Cases Nos.
9673 and 9674) alleging that the two conspired with Ruiz who was referred to as
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748. - Padilla and Ongchenco moved to q
uash the two new informations. The motion was denied by the lower court. - Ruiz
also filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674 a motion to permit to quash and/
or strike out the allegation of conspiracy in the two informations. The trial Ju
dge ordered the striking out from the records the aforesaid motion and clarified
that the allegation of conspiracy does not alter the theory of the case, nor doe
s it introduce innovation nor does it present alternative imputation nor is it i
nconsistent with the with the original allegations. - From these orders of the lo
wer court, Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco went to the CA on a petition for certior
ari with preliminary injunction alleging that the trial Judge exceeded his juris
diction or abused his judicial discretion in issuing the orders in Criminal Case
s Nos. 9673 and 9674.
PEOPLE v MONTENEGRO 159 SCRA 236 PADILLA; March 25, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining or
der FACTS - The City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G. Va
ldez, filed an Information for "Robbery" before the Court of First Instance of R
izal against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leo
n. Said accused (now private respondents) were all members of the police force o
f Quezon City and were charged as accessories-afterthe-fact in the robbery commi
tted by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and had been
convicted in a crimial case before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, a
rticles and pieces of jewelry belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P75,591.4
0. - Upon arraignment, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered a pl
ea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them. - However, before the trial
could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Informati
on seeking to amend the original information by: (1) changing the offense charge
d from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy a
mong all the
Criminal Procedure
accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and pieces of jewelry alleged to h
ave been stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a differe
nt set of items valued at P71,336.80. - Private respondents opposed the admissio
n of the Amended Information. The respondent court resolved to deny the proposed
amendments contained in the Amended Information. Petitioner moved for reconside
ration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court denied said motion; hence
, this petition. ISSUE WON the amended information should be admitted HELD - Ame
ndment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal P
rocedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure)
may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereaf
ter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as
to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the ac
cused. - The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amen
dment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or inf
ormation, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendme
nt is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable

to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment whic


h merely states with additional precision something which is already contained i
n the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for con
viction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytim
e. - The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, ar
e clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Ro
bbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punisha
ble under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respo
ndents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the
offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already ent
ered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment. - Moreover, the change in
the items, articles and pieces of jewelry allegedly stolen into entirely differe
nt articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the impu
ted crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the alle
gations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the
charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were acc
used as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already
been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To c
harge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that com
mitted by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the
Court. - The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused
, which was not previously included in the original information, is likewise a s
ubstantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in
order to meet a different situation in the trial court. To allow at this stage t
he proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will make all o
f the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but
also for the acts of their co-conspirators.
a2010 page 21
Dispositive Petition is DISMISSED. Orders of the respondent court AFFIRMED. TRO
lifted.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code,
is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries
or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. - The lower
court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. WON th
e lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that s
ince no express reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of th
e criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the cr
iminal case 2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based
on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must n
ot be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulatio
ns and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the de
fendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary dama
ges HELD 1. YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independ
ently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-del
ict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case. Reasoning - In the case at bar, there is no questi
on that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Ch
ief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal a
ction been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. - It is
, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for dam
ages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for dam
ages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present
civil case. - As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of
private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal acti
on. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecutio
n of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly
reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the ci

vil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has
disappeared. - As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing d
amages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for
quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the crimina
l law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always
had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view tha
t in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may pr
oceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regar
dless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111
with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . .
. and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in wha
t is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be re
garded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 o
f
GARCIA v FLORIDO 52 SCRA 420 ANTONIO; August 31, 1973
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners action for damages against responden
ts, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling th
e said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case file
d by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order
of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners motion for reconsider
ation. FACTS - On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Mi
samis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate N
o. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and dri
ven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboa
nga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hosp
itals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Offi
ce No. 7 at Zamboanga City. - At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiati
ng a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Si
ndangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (
No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit C
o., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid col
lision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization. - Alleging that both drivers of the PU c
ar and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respecti
ve vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manne
r in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of th
e passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garci
a, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of Firs
t Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) aga
inst the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car an
d the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary a
ttachment. - The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motio
n to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1
971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent
Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sin
dangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and tha
t, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be file
d subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, purs
uant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of
the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is
merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendere
d finding the
Criminal Procedure
the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso

." - But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recover
y of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be go
verned by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require res
ervation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil a
ction even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioner
s have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reserva
tion to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itse
lf (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure
of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respo
ndent court s order of dismissal. 2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies t
he elements of quasi-delict. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a qu
asi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code are present, namely: (a) act or omission of the private respondents;
(b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of
the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision o
f the bus with the passenger car; (c) physical injuries and other damages sustai
ned by petitioners as a result of the collision; (d) existence of direct causal
connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of privat
e respondents; and (e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between
the parties. Reasoning - The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respo
ndents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast cl
ip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car"
does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on c
ulpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the fail
ure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, tha
t degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand
, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed
in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the sa
me negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of P
olice with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by
petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers negligence in b
oth complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the
same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a
crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-de
lict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. Thi
s distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 6
07, 620-621). - It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 o
f the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the c
ases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independ
ent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be in
stituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be
noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time li
mit when such reservation shall be made.
a2010 page 22
SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur]
- I would like to limit my concurrence. - Article 2176 and 2177 definitely creat
e a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from th
e offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850
is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability im
posed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made i
n the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of
the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative,
it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Co
urt to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot
stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legisl
ature superseding the Rules of 1940. - Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case

No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no showing th
at prejudice could be caused by doing so. - Accordingly, I concur in the judgmen
t reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case N
o. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments,
the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
by the accused. People v. Dacudao and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Ver
idiano II apply, such that a private prosecutor in a criminal case has no author
ity to act for the People of the Philippines. It is the governments counsel, the
Sol-Gen, who appears in criminal cases or incidents before SC. ISSUE WON a priva
te offended party in a criminal proceeding may file a special civil action for c
ertiorari under Rule 65, assailing an interlocutory order, without the conformit
y of the public prosecutor HELD YES Ratio If criminal case is dismissed by the t
rial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The ca
pability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is l
imited only to the civil aspect of the case. (Metrobank v. Veridiano II). But if
the order which is assailed is not one dismissing the case or acquitting respon
dents / defendants, there is no limitation to the capacity of the private compla
inant to seek judicial review of the assailed order. Reasoning - [1] A special c
ivil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abu
se of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court. In a long line of cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved par
ties to include the State and the private offended party or complainant. The comp
lainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such spec
ial civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on j
urisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in t
he name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name o
f said complainant. - [2] In this case, there is no doubt that petitioner mainta
ins an interest in the litigation of the civil aspect of the case against respon
dents. Section 1(b), Rule 111 of 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states that th
e criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corres
ponding civil action. Hence, the possible conviction of respondents would concur
rently provide a judgment for damages in favor of petitioner. The suspension of
the criminal case which petitioner decries would necessarily cause delay in the
resolution of the civil aspect of the said case which precisely is the interest
and concern of petitioner. Such interest warrants protection from the courts. Di
spositive: Petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of RTC are SET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. CEB-26195 is REINSTATED
RODRIGUEZ v GADIANE 495 SCRA 368 TINGA; July 17, 2006
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Thomasita Rodriguez (petitioner
) was the private complainant in a criminal case filed against Rolando Gadiane a
nd Ricardo Rafols, Jr. (respondents), for violation of B.P. 22. The MTC hearing
the complaint had suspended the criminal proceeding on the ground that a prejudi
cial question was posed in a separate civil case then pending. On 28 Feb. 2001,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC, Branch
12, seeking to set aside the MTC order of suspension. The petition was docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-26195. - Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petitio
n on the ground that the petition was filed by the private complainant, instead
of the government prosecutor representing the People of the Philippines in crimi
nal cases. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of conformity or signature of the
government prosecutor. Petitioner moved MFR but was denied. From these orders,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review. Petitioners Claim That a person
aggrieved may file a special civil action for certiorari and that person includes
the complainant or the offended party. A special action on an order issued by a
lower court in a criminal case may be filed by the private offended party. Resp
ondentss Comment In all criminal cases, all initiatory pleadings, as well as subs

equent proceedings, must be initiated by the government counsel because the inju
red party is the People of the Philippines and the private complainant is a mere
witness to the offense allegedly committed
Criminal Procedure
NAGUIAT v IAC (TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORP) 164 SCRA 505 PADILLA; August 18,
1988
NATURE Petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Intermediate Appella
te Court FACTS -Timog Silangan Development Corporation (TSDC, for short) is a do
mestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision
lots in "Timog Park," located in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin (Lazatin,
for short) as its President. - Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment bas
is, four (4) lots from TSDC, identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block
26 of Timog Park. Each lot consists of 300 square meters. The four (4) lots hav
e a total area of 1,200 square meters, with a price of P60.00 per square meter.
On the same date (7 February 1983) petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00,
representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four (4) lots.
A corresponding receipt for the downpayment was issued by TSDC to the petitione
r. While the Contract to Sell between TSDC and the petitioner stipulated a two-y
ear period within which to pay the total contract price, the latter made substan
tial payments in the months of June to August 1983. On 10 August 1983, he paid t
he sum of P12,529.30 as his alleged full payment for Lot. No. 16, after which, T
SDC caused to be issued in the name of the petitioner the title to said lot. On
7 November 1983, petitioner paid TSDC the amount of P36,067.97, which was allege
dly his full payment for the remaining three (3) Lots, namely, Lots Nos. 13, 14
and 15. A corresponding receipt for said amount was also issued by TSDC to the p
etitioner. -Thereafter, from December 1983 up to June 1984, petitioner demanded
from TSDC the issuance in his favor of the certificates of title for the three (
3) lots, last paid for, but the private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin) refused o
n the ground that the petitioner had not fully paid for said three (3) lots. -So
metime in January, 1983, TSDC s Board of Directors approved the petitioner s con
templated purchase of the aforesaid lots. To confirm the agreement, respondent L
azatin wrote petitioner a letter reiterating standard conditions of the sale, wh
ich the petitioner allegedly accepted by affixing his conformity to said letter.
The conditions for the sale of the lots were among others, "(i) 10% down paymen
t with a commitment to commence construction therefrom (thereon) in one month s
time; (ii) said construction to be finished within a period of six (6) months; a
nd, (iii) the effective price was P70 per square meter with a rebate of P10.00 p
er square meter upon completion of the house in six (6) months." But, as alleged
by the private respondents, petitioner commenced the construction of a house on
one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated period of six (6) months.
And as to the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed altogether to construct h
ouses on them. -Private respondents contend that since petitioner did not comply
with the agreement, he was not entitled to the 10% rebate in price, and as a co
nsequence, the previous payments made by petitioner did not amount to full payme
nt as required for all the lots and which would have entitled
a2010 page 23
petitioner to the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title to all the
lots. -On 26 July 1984, petitioner, filed a complaint for specific performance w
ith damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX, docketed
as Civil Case No. 4224. In his complaint, petitioner prayed, among others, that
judgment be rendered ordering private respondents to deliver to him the transfer
certificates of title covering the three (3) lots which he had allegedly fully
paid for, and which private respondents had refused to do so. Also, it was praye
d that judgment be rendered ordering the private respondents to jointly and seve
rally pay the petitioner, actual damages equal to P320,000.00, representing unre
alized gross profits; moral damages at the discretion of the court; and, attorne
y s fees equal to P15,000.00, plus the costs of the action. -Before the civil ac

tion was filed, petitioner also filed on 5 June 1984 with the City Fiscal of Ang
eles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for vio
lation of Presidential Decree No. 957, specifically Section 25 thereof, which pr
ovides: "PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISIONS LOTS AN
D CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF. SEC. 25. Issuance of
Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the
buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for t
he registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected
for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is
outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or
developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within
six months such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit
may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith. SEC. 39. Pena
lties. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or
any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree, shall, upon c
onviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) p
esos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, that in the case
of corporations, partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Mana
ger or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the b
usiness shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree and/or
the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto." -On 13 September 1984,
an information was filed against respondent Lazatin. -Petitioner filed on 23 Feb
ruary 1985 a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 4224 and Criminal Case No. 672
7. Despite the objection and opposition of the private respondents, in an Order
dated 20 March 1985, the trial court granted the motion and ordered consolidatio
n of the two (2) cases. -At the pre-trial hearing of both cases, petitioners s c
ounsel appeared as counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case and as private prosec
utor in the Criminal Case. Private respondents objected, and filed their Motion
and Opposition to Appearance of Plaintiff as Private Prosecutor with respect to
the trial of the Criminal Case; the opposition was overruled by the trial court.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
-Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the re
spondent appellate court, seeking the annulment of the orders of the trial court
, dated 20 March 1985 and 29 May 1985. In due course, the respondent appellate c
ourt rendered a decision favorable to herein private respondents. -The decision
of the respondent appellate court was received by petitioner s counsel on 16 Oct
ober 1985. On 30 October 1985, petitioner s counsel filed with the respondent ap
pellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to file a motion for reconsideratio
n of aforesaid decision, praying for fifteen (15) days from 31 October 1985, wit
hin which to file said motion. -On 15 November 1985, petitioner s counsel filed
a Second Motion for Extension of Time to file a motion for reconsideration, pray
ing for another fifteen (15) days from 15 November 1985, within which to file sa
id motion for reconsideration. It was denied stating among others that the fifte
en (5) days period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. -On 2
December 1985, petitioner s counsel still filed his motion for reconsideration
it was also denied. ISSUES 1. WON no motion for extension of time to file a moti
on for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Munici
pal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Cour
t as applied in the Habaluyas rule 2. WON the civil and criminal case should be
consolidated HELD 1. NO - In the case at bar, the petitioner filed his motions f
or extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration on 30 October 1985 and
15 November 1985, both within the periods sought to be extended. Hence the Haba
luyas ruling did not yet apply to bar said motions for extension. As admitted by
petitioner himself, he filed with the respondent appellate court two (2) motion
s for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration of the latter court s
decision, with the justification that the two (2) motions were timely and prope
rly presented, since they were filed before the expiration of the respective per
iods sought to be extended. - The case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
has ruled that: "Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution,

the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to fil
e a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan o
r Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appell
ate Court." - Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Habaluyas case, motions for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no long
er be filed before all courts, lower than the Supreme Court. The rule in Habaluy
as applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sough
t to be extended, because the fifteen (15) day period for filing a motion for ne
w trial or reconsideration with said courts, is nonextendible. But as resolved a
lso in the Habaluyas case, the rule that no motion for extension of time to file
a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appella
te Court, shall be strictly enforced "beginning one month after the promulgation
of this Resolution." The Court promulgated the Habaluyas resolution on 30 May 1
986. Thus,
Criminal Procedure
the Habaluyas ruling became effective, and strictly enforced, only beginning 1 J
uly 1986. 2. YES - In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at le
ast, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost identical,
i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchased from th
e private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the certificates
of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise, would virtually be
the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditi
ons for the purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his
conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitione
r, and other related documents. - Based on the foregoing, and considering that t
he criminal action filed is one for violation of a special law where, irrespecti
ve of the motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by said special law, co
nstitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner s counsel, as pri
vate prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial right
s of the accused. - The consolidation of the two cases in question, where petiti
oner s counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and privat
e prosecutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termin
ation of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of t
he parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice. - As a ground fo
r the consolidation of the criminal and civil cases, petitioner invokes Rule 111
, Sec. 3(a), Rules of Court, which provides: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arisin
g from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil act
ion to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as contemplated in
the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arisin
g from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found un
til final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. However, if no
final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the sam
e may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court t
rying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented
and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in th
e criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence tha
t any party may wish to present. Under the aforequoted provision, the civil acti
on that may be consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the recovery of c
ivil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In the case at
bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with
damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the ce
rtificates of title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, w
as grounded on the Contract to Sell between the petitioner and the private respo
ndent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was for the enforcement of
an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu, and not one for the rec
overy of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the

petitioner is inapplicable. - But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidatio


n of a criminal action with a civil action arising not ex delicto, may still be
done, based upon the
a2010 page 24
express authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fac
t are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidat
ed; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to av
oid unnecessary costs or delay." - In Canos v. Peralta, where the Court sustaine
d the order of a trial court to consolidate a civil action (an action for the re
covery of wage differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages) with a
criminal action (for violation of the Minimum Wage Law), it was held that: "A Co
urt may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues,
and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the cour
t has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will
not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of an
y of the parties . . . - The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multip
licity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to cl
ear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the att
ainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.
" Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
appellate court, dated 9 October 1985, is SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial co
urt, in Civil Case No. 4224 and Criminal Case No. 6727, dated 20 March 1985 and
29 May 1985 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private pros
ecutor in the criminal case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said case
she did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages. There was a
lso admission that the private prosecutor was for proving damages against the ac
cused. - The issue in the RTC was WON the plaintiff, represented by a private pr
osecutor and the failing to make a reservation to file a separate action, was ba
rred from filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused Cristin
a Malicsi. RTC ruled in favor of the defendant. - RTC: There is no question that
in defamation cases (such as the present) as in cases of fraud and physical inju
ries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the crimina
l action may be brought by the injured party, and such action shall proceed inde
pendently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. An exception to the above rule; when the offended party actually inter
venes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor f
or the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived
his right to file a separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a res
ervation therefore (Judgment in such a proceeding becomes binding as res judicata,
according to Roa v Dela Cruz. Thus, plaintiff is barred). ISSUE WON interventio
n of private prosecution and failure to make a reservation bars plaintiff from f
iling a separate civil action for damages against the accused HELD NO, plaintiff
is not barred. Ratio The mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the crimina
l case does not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggr
ieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for
damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civi
l action for damages. Reasoning - In the Roa case, there was a full-blown hearin
g where a private prosecutor participated actively and there could be no questio
n that the aggrieved party s participation through the private prosecutor in sai
d case clearly indicated her intention to have her claim for damages litigated i
n the criminal action against the accused. It was only after the trial of the ca
se on the merits that a decision was rendered finding the accused guilty of slig
ht slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00 but making no award of dam

ages in favor of the aggrieved party. The reason for the Court s not making any
award of damages is because of the failure of the aggrieved party to submit evid
ence to support her claim for damages. - In the present case, while it is true t
hat Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving dam
ages, the unexpected plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immedi
ately to a fine of P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for damage
s and making a reservation to file a separate civil action. Controlling case sho
uld be Meneses v Luat, and not Roa v Dela Cruz. In the Roa case, not only was th
e offended party represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal action, the
action went through trial on the merits. In the Luat case, defendant Luat did n
ot proceed to trial, as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance
of private counsel in representation of
CORPUS v PAJE BORDAS v CANADALLA REYES v SEMPIO-DIY 141 SCRA 208 PATAJO; January
29, 1986
NATURE Direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of the Regional Tria
l Court (Malabon). FACTS - MTC (Navotas): Cristina Malicsi was charged with the
crime of intriguing against honor. Zenaida Cruz Reyes (petitioner) was the aggri
eved party. In said criminal case, Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor
named Atty. Barayang. - Malicsi pleaded guilty to the information and was sente
nced to pay P50. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable t
o present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Reyes was not able to m
ake a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. - In
stead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the
Regional Trial Court for damages arising from defamatory words which were the su
bject of the information in the Criminal action.
Criminal Procedure
the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as could only imp
ort an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action. - The failure
of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not fore
close her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of
the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a s
eparate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be firs
t made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary, the provision
of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding. Dispositive Petition is granted.
a2010 page 25
be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs arguments in their opposition are lac
king in merit." -Plaintiffs filed motion to set aside the order dismissing the c
omplaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration. -Defendants filed a comm
ent on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the atto
rneys of all the plaintiffs. -December 15, 1983: Judge Fortun issued an order vo
luntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "
to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid
pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end
to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to
resolve said pending motion." -Plaintiffs resolved an amplificatory motion for
reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of
Mabini Legal Aid Committee. -May 2,1984: defendants filed a comment on said ampl
ificatory motion for reconsideration. -May 11, 1984: RTC Judge Esteban Lising, w
ithout acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an or
der declaring that since certain plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconside
r the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an app
eal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, s
aid Order is now final against said plaintiffs. -on May 28,1984: plaintiffs file
d a motion for reconsideration, alleging that it was not true that the plaintiff
s mentioned in the order of May 11, 1984 failed to file MR within the reglementa

ry period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November
8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the
plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers. -September 21, 1984: RT
C issued order dealing with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11,
1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of Novemb
er 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of Nove
mber 8, 1983 granting the defendants motion to dismiss. In effect, the case aga
inst the defendants (except for Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and Master Sgt. Bienven
ido Balabaere) was dismissed. -March 15, 1985: petitioners (plaintiffs below) fi
led the instant petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside RTC s res
olution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. -Respondents filed comment on the petition, November 9, 198
5. -A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986. ISSUES 1. WON the suspe
nsion of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for dama
ges for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of
rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution 2. WON a superior office
r under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and
severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and
liberties have been violated 3. WON RTC was correct in dismissing the complaint
with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to f
ile a motion for reconsideration of the court s resolution of November 8, 1983,
granting the respondent s motion to dismiss HELD 1. NO - The suspension of the p
rivilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners right and ca
use of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations
of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwis
e illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the indi
vidual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a spe
edy means of obtaining his liberty. - At the heart of petitioners complaint is
Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal
provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms e
nshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate t
hose sacred rights with impunity. Certain basic rights and liberties are immutab
le and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the r
uling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our comm
itment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the
view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predomin
ant power in the community. Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty,
of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom
it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism.
On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a cer
tain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason ne
vertheless controls. 2 - We find respondents invocation of the doctrine of stat
e immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actuall
y involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written t
he ambit of their powers. It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP,
were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress la
wless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Procl
amation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on Janu
ary 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes
against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be const
rued as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitution
al restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the in
dividual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitutio
n remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civil
ian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. - Article 32 of the
Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individua

l liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of ano
ther, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility
. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their
acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other pena
l statute. - In carrying out this task and mission to protect the Republic from
its enemies, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed. -Moreover, pe
titioners right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.
D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following
to its text: However, when the action (for
ABERCA v VER 160 SCRA 590 YAP; April 15, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS -This case stems from alleged illegal searc
hes and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs
by various intelligence units of the AFP, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) or
dered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known commun
istterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plan
s to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," -Plaintiffs allege, among others, that c
omplying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing i
n most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raid
s, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warr
ants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were de
nied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in viola
tion of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; tha
t all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted an
d deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements f
rom plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previo
usly known to and sanctioned by defendants. -Plaintiffs sought damages (actual/c
ompensatory, moral, exemplary), and attorney s fees. -Defendants filed motion to
dismiss alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to th
em, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that t
he courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability
for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complain
t states no cause of action against the defendants. -Plaintiffs filed two separa
te oppositions to the motion to dismiss. -Defendants filed a Consolidated Reply.
-RTC NCR Branch 95 Judge Willelmo C. Fortun issued a resolution granting the mo
tion to dismiss. "After a careful study of defendants arguments, the court find
s the same to be meritorious and must, therefore,
Criminal Procedure
injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out
of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of
powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and
/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. -Even
assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspe
nds petitioners right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, i
t does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suf
fered because of respondents confiscation of their private belongings, the viol
ation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protecti
on against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other crue
l and inhuman treatment. -However, we find it unnecessary to address the constit
utional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino is
sued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question there
fore has become moot and academic. 2. YES -The doctrine of respondent superior h
as been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master

and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exi
sts between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. -Be that a
s it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the languag
e of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly o
r "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and li
berties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly respo
nsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly resp
onsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved par
ty. -By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials unde
r the Constitution acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may
a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his su
bordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transg
ressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights a
nd liberties of the citizen. Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tor
tfeasors. -RTC was therefore mistaken in dropping defendants General Fabian Ver,
Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Gal
ileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, L
t. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. -T
he responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set fo
rth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action mu
st be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. To determine the suffi
ciency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no o
thers, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypoth
etically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. -Applying this t
est, it is difficult to justify the trial court s ruling, dismissing for lack of
cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations
against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficie
nt to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32
of the Civil Code.
a2010 page 26
3. NO -A timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by
plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was not signed by all the counsels
for the several plaintiffs but the body of the motion itself clearly indicated
that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs.This must have been al
so the understanding of defendants counsel himself for when he filed his commen
t on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed
the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs. -In filing the motion to set
aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf
of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authori
ty of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless
questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was
never done in this case. Dispositive Petition granted. SC annuled and set aside
the resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated
May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Case remanded to the r
espondent court for further proceedings. Costs against private respondents.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
which the people decisively ratified on February 2,
of the Commission on Human Rights has been created
ers to investigate human rights violations and take
l such violations by the military as well as by the

1987, the independent office


and organized with ample pow
remedial measures against al
civilian groups.

OCCENA v ICAMINA 181 SCRA 328 FERNAN; January 22, 1990


NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of RTC FACTS - Petitioner
Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sib
alom, San Remigio Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a crimin

al complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegaf
ria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insult
ing words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, ma
lugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Capta
in, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar
import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and h
onor. - Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Tria
l ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate ci
vil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor. - After tr
ial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation a
nd was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonm
ent in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. - No damages were awarded to pet
itioner. - Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the RTC, which denied his
petition. - Petitioners Claim The RTC decision is contrary to Article 100 of the
RPC providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly l
iable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral damages may b
e recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. - Respondents Comm
ent The decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of he
r civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal
action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages,
he assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he cannot app
eal from the decision of the lower court. ISSUES 1. WON the decision of the MCTC
constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent s civil
liability 2. WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages HELD 1. NO - The
decision of the MCTC has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by
petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It w
as only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE [concur]
- All persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military
or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defe
at, violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civi
l liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages
as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code. - The decision herein upholds and rei
nstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-pla
intiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violation
s of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the
automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command respons
ibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for
damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed suc
h transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer
must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs t
he risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under t
he cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable wi
th the tortfeasor. - Brandeis:"In a government of laws, existence of the governm
ent be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our govern
ment is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole pe
ople by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker,
it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himse
lf, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law th
e end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." - It need only
be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under Presid
ent Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to fi
le our government s ratification and access to all human rights instruments adop
ted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government s
commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Univer
sal Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution
Criminal Procedure

- People vs. Coloma: from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may
, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as rega
rds both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respe
ct only to the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award
damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either
to appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dep
endent upon the other. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on th
e civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appe
al, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining fi
nality. 2. YES - Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed b
y Article 100 of the RPC which provides that "Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on
Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil
Code. - Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is
also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crim
e has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturb
ance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injur
ed by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, c
ontempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private pe
rson injured by the crime. In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civi
l liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentio
nal or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. - As a general rule, a
person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state
or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private
person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offens
e of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies wher
e no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no dam
age was caused to a private person. - There is here an offended party, whose mai
n contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory wor
ds and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand P
esos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P1
0,000) as exemplary damages. - Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows t
he recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defa
mation This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a cas
e for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his
feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover puni
tive or exemplary damages. Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an igno
ramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petition
er s character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Pet
itioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result o
f the incident complained of.
a2010 page 27
- Petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further
sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Dispositive The petition was granted.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
negligent. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provid
ed that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores. - A
rticle 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent
civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offense
s not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite for the exercise of the ri
ght to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquit
ted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. - The respondents argument
that the applicable provision is Article 33 is devoid of merit because of the ab
ovementioned argument. In addition, Article 33 assumes defamation, fraud, or phy

sical injuries were intentionally committed. - In the case at bar, Rule 111 of t
he former Rules of Criminal Procedure (i.e., that a reservation be made in the c
riminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action) is not appli
cable because Article 29 does not require it. - The requirement in Section 2 of
Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, that there be a reservation
in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has
been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized a
mendment to the substantive law, in this case the Civil Code. In fact, the reser
vation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Se
ction 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with th
e decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffec
tive. - The active participation of the Bonite heirs does not act as a bar from
pursuing a civil action for damages because the civil action based on criminal l
iability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and independent ac
tions. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court are hereby REVE
RSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered reinstating the complaint in the ci
vil case directing said court to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs again
st private respondent.
BONITE v ZOSA 162 SCRA 180 PADILLA; June 20, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instanc
e of Misamis Occidental, Br. III. Zosa, J. FACTS - September 24, 1968, 2 PM Boni
te, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was killed when he was hit by a
truck driven by Abamonga. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homic
ide was filed by the surviving heirs of Bonite but Abamonga was acquitted becaus
e of insufficient evidence. - In the course of the trial, the petitioners active
ly participated in the proceedings through their lawyer, private prosecutor Atty
. Dulalas. - December 28, 1970 The Bonite heirs filed an action for recovery of
damages against Abamonga based on the same act but the court dismissed the compl
aint for damages because the Court believes that the Bonite heirs did not reserv
e the right to do so. ISSUE WON an independent civil action for damages, under A
rticle 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners failure in the cri
minal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their
active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action. HELD YES Ratio
When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt ha
s not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the sa
me act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance
of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reason
able doubt (based on Article 29 of the Civil Code). Reasoning - In the criminal
case against Abamonga, the accused was acquitted because there was insufficient
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the Bonite heirs h
ave the right to file an independent civil action for damages despite the acquit
tal of the accused in the criminal case. - Aside from basing their action for da
mages in Article 29 of the Civil Code, the petitioners may also rely on Article
2176 which provides that acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal negl
igence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil a
ction for recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but
from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. - It has been held that Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishab
le by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentiona
l and voluntary or
SEPARATE OPINION MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]
- 4 of them merely concurred in the result- If there has been active participati
on in the prosecution of a criminal case by the offended party, the civil action
arising from the crime is deemed to have been also brought in the criminal case
. Consequently, a judgment finding the accused guilty and granting him damages i
s binding upon the offended party and he may not file a separate civil action un
der Article 33. - However if the accused is acquitted on the ground of reasonabl

e doubt, as in this case, the civil action for damages for the same act may be i
nstituted under Article 29 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding the fact that the
offended party had actively participated in the criminal action. - The rule in C
orpus vs. Paje which states that reckless imprudence is not included in Article
33 of the Civil Code, was note deemed as authoritative doctrine because, of 11 j
ustices, only 9 took part in the decision and
US v HEERY
Criminal Procedure
25 Phil 600 TRENT; Oct 22, 1913
FACTS -Heery was charged with attempted murder, but was convicted of the lesser
crime of maliciously inflicting serious injury upon Alex Sternberg, and was sent
enced to one year and three months of prision correccional by the trial court. On appeal, the decision was affirmed but case was remanded because it did not in
clude the evidence of civil damages suffered by the offended party. -Then lower
court, in its ruling, restated the conviction (of one yr to 3 months of prision
correccional) and then included P50,500 for indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonm
ent, in case of insolvency. -Heery raised the question of double jeopardy, and t
he award being excessive. ISSUES 1. WON remanding the case for determination of
civil damages and their assessment against the defendant are to be considered as
a modification of the punishment, by increasing the penalty or otherwise, meted
out to the defendant for the commission of the crime. (WON there is double jeop
ardy) 2. WON award was excessive HELD 1. NO. - Civil damages are no part of the
punishment for the crime. - What was the effect of the action of this court in a
ffirming that judgment as to the guilt and punishment of the accused and of reve
rsing it as to the question of civil damage, with instructions to execute the pu
nishment imposed and to try the civil branch of the case? Bearing in mind the br
oad line of demarcation between the civil liability of the accused and his crimi
nal liability, the bare fact that his civil liability was determined and fixed h
ad nothing whatever to do with the punishment imposed. The latter was not thereb
y affected. This time intervening between the judgment of guilt and the judgment
of civil damages could in no way give to the latter the character of the former.
- (That) the defendant might serve the term of imprisonment fixed by the court
as the punishment for his crime, and after the sentence for civil damages and in
case of his insolvency, he would have to return to prison to serve the subsidia
ry imprisonment by reason of his insolvency, being argued that this would consti
tute double jeopardy. It is well settled that execution against the person will
issue in civil actions in case of personal injuries, and that this is not impris
onment for debt or punishment for crime. It is in lieu of the payment of the ind
emnity and is considered as a discharge thereof. If the payment of the indemnity
is not punishment for the crime, the imprisonment in lieu thereof is not punish
ment for the crime. - As the civil liability is no part of the punishment for th
e crime, there would have been no question of double jeopardy... In the present
case, the civil liability of the defendant was established, and the sole questio
n determined upon the second trial was the amount of civil damages. The plea of
double jeopardy can not be allowed. -On civil liability of persons accused of cr
ime:
a2010 page 28
- Springer vs. Odlin: "By General Orders, No. 58, section 107, the privileges se
cured by the Spanish law to persons claiming to be injured by the commission of
an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages
for the injury sustained by reason of the same, are preserved and remain in for
ce, and it is therein expressly provided that the court, upon conviction of the
accused, may enter judgment in favor of the injured person, against the defendan
t in the criminal case for the damage occasioned by the wrongful act." - Rakes v
s. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.: "According to article 112 (Spanish Code of Crim
inal Procedure) the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought

therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly res
erve by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private compla
int, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished." - Almeida vs. Abaroa (
8 Phil. Rep., 178), was a civil action for damages brought the plaintiff against
a person who had been previously acquitted on a criminal charge. It was held th
at his acquittal in the criminal action was a complete bar to a civil action for
damages based upon the alleged criminal act of which the defendant had been acc
used. In the course of this decision it was said: - "Instituting a criminal acti
on only, it will be understood, brings the civil action as well, unless the dama
ged or prejudiced person waives the same or expressly reserves the right to inst
itute the civil action after the termination of the criminal case, if there be a
ny reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the said Law of Criminal Procedure.) - "The rig
ht to bring the civil action, as reserved by the person damaged or prejudiced, a
fter the termination of the criminal case, is only permitted, if there be any re
ason therefore, and so says the law, in the event that the judgment rendered in
the criminal cause is a finding of guilt against the accused; but if the accused
be acquitted, then the compliant in the civil action must be based on some fact
and or cause distinct and separate from the criminal act itself." - The court t
hen quotes from article 114 of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal proceeding is instituted for the judicial investigation of a cr
ime or misdemeanor, no civil action arising from the same act can be prosecuted;
but the same shall be suspended, if there be one, in whatever stage or state it
may be found, until final sentence in the criminal proceeding is pronounced. "T
o prosecute a penal action it shall not be necessary that a civil action arising
from the same crime or misdemeanor be previously instituted." - Under the Spani
sh criminal law, an injured person had the right to intervene in the prosecution
of the accused for the purpose of having his damages ascertained. The trial cou
rt was required to include the amount of these damages in the judgment of convic
tion. The plain provisions of section 107 of our criminal procedure, quoted supr
a, expressly preserves this right to the injured person. The refusal of the tria
l court to allow the injured person to introduce evidence as to his damages is,
therefore, clearly prejudicial error. 2. YES. - There can be no objection to all
owing the physicians fees of P500 and P1,300 for the three months salary, bein
g the time the injured party was incapacitated from performing the work in which
he was then engaged. The remainder, P48,700, appears to have been allowed on ac
count of the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
permanent diminution of Sternberg s ability to earn money. The evidence of recor
d does not establish such disability with that degree of certainly which will ju
stify an award for that purpose. We have reached this conclusion after a most ca
reful examination of all the testimony upon this point. Dispositive The award of
damages is reduced to P1,800, the defendant to suffer subsidiary imprisonment,
which in no event can exceed one-third of the principal penalty, in case of inso
lvency.
SEPARATE OPINION MORELAND [concurring and dissenting]
The record being in this condition, I am inclined to believe that this court sho
uld not take up and discuss, much less decide, the question of former jeopardy.
To do so it must not only hold, in violation of the provisions of section 24 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, that it is unnecessary to plead the defense in t
he trial court but must also hold that it is unnecessary to introduce evidence i
n that court to substantiate the plea. The plea of former conviction or once in
jeopardy should, according to established rules and the provisions of the Code o
f Criminal Procedure, be substantiated by the production of the record of the fo
rmer trial and the introduction of the same in evidence. That was not done in th
is case. While the evidence taken in the former trial was introduced in the pres
ent case for the purpose of establishing the extent of defendant s civil liabili
ty, the remaining part of the record was not introduced as evidence and was not,

therefore, considered by that court. If it had been introduced as evidence, the


government would have had the right to meet it and be heard upon it in that cou
rt. To permit the question to be raised here for the first time, and in the reso
lution thereof, to consider evidence that was never introduced in the trial cour
t and which the government has never had an opportunity to meet in an orderly wa
y, is not only to take the prosecution by surprise but is to establish a precede
nt which may be dangerous in practice and subversive of orderly procedure.
PARKER v PANLILIO and PHIL AIR LINES 91 PHIL 1 BAUTISTA ANGELO; March 5, 1952
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Asuncion Parker and her minor daughter Ka
thleen filed a complaint for damages against Philippine Air Lines, Inc., based o
n the alleged failure of PAL to carry safely Richard Parker from Daet, Camarines
Norte to Manila. - PAL set up as special defense that the plane exploded in mid
-air due to dynamite surreptitiously introduced into said air craft by criminal h
ands. A criminal case was already filed in CFI Camarines Norte against the suppos
ed guilty parties. - When the case was set for the continuation of the hearing,
PAL presented an oral motion for the suspension of the hearing, invoking (then)
sec 1 Rule 107, of the Rules of Court, which provides that no civil action arisi
ng from the same offense can be prosecuted until final
Criminal Procedure
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. Parker vehemently opposed
. - CFI suspended the hearing until the final determination of the criminal case
which was then pending appeal in the SC. Petitioners Claim It was a mistake on t
he part of respondent judge to consider and apply Sec 1, Rule 107 of the Rules o
f Court, as her cause of action in the civil case is based on culpa contractual
and not on the civil liability arising from the offense involved in the criminal
case. Respondents Comments When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged is imp
liedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately, and tha
t, inasmuch as petitioner had failed to expressly reserve her right to institute
the civil action separately, she may not now institute another action under art
icles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code based on the act or omission complained of in
the criminal action. ISSUES 1. WON CFI was correct in considering and applying S
ec 1, Rule 107, of the Rules of Court 2. WON respondent judge erred in suspendin
g the hearing HELD 1. NO - The present civil case is based upon a cause of actio
n not arising from the civil liability involved in the criminal case instituted
against the accused. The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurr
ed by PAL because of its failure to carry safely Richard Parker to his place of
destination, whereas the criminal case involves the civil liability of the accus
ed. - Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended party desires to press his
right to demand indemnity from the accused in the criminal case which he may as
sert either in the same criminal case or in a separate action. - The failure of
Parker to reserve her right to institute the civil action in the criminal case c
annot in any way be deemed as waiver on her part to institute a separate civil a
ction against PAL based on its contractual liability. 2. NO - The present civil
case is directly interwoven with the criminal case in the sense that the main is
sue involved in both cases is the determination of the failure of Richard Parker
to reach safely his destination or the determination of the cause of his death.
This was the main reason that guided the lower court in postponing the hearing
of the civil case until final judgment in the criminal case has been rendered. Inasmuch as the power to grant or refuse continuances is inherent in all courts
unless expressly limited by statute, and there is no showing that the lower cou
rt has abused its discretion is suspending the hearing, the petition for certior
ari must fail. Dispositive Petition denied
a2010 page 29
YAKULT PHILIPPINES v CA [CAMASO] 190 SCRA 357 GANCAYCO; Oct. 5, 1990

