Battle of Smolensk (1943)

The second Battle of Smolensk (7 August2 October

1943) was a Soviet strategic oensive operation conducted by the Red Army as part of the Summer-Autumn
Campaign of 1943. Staged almost simultaneously with
the Lower Dnieper Oensive (13 August22 September), the oensive lasted two months and was led by
General Andrei Yeremenko, commanding the Kalinin
Front, and Vasily Sokolovsky, commanding the Western
Front. Its goal was to clear the German presence from the
Smolensk and Bryansk regions. Smolensk had been under German occupation since the rst Battle of Smolensk
in 1941.

1 Strategic context

Despite an impressive German defense, the Red Army

was able to stage several breakthroughs, liberating several
major cities, including Smolensk and Roslavl. As a result
of this operation, the Red Army was able to start planning for the liberation of Belarus. However, the overall
advance was quite modest and slow in the face of heavy
German resistance, and the operation was therefore accomplished in three stages: 720 August, 21 August6
September, and 7 September2 October.

On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue the

liberation of occupied territories from German control,
a course of action that had its rst major success at
the end of 1942 with Operation Uranus, which led to
the liberation of Stalingrad. The Battle of the Dnieper
was to achieve the liberation of Ukraine and push the
southern part of the front towards the west. In order to
weaken the German defenses even further, however, the
Smolensk operation was staged simultaneously, in a move
that would also draw German reserves north, thereby
weakening the German defense on the southern part of
the front. Both operations were a part of the same strategic oensive plan, aiming to recover as much Soviet territory from German control as possible.

See also: Panther-Wotan line

By the end of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, Germany
had lost all hope of regaining the initiative on the Eastern
Front. Losses were considerable and the whole army was
less eective than before, as many of its experienced soldiers had fallen during the previous two years of ghting.
This left the German army capable of only reacting to
Soviet moves.

Although playing a major military role in its own right,

the Smolensk Operation was also important for its eect
on the Battle of the Dnieper. It has been estimated that as
many as 55 German divisions were committed to counter
the Smolensk Operation divisions which would have
been critical to prevent Soviet troops from crossing the Thirty years later, Marshal Vasilevsky (Chief of the GenDnieper in the south. In the course of the operation, eral Sta in 1943) wrote in his memoirs:
the Red Army also denitively drove back German forces
from the Smolensk land bridge, historically the most imThis plan, enormous both in regard of
portant approach for a western attack on Moscow.
its daring and of forces committed to it,
was executed through several operations: the
The Strategic Operations included smaller operations:
Smolensk operation, ...the Donbass [Operation], the left-bank Ukraine operation...[5]
Spas-Demensk Oensive Operation (720
August 1943)

1.1 Geography

Dukhovshchina-Demidov Oensive Operation

(1 Stage) (1318 August 1943)

The territory on which the oensive was to be staged

was a slightly hilly plain covered with ravines and possessing signicant areas of swamps and forests that restricted military movement. Its most important hills
reached heights over 270 m (890 ft), allowing for improved artillery defense. In 1943, the area was for the
most part covered with pine and mixed forests and thick
bushes.[6]

Yelnia-Dorogobuzh Oensive Operation (28

August-6 September 1943)
Dukhovshchina-Demidov Oensive Operation
(2 Stage) (14 September-2 October 1943)
Smolensk-Roslavl Oensive Operation (15
September-2 October 1943)

Numerous rivers also passed through the area, the most

important of them being the Donets Basin, Western Dvina, Dnieper, Desna, Volost' and Ugra rivers. None of

Bryansk Oensive Operation (17 August-3

October 1943)
1

OPPOSING FORCES

A detail of the Smolensk oensive, showing the concave shape of

the Soviet front line.

Map of the Smolensk operation and related oensives.

