How has the carrot-and-stick policy undertaken by China been effective in

achieving its objectives of reducing pro-independence sentiments in Taiwan?

Although pro-independence tendencies among the Taiwanese only started after 1996 with
Lee Teng Hui's assumption of the presidential appointment, as early as 1981, China has
already adopted the carrot-and-stick policies that sought for reunification through a
mixture of military coercion and peaceful inducements. The 'carrot' policies refer to the
economic benefits that China offers to Taiwan while the 'stick' policies are military
intimidation by the PLA. This essay seeks to argue that China on the whole has
succeeded at reducing pro-independence sentiments in Taiwan because not only are they
successful on their own, they are also aided by objective circumstances such as declining
American influence, Taiwan's domestic troubles, economic vulnerabilities and its
diplomatic isolation in the international arena. As long as military threat from PLA
continues to be present, independence is simply not a viable option for the Taiwanese.
China's policies to eliminate antagonism and to promote mutual understanding with
Taiwan since 1981, has succeeded in institutionalizing cross-straits contacts. Such has
formed the framework for future talks that are indicative of China's largely peaceful
intentions, which probably ameliorated pro-independence tendencies amongst the
Taiwanese. In January 1979, the PRC announced it would stop shelling Quemoy and
Matsu. A new policy introduced on 30 September 1981 suggested for talks between the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT). It specifically proposed the
santong and siliu as the first step to better cross-strait relations. Promotion of economic
and cultural exchanges and negotiations across the Taiwan Strait was also encouraged.
Beijing and Taiwan established semi-official organizations, the Association for Relations
across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Strait Exchange Foundation. Beijing had hoped
to move to the next phase and prepared for a breakthrough in their exchanges following
the Eight Point Proposal.
China's offer of economic benefits to the Taiwanese seemed successful, as both
economies are now drawn closer to each other. Pro-independence tendencies of some
Taiwanese are therefore curbed to some extent as their island-state has become more
dependent on China for its revenue. Beginning in early 1987, Deng Xiaoping's Taiwan
policy seems to bear fruits. The KMT loosened restrictions on individual and trade
contacts with China. Cross-strait economic ties blossomed. China became a major market
for Taiwan. Trade reached an annual level of $34billion in 1993. By March 1996, China
was Taiwan's second largest market, marking up 21percent of Taiwan's exports, and the
major target of Taiwan's overseas investment. In 2001, the combined Chinese-Hong
Kong market surpassed the US market as Taiwan's most important export market. In
2002 and 2003, Taiwan's exports to China increased by more than 25percent and its
exports to US declined. Moreover, in 2002, China was Taiwan's leading overseas
production center. Nearly 55% of Taiwan overseas investment was located in China and
Taiwan's largest corporations invested in the mainland. Beijing also provided many tax
shelters and other preferential treatments for Taiwanese investment and tolerated a hugh
trade deficit with Taiwan. The growth of economic ties gave China leverage over
Taiwan's domestic economy ad politics, and more pressure on governments ofKMT and