NATURE Petition for review of decision of the CA FACTS - 5 year old Roy Camaso (
standing on a sidewalk) was sideswiped by a motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippin
es and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado on Dec.1982. - An information was t
hen filed on Jan.1983 against Salvado charging him with the crime of reckless im
prudence resulting in slight physical injuries. - On Oct. 1984, a complaint for
damages was filed in the RTC of Manila by Roy Camaso (represented by his father,
David) against Yakult and Salvado. The RTC decided in favor of the Camasos and h
eld the defendants (herein petitioners) jointly and severally liable for damages
, which then moved said defendants Yakult and Salvado to appeal the judgment. Th
ey also filed a peitition for certiorari in the CA challenging the RTCs jurisdict
ion in the civil case. Their argument was that the civil action for damages for
injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence, there being no malice, cannot
be filed independently of the criminal action and that under Rule 111 Sec.1 of
the 1985 Rules of Crim. Pro., such a separate civil action may not be filed unle
ss reservation thereof is expressly made. - The CA on Nov. 1989, dismissed the p
etition and the subsequent MFR. ISSUE WON a civil action instituted after a crim
inal action was filed can prosper even if there was no reservation to file a sep
arate civil action HELD YES - Although the separate civil action filed in this c
ase was without previous reservation in the criminal case, it was nevertheless i
nstituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and
the presiding judge handling the criminal action was duly informed thereof, such
that no damages was awarded in the disposition of the criminal action. Reasonin
g - Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recove
ry of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless th
e offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it sep
arately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. - Such civi
l action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damage
s under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arisin
g from the same act or omission of the accused. It is also provided that the res
ervation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made befor
e the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affordi
ng the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. ** The
SC considered the actual filing of the civil action far better than a compliance
with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offen
ded party before the prosecution presents its evidence. It added that the purpos
e of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission. Dispo
sitive petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
MANIAGO vCA (BOADO) 253 SCRA 674 MENDOZA; February 20, 1996
FACTS - Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used
in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper
to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned
by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result
of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioners driver, Her
minio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City - A month later, a ci
vil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner hi
mself - Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But t
he trial court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil
Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in additio
n to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. - CA
dismissed his petition - There is no dispute that private respondent, as offend
ed party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civ
il action, based on the same accident, either against the driver, Herminio Anday
a, or against the latters employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. - petitioner

argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the crimin
al action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did n
ot reserve his right to bring this action separately. (The records show that whi
le this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismis
sed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of it
s evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its ca
se. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that since the civil action
to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismis
sal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.) - P
rivate respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the pres
ent civil action against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the rights
provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as
such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the act
ion to enforce them separately. ISSUE WON despite the absence of reservation, Bo
ado may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the Art
.2176, 2180 and 2177 of the Civil Code and Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
Criminal Procedure
HELD NO Ratio The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must
be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. 1 quit
e clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all c
ivil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed
to have been instituted with the criminal case. The right of the injured party t
o sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from cr
imes or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved oth
erwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Reasoning A. The
re are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the rul
emaking power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination
of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separate civil
action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civ
il action had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservati
on is needed. - In Garcia v. Florido the right of an injured person to bring an
action for damages even if he did not make a reservation of his action in the cr
iminal prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld
on the ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had in effect
abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the criminal case. In Abellana v. Marave in which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accid
ent to bring a separate action for damages was sustained despite the fact that t
he right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision
in that case was the fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a
reservation because it was made after the decision of the City Court convicting
the accused had been appealed. - In Jarantilla v. CA the ruling is that the acqu
ittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an a
ction for damages even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved.
This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that when an accused
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted
. This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismis
sal of the criminal case against the driver is the fact that the prosecution fai
led to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer of its e
vidence. - the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein
made that, on the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civi
l liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action
, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which
is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it sepa
rately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal
action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the ins
titution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recover

y of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act fro
m which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the
Civil Code. - Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action
arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, o
ne thing is clear: The change has been effected by this Court. The new rules
a2010 page 30
require reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the a
ction will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action. - Contrar
y to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat s
ubstantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of
orderly procedure. - It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not it
s institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed in
dependently of the outcome of the criminal case. B. There is a practical reason
for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civi
l Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one a
ction for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made agains
t the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 o
f the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil C
ode, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. - In the present case, the crim
inal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been conv
icted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable
for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising
from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility
that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no
pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the inst
itution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would no
t result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rul
e requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against d
ouble recovery for the same act or omission. - Nor does it matter that the actio
n is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very
much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whe
ther arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a
decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount beca
use the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his emp
loyee is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but
also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Dispositive The
decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMI
SSED.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and he
r two (2) passengers in the process. - A criminal case was thereafter filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of
the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple physical injuries. - About four (4) months lat
er, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Sure
ty Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for dama
ges against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to
recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as w
ell as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory d
amages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney s fees; P10,000.
00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.) - With the issues ha
ving been joined upon the filing of the petitioners answer to the complaint for
damages and after submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial brief
s, petitioners filed on September 18, 1992 a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against petitio

ner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reserva
tion to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by
the Manila Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 21, 1993 - After their m
otion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993 Order was denied, petitioners el
evated the matter to this Court via petition for certiorari which was, however,
referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. On February 24,
1995, a decision adverse to petitioners once again was rendered by respondent co
urt, upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order. Hence, this petit
ion for review after a motion for reconsideration of said respondent court judgm
ent was denied. ISSUES 1. WON an independent civil action based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code can be filed if no reservation was made in
the said criminal case 2. WON a subrogee of an offended party can maintain an in
dependent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservat
ion of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal ac
tion and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating
through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case HELD 1. NO - O
n the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the Ru
les of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.
-- In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code o
f the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be b
rought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action
, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." - Even though these so-ca
lled "independent civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles
are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action
as set forth in Section 2 of Rule
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. v CA (PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION) 300 SC
RA 484 MARTINEZ; April 24, 1998
NATURE Petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of respondent cour
t judgment was denied FACTS - In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite A
ce Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein peti
tioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) collided with each other at t
he intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in
Criminal Procedure
111, it is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought abo
ut by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure -- particularly the
phrase " which has been reserved" -- that the "independent" character of these c
ivil actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words,
prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent ci
vil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apa
rt from or simultaneous with the criminal action. - According to Justice Jose Y.
Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which drafted the 1988
amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by pe
titioners, the 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which is deem
ed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or prev
iously instituted. Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includ
es not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages unde
r Article 2176 (quasi-delicts) of the said code. - It should be noted that while
it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right
to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is nec
essary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is dee
med impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or i
nstituted. - Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the re
servation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":" to avoid mul
tiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to
clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litiga

nts." 2. NO - Private respondent PISC, as subrogee, is not exempt from the reser
vation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasidelict arising
from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the crimina
l case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as
owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural req
uirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil cas
e. Dispositive The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24,
1995 and the Resolution dated April 3,1995 denying the motion for reconsideratio
n thereof are reversed. The "manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceedin
gs" filed by petitioners is granted.
a2010 page 31
FACTS - On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenge
r bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its emplo
yee, private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Ma
rcia, resulting in the latter s death and in physical injuries to herein petitio
ners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and se
rious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje
in the CFI of Pampanga. - On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed i
n the CFI of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respectiv
e parents, against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that the m
ishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving
the passenger bus. - While said Civil Case was in progress in the Court of Firs
t Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instanc
e of Pampanga. The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. Ho
wever, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted with the CA holding t
hat "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT eve
n guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as appellant was concerned, the CA held th
at this was a case of PURE ACCIDENT." - As a consequence, herein private respond
ents, defendants in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved fo
r the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals a
cquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section 1 (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court
(now Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court). On August 10, 1966, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs com
plaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje. Petitioners
appealed the case to the CA, which basically affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, t
his recourse. ISSUE WON the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accu
sed in reckless imprudence on the ground that the incident was accidental, extin
guished by implication the civil action for damages HELD YES Ratio Extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the ext
inction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Since, the CA found that this case was of
pure accident, it is as good as saying as if he did not commit the crime charged
. There being no crime committed, no civil liability arises. Reasoning - It is t
he stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, n
ot Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar. "Sec. 2. Independent
civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separat
e and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party dur
ing the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as require
d in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." - We
do not agree. Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an indep
endent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the crimina
l action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof be
yond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an
acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not
exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the cri

me. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co
mpany, 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge
will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares i
n the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. Where the court states that the evidence throws no light on the cause of
fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be he
ld responsible, this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which
exempts the accused, from civil liability." - Also, the charge against Felardo
Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or c
riminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical
injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three
(3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil a
ction shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
BUNAG JR. v CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 440 REGALADO; July 10, 1992
NATURE Petition for review from the decision of the CA FACTS - On Sept. 8, 1973
Conrado Bunag Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel or hotel where they had sexu
al intercourse and later that evening he brought Zenaida to the house of his gra
ndmothers house where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until S
ept. 29, 1973. They filed their application for marriage license with the Local
Civil Registral of Bacoor, Cavite. However, after a few days, Conrado filed an a
ffidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiffs Claim Con
rado Bunag Jr. abducted her in the vicinity of San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasa
y City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. Afterwhich he said that h
e would not let her go unless they get married, as he intended to marry her , so
much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. They went t
o his gradmothers house and lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until
Bunag Jr. left and never returned which humiliated Zenaida and compelled her to
go back to her parents. Respondents Comment Conrado Bunag Jr.and Zenaida Cirilo h
ad earlier made plans to elope and get married (same as first set of facts) . An
d that the reason why Conrado broke off their plan to get married was their bitt
er disagreements over money and Zenaidas threats to his life. - The Cirilos filed
a complaint for damages against Conrado Bunag Jr. and his father Conrado Bunag S
r. (Zenaidas uncle claims that Bunag Sr. assured them that the couple were to be
married). The
MARCIA v CA (PAJE and VICTORY LINER) 120 SCRA 190 RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the compla
int filed by the petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an in
dependent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless
imprudence.
Criminal Procedure
Trial Court ordered Bunag Jr. to pay damages (80K-moral damages,20Kexemplary dam
ages, 20k-temperate damages and 10k attorneys fees) Bunag Sr. was absolved from a
ny and all liability.CA affirmed in toto - Bunag Jr contends that both the trial
court awarded the damages on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcib
le abduction with rape,despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefore fi
led by Zenaida with the Pasay City Fiscals Office. ISSUE WON the Fiscals dismissal
of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape extinguished the civil liabil
ity of Conrado Bunag Jr HELD NO - The dismissal did not in any way affect the ri
ght of Zenaida Cirilo to institute a civil action arising from the offense. - Ex
tinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liab
ility unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Reasoning -Genera
lly, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal Liability w
ill give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or om
ission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate ca

use thereof. -The two proceedings involved are not between the same parties (the
criminal action is between the State and the defendant and the civil case is be
tween the offended party and the defendant). Also, there are different rules as
to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil
proceedings.(criminal action proof beyond reasonable doubt; civil actionpreponde
rance of evidence) - In this case
the dismissal of the complaint for forcible ab
duction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary invest
igation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from wh
ich the civil case might arise did not exist.
a2010 page 32
the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Petitioner w
as acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt". - On October 30, 1974,
private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976
, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of
in Criminal Case No. 47027. In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged
as special and affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no cause of
action and, additionally, that the latter s cause of action, if any, is barred b
y the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal c
ase was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein
plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the cr
iminal case. - Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, t
he trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial. Petitioner thereafter
filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which
was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, assailing the aforesaid order of the trial cou
rt. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court s resolution of J
uly 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same r
eason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. - After trial, the court below render
ed judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and orderi
ng herein petitioner to pay damages. Thus, petitioner appealed said decision to
the CA but said respondent court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial cour
t with a few changes in the amount of the damages to be paid. ISSUE WON the priv
ate respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical inju
ries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof wi
thout reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of,
can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omi
ssion where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reason
able doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of
acquittal HELD YES - The action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the r
espondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his interventio
n in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action fo
r damages. Ratio The allegations of the complaint filed by the private responden
t supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the pet
itioner. The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill that: ... a sepa
rate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offend
ed party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover d
amages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the big
ger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other w
ords, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 1
11, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-d
elict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused . . . - The aforecited case of Lontoc v
s. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same factual situa
tion. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly de

clared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a
separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did
not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially conside
ring that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved bey
ond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes o
f action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised P
enal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict
; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability wa
s not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as aut
horized by Article 29 of the Civil Code. - Under the present jurisprudential mil
ieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could ver
y well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused and the compl
ainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include s
uch civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. And that the failure of the co
urt to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liabili
ty of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liabil
ity litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide tha
t if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enfor
ceable. Dispositive Decision of CA affirmed, petion denied.
JIMENEZ v AVERIA 22 SCRA 380 DIZON; March 29, 1968
FACTS - Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were charged with estafa
in the CFI of Cavite with the information alleging that they misappropriated P2
0,000 received from Manuel Jimenez for the purchase of a fishing boat named Basn
ig. They also have the obligation to return the money if they do not purchase th
e boat, which they did not do. - Before arraignment, the accused filed a civil s
uit against Jimenez in the Quezon CFI contesting the validity of a certain recei
pt signed by them on October 26, 1962 wherein they acknowledged having received
from him the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and
its accessories, and the further sum of P240.00 as agent s commission, with the
obligation, on their part, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30, 1963
in case they were unable to buy the fishing boat. They assert now that they neve
r received any amount from Jimenez and that they signatures were taken through t
he means of fraud and deceit by Jimenez - After a few days, they filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case pending the resolution of the pr
ejudicial question in the civil case whether or not their signatures were taken
through means of fraud and deceit by Jimenez. - Judge Averia granted the motion
and hence this certiorari petition
JARANTILLA v CA (SING) 171 SCRA 429 REGALADO; March 21, 1989
NATURE Appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of
the trial court awarding damages to the private respondent. FACTS - Private resp
ondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 19
71 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in t
he findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap
, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla
along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that priv
ate respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence. - Petitioner was ac
cordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical inju
ries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. Private respon
dent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute
a separate civil action and he intervened in
Criminal Procedure
- Pre-ratio: Jimenez erred in the filing of a certiorari petition, and should ha
ve filed a mandamus to the SC instead to compel the lower court to proceed with
the case. ISSUE WON the determination of the issue raised in the civil case ment
ioned heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must be first r
esolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed HELD

NO - The issue of fraud and deceit raised in the civil case does not constitute
a prejudicial question. The criminal court must now try the estafa case against
the two accused. Reasoning - A prejudicial question has been define to be one wh
ich arises in a case, the resolution of which, (question ) is a logical antecede
nt of the issued involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. Simply put, the questions must be determinative of the case be
fore the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be l
odged in another tribunal. - Applying these to the case, it will be readily seen
that the alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or inno
cence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption that th
e execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was vit
iated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established b
y other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they had actually
received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fi
shing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and re
fused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the
private respondents herein would be tenable had they been charged with falsific
ation of the same receipt involved in the civil action. - If the ruling were oth
erwise, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedil
y, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the si
mple expedient of filing an independent civil action against the complainant, ra
ising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alle
ged to have been misappropriated.
a2010 page 33
which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage when a prior ch
attel mortgage was still valid and subsisting, thus giving lie to his express ma
nifestation that the property was free from all liens and encumbrances. - Note:
the trigger for the filing of information re: art.319 violation was the filing o
f 5 estafa cases against Rojas. - CFI Judge Alikpala ordered the arraignment, th
en the trial for the criminal case. Rojas filed an action for certiorari against
the arraignment order, and prohibition against the order setting the trial, bas
ed on the civil action for the revocation of the management contract. He contend
ed that a prejudicial question was involved, thus he could no longer be tried pe
nding the termination of the civil suit. The respondents, in turn, contended tha
t the resolution of the civil case will not determine the liability of Rojas in
the criminal case (not a prejudicial question); and even granting that there was
a prejudicial question, the cases could proceed independently pursuant to Art.3
3 of CC, which provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal actio
n may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independe
ntly of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evid
ence. ISSUE WON the is a prejudicial question, thus requiring the resolution of
the civil action for the determination of the criminal case HELD NO Ratio: A pre
judicial question, which is must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court, is not present
in this case. Reasoning: - It is indispensable then for this petition to succee
d that the alleged prejudicial question must be determinative of the criminal ca
se before respondent Judge. It is not so in this case. - Pisalbor. v. Tesoro: CF
I erred in holding that the criminal case should be suspended. In the present pr
oceedings, the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial to the crimina
l case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the evidence has bee
n presented in the civil case, may not affect the alleged crime committed by the
notary public, which is the subject of the criminal case. But, even supposing t
hat both the civil and the criminal case involve the same question and one must
precede the other, it should be the civil case which should be suspended rather
than the criminal, to await the result of the latter. - Dela Cruz v City Fiscal:
Regardless of the outcome of the pending civil case for annulment of the affida
vit of adjudication, determination of the charge of falsification would be based
on the truth or falsity of the narration of facts in the affidavit of adjudicat

ion, * * *. Therefore, the civil case aforementioned does not involve a prejudic
ial question. - Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr (more analogous): the fact that the pr
incipal issues in both cases are the same and did arise from the same facts woul
d not show any necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking u
p the criminal case. - Isip v. Gonzales: there is a prejudicial question only wh
en the matter that has to be priorly decided by another authority is one the cog
nizance of
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
which pertains to that authority and should not, under the circumstances, be pas
sed upon by the court trying the criminal case. - Moreover, Art.33 explicitly pr
ovides that in cases of xxx fraud, xxx, a civil action for damages entirely sepa
rate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action SHALL proceed independently of the criminal prosecution xxx.
- in this case, fraud is the basis for both the civil and criminal actions, thus
they are to proceed independently. The invocation of the doctrine of prejudicia
l question is thus attended with futility. Personal note: ang pangit ng case. th
eres realy no discussion, puro citations, thats why this digest is also full of it
. Dispositive Petition DENIED.
RAS v RASUL 100 SCRA 125 TEEHANKEE; September 18, 1980
NATURE Petition to review and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated Dece
mber 12, 1978 of criminal case in CFI Basilan denying petitioner s motion as acc
used therein to suspend proceedings due to the existence of a prejudicial questi
on in Civil Case of the same court FACTS - April 27, 1978 - Luis Pichel filed a
COMPLAINT against Alejandro Ras and Bienvenido Martin before CFI Basilan praying
for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Ras in favor of Martin an
d for the declaration of the prior deed of sale allegedly executed in his favor
by the defendant Alejandro Ras as valid. - RAS ANSWER > they never sold the prop
erty to Pichel > the signatures appearing in the deed of sale in favor of plaint
iff Pichel were forgeries > therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel s favor
sought to be declared valid was fictitious and inexistent - September 5, 1978 while Civil Case was being TRIED before CFI Basilan, the Provincial Fiscal of B
asilan filed an INFORMATION for Estafa (criminal case) in the same court against
Ras arising from the same double sale subject matter of the civil complaint fil
ed by Luis Pichel. - November 6, 1978 - petitioner filed a MOTION FOR SUSPENSION
OF ACTION in said Criminal Case claiming that same facts and issues were involv
ed in both the civil and criminal case and that the resolution of the issues in
the civil case would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of t
he accused. - December 4, 1978 - Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his oppositi
on on - December 12, 1978 - respondent judge saw no prejudicial question and acc
ordingly denied the motion ISSUE WON civil case would be prejudicial to the crim
inal case given that they would discuss same facts and issues HELD YES
ROJAS v PEOPLE (ALIKPALA) 57 SCRA 243 FERNANDO; May 31, 1974
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Rojas was charged w/ viol
ation of Art.319 (Removal, sale, pledge of mortgaged property) of RPC for execut
ing a new chattel mortgage on personal property (Caterpillar Tractor) in favor o
f another party w/o the consent of the previous mortgagee. After the criminal ca
se was instituted, a civil case was filed against him by the offended party (CMS
Estate) for the termination of a management contract, one of the causes of acti
on of
Criminal Procedure
- there appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering tha
t Ras defense in Civil Case of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior dee
d of sale in favor of Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnes
s in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessari
ly determinative of Ras guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. Rat

io A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resoluti


on of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cogni
zance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be de
terminative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question base
d on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected wit
h it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Reasoning - For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the su
spension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the crimi
nal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in s
aid civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. - If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitio
us, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the o
ffense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed
ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were fin
ally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was
a forgery and spurious. Dispositive Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case d
ated December 12, 1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order issu
ed by this Court on May 16, 1979 is hereby made permanent and respondent judge i
s enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case u
nless the civil case shall have been finally decided and terminated adversely ag
ainst petitioner.
a2010 page 34
- In the meantime, according to the petitioner, private respondents, Guanteros,
harvested the sugar canes he planted on the land he leased from Rufino. On Augus
t 10, 1978, a Criminal Case (the Criminal Case) was filed against the respondent
s for theft demanding damages amounting to Pesos 15,120.00. During the pendency
of the Criminal Case, another case for damages (the Damages Case) against the pr
ivate respondents alleging damages to the petitioner caused by the private respo
ndents theft of the sugar canes and their occupation of the leased properties thu
s preventing him from cultivating or taking possession of the same. He alleged t
hat this resulted in his being deprived of income for two years amounting to Pes
os 78,280.00. - In their answer, respondents asserted that the lots are still un
der coownership among the heirs and that this is the subject of another special
proceeding (the Intestate Case). That said, Democrata contended that Rufino coul
d not execute the lease contracts without her conformity without her conformity
as co-owner. The Guanteros filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the Crim
inal Case on the ground of pendency of the Damages Case, the Intestate Case, and
the ejectment case (the Ejectment Case) which was filed by Rufino against Democ
rata on January 13, 1977. - The respondents took the position that the various c
ases focused on the issues of possession and ownership of the lots involved as w
ell as of the improvements thereon, hence, determinative of their guilt in the c
riminal action and hence constitutive of a prejudicial question. - Despite the o
bjections made by the petitioner, the lower court issued the order finding that
a prejudicial question existed and suspending the Criminal case proceeding. Henc
e this appeal. ISSUE WON the issues raised in the three cases mentioned involve
a prejudicial question that warrants a suspension of the Criminal Case HELD NO T
he issues raised in the three cases do not involve the pivotal question of who p
lanted the sugar can and, therefore, are not determinative juris et jure of guil
t or innocence in the Criminal Case. Reasoning - A prejudicial question is one b
ased on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused., and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves fa
cts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be bas
ed but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil ca
se, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. - In
the case at bar, the issues raised would not constitute a prejudicial question t
o the Criminal Case. The Intestate Case involves only the coheirs and the facts

involved are totally unrelated to the Criminal Case. Even if the Intestate Court
should annul the division and uphold the coownership, that would not be determi
native of the criminal responsibility of private respondents for theft of the su
gar cane, which petitioner claims he planted in good faith by virtue of the vali
d lease agreement. The Ejectment Case also does not constitute a prejudicial que
stion to the Criminal Case. It involves the issue of possession between co-owner
s. A decision therein
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
in favor of Democrata would not affect the rights of Librodo, which spring from
the lease contract. With regard the Damages case, it is actually the civil aspec
t of the Criminal Case as the two cases are of the same facts, and the entitleme
nt to damages being predicated on the unlawful taking treated of in the Criminal
Case, no necessity arises for that civil Case to be determined ahead of the Cri
minal Case. Dispositive In the absence of a prejudicial question, the order of t
he judge is set aside and he is instructed to proceed without delay with the tri
al of the criminal case.
BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN 176 SCRA 287 GANCAYCO; August 10, 1989
NATURE Petition to review the decision of Sandiganbayan FACTS - Balgos et al wer
e charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti
-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, as amended, in an information that was filed wi
th the Sandiganbayan by the Special Prosecutor which was approved by the Deputy
Tanodbayan, after a preliminary investigation. - Lim, the plaintiff and prevaili
ng party in Civil Case No. 4047 filed a complaint for rescission of the sale of
the car by Juanito Ang to private respondent Leticia Acosta-Ang for being allege
dly in fraud of creditors. The said complaint was filed with the RTC of Nueva Vi
zcaya. On the same day, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation in the Ta
nodbayan. The same was granted. - The Tanodbayan ordered to dismiss the case for
lack of merit and to withdraw the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 11414
as soon as possible in the interest of justice. - Tanodbayan filed with the Sand
iganbayan a motion to withdraw the information against petitioners. This was den
ied. - BAlgos et al filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the criminal case a
gainst them on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Ca
se No. 5307. This was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE WON the denial
by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to withdraw the information and of another m
otion to suspend proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in a pendin
g civil action constitute a grave abuse of discretion. HELD NO. - While the publ
ic prosecutor has the sole direction and control in the prosecution of offenses,
once the complaint or information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case and all subsequent actions that may be taken by the
public prosecutor in relation to the disposition of the case must be subject to
the approval of the said court. Before a re-investigation of the case may be con
ducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be
secured. And if after such reinvestigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis
to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such
LIBRODO v COSCOLLUELA, JR. (GUANTERO) 116 SCRA 303 MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30,
1982
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review Negros CFI order FACTS - Felipe Rivera
died leaving certain properties in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His estate was
settled in a special proceeding on November 24, 1976 and was terminated on the
basis of a Project of Partition among Rufino Rivera Damandaman, Democrata Guante
ro, and Zosimo Guantero. - Rufinos share of the estate comprise of lots designate
d as Lots 559-B, 1906-B, 1910-B, and a901-B which were all sugar lands. On Janua
ry 18, 1977, Rufino leased the properties to Dr. Librodo, the petitioner, for a
period of ten agricultural crop years. - On August 31, Democrata filed a petitio
n to re-open the intestate proceeding on the ground that she was not present whe
n the subdivision plan was submitted and that the judgment has not become final
as the boundaries on the partition have not been platted.

Criminal Procedure
proposed course of action must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court
. - The only instance when the appellate court should stay the hand of the trial
court in such cases is when it is shown that the trial court acted without juri
sdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise committed a grave abuse o
f discretion amounting to such lack or excess of jurisdiction. - Petitioners are
public officers charged with having violated Section 3(c) of RA 3019, for evide
nt bad faith and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 4047 against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-An
g (complainant) who is not the judgment debtor thereby causing undue injury to s
aid complainant and giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor in said
case. - Upon reinvestigation of the criminal case by the Tanodbayan, he found e
vidence tending to show that the sale of said car to the complainant by Juanito
Ang, the judgment debtor, was a sham intended to defraud his creditors; that the
deed of absolute sale which ostensibly was executed before a notary public appe
ared to be fictitious inasmuch as the entry of the document in the notarial regi
ster of said notary public on said date referred to a catering contract of other
parties; that the certificate of registration of the car was issued to complain
ant only on June 13, 1984 which showed that the document of sale was actually ex
ecuted only on or about the same date, that is, seven days after Juanito Ang rec
eived copy of the adverse decision in Civil Case No. 4047; and that upon the exe
cution of the judgment, the car was found in the possession of Alvin, the son of
Juanito Ang, who admitted that the car belonged to his father by showing the re
ceipt of its repair in the name of Juanito Ang. This is the basis of the motion
for withdrawal of the information of the Tanodbayan. - The respondents are aware
that the complainant is not a party to the civil case filed by the creditor aga
inst spouses Juanito and Lydia Ang and that a writ of execution cannot be implem
ented validly against one who is not a party to the action. All these, coupled w
ith the under haste in which the levy on the Mustang car was made without first
ascertaining the true owner thereof demonstrate quite convincingly the evident b
ad faith and manifest partiality of the respondents, thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to the judgment creditor to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
. - Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was persuaded that in fact t
he sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily clear
petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft charge against them. Still the burden i
s on the petitioners to establish that they acted in good faith in proceeding wi
th the execution on the car even they were presented evidence tending to show it
did not belong to Juanito Ang anymore. - The denial of the motion to suspend th
e criminal proceedings on the ground of the pendency of a prejudicial question i
n Civil Case No. 5307 is well taken. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes
into play usually in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because whatsoever the issue ra
ised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. - The pending civil cas
e for the annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang is not determinative o
f the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts allegedly committed by
them in seizing the car. Even if in the civil action it is ultimately resolved t
hat the sale was null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the seizure
of the car was rightfully undertaken.
a2010 page 35
The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang six months before the seizure.
Until the nullity of the sale is declared by the courts, the same is presumptiv
ely valid. Thus, petitioners must demonstrate that the seizure was not attended
by manifest bad faith in order to clear themselves of the charge in the criminal
action. Dispositive The petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the restrainin
g order dated June 6, 1989 is hereby lifted. No costs.

Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales


HELD NO. - CV No. 8769 seeks the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Orose
a on the gound that there was fraud in misrepresenting that the land is free fro
m all liens and encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted, when in truth and fac
t, the land is covered by the land reform program and that vast portions thereof
are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land. Therefore, accordin
g to petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will dete
rmine whether or not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They fu
rther argue that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 7869 annuls the subject d
eed of sale, then, their obligation to pay private respondents under the said de
ed would be extinguished, resulting in the dismissal of CR No. 1423-I. The contr
acts are thus voidable with the existence of fraud vitiating their consent. - Ho
wever, it cannot be denied that at the time the acts complained of in the estafa
case were committed, the deed of sale they seek to be annulled, was still bindi
ng to the parties. - The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question t
o exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately relate
d to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such iss
ue in the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed
. - Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raise
d in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent C
ourt of Appeals that the resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determin
ative of the guilt or innocence of the petitionersaccused in CR No. 1423-I, henc
e, no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases. Dispositi
ve WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated 23 September 1982 of th
e Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is hereby AFFIRMED.
UMALI v IAC (EDANO) 219 SCRA 339 PADILLA; June 21, 1990
NATURE Review on certiorari FACTS - Petitioners (Umali, Calleja, Ledesma) are of
ficers of the Orosea Devt Corporation. Sometime on Sept. 4, 1979, Umali purchased
from spoused Homorio and Solina Edano a lot in Mulanay, Province of Queazon for
P1, 036,500 payable on 4 installments (P225,000, P271,500, P270,000, P 270,000)
They issued for this purpose 4 checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila
Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment. By arr
angement the petitioners made with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale in
the name of Orosea Devt Corp. was executed even of the full purchase price has n
ot yet been fully paid. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from
the Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security. When the check for
the second installment fell due, petitioners twice asked for deferment. The che
cks they have issued were dishonored. As a consequence of the dishonor of these
checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. - Th
e information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21,
1981, and it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on Se
ptember 4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 198
1 but this was postponed upon motion of petitioners. - On October 14, 1981, OROS
EA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Edano
spouses for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale for which the petit
ioners issued the checks, subject of the criminal case. - The estafa case was ag
ain set for arraignment. This was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, pe
titioners filed a motion to quash the estafa case, on ground of improper venue,
but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. - The
arraignment was again postponed thrice. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Susp
end Arraignment and Further Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion To Suspend P
roceedings. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the m
otion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denyin
g the motion. CFI of Zambales also denied the same motion. A petition for certio
rari is filed with CA and CA affirmed. ISSUE WON proceedings should be suspended
until the civil case is disposed of, since CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial q
uestion.