2.1 Soviet oensive sector

As of July 1943, the shape of the Soviet front line on this

part of the Eastern Front was described by a concave with
these rivers were especially wide at 10120 m (33394
a re-entrant centered around Oryol, oering them the opft) respectively, nor deep at 40 to 250 cm (1.3 to 8.2 ft)
portunity to attack Wehrmacht defensive lines which berespectively; but the surrounding wide, swamp-like arcame exposed to ank attacks from the north.
eas proved dicult to cross, especially for mechanized
troops. Moreover, like many south-owing rivers in Eu- Therefore, the oensive promised to be quite dicult for
rope, the Dniepers western bank, which was held by Soviet troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts who were
German troops, was higher and steeper than the eastern. predominantly tasked with the operation.
There were very few available bridges or ferries.[7]
The Kalinin Front had assigned for the operation the 10th

1.2

Transport infrastructure

For the Soviet troops, the oensive was further complicated by a lack of transport in the area in which the oensive was to be staged. The road network was not well developed and paved roads were rare. After rainfall, which
was quite common during the Russian summer, most of
them were turned into mud (a phenomenon known as
rasputitsa), greatly slowing down any advance of mechanized troops, and raising logistical issues as well. The
only major railroad axis available for Soviet troops was
the Rzhev-Vyazma-Kirov line.

Guards rmy, 5th Army, 10th Army, 21st Army, 33rd

Army, 49th Army, 68th rmy, 1st Air Army, 2nd Guards
Tank Corps, 5th Mechanised Corps, 6th Guards Cavalry
Corps.
The Western Front would have for the operation the 4th
Shock Army, 39th Army, 43rd Army, 3rd Air Army, 31st
Army.

2.2 German defenses

As a result of the shape of the front, a signicant number
of divisions of Army Group Center were kept on this part
of the front because of a (quite legitimate) fear of a major
oensive in this sector.

The Wehrmacht controlled a much wider network of

roads and railroads, centered on Smolensk and Roslavl. For instance, at the end of July 1943, a German sta
These two cities were important logistical centers, allow- brieng stated:
ing quick supply and reinforcements for German troops.
By far the most important railroads for German troops
On the front... held by the Army Group
were the Smolensk-Bryansk axis and the Nevel-OrshaCenter many signs show a continuous prepaMogilev axis, linking German western troops with troops
ration to a yet limited oensive (Roslavl,
concentrated around Oryol.[7] As part of the Soviet planSmolensk, Vitebsk) and of a maneuver of imning the German railroad communications were attacked
mobilization of the Army Group Center...[8]
by the partisans during the conduct of Operation Concert,
one of the largest railroad sabotage operations of World
The front had been more or less stable for four to ve
War II.
months (and up to 18 months in several places) before
the battle, and possessed geographical features favorable
for a strong defensive setup. Thus, German forces had
time to build extensive defensive positions, numbering as
2 Opposing forces
much as ve or six defensive lines in some places, for a
total depth extending from 100130 km (6281 mi).[9]

3.2

Spas-Demensk oensive

The rst (tactical or outer) defensive zone included the

rst (main) and the second defense lines, for a total depth
of 1215 km (7.59.3 mi), and located, whenever possible, on elevated ground. The main defense line, 5 km
(3.1 mi) deep, possessed three sets of trenches and ring
points, linked by an extensive communication network.
The density of ring points reached six or seven per kilometer (0.6 mi) of front line. In some places, where heavy
tank attacks were feared, the third set of trenches was in
fact a solid antitank moat with a steep western side integrating artillery and machine guns emplacements. The
forward edge of the battle area was protected by three
lines of barbed wire and a solid wall of mineelds.[8]
The second defense zone, located about 10 km (6.2 mi)
behind the outer defense zone and covering the most important directions, was composed of a set of ring points
connected with trenches. It was protected with barbed
wire, and also with mineelds in some places where heavy
tank oensives were anticipated. Between the outer and
the second defense zones, a set of small ring points and
garrisons was also created in order to slow down a Soviet
advance should the Red Army break through the outer
defense zone. Behind the second zone, heavy guns were
positioned.
Finally, deep behind the front line, three or four more
defense lines were located, whenever possible, on the
western shore of a river. For instance, important defense lines were set up on the western side of the Dnieper
and Desna. Additionally, the main urban centers located
on the defense line (such as Yelnya, Dukhovshchina and
Spas-Demensk), were reinforced and fortied, preparing
them for a potentially long ght. Roads were mined and
covered with antitank devices and ring points were installed in the most important and tallest buildings.

