1

1. Suroza v. Honrado 110 SCRA 388 |

FACTS: Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a
boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named
Lilia. Nenita became Agapitos guardian when he became disabled. A certain
Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it was
dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who
brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the surname
Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an
illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in
English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all her
properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje.
Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelinas will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as
administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the
savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the sheriff to eject the
occupants of testatrixs house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other
occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito
was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedents
granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelinas
will. Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with
counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction, and an opposition to
the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration, which
were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul
the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then closed the
testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to
Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid. Ten months later, Nenita filed a
complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the
fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was
illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that
she did not know English, the language in which the will was written. She further
alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the consequences of the
preterition of testatrixs son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal
specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not
appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a thirty day
period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in
the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she
prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate
case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenitas remedy was
an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil
action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the
administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
ISSUE: W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having
admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a
language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will
because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as
admitted by the notary himself.
HELD: YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily
perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated
that English was a language understood and known to the testatrix. But in its
concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix and
translated into Filipino language. That could only mean that the will was written in

2
a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of
the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. The hasty preparation of
the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where
Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the testator instead of
testatrix. Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted
not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and
giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after
the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have
noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of
an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on
the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was
validly executed.
2. Matias v. Salud L-10751, 23 June 1958
FACTS: The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It must be noted that
Gabina Raquel was suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and
shoulder of the testatrix, which made writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon
the insistence of the attorney, Gabina attempted to sign, but since it was so painful
she just managed to thumbmarked the foot of the document and the left margin at
each page. The parties opposing the probate of the will contended that the will was
void due to the irregularities in the execution thereof. One of the points raised by
the oppositors was that the finger mark can not be regarded as the decedents valid
signature as it does not show distinct identifying ridgelines. And since the finger
mark was an invalid signature, there must appear in the attestation clause that
another person wrote the testators name at his request.
ISSUE: W/N the will was valid.
HELD: YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so dependent on aleatory
requirements as to require dexterity that can be expected of very few persons;
testators should not be required to possess the skill of trained officers. And as to the
validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been held in a long
line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the
purpose of complying with the requirement of the article. Furthermore, the validity
of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness or infirmity. A thumbprint is
considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with the requirements of
the article.
3. Garcia v. Lacuesta 90:489 |
FACTS: This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects
was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an X). The will was signed by
Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly
wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it
because its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was
signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator
wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that the
3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE: Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation
clause since the testator had placed a cross mark himself as his signature.

3
HELD: The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado
directed Javier to write the testators name under his express direction. Petitioners
argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed the will
himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark
(which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not
the same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have the same
trustworthiness of a thumb mark.
4. Barut v. Cabacungan 21:461 |
FACTS: Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The
testatrix stated in the will that being unable to read or write, the will was read to her
by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo
Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested by a number
of the relatives of the deceased on various grounds. The probate court found that
the will was not entitled to probate because the handwriting of the person who it is
alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked
more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than to the
person whose handwriting it was alleged to be (i.e. The probate court denied
probate because the signature seemed to not have been by Severo Agayan but by
another witness).
ISSUE: Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD: No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses that the signature of
the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the
name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in
the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will. Based on Section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with respect to the validity of the will,
it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his
own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the
testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of 3 witnesses and that
they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each other. It
may be wise that the one who signs the testators name signs also his own; but that
is not essential to the validity of the will. The court also held that the 3 cases cited
by the lower court was not applicable. In those cases, the person who signed the
will for the testator wrote his own name instead of the testators, so that the
testators name nowhere appeared in the will, and were thus wills not duly
executed.
5. Nera v. Rimando 18:450 | Cukingnan
FACTS: The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due
execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one
of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed
at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their
signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in
a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was
hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures
to the instrument.
HELD: Citing Jaboneta v. Gustilo, the court held that The true test of presence of
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had

4
they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position
with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature. But it is
especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at
the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see
each other sign if they choose to do so. The question is whether the testator and
the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will signed the instrument in the presence of
each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that
moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such
that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of
all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for
which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in
the execution of a will.
6. Icasiano v. Icasiano 11 SCRA 422
FACTS: Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of
the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof.
Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their
opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started
to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in
duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the
duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique
filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the
trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors. Oppositors-appellants (Natividad
and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of
the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on
the same occasion as the original, and further aver that
granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake
and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into
adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit
from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof,
whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as
attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in
the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in
the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE: Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate
given the allegations of forgery of the testators signature, or that the will was
executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and
pressure? (Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and
in Sirs book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to
its validity?
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its
duplicate are valid in all respects. On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue
influence: The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have
been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of
the testatrix's signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is directly
contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the

5
standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age
of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing
fatigue. Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted
and questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and
challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces
and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor's expert is
insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to
the wills execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial. Nor is there
adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual
reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate.
The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property
and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of
forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue
influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation
which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the
estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these
clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is also
well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude
each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite
evidence against the validity of the will. On the failure of a witness to sign a page in
the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate: The records show that the original
of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it
does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and
supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in
each and every page. Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign
page 3 of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one
when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence. The
failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears
a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was
aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividads failure to sign page 3 of
the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the wills validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its
bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the
testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be
so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component
pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the
evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. This
would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are
otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held
that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses,
but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan,
41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the
correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by
letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These
precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal

6
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege. The appellants also argue
that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not
entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked
one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositorsappellants run
here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no
other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the
original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate
need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said
duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the
original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
7.