VALDEPENAS V PEOPLE 16 SCRA 871 CONCEPTION; April 30, 1966


NATURE Appeal by Maximino Valdepenas from a decision of the CA, affirming that o
f the CFI of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent. FAC
TS - Jan 25, 56 Ester Ulsano filed with the justice of peace a criminal complain
t charging Valdepenas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After t
he preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by Valdepenas
, the justice of peace found that there was probable cause and forwarded the com
plaint to the CFI. - CFI found him guilty as charged and sentenced him according
ly. - On appeal, CA modified the decision, convicting him of abduction with cons
ent. - Valdepenas filed MFR and new trial contesting the findings of CA, to the
effect that complainant was below 18 y/o at the time of the occurrence. Motion w
as granted. The decision was set aside and the case was remanded to the CFI
Criminal Procedure
- CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA. Petitioner again appealed to
CA which affirmed the CFI decision. - MFR was filed on the ground that lower co
urt had no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the action wrt
the offense of abduction with consent. MFR was denied Petitioners claims there w
as no complaint for abduction with consent filed and that the lower court acquir
ed no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent.
ISSUE WON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC for lack of jurisdicti
on over the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense abducti
on with consent HELD NO. - Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquire
d upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to th
e jurisdiction of the court. It is not claimed that petitioner had not been appr
ehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His actio
ns show that he never questioned the judicial authority of the CFI, the justice
of peace and the CA. He is deemed to have waived whatever objection he might hav
e had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself
to the Court s jurisdiction. His behavior - particularly the motions therein fi
led by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but als
o, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person. On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of an action is and may be conferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a give
n crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto
by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for forc
ible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. Art 344
(3) RPC states that: ". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts o
f lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the o
ffended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the
offended has been expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the case m
ay be". - Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the
offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the
same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC, which deals primarily
with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of th
e culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition pre
cedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the g
uilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial." - The gist of petit
ioner s pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not inc
luded in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed
herein, namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over
12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said co
mplaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age . . ."
, and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.
a2010 page 36
- As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Ar

t 343 RPC, as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, sh


ould not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of ab
duction of a virtuous woman of good reputation because the essence of the offens
e "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the ala
rm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." - The complaint i
n the case at bar alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age,
but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her by fo
rce and violence . . . against her will and taking advantage of the absence of h
er mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carna
l intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidatio
n and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a mino
r living under patria protestas, thus leading to the presumption that she is a v
irgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation. The presumption of
innocence includes that of morality and decency, and of chastity. Dispositive W
herefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- The murder case was elevated to SC for review. Together with it, the Solicitor
General elevated the attempted murder case be he believed that the decision of
CA is void because Lahoys appeal ought to have been certified to the Supreme Cour
t by the CA because the attempted murder imputed to Lahoy was committed on the s
ame occasion and arose out of the same occurrence as the murder imputed to him a
nd Plateros in this case, as contemplated in section 17(1), formerly section 17(
4) of the Judiciary Law, which reads: "SEC. 17, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Cour
t. -x x x " x x xx x x x x x "The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdictio
n to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts herein provid
ed, in "(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, althoug
h not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been commi
tted by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rice to the more seriou
s offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accompli
ces or accessories, or whether have been tried jointly or separately; x x x." In other words, the attempted murder case like the instant murder case, comes wi
thin the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the SCt and should have been decide
d together with the instant murder case. ISSUES On Attempted Murder Case 1. WON
the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Lahoy of attempted murder should
be set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction or as a lawless thing On Murder c
ase 2. WON the guilt of Lahoy and Plateros was proven beyond reasonable doubt 3.
WON there was conspiracy between Lahoy and Plateros 4. WON the crime should be
categorized as simple homicide only and not murder HELD 1. NO. Ratio: The rule i
n section 17(1) is designed to avoid conflicts between the decisions of this Cou
rt and the Court of Appeals in cases involving offenses which arose from the sam
e occurrence or which were committed on the same occasion usually by the same ac
cused. However, that general rule has an exception. Where, by allowing the Court
of Appeals to decide a can involving an offense, which is not punishable by dea
th or reclusion perpetua but which arose out of the same occurrence or was commi
tted on the same occasion, as the case involving an offense punishable by death
or reclusion perpetua pending in this Court, there will be no conflict between t
he decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, the former case need not be
elevated to this Court (People vs. Cario, 101 Phil. 1206). The rationale of that
exception to the general rule is found in the maxim: Cessanie ratione legis, ce
ssat et ipsa lex. (The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.)
Reasoning: - The doctrine of the Cario case may be applied in this case because h
ere there can be no conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals
PEOPLE v PLATEROS 83 SCRA 401 AQUINO; May 30 1978
FACTS - One night, Pedro Candel together with other pedicab drivers and Tomas Me
tucua, a second year college student drank beer in the kitchenette. Seated at an

other table were Warlito Plateros and Murillo Lahoy who were also drinking beer.
- Metucua and Plateros were rivals for the affection of Estrella Silamro, the c
ashier in the kitchenette. When Metucua was talking with Estrella, his alleged s
weetheart, Plateros went near them and refused to leave them, thereby annoying M
etucua. - At about midnight. Piquero, Candel and Aora, accompanied by Metucua, le
ft the kitchenette and went to their pedicab. Candel was seated in the sidecar o
f the tricycle. Metucua sat on the driver s seat. Lahoy and Plateros came out of
the kitchenette. Lahoy appeared to be angry, hostile and menacing. Without any
warning, he stabbed Candel (maybe thinking that it was Metucua who was inside th
e pedicab because Candel is the driver abberatio personae) two times. Plateros a
lso stabbed Candel. Moved by the instinct of selfpreservation, Candel jumped out
of the sidecar. He fell on the ground face down. Lahoy allegedly stabbed Metucu
a. Then, Plateros and Lahoy fled from the scene of the assault, - Candel was bro
ught to the hospital but he died on that same morning. Procedure - Two informati
ons were filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol accusing Plateros and Lah
oy of (1) Murder of Candel and (2) Attempted Murder of Metucua. - The trial cour
t tried the two cases jointly and rendered only one decision. Plateros and Lahoy
were found guilty of murder, sentencing each of them of reclusion perpetua. In
that same decision, the trial court convicted Lahoy of attempted murder (Platero
s, his co-accused, was acquitted) of Metucua. - Lahoy appealed to the Court of A
ppeals and the CA acquitted him.
Criminal Procedure
and this Court s decision in the instant murder case inasmuch as the victims in
the two cases are different. The attempted murder case decided by the Court of A
ppeals involved the wounding of a certain Tomas Metucua whereas, in the instant
murder case the victim was Pedro Candel. The acquittal of Lahoy in connection wi
th the wounding of Metucua would not affect the determination of his guilt or in
nocence in connection with the death of Pedro Candel. - This holding does not in
anyway emasculate the rule in section 17(1) that criminal cases appealed to the
Court of Appeals, involving offenses which arose out of the same occurrence, or
which were committed on the same occasion as the offense punished by death or r
eclusion perpetua should be certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. It
is this Court that would determine whether or not the cases appealed to the Cour
t of Appeals should be decided together with the case appealed to this Court. 2.
YES The feeble denials of Plateros and Lahoy (who admittedly were near the owns
of the crime, when it was perpetrated) cannot prevail over the positive and une
quivocal declarations of the eyewitnesses, Aora and Piquero, that the appellants
were the authors of the stab wounds which caused Candal s death. Their guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. 3. YES. There was a conspiracy between Plateros
and Lahoy as shown in their concerted efforts to injure Candel. Plateros and La
hoy, as boon companions, had been together since four o clock in the afternoon.
They had gone to different places and repaired twice to the kitchenette. They we
re together when they left the scene of the stabbing. 4. NO Lahoy and Plateros,
who could have stabbed Candel or Metucua inside the kitchenette, did not do so.
They waited for Metucua and the pedicab drivers to leave the kitchenette. Their
intention was to make a surprise attack without any risk to themselves. The assa
ult was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. That is the characteristics manifesta
tion of treachery (alevosia). Hence, the killing was properly categorized as mur
der by the trial court (Art. 14(16), Revised Penal Code). Dispositive WHEREFORE,
the trial court s judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. They
are entitled to credit for their preventive imprisonment under the conditions la
id down in article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
a2010 page 37
NO - It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters
is determined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the crimi
nal action and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offens
e charged. -Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal judges in the ca

pitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged with an offense within their resp
ective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not exceed prision correcci
onal or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both. -At the time of the commission of the
crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC was arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period, falling well within
the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818
had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period. -The
real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the r
ule against retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in cri
minal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determined by what may be meted out to t
he offender in after trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law impose
s. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which the information is filed,
it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense which
carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an infer
ior court. -In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC,
the court may not impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC re
tains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 81
8, given the date of the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818),
the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the
City Court) should be imposed. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DEN
Y the petition
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; . - Petitioner also invokes Act N
o. 3326, "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized b
y Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall B
egin to Run," reading as follows: Section 1. Violations penalized by special act
s shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with th
e following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall pres
cribe after two months. Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at t
he time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run ag
ain if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. - Pe
titioner concludes that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month st
atutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charg
e against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription. Prosecutions
position The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended up
on the filing of the complaint against her with the OPP. The SolGen invokes Sect
ion 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (RCP), providing as foll
ows: Section 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary p
rocedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follow
s: b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC, by filing
the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal s of
fice. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution i
nterrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. - Respondent mainta
ins that the filing of the complaint with the OPP comes under the phrase "such i
nstitution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without dis
tinction, including those falling under the RSP. ISSUE WON the offense has presc
ribed HELD YES - The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it be merely fo
r purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interr
upt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed
to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of th
e proceedings against the offender. - It is important to note that this decision
was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the RSP

on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the RCP on January 1, 1985, except for
the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
ZALDIVIA V REYES, JR. 211 SCRA 277 CRUZ; July 3, 1992
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - The petitioner Lus Zaldivia is
charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor s permit in viola
tion of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in th
e Province of Rizal, allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint
of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of
Rizal on May 30, 1990 and the information was filed with the MTC of Rodriguez, p
resided by Judge Andres Reyes, Jr., on October 2, 1990. - The petitioner moved t
o quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the mot
ion was denied. On appeal, the RTC of Rizal affirmed the denial of the motion. P
etitioners claims In this petition, the petitioner argues that the charge against
her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure (R
SP): Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the MetTC, the MT
C, and the MCTC in the following cases: B. Criminal Cases:
PEOPLE v LAGON 185 SCRA 442 FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990
FACTS -On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with the City Court of Roxas c
harging Lagon with estafa for allegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment for go
ods knowing she had insufficient funds. However on Dec. 2, as the trial commence
d, the City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty presc
ribed by law for estafa was beyond the courts authority to impose. Hence this pet
ition for review. ISSUE WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case HELD
Criminal Procedure
- Sec. 1 of the RCP begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rul
e on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the secti
on does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase
"in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases co
vered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the RSP. - The cha
rge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of R
odriguez, is governed by the RSP and not the RCP. - Where paragraph (b) of the s
ection does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCT
C," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with im
prisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more tha
n four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other i
mposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising fro
m such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or a
mount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction wher
e the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. - These offenses are
not covered by the RSP. Under Section 9 of the RSP, "the complaint or informati
on shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examinat
ion or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does n
ot prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he want
s to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court
, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation.
This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the d
ate the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that. - This in
terpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that they inclu
de administrative proceedings. - At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a
conflict between the RSP and the RCP, the former should prevail as the special

law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and the RCP, the latter mus
t again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is n
ot allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VI
II, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substa
ntive right. The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner com
menced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereaf
ter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30, 1990, as this
was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrup
ted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but
this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. D
ispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.
a2010 page 38
NATURE Petition for review on Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS -Petitioners (Roy
Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor) and other heirs of s
pouses Manuel Meijia and Gloria Lazatin entered into a contract with respondent
Trinidad Lazatin for the development and subdivision of 3 parcels of land belong
ing to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferred his rights to Terra Devt Co (TDC
). -Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC for rescission of said co
ntract with Lazatin for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. -Respo
ndents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with Fiscals Office of City of Angeles a complaint
against petitioners for violation of A172 in relation to A171, par4, RPC. Preli
minary investigation conducted. Fiscal filed with Court in Angeles City informat
ion charging petitioners with crime of falsification of private document. Allege
dly, Aurora and Angelina made it appear that they were the guardians of minors G
eorge and Alexander Meijia (sons of the spouses?) when they werent the guardians
at the date of the execution of the document, a certain Carolina M. de Castro wa
s the judicial guardian of the said minors). -Petitioners asked for a reinvestig
ation. Angeles City Fiscal reinvestigated to give them opportunity to present ex
culpatory evidence. After reinvestigation, parties charged moved for the dismiss
al of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisd
iction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged
false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of sai
d city (One in Makati, the other one in QC). -However, the resolution of their m
otion to dismiss was delayed and the City Court already set their criminal case
for arraignment. Petitioners secured several postponements of the arraignment. B
ut since City Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion to dismiss, petit
ioners filed a motion to quash instead, on the ground that court had no jurisdic
tion. Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed an opposition to the mo
tion to quash. Respondent judge denied motion to quash, set arraignment. So peti
tioners filed present action. ISSUE 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisd
iction to try and decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of a privat
e document allegedly done by the parties named in the info even if the acts of f
alsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC, and thus outside the jurisdict
ion of said court Other procedural issues 2. WON the motion to quash was imprope
r, and should not be allowed since by filing the said motion, the petitioners ne
cessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect t
hat the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles Cit
y 3. WON the prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is proper HELD 1. NO
.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
Ratio. The place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines th
e venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction [US vs. Pagday
uman]. Reasoning. Petitioners are charged with having falsified a private docume
nt, not using a falsified document, so it is essential to determine when and whe
re the offense of falsification of a private document is deemed consummated or c
ommitted. The crime of falsification of a private document is consummated when s
uch document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a 3rd person, wh

ether such falsified document is or is not put to use illegally. The improper an
d illegal use of the document is not material or essential element of the crime
of falsification of a private document [US vs. Infante, US vs. Barreto] 2. NO Ra
tio. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is m
anifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects ap
parent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends to issues arisi
ng out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds
for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or a
cquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused et
c., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which a
preliminary trial is required. Reasoning. The argument of the respondents refer
to the now obsolete demurrer to an information. 3. YES Ratio. The general rule i
s that a court of equity will not issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order o
f a lower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to pr
event said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the r
ule that upon such denial the defendant should enter his plea of not guilty and
go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questions covered
by his motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions, however, this
is no longer the hard and fast rule. -The writs of certiorari and prohibition,
as extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to annu
l void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal aut
hority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. Reasonin
g. In several cases, the court already took cognizance of said writs, overlookin
g the flaw in the procedure followed in the interest of a more enlightened and s
ubstantial justice. The lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles is pat
ent and it would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners to undergo trial in
said court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense ch
arged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City Court of
Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, s
aid court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein.
Costs against the private respondents.
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE 18 SCRA 616 DIZON, October 29, 1966
PEOPLE v YABUT 76 SCRA 624 MARTIN; April 29, 1977
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of Orders of CFI Bulacan
Criminal Procedure
FACTS - Cecilia YABUT was accused of ESTAFA by means of false pretenses before t
he CFI Bulacan. She, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit Lines, made out 3 checks
in the total sum of P6, 568.94 drawn against the Merchants Banking Corp (located
in Caloocan City), payable to Freeway Tires Supply. The checks were dishonored
because of insufficient funds. Yabut failed to deposit the necessary funds to co
ver the checks. - Instead of entering a plea, YABUT filed a MOTION TO QUASH cont
ending that: (1) the acts charged do not constitute the offense as there is no a
llegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant
prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise; (2) estafa is
not indictable when checks are postdated or issued in payment of pre-existing ob
ligations; (3) venue was improperly laid because checks were issued and received
by complainant in Caloocan, Yabuts office. - The People opposed and maintained t
hat new law on checks, RA 4885, amending Art. 315 par.2(d) RPC, penalizes the po
stdating and that Malolos court can exercise jurisdiction since the last ingredi
ent of the case, damage, transpired in Bulacan (residence of the complainant) af
ter the dishonor of the checks for lack of funds. - The judge quashed the inform
ation for the reason of improper venue. The other issue was not resolved by the
judge. - Peoples MFR for this dismissal was denied. ** This is actually a decisio
n for two petitions: the other case involved Cecilias husband, GEMINIANO who was
also charged with estafa, in his capacity as the President of Yabut Transit Line

s. The exact same thing happened in his case (motion to quash -> improper venue
reason -> quashed -> MFR denied). ISSUE 1. WON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over
the case 2. WON new law punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment
of a pre-existing obligation 3. WON facts charged in the informations constitute
estafa HELD 1. YES Ratio Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art.
315 par 2(d) of the RPC may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic el
ements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the e
vent of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place
is legally allowed. - The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check
was executed and delivered to the payee. Reasoning Section 14(a), Rule 110 of t
he ROC: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or a
ny one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. - The estafa charged in t
he 2 informations involved here appear to be transitory or continuing in nature.
Deceit has taken place in Malolos (thru issuance and delivery of worthless chec
ks), while the damage in Caloocan, where the checks were dishonored by the drawe
e banks there. - The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does no
t necessarily fix the place where they were executed. What is decisive is
a2010 page 39
the delivery of the instrument which is the final act essential to its consummat
ion as an obligation. - The receipt of the bad checks by a certain Yambao in Cal
oocan cannot be taken as delivery of the checks to Freeway Tires because he did
not take delivery of the checks as holder. - Place of business of Freeway Tires
is at Malolos, Bulacan from where the tire and gas purchases were made by the pr
ivate respondents. Payment should then be considered effected there. 2. YES - Du
e to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific nature of the obligation a
ssumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks, resolution of
this controversial issue on the basis of the averments in the informations alon
e is not ripe. 3. YES Reasoning In considering a motion to quash based on the gr
ound that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the point of resolutio
n is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essen
tial elements of the offense as defined in the law. Facts alleged should be take
n as they are. Dispositive Appealed orders ordering the quashal of the estafa in
formations against the two private respondents are reversed and set aside. Arrai
gnment of the private respondents in the criminal cases should be set at the ear
liest date, and thereafter, the trial on the merits to proceed immediately.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya. -Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Ba
utista signed at Cauayan, Isabela, Bautista s undated letter asking for Mahinan
s dismissal, and Agbayani s "unusual incident report" subscribed and sworn to be
fore a Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges o
f malversation and falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter s se
paration from the service. -According to the information, all those documents al
legedly depicted Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of pub
lic office, spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier", a
nd an "unreformed ex-convict". -The four accused filed a motion to quash contend
ing that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over t
he offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauaya
n, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Re
vised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva V
izcaya had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the
information. -It was denied by the trial court in its order of April 25, 1977 o
n the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of article
203 of the Revised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not a
n inherently governmental function. -After petitioners motion for the reconside
ration of that order was denied, they filed in this Court the instant petition.

ISSUE WON the CFI of Nueva Ecija was the proper venue of the criminal action for
written defamation filed by Mahinan HELD NO -There is no issue as to whether Ma
hinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is unquestionably a public
officer. -Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written d
efamation and which specifies the officer or court that should conduct the preli
minary investigation, reads as follows: ART. 360.Persons responsible. . . . "The
criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provid
ed for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the cou
rt of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is print
ed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense: "Provided, however, That where one of
the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila
at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the C
ourt of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where th
e libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public offic
er does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and f
irst published
SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE [concurring]
- The motion to quash on the ground of improper venue must yield to the express
allegations of the informations, bearing in mind that what determines jurisdicti
on are the allegations in the information and that venue is sufficiently conferr
ed wherein any one of the essential ingredients of the offense charged took plac
e. It also imports on the part of the accused a hypothetical admission of the fa
cts alleged in the information.
AGBAYANI v SAYO 89 SCRA 699 AQUINO; April 30, 1979
NATURE Instant petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS -Conrado B. Mahinan
, a lawyer, was the manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the Government Servi
ce Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. Among his subordinates
were Wilson Agbayani, Carmelo N. Bautista, Pablo R. Pascual, and Renato Romeo P
. Dugay. -On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal s office at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pa
scual and Dugay. -On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed
in the Court of First Instance of that province an information for libel chargi
ng Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay with having maliciously made
Criminal Procedure
"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provid
ed for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the
province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the provi
nce where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of th
is article. ". . . ." (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363) - Before a
rticle 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be ins
tituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulat
ed, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the crimin
al action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. -Experience
had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distan
t place. -Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted so as to prevent the offended party
in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-oftown libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts -The rules
on venue in article 360 may be restated thus: 1. Whether the offended party is
a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the C
ourt of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is pri
nted and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the
criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province

where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If t


he offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of t
he commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Inst
ance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outs
ide of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the pro
vince or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
-As a corollary, the preliminary investigation of the criminal action for writt
en defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the provinc
e or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province wher
e such action may be instituted. -Applying the foregoing rules, the proper venue
of Mahinan s criminal action for written defamation against the petitioners is
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a
public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committ
ed when he was (as he still) in the public service. The preliminary investigatio
n of the complaint should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabel
a, or by the municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the Court
of First Instance of the same province. -The criminal action could have been fil
ed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of t
he city where the libel was printed and first published. -The information in thi
s case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the Court of Firs
t Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain t
he criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against the petit
ioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to cond
uct the preliminary investigation. -Venue in criminal cases is an essential elem
ent of jurisdiction
a2010 page 40
Dispositive Petition granted. The trial court s order denying petitioners motio
n to quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the li
bel case against the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another cri
minal action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
from the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro branch. The essential ingredient of receiving the
sweepstakes tickets took place in Cagayan de Oro City. He could also be charged
in the City of Manila since the final accounting must be rendered in the Central
Office, Manila. This is therefore, a case of concurrent jurisdiction by the pro
per court of the place wherein "anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took
place." But the choice of venue lies with the prosecuting officer and not with
the accused. Dispositive Decision of CA Affirmed. Remand to the trial court for
further proceedings in the ordinary course of law
CATINGUB v CA (PCSO) 121 SCRA 106. GUERRERO; March 25, 1983.
NATURE This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 38698-R entitled "PEDRITO L. CATINGUB, Petitioner, versus HON. R
ICARDO C. PUNO, Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch 24, and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY S
WEEPSTAKES OFFICE, Respondents." FACTS - Catingub was designated Temporary Sales
Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) assigned at the
Cagayan de Oro Branch. As such, he received sweepstakes tickets on consignment,
with the express obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sales of these tick
ets to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. Later, he was informed by the
Auditing Examiner of the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro Branch that he has been found shor
t of P12,307.45. Petitioner was ordered to explain the shortage in writing and t
o produce the missing amount. He failed to do so. His services were terminated w
ithout prejudice to whatever court action the PCSO will take for the recovery of
the amount involved. In a letter, petitioner proposed to the General Manager of
the PCSO, Manila, to settle his shortages by making monthly payments in the amo
unt of at least P200.00, which proposal was, however, denied by the General Mana
ger (there was already an admission in this letter). -Catingub, was charged with
the crime of malversation (take note: crimes of estafa and malversation are sim

ilar in nature: difference is that the funds in malversation are public in chara
cter) in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He filed motion to dismiss after
arraignment on the sole ground that "the prosecution made a wrong choice of jur
isdiction." He contended that "on the basis of the prosecution s evidence, the o
ffense charged, together with all its essential ingredients occurred and the con
summation thereof (was) completed, in Cagayan de Oro. -TC and CA dismissed motio
n hence this petition before the SC ISSUE WON CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to
continue with the trial of the offense as charged in view of the evidence presen
ted by the prodecution HELD YES. - Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec.
14(a) provides: "Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all cri
minal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the es
sential ingredients thereof took place. -Petitioner could have been charged and t
ried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is not disputed that he received the sweepsta
kes tickets
PEOPLE v GROSPE 157 SCRA 154. MELENCIO-HERRERA ; January 20, 1988
FACTS - Manuel Parulan is a wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp (SMC). He issued
two checks in favor of SMC (P86,071.20 and P11,918.80) that were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. - The checks were received at the SMC Bulacan branch, t
hen forwarded to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga. - SMC Financ
e Officer deposited the check in BPI San Fernando, Pampanga branch. - (Parulans b
ank is Planters Development Bank in Bulacan) - SMC filed for violation of BP22 (
1st check) and for estafa under par. 2d 2 (2nd check) with the RTC in Pampanga.
- After hearing the facts and evidence, Judge Grospe of the Pampanga RTC dismiss
ed the case because he said that the two essential elements, deceit and damage,
of the offenses charged occurred and took place in Bulacan. DECEIT took place wh
en Parulan gave the checks to SMC in Bulacan, with the false assurance that it h
ad sufficient funds. DAMAGE occurred at the moment the checks issued by the accu
sed were dishonored by the Planters Development Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa
Maria, Bulacan which received them from the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch f
or clearing purpose. ISSUES 1. WON any of the essential elements of the offenses
charged occurred or took place within the jurisdiction of RTC Pampanga. 2. WON
this petition for Certiorari places accused in double jeopardy. HELD 1. YES - A
person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing
offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite t
o its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of eithe
r province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first
Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others. ESTAFA under par 2d
Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: By postdating a check, or issuing a check in paymen
t of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds depo
sited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check
2
Criminal Procedure
- Elements: (1) Deceit took place in Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivere
d. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to
a person who takes it as a holder, which means the payee or indorsee of a bill
or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof, who in this case is
the Financial Officer of SMC (2) Damage took place in Bulacan, where the check
was dishonored by the drawee bank. - Therefore, jurisdiction may be entertained
by either the Bulacan or the Pampanga court. BP 22 violation - In respect of the
Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It i
s true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and th
at the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check bu
t also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case,
therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. The determinative factor (in d
etermining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. However, it is like

wise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is b
y itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory o
r another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies
in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. - Jurisdiction or venue is determined
by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Information fi
led herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pa
mpanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below. 2. NO The ca
se was dismissed not on merits but on the erroneous conclusion of the judge that
his court had no jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal being null and void,
the proceedings before the RTC cant be said to have been lawfully terminated. Th
erefore, there is no second proceeding to place the accused in double jeopardy.
Dispositive Petition granted. Judge is ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Cri
minal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either con
viction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the
joint trial of said two cases.
a2010 page 41
applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated
August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of
one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. - The pro
bationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for permission to
transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Pias spec
ifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probatione
r s request as he found nothing objectionable to it. - By the terms of the petit
ioner s probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the
order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not
be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his fi
nal report on the conduct of his charge. Subsequently, the respondent People of
the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed
a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the Regio
nal Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge. The moti
on alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his prob
ation. - On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion o
n the ground that he was no longer under probation, his probation period having
terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reas
on existed to revoke the same, he contended. As if to confirm the Manila Assista
nt City Fiscal s motion to revoke the petitioner s probation, the respondent pro
bation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala s pro
bation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated Janu
ary 5, 1984. The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation,"
dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing
the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a sup
plemental report which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of
new facts, information, and evidences." - Thereafter, the petitioner filed a mot
ion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation, questioning the
jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had al
ready expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the v
enue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC of M
akati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las
Pias the probationer s place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, whi
ch provides Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ... Whenever a prob
ationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another cour
t, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of
First Instance of that place, and in such a case a copy of the probation order
the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said
Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the p
robationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was prev
iously possessed by the court which granted the probation. - The respondent judg
e denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE

Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales


WON his transfer of residence automatically transferred jurisdiction over his pr
obation from the Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in his new addres
s. HELD NO - In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. Such being
the case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived of its jurisdiction over the prob
ation case. To uphold the petitioner s contention would mean a depreciation of t
he Manila court s power to grant probation in the first place. It is to be remem
bered that when the petitioner-accused applied for probation in the then CFI of
Manila, he was a resident of Las Pias as he is up to now, although in a different
subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Li
fe Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Pias. On the other hand, pursuing th
e petitioner s argument on this score to the limits of it logic would mean that
his probation was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI was wi
thout jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Pias. It is
therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner s change of abode compels cha
nge of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Jud
ge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional t
rial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reor
ganization Act of 1980, Las Pias is one among the municipalities included in the
National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needle
ss to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Co
urt, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. 19 A
ccordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manil
a under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal courts, the tot
ality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the c
ourt, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch
or judge. Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the pr
obation, has not lost control and supervision over the probation of the petition
er. Dispositive Petition dismissed
BALA v MARTINEZ 181 SCRA 459 MARTINEZ; January 20, 1999
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to re
view the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS - The petitioner h
ad been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Diazen which had b
een attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Notarte, in
effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. The trial court adjudge
d petitioner Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsificati
on of a public document. The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Ap
peals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court s decision. After the
case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, the pet
itioner
PEOPLE v SOLA 103 SCRA 393 FERNANDO; March 17, 1981
FACTS - September 15, 1980: acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine C
onstabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the CFI issued a search w
arrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed i
n the hacienda of Pablo Sola at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. - Se
ptember 16, 1980: elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of
Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 b
odies. - September 23 and October 1, 1980: the PC provincial commander filed 7 s
eparate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and 14 other persons of
unknown names.
Criminal Procedure
- After due preliminary examination of the complainant s witnesses and his other
evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus
issued an order for their arrest. - Without giving the prosecution the opportun

ity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong, the court granted them the ri
ght to post bail for their temporary release. Sola, Garcia and Cabral posted bai
l and have since been released. -The witnesses informed the prosecution of their
fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometer
s from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accuse
d are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been releas
ed on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there ha
ve been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of th
e witnesses. - February 11, 1981: petition for cancellation of bail bonds and ch
ange of venue was filed. - February 12, 1981: the Court required the comment of
the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents. - March 4, 1981, th
e Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Mendoza. It opened with this prelim
inary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in C
riminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before
the CFI of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court
on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted on
ly by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors
that they are instituting the action subject to the control and supervision of
the Fiscal will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." Nonetheless, it
adopted the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certio
rari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge
Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, an
d 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal c
ases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. - March 15, 1981: The Court Resolved to:
(a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for chan
ge of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, n
amely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court
of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the acc
used in the 7 Criminal Cases, and (2) the petition for a change of venue or plac
e of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Tr
ansfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of Fi
rst Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge A
lfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of
First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leav
e of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild
attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court s
tation to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition
to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the
necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." Th
us, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. ISSUE WON the b
ail bonds should be cancelled
a2010 page 42
HELD YES Ratio Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for
a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regu
lar trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a rea
sonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the
instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportuni
ty, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the c
ourt granting bail should be considered void on that ground. (People v San Diego
) Reasoning - Bail was granted to the accused without hearing the prosecution -J
ustice Cardozo: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defe
ndant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an op
portunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concep
t of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will
be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incri
minating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser al
so. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filame
nt. We are to keep the balance true." - It does not suffice that the questions a

sked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as se
arching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. On c
hange of venue - 1973 Constitution: The Supreme Court could order "a change of v
enue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." - People v. Gutierrez
: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesse
s will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the ju
dicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been establ
ished." - It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively vi
ewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must a
lways be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim
and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it
should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there nee
d not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could
have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is jus
tification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the ch
ange of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. Dispositive T
he assailed order of Judge Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is null
ified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Exec. Judge Alfon
so Baguio of the CFI of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been tran
sferred is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private responde
nts, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediate
ly executory. No costs.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
ABAD SANTOS; May 15, 1984
FACTS - In a verified Complaint filed on October 8, 1974 with the Municipal Cour
t of Pulilan, Bulacan, Anastacia de Jesus (14 yrs old) accused Gerardo Fajardo,
Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Ra
pe. - The crime was said to have been committed on September 30, 1974, starting
in Plaridel, Bulacan, thru Pulilan, and thence to Talavera, Nueva Ecija (in a hu
t where she was detained for 9 days and sexually abused during the night. She wa
s made to lose her consciousness first by waiving a hankerchief on her face befo
re they abducted her and eventually taking her to said place.) - Municipal Judge
Alfredo V. Granados of the Municipal Court of Pulilan received the complaint an
d conducted a preliminary investigation, first stage. - October 25, 1974: the Co
mplaint was amended. - Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe were again named bu
t Gerardo Fajardo was dropped and Oscar Alvaran was named instead. -The date whe
n the crime was said to have been committed was changed from September 30, 1974
to September 25, 1974. - Again Judge Granados conducted a preliminary investigat
ion and on November 18, 1974, he issued an order for the arrest of Bulanadi, Gor
ospe and Alvaran and fixed their bail at P15,000.00 each. -Bulanadi and Gorospe
posted the requisite bail. Alvaran remained at large. -The second stage of the p
reliminary investigation was set on February 5, 1975, but on that day, neither B
ulanadi or Gorospe appeared for which reason, Judge Granados declared that they
had waived their right thereto and elevated the case to the CFI of Bulacan. - Ma
rch 19, 1975: Provincial Fiscal Pascual C. Kliatchko filed with the CFI of Bulac
an an Information for forcible Abduction with Rape against Gorospe and Bulanadi.
But said information was later on amended. -Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon sta
rted the trial of the case on October 15, 1975. -The accused and their counsel d
e parte had long been notified that the case was to be tried on that day but the
y did not appear so the former were tried in absentia. -After hearing part of th
e testimony of Anastacia de Jesus, the complainant, Judge Valdellon was transfer
red to Metro Manila and she was replaced by Judge Fidel P. Purisima who finished
the trial. -But Judge Purisima inhibited himself from deciding the case because
J. Granados is his first cousin by affinity (to make sure that the decision to
be rendered in this case shall be above suspicion) -So it was Judge Jesus R. de
Vega who decided the case CFI: found Gorospe and Bulanadi guilty beyond reasonabl
e doubt of Rape committed against Anastacia de Jesus as charged in the informati
on; sentenced each of the accused to suffer 2 perpetual penalties of reclusion p

erpetua to be served in accordance with Art. 70 of the RPC, with all the accesso
ry penalty of the law; to indemnify de Jesus in the amount of P40,000.00 for act
ual exemplary and moral damages, and to pay the costs. ISSUES
PEOPLE v FELICIANO GOROSPE and RUFINO BULANADI 129 SCRA 233
Criminal Procedure
1. WON there was error in filing the complaint since it was not filed in Plaride
l, Bulacan or Talavera, Nueva Ecija but in Pulilan, Bulacan (and if yes, then WO
N an error was by the CFI of Bulacan in hearing the said case and not by the CFI
of Nueva Ecija) 2. WON Judge Vega had authority to hear the case (***there are
other issues but no longer related to the topic venue so I didnt include them anymo
re ~ eoc) HELD 1. NO - The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because t
he abductors and their captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Tala
vera. And the CFI of Bulacan [as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija] had jurisdictio
n because essential elements of the offense took place in Bulacan [and also in N
ueva Ecija]. Reasoning Abduction is a persistent and continuing offense. (U.S. v
s. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912]). - Hence it may be "tried in the court of the m
unicipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the esse
ntial ingredients thereof took place." (Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14[a]). 2
. YES. - Judge de Vega had the power to decide the case. Reasoning "Where a cour
t of first instance is divided into several branches, each of the branches is no
t a court distinct and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the c
ourt, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before
one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone
, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or proceedings may continue b
y and before another branch or judge." [Lumpay, et al. vs. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 96
8 (1959)]. Dispositive The judgment of the Court a quo is hereby affirmed in all
respects.
a2010 page 43
ISSUE WON in prelim investigation by fiscal, accused is entitled to be informed
of substance of testimony and evidence against him HELD NO - Prelim investigatio
n by fiscal is not within purview of Sections 13 and 11 of Rule 108. Sec 13 deal
s with transmission of records requirements and Sec 11 deals with prelim investi
gation by justices of peace and judges for purpose of issuance of warrant. - Sec
2, Act No 612: In cases triable only in CFI, defendant shall have speedy trial,
but shall not be entitled as of right to a prelim investigation where prosecuti
ng attorney, after investigation, shall have presented an information against hi
m. - THE RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS STATUTORY, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL.
Its purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty prosecutions and protect him
from public accusation, and also to protect the State from useless prosecutions
. - This investigation is called preliminary, to be followed by trial proper. In
vestigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable
belief, not upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In this case, to ask for abst
ract of testimony at that stage for no other purpose than to scrutinize the same
is, in effect, to ask for another prelim investigation.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- 10 December 1980: the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe
that respondents Arnulfo Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez
and Arturo Syloria committed the crimes charged. Informations were filed with th
e City Court. - With respect to the criminal complaint filed by Arnulfo Payopay
and Manuel Cancino against petitioners for Serious Oral Defamation, Grave Threat
s and Physical Injuries, the Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping
of said charges because they "were found to be in the nature of a counter charge
, the same having been filed after more than 1 month from the date of the allege
d incident." However, as to the charge of Trespass to Dwelling filed by Conrado
Payopay, Sr. against Pedro Tandoc, a prima facie case was found by the investiga