3
3.1

First stage (7 August 20 August)

Main breakthrough

After a day of probing, the goal of which was to determine whether German troops would choose to withdraw
or not from the rst set of trenches, the oensive started
on 7 August 1943 at 06:30 (with a preliminary bombardment starting at 04:40 am) with a breakthrough towards
Roslavl. Three armies (apparently under the control of
Soviet Western Front) were committed to this oensive:
the 5th Army (Soviet Union), the 10th Guards Army, and
the 33rd Army.

General layout of Smolensk region during the battle.

one.[10] On the rst day, the Soviet troops advanced only

4 km (2.5 mi),[11] with all available troops (including artillery, communications men, and engineers) committed
to battle.[12]
Despite violent Soviet attacks, it quickly became obvious
that the three armies would not be able to get through the
German lines. Soviet commanders decided therefore to
commit the 68th Army, kept in reserve, to battle. On the
German side, three additional divisions (2nd Panzer Division, 36th Infantry Division, and 56th Infantry Division)
were sent to the front from the Oryol sector to try to stop
the Soviet advance.
The attack resumed the following day with another attempt at a simultaneous breakthrough taking place further north, towards Yartzevo. Both attacks were stopped
in their tracks by heavy German resistance. In the following ve days, Soviet troops slowly made their way through
German defenses, repelling heavy counterattacks and sustaining heavy losses. By feeding reserve troops to battle,
the Red Army managed to advance to a depth varying
from 1525 km (9.315.5 mi) by 11 August.[13]
Subsequent attacks by the armored and cavalry forces of
the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps had no further eect and
resulted in heavy casualties because of strong German defenses, leading to a stalemate.

3.2 Spas-Demensk oensive

During the Spas-Demensk oensive operation ( ) in the region of
Spas-Demensk, things went better for the 10th Army.
The Wehrmacht had fewer troops and only limited reserves in this area, enabling the 10th Army to break
through German lines and advance 10 km (6.2 mi) in two
days.

The attack quickly encountered heavy opposition and

stalled. German troops attempted numerous counterattacks from their well-prepared defense positions, supported by tanks, assault guns, and the re of heavy guns
and mortars. As Konstantin Rokossovsky recalls, we literally had to tear ourselves through German lines, one by The 5th Mechanized Corps,[14] relocated from Kirov and

SECOND STAGE (21 AUGUST 6 SEPTEMBER)

2. Wehrmacht defense lines were exceptionally well

prepared (ring points reinforced by trenches,
barbed wire, mineelds etc.)
3. Several Red Army rie divisions were insuciently
prepared to perform an assault of a multi-lined defense setup. This was especially true for reserve divisions, whose training was not always properly supervised.

A destroyed German bunker, showing shell impacts in its steel

plating.

committed to battle in order to exploit the breakthrough,

failed in its mission, mainly because a poorly organized
anti-aircraft defense enabled Luftwae dive bombers to
attack its light Valentine tanks with some impunity. The
corps sustained heavy losses and had to pull away from
combat. Soviet troops eventually advanced a further 25
km (16 mi) as of 13 August, liberating Spas-Demensk.[15]

3.3

Dukhovshchina oensive

4. There were not enough tanks committed to battle,

forcing Red Army commanders to rely on artillery,
mortars, and infantry to break through Wehrmacht
lines. Moreover, numerous counterattacks and an
abundance of mineelds slowed down the infantrys
progress.
5. The interaction between regiments and divisions was
far from perfect. There were unexpected pauses
during the attack and a strong will of some regiments
to hide from the attack and expose another regiment.
6. Many Red Army commanders were too impressed
by Wehrmacht counterattacks and failed to act properly, even if their own troops outnumbered those of
the Wehrmacht.

