Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan vs. Mun.

of
Buruanga, Aklan (March 31, 2006)
towns/pueblos/churches/public plaza are property
for public use and not subject for appropriation by
the State and private persons
Facts:
Petitioners claim ownership on Lots 138-A, 138-B, and 138-C contending that said
lots were adjacent to the land area occupied by the church. Respondent however
claims ownership on Lots 138-A and 138-C as the Lot 138-B is indisputably owned
by the Church with its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof.
The lots in dispute have constructions of a public plaza, municipal building, rural
health center, community medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and
a grandstand. Petitioner contends that such constructions and buildings were
merely allowed by them in occupation by tolerance and does not constitute
possession of the respondents.
Issues:
Whether or not the land in dispute belongs to a public domain based on its nature of
use?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that public plaza and public thoroughfares is not subject for
registration by either the church or the municipality. Property for public use of
provinces and towns are governed by the same principles as property of public
dominion of the same character. They are intended for the common and public
welfare so they cannot be subject for appropriation either by the State or private
person.

Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property,
which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese
Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the
war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of
public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case
because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect
of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted
to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring
the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

Villarico v. Sarmiento

Facts:
Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy
Aquino Avenue highway by a strip of land belonging to the
government.
Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the said
government land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson

Corp.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villarico
acquired a portion of the same area owned by the
government.
o He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents
(Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way to
the Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of his
lot.
Issue:
Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.
Ratio:
No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way
to the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion.
o It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined to
privileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public.
Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is
for the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property
for public dominion.
o Public dominion property is outside the commerce of
man and hence, it cannot be:
Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter
of contracts
Acquired by prescription against the state
Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution
Be burdened by any voluntary easement
It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor
of the petitioner and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself and
he cannot claim any right of possession over it.

Manila International Airport Authority vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No 155650, July 20, 2006.
Carpio, J.:
Doctrine: The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the
Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion
and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Complex in Paraaque City. As operator of the international
airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of
land,including the runways and buildings (Airport Lands and Buildings) then under

the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion
of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode
unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.The Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel issued Opinion No. 061, in which it said that the
Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption for real estate tax granted
to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA charter. Therefore, MIAA was held to be
delinquent in paying its taxes. The City of Paraaque Levied upon the properties of
MIAA, and posted invitations for public biddings of MIAAs properties. The City of
Paraaque averred that Section 193 of the Local Government code expressly
withdrew tax exemptions from government owned and controlled corporations
(GOCCs).
Issue: Whether properties of the MIAA are subject to real estate taxes.
Held: No. In the first place, MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality of the
government. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. As
operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (Airport
Lands and Buildings) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA
Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be
disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines.
Furthermore, Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion
and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 419 of
the Civil Code provides, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of
public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis
supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of
the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the
MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the
character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The
operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character of the road
as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road, either
the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those
among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon
using the road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of
taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property
whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property
of public dominion as one intended for public use. Even if the government collects
toll fees, the road is still intended for public use if anyone can use the road under
the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the
limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and
other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the
road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA
charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations
of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an
airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing
those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the
public including those who never use the particular public facility. A users tax is
more equitable a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the principal
airport of the Philippines for both international and domestic air traffic, are
properties of public dominion because they are intended for public use. As
properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic
of the Philippines.
Being a property of public dominion, the properties of MIAA are beyond the
commerce of man.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be
held liable under the law of Karma.

CITY OF PASIG vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON

GOOD GOVERNMENT- Real Property Tax
FACTS:
MPLDC owned two parcels of land in Pasig City. In 1986, Jose Y. Campos, the
registered owner of MPLDC, voluntarily surrendered MPLDC to the government.
From 2002-2005, Pasig City sent notices of assessment to MPLDC to demand
payment of real property taxes. PCGG filed with the RTCC a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for issuance of a TRO claiming ownership over the said properties.
ISSUE:
Are the properties owned by PCGG subject to real property taxes?
HELD:
Only those portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real
estate taxes for the period of such leases and may also be sold at public auctioned
to satisfy the tax delinquency. While it was established that the owner of the
properties is now clearly the Republic of the Philippines given the voluntary
surrender, the Local Government Code clearly states that the exemption will not
apply when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person. The Court cited several cases to support the
decision such as Philippine Fisheries, GSIS, MIAA, and Lung Center.

Dream Village Neighborhood Association Inc.,

Represented by its Incumbent President, Greg
Seriego, Petitioner, vs. Bases Conversion
Development Authority, Respondent
G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013
Facts: Dream Village, composed of more than 2,000 families have been occupying
the disputed lot continuously, exclusively and notoriously since the year 1985. Said
lot used to be a part of the Hacienda de Maricaban, which was subsequently
purchased by the government of the United States of America (USA) and was
converted to Fort William McKinley. Later on, USA transferred 30 hectares of it to the
Manila Railroad Company, while the rest were still in the name of US Government.
Finally, on December of 1956, the US government ceded Fort William McKinley to
the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and was renamed Fort Bonifacio, reserved for
military purposes. On January 1986, President Marcos Issued Proclamation No. 2476
declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable, thus allowing
sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and
Western Bicutan. President Corazon Aquino on the other hand amended the
proclamation of Pres. Marcos and limited the lots which were open for disposition.
On March of 1992, the Bases conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) was
created to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Military Reservations
to productive civilian uses, which then authorized the President of the Philippines to
sell the lands covered in whole or in part, specifically to raise capital for the BCDA.
BCDA asserted its title to Dream Village owing to the fact that BCDAs titles over

