Dura Lex Sed Lex Principle

And
Application and
Interpretation of Laws

Persons and Family Relations Section A

Group IV Members:
Abragan,Roxanne
Alboria,MarkLloyd
Azis,Noraima
Carbonell,Andrew
Chun,CelinkaMorgan
Gacus,GeorgiaDawn
Lojo,PhillipAnthony
Pedroza,NikkoArnold
Radiamoda,Rohanah

I.

A.The
DuraLexSedLex
Principle

Duralex sed lex is aLatinlegal maxim means,Thelawmaybeharsh,butit

isstillthelaw.Toetymologizethemaxim:
Durameanshardordifficult
lex
meanslaw(createdbymen)and
Sed
meansbut.

This legal brocard originated in the 11th century asaprinciple ofcanon law
by Bishop Buchard of Worms. It stands for the Rule of Law in which the
letter of the law must be followed by everyone andthat no one is above the
law. A societywho strongly believes in therule oflawis saidtobemorefree
oftyranny.Ifarulerisabovethelaw,thenhecanruletyrannically.1

The
duralex sedlexprincipleisinconsonancewithanotherLatinmaxim:
hoc
quidem perquam durum est, sed ital ex scripta est,
which translates: It is
exceedingly hard but so the law is written. Both principles requirethat the
statute should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise, hard orharsh2
andthat such statutes mustbecompliedwithbyallbecauseignoranceofthe
lawexcusesnoone.3

It is a general rule in statutory construction that if the law is clear and free
from ambiguity, it is theduty of thecourts to applyitwithout fear or favor, to
followitsmandate andnot to tamperwithit.4 Anexampleofapplicationofthe
aforementioned rule is withregards to penallegislations: whenevera certain
act which the court believes best it be suppressed but is not punishable by
law, the courts must render a decision in accordance with the existinglaws
and then report the said act to the President of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice, to make it a subject forpenal legislation.5 The law is
the law andifthereisaneedtochange,amendorrepealit,that maybedone
throughlegislativeprocess,notbyjudicialdecree.6

Anonymous
.https://ph.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20091009211507AA0PNqD.
Lastvisited:20Jun2015
2
A
gpalo,Ruben.StatutoryConstruction.6thEd.2009.
3
A
rticle3NewCivilCode
4
G
ovs.AntiChineseLeagueofthePhils,,84Phil.468
5
A
rticle5oftheRevisedPenalCodeofthePhilippines
1

Bakingvs.DirectorofPrisons,GRNo.30364

B.Relevantcasesapplyingthe
duralexsedlex
principle

PeopleofthePhilippines
versus
Eugenia Abano, Eliseo Cabaa Alias Lucio Cabaa And Pablo Cabaa
AliasTeofiloCabaa
G.R.No.57184
14November1986
.

FACTS: The accused (Eugenia) and the victim (Agripino)arelegally married

but have not been living together for three years. The latter lived with his
paramour,BienvenidaCumad,inahutonly400metersawayfromhisandhis
legalwife's commonhouse.The legal wifehired two men to kill her husband
and his paramour. The crime was consummated. During the preliminary
investigation, the accused admitted that she hired men to kill her husband
andtheparamourbuttheconfessionwasdoneintheabsenceofhercounsel.

ISSUE: Whether the Court should look with favor towards the legal wife
consideringthecircumstancesthatledhertocommitthecrime.

RULING: The Court affirmed thedecision oftheCebuBohol CircuitCriminal

Court finding the accused guilty of the crime of parricide and murder.
However,theCourt recommends ExecutiveClemencyforthelegalwife.
The
courtsaidthattheconfession oftheaccusedisinadmissiblesincethereisno
proof that the accused was offered to secure a lawyer and right to remain
silent during the custodial investigation. As the accused, an unschooled
copramaker was left to fend forherselfin a proceeding wherein she herself
was theaccused.Theinadmissibilityinevidence oftheaccused'sconfession,
notwithstanding.Thecourtfindthe"webofcircumstantialevidence"whichthe
trialcourt found sufficientfor conviction,tohaveremainedunimpaired.Under
section 5 of rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if 1.
There is morethan onecircumstance2. Thefactsfromwhich theinferences
are derivedareproven3. Thecombinationof all the circumstanceissuchas
to produce a conviction beyondreasonabledoubt. Theserequirements have
beensatisfiedinthecaseatbar.