7. The infantry were not using their own weapons (such

As ordered by the Stavka (the Soviet Armed Forces
as their own heavy guns and portable mortars) well
Command), the Dukhovshchina-Demidov oensive openough. They relied too much on artillery.
eration (-
) near Dukhovshchina started almost a week
8. The fact that the oensive was postponed from 37
later, on 13 August. As on other parts of the front, the
August gave German troops more time to increase
39th Army and the 43rd Army encountered serious optheir readiness.
position. During the rst day alone, Wehrmacht troops
attempted 24 regimental-sized counterattacks, supported
With all these factors considered, Voronov demanded
by tanks, assault guns, and aviation.[16]
that the 4th Tank Army and the 8th Artillery Corps be
Soviet troops managed to advance only 67 km (3.74.3 transferred from the Bryansk Front and instead commitmi) over the next ve days and, although they inicted ted to support the attack near Smolensk.[20]
heavy casualties on Wehrmacht troops, their own losses
The stalemate was far from what had been desired by the
were also heavy.[17]
Stavka, but it had at least one merit: it tied down as much
as 40% of all Wehrmacht divisions on the Eastern Front
near Smolensk, making the task for troops ghting in the
3.4 Causes of the stalemate
south and near Kursk much easier.[21] The Stavka planned
to resume the oensive on 21 August, but decided to postBy mid-August, Soviet operations all along the Smolensk pone it slightly to give Soviet units time to resupply and
front stabilized. The resulting stalemate, while not a de- reinforce.[22]
feat per se, was stinging for Soviet commanders, who
provided several explanations for their failure to press
forward. Deputy Chief of General Sta General A. I.
Antonov reported We have to deal both with forests and 4 Second stage (21 August 6
swamps and with increasing resistance of enemy troops
September)
reinforced by divisions arriving from Bryansk region[18]
while Marshal Nikolai Voronov, formerly a Stavka mem- By mid-August, the situation on the Eastern Front had
ber, analysed the stalemate in his memoirs, publishing changed as the Red Army started a general oensive,
what he saw as the eight primary causes:[19]
beginning with the Belgorod-Khar'kov Oensive Operation (-
1. The Wehrmacht OKH command knew about the op- )(Operation
Polkovodets
Rumyantsev)
eration and was prepared for it.
( "" - 323 August) and the Orlov

4.2

Bryansk maneuver

oensive operation (
) (Operation Polkovodets Kutuzov) (
"" - 12 July - 18 August) known in German
history as the Battle of Kursk, and continuing with the
Wehrmachts defensive Battle of the Dnieper line in
North Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht command
was still reinforcing its troops around Smolensk and
Roslavl, withdrawing several divisions from the Oryol
region. As a result, the two Soviet counteroensives
that followed the Kursk defensive operation (
523 July) proceeded
relatively easily for the Red Army around Oryol, creating
a large salient south of Smolensk and Bryansk.

5
Dniepr.

4.2 Bryansk maneuver

Near Bryansk, things went equally well for the Soviet

armies, despite heavy German resistance. However, an
identied weakness changed all the previous plans. A
surprisingly easy capture of several hills commanding the
Dubrovka region north of Bryansk, with numerous German soldiers captured in total absence of battle readiness, came to the attention of General Markian Popov,
commander of the Bryansk Front from June to October
1943.[26] This meant that the Soviet oensive was probIn this situation, the former attack axis, directed south- ably not expected along that particular axis.
west towards Roslavl and Bryansk, became useless. The
Stavka decided instead to shift the attack axis west to Therefore, the boundary between the First Belorussian
Front and the Western Front was shifted south, and
Yelnya and Smolensk.[23]
two new armies executed a single-pincer movement to
Dubrovka and around Bryansk, forcing German forces to
withdraw.[27]