ting fiscal. Thus, an information was filed with the City Court. - 28 July 1981:
Arnulfo Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr. and Manuel Cancino, directly lodged with
the City Court of San Carlos City the following criminal complaints: (1) against
Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor for Serio
us Physical Injuries, filed by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; (2) against Rudy Diaz,
Juan Rosario and Fred Menor for Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Conrado Payopay,
Sr.; (3) against Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred dela Vega for Le
ss Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Manuel Cancino; (4) against Pedro Tandoc,
Rudy Diaz, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario & Fred Menor for Grave Threats to Kill
, with Arnulfo Payopay as private complainant. - 13 August 1981: City Court, aft
er conducting a preliminary examination of the 4 aforementioned cases, found rea
sonable ground to believe that the offenses charged may have been committed by t
he herein petitioners and that the latter were probably guilty thereof. - The is
suance of warrants of arrest was ordered against them, although said warrants we
re later suspended upon motion of the petitioners. - A motion for reconsideratio
n was denied. - Petitioners moved for a re-investigation of the cases by the Off
ice of the City Fiscal. The court a quo denied said motion. Petitioners sought a
reconsideration of said order, but it was likewise denied. ISSUE WON the city c
ourt has the power and authority to conduct a new a preliminary examination of c
harges, which were previously the subject of a preliminary investigation conduct
ed by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter dismissed by the latter. HELD
YES Ratio As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has
the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed with t
he trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. Reasoning - The offenses
charged against petitioners for Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats and Physical
Injuries were all within the jurisdiction of the City Court. The complaints cou
ld be filed directly with the City Court which is empowered to conduct a prelimi
nary examination for purposes of issuance of warrants of arrest, and thereafter
to proceed with the trial of the cases on the merits. The preliminary investigat
ion proper conducted by the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither
did the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal
bar the filing of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double j
eopardy.
TANDOC v RESULTAN 175 SCRA 37 PADILLA; July 5, 1989
NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul orders of the City Court of San Carlos F
ACTS - October 19, 1980: Respondents entered the store and dining room of the Pa
cita Tandoc without her permission. There was an altercation between Tandoc and
respondent, Arnold Payopay, regarding the stoning of the store and house. Payopa
y picked up stones and struck Tandoc but instead her helper, Bonifacio Menor, wa
s hit and suffered physical injuries which according to the medico-legal certifi
cate will heal in more than 30 days. Beda Acosta, who was behind Arnold Payopay,
picked up the stone and struck Tandoc but her helper, Fred de la Vega, was hit
instead and suffered injuries which injury will heal in less than 9 days. - 19 O
ctober 1980: a criminal complaint was lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal
with the charges of Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Bonifacio Menor against
Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; Slight Physical Injuries, filed by Fred de la Vega aga
inst Beda Acosta, and Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Pacita Tandoc against Arnul
fo Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria. 2 December 1980: Arnulfo Payopay and his father Conrado Payopay, Sr., together w
ith Manuel Cancino, also filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal, a
gainst Pedro Tandoc, Pacita Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan
Rosario and Fred de la Vega, with the charges of Trespass to Dwelling, Serious
Oral Defamation, Grave Threats and Physical Injuries
HASHIM v CITY FISCAL OF MANILA 71 Phil 216 LAUREL; January 13, 1941
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Hashim was caught in possession of counte
rfeit treasury certificates, but was released upon filing of bond. Complaint was
filed with Office of City Fiscal and after investigation of fiscal, information
was lodged. Case was docketed and Judge issued arrest warrant. Petitioners couns

el filed motion asking fiscal to furnish clerk of court w/ testimony of witnesse


s who testified at preliminary investigation. Fiscal opposed. - Counsel for peti
tioner put in motion that should his first motion be acted upon adversely, that
Court itself conduct the investigation under Sec 4 of Rule 108. Fiscal opposed.
- Petitioners counsel asked that warrant of arrest be cancelled and the court con
duct preliminary investigation. Judge denied motions and the MFRs. Hence the ins
tant certiorari and mandamus petition.
Criminal Procedure
- The prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. Th
e penalties for the crimes charged are: arresto mayor for Trespass to Dwelling,
Grave Threats and Less Serious Physical Injuries; and arresto mayor in its maxim
um period to prision correccional in its minimum period for Serious Physical Inj
uries. The prescriptive period of offenses punishable by arresto mayor is 5 year
s, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in 10 years. The
complaints were filed with the City Court only 9 months from said occurrence. The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a cas
e is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for
purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latt
er on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable
by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary
investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no
authority to re-investigate. On Preliminary Investigation: - Purpose: to protect
the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in
a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been fi
rst ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer; and to pr
otect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. - Stages: (
1) the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the
arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a wa
rrant of arrest; (2) preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, afte
r his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed against him and is given access
to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also permitted to introduc
e evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to determ
ine whether or not the accused should be released or held before trial. - Nature
: merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons w
ho may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his c
omplaint or information; not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpos
e except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether ther
e is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does n
ot place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. - Under Section 10, Ru
le 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts with Courts of Fi
rst Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investig
ation proper. The reason behind this rule is as follows: " The loss of time enta
iled in the conduct of preliminary investigations, with the consequent extension
of deprivation of the accused s liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which a
t times outlasts the period of the penalty provided by law for the offense, besi
des the mental anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with t
he assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraign
ment (without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary investigatio
n), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the so
-called first stage of preliminary investigation or the preliminary examination,
conducted by the duly authorized officer, as borne out by the examination and s
worn written statement of the complainants and their witnesses, generally suffic
es to establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused with ha
ving committed the offense complained of."
a2010 page 44

- The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise
to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investi
gation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof
. In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a former judgment
, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render
the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or
at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was comm
itted. Dispositive Petition dismissed.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
magistrate or, within the city of Manila, not to be brought to trial except in p
ursuance of like proceeding or the proceeding substituted by law, is a substanti
al one. Its denial, over the objection of the accused is prejudicial error, in t
hat it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Reasoning The accused was brought to trial, over his objection
without having been committed or remanded for trial by an investigating magistra
te. The justice of the peace who held the preliminary investigation dismissed th
e original complaint against the accused, being of opinion that there was no pro
bable cause to believe him guilty of the offense; and although a so-called report
of the proceedings was forwarded to the fiscal and doubtless submitted to the tr
ial judge, original jurisdiction to commit the accused for trial as result of th
ose proceedings was vested exclusively in the justice of the peace before whom t
hey were had. - The order of the justice of the peace discharging the accused di
d not operate as a final acquittal, and was not a bar to re-arrest and prosecuti
on for the offense originally charged. If the fiscal was not satisfied with the
action of the justice of the peace, he could have secured the arrest of the accu
sed upon a new complaint, and sought an order remanding the accused for trial in
a second preliminary investigation had before either the justice of the peace w
ho held the first investigation or before the judge of the CFI in the exercise o
f his functions as a committing magistrate. (Act 1627, Sec. 37) - But it would m
anifestly defeat the end sought to be attained by the provisions of law for the
holding of preliminary investigations if either the fiscal, or the trial judge,
or both acting together were permitted to make use of the record of the proceedi
ngs had before a justice of the peace at a preliminary trial, as a result of whi
ch the accused was discharged, for the purpose of bringing the accused to trial
despite the order of discharge and over his objection based on the ground that h
e has not been remanded for trial as a result of a preliminary trial. Dispositiv
e Judgment convicting and sentencing the accused REVERSED with the costs of both
instances de officio and the record REMANDED to the court below for further pro
ceedings.
UNITED STATES v MARFORI 35 Phil 666 CARSON; December 9, 1916
FACTS - CASIANO MARFORI was convicted of the crime of injurias graves (aggravate
d slander), and sentenced to six months and one day of destierro (banishment) fo
r a distance of 25 kilometers from the municipality where the crime was committe
d, to pay a fine of P65, together with subsidiary destierro as prescribed by law
on failure to pay this fine and to pay the costs. The complaint charges him of
having spoken of the complainant in a manner which reflected adversely upon her
virtue and good name in the presence of several witnesses. - The complaint was o
riginally filed in the court of a justice of the peace who held a preliminary in
vestigation and discharged the accused on the ground that he was not guilty of t
he crime with which he was charged. - A report of the proceedings was forwarded
to the provincial fiscal by the justice of the peace. The complaining witness re
newed the complaint in the CFI. An information was filed in that court and Marfo
ri was brought to trial without further proceedings. - Upon arraignment, when Ma
rfori was called upon to plead, his counsel declined to proceed on the ground th
at the court was without jurisdiction to bring Marfori to trial, no order remand
ing him for trial having been issued by a competent magistrate as a result of a
preliminary trial (old term for PI, I think) held in accordance with law. - The
trial judge overruled the objections of counsel, and ordered the parties to proc

eed with the trial on the ground that the report of the proceedings had at the p
reliminary trial held by the justice of the peace disclosed a reasonable probabi
lity that the crime charged had been committed and that the accused had committe
d it; that the justice of the peace had erred in discharging the accused; and th
at he should have remanded the accused for trial. - Marforis counsel then exempte
d to the ruling and insisted on the right to a preliminary trial. Marfori refuse
d to enter a plea so that the court was compelled to direct the entry of a plea
of not guilty in his behalf. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in bringing the acc
used to trial, over his objection, in the absence of an order remanding him for
trial based upon a preliminary trial held in accordance with the provisions of l
aw HELD YES. Ratio The right of an accused not to be brought to trial except whe
n remanded as the result of a preliminary examination before a committing
PEOPLE v OVILLA 65 Phil 722 VILLA-REAL; June 27, 1938
NATURE This is an appeal by the offended party, Petra Flores, from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna. FACTS - ORDER OF CFI:"The provincial fisc
al having filed a motion in the above entitled case praying for the dismissal of
the case, and the court having found meritorious the reasons alleged therein, a
dd case is hereby dismissed, as prayed, with costs de oficio, and the bond filed
for the temporary release of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. It is so
ordered." ISSUE WON the provincial fiscal has authority to conduct another preli
minary investigation and thereafter ask the Court of First Instance to dismiss t
he criminal case remanded by the justice of the peace, after the latter had
Criminal Procedure
conducted the preliminary investigation and issued an order to the effect that t
here was probable cause to prosecute the offense charged which falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance." HELD After a criminal case has bee
n remanded by the justice of the peace to the Court of First Instance which has
jurisdiction to try it on the merits, and before the provincial fiscal has filed
the necessary information, the latter not only has the power but also the duty
to investigate the facts upon which the complaint filed in the justice of the pe
ace court was based, to examine the evidence submitted to the justice of the pea
ce and such other evidence as the parties may deem proper to submit on their own
free will or on demand of the fiscal, for the purpose of determining whether th
ere is at least prima facie evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and o
vercoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. If after he has done all th
is and considering all the circumstances of the case, the fiscal believes that t
he evidence is not sufficient to establish prima facie the guilt of the accused,
he should submit to the court before which the case is pending the correspondin
g motion for dismissal. The provincial fiscal of Laguna complied with all these
requirements before asking for the dismissal of the present case, thereby keepin
g within the powers conferred upon him by section 1687 of the Revised Administra
tive Code. Dispositive Finding no merit in the sole error assigned by the appell
ant, the offended party in this case, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed
, with costs against the appellant.
a2010 page 45
Petitioners Claim (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for w
ant of preliminary investigation (2) the extrajudicial confession he executed wa
s obtained through force and intimidation and, therefore, inadmissible in eviden
ce, and (3) in the absence of adequate proof that it was he who killed the decea
sed Hermenegildo Odiamar, he should be held guilty of the offense of robbery onl
y, and not of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and double serious phys
ical injuries.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
3. Criminal Case No. 3088.-- Estafa thru falsification of public/official docume
nts was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City against Prudencio

Cichon and Paulino Duma, Also has certification of the State Prosecutors that t
hey had conducted a preliminary investigation in the case The two accused pleaded
not guilty. 4. Criminal Case No. 3128.-- Prudencio Cichon, Jesus F Atilano and
Pedro Cuento were charged with Estafa thru falsification of public/official docu
ments. No certification that a preliminary investigation of the case had been ma
de by the prosecutors. So District Judge himself made the preliminary investigat
ion and once satisfied that a prima facie case against the three accused existed
, issued warrants for their arrest on the same day. At the arraignment, all the
accused pleaded not guilty. - On June 22, 1966, the accused in the four (4) case
s, thru their counsel, filed a MOTION TO DECLARE INFORMATIONS AND WARRANTS OF AR
REST null and void on the ground that the prosecution failed to observe the prov
isions of Section 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court regarding prel
iminary investigation and prayed the court to cancel the warrants of arrest issu
ed. - On September 27, 1966, the lower court, for lack of merit, denied the afor
esaid motion. - Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, thru cou
nsel, the lower court, on November 2, 1966, reversed its former ruling and order
ed the dismissal of all the four (4) cases against them, without prejudice to th
e refiling of the same. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in dismissing these case
s on the ground that the preliminary investigations conducted therein were not i
n accordance with Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112, in relation to Rule 144 of the
Revised Rules of Court. HELD YES Ratio The preliminary investigations in these
four (4) cases were terminated in 1962, or before the New Rules of Court took ef
fect on January 1, 1964. Rules 112 and 113 thereof cannot, therefore, apply to t
hese cases at bar. Reasoning The government prosecutors certified under oath tha
t they had conducted a preliminary investigation in said cases. And, in Criminal
Case No. 3128, it was District Judge Gregorio Montejo who conducted the prelimi
nary investigation and, finding the existence of a prima facie case, ordered the
arrest of the defendant. It is clear, therefore, that the required investigatio
ns were complied with. - But then, assuming that the informations did not contai
n the requisite certificates regarding the Fiscal s having held a preliminary in
vestigation, the omissions are not necessarily fatal. The absence of preliminary
investigations does not affect the court s jurisdiction over the case. Nor do t
hey impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If
there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering the
ir plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, "instead
of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fis
cal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the prelimina
ry investigation may be
ISSUE WON the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of prelim
inary investigation HELD NO Reasoning - When Judge Templo set the case for preli
minary investigation to afford the accused occasion to confront the witnesses ag
ainst him, the accused instead filed a manifestation waiving his right to presen
t evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. When the case w
as forwarded to the CFI, the accused entered his plea without raising the questi
on of lack of preliminary investigation. The aforesaid constitute waiver of the
accuseds right to preliminary investigation. It is well-settled that the right to
preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and that the same may be w
aived expressly or by silence. Such waiver carried with it the waiver of any pro
cedural error or irregularity that may have attended the preliminary investigati
on. Dispositive The judgment under review is hereby affirmed
PEOPLE v VELOSO 112 SCRA 173 PER CURIAM; February 25, 1982
NATURE Automatic review of CFI decision imposing the capital penalty of death on
accused Veloso for the crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physic
al injuries FACTS - Veloso and others entered the Odiamars house and robbed them
around 7:30 in the evening. They stole money, tear gas gun, jewelry, old coins.
- Hermenegildo Odiamar was shot and killed during the robbery, while the Odiamar
spouses sustained serious physical injuries. - Veloso, among others, was charge
d for robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries - July 5, 1970

(the case says july but I think its a typo probably june) : Judge Templo conducted
preliminary examination - June 22, 1970 Judge Templo set the case for prelimina
ry investigation to afford the accused the occasion to confront the witnesses ag
ainst him and to present his own evidence - instead of availing himself of this
opportunity, he filed a manifestation stating that he Waives his right to present
evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. - the case was fo
rwarded to the CFI, and it appears that accused entered his non-guilty plea with
out raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation.
PEOPLE v GOMEZ 117 SCRA 72 RELOVA; September 30, 1982
FACTS - In 1962, four (4) informations were filed by the prosecuting fiscals bef
ore the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. They were as follows: 1. Crim
inal Case No. 3083.-- Edilberto Gomez, Prudencio N. Cichon, Cesar V. Castillo, P
edro Cuento and John Doe charged with Estafa thru falsification of public/offici
al documents. The prosecuting officers certified under oath that they had conduc
ted a preliminary investigation of the case in accordance with law; and that the
y believed that the offense charged had been committed and the accused were prob
ably guilty thereof. The corresponding warrant of arrest for each of the accused
was accordingly issued. The accused Pedro Cuento and Cesar Castillo pleaded not
guilty. 2. Criminal Case No. 3084.-- Estafa thru falsification of public/offici
al documents against Lorenzo Delantar, Prudencio Cichon, Jesus F. Atilano and tw
o other unidentified persons, Richard Doe and John Doe. The prosecution also cer
tified under oath that they conducted a preliminary investigation of the case Upo
n arraignment, Jesus Atilano, Prudencio Cichon and Lorenzo Delantar pleaded not
guilty.
Criminal Procedure
conducted." (People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478). The defendants in these cases did
not question the validity of the informations on the ground of defective certifi
cations or the right to preliminary investigations before they entered the plea
of not guilty. They filed the motion to declare informations and warrants of arr
est null and void only after more than one (1) year thereafter. Consequently, wh
en they entered a plea of not guilty, they thereby waived all objections that ar
e grounds for a motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction or failure of the i
nformation to charge an offense. Thus, they waived the right to a preliminary in
vestigation when they failed to invoke it prior to, or at least at, the time of
the entry of their plea in the Court of First Instance. Dispositive ACCORDINGLY,
the order dated November 2, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is
set aside and the said court is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the
said criminal cases.
a2010 page 46
and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation HE
LD NO. -The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the e
xistence of probable cause (Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution). P.D. No.
911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of prob
able cause. - There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal s
certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, iss
ue a warrant of arrest. But this does not bind the judge to issue a warrant - Se
ction 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:: "Warrant of arrest, when issued. - If
the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by t
he investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and t
hat there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he
must issue a warrant or order for his arrest." -the judge must satisfy himself o
f the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. I
f on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disre
gard the fiscal s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probab
le cause. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence

which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informati


ons filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for th
e determination of probable cause -Also, Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Ca
ses, is applicable to some of the crimes in the said informations. This rule req
uires that the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of
the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are defen
dants plus two (2) copies for the court s files -judge also did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in remanding some of the cases to the City Fiscal for furthe
r investigation. From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found
the charges patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue the warran
ts of arrest and try the accused would only expose the latter to unnecessary har
rassment, anxiety and expense. And as already pointed out, under the Rule on Sum
mary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge has the power to order the
outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits at
tached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
so doing, he nearly collided with the car of accused Rolito Go. Go got out of hi
s car and shot Maguan. - A security guard of a nearby bake shop witnessed the ev
ent and was able to note the plate number of the petitioner. The car was eventua
lly traced to an Elisa Ang Go, wife of the accused. - The police were informed t
hat the petitioner had a meal at the bake shop where his credit card was used to
pay for the transaction. Police were able to identify the card owner as the acc
used Go and when his picture was shown to the security guard who positively iden
tified him as the supposed assailant. Police then launched a manhunt for Go. - J
uly 8, 1991 Go presented himself in the San Juan police station with his two law
yers in tow to verify reports that he was being hunted down by the police. 1. Th
e police detained Go and a COMPLAINT for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE was filed against h
im. 2. Asst. Prov. Prosecutor Villa Ignacio informed Go, in the presence of his
lawyers, of his right to avail of preliminary investigation but in so doing, Go
had to waive the provisions in Art. 125, RPC. Go refused. - July 9, 1991 Maguan
died as a result of his gunshot wounds before an INFORMATION could be filed. - J
uly 11, 1991: 3. The prosecutor filed an INFORMATION for murder, instead of an i
nformation for frustrated homicide. The prosecutor stated that no preliminary in
vestigation was conducted because Go refused to waive provisions of Art. 125, RP
C. 4. Gos counsel filed an OMNIBUS MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND PROPER PRELIM
INARY INVESTIGATION with the allegations that an illegal warrantless arrest had
been effected and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and praye
d that Go be released on bail. - July 12, 1991: 5. Go filed an urgent EX-PARTE M
OTION FOR SPECIAL RAFFLE in order to expedite action on the bail recommendation.
The cash bond was approved and Go was released from jail. - July 16, 1991: 6. P
rosecutor filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION and pray
ed that the court proceedings be suspended momentarily. 7. The trial court grant
ed LEAVE to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelled the arraignment sche
duled on August 15, 1991. - July 19, 1991: 8. Go contended through a PETITION FO
R CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS that the information was null and void be
cause no preliminary investigation had been conducted. - July 23, 1991 Go surren
dered to the police and the judge set the arraignment on August 23. - August 23,
1991: 9. Respondent judge issued a commitment order for Go. Upon arraignment, a
plea of not guilty was entered because Go refused to enter a plea. 10. Go filed
a PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS and the CA issued the writ. The petition for habea
s corpus was consolidated with the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mand
amus.
PLACER v VILLANUEVA 126 SCRA 463 ESCOLIN; December 29, 1983
FACTS -petitioners the City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in th
e City Court of Butuan certain informations and certified them as follows: that a
preliminary examination has been conducted by me in this case, having examined
the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements and
other evidence submitted before this Office, there is reasonable ground to beli

eve that the crime charged has been committed and that herein accused is probabl
y guilty thereof. -respondent judge set a hearing to determine the propriety of i
ssuing warrants of arrest. After hearing, judge issued orders requiring petition
ers to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise
of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners
-petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration stating that they w
ere authorized to determine the existence of probable cause ni a preliminary inv
estigation and that their findings constitute sufficient basis for the issuance
of warrants of arrest. -respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his jud
icial power to review the fiscal s findings of probable cause. He further mainta
ins that the failure of petitioners to file the required affidavits destroys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners official duties, p
articularly in the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the City
Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations filed with the court the affi
davits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation -judge denied motion. And asked the submission of
documents earlier asked for. *eventually, petitioners submitted the documents re
ndering the case mute (haha) and academic. But the Court decided to tackle the i
ssue nonetheless. Some warrants were granted, some were remanded to ISSUE WON th
e respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, com
pel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
GO v CA (PELAYO) 206 SCRA 138 FELICIANO; February 11, 1992
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appea
ls FACTS - July 2, 1991 Eldon Maguan entered a one-way street (Wilson St.) from
the opposite direction (counterflow), heading towards P. Guevarra St. In
Criminal Procedure
- September 19, 1991 The trial started and the prosecution presented its first w
itness. This was followed by three more witnesses on October 3, 1991. - Septembe
r 23, 1991 The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on the following grounds, among others: a)
Validity of the warrantless arrest because the crime had been freshly committed. H
e was positively identified by the witness and his identity had been established
when he came to the police station. b) Waiver of the right to preliminary inves
tigation when he did not invoke it properly and waiver of any irregularity in hi
s arrest when accused posted bail. c) Validity of the information against the ac
cused precluded the grant of the petition for habeas corpus Petitioners Claim: Go
contends that the crime had not been just committed because of the 6-day disparit
y. - None of the police officers who arrested him had any personal knowledge of th
e crime. Respondents Comments: Go had been validly arrested because the crime had
been committed 6 days before he was arrested. - Invoking Umali vs. Ramos where
the Court upheld that a warrantless arrest was valid 14 days after the crime was
committed. - The prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Sect
ion 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a prel
iminary investigation. Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that r
ight should have been accorded him without any conditions. ISSUES 1. WON the war
rantless arrest was lawful 2. WON the accused Go had waived his right to prelimi
nary investigation HELD 1. NO, the warrantless arrest was not lawful Ratio Rule
112, Sec. 7 states that a complaint for information can be filed sans preliminar
y investigation when a person has been lawfully arrested without a warrant excep
t than an affidavit should be executed by the person who was responsible for the
arrest. But the person arrested can ask for preliminary investigation by the pr
oper officer before the complaint or information can be filed. In this case, the
person arrested must waive the provisions of A125, RPC with the assistance of c
ounsel (a lawyer or another person of his choice if a lawyer is not available).
He may also apply for bail despite the waiver and the investigation must termina

te within 15 days. Reasoning - Umil vs. Ramos only applies to continuing crimes
so it does not apply in the case at bar. Murder is not a continuing crime becaus
e it happens in one place at a particular point in time and ends there as well.
- The warrantless arrest does not follow the requisites in Rule 113, Sec. 5 beca
use: >The arrest took place 6 days after Maguan was shot whereas the RoC provide t
hat the crime should have been just committed, is about to be committed or is be
ing committed.
a2010 page 47
>None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating t
hat Go was the gunman as required in the RoC. The information that the police ha
d was derived from eyewitness accounts. - When Go walked into the police station
6 days after Maguan was shot, he did not surrender (so as not to imply that he
committed the crime) nor was he arrested but he placed himself in the disposal o
f the police authorities. 2. NO, Go had not waived his right to preliminary inve
stigation. Ratio The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waiv
ed when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea
at arraignment. Reasoning - The right to have a preliminary investigation conduc
ted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally a
t risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right. - The nature of the crime demanded that a pre
liminary investigation be conducted. Go did ask for a preliminary investigation
from the start. On the day the information for murder was filed, he also filed a
n OMNIBUS MOTION for IMMEDIATE RELEASE and PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. The Court
is not ready to ignore that act by Go and consider it as a waiver based simply o
n the contention of the SolGen that the motion should have been filed with the t
rial court and not the prosecutor. - According to Crespo vs. Mogul: The prelimin
ary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminat
ed upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal fin
d it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permiss
ion of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and rec
ommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate acti
on. - However, in the case at bar, Gos omnibus motion asked for a PRELIMINARY INV
ESTIGATION not REINVESTIGATION as discussed in Crespo vs. Mogul. The Prosecutor
also filed a MOTION for LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION so the omnibu
s motion of Go was, in effect, filed in the trial court. Go did ask for a prelim
inary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was 5 days later apprised of
the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. - There was no
waiver of the right to preliminary investigation because Go had vigorously insi
sted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the ti
me of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on cer
tiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigati
on before being forced to stand trial. - Gos act of posting bail cannot be deemed
to be a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. Go asked for release
on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus moti
on. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent
Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Obit
er - However, contrary to petitioner s contention, the failure to accord prelimi
nary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full meas
ure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. - In the case at bar, a trial for merits had already commenced and the pr
osecution had already presented 4 witnesses. > This, however, still entitles the
accused to preliminary investigation. Trial on the merits should be suspended o
r held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation should accorded to petitioner
, even if eventually, the prosecutor may or may not find probable cause. The poi

nt is that Go was not accorded his proper rights. > As for bail, Go is still ent
itled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence against t
he accused be strong, the bail can then be cancelled. > To hold that the rights
of Go were obliterated by the presentation of evidence in the proceedings in the
trial court would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process. Dispositive
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIE
D, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVER
SED. - The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct fort
hwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go,
and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15)
days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in
the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preli
minary investigation. - Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwit
h upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
This release shall be without prejudice to issue, should the any lawful order th
at the trial court Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of
all at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concurring]
- There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation even if Go freel
y participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. - Go had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that
his counsel had reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court th
reatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if he did not. The petitioner w
as virtually compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and the unjustified denia
l of a clear statutory right of the petitioner vitiated the proceedings as viola
tive of procedural due process. - It appears that the trial court has been moved
by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial admini
stration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a p
opular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by
this irrelevant consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the m
andate of the law.
GUTIERREZ [concurring]
- The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and
persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is
particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of
Criminal Procedure
those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside.
a2010 page 48
International Trading Corporation which submitted bids to supply equipment to th
e DECS and the National Manpower and Youth Council. - January 25, 1988, Special
Prosecution Officer filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against petitioner
. - The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC que
stioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the
approval of the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. - June
30, 1988, the SC annulled the information - Upon the annulment of the informati
on against the petitioner, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombu
dsman to refile it - The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that some chang
es be made in the information previously filed - A new information was filed in
the Sandiganbayan - Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information for being
invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation and defective becau
se the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged. - The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion to quash - The Special Prosecutor filed a motion to suspend ac
cused pendente lite. Over the objection of the accused the Sandiganbayan ordered
his suspension pendente lite from his position as PCGG Commissioner and from an

y other office he may be holding. ISSUES 1. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grav
e abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the information 2. W
ON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petit
ioner from office despite the Presidents having previously approved his indefinit
e leave of absence until final decision in the case HELD 1. YES - A new prelimin
ary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only beca
use the first was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right
. Moreover, the charge against him had been changed as directed by the Ombudsman
. The petitioners right to a preliminary investigation of the new charge is secur
ed to him by Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. That right of the
accused is substantial and its denial over his opposition is a prejudicial erro
r in that it subjects the accused to loss of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Since the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive i
t. If he demands it, the State may not withhold it. However, as the absence of a
preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information
, the proceedings upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in a
beyance and the case should be remanded to the office of the Ombudsman for him o
r the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 2. NO - Since t
he petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information wit
h an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws, the laws command tha
t he shall be suspended from office pendent lite must be obeyed. His approved leav
e of absence should not be a bar to his preventive suspension for, as indicated
by the Solicitor General, and approved leave, whether it be for a fixed of indef
inite period may be
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
cancelled or shortened at will by the incumbent. However, since the preventive s
uspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of ninety days provided in
Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, it should now be lift
ed. Dispositive Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
GRIO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- After 4 witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identif
ied the accused as the gunman and a security guard who identified the plate numb
er of the gunman s car, there is no need to conduct a preliminary investigation
the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to
believe that a crime was committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and
that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by fi
ling the information against him, presumably believed to be so). - This case did
not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with am
ple media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who, 7 days after t
he shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to verify news reports that
he was the object of a police manhunt. There witnesses identified him to be the
assailant. - It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the a
ccused to a preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its abs
ence is not a ground to quash the information. It does not affect the court s ju
risdiction, nor impair the validity of the information, nor constitute an infrin
gement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses. - The petitioner s mot
ion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application f
or release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not
more important than the hearing of the application for bail. The court s hearin
g of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary inve
stigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allo
wed to proceed because the parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (a
) whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed E
ldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt i
s strong. The judge s determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong wou
ld naturally foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the
probability of his guilt. - Go was indeed arrested by the police. Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the

commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the perso


n to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the a
rrest
ALLADO v DIOKNO 232 SCRA 192 BELLOSILLO; May 5, 1994
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restr
aining order FACTS - Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, al
umni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the L
aw Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, a
nd on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard (Umba
l), they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of a G
erman national named Van Twest by the Presidential AntiCrime Commission (PACC) a
nd ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge. - Petitioners filed this p
etition and principally contended that respondent judge acted with grave abuse o
f discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is
probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings
," and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that p
robable cause exists when the certification is flawed." Petitioners maintain tha
t the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely rel
ied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance
of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors "clear s
ign of bias and partiality." - On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor Ge
neral argues that the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge
who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him t
hat the accused probably committed the crime charged. ISSUE WON the respondent j
udge committed grave abuse of discretion in the preliminary inquiry which determ
ines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest HELD - In the Order
of respondent judge, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful eva
luation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists
; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable t
o see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examine
d the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the contrary
, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be in
sufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners. - The PACC relie
s heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confesse
d his participation in the alleged
DOROMAL v SANDIGANBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR) 177 SCRA 1989 GRINO-A
QUINO; September 7, 1989
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - October 1987, the Special Prosecution Off
icer conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge against petitioner, Qui
ntin Doromal, a former commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Gover
nment for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection wi
th his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal
Criminal Procedure
kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest
s reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have hi
s remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into
ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o clock in the
evening to six o clock the next morning. This is highly improbable, if not ridic
ulous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with th
e use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirel
y closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. Thereafter,
the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust. Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest s reported abduction which culminat
ed in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Es

toesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter s death. - Verily,
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for
the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the ev
idence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of thei
r incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the pro
secutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out th
at the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arres
t of petitioners. - In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall per
sonally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a wa
rrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may
disregard the fiscal s report and require the submission of supporting affidavi
ts of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of proba
ble cause. - In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the co
nstitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of t
he judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only t
he judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inqui
ry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making
the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor s certification of probab
le cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of ste
nographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecut
or s certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determinatio
n of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish th
e preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warr
ant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be
conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no conf
usion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warran
t is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not ther
e is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense char
ged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors
and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor. - ALLADO DOCTRINE: I
f upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing
the information and the document attached thereto, finds that no probable cause
exists, he must either call for the
a2010 page 49
complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no
reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and publ
ic accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. Dispositive Petition g
ranted
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- The teachings of the cases of Soliven3, Inting4, Lim5, Allado, and Webb reject
the proposition that the investigating prosecutors certification in an informati
on or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information,
or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the i
ssuance of a warrant of arrest. - In the present case, nothing accompanied the i
nformation upon its filing with the trial court. Clearly, when respondent Judge
Asuncion issued the assailed order directing, among other things, the issuance o
f warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Join
t Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supportin
g the prosecutors finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no spe
cific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of
arrest. It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of p
robable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the pro
tection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or e
ven convincing logic.

ROBERTS v CA 254 SCRA 307 DAVIDE, JR; March 5, 1996


FACTS - Several thousand holders of 349 Pepsi crowns in connection with the Number
Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City com
plaints against the petitioner officials of PEPSI. - The petitioners filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for the reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution and with the DOJ a Petition for Review. The petitioners also Motions
to Suspend Proceedings and to hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on
the ground that they had filed the aforesaid Petition for Review. - Respondent
Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying the petitioners Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold In Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and t
he public prosecutors Motion to Defer Arraignment and (2) directing the issuance
of the warrants of arrest after and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. - Th
e petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certior
ari and prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order. They con
tended therein that respondent Judge Asuncion had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforementioned ord
er. - The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution denying the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON public respondent Judge Asuncion com
mitted grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation. HELD YES. - Sect
ion 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant o
r warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined pers
onally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaina
nt and the witnesses he may produce. - The determination of probable cause is a
function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the
Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination. - The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the
Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The J
udge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, th
e affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supp
orting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material in assis
ting the Judge to make his determination.
PEOPLE v CA (CERBO) (Republic v CA in page 5 of the outline) 301 SCRA 475 PANGAN
IBAN; January 21, 1999
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS - Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo shot, at po
intblank range, Rosalinda Dy in the presence and at the office of his father pri
vate respondent Billy Cerbo. - An information for murder was filed against Jonat
han Cerbo. - The daughter of the victim executed an affidavit-complaint charging
private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. - Accordingly, the
prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder ca
se. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. - Billy Cerbo filed a motion to q
uash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause.
- The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo a
nd recalling the warrant for his arrest. - The Court of Appeals debunked the pet
itioners assertion that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion and t
hat the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate the charge.. Hence this
petition. ISSUE
The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking
of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents suppo
rting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. 4
The supporting documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Pros
ecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his deter
mination of probable cause 5 The issuance of the warrants of arrest by a judge s
olely on the basis of the prosecutors certification in the information that there
existed probable cause, without having before him any other basis for his perso
nal determination of the existence of a probable cause, is null and void.