Cagro v. Cagro 92:1032 |

FACTS: Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly
made a will prior to his death, the will was probated before the CFI of Samar.
However, the oppositorsappellant objected the probate proceeding alleging that the
will is fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses. It is undisputed that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do
not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing
the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
ISSUE: W/N the will may be probated even if the signatures of the witnesses do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, and instead, they were placed on
the left-hand margin of the page containing the same.
HELD:
No. The position taken by the oppositor-appellant is correct. The attestation clause
is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law
to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives
their participation. The petitioner-appellee contends that signatures of the three
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be
deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on
the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three
witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add
such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator
and any or all of the witnesses. Bautista Angelo, J. dissenting: I dissent. In my
opinion the will in question has substantially complied with the formalities of the law
and, therefore, should be admitted to probate. It appears that the will was signed by
the testator and was attested by three instrumental witnesses, not only at the
bottom, but also on the left-hand margin. The witnesses testified not only that the
will was signed by the testator in their presence and in the presence of each other
but also that when they did so, the attestation clause was already written thereon.
Their testimony has not been contradicted. The only objection set up by the
oppositors to the validity of the will is the fact that the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses do not appear immediately after the attestation clause. This
objection is too technical to be entertained. In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan,
(40 Phil. 476), this court said that when the testamentary dispositions "are wholly
written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses
(as the instant case),their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be
completely purposeless." In such a case, the court said, the requirement of the

7
signatures on the left hand margin was not necessary because the purpose of the
law which is to avoid the substitution of any of the sheets of the will, thereby
changing the testator's dispositions has already been accomplished. We may say
the same thing in connection with the will under consideration because while the
three instrumental witnesses did not sign immediately by the majority that it may
have been only added on a subsequent occasion and not at the uncontradicted
testimony of said witnesses to the effect that such attestation clause was already
written in the will when the same was signed.
8. Cruz v. Villasor 54 SCRA 752 |
FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and
testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will
alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been
fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in
accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805
and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to
acknowledge the will before a notary public.).
HELD: NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves)
is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have
been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before
means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to
assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be
done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such
a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the
function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent
position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud,
would be thwarted. Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary
public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has
notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will
nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the
purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because
the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as
instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses.
Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging
witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.
9.

Javellana v. Ledesma 97:258 |

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the
Visayan dialectas the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da.
Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952,

8
respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as
witnesses. The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of
said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not
executed in conformity with law. Ledesma is questioning the validity of the codicil
contending that the fact that the notary did not sign the instrument in the presence
of the testator and the witness made the codicil was not executed in conformity
with the law
ISSUE: W/N the codicil was validly executed.
HELD: The instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested
the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and
the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by notary
public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he
did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of
the witnesses, but appears rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the
tendency of the mind, in recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual
for what differs slightly from it. Whether or not the notary signed the certification of
acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect
the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of
the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A
comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator
and witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is
that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer
the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in
executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent
signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly
acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself
nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of
the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments
should be completed without interruption. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the
new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses
should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was
executed.
10.Garcia v. Vasquez 32 SCRA 489 |
FACTS: This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the
will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (Gliceria) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is
also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo GonzalesPrecilla( Consuelo) as special administratrix of the estate on the ground of
Consuelo possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to
annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens. When Gliceria died she
had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her
niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of the properties. The
court approved this because Consuelo has been was already managing the
properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the respondents allege is that
in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of
land valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud
and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo
asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of land for the
purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown was that
NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo

9
asked for the old TCTs. At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that
Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed
because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the
deceased was not of sound mind, that eventough the allegations state that the
deceased prepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from
executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the witnesses prove their truthfulness.
ISSUE: Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
HELD: NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due
execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale
behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the deceased is
not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will
and as well as the typographical errors contain therein which show the haste in
preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created in 1956 written in
Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of the
doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because of cataracts.
(Testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.)
Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly
executed. ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not
expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate alleged to
have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband. The notice of lis
pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem, affecting real
property or the title thereto.
11.Labrador v. CA 184 SCRA 170 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER FACTS: Melecio
died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate
proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the
will has been extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecios
death, the land was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus
eventually sold it to Navat. Trial court admitted the will to probate and
declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied probate on
the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE: W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of
CC.
HELD:YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator. The intention to show March 17 1968 as the
date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. It states that this being in the month of March 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And
the one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This
clearly shows that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was
executing a will.
12.Rodelas v. Aranza 119 SCRA 16 |

10
FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of: 1. Rodelas was estopped from
claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty
days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court; 2. the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore
it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent; 3. the
hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills
cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills 4. the deceased did
not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by
law. MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition. The CFI
set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that
in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the
matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills. And that the
alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla
died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of
the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged
holographic will before his death. Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas
appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves
a question of law not of fact.
ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.
HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of
the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the
handwriting of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court
ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The
law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8
of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means,
if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court,"