4.1

Yelnya oensive

By 6 September, the oensive slowed down almost to a

halt on the entire front, with Soviet troops advancing only
2 km (1.2 mi) each day. On the right ank, heavy ghting broke out in the woods near Yartzevo. On the center,
advancing Soviet troops hit the Dnieper defense line. On
the left ank, Soviet rie divisions were slowed as they
entered forests southwest of Yelnya. Moreover, Soviet divisions were tired and depleted, at less than 60% nominal
strength. On 7 September, the oensive was stopped, and
The Soviet armies, aware of the Wehrmacht preparations, the second stage of the Smolensk operation was over.[28]
were reinforced with tanks and artillery during the week
from 2027 August.
Yelnya-Dorogobuzh
oensive
operation
The
(-

) was considered the key to Smolensk

and Wehrmacht troops created a massive fortied
defense position around the city. Swampy areas on the
Desna and Ugra rivers were mined and heavy guns set up
on hills overlooking the city.

The oensive nally commenced on 28 August by the 5 Third stage (7 September 2 Oc10th Guards Army, 21st Army and the 33rd Army), suptober)
ported by three Tank, a Mechanized corps and the 1st Air
Army. These four armies were covering a front of only 36
km (22 mi), creating a very high concentration of troops. In the week from 714 September, Soviet troops were
The troops, however, had fuel and supplies for two weeks once again reinforced and were preparing for another ofat most.[24]
fensive. The next objectives set by the Stavka were the
Soviet troops moved forward after an intense 90-minute major cities of Smolensk, Vitebsk and Orsha. The operation resumed on 14 September with the Smolenskshelling. The artillery bombardment as well as ground attack aircraft signicantly damaged Wehrmacht lines, al- Roslavl oensive operation (-
), involving the left ank of
lowing the Red Army to execute a breakthrough on a 25
km (16 mi) sector front and advance 68 km (3.75.0 mi) the Kalinin Front and the Western Front. After a prelimby the end of the day. The following day, 29 August, Red inary artillery bombardment, Soviet troops attempted to
Army rie divisions advanced further, creating a salient break through the Wehrmacht lines.
30 km (19 mi) wide and 1215 km (7.59.3 mi) deep.[25]
In order to exploit the breakthrough, the 2nd Guards
Tank Corps was thrown into the battle. In one day,
its troops advanced 30 km (19 mi) and reached the
outskirts of Yelnya. Leaving Wehrmacht troops no time
to regroup their forces, Red Army troops attacked the
city and started to form an encirclement. On 30 August,
Wehrmacht forces were forced to abandon Yelnya, sustaining heavy casualties. This commenced a full-scale retreat by Wehrmacht troops from the area. By 3 September, Soviet forces had reached the eastern shore of the

On the Kalinin Fronts attack sector, the Red Army created a salient 30 km (19 mi) wide and 313 km (1.9
8.1 mi) deep by the end of the day. After four days of
battle, Soviet rie divisions captured Dukhovshchina, another key to Smolensk.[29]
On the Western Front's attack sector, where the oensive
started one day later, the breakthrough was also promising, with a developing salient 20 km (12 mi) large and
10 km (6.2 mi) deep. The same day, Yartsevo, an important railroad hub near Smolensk, was liberated by Soviet troops. On the Western Fronts left ank, Soviet ri-