3
Criminal Procedure
WON the CA erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of
charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo
a2010 page 50
- Provincial Fiscal failed to file the information required within the time appo
inted, or at any time thereafter. Consequently, he was directed by His Honor to
explain within 10 days "why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
delaying the speedy administration of justice for disobeying a lawful order of t
he Court." Fiscal filed a MFR, but was denied. Hence, this petition for certiora
ri and prohibition was presented by petitioner Fiscal, seeking annulment of the
aforesaid orders. ISSUES 1.WON respondent judge had no jurisdiction to conduct p
reliminary investigations, because the law creating Circuit Criminal Courts, R.A
. 5179, did not confer on said courts the power to conduct preliminary investiga
tions 2. WON judge erred in compelling fiscal under sanction of contempt, to fil
e an information in court without conducting his own preliminary investigation H
ELD 1. YES Ratio: The conduct of a preliminary investigation is not a judicial f
unction but part of the fiscals job, a function of the executive. Wherever there
are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts
are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them, and the
fact that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be
indiscriminately exercised. Reasoning: [a] Sec. 37 of BP. 129 reiterated the re
moval from Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region of
the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and Sec 2 of Rule 112 of 19
85 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes RTC Judges to conduct PIs. [
b] The assignment of PI function to judges of inferior courts and to a very limi
ted extent to courts of first instance was dictated by necessity and practical c
onsiderations, and the consequent policy, was that wherever there were enough fi
scals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts were to leave
that job which is essentially executive to them. It follows that the conclusion
s derived by a judge from his own investigation cannot be superior to and conclu
sively binding on the fiscal or public prosecutor, in whom that function is prin
cipally and more logically lodged. 2. YES The power to conduct PI is lodged in t
he fiscal. It is grave abuse of discretion on a judge to seek to foreclose the f
iscal s prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation to determine fo
r himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him t
o show cause for not filing the information within 24 hours, on the sole basis o
f the Judge s conclusions. The fiscal has the duty to satisfy himself of the exi
stence of probable cause, and could not shirk or be made to evade it by an unrea
soning and indiscriminate reliance on the judge s investigation. Dispositive: Pe
tition GRANTED. Challenged Orders annulled and set aside.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- The fiscal prevails over the judge only in the determination of the existence
of a prima facie case to justify the filing of a complaint or information. This
task is executive. - But the determination of probable cause to justify the issu
ance of a search warrant or a warrant of arrest is the constitutional prerogativ
e of the judge and may not be withdrawn from him or even only limited by statute
or ROC. This task is judicial. The findings of fiscal in the PI do not control
or foreclose the exercise of the power conferred personally on the judge under S
ec. 2 the Bill of Rights. That power is his alone.
HELD YES - The petition is meritorious. - The determination of probable cause du
ring preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecut
or. It is an executive function. - The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from

the inconvenience, expense, ignominy, and stress of defending himself/herself in


the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her gu
ilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law
for that purpose. 6 - Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the st
ate from the burden of the unnecessary expense of an effort in prosecuting alleg
ed offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous, or groundless c
harges.7 - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must b
e distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of a
rrest, which is a judicial function. - A judge cannot be compelled to issue a wa
rrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so.
- Corrollarily, the judge should not override the public prosecutors determinati
on of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the eviden
ce presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient,
as in the present case. - Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, a
nd there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudic
e on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such dete
rmination. Dispositive Reversed.
BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 34] RODIL v GARCIA 104 SCRA 362 FERNANDO; Ma
y 13, 1981
NATURE Writ of Certiorari FACTS -Counsel for Reynaldo Rodil who was charged with
murder, asks to recall witnesses for the prosecution to enable such counsel to
cross-examine them, on, to quote his words, "clarificatory and amplificatory mat
ters" which was denied by Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz, Marind
uque. -What is prayed for is not only that such order denying counsel s request
to recall government witnesses be set aside and nullified, but also that bail be
granted petitioner, a petition to that effect having been denied with a subsequ
ent motion for reconsideration still undecided. -Respondents were required to co
mment and the Court likewise issued a temporary restraining order. Such a commen
t was submitted on behalf of respondents by the Solicitor General seeking the di
smissal of the petition on the ground that the right to cross-examine in a preli
minary investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the exercise of
discretion by respondent Judge considering the evidence of record sufficed to ju
stify denial of the application for bail. -An examination of the record, as well
as the pertinent doctrines, makes evident that the jurisdictional issue posed a
rises from the failure to accord petitioner a hearing on his application for bai
l. -A resolution of that question in the sense of respondent Judge affording pet
itioner his day in court is equally decisive of the other issue, whether or not
counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpos
e of asking clarificatory questions. That he could very well do when they testif
y to prove evidence of guilt is strong. Under the present state of the law, it c
annot be said that the right to cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the st
age of preliminary investigation. ISSUE WON counsel for petitioner could recall
witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions
(that he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is stro
ng) HELD
CASTILLO v VILLALUZ 171 SCRA 39 NARVASA; March 8, 1989
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - In July 1971, a complaint
and a Joint Affidavit were filed directly by Renato Montes and Jose de Silva ag
ainst Manuel Laconico. The complaint charged the latter with estafa in the amoun
t of P1K. Preliminary investigation (now in question) was conducted by responden
t Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, and thereafter issued a warrant of arrest
. He ordered Provincial Fiscal to file the corresponding information against the
respondent before the court of competent jurisdiction within 24 hours from rece
ipt of said order.
SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concurring]
6 7

Ledesma v. CA, 278 SCRA 657, Sept. 5, 1997. Id.


Criminal Procedure
YES. Counsel could recall the witnesses. - The Judge issued the denial for bail
on the basis of the motion of petitioner that he be granted such right and the o
pposition filed by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal without conducting any
hearing on such motion. Clearly, he acted on the mistaken belief that the presen
tation of evidence by the prosecution for the purpose of the issuance of the war
rant of arrest, the preliminary examination proper, suffices for the denial of t
he plea for bail. In the latest case on the subject, People v. Sola, decided on
March 17, 1981, this Court relying on People v. San Diego, nullified an order of
a municipal judge named respondent in that case as he granted bail to the accus
ed without hearing the prosecution. The present case is much stronger; it is the
accused himself, the explicit beneficiary of the constitutional right, who was
not heard. - There was misapprehension on the part of respondent Judge of the im
port of the ruling in Ocampo v. Bernabe citing that The regular trial is, to a li
mited extent at least, anticipated. While the guilt or innocence of the accused
is not to be determined, the quantity and character of the proofs on this point
are, for the special purpose in hand, necessarily considered. Occasionally much
time is thus consumed, and the court s attention is correspondingly diverted fro
m other business. But these objections cannot avail against a positive constitut
ional command; if the Constitution requires the court to determine for itself wh
ether or not the proof is evident or presumption great in a given case, all cons
iderations of expediency or convenience, however potent they might be at the com
mon law, must give way. " This is so because the procedure to be followed in the
hearing on an application for bail, while summary in character, is not to be a
mere sham or pretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused is no
t to be denied his day in court. - While it could be said that that the refusal
of the Justice of the Peace to allow the defense to cross-examine the prosecutio
n s witnesses presented prior to petitioner s arrest, cannot be utilized as argu
ment for the contention that the prosecution should not have been allowed to cro
ss-examine the defense witnesses and that an accused is not entitled to cross-ex
amine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation befor
e his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Ju
dge or investigating officer concerned (People v. Ramilo, \Dequito v. Arellano,
Bustos v. Lucero) it could still be argued that the judge is not a ministerial o
fficer reduced to recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the exami
nation. Above all, his is the great responsibility of safeguarding the accused f
rom groundless or vindictive prosecution. If the justice of the peace is to asce
rtain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there
is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority cannot be confine
d as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and outmoded technicaliti
es of practice. It thus appears clearly that in the exercise of his discretion r
espondent Judge could have granted the request and thus avoided the necessity of
a petition of this character having to be filed. The interest of a more speedy
and a more efficient administration of justice would be best served if there is
a greater awareness on the part of judges that in addition to safeguarding the e
xpress rights of an accused person, a matter mandated by the Constitution or the
Rules of Court, they should likewise exercise their discretion in such a way th
at the
a2010 page 51
purpose of a preliminary investigation, the avoidance of groundless or vindictiv
e prosecutions, could be attained in as fair and objective manner as possible. D
ispositive WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of respondent
Judge denying bail is set aside. He, or whoever is now the Municipal Judge of S
anta Cruz, Marinduque, must set forthwith the hearing on the application for bai
l of petitioner, to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Cons

titution, the Rules of Court, and this opinion. No costs.


Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the inv
estigation was expressly denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish it
from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper - Sec 3 of rule 112
consists of 2 phases: - The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the
sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in
support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) tha
t there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses th
e complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of t
he case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting
documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers in
the second phase. - This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice
of the complaint, access to the complainant s evidence and an opportunity to sub
mit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge m
ay conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions o
n matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes wi
th the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or
holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the
record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action. - The argument, therefo
re, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discret
ion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completin
g the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The
rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of pro
bable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investiga
tion - Also without appreciable merit is petitioners other argument that there
was scarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the fo
urteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within a matter of hours on a Saturday when
municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Nothing in the
record before this Court belies or discredits those affirmations which have, be
sides, the benefit of the legal presumption that official duty has been regularl
y performed. - Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "J
ohn Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify
, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscri
bed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the lib
erty of the subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that wa
rrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized
, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided. Dispositive
Warrants against petitioners upheld; warrants against John Does denied
PANGANDAMAN v CASAR 159 SCRA 599 NARVASA; April 14, 1988
FACTS - On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao d
el Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fa
ct transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked
a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering casua
lties. Another version has it that a group that was on its way to another place,
Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed - The next day, a lawyer (Atty. Batu
ampar) of one of the widows filed a letter-complaint with the fiscal, asking for
a full blast preliminary investigation. The letter adverted to the possibility of
innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides none of
whom was, however, identified and promised that supporting affidavits would sho
rtly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st indorsement" t
o the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar s letter and requesting tha
t "all cases that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in th
e afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first take
n cognizance of said cases. - On August 10, 1985, a criminal complaint for multi
ple murder was filed. On the same day, respondent Judge examined personally the
3 witnesses. Thereafter, the Judge approved the complaint and issued a warrant o
f arrest against the 14 petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and 50 "Jo

hn Does. - On Aug 14, 1985, an ex-parte motion was filed by Atty. Batuampar seek
ing recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough invest
igation" on the ground that the Judge s initial investigation had been "hasty an
d manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. Th
e respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;" hence the present peti
tion. ISSUE WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arres
t without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigati
on HELD YES. - What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing
that procedure. Sec. 6 of Rule 112 clearly authorizes the MTC to issue a warrant
even before opening the second phase.
SAMULDE v SALVANI 165 SCRA 734 GRIO-AQUINO: September 26, 1988
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC FACTS
Criminal Procedure
- Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation upon a complaint
for robbery. After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits o
f the complainant and her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and
his witnesses, Judge Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial
Fiscal Salvani with his finding that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery a
s charge in the complaint". The fiscal returned the records on the ground that J
udge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest against the accused as prov
ided in Sec 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Judge Samulde s
ent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under Sec 6, Rule 11
2, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied "that a probable cause ex
ists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate cus
tody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, " implying that, although he
found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that the accused should
be immediately placed under custody. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of ar
rest. - A special civil action of mandamus was filed in the RTC by Provincial Fi
scal Salvani against Judge Samulde to compel the latter to issue a warrant of ar
rest. The RTC dismissed the petition but nevertheless ordered Judge Samulde to i
ssue a warrant of arrest, and to transmit the warrant to the Provincial Fiscal f
or appropriate action. He further advised the Municipal Judge "that henceforth h
e adheres to the same rule in similar cases where he conducts a preliminary inve
stigation with a finding of a prima facie or probable cause." Unconvinced, Judge
Samulde appealed to this Court. ISSUE WON a judge may be compelled to issue a w
arrant of arrest upon a finding of probable cause HELD NO Ratio 3 conditions mus
t concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must
: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses
by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that a probable cause exist
s; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Reasoning The mandatory provision
that the investigating judge "must issue a warrant of arrest" if he finds proba
ble cause that the respondent committed the crime charged, found in all previous
rules of criminal procedure, from General Orders No. 58 down to Rule 112 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court, is absent in Section 1 of the 1985 Rules on Crimin
al Procedure. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investiga
ting judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, for the determinati
on of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the
accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judg
ment or discretion. In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the of
fshoot of a boundary dispute between two property owners, the investigating judg
e did not believe there was any danger of the accused absconding before the fili
ng of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to plac
e him under immediate custody. Dispositive The appealed decision is SET ASIDE.
a2010 page 52

TANDOC v RESULTAN [SUPRA, PAGE 43] LIM vFELIX 194 SCRA 292 GUTIERREZ; February 1
9, 1991
NATURE Review for certiorari. FACTS - March 17, 1989: at the vicinity of the air
port road of the Masbate Domestic Airport (Masbate, Masbate), Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes
, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin.
Dante Siblante, another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived t
he assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. - For the
purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tant
iado, TSg (Legaspi) filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate,
Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nes
tor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder in connection with the airport incident. - July 31, 1989: after the preli
minary investigation court released an order stating after that a probable cause
has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused i
n the amended complaint. - August 29, 1989: records of the case were transmitted
to Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane
was designated to review the case. On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued
a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the petiti
oners but differed in the designation of the crime (he said it should be MURDER
for each case, with serious physical injuries). Fiscal Alfane filed with the Reg
ional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against t
he twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. - Respondents Lims file
d a verified petition for a change of venue. Court granted the petition. The cas
e was raffled to Judge Nemesio Felix. - Lims then prayed for the following: 1. A
n order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the prelim
inary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masba
te for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determinat
ion of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of th
e constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall h
ave himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. 2. Movants be give
n ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matt
er of right; - In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court cond
uct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against the
m in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
preliminary investigation. The respondent court issued an order denying for lack
of merit. ISSUE WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simpl
y relying on the prosecution s certification and recommendation that a probable
cause exists. HELD NO Ratio A Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidenc
e earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends o
n the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge s sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, h
e issues a warrant of arrest. Reasoning - Respondent Judge committed a grave err
or when he relied solely on the Prosecutor s certification and issued the questi
oned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his
personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. If a Judge relies s
olely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the recor
ds of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The cons
titutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse o
f discretion. - The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Mu
nicipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Mas
bate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petiti
oners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal dete
rmination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warr
ant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known

what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification - Art. III, Sec
. 2. (Constitution) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house
s, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nat
ure and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by th
e judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the w
itnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched an
d the persons or things to be seized. - What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself o
f the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to per
sonally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrin
e and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supportin
g documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause an
d, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis there
of he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal s report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Criminal Procedure
- Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden w
ith the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instea
d of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. - Th
e determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge
. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable grou
nd to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment o
f trial - is the function of the Prosecutor. - The power to make a preliminary e
xamination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justi
fy the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant) has been and remains
vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1
973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonabl
e searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court
Rule or Statute to revoke. - The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially
in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question ea
ch complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor s investigat
ion page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of appli
cations for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his
or her more important judicial functions. Dispositive Petition is granted.
a2010 page 53
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Pena
l Code." Petitioners claim that the aforementioned search warrants are null and
void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court; that the searches
and seizures made in pursuance thereof are illegal; and that evidences obtained
therein are consequently inadmissible. Respondents/prosecutors comments (1) that
the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with
law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in eviden
ce against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the afore
mentioned searches and seizures. Procedure: -March 22, 1962: SC issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. -June 29, 1962: the writ w
as partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things se
ized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, th
e injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found an
d seized in the residences of petitioners. NOTE: The ponencia splits the documen
ts, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in que
stion into two (2) major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of th
e aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences
of petitioners. ISSUES 1. As regards the first group, WON petitioners have a cau

se of action 2. As regards the second group, WON the search warrants in question
, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid (and
, WON said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petition
ers) HELD 1. NONE. -The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Petitioners may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the d
ocuments, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporat
ions, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belo
ngs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their in
dividual capacity. 2. NO. -1935 Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3) provides
(a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by th
e judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (b) that the warrant shal
l particularly describe the things to be seized. -Search warrants, issued upon a
pplications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had comm
itted offenses as abstract as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom
s Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code" do not satisfy the const
itutional requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said appl
ications. It was impossible for the judges who issued the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, which presupposes the in
troduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has perfo
rmed particular acts, or committed specific omissions in violation of a given pe
nal provision. -General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanc
tity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. -To prevent the issuan
ce of general search warrants, SC amended Sec. 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules
of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search warrant sha
ll issue for more than one specific offense." -Search warrants authorizing the s
eizure of books of accounts and records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or ille
gal contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be
seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of elimin
ating general warrants. -SC resolved to adopt the doctrine in Mapp v Ohio (1961)
and to finally abandon the 1948 ruling in Moncado vs. People s Court, 80 Phil.
1.
(*The latter case (citing Wigmore) held that illegally seized evidence is admiss
ible, as long as it is relevant, but without prejudice to the criminal liability
of the peace officers who made the seizure, for violation of domicile or under
any other provision of the Penal Code. Justices Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones & Par
as dissented from the majority opinion. ~marge~*)
STONEHILL v DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 CONCEPCION; June 19, 1967
NATURE Original action in the SC. Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, injunction.
-Petitioners: Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Bec
k; accused in certain deportation cases -Respondents-prosecutors: DOJ Sec Jose W
. Diokno, NBI Acting Director Jose Lukban, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon,
Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Manila City Asst. Fiscal Maneses G.
Reyes -Repondents-judges: Judge Amado Roan of the Municipal (now City) Court of
Manila, Judge Roman Cansino of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Judge
Hermogenes Caluag of CFI Rizal Quezon City Branch, Judge Eulogio Mencias of CFI
Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Judge Damian Jimenez of the Municipal (now City) Court
of Quezon City. FACTS -Upon application of the respondents-prosecutors, responde
nts-judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the c
orporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to s
earch the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses a
nd/or residences, and to seize and take possession of books of accounts, financia
l records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, cr

edit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all busine
ss transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense" of "violation of Central
-The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitution
al injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. -The non-exclusionary
rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constit
utional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is compe
tent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. If he
has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there i
s probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necess
ity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing ex
pedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Foreign references cited to support this contention 1. Judge Learned Hand: Only
in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed. 2. Weeks v US (1914
): The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishmen
t, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted i
n their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. 3. Mapp v Ohio (1961): all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court. *Without that rule the fr
eedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severe
d from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court s high regard as a freedom implicit in the c
oncept of ordered liberty.
Criminal Procedure
*The exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reaso
n of the unlawful seizure is the most important constitutional privilege. *The p
urpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter -- to compel respect for the con
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing the in
centive to disregard it." *We can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise, to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of
law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constit
ution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessa
ry in the true administration of justice. Obiter -In their MFR, petitioners furt
her alleged possession of and control over the records, papers and effects found
in the offices of the corporation, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof. SC disposed of them by saying that this new theory was advanced, not in their pe
tition or amended petition, but in the MR. At any rate, it is best to leave the
matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future. Dispositive Wr
its granted in part and denied in part; MR denied.
a2010 page 54
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of A
ppeals. -The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the supp
ression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an un
lawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a) ownership of docume
nts, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or posses
sion actual or constructive -- of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) th
e "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application

for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing." -An examination of the search warrants in
this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the
petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the part
icular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants
. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants
were also the same as those declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants. -Thus, the petitioners have full
standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these w
ere directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they we
re corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their per
sonal control. -SC, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners al
l personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were sei
zed, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or pl
aces. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various p
leadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seize
d from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers a
nd effects belonging to the petitioners. -If there should be any categorization
of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful sear
ches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private
papers of the petitioners, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corpora
tions.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- The affiants signed their respective affidavits in the presence of the respond
ent Judge, who also signed after the usual procedure of administering the oath.
- Considering the answers of the affiants to the, questions contained in their s
worn statements, together with the postmortem and autopsy report on the dead bod
y of the victim Jaime Diaz Ng, the certificate of death, the sketch showing the
position of the victim and the accused, the respondent Judge opine that there wa
s reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and t
he amused was probably guilty thereof. - Respondent Judge issued the order and w
arrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be accepted for the pro
visional release of the accused. - Upon motion of petitioner upon the ground tha
t the evidence of guilt was not strong, respondent Judge issued an order, granti
ng bail,; which order, however, respondent Judge later revoked, and petitioner w
as denied bail. - The case was subsequently remanded to the CFI of Surigao del S
ur, after petitioner filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. Respondent Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging petitioner with the
crime of murder. The petitioner was detained in the provincial jail. - Petitione
r filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Surigao del Sur,
claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without due process of law, on th
e ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arre
st issued by respondent Judge in violation of Republic Act No. 3828, and praying
for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinemen
t. - Respondents filed their answer, alleging that Republic Act Nor. 3828 had be
en substantially complied with; that a motion to quash, and not a petition for h
abeas corpus was the proper remedy, and that petitioner s application for bail c
onstituted a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest. - The C
FI of Surigao del Sur ruled that respondent Municipal Judge had substantially co
mplied with Republic Act No. 3828, and consequently denied the application for t
he writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the case. - Hence the appeal. Petitioners
Claim Republic Act No. 3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a
warrant of arrest, two specific duties, to wit: (1) personally examine the comp
lainant and witnesses with "searching questions and answers," which means that t
he judge must cross-examine them in case their affidavits are presented; and (2)
said examination must be reduced to writing and form part of the records of the
case. The record of the instant case, does not show that said examination was p

erformed by respondent Judge notwithstanding his testimony to the effect that he


adopted the questions propounded to each of the prosecution witnesses by T-Sgt.
Patosa. And assuming that the adoption of the questions made by T-Sgt. Patosa c
onstituted substantial compliance with the requirement that the judge should exa
mine the witnesses by asking searching questions, still the second requirement,
that of reducing to writing the said procedure of adoption, has not been compile
d with; and so, Republic Act No. 3828 was still violated, and the issuance of th
e warrant of arrest was in violation of said Act and the Constitution and consti
tuted denial of due process.
SEPARATE OPINION CASTRO [concurring and dissenting]
-Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demon
strated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documen
ts, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adve
rted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly
declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as
illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future." -It is with this position tha
t Justice Castro is not in accord. -He says that All the search warrants, withou
t exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants an
d are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and th
e searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. -He argues that assuming t
hat the petitioners have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the pap
ers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, this can
not in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the
search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warra
nts are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and rem
ain illegal. -He insists that, upon the pleadings submitted to SC, the petitione
rs have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of t
he documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their f
amily residences. -Since our constitutional provision on searches and seizures w
as derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti
tution, in the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the sai
d constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
LUNA v PLAZA 26 SCRA 310 ZALDIVAR; November 29, 1968
FACTS - A criminal action was commenced by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, PC investigato
r against Simon Luna, by filing with respondent Municipal Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza
, of the Municipal Court of Tandag, charging the petitioner, with the crime of m
urder.
- Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosec
ution, in the form of questions and answers taken by T-Sgt. Patosa, and subscrib
ed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the com
plaint.
- The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "al
l over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the
witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions were propounded
by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them.
Criminal Procedure
ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony
of respondent Municipal Judge. 2. WON the requirements of Republic Act No. 3828
was satisfied. 3. WON the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of
the Constitution and of procedural due process. 4. WON the trial court erred in
denying the writ of habeas corpus. HELD 1. NO - As a general rule, the lower cou
rt s findings, as to the credibility of witnesses will not be interfered with by

appellate courts. Since petitioner appealed directly to this Court he must, rai
se only questions of law and he has thereby waived the right to raise any questi
on of fact, and the findings of facts of the trial court, under the rules and pr
ecedents, must be deemed final and binding upon this Court. 2. YES. - As provide
d in Republic Act No. 3828 Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arres
t, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the wit
nesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; (3) the examination m
ust be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - The
first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respond
ent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution; that respondent
judge adopted as his own personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt. Pat
osa as appearing in the written statements, which he read over again to the witn
esses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said
answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witne
sses answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the mu
nicipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. - Th
e second condition was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint
was "supported by statements of the witnesses under oath." The record also shows
there were documents to have been subscribed and sworn to before respondent Jud
ge. - The third condition was likewise fulfilled. The examination of the witness
es was written down, in the form of searching questions and answers. The term sea
rching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose
of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasona
ble ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is prob
ably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused he
ld for trial," such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime
and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on
what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date
, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; th
e subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his a
ttitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the
offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and soc
ial circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of inqu
iry may differ from case to case. - The questions, therefore, must to a great de
gree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At any rate, the court a qu
o found that respondent Judge was "satisfied that the questions and answers
a2010 page 55
contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the nature o
f his searching questions and answers as required by law," so the respondent Jud
ge adopted them. 3. NO - The Constitution, in Section 1 (3), Article III, provid
es that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the wit
nesses he may produce. - The constitutional requirement of examination of witnes
ses under oath was, as shown above, fulfilled. The existence of probable cause d
epended to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting th
e examination. Respondent Judge found that there was a probable cause, as stated
in his order of arrest. - Preliminary examination is not an essential part of d
ue process of law. Preliminary examination may be conducted by the municipal jud
ge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or i
n the absence, of the accused. - The record shows that herein petitioner waived
the preliminary investigation before respondent Municipal Judge, and instead, he
riled a petition for bail. This conduct of petitioner indicates that he had wai
ved his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination con
ducted by respondent Judge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 4. NO
- Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides in part, as follows: "Se
c. 4 When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the perso
n alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge ... and that the court or judge had jurisdict
ion to issue the process ... or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed ..

. " - All the conditions, in the afore-quoted Section 4, set forth to deny the w
rit, are present in the instant case. - Petitioner is detained and is in the cus
tody of the respondent Provincial Warden by virtue of the order of arrest and th
e order of respondent Judge, to confine petitioner in the provincial jail. It is
not disputed by petitioner that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the
warrant of arrest and the order of commitment under the provisions of Section 47
, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201, although petitioner
did question the validity of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been is
sued in violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which was found to be untenable. - Th
e remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in t
his opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to qua
sh the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the
respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. - The Court stressed tha
t what has been stated in the opinion was not intended to sanction the return to
the former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sw
orn statements that are made to accompany the complaints that are filed before t
hem, in determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warr
ant of arrest. - That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the a
mendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which req
uires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first s
atisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - It is obvious that th
e purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest ag
ainst a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to,
their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom th
e criminal complaint is filed. Dispositive The decision of the trial court appea
led from, was affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant.
CASTILLO v CA (ROSARIO) 176 SCRA 591 FERNAN; August 21, 1989
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - May 2, 1965: Parties figured in
a vehicular accident which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their
respective vehicles. They had conflicting versions of the accident. - June 30:
Petitioners instituted a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries
sustained and for the damage to the vehicle in CFI Manila. - September 29: Whil
e this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against Rosa
rio, private respondent, for double physical injuries; double less serious physi
cal injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, in CFI Urdaneta.
- Rosario was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the criminal case.
CA acquitted him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not bee
n proved beyond reasonable doubt. - April 3, 1972: Respondents filed a "Request
for Admission" in the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit the truthfulne
ss of the facts set forth as well as the correctness and genuineness of the docu
ments attached. - May 5,1972: Petitioners filled a "Manifestation", admitting th
e allegations in the "Request for Admission" with some qualifications. Later, bo
th parties submitted their respective memoranda. - December 28, 1972: On the bas
is of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well as the
records of the criminal case attached in the "Request for Admission" of the priv
ate respondents, CFI Manila rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint of the
petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private
respondents against the petitioners. - February 13, 1978: CA affirmed Petitioner
s Version Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the northbound lane of the McA
rthur Highway with his wife, father, and child at the rate of 25 kph. Just past
San Nicolas bridge, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters more or less, a sp
eeding oncoming car along the same lane he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck
ahead of it. - He switched on his headlights to signal the car to return to its
own right lane as the way was not clear for it to overtake the truck. The signa
l was disregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction. - To evade the collisi

on, he swerved his jeep to the right towards the shoulder and applied on the bra
kes, leaving his feet on it, even, immediately after the impact. The car rested
on the shoulder of the right
Criminal Procedure
lane. The jeep s rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tire marks behin
d it; while the car left long tire marks, specially its left rear wheel. Respode
nts Version Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, with his wife and daughter,
were along MacArthur Highway going southwards. They saw ahead of them a big heav
ily loaded cargo truck. The truck was moving very slowly because of its heavy lo
ad so that Rosario decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to
it that the road was clear and as additional precautionary measure, he blew his
horn several times at the time he was overtaking the truck. - As the car was abo
ut to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car s front left tire suddenly b
urst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and naturally making
steering and control difficult. - Because of the tendency of the car to veer tow
ards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the
direction where he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He finally
brought the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road. - Just as he was abo
ut to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep whic
h came from the opposite direction ISSUE WON petitioners were deprived of due pr
ocess because their civil action was decided on the basis of private respondent
Juanita Rosario s acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence HELD NO
Ratio Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties an
d on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appel
lee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petiti
on as well as in the petitioner s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premise
d on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. Reasonin
g - The subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and disti
nct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civi
l Code, with a substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apa
rt and independent from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civi
l liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or cul
pa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liab
ility arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quaside
lictos or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the R
ules of Court provides:
a2010 page 56
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, u
nless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. - In a previous case
, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the CA after a painstaking analysis o
f. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions of the two vehicles
as depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two vehicles from t
he cemented edge of the road; (d) the point of impact; (e) the visible tire mark
s, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruled
that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car who was
negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. - Negligence, being the source

and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of dama
ges. In the case at bar, the CA found that collision was not due to the negligen
ce of Rosario but rather it was Castillo s own act of driving the jeep to the sh
oulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of
the collision. With this finding, the CA exonerated Rosario from civil liability
on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist. - During the trial of
the case before the CFI, respondents were not present because they were abroad.
Their counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the criminal
case, in accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These recor
ds, mostly composed of transcripts of the hearing in the criminal case, were att
ached to their "Request for Admission" and were substantially admitted by petiti
oners. Petitioners raised, as one of their objections, the propriety and correct
ness of admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of the record in the ci
vil case. According to them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130, on the
ground that petitioners were not given the opportunity to cross-examine. We dis
agree. A careful reading of the transcripts would reveal that counsel for petiti
oners actively participated during the proceedings of the criminal case. He rais
ed various objections, in the course of the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru
counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Dispositive Petition
denied
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- February 25, 1965 After the Court had conducted preliminary investigation and
had acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Court referred the case to the Fisc
al. - March 4, 1965 The arraignment was postponed because the Fiscal was still d
oing his investigation. - In the proceedings of April 20, 1965, the Fiscal enter
ed his appearance for the government and manifested that he was ready for trial.
ISSUE WON Callanta can contest the validity of his arrest HELD NO Ratio Posting
of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a
person and estops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. Reasoning - I
n the case of Luna vs. Plaza, the Court held that where petitioner has filed an
application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he waived
his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conduct
ed, prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - This doctrine has been uphel
d in a number of cases including People vs. Olandar, Zacarias vs. Cruz, Bermejo
vs. Barrios, People vs. La Caste, Manzano vs Villa and People vs. Obngayan which
stated that where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary investi
gation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examina
tion conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. - The city fiscal
had been quite active in the investigation and in the prosecution of the accuse
d. It was he who manifested his readiness to appear in the trial. Obiter - With
regard to the issue of whether or not the only person vested with authority to c
onduct a preliminary investigation is the city fiscal, the Charter of the City o
f Dagupan provides that the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct prelimina
ry investigation for for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment
and may release or commit any person charged with such offense to secure his ap
pearance before the proper court. Dispositive WHEREFORE, these petitions for cer
tiorari are dismissed. The restraining order issued by this Court is lifted and
set aside. Costs against petitioner.
CALLANTA v VILLANUEVA 77 SCRA 377 FERNANDO; June 20, 1977
NATURE Original petitions in the Supreme Court, certiorari with preliminary inju
nction FACTS - Judge Villanueva of Dagupan refused to grant the motions to quash
two complaints for oral defamation against Callanta. - Callantas counsel argued
that there was an issue with regard to the validity of Villanuevas issuance of th
e warrants of arrest on the ground that it should have been the City Fiscal who
conducted the preliminary investigation. - After the warrants were issued (with
bail pegged at P600), Callanta posted the required bail bonds and was granted he
r provisional liberty. - The City Fiscal had manifested his intent to prosecute
the case.

SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concurring]


- Sec. 77 of the Dagupan City charter expressly empowers its city court (formerl
y municipal court) to conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without
regard to the limits of punishment. - Every justice of the peace, municipal jud
ge (meaning city judge), city or provincial fiscal, shall have authority to cond
uct preliminary examination or investigation in accordance with these rules of a
ll offenses alleged to have been committed within his municipality, city or prov
ince, cognizable by the Court of First Instance (Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Law an
d Sec. 2, Rule 112).
Criminal Procedure
RODRIGUEZ v VILLAMIEL 65 Phil 230 IMPERIAL; DEC 23, 1937
FACTS -Victor Villamiel, special agent for the Anti-Usury Board, made two affida
vits for the purpose of obtaining search warrants against Rodriguez and Evangeli
sta. The text of both affidavits reads as follows: "Victor D. Villamiel having ta
ken the oath prescribed by law, appears and states: that he has and there is jus
t and probable cause to believe and he does believe that the books, lists, chits
, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to the activities of Juan Evang
elista, as usurer, are being kept and concealed in the house of said Juan Evange
lista situated at Lucena, Tayabas, all of which is contrary to the statute of la
w." -The justice of the peace of the provincial capital issued the two search wa
rrants against the petitioners (see original for the wording of the warrant) -Vi
llamiel, with other agents and a constabulary soldier, executed the warrants, we
nt to the residences of the petitioners, searched them and seized documents and
papers belonging to petitioners. Villamiel issued a receipt to each of the petit
ioners, without specifying the documents and papers seized by him, which were ta
ken to his office in Manila, keeping them there until he was ordered by the CFI
to deposit them in the office of the clerk of court. -Petitioners filed a petiti
on praying that the search warrants be declared null and void and illegal; that
Villamiel be punished for contempt of court for having conducted the searches an
d for having seized the documents and papers without issuing detailed receipts a
nd for not having turned them over to the court, and that said documents and pap
ers be ordered returned to the petitioners. -the CFI found Villamiel guilty of c
ontempt of court and fined him P10. The court declared the search warrants and t
he seizure of the documents and papers VALID, authorizing the agents of the Anti
-Usury Board to examine them and retain those that are necessary and material to
whatever criminal action they may wish to bring against the petitioners. -Petit
ioners appealed. They contend that the search warrants issued by the court are i
llegal because they have been based on the affidavits of special agent Villamiel
wherein he affirmed and stated that he had no personal knowledge of the facts t
hat were to serve as basis for the issuance of the search warrants, but merely c
onfined himself to asserting that he believed and there was probable cause to be
lieve that the documents and papers were related to the activities of the petiti
oners as usurers. As has been seen, the special agent s affirmation in this resp
ect consisted merely in the following: "that he has and there is just and probab
le cause to believe and he does believe that the books (etc) relating to the act
ivities of . . . as usurer, are being kept and concealed in the house. . . all o
f which is contrary to the statute of law." ISSUE WON the search warrant and the
seizure were illegal HELD YES
a2010 page 57
-Reason 1: it appears that the affidavits, which served as the exclusive basis o
f the search warrants, are insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the m
anner in which the oaths were made and, therefore, it is hereby held that the se
arch warrants in question and the subsequent seizure of the documents and papers
are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petition
ers were subjected. -The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts with
in the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpos

e thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making th


e affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probabl
e cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a s
earch warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could b
e charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. -Sec 1, par 3,
of Art III, Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons
, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall n
ot be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be deter
mined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainan
t and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Sec 97 of General Orders No.
58: "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon applica
tion supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized." - Both provisions require that there be not only
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warra
nt must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of at
testation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform a
n act faithfully and truthfully. -Reason 2: At the hearing of the case, it was s
hown that the documents and papers had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usu
ry Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of them as eviden
ce against the petitioners in the criminal cases that may be brought against the
m. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purp
ose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose pos
session they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreas
onable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision proh
ibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself Therefore, it ap
pearing that the documents and papers were seized for the purpose of fishing for
evidence to be used against the petitioners in the criminal proceedings for vio
lation of the Anti-Usury Law which might be instituted against them, this court
holds that the search warrants issued are illegal and that the documents and pap
ers should be returned to them. - Definition and rationale of search warrant: A
search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the P
hilippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it bef
ore the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, a
nd that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from th
e inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is nece
ssary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for th
e enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.
BURGOS SR v CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800 ESCOLIN; December 26, 1984
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandat
ory and prohibitory injunction FACTS - December 7, 1982 Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao CFI
Rizal [Quezon City], issued two search warrants under which the premises known
as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, business address of Metropolitan Mail
newspaper, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, busin
ess address of the "We Forum" newspaper were searched. - office and printing mac
hines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the p
rinting, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerou
s papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the pos
session and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We F
orum" newspaper, were seized. - The questioned search warrants were issued by re
spondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, Intelligence Office
r of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit o

f Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligenc


e and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the p
remises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on Decemb
er 7, 1982. - Respondents aver that the case should be dismissed on the ground t
hat petitioners had come to SC without having previously sought the quashal of t
he search warrants before the issuing judge. But this procedural flaw notwithsta
nding, SC took cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgenc
y of the constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest genera
ted by the search. - Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on grou
nd of laches, since said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, but th
e instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983. However,
SC found that the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently n
egate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of t
he seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. Petition
ers Claims > Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to cond
uct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses,
as mandated by the constitution as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Cou
rt. However, SC found that as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing
on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent
judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses, this issue is moot and academic.
Criminal Procedure
> Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b] were used to search two distinct
places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Buildin
g, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Objection is interposed to the execution of Searc
h Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search w
arrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedl
y keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Proj
ect 6, Quezon City. > although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, J
r. alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Sori
ano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. > real properties were s
eized under the disputed warrants. > that documents relied on by respondents cou
ld not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon w
hich a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution ISSUES WON the two search warrants are: 1. defective for stat
ing only one and the same place to be searched 2. null and void for including pr
operties not owned by the person named in the warrants 3. null and void for incl
uding real properties 4. null and void for being violative of the constitution,
thus encroaching on petitioners fundamental rights HELD 1. NO - The defect poin
ted out is a typographical error. Two search warrants were applied for and issue
d because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. The addre
sses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the appl
ication, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which execut
ed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the ty
pographical error is more apparent than real. - In the determination of whether
a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particula
rity, it has been held "that the executing officer s prior knowledge as to the p
lace intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had is
sued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the build
ing described in the affidavit. And it has also been said that the executing off
icer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguit
y in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 2. NO - Section 2, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under
a search warrant. The rule does not require that the property to be seized shou
ld be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or p
ossession of the property sought to be seized. 3. NO

a2010 page 58
- Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code , "machinery, receptables, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works whi
ch may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable prope
rty. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on wh
ich the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in questio
n, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to sei
zure under a search warrant. 4. YES - Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when th
e search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at b
ar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specificatio
n, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published o
r is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. - In mandating
that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, . . . after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce the Constitution requires no less than personal know
ledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance o
f a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. CFI, SC ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of t
he petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the c
ommitting magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the is
suance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." - the search warrant
s are in the nature of general warrants. - As a consequence of the search and se
izure, the premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is i
n the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners freedom to express themselves in print. Dispositive Search Warrant
s Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
null and void. All articles seized thereunder are ordered released to petitioner
s.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was able to locate Ruben Burgos, who wa
s plowing his field at the time. - When asked about the firearm, the accused den
ied possession of it, but after questioning the accuseds wife, the police were ab
le to locate and retrieve the said firearm, a .38 caliber S & W, buried in the g
round below their house. The police, after accused pointed them to the location,
were also able to retrieve alleged subversive documents (a notebook and a pamph
let) hidden underground a few meters away from the house. - To prove accuseds sub
versive activities, Masamlok testified that accused came to his house and told h
im to join the NPA or his family will be killed along with him. The threat to hi
s life and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA. He later attended an NPA semi
nar where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly that he is an NPA toge
ther with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encourage
d the group to overthrow the government. To prove illegal possession, a person i
n charge of firearms and explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified that accused
was not among the list of firearm holders - On the other hand, accused-appellan
ts claims that he was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership of t
he gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was
forced to admit possession or ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as Rubens
wife Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the accuseds denial of
the charge against him. Urbana claimed that it was Masamlok who left the firearm
there. - The RTC after considering the evidences presented by both prosecution
and defense convicted accused Ruben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion. The RTC j


ustified the warrantless arrest as falling under one of the circumstances when a
rrests may be validly made without a warrant, under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules
of Court. It stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos,
the fact that the authorities received an urgent report of accused s involvement
in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the c
ircumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within th
e ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and applicable jurisprudence on the matter. If t
he arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the all
eged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provide
d by Rule 126, Sec. 12. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dang
erous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the of
fense. ISSUES 1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his house and th
e subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents conducted in a lawful manne
r. 2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. H
ELD 1. NO Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards against wanton and unreas
onable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers
and effects. In this case, the arrest was made without warrant and since it doe
s not fall within the exceptions of arrests that can
PEOPLE v BURGOS 144 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ; Sept.4, 1986
NATURE Appeal from RTC decision convicting Ruben Burgos of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion FACTS - Prosecution version:
Upon obtaining information from one Cesar Masamlok, who personally and voluntar
ily surrendered to the Davao del Sur police HQ stating that accused Ruben Burgos
forcibly recruited him to join the NPA with the use of a firearm against his li
fe, a team was dispatched the following day to arrest Burgos. Through the help o
f Pedro
Criminal Procedure
be made without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the fruit of the poison
ous tree doctrine applies. Reasoning Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer ar
resting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be com
mitted in his presence or within his view. There is no such personal knowledge i
n this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came
in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location
of the firearm was given by Burgos wife. At the time of arrest, Burgos was not in
actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committ
ing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his
field at the time. - The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be considere
d lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of reasonableness. The SolGen submits tha
t the info given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In ar
rests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crim
e. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspec
t that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offens
e must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity
of the perpetrator. In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of
Masamlok s verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accu
sed had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not y
et ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of i
nformation from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If
an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothin
g that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a p
oisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More important, We find no compelling
reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accu

sed. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining
a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the a
ccused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real ap
prehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, ther
e is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. - The basis fo
r the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masaml
ok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no co
mpulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecut
ion. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warra
nt and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused wh
ile he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search a
nd seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as bei
ng mere incidents to a valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a
waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because
he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructiv
e, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to
the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search there
in.
a2010 page 59
2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subvers
ive documents are inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain
the charge is the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict Burgos b
eyond reasonable doubt. Reasoning Although it is true that the trial court found
Masamloks testimony credible and convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by
the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As state
d in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to question of credibility t
he findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the
obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportm
ent of the witnesses during the trial. But We have also said that this rule is n
ot absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal
. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circ
umstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the tri
al court. In the instant case, Masamloks testimony was totally uncorroborated. Co
nsidering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended
on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be
charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. Hi
s testimony cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be
exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreo
ver, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged N
PA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok s testimony that the accused use
d the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subvers
ive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness. Dispositive Judgmen
t of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on ground
s of reasonable doubt.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court. Their purpose was to
recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evid
ence against them, and to challenge their fingerprinting, photographing and para
ffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination. - The petit
ioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were
taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confi
rmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoid
ance. ISSUE WON the search of petitioners premises was illegal. HELD YES. Ratio E
ven if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would n
ot have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which cove
rs both the innocent and the guilty. Reasoning Article IV, Section 3, of the 197

3 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, p


apers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination un
der oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. Article IV, Section 4(2): Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
. -The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, so
ught to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior ord
ers. There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of Ma
yor Cesar Climaco. - Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constit
ution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did n
ot excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. - Zamboanga City a
t the time in question certainly did not excuse the nonobservance of the constit
utional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state
of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions commit
ted therein against the petitioners. - The record does not disclose that the pet
itioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zo
na," they were merely suspected of the mayor s slaying and had not in fact even
been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not
guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. - lacking the shield of innocenc
e, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a de
served sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due
process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest
of the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Right
s, a majority of one.
ALIH v CASTRO 151 SCRA 279 CRUZ; June 23, 1987
NATURE Petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and res
training order FACTS - On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundr
ed Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compoun
d occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search
of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. - The military operation was
commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was like the feared practice of t
he kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a local
ity, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them out
right (although the last part is not included in the modern refinement). - The i
nitial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion wit
h a burst of gunfire. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued,
resulting in a number of casualties. - 16 male occupants were arrested, later to
be finger-printed, paraffintested and photographed over their objection. The mi
litary also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rif
le grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
Criminal Procedure
- The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fa
ct not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity
to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the we
apons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. - Conceding that the search
was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considere
d valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law
enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pi
ck up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arr
est, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy. - If
the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connect

ion with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what
was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. P
arenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b)
, the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground there
for. - It follows that as the search of the petitioners premises was violative
of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compo
und are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitione
rs. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the
search of the petitioners premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared IL
LEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in eviden
ce against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall
remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have bee
n or may later be filed against the petitioners.
a2010 page 60
possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.
- He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles
recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He w
as prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the m
erits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of th
e offense. (It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at t
he time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he was sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Te
mporal, and to pay the costs. The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are for
feited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby direct
ed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City.) - The p
etitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a d
ecision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming the appealed decision with c
osts against the petitioner. Hence, this petition for review, the main thrust of
which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items whi
ch were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in ev
idence against him. ISSUE WON the warrantless search imposed on the petitioner i
s valid HELD NO Ratio - The argument of the Solicitor General that when the two
policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just comm
itted the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the prese
nce of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contra
band was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is untenable. At the time the peace off
icers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he at
tempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committ
ing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just sus
pected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warran
t. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop
and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the con
stitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs
. de Villa (to quote: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Wh
ere, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or f
lashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. True, the m
anning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in unif
orm in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But,
at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales

discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abno
rmal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pa
y for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Checkpoints may also be regar
ded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government in the interest of
public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA
"sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the ala
rming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which a
re reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic condit
ions ? which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times.) - In this case, the warrantless search and seizure is more reas
onable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciousl
y and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the po
lice officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police o
fficers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they sh
all have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove t
o be useless, futile and much too late. - In People vs. CFI of Rizal, the Court
held as follows: . . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably nece
ssary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules
of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are ex
ceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to eff
ect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except wit
hout warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure be
comes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circum
stances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence o
r absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made
, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. Clearl
y, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofor
e discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
es and seizures has not been violated. Dispositive The petition is denied
POSADAS v CA (PEOPLE) 188 SCRA 288 GANCAYCO; August 2, 1990
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assign
ed with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magall
anes Street, Davao City on October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o clock in the mornin
g. They spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acti
ng suspiciously while they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleg
es They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the IN
P. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the
two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the peti
tioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial
No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear
gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought
the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of
the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority t
o
ALLADO v DIOKNO [supra, page 48] MALALOAN v CA (FINEZA) 232 SCRA 249 REGALADO; M
ay 6, 1994
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. FACTS - 1st Lt. Ab
salon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with t
he Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The
search warrant was sought for in connection with
Criminal Procedure

an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition


s) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, QUEZON CITY
. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of KALOOKAN CITY issued Search Warrant
No. 95-90. - On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed
with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to,
where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Resear
ch (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM s Inventory of Property S
eized, firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, we
re seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found
within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most
of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILE
R Instructors, who were indicted for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No.
Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, preside
d over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco. - On July 10, 1990, petitioners p
resented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Supp
ression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence before the Quezon City court; and a
Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant
and Exclusion of evidence Illegally Obtained . - On September 21, 1990, the resp
ondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject case
s but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the
validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the cat
egory of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraphs 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be serve not only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the iss
uing court (National Capital Judicial Region). - Respondent Court of Appeals ren
dered judgment, in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due cour
se to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it
had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respo
ndent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present rec
ourse before us. ISSUE WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a s
earch warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial ju
risdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outsid
e its territorial jurisdiction. HELD YES - No law or rule imposes such a limitat
ion on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided
for warrants of arrest. The arguments of petitioners are not inferable by necess
ary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete
and expressive of the intendment of the framers. A contrary interpretation on wh
atever pretext should not be countenanced. - A bit of legal history on his conte
station will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and p
rocess of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province o
nly with the approval of the former court of first instance. Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs
the approval of
a2010 page 61
the regional trial court. On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processe
s of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippin
es, under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified wr
its issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicia
l region. - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS The Court cannot be blind to the fact that
it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information
regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articl
es. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites fo
r the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, o
nce detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of pro
cedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that m
atter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down o
n objections based on territorial jurisdiction. - We do not believe that the enf
orcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdict
ion wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional qu

estion. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement
authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by fil
ing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be re
called that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the
constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search wa
rrant, and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichev
er region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requiremen
ts, together with the tenday lifetime of the warrant would discourage resort to
a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also th
e contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compe
lling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are
enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property a
nd privacy, but persons and liberty. - On the other hand, it is a matter of judi
cial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and
national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or f
inancial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtai
n a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should
we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applic
ant s witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk
, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of
experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by
respondent court: "This court is of the further belief that the possible leakag
e of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warra
nt is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not
hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the pl
ace to be searched is located." - The foregoing situations may also have obtaine
d and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the
absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of th
e county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the coun
ty and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another c
ourt having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. In the present
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with
respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement the
reof anywhere in the Philippines. - NONETHELESS, TO PUT DOUBTS TO REST, THE SUPR
EME COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING POLICY GUIDELINES; 1. The Court wherein the cr
iminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warra
nt may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstanc
es that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which m
ay or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of th
e justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisd
iction thereover. 2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion t
o quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without pr
ejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggr
ieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then av
ailable, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceed
ings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived. 3. W
here no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issui
ng court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under th
e warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate co
urts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to q
uash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that ob
jections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal

of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The reso
lution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any p
roper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 4. Where the court which issued th
e search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise preven
ted from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warr
ant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case
is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor. 5. These g
uidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged
in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with con
current original jurisdiction over the criminal action. When the issue of which
court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered
as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case. Dispositive WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises,
the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SEPARATE OPINION DAVIDE [concurring and dissenting]
- The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuin
g a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any cour
t of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in
Criminal Procedure
connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majo
rity view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan
, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue
one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts
in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a s
earch warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines.
Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for purposes of issui
ng a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago. - I cannot subscr
ibe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident
to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore,
the authority to issue it must necessarily be coextensive with the court s terr
itorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the stat
utory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of
the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdi
ction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 1
29 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropo
litan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts ar
e confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may l
egitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accus
ed or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience
as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to f
ile a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes
. - Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation
of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in
connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it
may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by s
everal Judges ---- specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manil
a, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the C
ourt of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the
City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) ---- there is no definite showi
ng that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of prop
erties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warr
ants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were off
icers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addressed in Ma

nila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City bot
h belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdict
ional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of th
e unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants. - I have serious misgivin
gs on the majority decision on the matter where another court may, because of ex
treme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a
criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the
Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the searc
h of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have
been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an informat
ion filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the excepti
on violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction,
the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the
a2010 page 62
case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 86
7, 870 [1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does no
t have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the
case does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including sea
rch warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance
of a search warrants is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the anci
llary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclus
ive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and
processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of
justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial pr
ocess, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enfo
rcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelli
ng circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case c
annot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority. - In the light of t
he foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectful
ly submit that: 1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was c
ommitted may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in
connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Ad
ministrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 mus
t be observed. 2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the
appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only
be issued by said court.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
Respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against Bil
ly Cerbo for lack of probable cause and recalling the warrant for his arrest and
ordered the withdrawal of the amended information and the filing of a new one c
harging Jonathan Cerbo only. - Private Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsidera
tion which was denied by the respondent judge. - The Court of Appeals held that
Judge Eugenio Valles did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the w
arrant of arrest issued against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and subsequently
dismissing the Information for murder filed against the private respondent, beca
use the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate such charge. ISSUE WON
the Trial Court had the authority to reverse the public prosecutor s finding of
probable cause to prosecute accused and thus dismiss the case filed by the latte
r on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest HELD NO Ratio The determin
ation of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that be
longs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of
the exercise of which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon. - If the information is valid on its face and there
is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the p
art of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence
, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. T
he functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "th
e proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly unde

rstood. Reasoning: Executive Determination of Probable Cause - The Separate (Con


curring) Opinion of former Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court o
f Appeals : xxxthe Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as h
as thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conc
lusion as to whether or not it suffices "to engender a well founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof an
d should be held for trial." - It is a function that this Court should not be ca
lled upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public pros
ecutor., one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are con
cerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort,
exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor.
It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed
to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal comme
ncement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may
well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a f
inal, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the per
sons charged with a felony or crime. Whether or not that function has been corre
ctly discharged by the public prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself
does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. It is not for instance permitte
d for an accused, upon the filing of the information against him by
PEOPLE v CA (CERBO) 301 SCRA 475 PANGANIBAN; January 21, 1999
NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45. FACTS - Rosalinda Dy was shot at point
blank range by Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, B
illy Cerbo - Elsa B. Gumban (eyewitness) identified Jonathan Cerbo as the assail
ant. - The 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a
preliminary investigation, found "sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded b
elief" that the crime of murder has been committed by private respondent Jonatha
n Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to the provincial
prosecutor at Tagum, Davao. - After an information for murder was filed against
Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda
Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of c
onspiracy in the killing , supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumb
an, alleging that the shooting was done in the office and in the presence of Bil
ly Cerbo who after the shooting did nothing (did not apply first aid nor bring t
he victim to the hospital) After a reinvestigation the prosecution filed an amen
ded information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arre
st was later issued. - Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to qua
sh warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause.
Criminal Procedure
the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court
praying for the quash or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evid
ence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the ant
ipodal theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, for the complaining part
y to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be c
ompelled to file the corresponding information against the accused. xxx xxx xxx
- Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probab
le cause exists and to charge those whom he or she believes to have committed th
e crime as defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicia
l authority to determine whether or not a criminal case list be filed in court.
- Crespo v. Mogul: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either c
ommenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or informa
tion, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to wh
ether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal pros
ecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or

unfounded prosecutions by private persons. Judicial Determination of Probable C


ause - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be di
stinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arres
t, which is a judicial function. The judicial determination of probable cause in
the issuance of arrest warrants has been emphasized in numerous cases. - The ru
lings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where w
e explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has bee
n committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuin
g a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitte
d, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty thereof." At this stage of the criminal proce
eding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted du
ring the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluate
s such evidence in determining probable cause. - As held in Inting, the determin
ation of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that w
hich is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe t
hat the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is
what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines wheth
er a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there
is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrat
e the ends of justice. - Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant
of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corol
lary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor s de
termination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground
a2010 page 63
that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant wa
s insufficient, as in the present case. Inapplicabilty of Allado and Salonga - A
llado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked o
nly if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. However, the present ca
se is not on all fours with Allado and Salonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principa
l eyewitness to the killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participation or conspira
tor in the commission of the said crime. In Allado and Salonga, however, the mai
n witnesses were the confessed perpetrators of the crimes, whose testimonies the
court deemed tainted . Second, in the case at bar, the private respondent was
accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias during the investigation
of the case can be imputed to the public prosecutor. On the other hand, the Cour
t noted in Allado the "undue haste in the filing of the Information and in the i
nordinate interest of the government" in pursuing the case; and in Salonga, " .
. . the failure of the prosecution to show that the petitioner was probably guil
ty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner s cons
titutioner rights and the massive and damaging publicity against him." The rulin
gs in the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was c
onducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Poli
ce should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted i
n an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Also, they question the validity of th
e search. ISSUES 1. WON the check point was illegal 2. WON the search was valid
3. WON the accused are guilty of violation of RA 6425 HELD 1. NO - Not all check
points are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. Ratio This
Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted
by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a cer
tain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it ca
nnot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers

during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or tw
o. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to
a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right agai
nst unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixe
d area, are even less intrusive. - The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursua
nce of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to imp
lement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedest
rians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those
who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a c
ar to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. - The facts adduced
do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the a
ccused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were mere
ly stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily
tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they w
ould merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without op
ening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is noth
ing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. We see no need
for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it
be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Eve
n so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed
location and the regularized manner in which they are operated. 2. YES - Escano
consented to the search and consented warrantless search is one of the exceptio
ns from the warrant requirement. Ratio Jurisprudence recognizes six generally ac
cepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest
; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs searche
s; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.
PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ 323 SCRA 754 DAVIDE; January 28, 2000
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the two a
ccused together with Julian D. Escano for the violation of R.A. 6425, as amended
FACTS - On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforce
rs of the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil P
uyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. They were checking the cars going to P
asay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running s
top on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Pla
te No. TBH 493. One of the policemen saw a long firearm on the lap of the person
seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They
asked the driver, identified as Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long
firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, pa
rked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were search for more weapon
s. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. - The
three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the K
ia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over th
e key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicl
e, he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk
himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao
to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by
National Bureau of Investigation, was found positive for hashish. - An informat
ion for violation of RA 6425 thereafter was filed against them. The trial court
found the three accused guilty of the said crime.
Criminal Procedure
- Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot
invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search
done on the car of Escao was consented to by him. 3. NO - No fact was adduced to
link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car and there was
no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of
the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Ratio Despite the validi

ty of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violati
on of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding
of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not op
ened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms;
(3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until
the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao,
without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police sta
tion and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the possession and c
ontrol of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to
the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the l
atters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an app
reciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate th
em to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug.
In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hash
ish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Disp
ositive Accused appellants are hereby acquitted.
a2010 page 64
ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao, the search of the latt
ers person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained th
erefrom is valid 2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being in plain view
of the police officers HELD 1. YES - We also hold that the warrantless arrest o
f accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in th
ree instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his p
resence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; - Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a perso
n may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing
, or is attempting to commit an offense." - In the case, Doria was caught in the
act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delic
to as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but d
uty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. - However, the warrantless arres
t, search and seizure of Gaddao is invalid - Accused-appellant Gaddao was not ca
ught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest unde
r Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the f
inding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to
flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she
was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. - Neither c
ould the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Ru
le 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5
(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual beli
ef or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In case, there was no reasonable suspici
on especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identificat
ion made by her co-accused - Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his asso
ciate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills
. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant
Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria may have left th
e money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspir
acy. Save for accused-appellant Doria s word, the Narcom agents had no reasonab
le grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. - As the arrest was
illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest 2. NO - The mari
juana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without the r
equisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as the
contents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readily app
arent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- As a general rule, objects in plain view of arresting officers may be seized w
ithout a search warrant but must follow these requisites: (a) the law enforcemen

t officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion o


r is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery o
f the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to t
he officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or o
therwise subject to seizure. - However, if it is not plain view of the police of
ficers, it may not be seized without a warrant except if the package proclaims i
ts contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if i
ts contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized. - The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijua
na 137 was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a fin
ding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. Dispositive the decision o
f the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in
Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows: 1. Accused-appella
nt Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perp
etua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). 2. Accusedappellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
PEOPLE v ELAMPARO 329 SCRA 404 QUISUMBING; March 31, 2000
NATURE Appeal from judgment of RTC. FACTS - Acting on a report by an informant,
police officers conducted a buy-bust operation (of marijuana) in Caloocan. They
arrested the person who sold them the marijuana (Spencer), but the same was able
to escape. Then: the buy-bust team pursued Spencer, who ran inside a bungalow-type
house. Having trapped Spencer inside the house, the police officers frisked him
and recovered the marked money. The officers also found Elamparo repacking 5 br
icks of marijuana inside the houses sala Elamparo was then arrested and were take
n to a precinct and delivered to an inquest fiscal for further investigation. The
buy-bust operation and arrest happened on the same day (12 Feb 1995), while the
information for illegal possession of drugs was filed on 15 Feb 1995. - Arraign
ment: plea of not guilty. - Trial: prosecution presented the ff witnesses: polic
e officer who was also poseur-buyer, another officer who took part in buy-bust,
and NBI chemist who examined and confirmed the confiscated drugs to be marijuana
. Defense presented as witnesses boarders of Elamparos house, saying that Elampar
o was at their house when somebody knocked at their door. His father opened the s
ame and was informed that somebody was looking for him. He went out and saw Spen
cer with handcuffs and being held by an arresting officer. When Elamparo persist
ently questioned Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting officers got m
ad at him prompting them to likewise bring him to the police station where he wa
s detained. The officers demanded P15,000.00 for his release which he did not gi
ve. On the other hand, Spencer gave the sum and was released.
PEOPLE v DORIA 301 SCRA 668 PUNO; January 22, 1999
FACTS - Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received in
formation from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in il
legal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided to entrap him via a buybust operation. -The poseur-buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600 pesos as marked
money for the entrapment operation, which was then handed to Jun upon transactio
n. Jun returned an hour later bringing marijuana where he and his associates sub
sequently arrested Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun said he lef
t the bills to his associate Neneth. Jun led the police to Neneths house. - The pol
ice went to Neneths house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton b
ox under the dining table. He saw that one of the box s flaps was open and insid
e the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth s" house and took hold of the box. He pe
eked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared
to be dried marijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. They arrested J
un and Neneth and brought them to headquarters. It was only then that the police
learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao
y Catama. - The trial court found them guilty.

Criminal Procedure
- RTC: Guilty, under RA 6425. penalty of reclusion perpetua and fine of P9millio
n. Elamparo appealed. ISSUE: 1. WON RTC was correct in the assessment of credibi
lity of witnesses 2. WON the arrest of Elamparo was valid 3. WON the penalty imp
osed was correct HELD: 1. YES Ratio: Unless the trial court overlooked substanti
al facts which would affect the outcome of the case, we accord the utmost respec
t to their findings of facts. Reasoning: -Elamparo contends that it is highly un
usual for arresting officers to act on an information of an unknown source without
confirming the veracity of the report, and that it is incredible that a peddler
of marijuana would be so brazen as to approach total strangers and offer to sel
l them marijuana. He insists that he was charged with illegal possession of mari
juana because he failed to pay the police officers P15,000.00 for his release. it is well-settled that the assessment of credibility of witnesses is within th
e province of the trial court which had an opportunity to observe the witnesses
and their demeanor during their testimonies. As compared to the baseless claims
of Elamparo, the version of the prosecution witnesses appears worthy of belief,
coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performe
d their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. -in many cases, drug pushe
rs did sell their prohibited articles to prospective customers, be they stranger
s or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, s
ome drug pushers appear to have become exceedingly daring, openly defiant of the
law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and
the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well
as the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs 2. YES Ratio: The
arrest was within the purview of Sec5 (a), Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedur
e, to wit: Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private per
son may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the pers
on to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to com
mit an offense; Reasoning: -Elamparo assails the legality of his arrest for fail
ure of the apprehending officers to secure a search warrant. - for warrantless a
rrests, 2 elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an ov
ert act indicating the he has just committed, is actually committing, or is atte
mpting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or with
in the view of the arresting officer. Thus, when he was seen repacking the marij
uana, the police officers were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant. Re: warrantless seizures: -However, not being absol
ute, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to exceptio
ns. Thus, for example, Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules on CrimPro, provides that a perso
n lawfully arrested may be
a2010 page 65
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the comm
ission of an offense, without a search warrant. -5 generally accepted exceptions
to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have also been judicially
formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by th
e accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. - t
his case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine People v Doria: Objects fal
ling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have t
hat view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introdu
ced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justi
fication for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particula
r area; (b) discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) immediat
ely apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime
, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must l
awfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came ina
dvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must

be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. - members of the buy-bust
team were justified in running after Spencer (when he escaped) and entering the
house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing crim
inal. Once inside the house, the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered
the buy-bust money from him. They also caught Elamparo in flagrante delicto repa
cking the marijuana bricks which were in full view 3. YES Ratio: Minority serves
as a privileged mitigating circumstance to a crime, thus entitling the accused
to a reduction of penalty one degree lower than that imposable (by virtue of art
.13 (2) RPC) Reasoning: - contends that if found guilty, the privileged mitigati
ng circumstance of minority should be appreciated in his favor. - In drug cases,
the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is determinative of the imposable pen
alty. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, pr
ovides that when the quantity of indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or more,
as in this case, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death and fine rangi
ng from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,
000.00). - Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978, was only 17 years, 1 m
onth, and 3 days old, at the time of the commission of the crime on February 12,
1995. - being a minor over 15 and under 18 at the time of the commission, he is
entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance - T
hus, penalty should be reduced to reclusion temporal. No fine is imposable in th
is case, for it is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclu
sion perpetua to death. Dispositive Petition AFFIRMED with modification.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
An appeal taken by accused Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes from the judgment of RTC
Iloilo City, convicting them of murder and sentencing them to each "suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties as provided in Articl
e 41 of the Revised Penal Code" and "to indemnify the family of their victim in
the amount of P50,000.00 plus P21,250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and ot
her related matter and to pay the costs. FACTS - July 12, 1991, Provincial Prosec
utor of Iloilo Province filed with RTC Iloilo City, an INFORMATION charging the
accused with MURDER: "That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the Municipali
ty of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mu
tually helping one another to better realize their purpose armed with a knife an
d a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or evident premeditati
on, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, st
ab and shot Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with which
they were then provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds a
nd gun shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death imm
ediately thereafter." - prosecution recommended NO BAIL for the provisional libe
rty of the accused. - July 22, 1991 - TC issued a WARRANT OF ARREST against the
accused - October 18, 1991 TC ordered the case ARCHIVED for failure to locate th
e two accused - June 24, 1992 - Sergon and Ramil Manes were ARRESTED in Romblon,
Romblon - September 17, 1992 - Upon ARRAIGNMENT, both accused pleaded NOT GUILT
Y to the information - August 25, 1992 - accused filed a PETITION FOR BAIL which
was opposed by the prosecution. TC did not hear the petition for bail. Neither
did the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial. - January 13
, 1995 - TC convicted the accused of murder - February 10, 1995 - both accused a
ppealed to SC where accused questioned TCs failure (a) to hear the petition for b
ail (b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil Manes and (c) to take
note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite s unlawful aggression Accor
ding to the prosecution > June 23, 1991 5 in the afternoon, ALAN Catequista with
NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita, went to see a basketball game at the barangay
plaza. When the game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor to go home;
at that time, he was still seated. Accused RAMIL Manes approached Nicanor and po
inted a 38 caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill me
during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the one to kill you." Ni
canor ran to Alan and used him as a shield from Ramil. At that point, Alan heard
a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused SERGON Manes with a gory knife and

he also saw Nicanor running away, with blood on his back. Ramil Manes pursued N
icanor and shot him hitting him at the back, just above the waistline. Both accu
sed continued to chase Nicanor who ran towards the premises of the house of ADIN
G Ablado. Ramil Manes fired two more
PEOPLE v MANES 303 SCRA 231 PARDO; February 17, 1999
NATURE
Criminal Procedure
shots. It could not be determined whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the
accused were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading. Jose who was nea
r Nicanor when the two accused chased him did not render assistance to him. Afte
r Alan heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told his father and uncle
that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, J
ose and the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of Nicanor was in the
downhill portion of the premises of the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his
back, with 2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab wound. According
to the accused(Ramil) > June 23, 1991 in the afternoon, he was at home cooking.
At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the direction of the baranga
y basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his house. He went
to the window to check what it was. He saw his younger brother Sergon lying on
the concrete pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three of whom
he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose. They kept on boxing and kicking his bro
ther prompting him to come to the latter s aid. On his way out, he saw a gun on
top of the table and brought it with him to the basketball court. > While on his
way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor from
stabbing his brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of Sergon, with a
knife in his hand. Sergon was about three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about
ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another shot that hit Nican
or who,, fell to the ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled
to the direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second shot beca
use he saw the group of Alan approaching,, armed with guns .12 Ramil and his bro
ther Sergon went into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they were arres
ted in Romblon. - prosecutions set of facts was favored by the court ISSUE WON pe
titioner has a right to bail HELD NO Ratio When an accused is charged with a cap
ital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonme
nt or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neit
her a matter of right nor of discretion Reasoning - In offenses punishable by re
clusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail w
hen evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to dete
rmine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny b
ail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear
his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or i
mpliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolv
ing the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not cal
l the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It
was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring t
o the attention of the trial Court at the earliest opportune time, appellants ar
e deemed to have waived their right to bail. - defense of relative: FAILED TO PR
OSPER because
a2010 page 66
1) unlawful aggression, the essential element to defense of relative is absent b
ecause if it were true that Sergon was being attacked, he would have suffered in
juries. 2) if indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who was t
hen under attack, he would not harbor any fear in presenting himself to the prop
er authorities. - even though prosecution failed to show evident premeditation,
trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the killing of the vict
im to murder. Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court convicting a

ccused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of
the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amou
nt of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
are strong, clear, and convincing. Consideration of the said factors and circums
tances would have resulted in the denial of bail. Reasoning - Article III, Secti
on 13 of the Bill of Rights provides: All persons, except those charged with offe
nses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
fore conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recogniza
nce as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall n
ot be required. - Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides: No person charg
ed with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or lif
e imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of criminal prosecution. - In the case at bar, bail is di
scretionary and not a matter of right considering that the punishment for the of
fense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is dependent on the evidence
of the guilt which should which should be strong to justify denial. this determi
nation is a matter of judicial discretion. - By judicial discretion, the law man
dates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt
is strong. Proof evident or evident proof is this connection, has been held to m
ean clear, strong evidence which leads a well guarded dispassionate judgment to
the conclusion that an offense has been committed as charged, that the accused i
s the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law i
s administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are
such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, cle
ar, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probabili
ty of any other conclusion. In other words, the test is not whether the evidence
establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident g
uilt or a great presumption of guilt. - In the case of an application for bail,
the duties of the judge are as follows: 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; 2. Cond
uct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prose
cution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is stro
ng for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion 3. Decide wh
ether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evi
dence of the prosecution 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the petition should b
e denied. - Based on the duties, the courts order granting or denying bail must c
ontain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a
comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a test or statement. HENCE
, THE SUMMARY SHOULD NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION OR RESTATEMENT OF ALL
THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The Lower court can
not exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be include
d in the summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered defective in form and s
ubstance which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of validity.
PEOPLE v CABRAL 303 SCRA 361 ROMERO; February 18, 1999
NATURE Special Civil Action FACTS - Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape o
f 15 year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, the accused
filed a motion for bail which was opposed by the petitioner. - The lower court
grated the motion on the ground that despite the crime alleged to have been comm
itted is punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence thus far presented is no
t strong enough to warrant denial of the bail. The judge in concluding thus cite
d the fact that the girl went with the offender voluntarily and did not resist d
uring the commission of the rape. In addition, the judge quoted the medico legal
report as not conclusion that rape was in fact committed consideration that the
lacerations on the victim may have been weeks or months old when the medical ex

amination was performed six days after the offense occurred. - The CA affirmed t
he decision saying that there was no abuse of discretion in this case. There is g
rave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despoti
c manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of the law. The People filed the appeal on the gr
ound that while the judge had discretion on the grant of bail, he had abused thi
s discretion. ISSUE - WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse despite a
showing by the prosecutor that there is strong evidence proving respondents guilt
for the crime charged. HELD YES - The SC held that the CA and the lower court f
ailed to mention and include some facts which are significant factors and circum
stances which
Criminal Procedure
Dispositive Grant of bail is declared void. The court should issue a warrant of
arrest of Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved.
a2010 page 67
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d) Ap
proval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused; - Petitioner filed
a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending resolution of his motion
, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled. He then filed a
motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.
00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. - Trial cou
rt denied petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, an
d to suspend arraignment. - Petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting ba
il bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions and the "
hold-departure" order. The pre-trial conference was set. - Petitioner filed a pe
tition for certiorari in CA, assailing the trial courts orders. - While the case
was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against pe
titioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all c
onsolidated. - CA: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearanc
e during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the he
arings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his b
ail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arres
t shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;]
- CA invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for
the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validit
y of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitio
ners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the
cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty
to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention." CA thoug
ht that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art.
III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial m
ay proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." - With respect to the
denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, CA held that
petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it,
but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motio
n to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him. ISSUE WON CA erred i
n not determining the validity of the conditions imposed in the trial courts orde
r of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail.. HELD YES - CA should have determined t
he validity of the conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 f
or the grant of bail because petitioners contention is that his arraignment was h
eld in pursuance of these conditions for bail. - Bail should be granted before a
rraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash
. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then

be no need for the


Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure th
e presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and order
ing his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rul
e 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is
that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by t
he court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused
at the arraignment is required. - On the other hand, to condition the grant of b
ail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where h
e has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment canno
t be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be a
rraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly u
ndermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon val
id complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail. [Under Art. III, 5 of R.A. 7610, the offenses with which petitioner is c
harged are punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion pe
rpetua.] - It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that
"approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which CA sho
uld instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial courts order o
f May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but tha
t he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance w
ith Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The fai
lure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due not
ice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed i
n absentia." - Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the p
roceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guil
t,9 [Rule 116, 1(b)] (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purpo
ses, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense,
in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative.11 [Rule 120, 6
.] At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be wai
ved. - Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignme
nt of petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners conten
tion, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval
of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a
condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although
the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment a
nd the subsequent proceedings against him are valid. - Petitioner concedes that
the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is denied is not
to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to
his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial o
n the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. Howeve
r, he argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He contends that
the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he should be ch
arged under several informations corresponding to the number of acts of child ab
use allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.
SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [dissenting]
- The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the rules of Court are not open wh
en the question is whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound di
scretion. These special reliefs are available only when the judge has committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his dec
ision or order such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or completely acting
on bias and whim.
LAVIDES v CA (PISON and PEOPLE) 324 SCRA 321 MENDOZA; February 1, 2000