The court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of the accused. How she
must have suffered during the three years that her husband lived with his
paramour.Itis indeed incaseslikethis, thatthe boundeddutyofthecourtto

apply thelaw becomesapainfultaskand themaxim"duralexsedlex"makes

itsfullimpact.

IsabelitaLahom
versus
JoseMelvinSibulo
G.R.No.143989
14July2003

FACTS:Achildlesscouple adoptedthewife'snephewandbroughthimupas
their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and
ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose
Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her
husband,theiradoptedsonrefusedtousetheirsurnameLahomandcontinue
to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in1998,RANo.8552wentintoeffect.Thenewstatutedeletedfromthe
law the right ofadopters torescindadecreeofadoption(Section19ofArticle
VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and
lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in
December1999 torescindthedecreeofadoptionpreviouslyissued wayback
onMay 5, 1972. When Lahom filed saidpetitiontherewasalreadyanewlaw
onadoption,specifically R.A. 8552also known astheDomesticAdoptionAct
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it wasprovided that: "Adoption, beingin
the interest of the child, shall not be subject torescissionbytheadopter(s).
However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article919oftheCivilCode"(Section19).

ISSUE: Whether the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an

adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 considering the indifference,
ingratitudeandlackofcareoftheadoptedchild

RULING:The action forrescission of theadoption decreecouldnolongerbe

pursued. Theactionwas initiated by petitionerafterR.A. No.8552hadcome
intoforce.Bythen,thenewlaw,hadalreadyabrogatedandrepealedtheright
of an adopter under theCivilCode andthe Family Code torescind a decree
ofadoption.

OlympioRevaldo
versus
PeopleofthePhilippines
G.R.No.170589

April16,2009

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of

premium hardwood lumber inviolationofSection68oftheForestryCode.On
the 17th day ofJune 1992,OlympioRevaldo,withintentofgain,didthenand
there willfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslypossess96.14boardft.offlatlumber
with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal
document as requiredunderexisting forest laws andregulations from proper
government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997 convicting petitioner of the
offense charged, he appealed and the Court ofAppealsruled thatmotive or
intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber
withoutthe legaldocuments gives rise tocriminalliability.Hence,thispetition
for certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
conductedbythe policeofficers wasillegaland thustheitems seized should
not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the
police officers were not armed with a search warrant when theywentto his
houseto verify the report thatpetitionerhadinhispossessionlumberwithout
thecorrespondinglicense

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is

admissibleincourt

HELD: Whenthe police officersarrived atthe houseof petitioner, thelumber

were lying around the vicinity of petitioners house. Under the plain view
doctrine, objectsfallingin"plainview"ofanofficerwhohasarighttobe inthe
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. When asked whetherhehad thenecessarypermit to possess the
lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the
lumberin hispossessionwas intendedfor therepairofhis houseandforhis
furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to
confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search
warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner

categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated

lumber aswell as the fact that hedid not have anylegaldocuments therefor
andthat he merely intendedtousethelumberfortherepairofhisdilapidated
house. Mere possessionofforestproducts without the properdocumentation
consummates the crime.
Dura lexsed lex. Thelawmay beharshbut thatis
the law.Therefore, theappealeddecision convicting petitioner forviolationof
Section68(nowSection77)oftheForestryCodeisaffirmed.

II.