7 NOTES

e divisions reached the Desna and conducted an assault last. An essay written after the war by several Wehrmacht
river crossing, creating several bridgeheads on its western ocers stated that:
shore.
Although the vigorous actions of their comAs the result, the Wehrmacht defense line protecting
mand
and troops allowed the Germans to creSmolensk was overrun, exposing the troops defending
ate
a
continuous
front, there was no doubt that
the city to envelopment. General Kurt von Tippelthe
poor
condition
of the troops, the complete
skirch, Chief of Sta of the German 4th Army during
lack
of
reserves,
and
the unavoidable lengththe Smolensk operation and later commander of the 4th
ening
of
individual
units
lines concealed the
Army, wrote that:
danger that the next major Soviet attack would
The forces of the Soviet Western Front struck the left
cause this patchwork frontconstructed with
wing of Army Group Center from the Dorogobuzhsuch dicultyto collapse.[33]
Yelnya line with the aim of achieving a breakthrough
in the direction of Smolensk. It became clear that the Third, as outlined above, the Smolensk Operation was
salientprojecting far to the eastin which the 9th an important helper for the Lower Dnieper Oensive,
Army was positioned could no longer be held.[30]
locking between 40 and 55 divisions near Smolensk and
By 19 September, Soviet troops had created a 250 kilometers (150 mi) long and 40 kilometers (25 mi) wide gap
in Wehrmacht lines. The following day, Stavka ordered
the Western Front troops to reach Smolensk before 27
September, then to proceed towards Orsha and Mogilev.
The Kalinin Front was ordered to capture Vitebsk before
10 October.
On 25 September, after an assault-crossing of the northern Dnieper and street ghting that lasted all night, Soviet troops completed the liberation of Smolensk. The
same day another important city Roslavl was recaptured.
By 30 September, the Soviet oensive force were tired
and depleted, and became bogged down outside Vitebsk,
Orsha, and Mogilev, which were still held by Wehrmacht
troops, and on the 2 October the Smolensk operation was
concluded. A limited follow-on was made to successfully
capture Nevel after two days of street ghting.

preventing their relocation to the southern front.

Finally, a once-united German front was now separated
by the huge and impassable Pripet marshes, cutting Army
Group South o from its northern counterparts, thus
greatly reducing the Wehrmachts abilities to shift troops
and supplies from one sector of the front to the other.[34]
For the rst time, Soviet troops entered territories which
had been occupied for a long time by German soldiers, and discovered war crimes committed by the
SS, Einsatzgruppen. In the areas liberated during the
Smolensk operation (occupied for almost two years), almost all industry and agriculture was gone. In Smolensk
oblast itself, almost 80% of urban and 50% of rural living
space had been destroyed, along with numerous factories
and plants.[6]

After the Smolensk oensive, the central part of the

Soviet-German front stabilized again for many months
Overall, Soviet troops advanced 100180 km (62112 until late June 1944, while the major ghting shifted
mi) during almost 20 days of this third part of the to the south for the Dnieper line and the territory of
oensive.[31]
Ukraine. Only during January 1944 would the front move
The Battle of Lenino (in the Byelorussian SSR) occurred again in the north, when German forces were driven back
from Leningrad, completely lifting the siege which had
in the same general area on 1213 October 1943.
lasted for 900 days. Finally, Operation Bagration in summer 1944 allowed the Red Army to clear almost all the remaining territory of the USSR of Wehrmacht troops, end6 Aftermath
ing German occupation and shifting the war into Poland
and Germany.
The Smolensk operation was a decisive Soviet victory and
a stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. Although quite modest compared to later oensive operations (not more than
200250 km (120160 mi) were gained in depth),[32] the
Soviet advance during this operation was important from
several points of view.
First, German troops were denitively driven back from
the Moscow approaches. This strategic threat, which had
been the Stavkas biggest source of worry since 1941, was
nally removed.
Second, German defense rings, on which German troops
planned to rely, were almost completely overrun. Quite
a few remained, but it was obvious that they would not

7 Notes
[1] A.A. Grechko and al., History of Second World War,
Moscow, 19731979, tome 7, p.241
[2] Glantz (1995), p. 297
[3] http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec43.html
[4] V.A. Zolotarev and al., Great Patriotic War 19411945,
Moskva, 1998, p 473.
[5] Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, The matter of my whole life,
Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p. 327.