FACTS - Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. 7610. His arrest was mad
e without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. - Pare
nts of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter
, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that ni
ght at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel. This was not the first time th
e police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. The police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a
shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn stateme
nt of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submi
tted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. 7610
was filed. - Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detai
ned on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolutio
n of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right
under the Law on Which He is Charged." - Nine more informations for child abuse
were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and b
y three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annaly
n Talingting. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned
in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had
been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as paymen
t for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse." - No bail was recommended. Nonethe
less, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases. - Trial
court granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case
or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions: a) T
he accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of t
hese cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be auto
matically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately
issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
Criminal Procedure
Dispositive The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Region
al Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condi
tion (d) in the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignmen
t a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared v
oid.
a2010 page 68
ISSUE WON he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extraditio
n proceedings are pending HELD NO Ratio. After being taken into custody, potenti
al extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of abscon
ding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no da
nger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling c
ircumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity
as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right;
it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of eac
h case. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows: Art.
III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by recl
usion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be ba
ilable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." - the
constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafte
r he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonabl
e doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to
a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. -

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in t
he United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To str
ess, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the of
fenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts tryin
g the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. - Also, we c
annot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who,
instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hen
ce, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obl
igations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons so
ught to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In th
e absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expr
essly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the pr
actice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards det
erring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their pros
ecutors. > - The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls
into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice
would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to
cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolutio
n of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extr
adition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their sp
eedy disposition. Dispositive the Petition is GRANTED. The bail bond posted by p
rivate respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed t
o conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United
States as well as our Extradition Law.
PEOPLE v FITZGERALD 505 SCRA 573 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; October 27, 2006
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the resolution of CA which gr
anted the Motion for bail of accused-appellant and herein respondent Victor Keit
h Fitzgerald. FACTS - An information was filed in the RTC charging Fitzgerald, a
n Australian citizen, with the violation of Art.III Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) o
f RA 7610 8 stating that, said Fitzgerald, actuated by lust, and by the use of dru
gs willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant AAA, a minor, 13 year
s of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there showering said AAA with gift
s, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation o
f the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice. - RTC rendered a decision fi
nding respondent Guilty of Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 7610 and sentenced t
o an indeterminate term of prision mayor min (8Y 1D) to prision temporal max (17
Y 4M 1D). Upon completion of his sentence, he shall be deported immediately and
forever barred from entry to the Philippines. He was acquitted on the case of ra
pe. On the basis of the evidence adduced, the court considered the view that the
the circumstances of the accused indicate a probability of flight and that ther
e is undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense, if released on ba
il pending appeal. - On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction, modifying the penalt
y to imprisonment of prision temporal (14Y 8M 1D) to reclusion perpetua (20Y 1D)
- Fitzgerald filed for a Motion for a New Trial and a supplemental appeal to th
e motion on the ground that new material of evidence not previously available ha
s surfaced. CA granted the motion for new trial. The original records of the cas
e were remanded to the RTC, which was also directed to receive new evidence. The
motion to transfer the respondent to the National Penitentiary was denied. - Th
e people file a MFR, while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to fix bail with Manifestat
ion. Both motions were denied by CA. The bail application was denied pursuant to
Sec.7 Rule 114 ROC. The maximum penalty imposable in accordance with RA 7610 is
reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong. - The people filed a pe
tition fro review on certiorari. It was dismissed which became final and executo
ry. - Fitzgerald filed with CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and
for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed and a Motion for Bail. CA issued
the assailed resolution granting bail. It stated that although the evidence of g

uilt is strong, Fitzgerald is of old age and not in the best of health. Bail was
granted premised not on the grounds stated in the motion
PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ G.R. No. 148571 PANGANIBAN; September 24, 2002
NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for the lifting of the bail Order, the ca
ncellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody FACTS - The
US govt through diplomatic channels sent to the Phil. govt a note requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt
of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted
them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Secti
on 5 of the Extradition Law. - Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, which prohibited the
DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The TRO was assail
ed byt the Sec. of Justice. Initially, the court dismissed the petition but afte
r acting upon the motion for reconsideration, it reversed its earlier decision.
It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the ev
aluation stage of the extradition process. - Finding no more legal obstacle, the
US govt, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate P
etition for Extradition. The Petition alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an
arrest warrant issued by the US District Court for the Southern District of Flo
rida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the follo
wing charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud (4) false statements, and (5) illegal
campaign contributions. - In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petitio
n prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Sec
tion 6 of PD No. 1069 - Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jim
enez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,"which prayed that
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC grantes the motion of
Jimenez. In that hearing, he manifested its reservations on the procedure adopt
ed by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard pr
ior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo r
equired the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jim
enez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be al
lowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez
was also set for hearing. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July
3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing ba
il for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrende
red his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisio
nal liberty. Hence, this Petition.
8
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminat
ion Act
Criminal Procedure
for bail, but on substantial justice and considering new trial was granted in th
e case. - RTC ordered Fitzgeralds temporary release upon filing a cash bond of P1
00 000.00. Petitioners Claim > People filed this petition to annul the CA Resolut
ion arguing that the CA erred in granting the Motion for Bail despite the crime
charged was punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong
. Plaintiffs Claim > the grant for new trail negated the previous findings of the
existence of strong evidence of guilt. The justification for provisional releas
e is on humanitarian grounds, citing his deteriorating health and old age. ISSUE
S 1. WON CA had jurisdiction over the motion to post bail after issuing the reso
lution granting new trial 2. WON CA erred in allowing bail HELD 1. (the ruling o
n this matter is limited to this specific case) When the SC grants new trial, it
vacates the judgment of the TC convicting the accused and remands the case to t
he TC for reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgm

ent. - However, when CA grants new trial, notwithstanding Sec1 Rule 125 ROC prov
iding for the uniformity of the procedure between the SC and CA, CA may decide q
uestions of fact and of law. When it grants a new trial pursuant to Sec14 Rule 1
24 ROC, it may either a) receive the new evidence under Sec 12 or b) refer the c
ase to the court of origin for reception of such evidence under Sec 15. in eithe
r case, it does not relinquish to the TC jurisdiction over the case. It retains
sufficient authority to resolve the incidents in the case and decide its merits.
- Even when CA remanded the case to the TC, CA retained appellate jurisdiction.
CA retained its authority to act on the respondents bail application. 2. The rig
ht to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of law who may by reason of the presumption of innocence h
e enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee
his appearance before any court, as required under specific conditions. - Bail i
s a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense not punishabl
e by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matter of discretion
on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense pun
ishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt
is strong. 9 - RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of
strong evidence of guilt. Under Sec 6(b) Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allo
ws for reception of newly discovered evidence, but maintains evidence already pr
esented or on record. In the present case, no new evidence had been introduced n
egating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail was not a matter of right b
ut a mere privilege subject to the discretion of CA. - However, the CA admitted
that the bail was based on health reasons disregarding the substantive and proce
dural requirements on bail.
a2010 page 69
- CA made no specific findings that the respondent suffered from an ailment of s
uch gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair
his health or put his life in danger. - Moreover, there is finding on the record
on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. Dispositive p
etition is granted and the CA resolution annulled and set aside. The bail bond p
osted is cancelled. Let an order of arrest issue against the person of the accus
ed.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
56 Phil 801 PEOPLE v CARIAGA 64 Phil 1057 CONCEPCION; June 29, 1937
NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila FACTS - Appellant Deogracia
s Cariaga was convicted of the crime of theft and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day
of arresto mayor and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1.50. - Car
iaga alleges that the court erred in having found him guilty of the crime based
of the fact that the appealed judgment states: Upon arraignment, he entered a ple
a of guilty. The appellant without denying the fact in itself, contends that the
record does not show when, where or how he was arraigned. ISSUE WON the statemen
t in the judgment that the accused has been arraigned and pleaded guilty is suff
icient HELD YES - The statement is in compliance with the provisions of section
16&25 of Gen. Order No. 58, inasmuch as it may be presumed from said statement t
hat the law has been obeyed by causing the accused to appear before the court, a
nd it is shown thereby that he has really been arraigned, his plea entered perso
nally being that of guilty. All this is not a mere conclusion as appellant conte
nds, because the court is of the opinion that generally a conclusion is the aver
ment or denial of a fact deduced from some evidence, or the averment or denial o
f a point of view of law derived from a law or a principle of law. In this case,
however, the courts averment that the accused was arraigned and that he pleaded
guilty, is not a deduction or consequence of an evidence, legal provision or pri
nciple of law, but a positive statement of facts. - It does not make a differenc
e if the court, after hearing the accused plead guilty upon arraignment, stated
such facts in the judgment rendered immediately, in open court and in the presen
ce of the accused, or caused said arraignment and plea to be stated in the minut
es. What is important is that the accused be arraigned and that he enters his pl

ea. It is immaterial how or in what manner such facts are stated. For legal purp
oses, it makes no difference whether they appear in the minutes or in the judgme
nt itself.
US v PALISOC 4 Phil 207 JOHNSON; February 13, 1905
FACTS The defendants were charged with the crime of robbery for entering the hou
se of one Regino Maminta, all being armed with talibones took and carried carrie
d away the sum of 20 pesos, Mexican, and various pieces of jewelry, all of the v
alue of 120 pesos, Mexican. The said defendants were tried and each of the defen
dants, Paulino Palisoc, Fabiano Diadib, Inocencio Valerio, and Domingo Torres, w
as sentenced to be imprisoned for the period of five years of presidio correccio
nal; and Rufino Lavarias, because the court found that he was the leader of the
said band of robbers, was sentenced to a period of six years of presidio correcc
ional. From this sentence Fabiano Diadib, Inocencio Valerio, and Rufino Lavarias
appealed to this court. The record shows that at the beginning of the trial Ruf
ino Lavarias was not present and did not appear in court until after the fiscal
had presented all of the witnesses for the prosecution; all of the other defenda
nts were present, were duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and were represented
by a lawyer; that after the prosecution had closed its case against all of the s
aid defendants except Rufino Lavarias, the court discovered that Rufino Lavarias
was outside the court room. Upon discovering this fact the court ordered the sa
id defendant Rufino Lavarias to appear in the court room, and then and there rec
alled one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Regino Maminta, and proceeded to
examine him with reference to the part Rufino Lavarias took in the said robbery
charged in the complaint, without arraigning the said Rufino Lavarias, reading
to him the complaint, or informing him that he had the right to be represented b
y an attorney during the trial, in accordance with the provisions of sections 16
, 17, and 18 of General Orders, No. 58. ISSUE WON the court did not comply with
the provisions of sections 16, 17, and 18 of General Order No. 58 HELD YES. Rufi
no Lavarias was not arraigned. Dispositive The judgment of the court with refere
nce to Rufino Lavarias is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the CFI Pangasi
nan for the purpose of a new trial. The court is affirmed as to the sentence of
Fabiano Diadib and Inocencio Valerio on the ground of sufficiency of evidence.
PEOPLE v SERNA 130 SCRA 550 CONCEPCION, July 25, 1984
NATURE Automatic review to the Supreme Court FACTS
PEOPLE v AMBROSIO
9
Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Consti
Criminal Procedure
-In Samar during the night of November 28, 1970, Rafael Serna and Antonio Cipria
no took away P80 from Romualdo Villones and Leonardo Carlos. The latter were pay
ing for the fish that they bought from a fisherman when the former stole their P
80 and on the occasion killed the 2 victims. -the 2 were charged with Robbery wi
th Double Homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of use of motorized banca
as a means for flight or concealment, plus recidivism as regards Serna since he
was previously convicted by final judgment in CFI of Manila, and was sentenced
to an imprisonment from 10 to 17 years in 1958. -upon arraignment, both pleaded
guilty, invoking the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt. Immediately, CFI
of Samar found the 2 guilty, considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilt and the aggravating circumstance cited above. Cipriano was sentenced to Re
clusion Perpetua (MC offset AC) while Serna was sentenced to death (1MC to 2AC),
therefore sent to SC for automatic review. -the information was read to the app
ellants in English and translated in Samar dialect, thereafter, the 2 pleaded gu
ilty. After the plea, the Fiscal asked the plea of guilty to be considered mitig
ating then asked the court to consider the 2 aggravating circumstance against Se

rna. The court did not explain the import of the plea to the 2 accused, did not
even bother to ask if they understood their plea, and just imposed on Serna the
death penalty. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in automatically rendering the pe
nalty of death to Serna HELD NO. Ratio. Considering that the appellant was charg
ed with an offense punishable by death, the trial court should have required the
prosecution to present its evidence to prove the extent of his culpability. The
taking of such testimony is the prudent and proper course to follow for the pur
pose of establishing not only the guilt but also the precise culpability of the
defendant. Where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, in cases where th
e capital penalty may be imposed, the court should make certain that defendant f
ully understands the nature of the charge preferred against him and the characte
r of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. The trial court should
therefore call witnesses for the purposes of establishing the guilt and degree
of culpability of the defendant, not only to satisfy the trial judge, but also t
o aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly unde
rstood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his p
lea. Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the judgment under automatic review is hereby SET A
SIDE and the case REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERE
D.
a2010 page 70
means of flight and not for the commission of the crime; (3) treachery generic a
ggravating but offset by plea of guilt; (4) fact of more than 1 homicide not agg
ravating, not enumerated under Art14, RPC. -Serna understood his plea because th
ere was no improvident plea -dont need to remand, 14 years already passed
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
judge required the taking of testimony as to the circumstances under which the c
rime was committed before passing judgment so that the resulting verdict cannot
in any way be branded as deficient. 2. NO. Reasoning The circumstances qualifyin
g or aggravating the act of killing a human being must be proved in an evident a
nd incontestable manner, mere presumptions or deductions from hypothetical facts
not being sufficient to consider them justified. - According to the RPC, "there
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, em
ploying means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly an
d specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the de
fense which the offended party might make." - It does not appear how and in what
position the victim was when he was killed so that it cannot be said for certai
n that the accused had adopted a mode or means of attack tending directly to ins
ure or facilitate the commission of the offense without risk to himself arising
from the defense or retaliation which the victim might put up. - Pat. Garcia of
the Bulalacao police force merely declared that he was in his house, about 15 me
ters away from the municipal building when the accused Rudy Tiongson and his com
panions escaped from prison, and he did not see the accused shoot Pat. Gelera. P
at. Gelera was already dead when the other witness saw him. - Treachery is also
not present in the killing of PC Constable since the deceased was actually warne
d by another PC not to remain standing but seek cover because of the known prese
nce of the accused in the vicinity, but that the said deceased disregarded the w
arning. - Since treachery, which would qualify the killing of Pat. Gelera and PC
Constable Canela to Murder, was not present, the crimes may only be punished as
Homicide. 3. NO. Reasoning (a) Evident premeditation must be ruled out in view
of the absence of sufficient proof that a plan to kill the victims existed, the
execution of which was preceded by deliberate thought and reflection. (b) That t
he crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities
cannot be appreciated since they are not persons in authority, but merely agent
s of a person in authority. (c) In order that commission of a crime in an uninha
bited place may be considered, it is necessary that the place of occurrence be w
here there are no houses at all, a considerable distance from the village or tow
n, or where the houses are a great distance apart. (d) Abuse of superior strengt
h must also be ruled out since there is no direct evidence that the accused empl

oyed it. Dispositive Petition is affirmed with the modification that the accused
Rudy Tiongson should be sentenced to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each homicide committed by him. Th
e indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victims is hereby increased to P30,00
0.00 in each case.
PEOPLE v TIONGSON 130 SCRA 614 CONCEPCION; July 25, 1984
NATURE Mandatory review for imposition of death penalty FACTS - Tiongson escaped
from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, together with de la Cru
z and Santiago, where they were detained under the charge of Attempted Homicide.
While in the act of escaping, Tiongson killed a member of the police force who
was guarding them and a PC Constable who went in pursuit. - By reason thereof, T
iongson was then charged with Murder, in two separate informations, alleging tha
t the commission of the offense was qualified by the circumstance of treachery,
and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities, nocturnity, committed in an uninhabited p
lace and with abuse of superior strength. - Upon arraignment, the said accused,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to both informations. The trial co
urt did not render judgment outright, but ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence, after which, it sentenced the said accused to suffer the death penalt
y in each case, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims. ISSUES 1. WON a plea
of guilt is always binding upon the accused for all the contents of the informat
ion 2. WON the killing was qualified by treachery 3. WON there were aggravating
circumstances present HELD 1. NO. Ratio It may be true that a judicial confessio
n of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information, including t
he aggravating circumstances listed therein, as stated by the trial judge, yet w
here there has been a hearing and such circumstances are disproven by the eviden
ce, they should be disallowed in the judgment. Reasoning The norm that should be
followed where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, especially in case
s where the capital penalty may be imposed, is that the court should be sure tha
t defendant fully understands the nature of the charges preferred against him an
d the character of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. For this
reason, the Court requires that in every case under a plea of guilty, where the
penalty may be death, the trial court should call witnesses for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant and not only t
o satisfy the trial judge but to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether ac
cuse understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences
of his plea. In the instant case, the trial
SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [dissenting]
-Serna should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua because: (1) recidivism not agg
ravating, the information not alleging the prior crime for which Serna was convi
cted; (2) use of motorized banca not aggravating, it was a
PEOPLE v NADERA 324 SCRA 490 MENDOZA; February 2, 2000
NATURE
Criminal Procedure
Automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro
FACTS -On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Maca
lalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father, herein accuse
d-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed
a complaint against accused-appellant -After preliminary examination, on June 6,
1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates w
ere filed in the Regional Trial-Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. -The record sh
ows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accusedappellant, assisted by Atty
. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney s Office, pleaded not guilty to the
charges filed against him. -However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution ha

d presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the cri


me charged in all the informations. -On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formall
y offered its documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter. -Accused-appe
llant did not present any evidence in his defense. -On August 27, 1997, the tria
l court rendered judgment finding accusedappellant guilty of four counts of rape
against his daughters. -Nadera appealed ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred whe
n it accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching
inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea 2. WON
the conviction must be set aside HELD 1. YES - Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides: Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evi
dence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the Court shall cond
uct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the con
sequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the pre
cise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
-Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of
guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused s full comprehension
of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to prese
nt evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culp
ability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present eviden
ce on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. -As explained in People v
. Alicando, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea
, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. -In the case a
t bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "gu
ilty," and whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea.
a2010 page 71
-In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused plea
ded guilty, thus: Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotone
l of the Public Attorney s Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Howe
ver, when these cases were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accus
ed manifested that the accused, realizing the futility of entering into trial an
d considering that he actually committed the acts complained of, intimated his i
ntention to enter a plea of guilty to the above-mentioned charges. The accused w
as then asked by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a plea of gui
lty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May 17, 1992 against
his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would be senten
ced to reclusion perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed on Ap
ril 17 and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on March 3, 1996 [against Ma
ricris Nadera, 11 years old at the time], he would be sentenced to death by leth
al injection. After having been informed of this, he insisted that he is willing
to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is ready to face the conseq
uences thereof. -The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short o
f the requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether acc
used-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been said,
a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insuffici
ent. For more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or becaus
e he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial judge must er
ase such mistaken impressions. He must be completely convinced that the guilty p
lea made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judg
e must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained, and wheth
er he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigation
s. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred wi
th the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences
of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio
-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the
case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them. -In this case, absent
any showing that these questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inqu
iry cannot be said to have been undertaken by the trial court. -In People v. Sev

illano, this Court held that: In every case where the accused enters a plea of gu
ilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with a litt
le or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evid
ence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of th
e information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not o
nly to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in dete
rmining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the mea
ning, full significance and consequences of his plea. -Clearly, the plea of guil
ty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently. 2. Yes. -Conviction
s based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the s
ole basis of judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evid
ence to convict the accused, the conviction must be
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the ac
cused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. -The prosec
ution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Oleby and Maricris Nadera, the re
sults of their medical examinations, and the testimonies of their mother, Daisy,
and the physician who conducted the medical examination of the two girls, Dr. C
ynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this case, however, persuade u
s that a remand of this case is necessary. -First, a perusal of the decision of
the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the factual and legal rea
sons on which he based accusedappellant s conviction. Except for the narration o
f the prosecution s evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate the reason for
the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the
court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible. -Second, the cavalier at
titude of accused-appellant s counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public At
torney s Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cr
oss examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera s
cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the ac
cused but also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Dispo
sitive The appealed decision is set aside.
PEOPLE v NAVARRO 75 Phil 516 BENGZON; December 4, 1945
FACTS - Information for arbitrary detention: "That from January 27, 1945, and fo
r several days thereafter, in the municipality of Calapan, Province of Mindoro,
Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable C
ourt, said defendants Juan Navarro and Anacleto Atienza, Acting Provincial Gover
nor and Provincial Warden, respectively, both being public officials to whom the
custody and responsibility of prisoners were entrusted for proper action, witho
ut any lawful or justifiable cause and without legal grounds therefor, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Esteban P. Beloncio in the
Provincial Jail of Mindoro which continued for more than fifteen days but less
than six months." - A pre-trial was held, the Judge asking the parties or their
attorneys some questions, which the latter answered, with the result that admiss
ions were made to the effect that Esteban P. Beloncio and Juan G. Beloncio II ha
d been detained for several days after January 27, 1945, in the provincial jail
of Mindoro by order of the Commanding General, Western Visayan Task Force, Unite
d States Army. Whereupon, defendants counsel lost no time in filing a motion to
quash, upon the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a criminal off
ense. - The judge dismissed the cases. ISSUE WON the motion to quash on the grou
nd that the facts charged do not constitute and offense must be restricted to the
facts charged in the informations
Criminal Procedure
HELD NO - The section of the rule permitting a motion to quash on the ground tha
t "the facts charged do not constitute an offense" omits reference to the facts
detailed "in the information." Other sections of the same rule would imply that

the issue is restricted to those alleged in the information. - Prima facie, the
"facts charged" are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified
or qualified by others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions
made by the people s representative, which admissions could anyway be submitted
by him as amendments to the same information. - It would seem to be pure techni
cality to hold that in the consideration of the motion, the parties and the judg
e were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, si
mply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be adde
d that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyo
nd the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a pr
emature and risky revelation of his evidence. - But the Court sees no reason to
prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts,
because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official s
role is to see that justice is done; not that all accused are convicted, but tha
t the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court
from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of
a speedy administration of justice. - The Beloncios were thus deprived of their
liberty by order of the military authorities, a few days after the liberations
of Mindoro. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact, that upon military occupat
ion and before the establishment of the normal processes of civil government the
liberties and rights of citizens are likely to suffer temporary restrictions, w
hat with the exigencies of military strategy, or the confusion usually resulting
from the situation. While the infringement of constitutional precepts and privi
leges is not to be tolerated, war necessities and consequences cannot be overloo
ked. At any rate, no reasons are shown why the irregularity, if any, committed b
y others, should be visited upon defendants-appellees. The acts imputed to them,
do not, of themselves, constitute a punishable offense. Dispositive Appealed de
cision affirmed.
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another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or
impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime by bribery
thru unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the
aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delive
ring said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then and ther
e willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; t
hat after the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner afo
restated, and while the latter was supposedly being investigated by the said acc
used, the said accused did then and there place on commingle a marked P1.00 bill
together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos, supposedly g
iven to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial Apolonio
y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar s Office of Manila, wo
uld appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connect
ion with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos) duties, which was to
expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or
imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribe
ry." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts charged in th
e information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot be com
plexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged -CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR was denied
-appeal by fiscal before SC ISSUE WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash
HELD YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arre
st" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted
to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party,
thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the info the SC finds a close conne
ction between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended
party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation that they
plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor General
in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in or
der to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended p

arty. Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense ch
arged in the information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arrest
o mayor or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine
not exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishab
le with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six mont
hs. Dispositive The order appealed from is reversed and set aside
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
PADILLA; June 27, 1988
NATURE Peition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Court o
f First Instance of Manila, Br. 29 FACTS Petitioner alleges that he was arrested
for vagrancy without a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, he was brought to Precinc
t 2, Manila where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together
with several others. The next day, five detainees, including petitioner, complai
nant Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, that one is a companion. After the ide
ntification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner
was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the poli
ce investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. Subsquently, a
n information for robbery was filed against petitioner. He was arraigned and the
reafter hearings were held. The prosecution formally offered its evidence and th
en rested its case. Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, m
anifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evi
dence. Petitioner filed said motion on the ground that the conduct of the line-u
p without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutio
nal rights to counsel and to due process. The respondent court issued an order d
enying the Motion to Acquit. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE WON the responde
nt judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in i
ssuing the assailed order HELD NO If a defendant does not move to quash the comp
laint or information before pleading, defendant is deemed to have waived all obj
ections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the complaint or i
nformation does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of t
he same. Here, petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit only after the the prosecutio
n presented its evidence and rested its case. Since the exceptions above-stated,
are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived objections which are gr
ounds for a motion to quash. Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in h
is Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of th
e Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information. Consequently, the lowe
r court did not err in denying petitioner s Motion to Acquit. Dispositive Petiti
on dismissed.
PEOPLE v ALAGAO 16 SCRA 879 ZALDIVAR; April 30, 1966
NATURE This is an appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila sustaining the motion to quash the information FACT
S -City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendantsappellees ch
arging them of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arr
est, as follows: "That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City o
f Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then members of the Manila Police
Department, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] GAMBOA v CRUZ 162 SCRA 642
PEOPLE v ASUNCION 161 SCRA 490 PADILLA; May 24, 1988
NATURE Certiorari FACTS:
Criminal Procedure
-Rolando Abadilla, a former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
charged before the QC RTC with the offense of Violation of PD No. 1866 [ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION) --The Information read that he willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession and under his custody and contr

ol rifles, pistons, ammunitions and magazines (see orig case for the list) without
first securing the necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority. -U
pon motion of the accused, Asuncion dismissed the Information on the ground that
it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since the possessi
on of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in view of Executive
Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammun
ition a period of six months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987
by EO No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, wit
hout incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm
or ammunition is carried outside of one s residence, not for the purpose of sur
rendering the same, or used in the commission of any other offense, and there is
no allegation in said information that the firearms and ammunition enumerated t
herein were carried outside the accused s residence or used in the commission of
some other crime. - In support thereof, the respondent judge cited the decision
in People vs. Lopez, 79 Phil 658. -The prosecution filed a MR of said Resolutio
n, but the motion was denied -Hence, the present recourse by the prosecution. Pe
titioners Claims -nothing is contained in said EOs which legalizes the possession
of firearms and ammunition without a permit; -that said EOs merely authorized h
olders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender the same
within a specified filing period without incurring criminal liability; -that il
legal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under PD No. 1866
which was not repealed by said EO NO. 107 and 222. ISSUES 1. WON J. Asuncion er
red in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illeg
al per se during the period covered by EO Nos. 107 and 222 2. WON it was not nec
essary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and am
munition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the
accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these ci
rcumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition 3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecut
ion may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his
residence HELD 1. EO NO. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4
and 482. SC did NOT give it a different meaning because there is no basis for s
uch a difference. 2. NO. IT IS NECESSARY TO ALLEGE IT IN THE INFO.
a2010 page 73
3. NO. The information, in this particular charge against Abadilla, is fatally d
efective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with t
he same offense. J. Asunction, in dismissing the information, committed no rever
sible error or grave abuse of discretion. Ratio (citing People vs. Austria) the
presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void informatio
n, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. ... The information was n
ot merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speak
ing, that information does not exist in contemplation of law." -Abadilla is rega
rded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of the Marcos regime. But t
he Court cannot be swayed by appellations for it has a duty, as a temple of just
ice, to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate proceedings the r
ight to due process and the equal protection of the laws. Reasoning 1. It may be
true that there is nothing in EO Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the
unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying statu
tes similar to the executive orders in question, and which also provided for a p
eriod within which a holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition m
ay surrender the same to the proper authorities without incurring criminal liabi
lity, had ruled that a criminal liability was temporarily LIFTED for mere posses
sion of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the period covered, although
such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing within the period provi
ded, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of surr
endering the same) or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicens
ed firearm and ammunition. -People vs. Lopez~ It will be seen that sec 2 (of RA
NO 4) excluded from the operation of sec 1 up to August 31, 1946, possession of
firearms and ammunition so long as they were not used for any purpose other than

selfdefense or carried for any purpose other than of surrendering them to the p
roper authorities. The Government does not dispute this interpretation. Although
the law does not categorically state that criminal liability was temporarily li
fted for mere possession of filing firegems and ammunition, that is the only con
struction compatible with the spirit and purposes of the enactment as revealed b
y its context. -People vs. Feliciano~ SC ruled that RA No. 482 legalized mere un
licensed possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified
in said law, and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition,
or (2) the carrying of such firearm or ammunition on the person, except to surre
nder them. The Court said: -Feliciano ruling was reiterated in People vs. Tabuna
res: RA No. 482, in effect legalized mere unlicensed on within one year from sai
d date, and punished only (1) the use of a or ammunition or (2) the carriage the
reof on the person except for purpose of surrender. Appellant s conviction canno
t stand, since it is rested solely on unlicensed possession on or about November
6, 1950. 2. People vs. Lopez~ the Court already ruled that, under RA No. 4, the
use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the
sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subjec
t to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. -People vs. Au
stria~ the Court also ruled that in order that an information charging illegal p
ossession of firearm and ammunition, under RA No. 482, may be deemed suffident,
it must allege that the accused was using the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the time he was apprehended b
y the authorities with said firearm. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] LAYOSA v RODRIGUEZ 86 SCRA 300 AQUINO; Novem
ber 10, 1978
NATURE Certiorari from order of CA FACTS - This is about suspension of Layosa, c
ollector of customs, who was charged by city fiscal in CFI w/ having violated An
tiGraft and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019). Information was based
on complaint filed by assistant director of District Anti-Smuggling Action Cent
er. It was one of 5 cases filed against Layosa, aside from malversation case. Gravamen is that he demanded and received from M/V Lady Angelita I 2 to 3 cases
of beer & soft drinks as consideration for giving preferential berthing faciliti
es. - Fiscal, pursuant to sec 13 of RA No. 3019, filed motion for Layosa s suspe
nsion. Respondent Judge granted motion. He found that a valid information had be
en filed against Layosa. - Layosa filed instant petition for certiorari. He pray
ed that suspension be set aside. He contended that the court did not acquire jur
isdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had as yet been issued wh
en hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent
Judge, that the Chief State Prosecutor in a telegram to the fiscal directed tha
t the record of the case be elevated for review, and that respondent Judge grave
ly abused his discretion. - Because Layosa defied suspension, lower court adjudg
ed him in contempt of court and penalized him by imprisonment for 3 mos and fine
of P500. Layosa appealed to CA. - Respondent Judge explained that, to avoid del
ay, he acted on motion for suspension because case was filed after raffling betw
een 2 branches of court had been terminated. He was scheduled to hold sessions a
nd the other Judge was to begin one-month vacation. Judge pointed out that his a
ction was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of SC which empowers Executiv
e Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to raffling. Case was eventually r
affled to sala of respondent Judge. Layosa posted bail bond. He was arraigned an
d replaced as collector of customs. Office of State Prosecutors sustained filing
of information against Layosa. - Layosa did not submit memorandum. Respondent f
iscal alleged that petitioner had abandoned contention as to lack of jurisdictio
n. Fiscal stressed that case had been scheduled for trial at instance of petitio
ner and that latter manifested his willingness to proceed. ISSUE WON trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering suspension