A.ApplicationandInterpretationoflaws

Incaseofdoubtintheinterpretationorapplicationoflaws,itis
presumedthatthelawmakingbodyintendedrightandjusticeto
prevail.7

Article 10 oftheNewCivilCodeisapplicableonlyifthereisdoubtonthelaw.
This article was embodied in the Code by the Code Commission for the
reason that it may tip the scales infavor ofrightand justicewhen the law is
doubtful or obscure.It willstrengthen the determination ofthecourtstoavoid
aninjusticewhich mayapparently be authorized bysome way ofinterpreting
thelaw.8

Asageneral ruleof statutory construction, the spirit, rather than theletter,of

a statute determines the construction thereof and the court looks less to its
words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effect.9 All
laws should receive a sensible construction and whena literalinterpretation
of general terms would lead to injustice, oppression or absurdity, it mustbe
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which
wouldavoidsuchresults.10

Statutes are interpreted orconstruedeitherstrictly or liberally, dependingon

its nature, purpose or the doubt to be ascertained. Strictconstruction isthat
construction accordingto the letterofastatute, whichrecognizesnothingthat
isnotexpressed,takesthelanguageusedinitsexactmeaningandadmitsno

7
8
9

Article10NewCivilCode

ReportofCodeCommission,p.78

TaadavsCuenco,103Phil1051
I
nRe:Allen,2Phil630

10

equitable consideration.11 Liberal construction, on the other hand, is that

construction which expandsthemeaningofastatutetomeetcaseswhichare
clearly within the spirit or reason thereof or within the evil which thestatute
was designed to remedy, or which gives a statute its generally accepted
meaning to the endthat themost comprehensiveapplication thereof may be
accorded, without being inconsistent with its language or doing violence to
anyofitsterms.12

Itmustbe putin mindthat social justicemust betakeningreatconsideration

in theapplication andinterpretationoflaws.Socialjusticeisthehumanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception mayatleastbe
approximated.13

B.Relevantcasesconcerninginterpretationorapplicationoflaws

InRe:AdoptionofStephanieNathyAstorgaGarcia
G.R.No.148311
31March2005

FACTS: Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The child has been using
her mothers middle name and surname, petitioner asks that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed toGarcia andsurnameGarcia changedto
Catindig.

ISSUE: Whether anillegitimatechild,uponadoptionbyhernaturalfather,use

thesurnameofhernaturalmotherashermiddlename.

RULING: It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and

salutary, shouldbe liberallyconstruedto carryoutthebeneficentpurposesof
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained topromoteand fulfill these nobleand compassionateobjectives of
the law. Sincethere isnolawprohibiting an illegitimatechildadopted by her

11
12
13

PriestvsCaptain,139S.W.204

CrescentCityvsGriffin,87P2d414MarylandCasualtyCo.vsSmith,40S.W.2nd213

CalalangvsWilliams70Phil726

natural father to use as middle name her mothers surname, the Courtfinds
noreasonwhysheshouldnotbeallowedtodoso.

RepublicFlourMillsInc
versus
CommissionerofCustomsandtheCourtofTaxAppeal
G.R.No:L28463,
May31,1971

FACTS:
From December 1963to July1964,RepublicFlour Mills (petitioner)exported
Pollard and/or bran, which were loaded from lighters alongside vessels
engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater. The
Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals (respondent)
assessed the petitionerbyway of wharfage duesonthesaid exportations in
the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under
protest. In this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to
interpret the wordsproducts ofthePhilippinesfoundin Section 2802 of the
Tariff and Custom Code, as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) onthe
ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the
Philippines,theyaremerelywastefromtheproductionofflour.

ISSUE:
Whetherornotsuchcollectionofwharfagedueswasinaccordancewithlaw

RULING/HELD:
Asstated on theSection2802oftheTariffandCustomCode,"Thereshallbe
levied, collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the
Philippines,andon productsof the PhilippinesexportedfromthePhilippines,
achargeof two pesospergross metrictonasafeefor wharfage."Itappears
tobequiteprecise.

Section 2802 refers to what is imported and exported. The objective of this
act must becarriedout.Evenifthereisdoubttothemeaningofthelanguage
employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought tobe
attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the
same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs
Code wouldlikewisebeentitledtosympatheticconsideration.Itwasdesirable
then thatthe gates tosuch effortsat unjustified restrictionofthe coverage of
the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end result wouldbenotrespect for,

but defianceof,aclearlegislativemandate.ThedecisionofrespondentCourt
of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed with costs against
petitioner.