[6] V.P. Istomin, Smolensk oensive operation, 1943,

Moscow, Mil. Lib., 1975, page 15
[7] V.P. Istomin, p. 16
[8] V.P. Istomin, p. 12
[9] Marshal N.N. Voronov, On military duty, Moscow, Lib.
Milit. Ed., 1963, pp. 382
[10] K. Rokossovsky, Soldiers duty, Moscow, Politizdat, 1988,
p. 218.
[11] V.P. Istomin, pp. 8182
[12] V.P. Istomin, p.84
[13] V.P. Istomin, p. 8488
[14] See Tank Corps (Soviet); John Erickson, writing in the
early 1980s, refers to the 5th Tank Corps being badly
mauled both from the air and the ground. John Erickson
(historian), Road to Berlin, 1982, p.130
[15] V.P. Istomin, p. 9294
[16] V.P. Istomin, p. 9495
[17] A.A. Grechko and al., History of Great Patriotic War,
19411945, Moscow, 1963, t. 3, p. 361.
[18] G.K. Zhukov, Memoirs, Moscow, Ed. APN, 1971, p. 485
[19] Voronov, pp. 387388
[20] V.P. Istomin, p. 101
[21] Operations of Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War 19411945 (collective work, part written by
V.P.Istomin), tome 2, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1958.
[22] Marshal A.I. Yeremenko, Years of retribution, Moscow,
Science, 1969, pp. 5155.
[23] V.P. Istomin, p. 104
[24] V.P. Istomin, p. 105
[25] V.P.Istomin, p.110.
[26] Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military history journal),
1969, #10, p. 31
[27] Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, p. 32

8 References
Author? World war 19391945 (collection of essays), Moscow, Ed. Foreign Lit., 1957.
Glantz, David M. & House, Jonathan (1995), When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler,
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,
ISBN 0-7006-0899-0
Grechko, A.A. and al., History of Great Patriotic
War, 19411945, Moscow, 1963.
Grechko, A.A. and al., History of Second World
War, Moscow, 19731979, tome 7.
Istomin, V.P. (collective work, part written by
V.P.Istomin) Operations of Soviet Armed Forces
during the Great Patriotic War 19411945, tome
2, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1958.
Istomin, V.P. Smolensk oensive operation, 1943,
Moscow, Mil. Lib., 1975.
Rokossovsky, K. Soldiers duty, Moscow, Politizdat,
1988.
Shefov, Nikolai. Russian ghts, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002.
Tippelskirch, Kurt. History of Second World War,
Moscow, 1957.
Vasilevsky, A.M. The matter of my whole life,
Moscow, Politizdat, 1973.
Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military history journal), 1969, #10, pp. 31,32
Voronov, N.N. On military duty, Moscow, Lib.
Milit. Ed., 1963.
Yeremenko, A.I. Years of retribution, Moscow, Science, 1969.
Zhukov, G.K. Memoirs, Moscow, Ed. APN, 1971,
p. 485
Zolotarev, V.A. and al., Great Patriotic War 1941
1945 (collection of essays), Moscow, 1998.

[28] V.P. Istomin, pp. 122123

Coordinates: 5447N 3203E / 54.783N 32.050E

[29] V.P. Istomin, p. 131
[30] Kurt Tippelskirch, History of Second World War,
Moscow, 1957, pp. 320321
[31] V.P. Istomin, pp. 134136
[32] V.P. Istomin, p. 5
[33] World war 19391945 (collection of essays), Moscow, Ed.
Foreign Lit., 1957, pp. 216217.
[34] V.P. Istomin, p. 163

9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1

Text

Battle of Smolensk (1943) Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Smolensk_(1943)?oldid=667069889 Contributors: Comte0,

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9.2

Images

File:A_destroyed_german_bunker.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/A_destroyed_german_bunker.

jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://militera.lib.ru/research/isaev_av1/ Original artist: Unknown
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File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_
Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source:
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Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
File:General_map_of_smolensk_region.png
Source:
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of_smolensk_region.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: en:Image:General_map_of_smolensk_region.png Original artist:
en:user:Grafikm fr
File:Map_detail_of_smolensk_operation.jpg Source:
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smolensk_operation.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: en:image:Map_detail_of_smolensk_operation.jpg Original artist:
en:user:Grafikm fr
File:Map_of_dnieper_battle_grand.jpg Source:
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Contributors: This is a cropped version of Image:Wikinews-logo-en.png. Original artist: Vectorized by Simon 01:05, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded by
Simon.
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9.3

Content license

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