Fort Bonifacio are valid and commercially valuable to the agency, however, due to
the passage of time, was contended to have been abandoned to Dream Village, and
that BCDAs right over it has already prescribed.
Issue: Whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by
prescription.
Ruling: No. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription (Art.1113, NCC). Also, under Article
422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there
is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. It is also stipulated under PD 1529 that
before the acquisitive prescription can commence, the property must expressly
declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the
development of national wealth, and that absent such express declaration, the land
remains to be property of public dominion. Subsequent proclamations over vast
portions of Maricaban exempted the lot where Dream Village was situated from
being open for disposition, thus Fort Bonifacio remains a property of public
Dominion of the State because although declared alienable and disposable, it is
reserved for some public service or development of national wealth, and thus, the
acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run. Thus,
the area occupied by Dream Village is still not susceptible of acquisition by
prescription.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by

Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en
banc in order to provide definitive clarity
to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections
14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree
(PD No. 1529)
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified
as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest

had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than thirty (30)
years.
Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a
22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sonsthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather.
Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert
the application.
Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the CENRO-DENR, which stated
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
o had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain,
and
o that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan.
CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529)
any period of possession prior to
the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession.

CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property
was declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be
factored in the computation of the period
of possession. (Interpretation of CA of Section 14(1) was based on the Courts ruling
in Republic v. Herbieto)
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA; it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court
Petitioners rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit (handed down just 4 months prior
to Herbieto) - with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property
as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the
Property Registration Decree.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in
Naguit is the correct interpretation of
the provision.
The OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have
been classified as alienable and
disposable as of 12 June 1945.
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the
land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
o According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered
was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the
property had already been
converted into private property through prescription.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to
patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands.
The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can
run against public lands, said period
should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
DISCUSSION:
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain.

The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable,
timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses
into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable,
or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasipublic uses.
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of
by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
agricultural lands was changed to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
o The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may
be registered.
o Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of
lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are a larger
class than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the
same as Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or
earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion
of Section 14(1) therein, the Public
Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized

representatives:
It is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership
of the possessor who has been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945.
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration
procedure for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of
the Public Land Act (amended by Rep.
Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits the period within which one may exercise the right to
seek registration under Section 48.
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December 31,
2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period
shall apply only where the area applied for
does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of
time designated by the President in accordance
with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not
be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any
time prior to the period fixed by the President.
The substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
December 2020.
The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessorsin-interest be in possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character
of the property must have been
declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after
12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended.
Discussed in Naguit. adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph
(1) of Section 14 virtually

inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered
an independent state.
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land
registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of
initial hearing.
The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2).
The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of
possession on their part prior to 1948,
thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the
decision whether petitioners therein
had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years,
but not before 12 June 1945.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2)
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There
is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such
conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced
on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible
basis for application for original
registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal
foundation for the application. It

reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible
to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that
are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or
mineral lands
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not
refer to or call into application the
Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
possession period immediately preceding
the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable
at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years.
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The
identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is
patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription
Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion
and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into
patrimonial.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such
in a duly enacted law or duly
promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be
reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? - We rule in
the negative.
As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil
Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still
classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the
Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available
both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.
Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No.
1472 is based on thirty years
of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
possession preceding the classification of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property
has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of
the possessor.
Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
property, the ideal next step is the
registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode

of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.

SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES APPLIED:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject
to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial

property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just
title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES:
Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the property since 12
June 1945 or earlier.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2
October 2007 are AFFIRMED.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of

Zamboanga, et al
L-24440, March 28, 1968
FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and
Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that-"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free
of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga."
Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was
unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process.
Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school
sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:
Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?
Should the city pay for said properties?
HELD:
If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for
public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the
rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public
service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is
for a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.
If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are
patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived
of its own property without just compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations
would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO
COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that
should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial,
they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the
control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired.
Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws."

Salas v Jarencio
Facts:
Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres. to consider the
feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial property of Manila for the
purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed
declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under
the Land Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority wrote
letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of w/c Manila accepted.
But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided to go against their agreement and
prayed that RA 4118 be not implemented and that it is unconstitutional.
Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is unconstitutional and invalid,
thus the petition for review.
Issue:
Is RA 4118 valid?
Held:
VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said land as private or
patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice
policy of the Constitution and the Land for the Landless program. The RA was
never intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its character as
communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the Natl
Govt through the Land Authority.

(STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES)

Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To declare a law as
unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear and unequivocal. To strike down a
law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or
prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.

CEBU OXYGEN VS BERCILLES

In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the citys
development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was
subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the
highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands registration
before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the court later through
Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the road is part of the public domain
hence beyond the commerce of man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city council may close any city
road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn
from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Since that
portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygens application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)

Posted on October 19, 2012
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of
J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC

Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20,
1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract
agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets
and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit
dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a
letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial
court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his
letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea
market is valid.
Held:
No.
J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of
respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence,
local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer
intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use
the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the
public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to
dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be

considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance
with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by
the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the
inhanbitants pf the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition
of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the
respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to
clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.
The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.