Criminal Procedure
HELD NO - Lower court acquired jurisdiction upon filing of information. Petition
er was notified of pre-suspension hearing. His counsel participated. Requirement
s of due process were observed. Public interest demands a speedy determination o
f that question. - It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into
custody when pre-suspension hearing was held. However, voluntary appearance thr
ough counsel was submission to lower court s jurisdiction. (Note that in civil c
ases, defendant s voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.) - "
Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection t
hat it has no jurisdiction of the person of the accused may be waived. One who d
esires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in
court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the ob
jection." Layosa waived the objection based on lack of jurisdiction over his per
son when, as already noted, he appeared at the pre-suspension hearing and his co
unsel cross-examined the prosecution witness.
a2010 page 74
fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the charac
ter of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitute
s a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopard
y if indicted for the new offense. Reasoning - Respondent court held that above
rule does not apply in this case. It based its decision on the ruling in People
v Buan, which held that Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent sta
te of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once pro
secuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted
for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury. - In his memo
randum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on October 21, 1972,
the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing and arraignment
of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that the victim, Diol
ito dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be amended." - Be that as
it may, the fact remains that the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "o
ne (1) day after the accident and the arrest of the respondent Gapay" and that o
n October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced acco
rdingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraig
nment and conviction of the accused. Dispositive Order of dismissal of lower cou
rt affirmed.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
1983. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his h
ead by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airt
ight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it was
technically impossible to get inside such a cordon." The military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identi
ty was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando G
alman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who p
icked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, an
d that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. - Marcos was constrained to
create a Fact Finding Board to investigate. Both majority and minority reports
were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief investigat
or, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stat
ing that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subver
sive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the stairc
ase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military s "fall guy
" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned d
own Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, de
liberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regar
ding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn,
of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy s assassination was the product of a m
ilitary conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two re
ports is that the majority report found all the 26 private respondents headed by

then AFP Chief General Fabian Ver involved in the military conspiracy while the
chairman s minority report would exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters "the
6 persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" an
d "General Luther Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned
and implemented without his intervention." - As the accused were tried in the S
andiganbayan, Marcos through all his recorded public acts and statements from th
e beginning disdained and rejected his own Board s findings and insisted on the
military version of Galman being Ninoy s assassin. [Note: His private acts in tr
ying to control the outcome of the case were to be known much later after he was
already deposed.] - Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respe
ctively, of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of three
former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents,
a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and soli
d citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistr
ial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitut
ional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to d
ue process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the inter
est of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present
vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution an
d that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor o
f the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerit
y of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitione
rs prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restrainin
g the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pe
nding criminal cases
PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA 121 SCRA 637 RELOVA; April 27, 1983
NATURE Petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI FACTS
- October 17, 1971: The incident occurred. - October 18, 1971: An information f
or serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Francisc
o Gapay y Mallares, driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de
la Cruz died. - October 20, 1972: Gapay was arraigned on the charge of serious p
hysical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 1
month and 1 day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. - October 24,
1972: An information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against Ga
pay - November 17, 1972: the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respon
dent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on t
he ground of double jeopardy. ISSUES WON a person who has been prosecuted for se
rious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be pr
osecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended part
y dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered HELD NO Ratio One who ha
s been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identica
l offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, where
after the first prosecution a new
SEPARATE OPINION GUTIERREZ [concurring]
- Knowing the volume of the caseload in the City Court of Manila and the inevita
bly slow pace of work, it is most surprising that the accused could have been ar
raigned for the charge of serious physical injuries only 3 days after the incide
nt, 2 days after the filing of the information and the death of the victim. The
accused does not appear to have been a detention prisoner necessitating his imme
diate arraignment right after the filing of the information. The only sensible c
onclusion is that the accused was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physic
al injuries to foreclose a charge for homicide even before it could be filed. In
such a case, there would be a trifling with the processes of justice and a coll
usive effort amounting to fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its authority
to prosecute an accused for the correct offense. - However, records are inadequa
te to show that the arraignment, while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspici
ous circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanery s

ufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process - At any ra
te, I concur in the affirmance of the order of dismissal in line with the many p
rotections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal pr
osecutions.
GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN 144 SCRA 43 TEEHANKEE; September 12, 1986
FACTS - Ninoy Aquino was cold-bloodedly killed while under escort from his plane
that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on August 21,
Criminal Procedure
which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declar
ing a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and order
ing a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. - The Sup
reme Court resolved by nine-to-two votes to issue the restraining order prayed f
or. But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-v
ote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary
restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rend
ering its decision. [Hmmm tsk] - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action an
d urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the ch
arge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evi
dence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the re
lief demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartia
l tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opport
unity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed b
y the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings
would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained
from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985. - On De
cember 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as s
cheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accuse
d of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of an
y civil liability. [Note: the word used by the Sandiganbayan was innocent instead
of not guilty!] - Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan s verdict of a
cquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, th
e same Court majority denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. [Note that EDSA I happened before the month ended.] - On March 20, 1986,
petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and ther
efore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the
March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that th
e then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernar
do Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the crimin
al cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
- Tanodbayan Fernandez claimed he never succumbed to any alleged attempts to inf
luence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perc
eived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigatio
n and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two murder cases agains
t private-party respondents. Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Div
ision in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the
criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidenc
e presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the
former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, wer
e pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the resul
t of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the r
eopening of those cases, if only
a2010 page 75
to allow justice to take its course." - Respondents-accused opposed the second m

otion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. The accused-respondents rai
sed the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot an
d academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan s judgment of acquittal
of all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents V
er and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment
of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the
judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by cle
ar, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. - The Supreme Co
urt appointed a three-member commission composed of retired SC Justice Conrado V
asquez, chairman, and retired IAC Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa a
s members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the cha
rges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all p
arties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The C
ommission submitted the following recommendation: Considering the existence of ad
equate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case
and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of so
me pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not on
ly prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all th
e evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the
final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and beli
ef, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court, that the
proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and her
eby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of
a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled People vs. Lut
her Custodio, et al., be granted." ISSUES 1. WON the petition for a declaration
of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled People vs.
Luther Custodio, et al., be granted 2. WON a retrial would constitute double je
opardy HELD 1. YES Reasoning - The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial
and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the lan
d under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no r
eason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, decep
tion and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of
judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice
to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the preventio
n or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the wo
rld are entitled to know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is a
t stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded i
n vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In
death, Ninoy is the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and th
e relatives and
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law
and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court
is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of the cen
tury - and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio. 2. NO Ratio Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court s sett
ing aside of the trial courts judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the pros
ecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due pr
ocess. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal prece
pt is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State s right to due p
rocess raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or dis
regarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is ap
parent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of juris
diction. Reasoning - Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (
b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been

entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the exp
ress consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted
of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process
. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the crim
inal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merel
y to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy. - More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy
hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock t
rial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tan
odbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure
the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of
all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice He
rrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was
his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they
could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the auth
oritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evide
nce, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or
prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution s difficulties in l
ocating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and
testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedi
ngs and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months t
ime or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution comp
lained of "the Presiding Justice s seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and
their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compa
red to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "
cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given
a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded
for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pendin
g cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time w
here the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. Mani
festly, the prosecution and the sovereign
Criminal Procedure
people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan
under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authori
tarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coe
rced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void
judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds no
r bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an ou
tlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. T
o paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the l
awbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law
unto himself, he invites anarchy. Dispositive Petitioners second motion for rec
onsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the pet
ition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration ar
e hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying t
he proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Crim
inal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Lut
her Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be
conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements
of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to all.
a2010 page 76
which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing
further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months afte
r discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. - Fourteen (14) days later,
another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric p
ower under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised
Penal Code. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Moti

on to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charg
ed in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his co
nstitutional right against double jeopardy. -Respondent Judge granted the accuse
d s Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. An MOR was denied. - On 1 De
cember 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this
Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People. ISSUE
WON the defense of double jeopardy applies in this case. (Yes) HELD RATIO: Where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized
by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the acc
used is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the t
wo offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense und
er a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise t
o the offense charged under a statute. REASONING: Constitutional provision on do
uble jeopardy reads: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the sa
me act. (Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) This case must be examined, not und
er the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution,
but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection again
st double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offen
se that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or s
et of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is a
vailable although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from
the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised P
enal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by dif
ferent sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inqu
iry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection a
gainst double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist bet
ween the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one off
ense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a st
atute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is
said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offen
ses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long
as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given ris
e to the offense charged under a statute. The question of Identity or lack of Id
entity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of t
he two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislat
ive definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts w
hich are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance an
d a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out
in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those
acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary d
esign or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral
whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different
legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute). DISPOSITION Pet
ition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related ci
vil liability be remanded to the CFI of Batangas City for further proceedings.
PEOPLE V. RELOVA 148 SCRA 292 FELICIANO; March 6, 1987
NATURE Petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People seek to set aside the or

ders of the respondent Judge of the CFI of Batangas in a criminal case, quashing
an information for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on t
he ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner s motion for reconsidera
tion. FACTS - CIRCUMSTANCES: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Po
lice together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped wit
h a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examine
d the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and ope
rated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that ele
ctric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the w
alls of the building" owned by the private respondent. These electric devices an
d contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to
lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric m
eter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the subsequent i
nvestigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had cause
d the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter. - CASE: On 24 November 1975, an information agai
nst Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas
City. Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion
to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had al
ready prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was b
eyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. Batangas City Court
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that t
he offense charged was a light felony
PEOPLE v GROSPE [supra, page 43] CANIZA v PEOPLE (AGLORO) 159 SCRA 16 FELICIANO;
March 18, 1988
NATURE Petition for Prohibition and certiorari directed at 1) the CFI Order of N
ov. 27, 1979 issued by Branch 23 of CFI of Manila in Criminal Case 46768 and 2)
said courts Order of March 20, 1980 in the same case denying Canizas Motion for Re
consideration FACTS - March 20, 1974: Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filed an I
nformation for falsification of public documents allegedly committed on Nov. 5,
1968 by Caniza. - May 24, 1974: Caniza filed Motion to Quash saying that allegat
ions in the information did not constitute an offense, and that the information
contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justifica
tion - trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza - Fisc
als Motion for Reconsideration of this Order was denied - June 13, 1979: a second
Information (docketed as Criminal Case 46768) was filed charging Caniza with su
bstantially the same offense as that charged under the previous information - Ca
niza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that 1) the offense c
harged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first Information had been on th
e merits, 3)the allegations of the second Information did not constitute and off
ense - Respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to quash - He also de
nied Canizas motion for reconsideration
Criminal Procedure
ISSUES 1. WON the offense charged had already prescribed 2. WON the filing of th
e second Information has placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the sa
me offense a second time HELD 1. NO Reasoning - 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days h
ad elapsed between November 5, 1968 (the date of commission of the alleged offen
se) and March 20 1974 (date of filing the first information); 4 years, 2 months
and 12 days had elapsed between April 3, 1975 (date of denial by the trial court
of the Fiscals motion for reconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date of filing of
the second information). A total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consu
med by the time the second Information was filed in court. - Under Article 90, i
n relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsificatio
n of public document committed by a private individual - the offense with which
petitioner Caiza is presently charged prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respe
ct, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further: - Computation of prescr

iption of offenses.
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the da
y on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or th
eir agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or informati
on, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are justifiably stopped for any reason
not imputable to him. 2. NO Reasoning - Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Co
urt 6 lists the following requisites in order that the defense of double jeopard
y may be successfully invoked by an accused person: a. a valid Complaint or Info
rmation or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a con
viction; b. a Court of competent jurisdiction; c. that the accused had pleaded t
o the charge against him; d. that the accused had been convicted, or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express co
nsent; and e. that the second offense charged is the same as the first, or an at
tempt to commit the same or a petition thereof, or that the second offense neces
sarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged. - Crimi
nal Case No. 16879 was ordered dismissed by the trial court with the express con
sent of the accused i.e., upon Motion to Quash filed by petitioner Caiza. General
ly, a dismissal under such circumstance win not bar another prosecution for the
same offense; the defendant, in having the case against him dismissed, thereby w
aives his constitutional right against double jeopardy for the reason that he ef
fectively prevents the trial court from proceeding to trial on the merits and re
ndering a judgment of conviction against him - Application of the aforestated do
ctrine of waiver, however, is subject to two (2) sine qua non conditions: first,
dismissal must have been sought or induced by the defendant, either personally
or through counsel; and second, such dismissal must not have been on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. In this respect, the record sho
ws that
a2010 page 77
petitioner Caiza moved to quash the first Information (Criminal Case No. 16879) o
n grounds that the allegations made therein did not constitute an offense and/or
that the first Information contained allegations which, if true, constituted a
legal excuse or justification. These grounds, upon which the trial court anchore
d its 27 November 1974 Order of dismissal, are clearly directed at the sufficien
cy of said information to sustain the conviction of petitioner Caniza and, hence
, indicate the absence of the first requisite in double-jeopardy. Furthermore, a
nd more importantly, dismissal of a criminal action on this basis is not properl
y considered as amounting to an acquittal on the merits; from a legal standpoint
, the defendant is deemed as not having been charged with the commission of any
offense whatsoever under the deficient information. Consequently, petitioner Caiz
as plea of second jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively waived his right
to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first Information filed against h
im. Dispositive Petition for Prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED. The 8 Dece
mber 1980 Resolution of this Court giving due course to the Petition is withdraw
n and the disputed Orders dated 27 November 1979 and 20 March 1980 issued by res
pondent judge in Criminal Case No. 46768 are hereby AFFIRMED. This case is reman
ded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- On November 21, 1986, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration from
the order of dismissal. This was opposed by the defense. - In the meantime, the
case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico. Judge Cosico in an order dated May
22, 1987, granted the prosecution s motion for reconsideration and caused the ca
se to be reopened. The subsequent motion for reconsideration flied by the defens
e was denied in an order dated November 27, 1987. - G.R. No. 83114 - accused Mar
telino filed before the CA a petition for certiorari praying that the order of J
udge Cosico reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of doub
le jeopardy. CA found merit in the petition and set aside Judge Cosico s order a
s "it amounts to double jeopardy on the part of the petitioner." The decision of
the appellate court is based on precedents which discuss the failure of the pro

secution to appear for trial, produce its witnesses, or present its evidence. G.R. No. 81861 - the accused Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for cer
tiorari directly with this court seeking to declare Judge Cosico s orders dated
May 22, 1987 and November 27, 1987 as null and void and to prohibit respondent f
rom further proceeding with the criminal case. ISSUE WON the reinstatement of th
e criminal case placed the accused in double jeopardy. HELD Ratio the requisites
that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are, to wit: 1) a valid complaint
or information; 2) a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the accused has pleade
d to the charge and 4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case d
ismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. Reasoning The
fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case was dismissed upon mo
tion and with the express consent of the accused. The accused Bernabe Que, Ameli
a Que and Paz Martelino invoked their constitutional right to a speedy trial whe
n the prosecution refused to present evidence until the court had ruled on the m
otion for inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the lower court ordered t
he case to be dismissed. There were no oppressive delays on the part of the pros
ecution. The prosecution s insistence that Judge Suplico rule on the motion to i
nhibit before further proceedings in the case was not dilatory. There is no reas
on apparent from the records why Suplico should vacillate or show anger on a mat
ter that affects the subsequent course of the trial. He could have easily grante
d or denied the motion, giving sound reasons for his ruling. He could have requi
red that the motion be submitted formally. The subsequent behavior of the former
Judge, especially his precipitate dismissal of the case shows that his reaction
was not mere impetuousness or pique. It bears the earmarks of bias and prejudic
e. As noted by Judge Cosico in his order dated November 27, 1987: ... A closed s
crutiny of the foregoing chronology of facts that transpired at the Regional Tri
al Court does not show that the prosecution deliberately delayed the prosecution
of this case nor does it appear that the prosecution was unprepared to present
its evidence. The two (2) postponements requested by the prosecution appear to b
e reasonable. Moreover, it appears that on November 10, 1986, Mr. Angel Yu, prin
cipal
QUE v COSICO 177 SCRA 410 GUTIERREZ, JR.; September 8, 1989
FACTS - Petitioners in G.R. No. 81861 and private respondent in G.R. No. 83114 a
ll stand as the accused in Criminal Case No. C-2152 for estafa thru falsificatio
n of commercial documents which case was dismissed but subsequently reinstated.
- During the trial for the estafa case, Atty. Rodriguez Dadivas, counsel for the
accused Devera and Machado, orally moved for the inhibition of the presiding Ju
dge Suplico on the ground that he had some doubts as to the impartiality of the
judge against whom he and some nineteen (19) other practicing lawyers had filed
serious administrative charges with the President of the Philippines, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Minister of Justice. Following Atty. Dadiv
as, Atty. Roberto Barrios, former private prosecutor, also moved for the inhibit
ion of the judge for the same reason alleged by Atty. Dadivas. The presiding jud
ge, however, ruled Attys. Dadivas and Barrios out of order and asked the City Fi
scal to present the evidence for the prosecution. Thereupon, the City Fiscal man
ifested that he was authorizing the private prosecutor to actively handle the pr
osecution of the case. Atty. Roberto Barrios, however, insisted that the presidi
ng judge should first rule on their previous motion for inhibition. Instead of r
esolving the motion for inhibition, the presiding judge asked the comments of At
ty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for the accused Bernabe Que and Amelia Que, and A
tty. Alberto Villarruz, counsel for the accused Paz L. Martelino, who both invok
ed the constitutional right of their clients to a speedy trial. The presiding ju
dge asked again the prosecution to present its evidence but the private prosecut
or insisted that a ruling be made by the presiding judge with regard to the pend
ing motion for inhibition. As a result, the presiding judge issued the order dat
ed November 10, 1986 dismissing this case.
Criminal Procedure

witness for the prosecution, was then present and ready to testify. On the other
hand, it appears that Atty. Lorenzo Coloso also asked for at least two (2) post
ponements. In invoking the right of the accused to speedy trial, Atty. Coloso is
not therefore coming to this court with clean hands. Considering the two (2) po
stponements requested by Atty. Coloso, the accused in effect waived their right
to speedy trial." Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. 81861 is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition docketed as G. R. No. 83114 is
GRANTED and the questioned orders of Judge Cosico dated May 22, 1987 and Novembe
r 27, 1978 are AFFIRMED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 19
88 is SET ASIDE.
a2010 page 78
1. WON the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals constitute gross i
mprudence 2. WON he was correctly found guilty of the offense estafa through (fa
lsification by) negligence HELD 1. YES - Appellant was, or must have been aware
that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos,
and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and
adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since they
we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would c
ertainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a
large amount - appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently intelligent
and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged o
r stolen - appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of esta
fa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could n
ot have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to ex
culpate him from liability 2. YES - counsel contends that: Samson cannot be conv
icted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason
that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsificati
on and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part; the alleged i
mprudent act does not include or is not necessarily included in the offense char
ged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inco
nsistent with the idea of negligence. - The rule regarding variance between alle
gation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the off
ense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by
the evidence, and the offense as charged, is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved incl
uded in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which
is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116 now rule 120. Rules of Court). -"An offense char
ged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elemen
ts or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or informat
ion, constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in t
he offense proves, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or fo
rm a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, now rule 120)
- conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclus
ively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the gre
ater includes the lesser offense - appellant did not act with criminal intent bu
t merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the ident
ity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, t
he information alleges acts which charge willful, falsification but which turned
out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when th
ere is a variance between the allegation and proof - Moreover, Section 5, Rule 1
16 now 120, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elemen
ts of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that
some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established to consti
tute the crime
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
proved. This conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of Section 9, Ruled 11
3, (I think sec 7 rule 117 na) of the Rules of Court under which appellant could
no longer be prosecuted for estafa through falsification of commercial document

s by reckless negligence were we to acquit him in the cases at bar on the obviou
sly technical theory of the dissenters
SEPARATE OPINION REYES JBL [dissent]
- Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor (97 Phil., 342), July 28, 1955, tha
t criminal negligence is not a mere variant of the intentional misdeed; that it
is a distinct and separate in itself. We also pointed out in that case that whil
e willful crimes are punished according to their result in crimes of negligence,
what the law punishes is the carelessness itself, the failure to take the preca
utions that society has a right to expect will be taken under the circumstances
of each case - that intentional falsification and falsification by negligence no
t only differ in seriousness, but in essence; they are, by their nature, two dif
ferent offenses altogether. Wherefore, an offender who is accused of intentional
falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because
the essential element of the latter offense, the ingredient that characterizes
it and separates it from all other offenses, to wit, the criminal negligence or
carelessness, is not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is
it not included: it is excluded by incompatibility, because malice or intent can
not co-exist with negligence - On the procedural side, the objections to appella
nt s conviction of estafa by falsification through negligence are much more seri
ous. Section 5, Rule 116 (now 120), upon which the majority relies as justifying
the conviction, expresses the following rule: An offense charged necessarily in
cludes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as this alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the l
atter. (Italic mine) It is not enough, therefore, that the elements of the crime
for which an accused is convicted should be proved, but then must also be charg
ed or alleged
SAMSON v CA 103 PHIL 277 BAUTISTA ANGELO; MARCH 31, 1958
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals F
ACTS - On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate R
ufino T. Samson in getting the checks of the two claimants who were with him at
Camp Murphy. After being assured twice of the identity of the supposed claimants
and after examining their residence certificates attached to the claim papers,
Samson accompanied by Cruz and the supposed claimants went to talk to Lt. Manuel
Valencia and requested him to act as guarantor to secure the claimants check. acting on the assurance of Samson, Valencia helped them secure checks in the na
me of Rosalinda Perez and Espiridion Lascano. Hese were encashed by Mallari agai
n believing Samson. - Paras didnt know how to write so she instead placed her thu
mbmark at the back of the check while Samson signed as witness. Lascano placed h
is signature while Samson signed as last endorser. - they then proceeded to Aris
tocrat to eat lunch. Here Samson received P300 supposedly to pay the officers wh
o helped them and P10 for taxi money. - two days after, Samson was informed of t
he possibility that the people who claimed the checks werent the real people who
they claimed to be. This he was able to verify. Upon knowing of this, Samson rep
orted the incident to an officer. - Samson, Cruz and Vergara and two others whos
e names are unknown in two separate informations with the complex crime of estaf
a through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank and were f
ound guilty. Sentence for each of the three defendants to suffer in each case a
penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9 years, 4 months a
nd 1 day of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, t
hey were sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine Ryukyus Command, the payee of th
e checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases - On appeal before th
e CA, Cruz and Vergara were given reduced penalties. Smason was only found guilt
y of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced
to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases. ISSUES
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON G.R. No. 149453 RESOLUTION: May 28, 2002
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - The assailed Decision of the ap
pellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended Petition for Prohibition

with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailin
g the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) o
f Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of th
e Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases e
ntitled People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before Branch
81 of the RTC of Quezon City. - On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recar
edo Sarmiento II
Criminal Procedure
announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kura
tong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over al
ong Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. - On May 22, 1
995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed t
hat the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rub-out or summary execution
and not a shootout. - In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reye
s stated that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robber
y and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the Nation
al Capital Region Commandand headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffi
c Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Pres
idential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo
de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintende
nt Romeo Acop - Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11
) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house in Superv
ille Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made t
o board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to
Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Com
monwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of the Anti-Bank Robe
rry Intelligence Task Force Group - On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, ano
ther CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegati
ons of delos Reyes - On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, exec
uted an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested
in Superville Subdivision - On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo,
PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombu
dsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The nextof-ki
n of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers a
nd personnel. - Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators
to conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. On October 20, 199
5, the panel issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the charges for l
ack of probable cause. - Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review.
On November 20, 1995, the review panel reversed the resolution and found probabl
e cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) o
fficers and personnel of ABRITFG. - On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed bef
ore the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five
(25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals. - Up
on motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman f
or reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against th
e same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was d
owngraded from principal to accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. - With the downgrading of charges against him, res
pondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the crim
inal
a2010 page 79
cases as none of the principal accused in the Amended Informations was a governmen
t official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A. No.
7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferr
ed to the Regional Trial Court - The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a mo

tion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A


. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particu
lar, the amendatory law deleted the word principal in Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975,
thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases wh
ere at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is
a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made a
pplicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as
of the date of its approval. - In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, respondent Lacs
on challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that the Sand
iganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismiss
ing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the crimin
al cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations
for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed
in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as
required by R. A. No. 8249. - The Criminal Cases were raffled off to Branch 81
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associat
e Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. - Before the accused cou
ld be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz,
Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respon
dent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. - On the other hand, private compl
ainants also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that t
hey were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. - Due to these developme
nts, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separa
te but identical motions to: (1) make a judicial determination of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest (2) hold in abeyance th
e issuance of the warrants (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lac
k of probable cause. - The records of the case before us are not clear whether t
he private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 held
by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other a
ccused. - During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do
not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Go
dwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of des
istance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty.
Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers League presented the affidavits of reca
ntation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane G
omez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affida
vit. - On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing the Crimina
l Cases - On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Dep
artment of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abel
ardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigatio
n. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. - On April 1
7, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation of said Crimi
nal Cases - On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others,
their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibi
tion with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the Sta
te prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. - The plea for tem
porary restraining order was denied - On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations
for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng ga
ng were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City - The new Informati
ons charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson a
nd his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in the original informations. The crimi
nal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. - On the same day, respon
dent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against
Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong an
d Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philipp
ines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents S

tate Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 - In the mean
time, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (p
resided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Prob
able Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent
Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking t
he suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. - The Court of Appeals
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warran
t of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-10
1102 to 01-101112. - On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the now a
ssailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981
679 to Q-99-81689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 o
f the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases
against the respondent ISSUE WON Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the elev
en (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. HELD - This rule which took effect on De
cember 1, 2000 provides: SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be prov
isionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with noti
ce to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by im
prisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall b
ecome permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Criminal Procedure
- Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroacti
ve effect. However, the Court cannot rule on this issue due to the lack of suffi
cient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts: (1) wh
ether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accu
sed; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party,
(3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether the
re is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal
of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respond
ent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable c
ause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal
bears his express consent. - The records of the case, however, do not reveal wit
h equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were
given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judg
e Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives o
f the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their aff
idavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Vald
ez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their af
fidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) pe
rsons submitted their affidavits of desistance. From the records of the case bef
ore us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance exec
uted by the relatives of the three other victims. The same records do not show w
hether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, i
t is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge
Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time. - The fact of not
ice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibitio
n with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunc
tion filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, to enjoin the prosecutors
from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in sai
d petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent L
acson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestiga
tion is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants. - Nor wa
s the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the elev

en (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were reviv
ed in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proce
eding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition f
or certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of
Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against h
im. - The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial
court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the fi
rst time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple
murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the
parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the off
ended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against resp
ondent Lacson and company. - Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive o
n the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacs
on are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the
2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the O
rder of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order
a2010 page 80
were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivit
y of the new rule. - If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the St
ate must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said tim
eline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable d
elay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present comp
elling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. - In light
of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to deter
mine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position t
o rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against res
pondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the p
rosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be he
ard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upo
n which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and
arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues ca
nnot be done in this Court but before the trial court. Dispositive Case remanded
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comp
ly with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to p
enalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed i
n court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons
to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar. - The petitioners aver
that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not appli
cable to the Criminal Cases because the essential requirements for its applicati
on were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 19
99. The petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express consen
t to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr. of the Criminal Cases. The respondent all
egedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the
hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even a
gree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were
allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge A
gnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the pr
ovisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims
of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to
the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. - The p
etitioners further contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expre
ssly consented to a provisional dismissal of the Criminal Cases and all the heir
s of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing there
on and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively aga
inst the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases agai

nst the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to d
ue process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right
to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. ISSUES 1. WON Section 8, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the Criminal Cases 2
. WON the time-bar in said rule should be applied retroactively HELD 1. YES - Se
ction 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 8. Prov
isional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the e
xpress consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisi
onal dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) year
s or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after is
suance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offens
es punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dism
issal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without t
he case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-pan
el of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to
establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON G.R. No. 149453 April 3, 2003
NATURE Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002 FACTS - R
espondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting
and killing of eleven male persons identified as members of the Kuratong Balelen
g Gang. - The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the p
rovisional dismissal of Criminal Cases against the accused were with the express
consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal wh
en he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for exam
ination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect
, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its applicatio
n are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following: ...
(1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of t
he accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) wheth
er there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year peri
od; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of r
espondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affi
davits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (
7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived
within or beyond the 2-year bar. - The Court further held that the reckoning da
te of the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the d
ate of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the date
s of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effect
ivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only af
ter the twoCriminal Procedure
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused mov
es for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecut
ion and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offende
d party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. th
e court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionall
y; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional di
smissal of the case. - The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to
the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The ra
ison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provis
ional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting tha
t the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the sam
e offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second pa
ragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanen
t one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the

provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become p
ermanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecut
or who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revi
ved. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless
he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. - Express consent to a prov
isional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, dir
ect, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its mea
ning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional d
ismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of th
e case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to ex
press consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is
an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisio
nally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a crimi
nal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused o
r over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or r
efiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to
oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refili
ng is barred by the statute of limitations. - In this case, the respondent has f
ailed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of th
e new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases. Irre
fragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal
of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provi
sional or otherwise of the Criminal Cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly
or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. - The Court also agr
ees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisio
nal dismissal or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims a
t least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private intere
sts, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of th
e victims must be given
a2010 page 81
adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the crim
inal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the v
ictim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public pro
secutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of
the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in cou
rt during the hearing. - In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered
for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of the Criminal Cases, h
owever, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing
on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed
his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or ba
rely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was serve
d with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were s
eparately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenas were issued to and
received by them - Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the
new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the Stat
e is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revi
ve or refile the Criminal Cases or file new Informations for multiple murder aga
inst the respondent. 2. NO - The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply
the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on Marc
h 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Jud
ge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment
of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally d
ismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, J

udge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases on March 29, 1999. The new rule too
k effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactivel
y, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 w
ithin which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year
period fixed under the new rule. - On the other hand, if the time limit is appli
ed prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until
December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with th
e intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice t
o the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful
results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to Novem
ber 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period becaus
e the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could
not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the S
tate waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it
was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new ru
le. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua n
on to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the Stat
e is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effec
t. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of o
ne year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the crim
inal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not revi
ving the case before the
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entit
led to justice and fairness, so is the State. Dispositive Motion for Reconsidera
tion is GRANTED
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON
October 2003
BULAONG v CA (PEOPLE) 181 SCRA 618 MEDIALDEA; January 30, 1990
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA FACTS - In March
1984, petitioner Bulaong filed with the RTC of Zambales an action for sum of mon
ey against Vistan, Buenaventura and Sta. Maria. Later, Vistan also filed a compl
aint against Bulaong for rescission of contract with damages. The said cases wer
e consolidated and are pending trial. - In Nov. 1984, Bulaong filed a criminal c
omplaint for estafa with the City Fiscal of Pasay against Vicente Vistan and Leo
nardo Buenaventura. The complainant and the defendants filed their affidavit and
counter-affidavits respectively. - In Jan. 1985, petitioners Bulaong and his co
unsel de Guzman submitted to City Fiscal of Pasay a reply-affidavit containing s
tatements which are alleged to be libelous. Hence, Vistan and Buenaventura filed
a complaint for libel against Bulaong and his counsel de Guzman with the City F
iscal. The latter conducted an investigation, and thereafter, filed an informati
on for libel against petitioners. The said information was later amended on. - P
etitioners moved to quash the Information on the ff. grounds: (1) that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and 2) that the fiscal has no authority t
o file the Information. They further argue that the replyaffidavit was submitted
and sworn to by petitioner Bulaong not only because he was required to do so by
the investigating fiscal but also because it was in compliance with his legal a
nd moral duty as complainant in the case for estafa against Vistan and Buenavent
ura and hence, the reply-affidavit belongs to the class of absolutely privileged
communications - The assistant city fiscal filed an opposition to the motion to
quash filed by petitioners. RTC of Pasay City denied the motion to quash. Petit
ioners filed MFR but was denied. Petitioners filed with CA a petition for certio
rari, prohibition, mandamus, with preliminary injunction. CA dismissed petition
for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was file
d ISSUE WON the procedure availed by petitioners after denial by the RTC of the
motion to quash (MTQ) was correct HELD NO Ratio: Petitions for certiorari and pr

ohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quas
h. The defendant should
Criminal Procedure
instead, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defens
es he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse de
cision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law Reasonin
g: [a] Sec. 1, Rule 117 of the ROC provides that, upon arraignment, defendant sh
all immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead there
to, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and
the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately plead, which means t
hat trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adve
rsely to the movant in the MTQ, he can appeal the judgment and raise the same de
fenses or objections earlier raised in his MTQ which would then be subject to re
view by the appellate court. [b] An order denying a MTQ, like an order denying a
motion to acquit, is interlocutory and not a final order, and thus, not appeala
ble. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of d
enial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the
judgment, after trial. [c] In Collins vs. Wolfe and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatc
o, the accused, after the denial of his MTQ, should have proceeded with the tria
l of the case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him,
he could then appeal, and upon such appeal, present the questions which he soug
ht to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.[d] Whether
or not the alleged libelous statements in the reply-affidavit are covered withi
n the mantle of absolutely privileged communications, is a defense which petitio
ners could raise upon the trial on the merits, and, if that defense should fail,
they could still raise the same on appeal. The MTQ the information for libel on
the ground of qualified privilege, duly opposed by the prosecution, is properly
denied, as the prosecution is entitled to prove at the trial that there was mal
ice in fact on the part of the petitioners Dispositive Petition is DENIED. CA de
cision is AFFIRMED.
a2010 page 82
HELD YES. The CA committed a mistake. -The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, whi
ch became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-tr
ial was held on August 8, 1985, provides: "SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be
signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conferenc
e shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and si
gned by him and his counsel." (Rule 118) The Rule is mandatory. Under the rule o
f statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as manda
tory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic). T
he use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means
that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersaba
l vs. Salvador). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and re
medial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against th
e government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado). -The co
nclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the acc
used and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulat
ion of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused,
in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect b
ecause Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulatio
n of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the acc
used did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to subm
it evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on
the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said
evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deeme
d established beyond reasonable doubt. -Consequently, under the circumstances ob
taining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to
determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by co

nsent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside o


r reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad). Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment of res
pondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED an
d REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City,
for further reception of evidence. SO ORDERED.
Prof. Rowena Daroy Morales
- The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions story of a legitimate buy bus
t and convicted him of 2 of the 3 charges against him. ISSUE 1. WON there was a
legitimate buy bust 2. WON Uy agreed to waive the testimony of the Forensic Chem
ist during the pre-trial HELD 1. YES. - As has been repeatedly held, credence sh
all be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses espec
ially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their dut
ies in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to