DPP to soften its stance towards China. Even under President Chen Shui-Bian,
perhaps Taiwan's most anti-China leader, allowed for Taipei's unilateral establishment
of the "Three Small Links". He also ended the limits on trade and investment with
China. Visit to China in May 2009 by Chen Ju, the DPP mayor of Kaoshiung city,
signified that even pro-independence politicians have recognized the need to forge
closer ties with the mainland. By 2010, cross-strait ties have become a non-issue in
Taiwanese election as even the DPP recognized the importance of economic
cooperation with China. Tsai Ing Wen, the DPP leader, even promised that
maintaining stability in cross-strait relations will be written into the party's platform
for the next ten years. Victory of pro-China KMT over DPP in the 2012 presidential
election signified Taiwanese preference for a more stable, China-friendly stance
towards the mainland.
Forceful insistence on the One-China Policy by the CCP government has also
deterred many Taiwanese from openly seeking de jure independence from the
mainland. This can be reflected in the military buildup of PLA and the relative
importance tasked to PLA on deterring Taiwan from declaring independence. Beijing
caught the world by surprise and launched successive waves of military exercises
aimed at Taiwan from July 1995 to March 1996. Taiwanese stock market fell by 25
percent. Public response at the height of the crisis also seen an immerse drop in
support of independence. In 2005, Beijing passed the Anti-Secession Law to justify
use of force e against Taiwan if the latter declared independence. Taiwan is constantly
reminded of the consequence of declaring independence by the more than 1300
Chinese missiles aimed at the island. Many Taiwanese have come to see that defiance
against China would be costly and futile.
Tough stance taken by the CCP government on the One China Policy has compelled
the United States to isolate itself from and be intolerant of the pro-independence
elements in Taiwan. Beijing placed the Taiwan issue as the core issue in its dealing
with Washington and believe that a good US-China relationship is important in its
Taiwan policy. Since Taiwan is of a lesser vital interest to US as compared to China,
US has been willing to accommodate that with China on the cross-strait issue to a
certain extent, yet not abandoning Taiwan entirely. On January 1, 1979, US changed
its diplomatic recognition of Chinese government from KMT to CCP as the sole
legal government of China and acknowledged China's position that there is only one
China and Taiwan is part of China. China has also constantly sought to remind US of
its acknowledgement of the "One China" policy. The Americans are displeased with
attempts by any of the Taiwanese leaders at displaying their pro-independence
tendencies openly as such would provoke the Chinese needlessly. Under the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), the US must commit to the defense of the island is China
launches a military invasion. The Americans, given their current compromised global
position, are extremely reluctant to do so. Taiwanese government under Chen Shuibian has been warned on several occasions for its overtly anti-China stance.
Attempts by President Chen to land his airplane in the US have been repeatedly
refused by Washington, for fear of needlessly antagonizing China.
Taiwan's isolation by the global community due to Beijing's inconsistence on
upholding the One-China Policy, has forced the island to be more accommodating to
the demands of the mainland. Taiwan is deprived of international rights and
placed in a shrinking

diplomatic tie with the world that leaves it vulnerable to China. As of 2008, Taiwan is
only recognized by 23 impoverished countries. Taiwan's position in the US was replaced
by China in 1971 and was excluded from many international organizations such as
World Health Organization. It is only when Taiwan under President Ma Ying-jeou has
become more friendly towards China, that island is allowed temporal membership in
WHO during 2009. For participation in international and regional events, Taiwan must
adopt titles that are indicative of its subordinating relations with China, such as
"Chinese Taipei". While many Taiwanese resented China's diplomatic maneuvers, such
have significantly reduced international sympathizer for, hence suppressed the voice
for Taiwan's independence tendencies.
Nevertheless, while largely successful, not all of China's cross strait policies beget their
intended results, as anti-China sentiments within Taiwan could hardly be ameliorated.
Beijing's missile-firings between 1995 and 1996 generated more anger than fear among
the Taiwanese. On March 23, 1996, Lee became the first popularly elected Taiwan
president. While Taiwan did not declare itself independent, the Taiwanese support of Lee
suggested a growing feeling of defiance towards China This can also be reflected in the
election of pro-independence Chen Shui-bian in 2000, despite China's threats. On the
other hand, China's economic policies can be seen as effective but not entirely successful
at influencing political sentiments in Taiwan. The election of Lee and Chen are evidence
of that.
Pragmatic considerations have encouraged the Taiwanese leadership and most of its
people, to eventually diminish thoughts for independence and to hope for the
maintenance of status quo instead. The election of pro-China Ma Ying Jeou as Taiwan's
president in 2008 is a result of popular disappointment against former President Chen
Shui-bian's mismanagement of the economy. It was also indicative of how ordinary
Taiwanese felt about their ties with China. The Taiwanese p[people are ware that better
economic prospects and peaceful political climate could only materialize if their relations
with China improve. Most Taiwanese saw Ma's proposal on closer, less confrontational
relation with China as pragmatic. On the other hand, the CCP leaders understood that
reunification between both sides in the foreseeable future us probably impossible, hence
have since toned down their aggressive rhetoric against Taiwanese. Socio-economic
exchanges conducted in the recent years such as China's gift of pandas, visits to Taiwan
by Chinese tourists and possibility of meeting between generals of both armies bode well
for cross-strait stability and silence much of pro-independence sentiments within Taiwan.
In conclusion, even though the carrot-and-stick policy undertaken by China has yet to
generate support from Taiwanese to reunify as most prefer to maintain status quo, it has
been largely effective in reducing pro-independence sentiments in Taiwan because
China's carrot-and-stick approach has diminished the role of the US, shrinked diplomatic
space for Taiwan and made it more dependent on China for revenue. However, in the
long run, it is likely that pro-independence sentiments will become harder to reduce as
the socio-political gulf between Beijing and Taiwan widens.